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
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THE
BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST,
AND
LITERARY MAGAZINE.

'MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT.

✻

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PREFACE.

THE right of free discussion has been of late not a little imperilled by several circumstances, notable enough of themselves, but to which in a preface we can only allude. Momentous questions have been brought before the public, and have been treated of with the intense bitterness of partisanship, not with the sober calmness of the love of truth. The passions do not reason, and hence such a mode of advocacy has aroused bitter animosities and excited religious rancour. In consequence of "the mischievous ferocity" to which this has given rise a call has been made, in the seeming interests of peace, by many of the influential organs of public opinion for "some sort of legal machinery" by which restraints might be put upon controversy. This prompting, in our day of unrest and uncertainty, amid the threatenings of change which everywhere abound when "legislation by panic" is so prevalent, might be too readily followed; and that liberty of speech, so laboriously gained by the toil and sufferings of many, may be withdrawn, to the detriment, as we believe, not only of the interests of truth, but the happiness of man. Yet, were this to happen, it would be the result of a profound mistake regarding controversy and its uses. To confound controversy with a faction fight, and thence to advocate the application of laws similar to those which are used for the repression of rioting, for the suppression of public discussion, now happily enjoyed among us, is, we apprehend, a most fallacious proceeding—one probably not without a foregone end in view; for serious debates "loom in the distance," not only in Parliament, but also "out of door."

Our pages have now for upwards of eighteen years been set apart for "the impartial discussion of important questions" and the employment of controversy as an educational agent; and we cannot look upon any movement for the legal suppression of full, free, and frank debate with any favour or good feeling. Our convictions regarding the advantages of controversy have been often expressed, and these advantages, we may venture to say, have been exemplified in the successive volumes of controversy which we have placed before our readers. Controversy, as we regard it, is an investigative effort of mind; is the weighing, valuing, and estimating of arguments as an aid to the forming of right conclusions concerning the matters under discussion; is an exertion of the intellectual faculties in reasoning, and hence we emphatically affirm that wherever "unseemly licence" or "ruffianly violence," "riotous disturbance" or "desperate fights" occur, there is no controversy, but rather a contravention of the first principles of free thought and impartial speech. It is the duty of controversy to show the force of arguments and to test their soundness, to balance thought with thought, and to place the results of honest examination before the mind, that it may see the results of deliberation; but it is no part of controversy to settle questions or to force beliefs upon unconvinced minds. It would be to perpetuate a misnomer in the statute-book to enact laws against controversy, as if it were the synonym of riot, confusion, fanaticism, and disorder.

So far is the repression of controversy from being the right way of dealing with the difficulties of our day, that it would only aggravate the evils it was meant to cure. It would drive the discussion of questions into secret societies, and reproduce the tyrannous days of conspiracies and treasons. The healthiest interests of society demand that the formation and the publi-

ation of opinions should be free, and that controversy should not be restrained any farther than is necessary for the assertion of the right of society to hold each man responsible for the direct consequences of opinions expressed with the design of effecting practical results, leading to an injury of the common rights of men. But the ability to argue—to state opinions so as to observe an exact equivalence between the assertion made and the reasons able to be given for holding it to be true, and to feel and admit the force of an argument or an objection just for what it is worth and no more—conduces to the calm consideration of things affecting the welfare of society; and the power of engaging in controversy in such a way becomes of greater importance as questions of interest become more intricate and more dependent on the proper balancing of the forces of colliding facts or ideas. Such a style of controversy is only to be acquired by practice, and hence we think that our serial has an important place among social agencies, and fulfils a function not unrequired in a land of which free discussion is not only the safeguard but the boast.

The *Debates* carried on in this volume are interesting and spirited, as well as varied in matter and in style; and they show skill in the treatment of objections, as well as ability in the statement of theses. The conductors owe their thanks to the participators in these tournaments of thought for their able and honourable advocacy of the opinions they maintain. If our *Essays* have been fewer in number than usual, they have been more lengthy and more thorough. In *Toiling Upward* we have been able to embrace representative men in literature, art, and science. Our *Topics* have had practical adaptation to the times, and have been concisely and thoughtfully treated. The *Inquirer* has been more than ordinarily full and instructive, and the *Societies' Section* has improved somewhat in suggestive value and information. Our *Collegiate Course* has furnished much expository annotation, and has supplied brief literary sketches of eminent imaginative writers; while the *Reviewer* has brought before the reader some most interesting notices and abstracts of important books. The *Poetic Critique* continues to possess the favour of our contributors and readers, as an endeavour to combine true views of poetry with examples of instructive criticism and kindly suggestion. The leading articles have concerned themselves with subjects of the highest importance, and embody the results of a reflective student's reading and thought, expressed with modesty and adorned with the graces of a cultivated style. They increase our debt and the debt of our readers to the learned author, who has devoted so much time and special effort on the preparation of papers for the *British Controversialist*.

The conductors look upon the volume now placed in a completed form before the reader with considerable satisfaction, as a proof of the possibility of honest debate and friendly controversy, and of mutual aid in the attainment of truth and knowledge. This is pre-eminently a co-operative magazine, and on that account the conductors can speak more freely of the contents of their "store of knowledge" than if they were themselves the producers of its literature. It is a matter for congratulation that the young men of Great Britain, greatly by their own efforts, can produce and support a serial which has for its main object the promotion of a love of truth and the encouragement of self-culture. With the hope that their aid may be continued and extended, that the range of their constituency may be widened, and that their hearts may be knit together in the closer communion of future efforts, the conductors place this volume before the thoughtful young men of their country, as an inducement to endeavour and an encouragement to pursue with diligence the duties of their lives.

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

The Philosophy of Politics.

THE philosophy of politics is a theme on which some of the mightiest thinkers of our race have expended the noblest efforts of their genius. One of the most earnest inquiries of the wise Pythagoras might be enunciated in these terms:—What are the capacities in man which lead him to civic association, national organization and the formation of states, which subordinate him to law, and which incline him to take part in the forms, arrangements, and responsibilities of society? Socrates, in his search after the secret of the worthiest life, made citizenship one of the most frequent subjects of these discourses, in which he sought to prove the close union which exists between truth and progress, order and prosperity. Plato sought to discover the principles of life according to which civilized society was possible, developable, and might be healthily conditioned—and few monuments of ancient thought contain so much of important systematic discussion concerning practical and ideal politics as his “Laws” and “Republic.” For keenness of reflective insight, vigorous comprehensiveness, and thorough investigation into the nature of the state as a living organic entirety providing for a sufficient and perfect individual life in the midst of the fluctuations of human events, the eight books of Aristotle’s “Politic” would be difficult to match and impossible to surpass—in so far as the possibilities of state life in ancient times are concerned. The theoretical elevation to which the speculations of the meditative spirits of antiquity attained, concerning the nature, tendencies, characteristics, and modes of legally-constituted communities is very wonderful, when we remember that they looked upon these questions in the dim light of nature, and sought the grounds of their treatises in consciousness and in experience. No little of the spirit of the Greek philosophers passed into the thoughts of the Roman statesmen, and the names of Cato, Scipio, and Cicero—if not that of Seneca as well—may be quoted as among those whose opinions on the conditions of social order, attainable by civil government, possess a speculative as well as a historic value.

In modern times, many men of immense intellectual might and originality have endeavoured to discover the eternal principles of right and law, upon which the foundations of the State may be truly said to rest, and to which the orderly progress of society may be trusted. Tradition, experience, hypothesis, history, and reconstructive speculation, have all been tried as the sources of a trustworthy political science—a science of justice or of the rights of man—a knowledge of the means to be employed to promote and secure the safety, peace, prosperity, and happiness of the individuals who compose a nation, empire, or sovereign community.

Of these it would be impossible for us to name—and still more to characterize—a tithe. But it is of importance, as showing the intense interest the subject has had for the greatest intellects, to indicate the state of the question as it took hold of the thoughts of the successive master minds who have devoted their reflections to the consideration of those “laws by which human actions ought to be regulated, in so far as men [can, may, or do] interfere with each other.” Of Machiavelli’s “Prince”—inasmuch as its intent and aim is matter of dispute even yet—we need make no mention. Bacon, Buchanan, and Hooker, Poynt, Mariana, and Paruta are writers who helped to trace out the distinctions between morals and politics, and to excise the duties of citizens from the territories of modern casuistry. Bodin is perhaps the earliest writer on philosophical politics who deserves serious study. In his “Republic” the metaphysics of government and social life are intermingled with dissertations on the forms and laws most beneficial to states and subjects. In 1625 the celebrated Grotius produced the first great work on international relations, a work which, according to Sir G. C. Lewis, “constitutes an epoch in politics.” His more celebrated and greater countryman Spinoza, (1632-77), in his “Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670), and his posthumously published “Tractatus Politicus,” sought to bring religion and politics into closer relationship, and to solve the interesting problem—What is the best government under which to pursue a true manly life. Shortly prior to this, Thomas Hobbes, first in his “De Cive,” 1642, then in his “De Corpore Politico,” 1650, and afterwards in an enlarged form in “The Leviathan,” 1651, attempted to place the theory of government on a psychological basis, and to show that the state is a natural outgrowth of humanity. These works excited an extraordinary amount of controversial writing, and for nearly half a century after their publication, “every young churchman militant would try his arms in thundering on Hobbes’ steel cap.” Among his opponents were Clarendon, Cudworth, Cumberland, Bramhall, Tenison, Eachard, and in a less direct manner Harrington in his “Oceana,” and Henry More in his “Psychozoia.”

After the stir of the Civil War and the brief glory of the Protectorate, which had called out the speculations of Algernon Sidney, the inquiries of Sir William Temple, and the magnificent defences and hortations of John Milton, uttered in

“ A voice whose sound was like the sea ;
Pure as the naked heavens, majestic, free,”

the Restoration and the Revolution came, and John Locke, in his “Treatises on Government,” supplied a philosophy of the constitution of England in accordance with the principles of that party which settled the conditions and safeguards of the throne and the people at the incoming of William III. Montesquieu, in his “Spirit of Laws” (1748), made the study of the philosophy of politics popular by the fascination he threw around his enlightened and systematic treatise on the relations between the laws and the circumstances of different countries and the conditions on which civil liberty depends. Rousseau’s “Social Contract” (1754) furnished the groundwork of the sham philosophism and crazy metaphysics out of which, acting on the exasperated minds of an outraged people, the French Revolution flared. To Filangieri’s “Science of Legislation” (1780), “whose object was to facilitate to the sovereigns of his age the task of a new legislation,” we owe an attempt to prove the compatibility of the freedom of the citizen with the authority of the crown, which, though based on Rousseau’s flimsy hypothesis of a social contract, possesses great value as a practical exposition of the rules of law which necessarily result from the acceptance of Montesquieu’s system. Political philosophy is considerably indebted likewise to Beccaria in regard to the theory of administration, and the proper legal relations of “Crimes and Punishments.” Bentham’s works on “Legislation” are distinguished for boldness, originality, intellectual power, invention, and thoroughness, and are a complete magazine of excellent thought on systems, principles, and methods of carrying on positive practical government adapted to the peculiar requirements and states of mankind in various stages of progress and different degrees of civilization.

In Kant’s “Metaphysical Elements of the Doctrine of Right,” we have an endeavour to find in Reason itself the fountain and origin of that freedom subjected to law in which the highest conditions of human life are attainable. In Fichte’s “Principles of Natural Law,” and in his “Contributions to the Correction of Public Opinion upon the French Revolution,” we have a series of arguments against the possibility of closing for ever the question of—What is the best form of Government? and an excellent advocacy of the principles that every true corporate polity should hold within itself the power of well-considered change and carefully devised improvement, in order that there may be a genuine interactivity of freedom and right. The same topics pursued even into the farther recesses of consciousness in Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right”—a search for the elementary principles of that civilizing process which is observable in all history, and which seems everywhere to result in nearer though very gradual approaches to rational liberty, while it forms the very initial in which social life originates, and out of which society grows as a coherent unity. These German thinkers pursued their quarry far into the subtleties of metaphy-

sics, and the farthest reaches of their investigations were found so remote from the ken of ordinary minds, that few could acquire a clear insight into the primal ideas and firstlings of their speculations. A similar objection has been taken to the metaphysical politic of that great English speculatist, whose aim it was "to reduce all knowledge into harmony" and to encyclopædize for mankind all thought, experience, phenomena and history—Coleridge—whose politico-theosophic expositions of the natural and essential organizations of society, wound so mellifluously from the lips of the Highgate seer. Far more influential upon the minds of men have been the treatises on Government, jurisprudence, the law of nations, &c., contributed by James Mill in the first instance to the "Encyclopædia Britannica," but subsequently reissued separately. The papers exhibit great powers of reasoning, analysis, and exposition, contain much condensed and excellent thinking, and many of the principles of government are in them evolved into wise practical suggestions. Sir James Mackintosh, who had much of the scheming comprehensiveness of Coleridge, but little of the accurate, vigorous, and extensive research of Mill, won an early and brilliant reputation—scarcely sustained in his after career—by a splendid series of lectures on "The Law of Nature and Nations"—lectures in which, however, the qualities of the theorist were less displayed than those of the expositor and advocate.

The popularity given to inquiries relating to speculative politics in the early part of the present century, led many of the thinkers of England and France to seek an acquaintance with the theorists of Italy and Germany; and thus there was brought into its proper place in European literature the able politico-historical work of Vico—the "*Scienza Nuova*," in which he strove to distinguish the accidental from the essential in social phenomena, to discover the laws which regulate the formation, growth and decay of social institutions, and to prove that the progress of society is the result of the free development of the human faculties under the special overruling designs of a providence divine. Among those who in France were touched into thought upon the great problems of political science, the names of Cousin, Guizot, Michelet, Jouffroy, occupy a high and honourable place. Cousin maintained that government draws its whole force from society, and ought to aim at making justice—as the guardian of the common freedom—reign; Guizot analyses the phenomena of European civilization so as to extricate from amongst their complexities the order of the causation by which each successive condition of modern Europe grew out of that which immediately preceded it, and to find out what natural laws linked event to event and condition to state. Michelet, besides translating and expounding Vico, has written history as a compound web, of which Philosophy forms the warp, and Poetry the woof—issuing in brilliant pictorial evolutions of philosophic narration, and realizing to the soul a philosophy of politics. Jouffroy, unfortunately too early called away from his earth-career, did

not live to complete his Social Ethics or the science of the rights and duties arising from the various relations in which man stands to man in actual every-day life.

It would lead us altogether apart from the main line of our subject were we to notice the theories of St. Simon and Fourier, but we can scarcely with justice omit from our brief *catalogue raisonné* the name of Auguste Comte, whose indebtedness to Vico, though unacknowledged, is very marked, but whose power of intellect and extraordinary fertility of generalization enabled him to suggest and in some measure expound, as the very head and keystone of philosophy, the science of sociology, or the investigation of the phenomena of corporate life, of man in a state of society. In the three volumes of his "Course of Positive Philosophy," which he devotes to social science, M. Comte, following Hegel's "German Footprints" with the graceful urbanity of a Frenchman—gives an epitome and review of the history of the world, points out the unsystematic anarchy of political doctrines, and suggests a new positive politics by which, if states are duly regulated according to his laws, the universal happiness of humanity may be, nay must be, secured. Comte's object in this department of his course is to discover the laws of continuous progress, and to determine the line of march taken by man in his gradual and sure development through all the successive changes which constitute orderly social progress. Social science considers each historical phenomena past, actual, or proposed from a double point of view,—1, Its harmony with coexisting phenomena; 2, Its connection with anterior and posterior conditions of human development. Among the sociological views of Comte there are to be found many striking ideas and many generalizations of great sweep and prevailing strength. "His work is hitherto" (1851), says J. S. Mill, "the only known example of the study of social phenomena according to this (*i. e.* the scientific) conception of the Historical Method." This distinguished logician and remarkable thinker has so far given in his adhesion to the Comtist school of speculative politics that he affirms that when "a philosophy of history is deemed to be at once the verification and the initial form of the philosophy of the progress of society,"—"no important branch of human affairs will be any longer abandoned to empiricism and unscientific surmise; the circle of human knowledge will be complete, and it can only thereafter receive further enlargement by perpetual expansion from within." Besides J. S. Mill many other notable thinkers coincide in accepting the results of Comtean positivism—G. H. Lewes, T. H. Buckle, Harriet Martineau, Charles Bray, Alexander Bain, as well as the "new Oxford school," of which Congreve, Bridges, Saunders, Bryce, Nichol, &c., are *illuminati*: these writers, together with many of the contributors to the various sections of the serial press, expound, pursue, and apply the tenets of the Comtean philosophy both in the speculative and the practical departments of politics; and positivism is becoming in a great measure the fashionable doctrine of sociology in our day.

The Social Science Association has likewise given a definite place and power to controversial thought on the principles of philosophic politics.

Not only as an expositor of Comtism, however, does J. S. Mill require mention among those who have honourably devoted themselves to the evolution and advocacy of speculative politics. In his "Considerations on Representative Government" he has added to the philosophy of politics one of its most valuable treasures, and in his almost Miltonic treatise "On Liberty," he seems to us to have marked off the circle of the human spirit beyond which law and social power ought not to enter, and within which morality, religion, and the conscience of the individual ought alone to reign.

Among other thinkers to whom the progress of the philosophy of politics is due, Samuel Bailey of Sheffield deserves, not only for his intrinsic merits, but for the influence he exerted (apparently) upon the minds of both the Mills. In his "Rationale of Political Representation" the theoretical grounds of representative government are clearly laid down and his opinions are boldly drawn out to their practical results. Nor ought the name of the great critic of "Democracy in America"—Alexis de Tocqueville—to be forgotten. "He has applied," J. S. Mill being our witness, "to the greatest question in the art and science of government those principles and methods of philosophizing to which mankind are indebted for all the advances made by modern times in the other branches of the study of nature. It is not too much to affirm of these volumes that they contain the first analytical inquiry into the influence of Democracy." We should notice too as a strong-minded guide "On the Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics," and as the author of a remarkable, somewhat Platonic, dialogue, on "The best Form of Government," the scholarly statesman and sage political speculator, Sir G. C. Lewis—a thinker of rare genius, devotion, and accuracy, a politician of genuine honesty and true worth.

Our enumeration—though we have noted scarcely a tithe, only a mere scantling, of those thinkers who have given diligent labour to the solution of the problems of social life and civic welfare—has been enough, we presume, to prove that the topic on which we propose to offer a few observations is one of no slight significance in the speculations of the past, of no small interest in the history of thought, and of considerable importance in its relation to the present. To each one whose influence is used, or is likely to be used, in practical politics, it must be of importance to have correct ideas regarding the primary principles and first elements of the conditions of social and civic life, happiness, and freedom. Eighteen years ago we asserted that the progress of humanity would result in an increase of political power to the mass, and expressed our conviction that the true preparation for the proper performance of the functions thus likely to be devolved upon a wider class by the enfranchisement, foreshadowed as probable and attainable, was a thorough study of the art of reasoning, and the acquisition of a

mastery of the power of expressing thought in terse and telling words. With the view of placing such provisional preparation within reach of our readers, we projected our popular expositions of the principles of Logic, our plain though philosophical epitome of the elements of Rhetoric, and our several contributions on Self-culture. The necessity and advantage of the possession of intellectual training and moral education as a preliminary, if possible, but at least as an accompaniment to extended political influence, was foreseen and advocated. We have now to follow up the preparatory teaching of past years by the presentation of thoughts more closely appropriate to present circumstances, and we cannot but believe that we may usefully lay before our readers a few of our gatherings and garnerings concerning the philosophy of politics.

It is to be remarked that we do not intend to enter into the debateable regions of details or to interfere at all with the discussion of the current topics of practical legislation, jurisprudence, or social economy. Our purpose does not extend to the elaboration of a new, fresh, just-born scheme for determining the laws and indicating the processes by which all the happiness possible upon earth compressible within the life of man may be necessarily produced, and so distributed among all men as to make prosperity inevitable among all the members of the body politic. So to mend the world is a design too herculean for us to attempt. An endeavour of a far humbler sort prompts our efforts. We desire as far as possible, with our powers and opportunities, to circulate in society sound and sensible views concerning the nature and possibilities of legislative influence upon the happiness and prosperity of individuals, to point out the limits of the desirable and the acquirable through political change, and to give some general notions of the true aims and ends of societarian incorporation in the form of a State. We have an ambition to be found suggestors of methods of thought and forms of reasoning, of ways of looking at the facts of social life so as to discover what they teach, and of considering the problems arising in the course of political speculation in such a manner as to derive thence some aid towards their true solution. We have no factious dogmatics on politics to enforce or any set of pet precepts to advocate in a didactic form; we wish rather to inform regarding the system of thinking from which hopeful results may be expected, than to work out into their results a series of ideas postulated in our own mind beforehand as irrefragable, undoubted and correct. We want to get at the inner spirit and core of civic incorporation, to learn what the essence of politics is, and to trace from the centre the radiations of the interjacent vitalities out of which customs, laws, and social conditions manifest themselves. Political society as a growth, politics as a tree bearing all manner of fruits according to the culture bestowed upon it, government as the *brain* of the body politic, will come under our consideration, but we shall sedulously abstain from injecting into our articles any of the spirit of faction, any of the gall and wormwood of partizanship. As a philo-

sophical speculation leading to and resulting in interesting and universally valuable truths, if we can get at them—we intend to hold the entire system of our thoughts before us and so to exhibit them to our readers that they may—to whichever party they incline—find that there are seed-truths and germs of political reflection of which it is advisable to know the properties and outcome, at the same time that in the system of evolution employed in our papers, they may notice the manner in which truth may be found to grow from truth, and each may be seen to give off from itself a new centre of fertility, with vast latencies of fructification under suitable management.

It may also be well to state at the outset that we make no pretension to cover the whole field of speculative politics with our thoughts, and do not for a moment dream of matching the cursory reflections possible in our projected papers with the magnificent and beneficial outcome of the minds of many of those whose names we have previously quoted as contributors to the literature of philosophic politics. We wish but to pioneer the way to farther investigations, only to show and suggest the plenitude of truth which lies discoverable before the mind possessed of insight when it explores with earnestness and in accordance with the proper forms of reasoned thought, the metaphysics of statesmanship, of the science of legislation and of the conditions of the welfare of human societies.

“Philosophy is the science of first principles,” a loving search into the primal causes of things and the connections which subsist among them. Each department of knowledge may be said to have its *philosophy*, because it rests and relies upon some principles and causes which, being alternate, are common to all special exercises of thought, some common fund of primitive cognitions, which are not the product but the conditions of the mind's own activity, and which we must accept as implied in the very constitution and possession of intellectual life. Men are impressed by and are thus led to examine into and investigate phenomena, but man is not satisfied till he has traced these back to their causes, and these again to their laws, and then he endeavours to penetrate beyond the laws and causes of phenomena to learn, if possible, the rational principles out of which these laws arise, and according to which these causes act and these phenomena are. This is philosophy properly so called, the mother and queen of science—the science of sciences, the intuitive source of discursive thought. To pierce down into thought so as to reach these fundamental certainties, these primary grounds of future knowledge, or rather to trace back the vitalities of the reason to this first life-essence and originative germ, is truly to philosophize; and the ground-strata or basement on which and from which we proceed to build up any given series of specific thoughts into a science, or the primitive elements which we adopt as the justifying and reasonable causes of our practice, is in the common and current language of our day termed the philosophy of that science, art, or practice.

Politics signifies the science of social life. The theory which regulates the practice of civic government in its endeavour to accomplish the ends of social co-existence, and to promote the welfare of the members of the entire community in all such ways and by all such manners as individuals themselves, or subordinate associations of individuals, cannot advantageously enter upon or carry into effect, is understood as comprehended under the term politics. Aristotle uses the word *Politeia* to denote a constitution or government administered according to law. It does not necessarily imply that the legislation employed has been determined upon for the purpose of securing the greatest common good of the members of the community, so that they enjoy a share in the sovereign power, or any control over the potential governors. But it does imply freedom from the necessity of obedience, or enforced submission, to any extraneous power on the part of the government, and a habit or necessity of obedience or submission, voluntary or enforced, on the part of the constituents of the community to the legislation of those who wield the powers in the State. It implies social or allied life. Politics might be called the ethics of nations; or of the rights of man in a gregarious condition, in a partnership of aim, effort and intent, in a confederacy to accomplish some object or maintain some state as a community. Safety, peace, and prosperity are the conditions of comfortable life. Hence a government is an embodiment in some form or other of the might of the community for defence against any interference from without in regard to its autonomy, self-governing rights or independence; for the augmentation of its strength in comparison with other states, and of its resources, not only in relation to other communities, but also in comparison with its former condition; for the protection of its members in their concerted or customary rights among themselves, and as regards others; as well as for the improvement of the condition, wealth, morals, and happiness of those who are subject to the laws it imposes. Politics is the science of the laws which regulate mankind in their relations to each other as individuals and as members of civic communities; and it includes constitutional, legislative, and administrative arrangements for the securing of the greatest possible amount of equity in the dealings of man with man and state with state in accordance with the aim, interest, and primary condition of the members among themselves, and in their relation to foreign or external authorities. Before we can comprehend the full signification of politics, we must conceive and realize the fact, that man is peculiarly differentiated by the characteristic, that he is capable of self-control, that he is an embodied *Will*, that he alone is amenable, intellectually, to the determinations of a Sovereign Will. Hence it is that we speak of the body corporate, because government, as the supreme regulating force of the State, acts towards it as will operates in the human frame, that is, as a protector, as a self-sufficing assertor of selfhood, and as a planner, thinker, and actor for the preservation

and progress of the being over which it holds mastery. Politics is autonomic equity and self-preservation, the entire unity of agencies by which civic and social life are rendered possible and pleasurable, permanent and progressive. It comprehends all those acts and relations of men which are not directly and immediately personal in their reference, but are concerned with the whole of a community, or at least a very large proportion of it ; in other words, it includes everything that relates to the principles on which a sovereignty is constituted or constructed, and all the immediate acts, self-preservative, executive, legislative, or influential, whether with regard to its own subjects or those of other governments, or those of the subjects in respect to other governments or itself.

Civil government is of the essence of human society. A man is a political creature. Individual isolation and entire personal independence is impossible, and the phenomena of human society as distinctly result from the nature of man as language seems necessary to his being and well-being. Politics is the main agency in the progressive civilization of man ; and the idea of it always seems to necessitate a union of constraint and security. Society must be controlled if it is to be upheld. That the public rights of the community may be impressed on others, and enforced on its own members, some privileges must be conferred on the governors, and some restraint must be placed on the ferocious craft, or mild and stubborn personality of the members of the community which they rule. Politics, therefore, at once implies freedom and constraint, and bring us face to face with the Miltonic paradox, that "Honest liberty is the greatest foe to dishonest licence." Law and civilization are only attainable by insisting on equity and justice in the performance of duty and the observance of right, on the avoidance of ill-doing or selfishness, and on the regulation of the propensities, desires, and activities of man, so as to make justice "the only true sovereign and supreme majesty upon earth," in so far as the people are capable of at once fulfilling her commands and enjoying her benefits. Wherever man can interfere with man, immediately or remotely, then there is a sphere for political action, and a probability of politics as the science of government, of justice, of enforcement, of right and civility. Hence the pure abstract or theoretic science of politics ultimately results in the question, What is equity as between man and man in their several places and relations. There is, however, a distinction to be drawn between the *existence* and the *goodness* of a state. That a state exists constitutes it a *politeia*, and it is the object of politics to make of that the best possible by such degrees, and in such ways as are most equitable. Politics is the science which governs governments.

Government exists for the benefit and welfare of the governed ; else it is not an agent of social life. Now the welfare of a community depends on health, morality, intelligence, property, the polity pursued by its government, the laws by which it is regulated, and the relations it maintains with other civic bodies. It falls to the

science of politics, therefore, to investigate all these matters—to augment their good and to diminish their evil, in so far as this cannot be better done by leaving their operations to be managed or interfered with at the suggestion of private interests; and where this cannot be advantageously done except by the interposition of the supreme authority, to determine the extent and mode of interference which shall most effectually, and yet least oppressively, effect the objects in view. There emerges from this idea of communistic welfare and the function of the state in endeavouring to accomplish it, a number of considerations which may all be regarded as coming under the review of politics as a science. Among these may be enumerated,—(1) The principles of government which are most likely to result in the fullest promotion of the welfare of communities; (2) the kind of supreme authority most suitable for the attainment of the ends of civil incorporations; (3) the duties incumbent on the ruling power of a community in its home and foreign relations; (4) the rights and reciprocal duties of the subjects of the supreme power as members of the community; (5) the means by which the rights and liberties of men may be best protected and secured, whether in the state or in the connection of state with state; (6) the conditions upon which the increase and development of the resources of the community depend; (7) the measures to be adopted for the preservation of the autonomy and self-existence of the government as independent of foreign control, or as liable to aggression or conquest; (8) the arrangements required for the maintenance in society of equitable conduct and such morality as the state may admit of, or justly impose on its members. From the considerations involved in these several matters there may arise discussions on, (1) The laws of nature as affecting man, or as resulting from his endowments and characteristics, that is, his wants, capacities, and feelings, in given conditions and circumstances as fixed limits to the choice of means and to the imposition of social or conventional laws. (2) The object of a state as a body corporate, and of the relations between a government and its subjects and allies. (3) The civic regulations by which the polity of a state may be best managed. (4) The means to be employed for the practical accomplishment of the affairs of states as they arise and demand attention in the course of events. (5) The political economy to be adopted by a state, that is, the means by which industry, effort, intelligence, and accumulations may have the fullest scope and freest development for the augmentation of human welfare, and the increase and stability of individual happiness. (6) The history of politics, or the means taken to secure the ends of government as it may be inferred from the allusions made to politics, customs, and laws, to be found in literature, in the facts of life, on monuments, &c. (7) The historical records of the states of Europe, the systems of government pursued in them, the results flowing from those various systems, and the changes which have been necessitated in them or have occurred in them to adapt them to the changes

taking place in the thoughts, feelings, aspirations, and conditions of man. (8) Statistics as a series of effects and as the data whence certain general inferences regarding the averages of life, the effects of customs, taxation, laws, &c., may be deduced and made the grounds of demands for change, or defences against proposed alterations. (9) The constitutional laws of states, as the script or written legislation on the various relations of life in different circumstances in these several states or communities. (10) The practical laws of special states, their effects on the manners, customs, and habits of those who are subject to them, and the manner in which these are interpreted, applied, or ignored in judicial assemblies or in public life. (11) Diplomacy, or the international regulations of states for their political existence and the safety of their subjects as regards their rights, property, and life. (12) The forms, styles, and technical management of public business in different countries.

Of course all political affairs depend upon the right and proper registration of the facts which arise or occur in a state. We can neither reason nor act wisely or well unless we can secure trustworthy records of facts, true history, and thorough statistics. These should supply an accurate description of the different possible existing governments, should enable us to comprehend all the possible varieties of states which are involved in the idea of actual political government. This should furnish us with the means of correct definitions of the several forms of bodies corporate. Descriptive politics should inform us what *is*, and what *results* from what is. Speculative politics ought to inform us what *ought to be*, and show us the results rationally to be expected to flow from what is proposed as right. The former should detail to us the customs and practices of positive politics; the latter ought to provide us with a criticism of these. We have a right to demand from speculative politics, after it has been furnished with veritable information, regarding (a) what a state is; (b) what are the functions of a state; (c) what are the conditions indispensable to the existence and independence of a state; (d) what are the agencies by which a state fulfils its functions; and (e) what are the possible relations that can exist between state and state, some critical estimate of the relative advantages and disadvantages, not only of the *nature* of different forms of political bodies but of their *principles*, and some guidance in the considerations involved in the alteration of old laws or the making of new ones. As jurisprudence has become a science overruling and guiding, because criticising and estimating, proposed or actual legislation, so should politics, in becoming philosophical, rise above the petty crafts of practice and executive management, and show us the conditions of the right, the true, the suitable, and the best. What are the relative duties and obligations of states to states, of states to subjects, and of subjects to states? and what are the principles upon which the equity of all these possible interferences of man with man can be reconciled and unified, shown to

be right and proper, enforcible and duly renderable. These are some of the queries which philosophy, on proceeding to concern itself with politics, must prepare itself to answer, and it must go over the whole field of investigation with the intent of reconnoitering it fully; keeping a sure outlook on all the facts, and deducing from the facts all the general principles which ought to govern the practice of those who trust to it. Only thus can it be speculative, surveying, theoretical; and thus alone can we achieve a philosophy of politics. Whether the facts are simple or undisputed, numerous, intricate, difficult to ascertain, doubtful, or contested, it must find and weigh them; generalize the truths they teach; and probe, and test, retry and persistently examine all the facts with the generalizations to which they have given rise, and the generalizations with the facts from which they have been induced.

The idea we have of the philosophy of politics is different from that of any work to which allusion has been made in the preceding part of our paper. It does not deal with legislation or statecraft, political agitation or executive measures. It passes beyond these into the region and dwelling-place of *principles*. It traces the course of thought through statistics, customs, laws, history, &c., into the recesses of will and the sphere of morality. It endeavours to acquire the idea of sanction as the common eventual source of duty and obligation; and to examine by the postulates and principles of righteousness what ought to be done that can be effectually done in subordinating the individual will to the general interest, and combining the idea of sanction with coercion so as to make individual life possible and pleasurable within the domain of duty to the state. The questions which arise in the course of our inquiry will, in many cases, coincide with those belonging to cognate sciences; but the point of view taken will give them a special interest and instructiveness. But our readers must judge for themselves—from our papers as they appear in order—how far they may be willing to peruse our intended chapters on the Philosophy of Politics.

TIME WORKS WONDERS.—Adam Smith, if we mistake not, had died before “The Wealth of Nations” had got past even a second edition. Several years had elapsed before a hundred copies of Mr. Hume’s “History” were sold; and he himself has told us that nothing but the earnest entreaties of his friends induced him, in the face of such a cold and chilling reception, to continue his historical labours. The book-sellers since Gibbon’s death are said to have made £200,000 off his “Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;” and hardly a year passes that a new edition of his immortal work or of Hume’s “History of England” does not issue from the press. The sums realized by the bookselling trade from the different editions of “The Wealth of Nations” would have constituted a large fortune.”—*Blackwood’s Magazine*.

Religion.

IS RITUALISM CONSISTENT WITH, OR UNNECESSARY TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF TRUE CHRISTIANITY?

CONSISTENT.—I.

Nothing is easier than to vilify opponents, and to misrepresent their opinions or malign their motives. Indeed it is too much the ordinary course of debates to write against opponents rather than against opinions, as if they thought that contempt was competent criticism, raillery was reasoning, and laughter logic. In no controversies whatever have there been such flagrant violations of Christian charity and such heartless disregard of upright dealing and honest disputation as in those carried on upon religious questions. We hope we may be spared from adding another instance to the many illustrations already in existence of the malice and uncharitableness of religious debate. If we would reflect more upon the sacredness of truth and yearn less after personal victory we should better fulfil the law of charity to which we are bound. Let truth be to us most sacred, as the representative and symbol of Him who is "the Way, the Truth, and the Life" to us; let us "deny ourselves" the pleasures of ill-natured imputations, and let us regard the questions before us as those which are of interest, not between the debaters only, but to the general assembly of the Church. If we do this, we shall, most probably, reach some portion of truth on the matters of controversy; if we fail in charity, one towards another, is it not most probably because there is no truth in us?

This controversy on Ritualism concerns itself with a subject, regarding which passion has been aroused to a lamentable extent and height. But had men duly considered that it was less a question about the duty of man than about the honour due to God, surely such unseemly events could not have occurred, as our newspapers report, in many towns where Ritualism has been introduced.

All religion is symbolical. It indicates rather than expresses the worshipfulness in human hearts. The very words of our prayers are merely signs, the very tones of the holy songs we sing are only representative of the joy or sorrow which we feel in our acts of devotion; the days on which we assemble ourselves together for worship are only seasons set apart by formal resolve to show forth the right of our God to supreme reverence and obedience. Baptism is a visible sign of our admission into the Church of Christ, and

the Eucharist of our being numbered among the reputed servants of the Most High in Christ our Passover. The earthly speech we employ in our worship only faintly adumbrates or shadows forth the feelings of our spirits; and the places set apart and consecrated to divine worship are only the evidences of our desire to serve Him "from whom all blessings flow." Our life is altogether a life of signs.

Ritualism we shall define for the convenience of discussion—not at all as admitting the accuracy, far less the adequacy of the definition—as the embodiment to the senses, by some means or other, of man's heartfelt desire to give unto the Lord the glory that is due, the shadow by which we seek to represent the substance of the devotion indwelling in our souls—the outward signs, tokens, means, methods, and appliances by which we endeavour to give palpable form to and evidence of the desire in our hearts to give glory to God. Ritualism, in this sense, then, is that whole and entire set of institutions, ceremonies, forms, signs, symbols, and representative acts, by which assemblies of Christ's disciples show forth their attachment to Him and their desire to shadow out their inward thoughts.

So viewed, Ritualism is undoubtedly necessary to Christianity. To be Christian at all we must let it be seen and known of all that we have been with Jesus. We must both feel His praise in our hearts, utter it with our lips, and show it forth in our lives. Prayer is a rite—a rite instituted by Christ. Praise is a rite—a rite the fulfilment of which God demands. The reading of the Word is a rite—a rite of theocratic Judea incorporated with apostolic Christianity. The exposition of the Scriptures is a rite—a rite which Christ himself engaged in with his disciples, to which his apostles were ordained, and in which they at once imitated and obeyed him. Baptism is a rite—a rite instituted by God, and conformed to as well as commanded to be observed by Jesus Christ. The Lord's Supper is a rite—a rite specially appointed by Jesus to commemorate, show forth, and repeat in everlasting symbols, the sacrifice of our Lord for our sins. In fact the whole of worship is a conjoined series of rites, of instituted ceremonial and representative acts and symbols; and life, if it be true life—a life in which all is done to the glory of God—is a whole and entire symbolism or series of ritualism.

In view of these facts how many will deny that Ritualism is not only strictly consistent with, but also absolutely necessary to, Christianity? Without attention to rites can a man be a true Christian? Must we not be baptized into Christ? meet together for the worship of God in Christ manifested unto us in mercy? pray to God after the manner taught us by our Lord? praise the Father of all mercies and goodness, consolation and peace, in fervency of spirit? and show forth the Lord's death as communicants at his own holy table, that so we may be made partakers of his body and blood, his sacrifice? How else are we able to signify our love for Him, to symbolize our relation

to Him, to make known our reliance on Him, to profess our faith in Him, or to confess our obligations to Him? Ritualism, then, is a part and parcel of Christianity, an expressly commanded portion of the duty of those who believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and who are not ashamed of the gospel of Him who came to save to the uttermost all those who come unto Him, who are baptized unto his death, and with whom he condescends to come in and sup. We cannot doubt the absolute commands of our Lord, we cannot gloze over his conformity to all the rights and ceremonies of the worship of his time, in which he was our ensample that we should walk in his steps; we cannot demur to the express revelations of Christ from heaven regarding the Eucharist, which shows us that He is the true bread of life which came down from heaven, and which alone can adequately satisfy the prayer which he taught his disciples to use, saying, "Give us this day our daily bread." We presume that there can be no dispute about the foregoing arguments, which seem to be so plain that he who runs may read, and reading may understand. The extent, not the fact, of Ritualism, will, we presume, be made the staple of oppugnant debate. When, however, we grant the consistency of Ritualism with Christianity, nay, are compelled to confess its absolute necessity to true Christianity, the question of extent becomes a thing of scarcely any importance. *That* comes to be argued upon other principles, and depends on other matters, but the *fact* is independent altogether of *degree*. We may be allowed here to remark—

The importance of Ritualism in worship.

All worship in all countries has set forms, and it has been the universal practice of humanity to give peculiar solemnity and sacredness to the forms of worship. It was on the *form*, not the *fact*, of worship that Cain was less favoured by and acceptable to God than his brother Abel. God expressly appointed the ritual of the wilderness and the temple. Failure to observe the ritual of the Mosaic dispensation was punished with great severities, and carelessness with regard to the glory of the Lord in the Jewish ceremonial called on the heads of the people severe chastisement, and the prophets are full of denunciations against those who profane the ritual and neglect the forms as well as the realities of worship. Jesus was careful to "go up to Jerusalem" according to the ritual of his time, to be present at the feasts, and to take his part in the services of Jehovah.

We may just notice in one other brief sentence—the *Christian law of Ritualism*.

We should give of our best to God—such was the law of sacrifice in the olden time. We should, "whatsoever we do"—and therefore preferably our worship—"do all to the glory of God." Can we be doing so while we live in palaces and worship in barns? while we fill our own dwellings with beauty, elegance, luxury, and refinement, and leave "the house of God" low, mean, unadorned? while we surround our own tables with ceremonial indicative of respect, and

hedge it round by etiquette promotive of grace? while we deny the comely forms of decency and order to the ordinances of the Lord in our holy things—in our prayers, our praise, our reading of the Word, in our communion with the blessed Saviour at the eucharistic feast? Do we wash with water and anoint with oil? do we array ourselves in fair raiment, and observe the forms of civility in our intercourse with each other? and shall we refuse to observe the forms of godliness in our worship of God? It is easy to deride vestments, genuflexions, breathed adorations, and respectful turnings, but it is not easy to justify the selfishness of man in making God's house a byword of shame from its shapeless unsuggestiveness of anything glorious, reverential, holy, and God-like.

The cathedrals of Europe, the paintings and statuary of our forefathers in the church, the glorious music in which the praises of our God have been enshrined, the age-long devotion given to the decoration of copies of the Holy Bible, all show how far we have departed from the good ways of those who felt the flame of holy love in their souls in ancient times. They gave their best in days of poverty and trial, and bestowed on the church the anxious, loving elaboration which their heart's love to God prompted; we in days of wealth grudge to the house of the Lord the outward decency of a mill erected to mammon, and allow the gin-palace and the theatre to use for the devil's service the talent and labour which they employed in striving to make their churches more fitting than before for the Lord to dwell in. Is this Christian? Is this wise? Is it not rather a true sign of the decadence of the reverential spirit of the worshipful love which Christians ought to show towards their loving God and Father and Saviour? If we are to worship the Lord in the *beauty* of holiness, how shall we do it if we discard Ritualism as inconsistent and unnecessary? LINES.

UNNECESSARY.—I.

WE shall preface the discussion of the above question, by—
I. Briefly noticing what Ritualism is. II. Giving a definition of true Christianity.

I. Ritualism is an excessive fondness for religious observances, rites, ceremonies, and solemnities, and is a marked feature of the ecclesiastical life of the present day; having been for some time past developing in certain sections of the professing Church of Christ, to an extent before unknown among the people of this empire, so that an increasing degree of importance is begun to be attached to it. As instances of this we may observe the growing frequency of such practices as the following:—the constant presence of candles in the church, either lighted or unlighted; the officiating minister entering the church accompanied by boys in surplices; turning to a particular quarter of the heavens, and using a different kind of dress, in all the various parts of the church service; a whole catalogue of kneelings, bowings, intonings, vestments, crosses, adornings of both person and building, &c.; an assimilation to Laudianism, as it was
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exemplified in the consecration of St. Catherine's Church, London, by the notable archbishop of the reign of Charles I., which consecration mainly consisted in bowings, steppings, and jumpings backwards and forwards, according to number and measure. These and all such things are included in and meant by Ritualism.

II. Christianity is the religion of Christ, or the religion of which Christ is the author. A Christian is a follower of Christ, one who manifests a likeness to Christ, it being only by resemblance to Christ that any person is evidenced to be a genuine Christian. Therefore true Christianity is that religion which is in accordance with the spirit, the example, and the practice of Jesus, and the more the religion is conformed hereto, the more true is the Christianity.

Now, where in the records which we have of the life, the worship, the devotions, the teaching, and the practices of Christ when He was on the earth, have we any event, circumstance, or command related in the most distant manner having an approach to Ritualism? When Christ was baptized, the baptism so far from being performed in a gorgeous building, was not performed within a building at all, but in a river, by an administrator dressed in a simple garment of camel's hair, and a girdle of leather. Ofttimes when Jesus preached it was sitting on the ground or in a ship, which, it must be owned, shows a disregard of all that is pompous, formal, ceremonial, or ritualistic, and His devotions were frequently attended to in the open air. The very least too that can be said of the teachings of Jesus, is that they in no way, or degree, favoured Ritualism. That worship and service which greatly consists in external performance, and attention to outward acts, the teachings of Jesus never favoured, while he inculcated the necessity of the worship of the heart, as may be seen by observing Matt. xv. 1—20; John iv. 24.

It must be admitted that the apostles were well acquainted with the mind of their Lord and Master; that their religious practices were in accordance with His will; and that we shall not err in following their example in these things. Then state what was their practice? We find them holding their assemblies in houses or rooms, unaccompanied by any of that ecclesiastical upholstery which is now put into such prominence by Ritualists, and in his letters to the Galatians and Colossians the Apostle Paul—writing, be it remembered, under the immediate inspiration of the Holy Ghost—strikes at the observances of times and seasons, and the laying of great stress on, or paying undue attention to outward ordinances, as that which led their minds away from the substance of true religion. See Gal. iv. 9, 10; v. 6; vi. 15; Col. ii. 16, 17. The decision of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem, as recorded in Acts xv., was of precisely the same purport.

True Christianity then, is a walking in the footsteps of Christ, it is the experience and practice of faith, love, humility, godly fear, meekness, self-denial, and uprightness, while the only worship which is acceptable to God is that of the heart, though it be offered

in the simplest manner and without the accompaniment of any outward adornings or formalities. To establish our assertion as to the nature of the worship which is acceptable to God, we need only refer to the words addressed by Christ to the Samaritan woman, "God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit, and in truth."

We have now to consider the question, Is Ritualism consistent with, or unnecessary to the advancement of true Christianity?

We shall first show that Ritualism is *unnecessary* to the advancement of true Christianity. That it is so, is manifest from the advances made by Christianity in apostolic days, when the Gospel was preached by unlettered men, in a simple manner, and the worship of God was conducted without any of that multiplicity of ceremonies advocated by Ritualists, and without any of those accompaniments which are so fascinating to the senses.

But to show the untenable position of our opponents we will adduce the testimony of the founders and early members of that Church in which Ritualism is at the present time advancing with the most rapid steps. Macaulay, in his History, informs us that the English Reformers desired to go as far as their brethren on the Continent; that they unanimously condemned as anti-Christian numerous practices which Henry VIII. retained, and which Elizabeth approved; that Hooper had the strongest aversion to episcopal vestments; that Ridley pulled down the altars of his diocese; and ordered the Eucharist to be administered in the middle of churches at tables which the Papists termed "oyster boards;" that Jewel called the clerical garb "a stage dress, a fool's coat, a relique of the Amorites;" that Grindal long hesitated about accepting a mitre from dislike of what he regarded as the mummary of consecration; and that Parkhurst prayed that the Church of England might model herself on the Church of Zurich. The sentiments here adduced were not those of persons whom the greatest Ritualists of the present day can term schismatics or separatists, but of members of and officials in their own Church, and show us that our English Reformers did not deem Ritualism to be either necessary to, or consistent with, the advancement of true Christianity.

At the time of the Hampton Court Conference, Lord Bacon published a pamphlet, of which Hallam thus writes, "He excepts to several matters of ceremony; the cap and surplice, the ring in marriage, the use of organs, the form of absolution, lay-baptism," &c. To this expression of Bacon's sentiments, a thinker of the present day thus adverts, "Let those who deem the Puritans narrow-minded bigots weigh that fact. There must have attached to the points on which they insisted a significance hard for us to conceive, or they could never have enlisted the sympathy of a mind so capacious, discreet, clear-sighted, and vigilant as the mind of Bacon."

In the declaration of Charles II., to his subjects concerning ecclesiastical affairs, there occurs the following language,—

"In the meantime, out of compassion for, and compliance towards those who would forbear the cross in baptism, we are content that no man shall be compelled to use the same, or suffer for not doing it, and if the proper minister shall refuse to omit that ceremony of the cross, it shall be lawful for the parent, who would not have his child so baptized, to procure another minister to do it, who will do it according to his desire. No man shall be compelled to bow at the name of Jesus, or suffer in any degree for not doing it.

"For the use of the surplice, we are contented that all men be left to their liberty to do as they shall think fit, without suffering in the least degree for wearing or not wearing it."

Thus Charles II. and his counsellors tacitly admitted that rites and ceremonies are not necessary to the advancement of Christianity. In the ranks, therefore, both of those members of the Church of England who were rigid, and of those who were lax in practice, we find testimonies to the needlessness of ceremonies for the promotion of Christianity.

And that Ritualism is unnecessary to the advancement of true Christianity is evident from the progress made by Christianity in the days of the Puritans, under Whitfield and his coadjutors, and since then in denominations who of all sections of the professing Church of Christ have the smallest number of ceremonies, and attach to them the smallest degree of importance.

That Ritualism is *not consistent with* the advancement of true Christianity is evident from its inconsistency with the nature of Christianity, as that is exemplified in the practice of Christ and His apostles—the standard by which we must test all that professes to be Christianity. Christ teaches us that God is a Spirit. He is not material. Therefore the worship which He requires is spiritual. Corporeal worship is suited to a corporeal being. Were the true God such, then bowings, genuflections, prostrations, risings, peculiar garments for worship, and changes of dress in it, with adornings of His temple would be suitable; but to the God who is a Spirit such things can give no pleasure; and when they are employed in His worship, they are wholly inappropriate and out of place. The whole of bodily worship that is possible is, if it be nothing more, utterly unacceptable to the true God, and altogether unprofitable to the worshipper. God requires to be worshipped *in spirit*, that is, with the heart and feelings; and *in truth*, that is, in sincerity and reality, not in appearance only.

The character of the place in which worship is conducted, or what there is present in or absent from the place, is wholly unessential. Worship is as acceptable in a room, a barn, or a hovel, as in a cathedral. The attitude of the worshipper is equally unimportant. God regards not whether the worship be paid in a sitting, standing, or kneeling posture, nor in what direction the face be turned; neither is the dress of the worshipper a matter of the smallest moment, for God hath declared that He looketh not on the outward appearance, but on the heart. Whenever, and

wherever the heart ascends to God, there is true worship, whatever else be absent. The apostle Paul tells the Corinthians that he was sent to preach the gospel, not with wisdom of words, *lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect*, that is, lest men's minds should be taken off the *matter* of preaching, and be taken up with the *manner* of preaching—lest the doctrine of a crucified Christ should be lost sight of from the attention being preeminently given to the eloquence of speech, and the accuracy and elegance of expression. So where Ritualism is put in the foreground, that which is essential and substantial is lost sight of, from the attention being supremely devoted to that which is adventitious; spiritual, heartfelt worship is ignored, unconcernedness about offering such worship is naturally and necessarily fostered, the necessity of it is forgotten, and devotion sinks into a mere round of lifeless, empty formalities. A system that is thus opposed to true Christianity cannot be consistent with its advancement. All that such a system does or can do is to lead its adherents, as it progresses, to an increasing distance from true Christianity, till it merges in Roman Catholicism, or some similar scheme of mere outward, lifeless formalities, and is therefore utterly antagonistic to true Christianity's advancement.

On this point we close with the words of a writer before quoted:—

“Hooper, Jewel, Hampden, Cromwell, all the thorough-going Protestants of the time, all the practical thinkers who knew mankind, believed that retention of ceremonies would predispose the people to Romanism. And looking along the intervening centuries, listening to the unappealable verdict of time, do we find that those rugged practical men were in the wrong? To Hooker's challenge to show how deadly infection could arise to the Church of England from similitude, in matters of indifference, to the Church of Rome, history has spoken their answer. Reminding her children constantly of the ancient church, leaving them to decide whether her affinity is greater for Rome or for the Reformation, the Church of England has entailed upon them a trial to which many in every generation have fallen victims. A long procession of illustrious deserters from her communion, a procession in which glitter two crowns and many coronets, a procession in which have gone some of the noblest hearts and proudest intellects of England, a procession from which a constant arrow-flight of venomous taunts has reached her own bosom, testifies whether or not the Puritans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries erred in pronouncing it dangerous for the Church of England to halt between the Romanists and the Reformers.”

S. S.

Literature.

IS CARLYLE OR MACAULAY THE GREATER WRITER?

MACAULAY.—III.

It is with no little pleasure that we embrace the opportunity of expressing our opinions regarding one whom we greatly admire, and whose works have been a source of delight and profit to us in our leisure as well as in our student hours. That celebrated man is Thomas Babington Macaulay, who was gifted by his great talents to be the literary ornament of the century in which he lived, and whose name will receive from succeeding ages the respect and homage due to high personal excellence, virtue, and ability, from all enlightened and impartial minds. It is impossible not to discourse at some length on one so eminent in so many respects;—as an historian, so profound and so graceful; as an essayist, so celebrated and so brilliant; as a poet, so racy and so pleasing; as an orator, so eloquent and so astute; as a statesman, so distinguished and admired: in short, on a man whose virtuous life and wonderful talents won for him the admiration of all and the enmity of none. It is against the ability of such a man, as a writer, that another great man—Carlyle—is placed, in order that it may be shown to whom the pre-eminence rightly belongs. We admit that Carlyle is a man of great power, but we must at the same time confess that his powers are such as we cannot admire. We trust, however, that we shall be able to give reasons why we prefer the one to the other, and otherwise consider in an impartial manner the arguments adduced in this discussion.

It is our first duty to consider what constitutes a “great writer,” and our view on this point is totally different from that given by H. K. (p. 90). A great writer is one who knows the subject upon which he is writing in all its details; can convey to the reader the views he entertains in the most easily understood manner—in clear, pointed, and comprehensive language; to express sentiments in language most appropriate to the subject, using, of course, the most suitable words in a distinct manner, so that he may be understood without trouble. The ideas must be logically linked, so as to give an unmistakable connection to the subject from beginning to end. He must have a vigorous, discriminative, and versatile mind—be, in fact, a thinker. H. K. measures Carlyle by the standard that Carlyle has himself given of what he conceives a great writer should be, quoting—“Men of letters are a perpetual priesthood

from age to age, teaching all men that a God is still present in their life." And—"In the true literary man there is ever, acknowledged or not by the world, a sacredness. He is the light of the world—the world's priest,—guiding it like a sacred pillar of fire in its dark pilgrimage through the waste of time." Our opponent considers this to be the most satisfactory definition that can be given; but it is one to which we demur, as having little or no meaning. What distinct statement is given of a great writer in the references quoted? The very first sentence is defective, as it asserts that men of letters are a priesthood that teach all men that a God is present in their lives. Is this the case? Many of the greatest writers that ever lived have never taught that a God is present in the lives of men. A great writer is known by the influence that he may have had over his fellow-men, and by the way in which his works have been received by the people. But Carlyle's definition allows no latitude for those who do not teach as he defines, and on his principle Hume was a poor writer! Then as to the sacredness attached to the literary man, we may remark that there is an equal sacredness in every one who discharges his duty in the light of reason between man and man as there is in the literary man; or even as Carlyle himself has it in his "Sartor Resartus," that there is "an inevitable, a veritable mystery in the meanest tinker that sees with eyes." We need not farther refer to the quotation; it is directly opposed to all experience, the practice and science of all who live or have lived in this world.

"A great writer must also be a great thinker." This is not the case. One may be the greatest thinker in an age, and at the same time quite unable to be such a writer as to influence his fellow-man. One with powers of composition—elegant and refined, or strong and telling, with not much thought—may be a far better and abler writer than one deeply versed in thought who cannot adequately express what he thinks.

Macaulay's literary creed was to master the subject upon which he wrote in all its aspects—to give all views having reference thereto impartially, embracing the side of truth, or the side which he conceives to be true; making his thoughts distinctly understood, adhering to the practical, showing the nobleness of a celebrated man on the one side and his faults on the other, adhering to the teachings of experience in opposition to that which bore the least signs of the theoretical, painting the whole in clear language, using no jarring word to tingle the ear, and embellishing with his master hand everything that flowed from his pen to meet the wants and suit the understandings of all classes alike. Carlyle, on the other hand, makes a great noise about theoretical truth, if such a form of truth can exist. He argues upon the nobleness of character, and what character is able to come to, without knowing that ultimate end more than we can know. In all his historical writings his ideas go zigzag, violating the recognised construction of the English language. No one knows what he is about when he writes, he

twists, contorts, and ill-uses the Queen's English. His writings generally excite curiosity, not at the ideas contained in them, but they awaken astonishment at the pell-mell outburst of words in which the extravagant ideas, if ascertainable, are clothed,—thus rendering the whole the reverse of practically useful or fascinating.

In our view, therefore, of the elements which constitute a great writer, Macaulay has certainly the pre-eminence; for with whatever attention and consideration we may look upon the suggestive thoughts in Carlyle's works, still when we find no practical purpose in them—in their relation to ourselves and to society,—we aver that Macaulay is the greater man, on account of the practical stamp which he has given to all his productions. When we can follow with ease and satisfaction to ourselves that which may be embraced in a work, we come to the conclusion that it is one which we may consider with profit, as tending to very beneficial results. But if it be written in an extravagant style, without due distinctness—in strange language without usefulness, without gracefulness, gaining vividness by *bizarre* speech, and moreover being without practical end, then there can be no other alternative for us but to deem such a work one of doubtful merit. Macaulay answers the former, and Carlyle the latter description. Macaulay is different both in style and thought from Carlyle—wide as are the literary poles asunder. Macaulay is like a river flowing gracefully, yet majestically, to the ocean, nothing impeding its progress, every obstacle being carried away with noiseless yet irresistible force to the main current, and all the fleets of merchandise or war borne on its bosom with ease, grace, and dignity. Carlyle is the reverse. He is like a huge natural piece of unhewn granite—unwieldy, uncouth, without beauty or elegance. Macaulay is like the granite polished, glittering in its grandeur, pure as crystal, vivid and distinct. Macaulay is a perfect master of English speech. Carlyle's is a bastard Scoto-German style. He rolls and wallows as if he were a Caliban!

H. K. lays great stress on, and of course endorses an opinion which appeared in an article in the *North British Review*, which says that Carlyle entertains a “very deep disdain for the robes and trappings of antiquity and prejudice.” But we are unable to reconcile this statement with Carlyle's own definition of a great writer, who, he says, is “a priest from age to age, teaching men that a God is present in their lives.” Surely he must refer to antiquity, or even to bygone years for experience. The wise man is, however, the one who takes all that he thinks worth from antiquity, and considers prejudices, either national or local, in the sense in which they may influence the subjects under their control for better or worse. If Carlyle does, as our opponent asserts on the authority quoted, spurn all antiquity and prejudice, then we maintain that his is no prudent precedent for us to adopt, as it is only by our knowledge of the past that we are able to trace the rise and progress of our species, with the different phases which nationalities

have undergone in their mental development and moral growth. But this we say for Macaulay, that he never idolized either antiquity or prejudice, and that his great knowledge of life, public and private, made him a far better judge of what to reject or accept than the Chelsea sage, who has lived in retirement and obscurity, one may say, all his days. There can be no doubt, however, that Macaulay ransacked history for precedents to illustrate any subject which came under his consideration. But although he did this, which was no fault, he took a broad common-sense view of every question, in addition to that suggested by or implied in his historical references.

Macaulay appeared on the literary horizon as an essayist—the prodigy of these days of literature. After contributing to Knight's Quarterly, he burst upon the literati of the time with his "Milton," and astonished the whole republic of letters by the ability with which he treated that subject. What prodigality of learning, what clearness of illustration, what purity and antithetical power of language, did he bring to bear on that unrivalled essay! With what pleasure did we read it over and over again! It established his fame; it showed that he was a man of genius, a man of great intellect, a perfect *thesaurus* of all qualities that combine to ennoble man. He ranked side by side with the witty Sydney Smith, the critical Jeffrey, the great-minded Brougham. Let us take a few quotations to illustrate our subject, and the following extracts from his essay on "Milton" will suffice:—

"We hear of the magical influence of poetry. The expression in general means nothing, but applied to the writings of Milton it is most appropriate. Its merit lies less in its obvious meaning than in its occult power. There would seem at first sight to be no more in his words than in other words. But they are words of enchantment. No sooner are they pronounced than the past is present, and the distant near. New forms of beauty start at once into existence, and all the burial-places of the memory give up their dead. Change the structure of the sentence, substitute one synonyme for another, and the whole effect is destroyed. The spell loses its power."

And again he remarks—

"That scarcely any passages in the poems of Milton are more generally known or more frequently repeated than those which are little more than muster rolls of names. They are not always more appropriate or more melodious than other names; but they are charmed names. Every one of them is the first link in a long chain of associated ideas. Like the dwelling-place of our infancy revisited in manhood, like a song of our country heard in a strange land, they produce upon us an effect wholly independent of their intrinsic value. One transports us back to a remote period of history. Another places us among the novel scenes and manners of a distant region. A third evokes all the dear classical recollections of childhood, the school-room, the dog-eared Virgil, the holiday, and the prize. A fourth brings before us the splendid phantoms of chivalrous romance, the trophied lists, the embroidered housings, the quaint devices, the haunted forests, the

enchanted gardens, the achievements of enamoured knights, and the smiles of rescued princesses."

These are only average specimens of the beauty and power of Macaulay's essays—so neat, so chaste, so concise, and so pleasing. In vain do we look for such finished English composition in the writings of Carlyle.

We admit that originality of thought is highly necessary in a great writer; but although one's vision of thought be deep and profound, either intuitively or experimentally, unless it be clothed in elegance of diction and purity of style, the palm of writing well cannot be yielded. However, a great deal of doubtful lustre hinges around what is called originality of thought. No doubt the phrase is awe-inspiring, but who has ever been able to tell what it means? Is it carving and inventing out of the mind rare thoughts, marvellous ideas? If so, what is its highest standard, or what its highest criterion? Carlyle is said to be a great thinker, and Macaulay only an eminent expositor. We maintain, however, that Macaulay is a great thinker, as no one can be an able expounder without being at the same time a good thinker. The one is inseparable from the other. It may be asked, From what source has Carlyle got all his wonderful thinking—his bomb-shell flashes of thought? We unhesitatingly answer that it is by reading his own mind, by being an expositor of his own faculties, what he thinks and believes. Macaulay is a great deal more: he expounds what his own mind contains as well as he arranges the thoughts, ideas, and sentiments of others. He has as comprehensive and grasping a mind as Carlyle, for he gives fuller and greater credit to the opinions of others, and is able to make their thoughts more attractive than the authors could have done themselves. Carlyle's mind is like a room in confusion—table, sofa, chairs, thrown topsy-turvy, and all in sad disorder. Macaulay is different; he has everything in its proper place, stately, beautiful, handsome, and arranged according to the various objects for which the different articles were designed.

The public in their literary criticisms have many faults to overcome. If a man speaks in a fluent manner, he is pronounced superficial. If he stammers, people generally believe that he thinks more than he can utter. So it is with writers. If a man writes with great precision and distinctness, so as to be understood by all readers, then it is asserted that he is not a thinker. On the contrary, if he be rather obscure and prosy, so as not to be easily understood, the verdict will be that he is thoughtful. So it is, so it has been, and so, we are afraid, it will continue to be. But clearness, we maintain, is the chief element in forming a great writer, and on this ground we maintain also that Macaulay is greater than Carlyle. The highest qualification that a writer can attain is that he make himself intelligible. If a person does not understand all that is contained in a book, how can he maintain that it is ably written, or that its author is a great writer? To

suppose the contrary is absurd. For a clear and graphic description, of originality, simplicity, and vigour, let us just take Macaulay on the Puritans:—

“The Puritans were men whose minds had derived a peculiar character from the daily contemplation of superior beings and eternal interests. Not content with acknowledging in general terms an overruling Providence, they habitually ascribed every event to the will of the Great Being, for whose power nothing was too vast, for whose inspection nothing was too minute. To know Him, to serve Him, to enjoy Him, was with them the great end of existence. They rejected with contempt the ceremonious homage which other sects substituted for the pure worship of the soul. Instead of catching occasional glimpses of the Deity through an obscuring veil, they aspired to gaze full on His intolerable brightness, and to commune with Him face to face. Hence originated their contempt for terrestrial distinctions. The difference between the greatest and the meanest of mankind seemed to vanish when compared with the boundless interval which separated the whole race from Him on whom their own eyes were constantly fixed. They recognised no title to superiority but His favour; and, confident of that favour, they despised all the accomplishments and all the dignities of the world. If they were unacquainted with the works of philosophers and poets, they were deeply read in the oracles of God. If their names were not found in the register of heralds, they were recorded in the book of life. If their steps were not accompanied by a splendid train of menials, legions of ministering angels had charge over them. Their palaces were houses not made with hands; their diadems crowns of glory which should never fade away. On the rich and the eloquent, on nobles and priests, they looked down with contempt; for they esteemed themselves rich in a more precious treasure, and eloquent in a more sublime language, nobles by the right of an earlier creation, and priests by the imposition of a mightier hand. The very meanest of them was a being to whose fate a mysterious and terrible importance belonged, on whose slightest action the spirits of light and darkness looked with anxious interest, who had been destined, before heaven and earth were created, to enjoy a felicity which should continue when heaven and earth should have passed away. Events which short-sighted politicians ascribed to earthly causes had been ordained to his account. For his sake empires had risen, and flourished, and decayed. For his sake the Almighty had proclaimed His will by the pen of the evangelist and the harp of the prophet. He had been wrested by no common deliverer from the grasp of no common foe. He had been ransomed by the sweat of no vulgar agony, by the blood of no earthly sacrifice. It was for him that the sun had been darkened, that the rocks had been rent, that the dead had risen, that all Nature had shuddered at the sufferings of her expiring God.”

That description of the Puritans is unsurpassed. Such a heightened and well-tuned enthusiasm pervades it as to make it particularly striking to the mind of any intelligent reader. There is also an extract which we shall quote from his “Review of Ranke’s History of the Popes:”—

“There is not, and there never was, on this earth a work of human policy so well deserving of examination as the Roman Catholic Church. The history of that church joins together the two great ages of human

civilization. No other institution is left standing which carries the mind back to the times when the smoke of sacrifice rose from the Pantheon, and when camelopards and tigers bounded in the Flavian amphitheatre. The proudest royal houses are but of yesterday when compared with the line of the Supreme Pontiffs. That line we trace back in an unbroken series from the Pope who crowned Napoleon in the nineteenth century to the Pope who crowned Pepin in the eighth; and far beyond the time of Pepin the august dynasty extends till it is lost in the twilight of fable. The republic of Venice came next in antiquity. But the republic of Venice was modern when compared with the Papacy; and the republic of Venice is gone, and the Papacy remains. The Papacy remains, not in decay, not a mere antique, but full of life and youthful vigour. The Catholic Church is still sending forth to the farthest ends of the world missionaries as zealous as those who landed in Kent with Augustine, and still confronting hostile kings, with the same spirit with which she confronted Attila. The number of her children is greater than in any former age. Her acquisitions in the New World have more than compensated for what she has lost in the Old. Her spiritual ascendancy extends over the vast centuries which lie between the plains of the Missouri and Cape Horn, countries which, a century hence, may not improbably contain a population as large as that which now inhabits Europe. The members of her communion are certainly not fewer than a hundred and fifty millions; and it will be difficult to show that all other Christian sects united amount to a hundred and twenty millions. Nor do we see any sign which indicates that the term of her long dominion is approaching. She saw the commencement of all the governments and of all the ecclesiastical establishments that now exist in the world; and we feel no assurance that she is not destined to see the end of them all. She was great and respected before the Saxon had set foot on Britain, before the Frank had passed the Rhine, when Grecian eloquence still flourished at Antioch, when idols were still worshipped in the temple of Mecca. And she may still exist in undiminished vigour when some traveller from New Zealand shall, in the midst of a vast solitude, take his stand on a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's."

Specimens such as these testify to the greatness of the writer. Although rich in rhetorical embellishment, no captious critic can cavil at an unnecessary number of words. There is no verbiage: the words are only used for conveying a distinct idea. Besides, this is quite consistent with the charming novelty, the extreme freshness, and the expressive mode of reasoning with which *the whole* is compacted. No wonder, then, that Macaulay's writings impress the mind with a sense of their merit. They kindle enthusiasm in the breast of the reader; a feeling of intense pleasure and admiration rushes across the mind, and the intellect is fascinated with the literary feast. A gleam of the holiest and most lasting joy flashes over our faculties; the fire of literary inspirations, as it were, glows and burns with matchless brilliancy, as the whole mind revels in the delight given by the illustrious Macaulay. The power which Macaulay exercises over the soul clearly shows that he is a great writer, of which this power must be considered as a very important element. When we read a few pages of Macaulay's productions, do we get wearied or wish that we were done? The

perusal of his works brings no weariness or irksomeness; the only fear looked at is that we are getting too near the end of what we are reading. Macaulay certainly gives pleasure; and a great writer must please as well as instruct. Sound teaching, no doubt, produces profit; and everybody knows that in the ordinary sense pleasure is sure to follow what is profitable, just as sure as that cause is followed by effect in the physical world.

There is another quality which must be taken into consideration that has something to do with good writing, and that is usefulness. There may be some vagueness about the import of this word; but the meaning is quite clear to our mind. It is no more or less than that the services which any object renders for good are valuable, whether appreciated or not. It is well known that many useful things which are very common are not thought valuable. But this we know, that after a little reflection anything of advantage to ourselves will be estimated at its proper value. Besides, a thing can only be valuable and useful when it can be realized, that is, tested and experienced. That which is plausible and probable without being practically carried out can be of no benefit. Inventions, without putting them to some purpose, will be of no utility. Suggestiveness, without some realizing equivalent, can establish no foundation upon which any system will stand. So it is with Macaulay and Carlyle. The former discourses upon no subject except what he has realized and experienced; the latter, on what may or may not be on the conditions of man, of which no definite knowledge is given. The one wrote what he believed would be useful, the other what suited his own whimsical fancy. You can ascertain the end the one has in view, but that of the other is obscure and vague. It may be said by some that they both searched for and investigated facts to ascertain truth. But what may be true to one man may be untrue to another. In like manner, Macaulay never wrote unless he knew that which he wrote about was thoroughly true—he was practically truthful. On the other hand, Carlyle has written much of what may be probably true, but of which there is no sufficient evidence to place it beyond doubt. Of course we do not mean Carlyle's historical works, as the opposite side has not extracted much from them. Macaulay's choice appears to us, therefore, the more preferable.

Carlyle's "French Revolution" has been founded on by H. K. as being one of the rarest and grandest historical works ever published. It may be what people call a splendid poem—a wonderful epic; but by a history we think is meant that a description of a particular event or events is given, so that when it is read one can tell what they have been reading about. Suppose that no one had ever read or heard anything about the French revolution; we ask, could any one give an explanation or detailed narrative of the French revolution from his work? We unhesitatingly aver that they could not. It is evident to all who read his "French Revolution," that without a previous knowledge of the subject we could form no

distinct idea of what the work contained. It may be all very well to give us thrilling accounts of certain personages who figured greatly, such as Mirabeau, Danton, &c. But what we want is a distinct and intelligible account of the *whole* revolution. What is conceived to be a wonderfully wise extract from the work in question is after the flight of Louis XVI. from Paris: "Stars fade out and galaxies; street lamps of the city of God." What do we understand by this collocation of words? We may infer the meaning, but is the language at all appropriate? Is it not quite possible to narrate the fact in a clearer manner? Let the whole paragraph from which that sentence is taken be read, until we ascertain how we can relish "the slumbering Wood of Bondy, where Long-haired Childeric Donothing was struck through with iron; not unreasonably in a world like ours. These peaked stone towers are Raincy—towers of wicked D'Orleans." Even the contents of the work go beyond what we would recommend, for we are gratified with such wonderful chapters as these,—"*Astræa Redux*," "*Windbags*," "*Contrat Social*," "*Inertia*," &c. How different, on the other hand, does Macaulay write! and let us take for a specimen the commencement of his celebrated "*History of England*," in which we will find reasonable thought and language.

"I purpose to write the History of England from the accession of King James the Second down to a time which is within the memory of men still living. I shall recount the errors which in a few months alienated a loyal gentry and priesthood from the House of Stuart. I shall trace the course of that revolution which terminated the long struggle between our Sovereigns and their Parliaments, and bound up together the rights of the people and the title of the reigning dynasty. I shall relate how the new settlement was, during many troubled years, successfully defended against foreign and domestic enemies; how, under that settlement, the authority of law and the security of property were found to be compatible with a liberty of discussion and of individual action never before known; how, from the auspicious union of order and freedom, sprang a prosperity of which the annals of human affairs had furnished no example; how our country, from a state of ignominious vassalage, rapidly rose to the place of umpire among European powers; how her opulence and her martial glory grew together; how, by wise and resolute good faith, was gradually established a public credit fruitful of marvels, which to the statesman of any former age would have seemed incredible; how a gigantic commerce gave birth to a maritime power, compared with which every other maritime power, ancient or modern, sinks into insignificance," &c.

Carlyle is set up as a man who has enunciated a principle, and that is telling the truth; but we nowhere find that Macaulay ever encouraged what was false or dishonest. In whatever way Carlyle has enunciated the principle of telling what is genuine, we believe that the enunciation of that principle is held by every honest and decent man in the kingdom as well as Carlyle. Carlyle lives in obscurity, and can therefore, without any timidity, give any ideas he may please to the public, without the public ever knowing if he would adhere to these ideas were he tested as to his belief.

What we mean is this,—that Carlyle was never in a position from which we are able to judge if he was honest to his convictions or not. He has not been publicly and practically tested. We do not attach much importance to those who create a buzz about truth. To write about it is very easy and commendable; but to realize and act it is a rather difficult task. We have, however, some acquaintance with Macaulay's estimate of the value of truth, or what he conceived to be such. His conscience told him that he should support the Roman Catholic College at Maynooth; and, as a matter of course, he obeyed the dictates of his conscience. Because he would not act against his principle of right in this question, he was driven by sectarian and sanctimonious Edinburgh from his seat in Parliament. In concluding a speech once on the subject, he said,—

"To every bill which shall seem to me likely to promote the real union of Great Britain and Ireland I will give my support, regardless of obloquy, regardless of the risk which I may run of losing my seat in Parliament. For such obloquy I have learned to consider as true glory; and as to my seat, I am determined that it shall never be held by an ignominious tenure; and I am sure that it can never be lost in a more honourable cause."

Was not that manly, outspoken conduct? Was it not a stand for individual truth? No sooner had Edinburgh degraded the high-souled champion than she was struck with remorse for her conduct. She felt grief; but she honoured herself once more by electing him without solicitation, without expenses, without trouble, to be her favoured and honoured representative. Whatever may be said about his polity with regard to the Maynooth question, it must be honoured for sincerity and conscientiousness. He believed that the Church of Rome had rights—that she was misrepresented. The natural sympathies that subsist between man and man are stronger than every religion and creed in the universe. Such being our convictions on Macaulay with regard to the Catholic Church, we certainly make no apology for following in the same train.

We have not a solitary instance in Carlyle's life to show that he ever clung so tenaciously to truth; and if truth be one of the elements that form a great writer, we think that Macaulay is greater than Carlyle. The former had to stand or fall from being the parliamentary representative of the "Modern Athens" for the sake of his beliefs, and he nobly chose the latter alternative.

We hear much talk now-a-days regarding hero-worship; and when an author condescends to portray the character of a public man, he generally selects a hero—the *beau idéal* of his own mind. If the hero chosen is or has been a virtuous man, one who contributed largely to the prosperity of his countrymen, who has avoided all unnecessary and aggressive acts, having the least tendency towards being oppressive in his character, then we admit that such a hero is worthy of admiration and deserving of praise. But who is Carlyle's *beau idéal*? No less than the selfish and cruel Frederick the Great, whose conduct and reputation have been well summed up by the negative opener. Macaulay's hero was the stern

yet loving, the daring yet intrepid man, the philosophic, wise, and prudent king, William of Orange. Even the selection of a noble hero gives Macaulay the pre-eminence for choosing so virtuous and exemplary a man as his *beau idéal*, for his *beau idéal* he undoubtedly was.

All the considerations that we have adduced will, in our opinion, show, at least, that Macaulay is the greater writer—that he has the elements which compose good writing on his side. We may state that our space has prevented us from giving more copious extracts to establish our view of the question, as extracts are the best means to explicate the matter. We will just make one quotation yet, and that the concluding paragraph of his address to the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh:—

“I have been requested to invite you to fill your glasses to the ‘Literature of Britain;’ to that literature, the brightest, the purest, the most durable of all the glories of our country; to that literature so rich in precious truth and precious fiction; to that literature which boasts of the prince of all poets and of the prince of all philosophers; to that literature which has exercised an influence wider than that of our commerce and mightier than that of our arms; to that literature which has taught France the principles of liberty, and has furnished Germany with models of art; to that literature which forms a tie closer than the tie of consanguinity between us and the commonwealths of the valley of the Mississippi; to that literature before the light of which impious and cruel superstitions are fast taking flight on the banks of the Ganges; to that literature which will, in future ages, instruct and delight the unborn millions who will have turned the Australasian and Caffrarian deserts into cities and gardens. To the literature of Britain, then! And wherever British literature spreads, may it be attended by British virtue and British freedom.”

We quote no more, as we believe our task is completed, although at greater length than we at first intended. We claim a verdict in favour of Macaulay. His literary life formed only a fractional part of his labours, and his life, as a whole, was short in comparison to that of Carlyle. In conclusion, therefore, we maintain that Macaulay is a greater writer than Carlyle.

G. M. S.

CARLYLE.—III.

No man has impressed his age more than Mr. Thomas Carlyle; and no one has delighted while instructing it so much as Lord Macaulay. This is because the former is a man of genius, while the latter is a man of talent only. Genius is the great source of original thought; talent is the subtle adapter of thought to use and time. We have only to look at facts to see and know that Carlyle is a great original force in the world, and that Macaulay is only a receptive and applying intellect. No man thinks of Macaulifying his English; but few men who have ever perused a page of Carlyle have been free from the fascination of his very expression, and have, without strong resistiveness, been able to avoid feeling inclined to imitate his phraseology. Carlyle sees and realizes,

Macaulay paints; Carlyle reproduces, Macaulay describes: Carlyle's figures live and move, think and act, feel and speak, are human and composite; Macaulay's are picturesque puppetry and semi-mechanical marionettes, and are far more histrionic than historic. Macaulay is an author, but Carlyle is far more; he is an influence, a force,—a force, too, without a rival in our times. Macaulay's history is re-creative, Carlyle's creative. The latter writes to inform and inspire, the former to gratify and incline to Whiggism; the latter is a productive writer, the former is a reproductive one. Carlyle is a lofty and ardent soul, whose fire, and life, and honest sincerity is felt; Macaulay is a clever and popular man, whose prodigious efforts of culture and power of position made him the darling of a party and the pet of a political circle. Macaulay wanted generous geniality and hearty sympathy, Carlyle possesses a spirit aglow with love for humanity, and his sympathies are so intense that he can enter into the very soul of each of his characters, and learn the very secrets of his mode of life, thought, and individuality. This arises from his genius, his inborn greatness, his poetic gift. The greater writer is certainly he who most influences the vital soul of man. Carlyle has been the influential mind of the age on all the effective men of our time. Macaulay has exerted little or no influence on the thinkers, teachers, and statesmen of the age. Macaulay was an Edinburgh Reviewer, Carlyle is reviewer and reviser of human thought. The man who keeps but a little above the commonplace level of life and thought current in an age, and who, accepting the opinions prevalent in that time, touches them into elegant expression and burnishes them into aphoristic and quotable sentences, is sure to be popular; for he makes himself only the mirror in which the most ordinary minds of the country see themselves reflected, and they accept him as their representative-man. But the chief merit of such a man is a millinery dexterity, a manipulative cleverness, a power of management of the materials in hand or in fashion. Such a modish modiste was Macaulay. He caught the watchwords of his party, and played the echo to the opinions entertained by them. He got hold of the few notions which were current among the men of the day who were admired and looked up to, and he put them into a cunning kaleidoscope, wherein he juggled them into unwonted beauty, which dazzled and bewildered and gratified those who saw into what seemingly divine crystallizations the few beads and broken glass got into when turned and twirled in the ambidextrous style of the magicians of parliamentary oratory and review literature. Even his History is more of a showman's catalogue of portraits, and the prestidigitation of puppets, than the impressive exhibition of principles. His general acceptance as the interpreter of a party, his ready acquiescence in party tactics, and his willing reception of a party position as the advocate and apologist of his faction, are all evidences of the essentially mediocre spirit of Macaulay as a man, and consequently as a writer; for, as a writer, an author cannot

rise higher than his nature. In this relation Macaulay made some telling remarks in his review of the Rev. Robert Montgomery's poems after quoting the lines,—

“The soul, aspiring, pants its source to mount,
As streams meander level with their fount.”

We take this to be, on the whole, the worst simile in the world. In the first place, no stream meanders, or can possibly meander, level with its fount. In the next place, if streams did meander level with their founts, no two motions can be less like each other than that of meandering level and that of mounting upwards. As streams cannot rise higher than their founts, writers cannot rise higher than their natures; and hence every proof of the mediocrity of a man is an argument of his being commonplace as a writer, in comparison with those great original souls who are the begetters of new truths and influences which operate in changing life.

Such a great soul is Thomas Carlyle. In effectiveness, no man of the present age rivals him. He has been the best abused man in all the literary world, and he has been able to withstand the united abuse of both hemispheres, and that, be it remembered, was the product of all the intensest hatred of the world; for the *odium theologicum* has been poured out very vehemently on his devoted head; the *odium politicum* has been hurled against him from the highest places; the *odium philosophicum* has been used to pelt him with its hard names and harsh imprecations; the *odium literarium* has spilt much splenetic ink upon his reputation; and the *odium vulgare* has not been spared; but he has overlived them all, and his words, howsoever rugged and unliked, go forth to the ends of the world. He is not only an expositor, he is an impulse, an influence, an original force, a stirrer of the hearts of men.

No amount of comparison of extracts can give any adequate exhibition of this difference. It is a whole, as well as a wholesome entireness of being with which Carlyle impresses us; while Macaulay may be judged of by extracts, Carlyle cannot be so. He is full of the “infinite variety” of genius; Macaulay is only full of the “infinite variety” of, as we have said, kaleidoscopic commonplace. To determine what constitutes greatness in a writer is the first thing, and then there comes out the ground of comparison regarding who is the “greater” of the two. Nobody, I presume, ever thought of Macaulay as one of the great new creations of the Infinite Father; he has always been, we think, looked upon as the offspring of his party. Carlyle is the issue of no party. He is an independent and fresh soul. He looks upon the problems of life *ab initio*, and does not believe in the gospel of custom and the evangelism of British factions. He writes out of the depths of a pure spirit, and does not care to harmonize his views with the conditions of things as they have been from of old. Productiveness is better than reproductiveness, genius is higher than talent, truth is nobler than party, and life is higher than politics; and hence Carlyle is a greater writer than Macaulay.

H. W.

History.

HAS THE PAPACY BEEN BENEFICIAL TO THE WORLD?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

As this question has been set down by the conductors of the *British Controversialist* in the "History" section, it is quite apparent that they, in their wisdom, have decided that the argumentative contention should be carried on mainly, at all events, regarding the Papacy as a civil institution, rather than as a religious system. It is not necessary, therefore, to be a Papist in belief, or a Romanist in creed, to take the affirmative of the controversy. So far from this, we are of opinion that a discussion of much more worth may be conducted by those who are adverse to the Papacy as a theological power, than by those who believe in its omnipotency as an earthly headship of the Church. The writer of this article is not at all favourable in his sentiments to tyranny of any kind—ecclesiastical or political,—but he believes that he may justly affirm that "the Papacy has been beneficial to the world" as an historical fact, and as a reality in human experience.

In this point of view the question is of intense present interest, as well as of considerable importance as a mere topic in philosophical history. The political value of the Papacy as a temporal institution has become inwoven with all modern history, and has been a matter of very serious concernment to Europe, at least, for the last three quarters of a century. In fact, since the French Revolution, if not before it, the power of the Popedom has been a European question; and this has gathered intensity, especially since the French intervention in 1849. In truth, since the modern unsettlement of the political state of Rome, and the States of the Church as the fief of the father of the faithful Catholic Church under Napoleon I., there have been such constant uneasiness and turmoil in the papal states by insurrection, secession, and civil war, that it has more or less influenced the entire policy of the Governments of South-western Europe at least, and we opine that the French monarch, the King of Italy, the Austrian Emperor, the peninsular Sovereigns, the Prussian Prime Minister, and the British Cabinet have found that the supremacy of the See of Rome is beat behind and before, on the right hand and on the left, by anxieties that, besides being a torment to the other sovereignties, it is itself—

"With difficulty and with danger compassed round."

What can be done with the Papacy? is one of the entrancing political questions of our day. Many people imagine that that

topic is only shelved during the tenure of life and office by Pio Nono; while a few others think that the time of the prophecies has fully come, and that the Papacy must fall from its high estate, that the days of the millennial glory may manifest themselves, and Christ may reign instead of Antichrist. The least considerate of men can scarcely look upon the condition of Italy as satisfactory so long as the sighs for national unity, so strongly and thoroughly expressive of the heartfelt grief of the Peninsula of the Boot, are heaved in vain, because Rome, the capital and mistress of the world, is the patrimonial heritage of the See of St. Peter, and Italy is motherless. Italians are ready to say,—

“Men, this is the great year of resurrection!
 All who are in their graves shall hear His voice,
 And shall come forth! That which twenty centuries since
 Lay down a hero, shall rise up a God!
 Shout, countrymen! and wake the graves, shout ROME;”

while the heart of each true patriot throbs with the hope that Rome will yet again become the head and leader of a regenerated Italy.

These mere commonplaces on “the situation,” as it is now the cant, if not the slang, of the day to call any occurrence exciting special mark, will show the opportune character of the present debate. We shall endeavour to adhere to its discussion as an historical question, and shall attempt to view it altogether apart from the *odium theologicum* which usually accompanies the consideration of such topics in so-called Protestant England. The better to do this we may define “the Papacy” as it appears to us in an historical retrospect. The Papacy is not at all synonymous with the Church, not even of the Church visible and militant, not even of the Church Catholic. It is the Church existing in state, as a state with a Capital, and capital powers. Is is the Church in its sovereignty as a body corporate, exercising functions political as well as religious. It is that independent and constituted society standing among the masters and sovereigns of the world, with higher claims and rights than earthly dignities, and a mightier majesty than kings possessed, which though in the world was not of the world; and yet an institution which, without lineal successorship, maintained its corporate existence from the people. It is that centre of energy and system, discipline and influence, which, founded on religion, exerts through a sacerdotal caste, an incorporated priesthood, the power of a temporal sovereignty, as an agency for making more effective the spiritual supremacy which it claimed, and at which it aimed. Of course, the Papacy is here used, like all abstract nouns, as an abbreviated expression for a multitude of separate thoughts gathered into a unity, and grouped into a whole; and it is difficult to get hold of so many of the central ideas as may be held to form the inner essence which supplied the persistency of vital effectiveness to it without a knowledge of the events involved in its appearance as a

historical product. If we accept of the bare idea of pontifical supremacy, and if we agglomerate to that all the means and agencies implied in the making of that sovereignty effective, and securing the safety, prosperity, and workableness of the government of the vicar of Christ, perhaps we would come nearest it. It is, in fact, a word which, like our own word parliament, is much more easily understood than defined,—analysis, in this as in so many other cases, destroying the life of that which it endeavours to dissect that it may understand.

The turning-point in human history is the advent of Christianity. Thereafter the civilisation of the world became changed in its direction, and—

“ Westward the course of empire *took* its way.”

Amid the contests of Greece and Rome the Church organized itself, fixed its chief dogmas, developed its main doctrines, and set up its new priesthood in the place of the old pagan sacerdotalism, and took its place among powers and potentates. In the hour of the weakness of the Greek empire, and when the Goths and Lombards held Italy in their barbarous grasp, the Pope energetically maintained the dignity and importance of Rome, intimidated the barbarians, animated the Romans, and rivalled in some measure the Greek sway; thus acquiring a *prestige* which served as a great help to the attainment of temporal sovereignty. Gregory III. declared the independence of Rome, and Pepin and Charlemagne, Rome's Pontiff-rulers, received many augmentations of power and territory. Diplomacy, force, and cunning, swelled the might and the majesty of the Papal States, and the German empire formally acknowledged the exclusive authority of the Pope in a wide district of Italy, and asserted the right of his Holiness to undisputed allegiance.

The mighty mind of Hildebrand had seized upon the prime power by which men could be governed; he had clarified, to his own view, the purposes to which his predecessors had aspired—to unite the entire community of the faithful into one banded brotherhood, moved by the same spirit, stirred by the same ambition, and acting from the same motive. He had gathered together the scattered threads of the policy of former Popes, and he had planned out the wondrous scheme which their fitful efforts had only foreshadowed; and he left this great idea of a spiritual government to be worked out by his successors. In this, as we have just stated, they were pretty successful, and had acquired acknowledged sovereign rights among certain states in Rome, together with certain privileges and immunities in many other countries. I grant that there were many tyrannies perpetrated by several holders of the Popedom, but these by no means convince us that the Papacy was not beneficial. Indeed, we think that, great and terrible as the tyrannies of the Popes were, the atrocities of the secular sovereignties would have been far worse had that not been there with a might above monarchs to restrain from evil and to constrain to good. During many centuries

it stood before the people as their protector, and among sovereigns as their master; as, so long as it did so the king knew well where an avenger of blood was to be found by people if he wronged them, and the people knew at what throne they might place their petition for redress of grievances. As a sort of sovereign arbiter between sovereigns, nobles, hosts, and peoples, the Papacy exercised a most beneficial influence in human affairs; while, by its furnishing so many trained statesmen to the nations, it provided a vast boon for the common people. The hold it had, too, upon the several statesmen, as being bound in supreme fealty to it, however much they were enticed to serve their temporal masters, had a good effect in causing a sort of international civility which gradually grew into international law. The great benefit which theorists now dream of about an international commission for the abolition of war, and the supreme decision of all questions of right between nation and nation, was the function in which the Papacy most thoroughly exerted itself for the benefit of the world.

The moral grandeur of the Papacy as a sacerdotal power, the intellectual greatness of the Papacy as a college of training for statesmen, the temporal might of the Papacy as having devoted subjects in all lands and in all ranks, who were ready to give allegiance to it in the last resort in any matter of dispute, the religious supremacy of the Papacy as holding the keys—the terrible triple keys—were also very marked. Then the theory of its foundation as the kingdom of God in the earth—as the very viceroy of Jesus Christ, and the lieutenant of the eternal King, had a great effect, not only among kings and people, but also over the administrators of the concerns of the Holy See itself; for, however insincere men's pretensions are, they are always bound by these very pretensions—to some extent, at least,—to conform in some measure to their apparent scope. So that even those of our opponents who may feel inclined to stigmatise the Papacy as an organized hypocrisy, will gain little in argument from that course unless they can prove that the hypocrisy itself did not operate as a restraint. None of the accusations of heinous sins preferable against Sixtus VI., Alexander VI., Julius II., Leo X., &c., can be urged in this relation against the beneficiality of the Papacy, because the objector will require to show cause why, if these great crimes were really chargeable on the Papacy, as exceptionably wicked as compared with all other sovereignties, they were neither followed by revolt nor arraignment; will have to prove their exceptional guilt; and will require to bring home to the Papacy the perpetration of these crimes for its own specific ends, and not for the mere personal ends of the administrators. I do not myself see how the negative side of this controversy can be maintained without an almost blasphemous imputation against the God of providence for suffering a sovereignty not beneficial to the world to exist under the name and form of Christ's church for centuries. But to bring the matter more closely into controversial possibility, I venture to affirm the beneficiality of the Papacy as an

historic institution upon the following grounds, which those who list may attempt to gainsay:—

1. The *existence* of the Papacy has been beneficial to the world because it proves the might of moral agency and the power of thought. From the lowliest ranks of men, from a despised race, from a reputed malefactor, Christianity arose and spread. And from the traitor apostle as well as himself, a convict according to the laws of Rome, the Roman pontiff claimed his power, authority, influence, and position. It is beneficial that such a lesson should be stamped into history of the might of ideas over the most powerful forms of government, and against apparently the most stable states; that there should be shown in a most palpable and undeniable manner the fact that the despised Nazarenes, whose Master was overmastered by Rome, had now overmastered Rome, and that, too, by sheer might of thought and the strength of altered convictions. The mere existence of this protest regarding the powerlessness of mere might as against a soul-felt truth, and of the superior power of an inward conviction to all outward forces, ought to be a great lesson for humanity, that in the controversy between force and truth the former must fail, the latter must conquer.

2. The *principle* on which the Papacy was founded has been beneficial to the world. That principle is faith—faith in common facts, doctrines, and results. It is a good thing to know the power of faith. All the foregoing sovereignties in the world were sovereignties of force; the Papacy was a sovereignty of faith. The succession to the monarchy of that sublime, extensive, and active dominion whose chief city was watered by the “yellow Tiber” was not that of hereditary descent, nor of bequeathment from legatee to legatee, nor of natural claims, nor of force; it was the sovereignty of the choice of the faithful. Common as might possessing right is in the world, can we deny that it was of great practical benefit in the world that it should be seen that there were ties which bound man to man much more strongly and effectively than the mere slavish power of fear or the mere utilitarianism of statecraft? To show that faith is might, and that it possesses and exercises an influence and effect greater than bulwarks and battle-fields, thrones and swords, is surely a great benefit; and that the Papacy has shown the might of this principle cannot, we presume, be truthfully denied.

3. The *form* of government adopted by the Papacy was beneficial to the world. This form of government was administrative. It was not the mere expression of the wish or will of the sovereign; it was the decision of a select court of trustworthy advisers, possessed of a certain representative character and of a distinct responsibility, as being in some measure elected as well as selected. The Papacy was, in truth, a great democratic body on which an aristocracy had been grafted. The lowest peasant could enter the Church, and could rise to the tiara by the exercise of the faculties with which he was endowed. But before he could do so he required

to show in all subordinate positions the ability to obey as well as to effect; he required to win respect and power, confidence and esteem. Then, though he did rise, he was compelled to rise slowly, tested at every step, and exposed at each step by the envy of equals, the jealousy of superiors, and the detestation of success felt by inferiors. Here were the secrets of the successes of the papal administrators found; they were all men who had been thoroughly trained and most surely tested. We talk now-a-days of our competitive examinations; these examinations were not mere pedantic word-tests, but they were express work-tests. Here is a piece of work to do,—do it, do it thoroughly and well as you are told; and when you have acquired the art of accomplishing the will of others, you may receive the opportunity of exercising a will of your own. Here is a chance offered to every possessor of a special gift to rise by it to the highest offices for which his gifts qualify him, and here, therefore, there is a specific activity of the whole scheme, from root to fruit.

4. In its *administration* the Papacy was beneficial to the world. It wrought throughout the world a whole network of agencies, animated by one spirit and stirred to one end. It occupied intelligence everywhere; it demanded self-denial and it kept its best rewards to its best men. It was a great idea to create a unity of interests in all its members, and to keep up the vital circulation from the centre at Rome to the utmost wildernesses where the humblest hermit dwelt. In its administration it gave a lesson of thorough earnestness and perfect organization, which nations could copy though they have never been able to emulate it.

5. Even in its *history*—as compared with any other sovereignty in the world, taken century by century alongside of it—the Papacy has been beneficial to the world. It is easy to compute the evils laid to the charge of a state, for its enemies are keen-sighted to detect its faults, and loud of lung and tongue to expose them; but even thus a comparison of the evils of the Papacy as a state, will result in its favour if all things be taken into the calculation—the ends, the means, and the results. Indeed, by cutting off from itself all temptations to commit crimes capable of yielding to those who committed them more than a life-rent advantage, it showed that it had a principle in it superior to the family feuds and dynastic quarrels and the inter-dynastic wars which disgraced history in former times; while in modern times, if it has been, or rather seems to be, less immaculate than other Governments, a great deal of this is owing to the false position assigned to it by its bitterest assailants and most virulent enemies. Altogether, while repudiating Catholicism in its Romanistic form, and willing to denounce the Papacy as an effete form of church government, I cannot but affirm that there is no greater marvel of human history than the Papacy, no monarchy so wondrous as the Popedom, and no sovereignty of such a strange nature as that of the Pontificate; nor can I doubt that so singular and so ancient an institution has

been productive of much benefit to the world ; those who would attempt to prove a negative so vast as that the Papacy has been of no benefit to the world must have hard work. We shall not claim that they should do so. If they can prove that the balance of beneficiality is not in its favour, then we shall hold them to have done enough to prove their point ; but so far as we can see, in the light of reason, history, social life, and religion, there seems to be no good grounds for believing otherwise than that the Papacy has been beneficial to society as an institution and an influence.

PHILOMATHES.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

By the term Papacy, in the question now proposed for debate, we understand not so much Popery as a religious system—though that cannot be wholly omitted from consideration,—as the office, dignity, and jurisdiction of the Popes of Rome, together with their policy, acts, character, and influence. In considering whether the Papacy has been beneficial to the world, we must endeavour to determine whether its influences and effects have preponderated on the side of good or on that of evil. Though our opponents should show that in some two or three ways the Papacy has been beneficial, that cannot be considered to be a satisfactory settlement of the question now under debate : for who or what is there that is evil, that has not been in some way or other beneficial ? as is implied in the old proverb, “ It is an ill wind that blows nobody any good.” The extravagance of a number of individuals may have been of benefit to a virtuous and deserving family, with whom they have spent their money ; but if themselves and their own families have been ruined, and many others greatly injured by their extravagance, would it be right to say that their extravagance has been beneficial because one family happened to be benefited by it ? A monopoly may be of great service to a few individuals, and be the means of their amassing vast wealth, while it may be impoverishing and crushing to the majority of the nation ; would it then be correct to speak of such a monopoly as having been beneficial ? We know that it may be alleged with truth that some of the Popes have been patrons of learning, science, art, and individual worth, and that they have sometimes taken the part of right ; but if it can be shown that the iniquities of the Papacy have been such as to much more than counterbalance all its good effects,—if it can be shown that, *on the whole*, the influences and effects of the Papacy have been evil and injurious,—then it will be plainly proved that the Papacy has not been beneficial to the world.

We understand the question then to be, Have the office, dignity, character, measures, and influence of the Popes of Rome been beneficial to the world ?

To this question we reply in the negative ; and in proof of the correctness of our answer we adduce,—

1. The peculiar character of the Papacy, from the union of

some temporal, and so great spiritual power in the same individual. For the furtherance of schemes of ambition and aggrandizement, the Popes, as temporal princes, have entered into alliances, raised supplies, and furnished their contingent of troops so as to carry on an offensive war; but when endangered by defeat, and alarmed for the safety of their own dominions they resorted for shelter to their pontifical robes, and called on all Christendom to protect the head of the universal Church. This part has been frequently played by the Popes with great address and advantage, to the detriment of various nations in their turn; for the extreme sacredness attributed to their persons has led to their being protected by various powers with injustice to others, when but for their peculiar position they would have been left to the usual and just consequences of defeat in war; and thus the Papacy has been not beneficial, but injurious.

2. The authority claimed by the Popes above all lawful earthly sovereigns.

The authority thus claimed has led to a baneful interference in the affairs of the nations. Subjects have been countenanced in breaking faith with, in disturbing the government of, and even in putting to death, heretical sovereigns. Kingdoms have been laid under interdict. The persons of monarchs have been enslaved and trampled on. Princes have been deposed, and subjects absolved from their obedience. The Popes have paralyzed parliaments, agitated nations, and sown heart-burnings among peoples, introducing and carrying on war, bloodshed, adversity, and numberless calamities. Can these measures of the Papacy have been beneficial to the world? That the Popes have given an ill example to subjects, let the following relation by Baronius, a celebrated Roman Catholic historian, show:—"Our lord the Pope sat in his pontifical chair, holding between his feet the golden imperial crown; and the Emperor (Henry VI., of Germany), with bent head, received the crown, and the Empress likewise her crown from the feet of our lord the Pope. But our lord the Pope immediately struck with his foot the crown of the Emperor, and knocked it to the ground, signifying that he has the power to depose him from the imperial dignity if he deserved it."

3. Papal bulls and indulgences will tell us whether the Papacy has been beneficial to the world.

A bull of Clement VII. declared the doctrine of works of supererogation to be an article of faith. It was said that Christ had done more than was necessary to make atonement for sin; that one drop of His blood would have sufficed, but that he shed it copiously to form a treasure for His Church, which the supererogatory merits of the saints, the reward of the good works they have done beyond their obligation, have augmented. The keeping and management of this treasure, it was said, were confided to Christ's vicar upon earth. Under John XXII. a tariff of indulgences was invented. Incest, if not detected, was to cost five groats; and six

if it was known. There was a stated price for murder, infanticide, adultery, perjury, &c. In the year 1300, Boniface VIII. published a bull in which he declared that every hundred years all who made a pilgrimage to Rome should receive a plenary indulgence. From all parts people flocked in crowds. They brought with them rich offerings; and the Pope had his coffers replenished. Could an institution which propagated such base delusions on solemn matters, and which so evidently propagated them for worldly gain, be beneficial to the world? And was it not the tendency of what was thus propagated, not only to deceive men's souls and ruin them eternally, but also to encourage the practice among men prone enough to sin already, of all crimes and wickednesses, and thus make the Papacy to be in every sense a deadly evil?

4. The persecutions of the excellent of the earth by the Popes of Rome, whenever they have been able to persecute, show that the Papacy has ever been injurious the world.

For centuries the Popes practised persecution by fire and fagot, rack and torture, imprisonment and death. Others have persecuted from passion, but the Popes have persecuted from principle. The extermination of heretics has been their avowed object. And they have not only killed the bodies of such, but have claimed the power to damn their souls—to pursue them not only to the limits of time, but to curse them to all eternity. Nor have the murders they committed or encouraged been common murders. They have oftentimes been wholesale butcheries, *e. g.*, the massacre of St. Bartholomew, &c. And has the Papacy, which has authorized, directed, countenanced, and defended such measures, been beneficial to the world?

5. Ignatius Loyola and his companions were, by a bull of Paul III., incorporated as "The Society of Jesus." The actions and influence of the Jesuits will show us whether, in incorporating this society, the Pope acted for the world's benefit. To show what the influence of the Jesuits has been we give an extract from Macaulay's Essay on "Ranke's History of the Popes":—"Jesuits were to be found under every disguise, and in every country; scholars, physicians, merchants, serving men; in the hostile court of Sweden, in the old manor-houses of Cheshire, among the hovels of Connaught; arguing, instructing, consoling, stealing away the hearts of the young, animating the courage of the timid, holding up the crucifix before the eyes of the dying. Nor was it less their office to plot against the thrones and lives of apostate kings, to spread evil rumours, to raise tumults, to inflame civil wars, to arm the hand of the assassin. Inflexible in nothing but in their fidelity to the Church, they were equally ready to appeal in her cause to the spirit of loyalty and to the spirit of freedom. Extreme doctrines of obedience and extreme doctrines of liberty, the right of rulers to misgovern the people, the right of every one of the people to plunge his knife in the heart of a bad ruler, were inculcated by the same man, according as he addressed himself to the subject of Philip, or to the subject of Elizabeth. Some described these divines as the

most rigid, others as the most indulgent of spiritual directors; and both descriptions were correct. The truly devout listened with awe to the high and saintly morality of the Jesuit. The gay cavalier who had run his rival through the body, the frail beauty who had forgotten her marriage vow, found in the Jesuit an easy, well-bred man of the world, who knew how to make allowance for the little irregularities of people of fashion. The confessor was strict or lax, according to the temper of the penitent. The first object was to drive no person out of the pale of the Church. Since there were bad people, it was better that they should be bad Catholics than bad Protestants. If a person was so unfortunate as to be a bravo, a libertine, or a gambler, that was no reason for making him a heretic too." Such a society of men could not be other than a curse to the world, and it was under the patronage of the Papacy that they were sheltered and that they flourished.

6. The personal character of the Popes, and the encouragement given to wickedness through the practice of it by persons in their exalted and supposed spiritual station, proves that the Papacy has been adverse to the interests of the world. We know that example, whether it be good or evil, travels downwards. The example of sovereigns influences their courts, and thence descends to the next in rank, influencing all grades of society. We need not go out of our own country for proof of this fact in human nature. The example of profanity and licentiousness given by Charles II. infected and influenced the whole nation; and the pattern of virtue given by our present beloved Sovereign has had a mighty effect for good on all classes of her subjects. If such, then, be the effect of example as set by common human beings, what must be its effect when given by a personage unique in his character and position, and exalted above all other earthly personages? What inference so natural to be drawn by those who viewed the Pope as infallible, as that deeds done by the vicerent of the Most High must at least be void of any gross sin? and if not grossly sinful in him, why so in them?

But what was the personal character of the Popes? Let us hear witnesses. Erasmus, in his "Praise of Folly," writes, "Are there more formidable enemies of the Church than those impious Pontiffs who, by their silence, allow Jesus Christ to be disannulled; who bind Him by their mercenary laws, falsify Him by their erroneous interpretations, and strangle Him by their pestilential life?" Of Alexander VI., Guicciardini writes, "In his manners he was most shameless; wholly divested of sincerity, of decency, and of truth; without fidelity, without religion; in his avarice, immoderate; in his ambition, insatiable; in his cruelty, more than barbarous; with a most ardent desire of exalting his numerous children by whatever means it might be accomplished." Of Julius II., Roscoe writes, "Bold, enterprising, ambitious, and indefatigable, he neither sought repose himself, nor allowed it to be enjoyed by others. In searching for a vicar of Christ upon earth it would indeed have been

difficult to have found a person whose conduct and temper were more directly opposed to the mild spirit of Christianity and the example of its Founder."

Of Leo X. the same historian says, "In one respect, however, it is impossible that the conduct of Leo X., as a temporal prince can either be justified or extenuated. If a sovereign expects to meet with fidelity in his allies or obedience in his subjects, he ought to consider his own engagements as sacred, and his promises as inviolable. In condescending to make use of treachery against his adversaries he sets an example which shakes the foundations of his own authority, and endangers his own safety; and it is by no means improbable, that the untimely death of the Pontiff was the consequence of an act of revenge. The same misconduct which probably shortened his days has also been injurious to his fame; and the certainty, that he on many occasions resorted to indirect and treacherous means to circumvent or destroy his adversaries, has caused him to be accused of crimes which are not only unsupported by any positive evidence, but are in the highest degree improbable. He has, however, sufficient to answer for in this respect, without being charged with conjectured offences. Under the plea of freeing the territory of the church from the dominion of its usurpers, he became a usurper himself; and on the pretext of punishing the guilt of others, was himself guilty of great atrocities."

7. The religion of the Popes, of which the Papacy is the head, and which has been patronized, encouraged, and defended by Popes, shows that the Papacy has been of indescribable injury to the world.

Wherever the Popery reigns, wickedness prevails. The murders of Ireland, the universal perjury of her witness-box, the rioting, violence, drunkenness, filth, and profligacy of the lower Irish congregated together in the large towns of England, show such to be the case. An eminent barrister has declared that in Ireland, no one in a court of justice attaches the least credit to the testimony given upon oath by the lower Irish. The truth is only to be elicited by cross-examination. And for this Popery is responsible, it being a Popish dogma that faith is not to be kept with heretics, and thus perjury is sanctified. Popery encourages numerous delusions of an awful character—as that the Pope is infallible; that he has power to pardon sin; that the Virgin Mary is a lawful object of worship; that the consecrated wafer is the actual body of Christ; and many other similar errors or deceptions. Popery is a hindrance to all desirable progress, and a barrier against true religion. It enslaves all whom it influences. The palpable backwardness in knowledge and in all works of utility in all countries where Popery prevails sufficiently shows this; and the very claim of the Popes to infallibility—an impossibility of erring—is necessarily a barrier to progress, as Galileo and others have had to prove.

For these reasons we believe that the Papacy has not been beneficial to the world.

S. S.

Politics.

IS A CONSERVATIVE SUPERIOR TO A WHIG MINISTRY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THIS question should be reasoned out historically, and the conclusion sought should be based on some principle or principles from which an answer should be seen to result as essential and necessary. Conservatism is altogether misrepresented in the present generation. The voice of the enemy has been heard, listened to, regarded, and believed against the Conservative party, and that same party's vaunts have been accepted as an historical gospel. Reform, and the extension of the franchise are excellent words to juggle with. Whiggery claims to be the opener of the doors of the British Parliament to the working classes. But it is well known that it admits of no influences there except money influences. Whiggism means mammonism. The Whigs are the sticklers for a money qualification, and the opponents of the ballot, because they want only those to possess power who are interested in the maintenance of the present state of things or least possible alteration of them. They fatten on panics and batten on war; they stoop and snivel when they are asked to state their principles; the modern Whig Moloch is expediency.

Conservatism is government by principles, by English wisdom and justice. The opposition the Conservatives offered to so-called Reform bills were really offered to the trickeries of the Whigs who wished to make their bill a bill for the further protection of moneyed men, manufacturers, and speculators. The Conservatives have all along scouted the idea of making anything paramount in legislation but the honour and the interests of England.

The Whigs agitated reform, not for the benefit of the nation, but to break the power of the old Tories. They framed their bill expressly to attain that end, and not to advantage the country. They were the suggesters of the "Irish coercion," they were the peddling politicians of the poor law amendment, they were the real supporters of the Corn Laws, and they steadfastly combined to keep their repealer out of office during the remainder of his lifetime. They were the mutilators of and intriguers with royal despatches, they were the consecrators of the French *comp d'état*, the proposers of the Conspiracy to Murder Bill for the safety of Napoleon III., and they were the dastardly time-servers, who played fast and loose with the last European war, as well as the patchers of that vile peace at any price treaty, which left

England as much humiliated despite the heroism of its armies at the Crimea, as Russia had been.

The Conservatives struggled against the terrible catastrophes which followed in succession upon the closing of the anti-Bonaparte wars 1815—1829, and did much for the commutation of the distress; they gave Catholic emancipation and they resisted the early aggressions of Russia in the Levant; and, still more to their credit, they broke no pledges regarding parliamentary reform. They have thought more of getting up right administration than of passing laws for the promotion, as the Whigs did, of cheap labour and heaving taxation. They effectively helped Ireland at the time of the potato failure, and they instituted direct as opposed to indirect taxation. They have, besides, accomplished a Reform Bill, and have brought the nation once again into the position that the possibility of governing by principles is possible. As the true national party the Conservatives are superior to the Whigs, and the common feeling of the common people is just in its verdict that a Conservative is superior to a Whig government. D. B. E.

DEBATING SOCIETIES.—The discussions of debating societies are only the mere formal occasions on which the conscious life of the intellect disentangles for itself its own perplexities, tentatively asserts its own tendencies, emerges into provisional independence, and marks out its own scheme of future alliances. This is not talk, it is preparation for action, it is the stringing up and organization of intellectual energy, it is intellectual volition. No doubt, to those who have entered on those sorts of responsibilities, which, like the responsibilities of statesmen, involve in a high degree the happiness of others, there seems something childish about discussions whether Strafford deserved death, or Pope was a true poet. But that is only because they have got to a different stage of life, and nothing material in their future destiny could possibly be determined by their giving their minds gravely to either discussion. With young men at college it is quite different. It is not too much to say that those acts of deliberate intellectual and moral choice which give rise to, and are encouraged by, debating societies, are in fact the crystallising points of character, the facts on which the future current of character, its narrowness and intensity, or width and catholicity, its sincerity or spirit of compromise, its sobriety or fanaticism, its intellectual cynicism or moral earnestness, chiefly depend. A debate whether Pope or Wordsworth was the greater poet—whether Greece or Rome had exercised the most beneficial influence on the world—whether Carlyle or Mill were the truer teacher—has often, we feel no doubt, done more to determine the future lives of great men, and through them the future of England, than hundreds of so-called “practical” debates in the House of Commons—debates, say, on limited liability, or the taxes on malt and insurance.—*Spectator*.

The Essayist.

"UPWARD!"

A WORD FOR YOUNG MEN.

(*A New Year's Address to a Literary Society.*)

LIFE is change. "Time flies" is a mere truism, but common place as it is, it indicates a fact regarding human existence which can never be ignored without detriment to the soul: for as time flies, life shortens, and the long perspective of youth and hope contracts as the years pass. Already the revolving moons have brought us once again to the threshold of a new year. How short have seemed the gliding months!—how quick the passage of the duty-freighted days!—how speedy the oncome of the season of Janus-faced reflectiveness! The *Past*—how marvellous have been the incidents of life and history, of emotion and thought, of aim and effort, crowded into its narrow-looking space—space which formerly appeared like an estuary opening on a wide, wide sea, but now impresses us as a confined embankment built with the masonry of time! The *Present*—how moment-short, how seemingly inadequate to endeavour or accomplishment—to the work that calls us and the duties that devolve upon us! The *Future*—how wide its far-stretching vistas, how limitless—limitless as the covetousness of "young desire"—its forth-lying distances seem! and yet we know that, at any moment, the seal of death may be placed on the eyes that behold them with rapture, and look on them as their inheritance. Time's flight is an uncertain one, and its goal is unmarkable by the eye of man. We know, truly, whitherward it tends; and we can see, as the last footing it attains, the grave. But why should death conquer us on the levels of life, or lay us low in the valley-lands? Why should not our grave be like that of Moses on the mountain summits, with the Pisgah view of eternity clear in our eye? It was on Mount Moriah's top that Abraham fought the "good fight," which won him the title of "the father of the faithful." From the bare and splintered peaks of Sinai came down the law of life to man. On Carmel's heights the efficacious fervent prayer of Elijah brought rain to the thirst-spent inhabitants of Palestine. "An exceeding high mountain" was the scene of a wondrous temptation; a mount was the place of a marvellous death; and from the summit of a mountain the Greatest departed from the sight of men into the radiancy of His own eternity; in order that it might be true that, as the mountains are round about Jerusalem, so the Lord is round about His people from henceforth, even for ever."

Such ideas have come, like a rushing flood, into my soul as I was seeking "a word in season" for the New Year's Address, which I have been now, as your President, privileged to deliver for three successive—and, let me say it, also successful years. I have already bidden you go "Forward!" with brave and loyal hearts on the pathway of duty; "Forward!" in despite of innate fears or outward opposition; "Forward!" in the face of danger and difficulty; "Forward!" with all energy and might of spirit to dare and do whatsoever lies before you! I have already urged you "Onward!" though the heart should fail and the limbs become weakened; "Onward!" though daunting threats surround and causes of fear thicken in the air; "Onward!" though ambushed foes may lurk, or obstinate enemies may harass; "Onward!" though the soul wavers and faith shrinks; "Onward!" while Hope exhibits a shred of her heaven-blue banner, and life has a throb in the treasury of the heart. And what *can* I say more? What other word of might, of spirit-stirring potency, of energy-arousing force, is left me? What can inject into the very centre of the soul a divine, life-nerving pith, capable of strengthening you to greater effort, increased ardour, or a forceful activity such as is not implied in these? There is surely no single vocable in England's language of supreamer import than these—no concatenation of syllables invented in recorded time of mightier concernment and greater fulness of content! Forward! Onward! I can but reiterate the phrase and re-urge my message, until the enthusiasm of the expectant heart of each kindles into aspiration, and the spirit, all knit and concentrated into a unit of might, resolves to use its faith-fullest endeavours to go forward, to toil onward, and—ah! I have it now!—to struggle *upward*! Upward!—fit watchword for the living soul; for the appetant spirit, eager to rise to all the possible heights of its being and destiny.

"In life's rosy morning, in manhood's firm pride,
Let this be the motto your footsteps to guide,—
In storm or in sunshine, whatever assail,
We'll onward and *upward*, and never say fail!"

"Upward" is sinewy, alert, and daring; hardy, defiant, and intrepid: there is in it pith, resolve, and confronting nerve; enterprise, adventurousness, and chivalry. It admits the tendency of the heart to halt and hesitate, to seek ease and to delight itself in the haunts of frail-spirited luxury or effeminating indolency; but it is resistive of allurements, mettlesomely opposed to threatening dangers, and unappalled by difficulties. "Upward" is springy and free-footed; the elasticity of the soul is vital in it; it indicates a sense of power, and suggests a compressed and unexhausted energy of mind; it speaks of former lowliness, of nobler efforts, of higher aspirations, of more strenuous endeavours; it implies a desire to leave the earth and near the sky; it expresses determination and an infelt potentiality of being, not yet used up in the exertions of the past, or expended

in the toil of the forward and onward movements made. It stands in the face of the gorge-rent slopes, and looks with dauntless eye on the sky-cleaving upland heights; it sees the fissures and the chasms through which the rock-fretted torrents hasten, without despair or a blanching of the cheek, and it recognises the roughness of the way with a calm, soul-strengthening faith in the might of perseverance. It acknowledges that earth is not given as the place of human repose, and that life is not bestowed for indolent rest. It accepts, as a fact, that if we would see the sun rise early we must climb, and if we would catch the latest lingering of day we must stand upon the mountain-tops; that it is from the beetling headlands of the hills we see the most of earth, and gaze upon the largest stretches of the sky; and that while the valleys are darkening in the gloom of night,—

“The mountain summits, sunlit still,
Look proudly into heaven.”

It is on the mountain-tops that beacon-fires are lighted, and thither it is that the strong climber must make his way who desires to warn the low-lying dwellers in humble hamlets of approaching dangers. On the hill-heights the bonfires are set alight, that the outflush of their flames may regale the eye with tidings of gladness. On the upland summits cairns are built and landmarks are erected. Out in the wastes of the sea the up-jutting peaks of the rocky headlands are topped with lighthouses. The fire-cross flares, the flagstaff waves, the watch is set, and the outlook is kept on the stalwart bluffs or the towering steep, the lofty crag or the cloud-capped cliff. The tall steeple rings forth the bell-peal, the topmast bears the flying colours of heroes, and the banners are held aloft while contention reigns in the plains. On the tip-top tower of the castle hangs the insignia of greatness, on the crest of the mountain masses of the earth the very heavens seem to rest and turn, and it is from the cloud-piercing hills that the fertilizing rivers flow into the valleys; on them the benison is poured which fills the lands with plenty and men's homes with gladness. To be aspiring, then, to be persistently determined to pursue an upward course, is to be engaged in working out the greatness of being:—

“For from the birth
Of mortal man, the sovereign Maker said,
That not in humble or in brief delight,
Not in the fading echoes of renown,
Power's purple robes, nor Pleasure's flowery lap,
The soul should find enjoyment; but from these,
Turning disdainful to a higher good,
Through all the ascent of things enlarge her view,
Till every bound at length should disappear,
And infinite perfection close the scene.”

“Upward” is a word that indicates a spirit in its utterer superior to dalliance, indolence, and sloth. The Past has not exhausted the

pith of the soul; the Present, however filled with delight, can neither satisfy nor satiate it. Endeavour is not slackened by accomplishment, nor is effort paralyzed by the forth-look of fear; the heart is not subdued by the whispers of the syren voices of the senses, dulled by the pressure of sorrow, or flattered by the songs of self-esteem. It suggests a career and a future, power within and possibilities without. The eye is lit with life, the pulse is strong in its beat, the sense of fatigue is despised by the sinew, and the energy of the limb gains its force from the heroic impulses of the soul. When the inspiring activity of the entire being is suffused with the delicious enthusiasm which pants for nobler work and higher achievements, and the very central elements of your nature incite you to ardent aspirations, so that "Upward" lances itself forth from your stirred spirit, do not palter with the outflash of aspiration to which it has prompted, but—

" Pray Heaven for firmness thy whole soul to bind
To this thy purpose—to begin, pursue,
With thoughts all fixed and feelings purely kind;
Strength to complete and with delight review,
And grace to give the praise where all is ever due.

Rouse to some work of high and holy love,
And thou an angel's happiness shalt know,—
Shalt bless the earth;—while in the world above,
The good begun by thee shall onward flow
In many a branching stream, and wider grow:
The seed that, in life's few and fleeting hours,
Thy hands unsparing and unwearied sow,
Shall deck thy grave with amaranthine flowers,
And yield thee fruits divine in heaven's immortal bowers."

In each of us let the swelling heart throb with the might of endeavour, tingle with the joy of noble aims, and feel the rapture of a high resolve. With cheerful magnanimity let us look upon all difficulties as tests of the strength that is in us, and the vanquishment of each obstruction in the path of our intents as another opportunity afforded us of reaching the genuine glory of our life. Let us "toil and be strong:" the toil of a master spirit wins the heroic wealth of worthiness. Man's unconquerable will was given him that he might, by its aid, climb to the highest summits of life's capacities, and raise himself to all the possible heights of being. The common levels of existence are fraught with temptations and influences which lull to listlessness. These we must avoid and overcome, and though we may never attain to the height to which ambition prompted us to aspire, the very effort itself is a manifestation of greatness. No one can ever rise who determines merely to do what he knows he can accomplish.

" Nothing that altogether dies
Suffices man's just destinies;

So should we live, that every hour
 May die as dies the natural flower—
 A self-reviving thing of power ;
 That every thought and every deed
 May hold within itself the seed
 Of future good and future need ! ”

No halting cowardice, no self-seeking grudging for us, no holding back of our hand from working, or our heart from planning : let us determine and do. Upward, then ! nerve the heart and strain the sinew, stir the spirit to effort, and strengthen the soul for exertion ; fix the eye and the aim high, and toil to gain the top of life—the summits of endeavour. Let us lift the mind from the low and sordid delights of mere earthliness and sense ; let us recognise, but not resign ourselves to them, and with our eyes on the Alps of achievement possible to us—heaven-high and inviting our ascent—let us desire and aspire. “ Upward ” is our New Year’s word ; let us be true to it,—say it, feel it, be it, do it, show it, tell it,—aye and aye upward :—

“ Go breathe it in the ear
 Of all who doubt and fear,
 And say to them, ‘ Be of good cheer ! ’ ”

“ Upward ” let our efforts be, and our soul’s motto “ Excelsior ! ”

THE CULTURE OF BEING.

A NEW YEAR’S ADDRESS.

A. K. H. B., in one of his essay-sermons, discourses pleasantly upon the growth of one’s Being, its transitions, its difficulties, and its triumphs through the ordeal of existence ; and observes that all can point to a certain period of their life, generally and appropriately the commencement of a new year, when the scattered threads of experience were first bound together and treasured as guides henceforward to a better and a happier phase of life’s journey. Let us hope that many of the readers of the *British Controversialist* are entering upon this present new year with resolutions that shall in the future mark it indelibly as a new era in their being’s growth. As befitting the occasion, it has occurred to us to present our readers with a brief *résumé* of our thoughts on the culture of being, and what should be its aim, method, and means ; in the hope that, should we suggest no novelties in self-culture, we may at least—what is often much more beneficial—*remind* many of unchangeable precepts hitherto neglected or perhaps forgotten.

I. THE CULTURE OF BEING—ITS AIM.

Perfection of	I. Soul	1. Knowledge of the Scriptures.
		2. Prayer and self-purification.
		3. Theology.
	II. Body	4. Health and its laws.
		5. Physical training.
		6. Good habits.
	III. Mind	7. Mental discipline.
		8. Knowledge of facts.
		9. Principles.

It is a good, a sterling thing, to have an aim, a purpose, real and tangible, amid the battle of existence, with its thousand cares, disappointments, and possibilities of failure. In real truth, without a steady aim life is merely vegetative. It were to be wished that all young men started in life with an aim—a pure, a high, a holy purpose!

In marking out one's course of existence, three things, three phases, present themselves. Man's life is threefold—spiritual, physical, and moral. According as judgment dictates does either of the three predominate in importance to each of us. But oh! why does man so often and so perversely place his intellectual or his physical before his spiritual perfection? Alas that it should be so! contrary to the dictates of conscience, reason, and the commands of an all-guiding Creator. What is man? what does he live for? what is his first duty? Man is made by the Most High, his Creator, that he might learn to know, to love, and obey Him; and his first duty is to acquire that knowledge, foster that love, and fulfil that obedience. Physical care naturally follows, for are we not formed in the image of our God? Is it seemly, is it wise, is it good, that we should neglect the work—the wonderful, the fearful creation—of the Almighty? Should we not rather so tend, purify, and strengthen the dwelling-place of our immortal soul, that it may ably form an uncontaminated though temporary home, and keep itself “the unpolluted temple of the mind”? The intellect remains. All err who make it the first of man's aspirations. It is the handmaiden of soul and body, no more. It is of the earth and earthy, wholly and solely. It is man's, not God's care. So much of reason, feeling, and will, as guides him unerringly to his Creator, God demands of man,—no more. Not that He despises the excellence of intellect, which proclaims His own beneficence. No. But search the Scriptures. Find you there any distinction placed between the cultivated and the uncultivated? None. The reverse. There shall be no towering of intellect when the last trumpet sounds. “Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.”* We do not utter any word of contempt for intellect. No; but think of the great, the immutable responsibility involved with the soul—the care, the sympathy

* Matt. xviii 3.

necessary to the body,—and is it possible to put our trust, as too many do, in intellect—in *mere* intellect,—cold, clear, and brilliant though it be? When such a trust is given, is it not rather that we forget or ignore the prior claims of soul and body, than that we *reason* upon the relative importance of each, and choose the best? Is it not rather that, in a world of sin, we suffer ourselves to be carried with the stream that flows to temporary vanity, than that we earnestly, truthfully aim at the perfection of our capacities in the order which God, nature, and man himself dictate as the only good, true, and right sequence?

II. THE CULTURE OF BEING—ITS METHOD.

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|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| 1. Knowledge of the Scriptures . . . | { | 1. By self-study. |
| | | 2. Through commentaries. |
| | | 3. In the original languages. |
| 2. Prayer and self-purification . . . | { | 4. Earnest, constant prayer. |
| | | 5. Study of pious examples. |
| | | 6. Modelling and reviewing conduct. |
| 3. Theology . . . | { | 7. Principles. |
| | | 8. Systems and theories. |
| | | 9. Controversies. |
| 4. Health and its laws | { | 10. By study of the body and its functions. |
| | | 11. By securing all healthful requisites in food, &c. |
| | | 12. By preserving the body from hurtful physical influences. |
| 5. Physical training | { | 13. Nourishment and purification of the body. |
| | | 14. Pure and invigorating atmosphere. |
| | | 15. Gymnastic exercises, outdoor games, &c. |
| 6. Good habits . . . | { | 16. Punctual and just division of meals, &c. |
| | | 17. Temperance. |
| | | 18. Early rising, &c. |
| 7. Facts . . . | { | 19. History—natural, civil, and literary. |
| | | 20. The exact sciences. |
| | | 21. Arts, manufactures, &c. |
| 8. Principles . . . | { | 22. The philosophy of things, politics, &c. |
| | | 23. Method. |
| | | 24. Metaphysics. |
| 9. Mental discipline | { | 25. Logic. |
| | | 26. Mathematics. |
| | | 27. Languages. |

1. Let not the too frequent reproach that the Bible is as a sealed book to men fall upon *you*, O earnest, thoughtful reader. Resolve that you shall have the sacred book altogether imprinted on your memory, for such is the duty of all. We should all so study the Bible that its every page, its every line, is with us always,—so study it that its every precept guides us in our daily life. Let every day, every hour, be linked with God and His holy word. Every day learn by heart a set portion, until at length your memory, your being, is saturated with the best of all narrative, poetry, teaching, and reasoning. Let the awful reflection that so

many souls are called to God with few—how few!—of His words familiar to them, nerve and sustain you in this good purpose. 2. Let the joyful labours of those who have faithfully unfolded the labyrinths of Scripture assist you. 3. And, if possible, study the Scriptures in the original tongues, to possess yourselves of the shades of meaning that appear between the original and the translation. 4. Every day earnestly and humbly pray to God for guidance, help, and for the things which you may truthfully ask of Him. 5. Study the lives of good men, and aim at an imitation of their virtues, while you avoid their weaknesses. 6. Model your conduct daily and hourly upon principles of virtue. Constantly review and amend your conduct. Study especially in this section the character of Jesus, His humility and affection. 7. Acquire the principles of theology on their soundest basis as a sequel to Bible study. 8. Study the best systems and theories; prove all, and keep what is good. 9. Shrink not from controversies, but let your strength go forth in defending and spreading the gospel, to the conversion of its adversaries and the encouragement of its disciples. 10. Study how you are made, and let the knowledge guide you to the best care of the body. 11. Choose pure, sound, plain, and wholesome food. Eat little, and slowly. Be thoroughly clean. Take plenty of sleep. 12. Avoid late hours, extremes of heat and cold, tight garments, uneasy postures; vary studies and labours. 13. Be regular in meals. Avoid long fasts or rapid meals. Take little liquid food. 14. Neither touch nor taste intoxicating liquors. Eat little rather than enough. Avoid highly spiced or seasoned food. 15. Rise early, that you may cultivate your soul, and prepare it fittingly for the day's labours. 16. Watch the fluctuations of the body, and keep it well supplied with plain nourishment when needed. Keep the blood pure, and purify the system generally at set intervals. 17. Daily seek exercise in a pure atmosphere away from the town, for the benefit of the lungs and general invigoration of the system. 18. Train the body systematically in gymnastic exercises, to give it a full complement of strength, firmness, and activity. Vary gymnastics by outdoor games in fine weather. 19. Make yourself thoroughly familiar with logic, that the mind may be strengthened and quickened, and that truth may always be separated from error. 20. Let mathematics invigorate and steady your mind for studies of higher purpose. 21. Let languages teach you the subtle distinctions that lie in words, polish and refine your mind, and make you familiar with other peoples and other literatures than your own. 22. Seek the philosophy of all things,—that searching examination which reduces wide fields of knowledge to a focus whence new sciences, new fields of inquiry arise. 23. Study method, that things may be preserved in their relation and unity and the judgment be guided in its purposes. 24. Metaphysics study with care, that the science of being may accompany and underlie your daily life. 25. Study history, that man and his works, and the world and its changes, may yield general maxims and truths for reflection. 26.

Study the exact sciences for their importance in daily life, and the wonderful evidence they evolve of a wise Creator. 27. Study arts and manufactures according to the sphere of usefulness to which you are called to apply your energy.

III. THE CULTURE OF BEING—ITS MEANS.

In such an extensive subject as the present, our limited space prevents the much more minute details we had purposed presenting. In this the last section we can do nothing but name those authors whose works will give the reader the particulars of the culture we have eliminated in the preceding tables. In study, the principles are (1) a good text-book, (2) assiduity, and (3) thoroughness. We will direct the student to the first; let him supply the rest, and we doubt not of his success.

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|---|---|------------------------------------|
| 1. By self-study | { | Scott's Bible. |
| | | Bagster's Bible. |
| | | Cassell's Bible. |
| 2. Through commentaries | { | Kitto. |
| | | Chalmers. |
| | | Barnes. |
| 3. In the original languages | { | Gospel in Hebrew. |
| | | Gospel in Greek. |
| | | Gospel in Latin. |
| 4. Earnest, constant prayer | { | Epistles of New Testament. |
| | | The Psalms. |
| | | Altar of the Household. |
| 5. Study of pious examples | { | Life and words of Christ. |
| | | Old Testament history. |
| | | Cyclopædia of Religious Biography. |
| 6. Modelling and reviewing conduct . . . | { | Earnest Student, by Macleod. |
| | | Life of Franklin, Chalmers, &c. |
| | | Encyclopædia Metropolitana. |
| 7. Principles (Theology) . | { | Encyclopædia Britannica. |
| | | Chambers' Encyclopædia. |
| 8. Systems and theories (Theology) | { | 1. Chalmers. |
| | | 2. Ranken. |
| | | 3. Walton. |
| 9. Controversies (Theology) | { | 1. Chalmers. |
| | | 2. Isaac Taylor. |
| | | 3. Whewell. |
| 10. By study of the body and its functions . | { | George Combe and Andrew Combe. |
| | | Lewes, G. H. |
| | | Dr. Carpenter. |
| 11. By securing all healthful requisites in food, &c. | { | J. S. Beale. |
| | | Southwood Smith. |
| | | Hufeland and Wilson. |
| 12. By preserving the body from hurtful physical influences . . . | { | Haviland. |
| | | Dr. John Brown. |
| | | Dr. Coleman. |
| 13. Punctual and just division of meals, &c. . | { | Davis. |
| | | W. Chambers. |
| | | Beale. |

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| 14. Temperance | { L. Cornaro.
Franklin.
Smith.
W. Chambers. |
| 15. Early rising, &c. | { Franklin.
Cobbett. |
| 16. Nourishment and puri-
fication of body | { Horace Dobell.
Liebig.
Lankester. |
| 17. Pure and invigorating
atmosphere | { Dr. Coleman.
Southwood Smith.
Dr. Beale. |
| 18. Gymnastic exercises, out-
door games, &c. | { 1. Spencer's Gymnastics.
2. Walker's Manly Exercises.
3. Pycroft's Cricket-field, &c. |
| 19. Logic. | { 1. Sir William Hamilton.
2. J. S. Mill.
3. Samuel Neil. |
| 20. Mathematics | { Todhunter.
Potts.
Colenso. |
| 21. Languages | { Greek (Pryce).
Latin (Pryce).
French (Hall). |
| 22. The philosophy of things | { Bacon.
Schlegel.
Miller. |
| 23. Method | { S. T. Coleridge.
Encyclopædia Britannica.
English Encyclopædia. |
| 24. Metaphysics | { Sir W. Hamilton.
J. F. Ferrier.
F. D. Maurice. |
| 25. History | { Hallam.
Encyclopædia Metropolitana.
Rogers, Hooker, &c. |
| 26. The exact sciences | { Newton.
Owen.
Davy, &c., &c. |
| 27. Arts, manufactures, &c. | { C. Babbage.
Ure.
Mavor. |

There is very much still to remark upon our subject which space will not permit us to touch, but we may return to the subject and bring many other very important matters under the system we have outlined.

SIDNEY WENTWORTH YOUNG.

Toiling Upward.

JAMES PERRY, JOURNALIST.

THE story which I now aim to tell is exceedingly simple, yet I cannot think it will fail to be interesting, inasmuch as it will be an epitomized memoir of James Perry, "one of the first to raise the social status of the London newspaper editor," and so to exercise a beneficial influence on all human life; for the newspaper is, in our day, one of the necessities of the most commonplace life. He was a silent, unostentatious worker; one of those who *are* as well as exercise an influence, and who, as the originators of new adaptations for the conveniences of life, bestow continual benefits upon many who know not to whom they owe these common comforts.

The power of the press is so great, and its influence is in the main so wholesome, that any one of those who have aided in making it efficient for the working out of its high ends merits the interest of the enjoyers of the immense social benefits derivable from the possession of a free, independent, and trustworthy newspaper press. Napoleon I., on his return to France from the island of Elba, said to Benjamin Constant, "Public discussions, free elections, responsible ministers, liberty of the press especially,—I desire all these, particularly liberty of the press. To stifle it is absurd." James Perry was one of those who helped to make the press the giant power which protects cabinets, awes potentates, restrains tyranny, exposes villanies, and is engaged in guiding the destinies of the world to peace, prosperity, freedom, and happiness—the censor of events, the champion of progress, the forethoughtful critic of the future, the careful adviser of the present, and the skilful recorder of the past—"the palladium," as Junius called it, "of all the civil, political, and religious rights of an Englishman."

Few histories are so filled with the materials for romance and sensationalism as that of journalism; but we have no hankering after the artificial excitement of fiction, or even after the intensely moving power of that "truth which is stranger than fiction." The best lessons of life are learned, not from those biographies which are filled with strange incidents and uncommon events, but from those which are begun in the ordinary levels, and which show the upward achievements of thought, care, and industry, such as may be used and exhibited by all; and such is the life of the hero of my paper.

James Perry (as he afterwards called himself) was the son of a

house carpenter in the neighbourhood of Aberdeen, whose name was William Pirie. James received his early education at the parish school of Chapel Garioch, then under the dominieship of a Mr. Farquhar, with whom he was boarded. Beside the Maiden Stone, near the parish church, by the old castle of Balquhain, among the ruins of a Druidical temple that was near it, with its fine yet strange and weird echo,—as well as along the banks of the Don and the Urie, and even out to the scene of the battle of Harlow, celebrated in Scottish story,—James Perry's holiday strolls and week-day sports led him; and here he learned the art of making himself master of whatever he took in hand. When Mr. Farquhar had laid the groundwork of a good education in his mind, the lad was transferred to the grammar school of Aberdeen, a famous old institution, which acts as a gymnasium, and prepares for the university, whither in due time James Perry was sent as a student in 1771, when he was just upon the eve of closing his fifteenth year—for we should have said before that he was born 30th October, 1756. Here he studied Latin, Greek, and logic, and after going through three years of the curriculum he was articted to an Aberdeen advocate, named Arthur Dingwall Fordyce.

Before he had served the period specified in his indenture, his father, who had been somewhat prosperous in business, and had become rather reckless in his building speculations, having fallen into difficulties, was unable to help him in getting on in the profession for which he had been trained. The only opening which presented itself to him in the hour of his need was a connection with a company of actors, then going the circuit at Aberdeen. Being handsome, lively, and a good dancer, he got on the *rôle* for second-rate characters, rising at one time to that of *Sempronius*, in Addison's "Cato," and sometimes giving a hornpipe or other example of the poetry of motion between the pieces. In this way he visited Montrose, Arbroath, Dundee, Perth, and—Holcroft, who had performed with him, says—Newcastle-on-Tyne. But on Digges, the manager, becoming lessee of the Edinburgh Theatre, he was constrained to tell Perry that his strong provincial accent unfitted him for the metropolitan stage, and that he could scarcely achieve success on the boards. In Edinburgh he attempted to get into the courses of the law again, and hung about awhile in the hope of obtaining employment; but his efforts were vain, and he passed on to Manchester with a few letters of introduction. In Manchester a manufacturer named Mr. Dinwiddie employed him as clerk, and for two years he devoted himself to the work in hand, while he made great efforts to improve himself during his leisure hours. During his residence in Manchester he joined a literary institution and debating society. The essays, papers, speeches, &c., prepared for and delivered at this association attracted the notice and won the regard of many of the frequenters. Feeling within himself capacities for thinking and writing, he gave heed to reading and attention to composition, seeking fulness of mind and readiness of

utterance. The approval of his compeers justified his own opinion, and he at last determined to proceed to London in search of a higher position and a more extensive sphere of usefulness. His friends supplied him with testimonials, and in 1777, when the agitation about the American war was exciting men—when Horne Tooke was the hero of the time on account of his seditious declaration, when the recent death of Dr. Dodd for forgery was still a topic of talk, when Dr. Johnson was dictator of literature, “Junius” was the mystery of the age, and Woodfall was the sovereign of the newspaper press,—James Perry entered the great city, an almost penniless adventurer.

Having taken lodgings in Shire Lane, London, with a fellow-countryman named Lunan, a shoemaker, James Perry began his search for employment. He delivered his letters of introduction, and got from a few a sort of half-hearted invitation to call again. Not wishing to be idle, he used a portion of the time then too plenteously on his hands in composing a few letters and articles. Some of these he dropped into the box of the *General Advertiser*, a newspaper which had been started about ten years before, and which was then edited by William Cooke, biographer of Foote and Macklin, author of some minor poems, the “Elements of Dramatic Criticism,” &c., under the proprietorship of Messrs. Richardson and Urquhart, a firm to whom Perry had had a recommendation. Calling on one of his rounds on the firm, Mr. Urquhart, who was busily engaged in the perusal of the *General Advertiser*, looked up on Perry’s entrance, and, anticipating his address, said, “No, young man, I have heard of nothing suitable for you yet; but,” smiling blandly, “if, now, you could write some such article as this I have just been reading, I could give you immediate employment.” The paper spoken of was one of Perry’s box contributions, and this he proved by pulling from his pocket another of the same sort in the same handwriting, which he was just about to drop into the editorial receptacle. Mr. Urquhart secured his services at once at a guinea per week, with an additional half-guinea to be earned by acting as sub-editor of the *London Evening Post*, a paper to which Edmund, William, and Richard Burke contributed, and which Horne Tooke patronized and aided. Thus he became a literary man. In those days editorial work was not at high pressure as it is now, and Perry passed a considerable portion of his leisure in the debating assemblies which were frequent in those times, and formed one of the favourite public recreations. Perry’s intelligence, readiness, and gentlemanly manners attracted admiration, and he was a most popular and accomplished controversialist. He had scarcely yet achieved his true vocation. His organizing faculty had as yet no field for its activity. His opportunity came with the trial of Admiral Augustus Keppel, who was tried by court-martial at Portsmouth, at the instance of the Admiralty, on charges of misconduct and neglect of duty, resulting in the escape of the French fleet from him during the night of 27th July, 1778, brought against him

by Sir Hugh Palliser. The trial lasted for six weeks, and during that time Perry, who had been commissioned to report the proceedings for the *London Evening Post*, sent up daily eight columns of an account of the trial, and so increased the circulation by several thousands. The attention of the newspaper world was strongly excited by this extraordinary single-handed achievement, and these reports had no small influence in stirring up the strong passion of the people against Sir H. Palliser, resulting in the smashing of his windows and other riotous demonstrations, and leading to the illumination of the houses of Westminster and London for two successive nights.

At this time seventeen newspapers were published—seven daily, eight thrice, and two twice a week, and only one weekly—engaged in gratifying “the universal passion for politics;” and the keenness of this competition made a good man an acquisition. Hence on the demise of Wall, editor of the *Gazetteer*, the editorship of that paper was offered to Perry, with a salary of four guineas a week, a post, however, which he refused to accept until he had secured a provision that he should be left entirely free as an editor in the expression of his political opinions, in which he followed Charles James Fox.

In 1782 Perry projected the *European Magazine*, a monthly journal intended to combine a miscellany of general literature with a review of new books. The ability with which this serial was conducted added greatly to the popularity of the author, and the proprietor was able to dispose of his new venture to considerable advantage. Perry also acted as editor of John Debrett’s “Parliamentary Debates” and State papers; and “The Peerage,” which has now given a European celebrity to the name of the projector.

It was, however, as editor of the *Gazetteer* that James Perry made that revolution in parliamentary reporting which entitles him to the admiration and gratitude of mankind. It would be difficult to overrate the importance which ought to be attached to the introduction of a means by which the entire people of the nation are virtually made auditors of the eloquence of Parliament, and representatively spectators of its proceedings. It has been said that “no circumstance in the history of our country, not even parliamentary reform, has done more for freedom and good government than the unfettered liberty of reporting; and of all the services which the press has rendered to free institutions, none has been greater than its bold defiance of parliamentary privileges while labouring for the interests of the people;” but the beneficiality of such an exercise of the talents of the members of the Fourth Estate depended on the possibility of giving full, early, and accurate accounts of the proceedings of the consultative legislature. When Perry became connected with the press there was only one reporter attached to each of the morning papers. These servants of the public had no *status* or place in the Houses of Parliament, and required to take their positions in the strangers’ gallery, to remain

in the House during the whole of the proceedings, to attend to all that went on, and to remember it all without being allowed to take any note whatever. Of course it was only a mere outline that could in general thus be given, when after so much fatigue of attention the reporter proceeded from his memory to recall and reproduce the occurrences and the speeches of the sitting. William "Memory" Woodfall, brother of H. S. ("Junius") Woodfall, was at this time bringing out his reports single-handed by about twenty-four or thirty hours after the sittings of the House; and Wall, Perry's predecessor on the *Gazetteer*, had been sometimes weeks in arrears. The new editor changed all this. He was himself an excellent reporter from memory, his ability and practice as a speaker in debating societies giving him a keen interest in oratorical turns and forms of expression; but by introducing the system of relays and short service at once, with the writing out of the portion of copy immediately on the termination of the reporter's turn, and placing these in the hands of the compositors at once, he was able to provide pretty fair reports of the proceedings of Parliament in the next morning's issue of the paper, thus anticipating, and by a superior article, Wm. Woodfall's self-executed reports by nearly a day.

Woodfall saw this was a losing game, and he proposed parting with his property in the *Morning Chronicle*. This reached the ears of James Perry, who had made some friends, and he negotiated a purchase of the property. Mr. Bellamy, wine merchant in Chandos Street, one of the doorkeepers of the House of Commons, lent Perry a sum of money, as did also Ransom and Co., the bankers, and with this, joined to £500 contributed by a Scottish ally—a Mr. Gray, who had been Greek and Latin tutor at the Charterhouse,—Perry managed to buy the copyright and proprietorship of the *Morning Chronicle*. Gray soon afterwards died, and his capital was transmuted into an annuity payable to Gray's sister. In the hands of Perry the paper became a mine of wealth, and its proprietor and editor drew from it a very large income—varying from £600 to £1,000 per annum. Indeed, when the copyright of the *Morning Chronicle* was sold shortly after Perry's death, Mr. Clement is stated to have paid for it £42,000.

Perry in 1790, at the age of thirty-four, and after thirteen years' arduous literary labour—for he was the author of poems, pamphlets, and magazine articles, as well as newspaper work—was at the head of the journalism of his time. For a long period the *Times*, started in 1788, was inferior to the *Morning Chronicle* in circulation and influence, and it was not till after 1815 that Perry, having held office as its editor for more than a quarter of a century, began to succumb to the influences of age and the energy of Mr. Walter, proprietor of the *Times*. Up till that year the average circulation of Perry's paper was the largest then known—though it would be thought but a small one in our days,—4,500 *per diem*.

Perry determined not to pursue the usual course of newspaper editors in those days, to hire a few dull hacks, and work them to

death in harness. For instance, he offered Robert Burns a stated salary if he would settle in London and become a contributor to his paper. Under his editorial sway were produced the lyrics of Campbell, the squibs of Porson (his brother-in-law) and Thomas Moore, the jests of Charles Lamb, the criticisms of William Hazlitt, and the theatrical notices of John (afterwards Lord Chancellor) Campbell. He had assistants in the editorship—when he was himself in Paris in the crisis of the French Revolution, catering news for the paper—Sergeant Spankie (afterwards M.P. for Finsbury and Attorney-General of Bengal); and later on in his career, when the weight of work and age were telling on him, John Black, a native of Dunse, author of the life of "Torquato Tasso," editor of "Memoirs of Goldoni," translator of Schlegel and Humboldt,—a man worthy of a niche in the gallery of those famous for toiling upward, not only for what he was himself, but for what he did in discovering and encouraging the talents of Charles Dickens. Perry's theory of editorial responsibility was very high and nobly carried out. He would never consent to shelter himself from personal consequences by giving up the names of those who furnished the materials for his paper, even when he had been misinformed by them. On one occasion he fought a duel with a complaining party rather than give up the name of his informant, though he had not seen the objectionable paragraph before it had been put in type. He was twice prosecuted by Government, but on both occasions—defended in the one by Erskine, in the other by himself—he was acquitted; though both himself and his printer, Mr. Lambert, were imprisoned in Newgate for permitting the appearance of an article in which the House of Lords was designated an "Hospital of Incurables."

Perry was the personal friend of Fox, Sheridan, Pitt, Shelburne, &c., and at wide intervals of time the two latter urged him to accept a seat in the House of Commons. He was a notable speaker at the debating societies, at the contested elections of Westminster, at the meetings of the Whig Club, &c. Nor was he contented with literary fame, elocutionary reputation, and newspaper profits. He engaged in several commercial speculations, and few good-looking schemes were launched in those days without an endeavour to engage James Perry, Esq., of Lancaster Court, Strand—or, as Porson used to call him, "My Lord of Lancaster"—in the concern. In a scheme of Mr. Booth's for the production of polygraphic paintings he took great interest and sunk a good deal of money. He also bought some mills in Merton, on which he lost a considerable sum. He was not, in the common acceptation of the term, a scholar, but he was a man of taste and literary skill, and in his house in Tavistock Square he had a curious collection of books—including a good many black-letter tomes—which were valued at £1,500. Charles Lamb describes him as "a pleasant, gentlemanly man, with a dash of the courtier;" Leigh Hunt tells us "he was a lively, good-natured man, with a shrewd expression of countenance and twinkling eyes." "He held," says Francis Jeffrey, "the office of editor for

nearly forty years, and he held firm to his party and his principles all that time—a long time for political honesty and consistency to last! He was a man of strong natural sense, some acquired knowledge, a quick tact, prudent, plausible, and with great heartiness and warmth of feeling. His cordial voice and sanguine mode of address made friends whom his sincerity and gratitude insured." He was noted, among his own party, for ability, integrity, and independence of spirit, and hence he was often put in early possession of their plans and intents; but even the Tory opposition so strongly appreciated his sterling worth and genuine honesty, that he not unfrequently received communications from them which were valuable to him as giving a high standing to the paper of which he was the conductor and proprietor. He died, after a long and painful illness, at Brighton, 6th December, 1821, in the sixty-fifth year of his age. He had been twice married, and six children survived him.

"He was a highly honourable and brave man; confidence in him was never abused. He was the depositary of many most important secrets of high personages. Generous in the extreme, he was ever ready with his purse and his services. His manner was manly, frank, and candid, and he was the best of proprietors. Walter, of the *Times*, was a better man of business; and Daniel Stuart, of the *Post and Courier*, knew better how to make money; but Perry was a thorough gentleman, who attracted every man with whom he was connected."

"The press is mistress of intelligence, and intelligence is mistress of the world." How much are we indebted, then, to the silent, thoughtful man, who virtually invented reporting for us, and supplied the press with the means of taking into its repositories the history of the moment as it passes, with all its might of agitation, legislation, discussion, and event, and of placing before tens of thousands at the same instant the very thoughts and words which decide the fate of parties, the arbitrement of war, the interests of commerce, the blessedness of justice, and the triumph of truth! When men become wise enough to write with reverence the biographies of their benefactors, the name of James Perry will be written as that of one who opened Parliament to the people, and made representation real. Meanwhile we may surely place him before our readers as an instance of the power of perseverance, a dauntless endeavour to do the duty that lies before us, a determination to keep the heart above the caprice of fortune, and a fixed purpose to achieve success if it lies in the possibilities of "*Toiling Upward*."

The Reviewer.

Poems. By W. BLAKE ATKINSON. Wallingford: W. D. Jenkins.

THIS is a very creditable little local production. It contains forty pages of verses, chiefly relating to Wallingford and its neighbourhood, and three photographs pretty nicely executed. The poems are by a young man, and were nearly all written during his minority. They show fair poetic sympathy, and sense of rhythm; as well as a power of seizing upon the poetic side of things. They are, of course, as the firstlings of fancy should be, simple lays on subjects dear to human hearts, and near to the experience of many. The author has been favoured with a large local subscription list, which shows that he is popular with his townsfolk, as indeed we would surmise from the pleasant rhymes which appear here as having been delivered as prologues, or epilogues, at the penny readings of Wallingford, and at the mechanics' institute. The local sketches, of which photographs appear, are neatly described in pretty verse. We should think that with study, care, perusal of the best authors, and perseverance, the Laureate of Wallingford may do something to be known beyond the precincts of what we presume is his native town.

An Hour with Henry N. Barnet. By W. ORMOND.

The Poetry of Life and Nature and the Poet. By W. ORMOND.
Bristol: J. B. Taylor and Sons.

William Ormond's forthflow of emotioned thought always pleases us. He is fresh, earnest, enthusiastic, and sympathetic. His pamphlets come to us, now and again, from the double-rivered and double-countied city of poets, artists, navigators, ecclesiastics, military men and merchants, with the agreeable pungency of the sea air, or rather we should say of the Channel breezes. There is genuine power in him, and there is a vigour, frankness, and good-humouredness in his utterances, which we recognise as effective and fascinating. His "Hour with H. N. Barnet" brought us into the company of a stranger, to us, in an agreeable and enjoyable style, while his "Poetry of Life and Nature" is clearly a prose poem, an idyl of common life and the life-joys of common people of great merit. It is a grand gift that of glorifying the life of the poor, and seeing the poetry of poverty and the wealth of emotional delight which may be hidden under the humanity of the lowly. W. Ormond is a sweetener and an elevator of life, and we commend his brief pieces to the goodwill of all who rejoice in holding companionship with a right good fellow—socially, morally, and intellectually.

A Glance at the Commons and Open Spaces near London.
London: G. Hill.

—“The Parochial Critic” has done well to stir the question, What is to be done with the Commons and Open Spaces near London?—are they to be built upon, enclosed or preserved free for the use, the health, and recreation of the people? This glance is worth perusal in a topographical point of view, as well as in a controversial one. The Commons Preservation Society have a good work to do and require help to do it as it ought. Those who read this glance will sympathize with and assist in their labour.

Old Jonathan. London: Collingridge.

British Workman. London: Partridge.

These two illustrated penny journals, devoted to the social, moral, and religious elevation of the labouring classes, require and deserve a most earnest word of commendation. Their literature and their illustrations fit them for general improvement and delight. They should be widely bought and read.

The Church—The Appeal. London: E. Stock.

These two monthlies are admirably edited, and well adapted to promote piety and conduce to holy life and happy death. The former, at the cost of a penny, provides sermons, tales, poetry, essays, and ecclesiastical intelligence; the latter, at one halfpenny, contains hortative Christian invitations, remonstrance and advising.

Counsel and Cheer for the Battle of Life. By Rev. W. G. BLAIKIE, D.D., &c. London: Alexander Strahan.

This is a book we would gladly commend to the shelf devoted to our readers' heart-known and favourite books—the silent, but blessed and blessing companions of their better hours. We know of few men who are so thoroughly deserving of confidence, so absolutely worthy of trust and loving acceptancy as an adviser, as Dr. Blaikie is. His “Better days for Working People” we commended highly in a former issue, and this “Counsel and Cheer” we regard as an admirable supplement to that volume. It is a beam of light let into the spirit to brighten, enliven, invigorate, all that is best, noblest, and purest in humanity. It consists of *eight* chapters, of which the *first* treats of “Three levers for universal use.” These are Self-respect, Self-reliance, and Self-control, on all of which, with interesting discursiveness, the author writes like a man in earnest, and in the course of which he illustrates by anecdote the meaning of the several grades and shades of the qualities of soul he wishes to induce his readers to garner into their souls, that they may, live well, wisely, usefully, holily, and above all, hopefully. Chapter *second* is concerned with “Wild oats and good seed,” an excellent word of wise warning and kindly advice to young men.

showing the perils of early—however secret, indeed the more secret the more disastrously—self-indulgence, and in pressing faithfully and forcefully the need of fixed principles and high aims. Chapter *third* exhibits in an attractive and instructive manner the method of applying “an old key to our social puzzles” efficaciously—a dissertation on the value of the Bible as a treasury of moral principles, social suggestions, and life-counsel. In chapter *fourth* “the divine uses of beauty” are descanted on. The uses named are, (1) to give pleasure, (2) to refresh power, (3) to draw love, (4) to express divine thoughts and feelings. In the course of these remarks the views of Ruskin, Locke, Blackie, Chalmers, Taylor, and Dr. M’Vicar, on several related points, are made the subject of notice and criticism; and we are led in chapter *fifth* to pass on to the consideration of “the Enjoyment of Beauty.” This section is rich in sympathy with the classes who labour, and in it the author endeavours to prove that the Bible and Nature are co-illustrative and both full of enjoyable beauty. In chapter *sixth* we have pointed out to us some work for sunbeams—the sunbeams of (1) human love, (2) providential love, (3) redeeming love, (4) glorifying love; and here too illustrations again pour the light of sunbeams on the author’s meaning. Chapter *seventh* is entitled “Bear and Forbear,” and somewhat reminds us of the philosophy of A. K. H. B., though it is somewhat more robust than his. It very forcibly teaches the art of taking things in a right spirit and the value of sanctified common sense. The question of the relation of “the working man and the Christian Church” forms the topic of the last, the *eighth* chapter. Suggested by a recently held conference between the clergy and the members of the wage-class, it discusses the questions put and the answers given, and it offers some considerations as worthy of being weighed by working men—such as, that Jesus Christ in his human nature was *of* the people, and *for* the people, that the sacrifice of Christ was due to the value of the souls which he gave himself to redeem, and an affirmation of the unquestionable possibility of making—as Thomas Binney phrased it—the best of both worlds, by combining a wholesome regard to this life with a hopeful endeavour after that which is to come.

From this scanty outline the intelligent reader may glean some sort of notion of the utility of the line of thought adopted by the author, and how well such a course of reflection is calculated to give “counsel and cheer” to those who need them most; those who have fewest opportunities for culture and thought, and the scantiest supplies of comfort and training. We do not by any means imply that this is a book *merely* for the working classes. It is a book which will do good to all who read it with sympathy and intelligence, and is quite as well fitted to improve the advisers, teachers, and employers of the productive and administrative performers of life’s work, as the persons fastened to the oar of labour.

We find the book characterised by prudential wisdom, sympathetic geniality, Christian feeling and genuine philanthropy. We

recognise earnestness, love, and thoughtfulness in its pages, and we cannot help thinking that those who peruse its faithful and affectionate pages must feel their hearts bettered and their minds improved. It is a *good* book in the most emphatic sense of the term; it is good in its matter, style, method, intent and aim, good alike in its manliness and its godliness.

A Time for Thought. By J. A. COOPER, Esq., F.R.S.L. London: Sunday School Union.

To all who know the reputation of the author of this "New Year's Address to Sabbath School Teachers," his name alone will be enough to tell them that worth, earnestness, purity and holiness, will characterize the thought and writing. We do not think the Sunday School Union could have chosen a better man, though they had sought diligently through their whole host, to speak a word in season to their constituents. He calls on his readers to think 1, on the solemn responsibility of Christian life; 2, the special characteristics and requirements of their vocation; 3, the manner in which they have discharged their duties; 4, the results of their labours, and to endeavour to make their teaching (1) more attractive, (2) more definite and exact, (3) more spiritual. We cannot resist giving the following *souppçon* of its quality:—

"The scholars who now surround us will, in a few short years, arrive at maturity, and will take with them, into various positions in life, the remembrance of our teaching and the influences of our example. To distant parts of the world some of them may go, and there they will think of us, and there amidst the most unlikely scenes and circumstances they will recall to mind the lessons we gave them in their childhood or youth. A striking example of this once came to my knowledge. One Sunday morning a fine, tall young man entered the schoolroom in which I labour, and coming up to me put out his hand, and asked if I did not remember him. He told me his name, and I replied that I remembered a little boy of that name who was once in our school; and he smilingly assured me that it was the same 'little boy' who then addressed me. He went on to give a brief but deeply interesting account of his career. He entered the army, had been in the Russian war, where he had endured great hardships; but having obtained his discharge he returned to his home, and had come to have a look at the place where he had received so much instruction. Glancing round the room his eye rested on an elderly man, to whom he pointed and exclaimed, 'That was my teacher! I shall never forget him, nor the lessons he gave me. Often, when sleeping in my tent in the Crimea, I dreamt of him; and seemed then to hear his voice as I heard it when I was a boy in his class!' It will be even thus with many of our scholars; the lessons they receive now will be remembered in days to come, and in some form or other will be repeated by them to their own scholars, to their own sons and daughters, or it may be to their children's children. What an enlarged idea these considerations give us of the nature and extent of personal influence, the silent and mysterious pulsations of which can never cease, but will go on repeating themselves to the end of time, and even into eternity!"

Our Collegiate Course, STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.

MILTON'S SONG ON MAY MORNING.

[“The outbreak into beauty which nature makes at the end of April and beginning of May excites so joyful and admiring a feeling in the human breast, that there is no wonder the event should have at all times been celebrated in some way. The first emotion is a desire to seize some part of that profusion of flower and blossom which spreads around us, to set it up in decorative fashion, pay it a sort of homage, and let the pleasure it excites find expression in dance and song. A mad happiness goes abroad over the earth that nature, being dead and cold, lives and smiles again. Doubtless there is mingled with this, too, in bosoms of any reflection, a grateful sense of the divine goodness which makes the promise of seasons so stable and so sure.”—*Chambers's “Book of Days,”* vol. i., 571. “No date is assigned to this charming song; but we think there can hardly be a doubt of its having been written at Horton on some lovely morning in the month of May” (*Keightley*), and most probably concerning the first morning of it. The probable date, therefore, lies between 1632 and 1638.]

Now the bright morning star, (1) day's harbinger, (2)
Comes dancing from the east, and leads with her
The flowery May, (3) who from her green lap throws (4)
The yellow cowslip and the pale primrose.
Hail, bounteous May, that dost inspire
Mirth, and youth, and warm desire;
Woods and groves are of thy dressing,
Hill and dale doth boast thy blessing;
Thus (5) we salute thee with our early song,
And welcome thee, and wish thee long.

(1) When *Venus* (the planet nearest the earth, and, except *Mercury*, nearest to the sun) is to the west of the sun, she rises and sets before him, and she was then called by the ancients, *Phosphorus* and *Lucifer* (light-bringer). But when she is to the east of the sun, she rises and sets after him, and was then called *Hesperus*, *Vesper*, *Vesperugo*, *Noctifer*. The terms in our old almanacks—*Morning Star* and *Evening Star*—refer to these positions.

(2) Harbinger, as if Harbouringer, one who goes to secure or provide *harbour* or lodgings, and hence precursor or forerunner.

(3) The notion that May was so called in honour of *Maia*, the mother, by *Jupiter*, of the god *Hermes*, or *Mercury*, seems to have been a mere guess originating in the similarity of the sound of the word. The most probable derivation is that it was the name assigned to the month sacred to the *Majores* (*Maiores*) in the Roman senate, as *June* was of that devoted to the *Juniores*. See the question discussed in *Ovid's “Fasti,”* Book V.

(4) “Then came fair May, the fairest maid on ground,
Decked all with dainties of her season's pride,
And throwing flowers out of her lap around.”—*Spenser*.

(5) The word “thus” seems to refer to a May-day carol and festival.

LITERATURE OF ENGLAND;

BIOGRAPHICAL, CHRONOLOGICAL, CRITICAL, ETC.

TABLE IV.—IMAGINATIVE WRITERS.

1600—1700.

*Names and Dates.**Events and Works.*

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|-------------------------------------|---|---|
| 9. JOHN FORD,
1586— | } | Born at Ilchester; member of Middle Temple, 1602; "Fame's Memorial," 1606, an elegiac poem on Mountjoy, Earl of Devonshire, dedicated to his widow, formerly Penelope Devereux, Lady Rich; "The Sun's Darling," a Moral Masque, in conjunction with Decker; "The Witch of Edmonton," "Lover's Melancholy," "The Broken Heart," "Love's Sacrifice," "Perkin Warbeck," "The Lady's Trial," &c. Probably succeeded to a fortune, and died at Ilchester subsequently to 1645. |
| 10. BEN JONSON,
1574—1637. | } | Born at Westminster, where he was educated; brought up as a bricklayer; went as a soldier to the Netherlands; studied at Oxford and Cambridge, it is said; took to theatrical writing, and contested the headship of the drama with Shakspeare. In 1619 succeeded Daniel as poet laureate; sank into poverty; became unpopular, and failing in health, died. He was buried in Westminster Abbey in an upright position, it is said. His chief plays are "Every man in his Humour," 1598; "Sejanus," 1603; "Volpone," 1605; "The Silent Woman," 1609; "The Alchemist," 1610. Works published 1616. He wrote masques, pastorals, translations, minor poems, and several fine lyrics; he also left behind him some philological works and prose dissertations. |
| 11. NATHANIEL LEE,
1655—1691. | } | Son of a clergyman; was born at Westminster; educated at the school there, and at Trinity College, Cambridge. Became an actor and a dramatist; wrote thirteen plays, of which the best are "Mithridates," "Lucius Junius Brutus," "Theodosius," "The Rival Queens, or Alexander the Great." He assisted Dryden in "The Duke of Guise" and "Oedipus." He was for a time an inmate of Bedlam, after his release from which he was supported by charity. He died in London, and was buried in St. Clement's church. |
| 12. ANDREW MARVELL,
1620—1678. | } | Born at Kingston-on-Hull, where his father was schoolmaster; educated at Trinity College, Cambridge; travelled in France, Holland, Italy, and Spain, and learned the languages of these countries. Began his parliamentary career in 1660; visited Holland, and as secretary to Lord Carlisle went to Denmark, Sweden, and Russia. His political career was distinguished, and ultimately led to his being exposed to the enmity of the court. He died suddenly—some say by poison. He was a friend of Milton's. |
| 13. PHILIP MASSINGER,
1584—1640. | } | Born at Salisbury or Wilton; educated with the Earl of Pembroke's children, and sent to Oxford, 1602, which, however, he left in 1606 without a degree; attached himself to the drama, and amidst much poverty |

laboured along with Fletcher, Decker, Rowley, and Middleton, in the production of plays. Eighteen only have been recovered and printed, although he was the author of thirty-seven. He died suddenly in Southwark, and there, in the church of St. Mary Overies, he was buried as "a stranger," "New Way to Pay Old Debts," "Maid of Honour," "The City Madam," "The Unnatural Combat," "The Bondman," "The Roman Actor," "The Fatal Dowry," &c.

Epitome of Critical Opinions.

9. "Ford was of the first order of poets. He sought for sublimity not by parcels in metaphors or visible images, but directly where she has her full residence—in the heart of man; in the actions and sufferings of the greatest minds."—*Editor of Murray's Family Library, "Ford's Plays."* "Ford, with none of the beauty and elevation of Massinger, has, in a much higher degree, the power over tears. . . . He conducts his story well and without confusion; his scenes are often highly wrought and effective; his characters, with no striking novelty, are well supported; he is seldom extravagant or regardless of probability."—*Charles Lamb.* "In fulness and fine equability Ford was far below Massinger; but in intensity, in the power of making an audience miserable, and moving them to tears, he was thought to excel him."—*Hallam.* "The style of Ford is altogether original and his own. Without the majestic march which distinguishes the poetry of Massinger, and with little or none of that light and playful humour which characterizes the dialogue of Fletcher, or even of Shirley, he is yet elegant, and easy, and harmonious; and, though rarely sublime, yet sufficiently elevated for the most pathetic tones of that passion on whose romantic energies he chiefly delighted to dwell."—*David Masson.*

10. "Then Jonson came, instructed from the school,
To please by method, and invent by rule;
His studious patience and laborious art
With regular approach assayed the heart;
Cold approbation gave the lingering bays,
For they who durst not censure scarce could praise.
A mortal born, he met the general doom;
But left, like Egypt's kings, a lasting tomb."

Dr. Samuel Johnson.

"The art of Jonson was not confined to the cold observations of the unities of place and time, but appears in the whole adaptation of his incidents and characters in support of each other. Beneath his learning and art he moves with an activity which may be compared to the strength of a man who can leap and bound under the heaviest armour."—*Thomas Campbell.* "He was a poet of a high order, as far as learning, fancy, and an absolute rage of ambition could conspire to make him one; and that he never touched at the highest, except by violent efforts, and during the greatest felicity of his sense of success. The material so predominated in him over the spiritual, the sensual over the sentimental, that he was more social than loving, and far more wilful and fanciful than imaginative."—*Leigh Hunt.*

"Next Jonson sat, in ancient learning trained,
His rigid judgment Fancy's flight restrained,
Correctly pruned each wild, luxuriant thought,
Marked out her course, nor spared a glorious fault."

The book of man he read with nicest art,
 And ransacked all the secrets of the heart ;
 Excited penetration's utmost force,
 And traced each passion to its proper source ;
 Then, strongly marked, in liveliest colours drew,
 And brought each foible forth to public view.
 The coxcomb felt a lash in every word,
 The fools, hung out, their brother fools deterred :
 His comic humour kept the world in awe,
 And laughter frightened folly more than law."—*Churchill*.

11. "Lee, though some eloquent passages from his tragedies have survived, was really nothing more than a poor likeness of Dryden."—*William Spalding*. "He is, in spite of his proverbial extravagance, a man of poetical mind and some dramatic skill."—*Hallam*. "In tenderness and genuine passion he excels Dryden ; but his style often degenerates into bombast and extravagant frenzy, a defect which was heightened in his late productions by his mental malady." . . . "He wanted discretion to temper his tropical genius, and reduce his poetical conceptions to consistency and order ; yet among his wild ardour and martial enthusiasm are very soft and graceful lines."—*Chambers's "Cyclopædia of English Literature."*

12. "In his prose writings Marvell defended the principles of freedom with great vigour of eloquence and liveliness of humour. He mingled a playful exuberance of fancy and figure, not unlike that of Burke, with a keenness of sarcastic wit not surpassed even by Swift."—*C. Cleaveland*. "Marvell wrote sometimes with more taste and feeling than was usual, but his satires are gross and stupid."—*Hallam*. "He is the author of a number of satires in verse, in which a rich vein of vigorous, though often coarse humour runs through a careless extemporaneous style, and which did prodigious execution in the party warfare of the day ; but some of his other poetry, mostly perhaps written in the earlier part of his life, is eminent both for the delicate bloom of the sentiment, and for grace of form."—*G. L. Craik*.

13. "Any comparison of Massinger to Shakspeare would be invidious ; but though second to that great writer in the vastness and variety of his conceptions, he may certainly take the lead of those who have hitherto been considered his superiors. His invention is as fertile, and his management of his plots as ingenious, as those of Beaumont and Fletcher ; while the poetry of his language, the knowledge of human nature, and the fine development of the passions displayed in his tragedies, can only be surpassed by the great master himself. By Ben Jonson he is excelled in the studied exactness and classical polish of his style ; but in the freezing coldness of this writer he is deficient. The charm of his plays consists in the versatility of his imagination and the fine bursts of pathos which embellish his tender scenes."—*William Gifford*. "The most striking excellence of this poet is his conception of character ; and in this I must incline to place him above Fletcher and, if I may venture to say it, even above Jonson. He is free from the hard outline of the one and the negligent looseness of the other. He has, indeed, no great variety, and sometimes repeats, with such bare modifications as the story demands, the type of his first design."—*Hallam*. "Massinger, like Jonson, had received a learned education, and his classical reading has coloured his style and manner ; but he had scarcely so much originality of genius as Jonson. He is a very eloquent

writer, but has little power of high imagination or pathos, and still less wit or comic power. He could rise, however, to a vivid conception of a character moved by some single aim or passion; and he has drawn some of the darker shades of villainy with great force. His Sir Giles Overreach, in 'A New Way to pay Old Debts,' and his Luke in the 'City Madam,' are perhaps his most successful delineations in this style. In the conduct of his plots, also, he generally displays much skill. In short, all that can be reached by mere talent and warmth of susceptibility he has achieved; but his province was to appropriate and decorate, rather than to create."—*G. L. Craik.*

The Topic.

DOES THE ARMY AFFORD FAIR INDUCEMENTS TO ENLISTMENT?

AFFIRMATIVE.

ADVENTURE, travel, novelty, freedom from care, and admiration from many, belong to the soldier's expectations. He has no responsibility before him concerning provisions, clothing, hospital comforts, house-rent, where work is to come from. He has a small pay in ready money, it is true, but he has just as little to do with it; for the calls made on it, necessarily at least, are few. The joys of a soldier's life would not have been recounted in song and story unless there were rare fascinations connected with it, nor would it be so popular in every country in Europe if it did not supply a fair average of enjoyment. We think, therefore, that very fair inducements must be held out to the class required, or the supply would not be equal to the demand.—*E. G. L.*

The physical perfection of body maintained by due supervision of drill, exercise, food, rest and recreation, the general freedom from any need of giving heed to the things of the morrow, the changes of place and country open to the adventurer, and the chances of winning a

name in the annals of British warfare, all combine to prove that there is an attractive career opened up to those who have a desire to enlist, and it is now well known that the danger of death in battle is no greater than the average of accident in ordinary industrial life.—*F. B.*

A soldier's life is one possessing many attractions. The dress is gay, the pay sure, the housing generally comfortable on home service, and if called abroad there is the joy of travel and the delights of new scenery got free of cost to the military man. Health is well looked after, and moderate amusement is provided for. For a few years of a man's life, while growing and getting up a man's strength, the ease, comfort, and care cannot but be beneficial. The vices of a soldier's life are no necessary part of it; while the training, the opportunity of seeing the world, &c., are very material parts of it. Few working men can feel secure of constant employment and a regular supply of the necessities of life for ten years together, and many cares and difficulties crowd upon them from which the soldier is free; and hence we think

it may fairly be affirmed that the army affords fair inducements to enlistment.—E. J. O.

Care is a grim visitant at a hearthstone, and want is a dull companion, and asking for "leave to toil" as a favour and a blessing is a sorry lot. This is the common fate of a working man, and the workhouse without a pension looms in the distance. A soldier's lot is different in its comfort, certainty, and permanence.—W. M.

NEGATIVE.

The pay of private soldiers, trifling as it is, is merely a sham. Nearly every farthing is retained to defray uniform and rations, and a soldier is frequently in debt with the paymaster without having fingered a penny of pay. It is only when promoted to a sergeancy that a common soldier can really be said to hold any part of his pay. Promotion is very slow and precarious, and after the first few years of service is impossible. Unless a soldier is promoted early, he does not get promoted at all. A private rarely, if ever, is promoted to a commission. The quality of a regiment depends almost wholly upon the non-commissioned officers. They are they who do the real officer work of each regiment; the working affairs of a regiment are practically in their hands. Yet these men are little looked after, but left almost wholly without question. They are thus enabled to gratify petty vanities and severities upon the privates without check, and as they are frequently favourites of the commissioned officers, they hold the privates in their power to an extent which in most cases is perfect tyranny. To be under the command of a superior in rank and birth, even if he be a martinet, is not wholly displeasing to the private soldier; but to be constantly liable, under pain of punish-

ment, to the unquestioned tyranny of one superior only in title, is peculiarly galling to all who are not devoid of self-respect. This feature of our army discipline is a very bad one. Men imagine, when they enlist, that they will be brought into immediate contact with officers who are gentlemen. Instead of this, they are handed over to a sergeant who, according as his humour lies, treats them as dogs or rational animals. Look at the record of military murders: nearly all are committed upon obnoxious sergeants, by men driven desperate by petty tyranny. The great extension of trade and demand for skilled labour, contrasted with the inducements of the army, weigh most unfavourably against the latter. No one who can avoid it prefers the army to comfortable wages and the domestic hearth. The life of a private soldier is essentially an indolent one, and one open to great temptation. Regiments are frequently composed of questionable materials, and the well-disposed soldier, in constant contact with suspicious characters, cannot remain long uncorrupted. The enforced celibacy of privates is the cause also of many irregularities. The commissioned officers, under the absurd purchase system, are, as a rule, most unfit for their duties, and instead of being models which the privates may imitate, frequently rival the most abandoned of their own soldiers. To crown all, the history of the British army is, as regards the care and comfort of the troops, simply a series of the most ridiculous errors, only remedied by the sacrifice of thousands of valuable lives.—S. W. YOUNG.

The ordinary motives which induce a young man to choose a profession are its personal comfort, its pecuniary advantage, and its honourable position. The army affords none of those inducements. The

young man who has been surrounded at home by virtue and love, must, on enlistment, exchange these comforts for low vice and petty envy. Neither does the army afford a pecuniary advantage, as the pay is all along so little that even the most miserly cannot acquire a sufficiency, not to speak of wealth. Few common soldiers can attain a standing in society, as promotion is not by merit, but by purchase.—D. S.

The inducements held out for enlistment are numerous, but they are not of the right description. Soldiers are, on the whole, tolerably well housed, clothed, and fed; they have a surplus of a few pence per day, and as much time to idle away as they could wish for; they have the pleasure (?) of travelling over the world, and being stationed in its may be unhealthy climes for perhaps two-thirds to three-fourths of their

whole time. But is this sort of life likely to be particularly enticing to those men whom it is most desirable to obtain? Increase of pay *alone* will have comparatively little influence. What is wanted is a few what I may call *domestic reforms*. For instance, —(1) The barracks should be made more attractive, so as not to be *quite* so far behind the gin-shops in comfort; this would lessen drunkenness. (2) All soldiers who are acquainted with a trade should be encouraged and have ample opportunities to engage in it, so as to supply as far as possible their own regiment; this would be saving to Government, and a twofold benefit to the men. (3) The period of service in foreign parts should be somewhat shortened. Judiciously carried out, these need not cost the country the slightest additional expense.—R. R. Y.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

738. Is the Public School Latin Grammar really "the best Latin grammar ever produced in this country," as the reviews announce it to be?—UN ÉCOLIER.

739. A notice of works containing extracts from authors suitable for being used at penny readings; a list of tales, sketches, essays, poems, &c., that might be introduced, or references to any sources from which selections could be made, would greatly oblige—AN ASPIRANT.

740. Has there been any History of the "Sunday School Union" published?—R. F. L.

741. What was the Shakspeare Society?—HAMLET.

742. Could you inform me where a good collection of exercises in geometry—adapted to self-culture and self-examination—can be had?—A SELF-TAUGHT MATHEMATICIAN.

743. Is there any good English book on "the Mythology of Classical Literature"?—A. B. C.

744. What are the best books on descriptive physical geography,—plain, simple, and able to be understood by a reader not more than averagely acquainted with words of Greek, Latin, and German origin?—JODELL.

745. Do the Scotch use any Offices of Prayer?—CURIOUSUS.

746. A list of the best works on education, practical and theoretical, would be a favour.—S. W. YOUNG.

747. What are the Pestalozsian and Jacototian systems of teaching? —S. W. YOUNG.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

392. The life of Herder is one distinguished among instances of "Toiling Upward." Upon this subject we hope some of the writers in that department will keep their eye. It is a Romance of Literary Biography.—R. M. S.

724. "Thinker" has heard that Butler's "Analogy" "raises more doubts than it allays." A person who possesses a fair knowledge of the principles of rational religion, and yet doubts the authenticity of the Biblical revelation, would, I think, be more likely to have his doubts respecting Christianity dissipated than increased by a diligent perusal of this book. Knowledge modifies the requisite amount of faith. As Butler's book increases the knowledge of most Christians who read it, a proportionate increase in faith is necessary, or doubts will be the result. Every Christian reader of psychological works should be fixed to his Redeemer by faith, or the doubts caused by a "little knowledge" will wreck his piety before he has attained the "fulness" of knowledge. The result of a careful lecture on Butler's "Analogy," for the above reasons, differs with the character of the reader and the fixedness of his principles.—R. F. G.

731 & 732. I presume neither of the querists is a member of a university; and if so, the following course will be necessary. They will have to pass a preliminary examination in Latin and English History, one of which examinations is held every Saturday during term from ten to one o'clock in the Middle Temple Library. It is not very severe. Any information would probably be supplied by J. H. Dakyns, Esq., Middle Temple, who is, I believe, secretary

to the Board of Examiners. They will have to pay a deposit of £100, and about £40 or £50 for stamps, fees, &c., in addition to £1 1s. for the admission form, which must be signed by two barristers. The fees to be paid on call to the bar will be deducted from the £100, and the surplus (perhaps some £10) will be returned. They will have to keep twelve terms—that is, dine in the hall of their Inn six times each term,—which will thus spread over three years; in addition to which, they must qualify in one of the three following ways:—Read for one year in a barrister's chambers (£100 per year is a barrister's regular charge for pupils), attend two courses of lectures for one year (fee payable, £5 5s. per year), or pass a general examination. The student will, in addition, have to pay for his commons, which vary at the different Inns: about £10 per annum will be an average. These will be all the expenses really attending studying for the bar. The student can live anywhere. For more full details the querists would do well to provide themselves with a copy of the "consolidated regulations" of the Inns of Court, which may probably be procured gratis from (say) the steward of Lincoln's Inn or the under treasurer of Middle Temple. These regulations contain all the information necessary, without reference to any books, and indeed more information than can be found in any book. The student will fix upon which Inn he is going to enter, and get his admission form from there. He will probably choose that in which he has friends, or, if going to the Equity bar, Lincoln's Inn (on account of getting chambers near the Chancery Courts). As to the total amount required, I should say that the most careful student should see his way clear to have £1,000 at his disposal before

wooing Themis as a barrister; for not only is the necessary outlay in a library large, but there is the more than possibility of passing several years without any practice. Of course I speak of London men. A man in the country may step into a good connection immediately; and I would not wish to damp any one who, from the sums I have given and his own calculations, sees a possibility of making his way with a less amount, of doing so. I hope I have been sufficiently detailed in answering S. F. G. and "A Desirous Student."—NAM DER.

SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Are "the lives of the saints" profitable reading?

Is the weakness of the mind a more serious limit to religious than to scientific inquiry?

Does Vargas or Paul Sarpi supply the better history of the Council of Trent?

Is an irenicon or reconciliation of the churches possible, [desirable, or expedient]?

Were the decisions of the Council of Trent beneficial to Europe?

Is public health public wealth?

Were the French right in interfering with the Garibaldian expedition to Rome?

Is Swedenborgianism tenable as an interpretation of Christian doctrine?

Can Universalism be maintained from Scripture?

Is Tennyson's or Hallam's "Timbuctoo" the better poem?

Are Eugene Sue's novels immoral in tendency?

Does the political career of the Earl of Derby deserve the gratitude of the country?

Ought Government to offer premiums for the utilization of sewage as well as [or in preference to] the invention of destructive guns?

Are the sick better provided for in hospitals than at home?

Can the divine attributes be illustrated by nature?

Is the unction of the sick necessary to holy dying?

Does the history of dogmas prove that the Church has always accepted Scripture as the rule of faith?

Can conscience and faith be reconciled?

Have heresies been prejudicial to the church?

Does the history of Joan of Arc do greater discredit to England than to France?

Do the various liturgies of the church prove the unity or the diversity of her doctrines?

Is parliamentary government suitable to France?

Are the military institutions of France superior to those of Great Britain?

Do men think during sleep?

Are dreams proofs of a spiritual existence?

Is Michelet's "Bible of Humanity" suited to our age?

Could monetary uniformity in civilized countries be inaugurated and maintained?

Was Chaucer an imitator of the Trouvères?

Were the modern insurrections of Greece justifiable?

Is German thought less inductive than British?

Is the Platonic theory of ideas theistic or pantheistic?

Is the perusal of works of fiction consistent with a profession of Christianity?

Ought coroners to be medical men?

Is dogmatic theology only a statement of scriptural truth?

Is theology an inductive or an inferential science?

Have the Bampton Lectures been beneficial to Christianity?

Is the present system of colonization advantageous or the reverse?

The Societies' Section.

"THE ROUNDABOUT SOCIETY" is a private literary and discussion association, which has been in existence now for about five years. It has but few members, as the rules and penalties are strict; and no person is admitted who is indisposed to be a hard worker, and who is not well recommended. Its business is conducted by a President, Secretary, and Treasurer, elected annually. There is also a Chairman of Discussions, who occupies the chair *during* the readings and discussions at ordinary meetings, but for one night only, his place being taken at the following ordinary meeting by the retiring essayist.

Discussions are led by the members in rotation; the essayist next in order opening the discussion.

The members assemble for ordinary meetings every lunar cycle, on a Wednesday, at the house of the respective readers, in rotation. They are invited to tea at seven o'clock, and commence business at eight o'clock. Extraordinary meetings are also occasionally held on intermediate Wednesdays (at eight o'clock and without tea), at which the magazine papers, as undermentioned, are discussed; and other topics as agreed upon from time to time. Special meetings are sometimes called for special purposes.

A particular feature of this society is the "Roundabout Magazines," two or three of which are constantly circulating amongst the members, each member retaining one seven days, and being bound under penalty to deliver it to the member next in order on the seventh day.

In these magazines all manner of topics are permitted; and every style of literary composition is pro-

duced,—reviews, poetry, romance, essays, political squibs, &c., &c.,—in fact, anything a man dare write, knowing that he writes under the scrutiny and impending criticism of every individual member, who is at liberty to criticise every point and detail connected with the whole composition.

These magazines occupy a very high place in the society's proceedings.

All matters connected with the society are considered strictly private and confidential, and a pledge is given by each member that no allusion to them shall, under any circumstances, be made to outsiders. No strangers are admitted to the society's meetings.

The officers and members are elected by ballot, which, in the latter case, must be unanimous. A ballot is also taken in respect of each member every alternate ordinary meeting, to see whether the members approve of his further connection with the society. A majority against any member compels him to withdraw.

Members withdrawing with the full confidence of the society are made honorary members, having the privilege of attending *ordinary* meetings, but they are not required to contribute papers, and are not liable to penalties, though they pay the annual subscription.

The following are amongst the subjects that have engaged the society's attention:—

Alfred Tennyson—Secession of the Southern States—Cromwell—The Sabbath—Lenses; their Nature and Uses—Longfellow's Poetry—Education—Edward III.—Coal—Our National Constitution—Printing—Milton's Prose Works—The

Parsees of India—Continuity (phrenological)—The English People and their Governors—The True and the Good—Macbeth and Stage Plays—Alcohol—National Education—St. Paul—Steam Navigation—Religion and Secular Life—The Sun—The Deluge—Pagan Rome—Beauty—Saxon England—William I.—The Origin of Language—Electricity—Immortality of the Soul, and Brutes—The Pulpit—Light—Philosophy of Life—Philosophy of Being—The Telegraph—Faith and Philosophy—The Higher Progress of the Intellect—Indestructibility—The Apocalypse of St. John.—JOHN D. ROBINSON.

The Dublin Athenæum is no more. Founded almost exclusively for the benefit of mercantile young men, it presented many opportunities for improvement and enjoyment. The rooms were in a central position, close to our leading thoroughfares and great commercial establishments. The apartments were spacious, comfortable, and well furnished. There was a really excellent library, stored with the most valuable standard works, as well as supplied with the popular current literature of the day. Lectures were frequently delivered on the most interesting subjects by some of our most able men; and the institution was furnished with every accommodation and appliance suited to imparting sound information and rational amusement. The notion of establishing such an institution originated with one of our fellow-citizens, himself acquainted with the wants and aspirations of the young men of our city; and like many another enterprise which has had better fortune and success, the Dublin Athenæum was founded and fairly launched through the exertions and enthusiasm of a single individual. To Mr. Joseph Harris

first occurred the idea of starting the Athenæum. This gentleman devoted his leisure hours for weeks and months, snatched from the laborious duties of his office, to collecting the handsome sum of £1,000, freely and generously contributed for this purpose by the citizens of Dublin. The Athenæum had the great advantage, therefore, that when it opened it was quite free from debt. But like most other similar institutions, whether established in town or country, after the novelty and excitement attendant on its early operations had died away, the interest of the members began to flag, the reading-rooms, classes, and lectures were more and more thinly attended, until at last it became apparent that it was of little use to endeavour to sustain the institution. That is something like the history and fate of many associations. They have accomplished good, and much good, while in being. But our social instincts, and the desire for social enjoyments and free social intercourse, far exceed the desire of mere mental and intellectual improvement; and our young men, released from warehouses and offices, more readily and continuously betake themselves to the warm fireside, the tea-table, and the family scene, than to pore over dry books, read learned essays, or listen to philosophical lectures within the unsympathizing walls of any public institution. A serious responsibility, therefore, devolves more and more upon the heads of houses that private homes and social circles may be scenes where virtue flourishes, where purity and morality are commended by precept and example, and where all that tends to elevate and ennoble our nature is cultivated and cherished. The history of the rise and fall of the Dublin Athenæum is, therefore, instructive.

Literary Notes.

FITZGEREVE HALLECK, born 1795, one of the earliest poetical writers of the present century, and who grew in fame beside Paulding, Dana, Bryant, &c., author of "Fanny" (1819), "Alnwick Castle" (1827), &c., died 19th November.

Prof. John Tyndall is preparing for publication "Faraday as a Discoverer: a Memoir."

J. Ward, author of "The History of God," has in the press "Workmen and Wages at Home and Abroad," a work on the effects of strikes, combinations, and trades unions.

Susannah Winkworth has in course of translation the last work which Baron Bunsen lived to complete, "God in History; or, the Progress of Man's Faith in a Moral Order of the World."

The Rev. S. Davidson is preparing "An Introduction to the Study of the New Testament; Critical, Exegetical, and Theological," in two vols.

Messrs. Longman announce "two new works on Maritime and International Law."

To Macknight's lengthy biography of "Edmund Burke," there has recently been added John Morley's briefer memoir, and now Prof. Robertson has in the press "Lectures on the Life, Times, and Writings of Edmund Burke."

Napoleon III. is said to be preparing "Augustus" as a sequel to "Julius Cæsar."

A series of "English Reprints," in vols. at sixpence or a shilling, is to be commenced with John Milton's "Areopagitica," and continued monthly during 1868.

Prof. C. G. B. Danberry, author of an "Introduction to the Atomic Theory," 1831, "Lectures on Agriculture," 1841, and many papers on botany and geology, died 12th December, aged 72.

A "Caxton Society," to reproduce the works of the introducer of printing into England, is being projected.

Tuberville's songs and sonnets, 1597, have been reprinted by J. P. Collier.

"Essays on Robert Browning's Poetry" are promised from the pen of John T. Nettleship.

"A Dictionary of the Language of Shakspeare," by the late Swynfen Jarvis, Esq., has been issued by J. R. Smith.

Prof. Selwyn has translated "Enoch Arden" into Latin verse.

Samuel Sharpe considers that "the book of Isaiah contains writings relating to at least six periods of Jewish history, necessarily written by four different authors, and probably, judging from the style, by six or seven."

"A New Geological Theory" is being ventilated in the columns of the *Athenæum*.

Charles Brunet, author of the "Manuel du Libraire," the best bibliographical work extant, died recently.

The author of "F. W. Robertson's Life and Letters," Rev. Stopford A. Brooke, has been appointed editor of the *People's Magazine*, in place of Elihu Rich, a learned writer on the "Occult Sciences."

R. M. Phillimore has translated Bishop Dupanloup's treatise on "Studious Women."

Auguste Comte.

THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

AUGUSTE COMTE is the Messiah of Positivism. In Paris, on 1st January, 1868, for the eleventh time since the demise of the founder of "the Universal Religion," the disciples of the Inaugurator of the Positive Philosophy assembled at a solemn celebration of the worship of humanity for the promotion and furtherance of the principles of love, order, progress, and social prosperity, which constitute the chief elements of the Positivist Evangel. In an upper chamber, *i. e.*, on the second floor of the house No. 10, Rue Monsieur le Prince, near the garden of the Luxembourg—which the great master had sanctified by his residence, and whence he had ascended into "the aggregate of co-operative beings" which constitute "idealized humanity," and so became a part and portion of the one Supreme Being, to which the mind of the Comtist rises in worship—this annual solemnity was held. In these apartments—conserved, in accordance with his will, as it was when the great career of which it was the scene came to an end in it—the Comtists of France, to the number of about fifty, gathered themselves together under the auspices of M. Pierre Lafitte, director of Positivism, about two o'clock in the afternoon of New Year's day for spiritual communication, mutual encouragement, and "in sacred memory" of the initiator of the worship of humanity. Director Lafitte—a learned and eloquent expounder of the doctrines of the Universal Religion, took his position under a bust of Auguste Comte, between the two windows of the chief apartment, behind a small round table, and thence discoursed in fluent and facile terms on positivism, and the duties of positivists; the hopefulness of their ultimate success, and the progress which their master's views were making among politicians and scientific men, in literature, and within the churches. He hoped the ceremonies of Positivism would, at no distant date, be celebrated in edifices suitable to such a worship—masterpieces of architecture, glowing and beautified with paintings, glorious with the sculptor's noblest achievements in bronze and marble, and periodically filled with the grandest efforts of music. He explained the Positivist Calendar, the monthly festivals in honour of marriage, parentage, filial affection, domesticity, labour, thought, &c., which the hagiology of positivism involved, the doctrine of prayer, of private devotion, of combined action in social worship as "the systematic idealization of the ultimate sociability of mankind."

Simultaneously with this first-day festival of Comtists in the home of the founder—a spot sacred to all Comte's disciples as that 1868.

from which the light of positivist truth had issued for the enlightenment of the world—a similar meeting was held, under the directorate of Richard Congreve, M.A., in Bouverie Street, London;—while in Bradford, Dr. J. H. Bridges presided over another assembly of positivists engaged in the celebration of the worship of humanity. Organizations of Comtists are thus taking their place among the agencies of intellectual activity, and form a testimony to the vitality of the thoughts of the founder of the Positive Society, and the systematizer of science, politics, and religion.

It has been suggested to us that the curiosity excited in many minds from the constant mention of positivism by all parties as an agency of power, might be usefully gratified, and be made the occasion of an instructive exposition of the elements of the positive philosophy; and more especially that at this time it might be useful to supply an abstract of the life-work of Comte, together with a criticism of its main positions and an estimate of its place in systematic philosophy.

Among “modern metaphysicians” it is impossible to place him, for he abjured metaphysics; to name him among “modern logicians” would be absurd, as he wished to dethrone logic and to set up mathematics in its stead; to number him among “epoch men” would be premature, for his era of social science has not yet been visibly inaugurated. In the series of papers illustrative of “toiling upward” he might very fittingly have a place for the bravery of his pursuit of his speculations, in poverty, humbleness of station, and “with difficulties compassed round.” But a view of the man without an exposition of his system would be pre-eminently unsatisfactory; for the positive philosophy is the grand outcome of his life, and the industry and hopefulness of the man was due to the lofty thoughts with which it sustained him. We purpose, therefore, to devote three papers to the rendering (1) of an account of the life of Auguste Comte, (2) of an exposition of the positive philosophy, and (3) of a critical estimate of the foundations, the main elements, and the results of the philosophical, political, and religious ideas of the founder of positivism.

In our first paper we shall confine our attention chiefly to circumstances, events, and incidents, and shall only notice opinions and books as efforts and works, without attempting to epitomize them, or to account for them any farther than is essential to our being able to furnish a connected narrative. In this we shall avail ourselves of all the help, English and French, which we have been able to accumulate;* for we must owe our knowledge of facts to authorities, having had no opportunity—like John Stuart Mill, the friend and benefactor of Comte—of becoming acquainted with these at first hand and by personal connection. Our aim will be as

* At the end of this article (p. 99) will be found a note of the chief sources from which we have drawn the materials for this and the succeeding papers—arranged in such an order as may facilitate further study should our readers feel so inclined.

briefly and pertinently as we may, to supply a plain, unvarnished memoir of the notable thinker who aspired to be the reformer of civilisation; the re-organizer of social life; the regenerator of science, and the neo-evangelist of a worship before which those instituted by Menn, Zoroaster, Moses, and Mohammed, the polytheism of the old classic times, the idolatries of modern heathenism, and the theology of even the self-sacrificing death-victor Jesus Christ, shall pass away like the mists of morning in the sunrise—like things which had uses and show beauties, but which must change and depart in the ultimate brightness of the noon of truth. If we allow as little of prejudice or of partisanship as possible to get distilled into our narrative, and if we collect and arrange with impartiality, and an honest endeavour to attain to the truth, the scattered facts of a remarkable life, and bring them in a reasonably compacted form before the English reader, we shall at least effect a useful work; inasmuch as a fair statement of facts is admitted on all hands to be one of the prime essentials to the acquisition of a proper estimate either of a man, an event, a scientific truth, or a theological doctrine. There are, in the life of M. Comte, a nobility of effort and a loftiness of aim, a grandeur of aspiration and an intensity of purpose; there are in his writings so much mental energy and originality of thought, so much subtlety and hardihood of suggestion, so much temerity in destroying, and so much ingenuity in rebuilding knowledge and faith, so much rebellious strength and so much conservative conceptiveness, that signal advantage may be gained from the contemplation of the life and labours of the legislator of sociology, and the renovator alike of science, politics, philosophy, faith, life, and worship.

Isidore Auguste Marie François Xavier Comte was born at Montpellier, in the department Hérault, in Languedoc, January 19th, 1798. His father, Auguste Louis Comte, was cashier in the Revenue Office of Hérault, and his mother was Félicité Rosalie Boyer. Of the character or disposition of the elder Comte we can learn nothing; his mother seems to have had a powerful personal influence over him. They were devotedly monarchical in politics, and in their religion Catholics, sincere and austere even to superstition; and perhaps the worst effect of this ignorant devotion was the keen disgust which, when a boy, Auguste Comte learned to entertain for religious observances, theological morals, and ecclesiastical dogmas. As a boy Auguste was small and delicate, though not sickly, and he entered the college of his native town in the ninth year of his age. He was industrious and intelligent, so that he became distinguished soon; but he was also quarrelsome and stubborn, and therefore he not unfrequently brought down on himself pretty severe punishment. He played little but helped his companions readily, and hence was much liked by them. A year earlier than usual Auguste Comte passed the public competitive examination fixed as a preliminary to entrance into the Polytechnic School at Paris, instituted in 1794, and remodelled in

1804. To pass the year which must elapse prior to commencing his Polytechnic instruction, Comte requested permission to return to school, and there voluntarily acting for his professor, M. Encontre, he taught mathematics to the pupils, and thus effectually revised the studies to which the previous years had been devoted. On his entrance, at the close of 1814, he was placed first on the list of M. Francoeur, but after a year's attendance he was only ninth on the class list, his insubordination and careless caligraphy causing him to be thus put down. After the second Restoration, July, 1815, the staff of professors was changed; several were dismissed, and fresh men appointed. The pupils of the Polytechnic, dissatisfied with the overbearing manners of one of the teachers, sought the sympathy of their seniors, and it was resolved to memorialize that teacher not to reappear in the school. Comte composed the letter, and was the first to sign it. On account of this the school was broken up (3rd April, 1816)—though it was reconstituted in September of the same year,—and the pupils were rusticated. As the Polytechnic was intended only for the training of those who were inclined to enter the public service, this dismissal was equivalent to a decree against their being allowed to pursue an official career. His parents were naturally displeased, and he, unwilling to assent to their implied censure, determined to return to Paris. "To elaborate my ideas, I chose," he says, "of my own accord, in 1816, the teaching of mathematics, in regard to which my special aptitude, I venture to affirm, was noticed, while I studied at the Polytechnic school, both by my professors and by my companions."

His family refused to aid him; and as mathematical instruction promised but a shabby subsistence, for much work, in the shape of a certainty, to one so young, somewhat under a cloud, too, with no means of pushing himself into notice, he listened eagerly to a project communicated to him by General Campredon, a native of Montpellier and a friend of the Comtes. General Bernard, who had attained some distinction in the Imperial Army, but who had passed into the service of the United States, expected to induce the Western Republic to found a school similar to the Polytechnic, and was willing, should he succeed, to confer on Auguste Comte the chair of analytical mathematics; but Congress refused the funds, and America lost the honour of numbering among its citizens the founder of the positive philosophy.

At this time he was an active-minded, well-informed, ambitious young man, well acquainted with the facts of history and the principles of the inorganic sciences; and eager to pursue the course of thought laid open to man in philosophy and politics. Feeling thus, he entered into an engagement as secretary to Casimir Perier, banker, author, and statesman; but the freedom of his remarks upon his patron's works led to a separation in something less than a month. In 1818 he found a new connection of far greater importance, namely, that with Claude Henri, Count of Saint Simon, the social philosopher and founder of the sect of the Saint Simonians, then

engaged in considering a project for the "Reorganization of European Society," by the institution of a Parliament of Europe to arbitrate in all international disputes. Of Saint Simon's disciples Comte was the latest and the most favoured—the Benjamin of the patriarch of socialism among the other members of whose disciple-family were Thierry, Bailly (De Blois), Halévy, Enfantin, Buchet, Carnot, Chevalier, Duvergier, Leroux, Reynaud, Périère, &c. To Saint Simon, Comte held the threefold character of assistant, pupil, and friend. He was thus brought to engage in the criticism of thought, and in discussions regarding the faith and practice of mankind—a most important era in the education of one who is reported, like Bacon, Descartes, and Locke, to have planned while a youth at college, "an entire renovation of philosophy,"—more even than that, "a social renovation based on a mental revolution." From 1818 to 1820 the influence of Saint Simon was powerful upon him. In 1819 M. Comte composed an article on "The General Separation between Opinions and Desires," intended for insertion in *Le Censeur*. It was not published in that journal, but it appears as an appendix to vol. iv. of his "*Cours de Philosophie Positive*," to be afterwards noticed; and in 1820 he produced a "Brief Estimate of the Entirety of the Modern Past," which was inserted in *L'Organisateur*, the journal of the Saint Simonians, and that in which M. Comte's philosophical ideas were first laid before the public. He also published some articles with his signature attached to them in the *Encyclopædic Review*. Benjamin Constant accused him of advocating in these articles an industrial Papacy.

The era of M. Comte's earliest insight into the problems of social existence, and of the true solutions of them, is very marked. In his twenty-fifth year—in 1822—he fell into an ecstasy of meditation, in which he continued for eighty consecutive hours, and in the course of which the bases of all his subsequent philosophy were laid by the envisionment, if not the revelation, of the great sociological laws of which all his subsequent investigations are but elucidation, and by regard to which all his future inquiries were influenced.

The third volume of the important manifesto of the sect of the Saint Simonians—"Industry; or, Discussions Political, Moral, and Philosophical"—was the work of the youngest and most enthusiastic of the disciples of the pupil of D'Alembert. In 1822 Saint Simon had prepared a work on "The Social Contract," to which Comte supplied a section entitled "A Scheme of the Labours requisite for the Reorganization of Society;" but the impression was limited to a hundred proof presentation copies. In December, 1823, Saint Simon, in his "*Catéchisme des Industriels*," promised a work which he had confided to his pupil Auguste Comte upon "Scientific Method and the Method of Education;" but when the time for its publication arrived, in 1824, he could not get the sort of treatise he wanted from his pupil, who had by this time formed a

theory of his own, and he was compelled to issue in its place a work—written in 1822, and then published anonymously—entitled “A System of Positive Politics, by A. Comte, formerly a student of the Polytechnic School, pupil of Henri Saint Simon.” The book appeared with a double preface—one by the editor and another by the author—clearly indicating that a moment had arrived when each must henceforth take his own way, and that the bonds of unity had been snapped.

This rupture was announced by M. Comte to a former pupil of his in mathematics and philosophy, M. G. D'Eichthal, as “complete and irrevocable,” in a long letter detailing the cause and course of the quarrel, bearing date 1st May, 1824. This event proved to be the birth-throe of the positive philosophy, which is used as a phrase only, and nothing more, in the work which originated, or was the immediate cause of this quarrel. On 5th August, Comte communicated its elements to M. D'Eichthal, and in November, 1825, and March, 1826, he furnished papers entitled “Philosophic Considerations on the Sciences and Scientific Men,” and “The New Spiritual Power,” which appeared respectively in Nos. 5, 7, 8, 10, and in 13, 20, and 21 of *Le Producteur*, a journal edited by his friend M. Cerclet; and his scheme appeared in some respects fully developed in his programme of a course of “Positive Philosophy,” in seventy-two lectures, from 1st April, 1826, to 1st April, 1827, which was as follows:—

General Preliminaries	.	.	2 Lectures.	{	1st. Explanation of the Aim of the Course.
					2nd. Explanation of the Plan of the Course.
Mathematics	.	.	16	”	{ Calculus, Geometry, Mechanics. Geometrical & Mechanical.
Sciences of	{	Astronomy	10	”	
Inorganic Bodies.		Physics	10	”	
		Chemistry	10	”	
Science of	{	Physiology	10	”	
Organic Bodies.		Social Physics	14	”	

This course was commenced in Comte's house, 13, Rue du Faubourg-Montmartre, on Sabbath, 2nd of April, at noon, before an auditory of the celebrities of the day, among whom we may note Humboldt, the cosmist; Blainville, the zoologist and anatomist; Poinset, the mathematician of mechanics; Dunoyer, the economist, among the elder; while among the younger hearers were Allier, Carnot, Cerclet, D'Eichthal, Goudinet, Mellet, Mongery, Montebello, &c. Only three lectures of this course, however, were delivered, when that “cerebral crisis” occurred of which he has given such a singular account in his “Philosophie Positive,” and to which three circumstances largely contributed,—household anxieties acting upon a digestion already weakened by study and privation, extreme tension of mind in the production of his new philosophy in systematic lectures, and his controversy with some of the Saint-

Simonians, whom he accused of plagiarizing his ideas without acknowledgment.

To explain his domestic anxieties we must return to 1824, in which year he had been introduced by M. Cerclet to Caroline Massin, who had been in business as a bookseller for about two years. On 19th February, 1825, Comte, after some difficulty on the part of his family, and some hesitancy on the part of Miss Massin, because M. Comte would not agree to any religious ceremonial, married her by civil contract, which constitutes a validly legal matrimonial connection in France. His household establishment was set up in the Rue de l'Oratoire, opposite the church, and there, as a means of subsistence, Comte proposed to take pupils at home, and to give private lessons to pupils at their own houses. He had then only one home pupil, C. L. L. J. de Lamoricière, afterwards a statesman and warrior, then a pupil in the Polytechnic School; but in this strait his wife was able to place a small sum at his disposal, and he was induced hopefully to apply to M. de Villèle, then Minister of the Interior, to get something to do. From him he got a polite reply, but no help; and he also failed to gain a position as professor of physics and chemistry at Sorèze, for which he was an applicant. The conductor of the *Athenæum* asked him to compose a series of papers during the winter on the philosophy of history as he conceived it, but this he was inclined to refuse, as requiring too much condensation, and as being likely to impair the interest of the course he was meditating. At this time M. de Narbonne offered to place his son under M. Comte's care as a pupil and boarder, and with this as a beginning he hoped to be able to extend his connection among the families of the upper classes. He took and furnished a house for this purpose at the corner of the Rue St. Lazare, in the Rue de l'Arcade, but the scheme failed. He sent young Narbonne home, and set out with his wife on a trip to Montpellier. On their return to Paris he rented the lodging in the Faubourg-Montmartre in which the positive philosophy was first expounded, and here it was that insanity seized him. For nearly a month he had been irritable and passionate, and at last he suddenly left the house and Paris. Madame Comte set out in search of him, and found him at Montmorency. She called the local physician, who visited him frequently, and she also sent a letter to M. de Blainville. By and by M. Comte appeared less excited, and proposed a walk, to which Madame Comte consented. The path taken led them to the Lake d'Enghien, and when they reached the banks M. Comte made a rush into the water, attempting to drag his wife in along with him. She struggled, resisted, and, holding by the roots of the bushes on the margin, saved both. She went to the mayor of Montmorency, and besought him to procure two wardens, whom she would pay, while she set out to Paris to see De Blainville, who had not come. Nearly at midnight she called on him, and besought him to come. He promised to follow in the morning. She returned, and he reached Montmorency next day at nine o'clock, where

he found M. Comte guarded by two gendarmes, and waited upon by his wife. It was determined to place the over-excited thinker under the care of Dr. J. E. D. Esquirol, the most famous physician for the insane, at the *Maison des Aliénés*. There Esquirol could not accommodate him, but advised his being taken to Charenton, where there was a private asylum of which he was physician-in-chief. De Blainville proposed to treat him at home, but Madame Comte, believing herself incompetent to take care of him, declined to undertake the responsibility unless aided by a physician; by De Blainville's interest, Esquirol accepted him as a patient, and he was an inmate of the lunatic asylum under his charge from 18th April to 2nd December, 1826. In the meantime, Esquirol's hope of a speedy recovery showing no signs of fulfilment, Madame Comte communicated the alarming fact to his parents, and his mother, furnished with full powers from her husband, hastened to Paris, but she did not come to her daughter-in-law. His mother endeavoured to secure a legal interdiction of the patient, and thereafter his being placed in a monastery, where, under the influence of prayer and praise, his malady might be subdued, and the patient brought back to the Church, might be restored to his sound mind. Esquirol communicated with Madame Comte, and she, claiming that the interdict was needless because there was no child to be cared for, nor any fortune to be preserved, besides showing that the interdict was asked on false pretences, defeated this scheme. It had been represented that M. Comte was unmarried, that distress originating in the conduct of his mistress had led to his malady, and that he had been found by De Blainville wandering alone in the forest of Montmorency. Madame Comte proved these assertions to be false, and her husband was permitted to remain under Esquirol's care. The mother and the daughter-in-law, with little friendship for each other, but with a common love for the patient, met frequently during the summer and autumn, often squabbling with, and sometimes scolding each other. At length De Blainville expressed his conviction to Madame Auguste Comte that her husband's "cerebral exaltation" was increased rather than diminished by his sense of hatred to his wardens, and his dislike to the treatment to which he was subjected. This she communicated to her mother-in-law, who wrote home to a similar effect. Comte's father wrote that he must be brought to Montpellier. Esquirol thought he could not endure the voyage, and his wife proposed that she should take him home on trial for a fortnight. His mother, under religious impressions, stimulated by the Abbé de Lamennais, who was anxious to secure to the church such a notable convert as M. Comte, insisted on an ecclesiastical marriage between him and his (civilly legal) wife. The abbé procured a dispensation from the Archbishop of Paris, that M. Comte should be married at home by the curate of the parish of Saint-Laurent, in which he lived. He sent a priest, being unwilling himself to act in so serious a matter. This priest foolishly made a long oration on the occasion, and M.

Comte rejoined by an anti-religious speech. The sad celebration ended at length, and when he wrote his signature in the register, M. Comte added to his name the pseudonym *Brutus Bonaparte*. M. Comte's recovery was slow, and his wife required to run many risks from his haughty fierceness and regardless violence; but by address and devotion—a devotion extending to taking the same medicines and undergoing the same treatment as her husband—Madame Comte's victory over his insanity was complete in about two months. During this time his father made him a small allowance, and some of his friends raised the means by which he could get a little rest, recreation, and health in the country. Madness released him, but melancholy seized him, and so deep was his depression, in view of the impossibility of gaining a livelihood by his acquirements, that in the spring of 1827, during the necessary absence of Madame Comte, he escaped from the house, and threw himself into the Seine, from the top of the Pont des Arts. A royal guard who was passing jumped in after him, and brought him to the bank. His death was announced in *La France Littéraire*, but he was saved, though the name of his preserver has not transpired. In July he set out for Montpellier, in a "state of *quasi-vegetation*." Home-affection, and a good constitution had succeeded in restoring him to sanity of mind, his native air brought him a restoration to sanity of body. He returned to his home gladly and hopefully.

At the close of 1827 he resumed his intellectual labours, and for a time found the means of subsistence in superintending the mathematical sections of a work which two friends of his, MM. Henri and Mellet, were engaged in translating from the English. In August he wrote a paper for the *Journal of Paris* (August, 1828), entitled "An Examination of the Treatise of M. Broussais upon Irritation and Madness"—a work in which the founder of the physiological school of medicine sought to establish a theory connecting all the mental and moral manifestations of which man is capable with physical causes. This exercitation in criticism brought up before him the grand panorama of thought which had been snatched for a while out of his sight, and he was able so to arrange his ideas and to recall his purpose, that on January 4th, 1829, he recommenced his course on positive philosophy in his house, at No. 159, Rue St. Jacques, to an audience which, besides most of those who attended the inaugural discourses in 1826, comprised Fourier (the mathematician), Broussais, Esquirol, Binet, &c. The positive philosophy was now unveiled and expounded; his contemporaries had heard it, and the proper work of Comte's life was begun—a work immense not only in the labour it entailed, but in the influences it was to exert on history, science, philosophy, and social existence.

The elaboration of the general course of thought to which he had devoted himself was now begun by M. Comte, and in 1830, after presenting a brief outline of his ideas on the progress of thought

and the history of science in the *Athenæum*, he began the composition of his great work, "The Course of Positive Philosophy," of which the first volume was issued in 1832, and the other five at differing intervals up till 1842. The devotion of twelve years of study, reflection, and criticism, condensed itself into these six volumes as the essence at once of science, history, morals, theology, and human progress—the experience of the past gathered and garnered to enrich the present and provide unfailing supplies for the future—experience no longer used like the hind lights of a vessel to cast its light over the paths that had been traversed ; but brought, as it were, into an intellectual Pharos, to explain the past, gladden the present, and brighten the future. This noble devotion of soul, this stern self-restraint which refused to yield to the yearnings of the heart for appreciation and instant approval, to sell the truth as it rose into the view of the soul for the supply of the daily wants of life, to succumb to the entreaties of friends or the taunts of foes, the distractions of the politics of the time, or the ambitions which saw the chances of the prizes of life departing, or to cater for the applause of the day by hasty and rash utterances likely to catch the tastes of the times—this courageous calm, this heroic daring and enduring, this flinchless labour amidst poverty, pecuniary anxieties, and bread-getting pursuits, is an admirable example of the positive philosophy of earnestness on which success depends. The work produced by him was indeed great, but the man, the hero, was greater, nobler even than his work.

The memory and the industry of M. Comte were alike prodigious. He learned English, Spanish, Italian, and German, by self-application—taking up a book in which he felt interested, and with a grammar and dictionary beside him, working into himself not only an adequate knowledge of the contents of the book studied, but also of the spirit and genius of the language in which it was written. By far the greater part of his reading was accomplished prior to 1826. After that, on principle, he neither read nor re-read many books, but devoted himself to the elaboration of his great conception of a philosophy which should make all mysteries plain. His immense store of facts and repositories of information were, when once filled, always ready at hand for immediate service. His books were all planned in his mind without notes or writing ; first in grand outline, then in special subdivisions, and subsequently the details proper to each section. This done, he regarded the work as matured. Then he commenced writing, and composed right onwards, sending to press, and seldom revising what he had written. Long conception was followed by rapid birth. It had power in it, this grand mental activity ; but it sadly, as in 1826, overcharged the cerebral functions, and did not do justice to the literary form of his works.

M. Comte had no resources, neither fortune, position, nor pension ; he subsisted by taking private pupils, his excellence as a teacher was recognised, and he gained by this harassing task-work

the means of bestowing on the world the treasure of his thoughts. In February, 1831, he became a candidate for the chair of Analysis and of Rational Mechanics in the Polytechnic School, but he failed. In the same year he commenced a gratuitous course of popular Sunday lectures on astronomy, and this course he continued to deliver annually from 1831 to 1848, without withdrawal of the authorization granted, notwithstanding the boldness of his views and the thoroughgoing republicanism of his heart and soul. This republicanism had in 1830 been brought into public manifestation by his refusal to take his place in the national guard because that was instituted to preserve the government France chose, and was not intended to be used in political strifes. He was imprisoned for three days for refusing to take an oath to defend the government—"a government which," said he, "were I a man of action, I would contend against, at the peril of my own life and that of others."

M. Chevalier, having spoken slightly of M. Comte's secession from Saint-Simonianism in the *Globe*, January 3rd, 1832, M. Comte forwarded a lengthy protest against its being supposed that he had ever been connected with the association of Saint-Simonians, acknowledged his intimate friendship with their chief, denied being under obligations to him for any of the elements of his system, and explained his position with regard to that system as one of independent progressiveness and personal originality. M. Guizot, as minister of education, was engaged in reforming and improving the higher teaching in France, and was instituting new Chairs for the promulgation of branches of knowledge not included in the programme of the elder universities. Hearing of this, M. Comte (29th October, 1832) forwarded a scheme for the creation of a chair of the General History of Physical and Mathematical Sciences in the college of France. This led to an interview and some talk, in the course of which M. Comte laid before the minister his claim to fill such a chair should it be instituted. Guizot had never heard of him, and he records in his "Memoirs" that M. Comte "was a simple, honest, earnest man, devoted to his ideas, modest in appearance, although, in truth, prodigiously proud," "but one who sincerely believed that he was called to open up to the human mind and to human society a new era." M. Guizot's advisers taught him to repulse Comte and to condemn his suggestion.

In 1832 he was chosen tutor in the Polytechnic School; subsequently he was elected (1836) to be examiner for admission to the same school, and professor at the Laville Institution. In 1836 he sought again a chair in the Polytechnic School, and was defeated in his candidature by M. Liouville. On the death of M. Navier in 1836, he renewed his claim to a professorship, and again—though he taught the class for two months during the vacancy—another, M. Duhamel, was preferred. In July, 1840, he applied again for recognition as a professor, but was with greater alacrity and unanimity than before set on the shady side by the Academy. The disastrous influence upon his success in these repeated candidatures

M. Comte believed to proceed from M. Arago, and in a note to the preface of the sixth and closing volume of his *magnum opus*, the "Course of Positive Philosophy," he expressly charged that *savant* with being the leading agent in holding him down. The publisher, M. Bachelier, asked Comte to suppress this note, as he was under obligations to M. Arago; but the excited author would not listen to the cool man of business, and insisted on its publication. M. Bachelier inserted in the volume an advertisement, including a note from Arago, "explanatory of the disagreement between M. Comte" and himself. Comte instantly raised an action against his publisher to cause him (1) to suppress the advertisement in all the unissued copies; (2) to recall all issued copies, and to delete it therefrom; (3) to pay 10,000 francs as damages. Arago and Comte were to implead each other through the publisher. He was his own advocate, and he gained his main ends,—publicity to his case, an opportunity of testing his position with the public, and the deletion of the obnoxious advertisement. But it was not a victory in which all was gain. It led to a rallying of the forces of his opponents, to his being ultimately ejected from his examiner-ship—a situation which was held by an annual tenure, and to his dismissal from the Laville Institution. So much could be done by partisanship and personal spite against a functionary who had fulfilled all the duties of his office with punctuality, honesty, ability, and eminent success. It had also a more serious private issue in bringing the relations between M. Comte and his wife, which had for some time been less than friendly, to an open rupture, and ended in a voluntary separation between them, after a long-continued endurance of matrimonial civil war, domestic duelling, and incompatibility of temper.

This separation was conducted with great complacency, deliberation, and mutual considerateness; though M. Comte, in self-willed determination to write a preface which Madame Comte foresaw would injure his material interests, and involve them in domestic troubles, treated her dissuasions with scorn and herself with such rudeness, that she did not feel justified in submitting to his imperious requirements and his overmasterful conduct; she consented to continue to manage his household affairs till his great work was finished, and he should begin to feel the glory of his achievements, and have leisure to spare in making new arrangements in regard to home, scholastic duties, and literary conveniences. The separation involved no loss of esteem, and there had never been any, or at least any great degree of affection between them. He recognised her goodness, her right to gratitude, and her noble moral character; while she admitted his greatness, admired his genius, and acquitted him of any unhusbandly vice. They corresponded regularly for many years. He allowed her a pension; and she followed his career with appreciating intellect, though with a sense of personal injustice endured from him, partly owing to the influence of his family—who were

systematically uncivil to her—and partly from the irritation of circumstances.

Among English thinkers, some of the earliest who were brought under the influence of M. Comte were John Austin, author of "Lectures on Jurisprudence," and Mrs. Austin, translatress of the "Educational Works of Victor Cousin," who became personally intimate with him in Paris; George Grote, the historian of Greece and the expositor of Plato; Sir William Molesworth, the editor of "Hobbes," and the reformer of colonial government; Alexander Bain, the psychological investigator; G. H. Lewes, the historian of philosophy; and Raikes Currie, Esq. When, by the intrigues and hatreds of those who opposed his philosophy, M. Comte was deprived of the moderate means of subsistence which his official connection with the Polytechnic School secured to him, by the intervention of J. S. Mill, Sir W. Molesworth, George Grote, and Mr. Raikes Currie, provided him with a subsidy for his material support during 1844-5; and when his misfortunes continued, and Mr. Mill suggested that M. Comte should become a contributor to some of the British reviews, Messrs. Bain and Lewes voluntarily proffered their aid in translating any papers he might write, and in seeing them through the press.

The earliest British recognition M. Comte received as an original thinker, who had added to the wealth of the world's loftier wisdom, was from (now Sir) David Brewster, in the *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1838, in a notice of his two earliest volumes—those on mathematics, astronomy, and physics. In 1843 a higher place was assigned to him by John Stuart Mill, in his "System of Logic," when he spoke of him as greater than Sir John Herschel and Dr. Whewell, and of the "Course of Positive Philosophy" as the greatest work which has been produced upon the philosophy of the sciences, a work which only required to be better known to place its author in the first rank of European thinkers. In the same year a brilliant paper, by Professor Ferrier, appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine* on Comte's system. In August, 1843, the *British and Foreign Review* contained an appreciative article on him who was at once the Bacon and the Newton of social science. In 1846 G. H. Lewes issued his "Biographical History of Philosophy," in which he gives a brief epitome of the opinions of M. Comte, "the Bacon of the 19th century." In 1848 we first, at the suggestion of the notable and noble thinker who assisted Miss Martineau in her condensed translation of Comte's book, John Pringle Nichol, read the "*Philosophie Positive*," of which he had a high opinion; and with our desire to see the book of which we had heard so much, he immediately complied by placing it in our hands on loan; it was read with avidity and was afterwards made the theme of not a few conversations.

We had previously read, as recommended by G. H. Lewes, M. Littré's pamphlet "De la Philosophie Positive," not only in the original, but also in an (unacknowledged) translation in the *Democratic Review*; we had also heard the lecture "On the Philosophical

Tendencies of the Age," in which J. D. Morell epitomized and reviewed the principles of positivism as a supplement to the abstract which he had supplied in his *"History of Modern Philosophy,"* with which we were familiar. We need cite only Miss Martineau's condensed edition of *"The Positive Philosophy ;"* G. H. Lewes's *"Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences,"* and Mill's specific treatise on *"Auguste Comte,"* to show that this great thinker has not left the English mind uninfluenced, without at all mentioning the School of Comtists which has arisen in Oxford, of which Richard Congreve, translator of Comte's *"Catechism of Positive Religion,"* is perhaps the chief, and of which J. H. Bridges, J. M. Green, &c., are adherents. It may also be noticed here, that both P. E. Dove and Herbert Spenser have produced a classifications of the sciences which, while substantially independent, they hold to be more philosophical than that of Comte, and that the era of criticism now seems to be succeeding to the age of acceptance.

As we have named a few of the more prominent of those who in England have been affected by and have given in their adhesion to M. Comte's system, it is quite right that we should make mention also of the fact that he "now counts among his French disciples Dr. Littré—the physiologist, and his first eminent coadjutor,—Dr. Charles Robin, perhaps the most distinguished living French anatomist, and the worthy successor to Bichat; Dr. Verdeil, the organic chemist; Dr. Segond, the physiologist, and Dr. J. B. Béraud," author of the *"Manual of Physiology,"* Celestin de Bliquières, author of an abridged exposition of the *"Positive Philosophy and Religion,"* "Constant Rebecque," &c.

In May, 1843, a very serious opposition was organized against M. Comte, on account of his singular preface, by certain coteries of the Academy, in whom the management of the Polytechnic School was vested, which, though unsuccessful then, proved disastrous to him at the next election—although in the meantime he had published his *"Elementary Treatise on Analytic Geometry in two and three dimensions,"*—an able and lucid work, which has been translated into English. He also issued a *"Discourse on the Positive Spirit,"* which he had delivered Feb. 1844, at the opening of his annual gratuitous course of lectures on popular astronomy. But the "indefatigable hatred" and the "pedantocratic oppression" of the coteries scientific, political, and religious were unappeasable; and even Marshal Soult, the minister of the time, though disapproving of the shabbiness of the treatment to which M. Comte had been exposed, was unable, in the circumstances of the country, to defend or relieve him. In this moment of difficulty it was that his English admirers furnished him with an immediate aid, which they intended to tide him over till he had set himself to rights again, but which he expected would be continued to him as a pension bestowed on one who was the Bacon and Newton of science and society; and when he learned that the sum put at his disposal was only intended to be tempo-

rary, he felt not only chagrin, but a sense of injury which induced him to cool towards his friends, and to close his correspondence with his best hope—J. S. Mill,—after a lively friendship extending over five years—during the interval of which M. Comte and Mr. Mill discussed with philosophy and warmth the question of the rights of women, in which the former was conservative and the latter liberal—a liberality from which he has never resiled.

It was one of the unfortunate influences of his St. Simonian connection that M. Comte had learned to believe that it was right and proper that the disciples of a system recognising the priesthood of thought should frankly and fully subsidise the chief of their school; and this short enjoyment of the freedom from anxiety and harassment such a form of loyalty brought with it, excited in his mind a hunger for some settled stipend by which his apostolate would be recognised, and his material wants provided for. In the meantime he issued his "Philosophical Treatise on Popular Astronomy," 1845, as an evidence at once of his talents and of his endeavours to be a self-supporting thinker. In 1845 the post of Director of Studies in the Polytechnic School became vacant, and in an application for this, too, he failed. M. Littré, his eminent disciple, in his straits, projected the publication of a "Positivist Review," of which M. Comte should be the editor, and for the support of which the pecuniary appliances should be provided in England. But his protectors in England did not see that this was a scheme of practical efficacy, and the author of the "System of Positive Philosophy" regarded them as involuntary accomplices in his unjust persecution.

Hitherto M. Comte had been the solitary thinker, leading a purely intellectual life and almost without sympathy, elaborating a philosophy of the sciences as the life-work of a man whose days were filled with the tasks of tuition and the travail of meditation. All his previous efforts had been made from the intellectual side, because his emotional nature had never been deeply stirred; but now a change came over the spirit of his life's tenor. Science was subdued by sentiment, and intellectualism by inamoratism. About this time he made the acquaintance of Madame Clotilde de Vaux, and to the influence which she exercised over him he attributed the reorganization of his existence, by demonstrating to him the lordship of the heart over the head, of love over logic,—and he has burned the incense of his soul on the altar of her perfections. Through her life and thought opened before him and showed a diviner beauty than they had previously possessed, for the universe of generous feelings, high imaginations, glorious fancies, and sympathetic inspirations came like a distillation from paradise into his being; but the story has been told by himself in the roseate hue of love in the introduction to "The System of Positive Politics," and has been very sympathetically recorded by a distinguished British disciple, from whom we quote:—

"About the age of forty-five Comte fell in love with an unhappy and remarkable woman, separated from her husband. One whole year of chaste

and exquisite affection changed his life.* He had completed his work on 'Positive Philosophy.' His scientific elaboration was over. He was now to enter upon the great problems of social life; and by a fortunate coincidence it was at this moment he fell in love. It was then this philosopher was to feel in all its intensity the truth which he before had perceived, viz., that in the mass, as in the individual, predominance is due to the affections, because the intellect is really no more than the servant of the affections. A new influence, penetrating like sunshine into the very depths of his being, awakened there the feelings dormant since childhood, and by their light he saw the world under new aspects. He grew religious. He learned to appreciate the abiding and universal influence of the affections. He gained a new glimpse into man's destiny. He aspired to become the founder of a new religion—the religion of humanity.

"For one long blissful year Auguste Comte knew the inexpressible happiness of a profound attachment; and then the consolation of his life was withdrawn from him,—the angel who had appeared to him in his solitude, opening the gates of heaven to his eager gaze, vanished again, and left him once more to his loneliness; but although her presence was no longer there, a trace of luminous glory left behind in the heart of the bereaved man sufficed to make him bear his burden, and dedicate his days to that great mission which her love had sanctified."†

"It is a gentle and affectionate thought,
That in immeasurable heights above us,
Even at our birth, the wreath of love was woven,
With sparkling stars for flowers."

But wherefore—can philosophy tell us? is so much of the *glamourie* of poetry shed over unholy love, while so little is bestowed upon those true loves which comfort and do not burn? Is it not that too often we desire to hide from our own selves the sin or the folly of our conduct by the fine rhetoric in which we deck the vulgar story?

"The Materialistic Mathematician" sees the need of something more for the satisfaction of man's nature than the aridities of biological science, and he now extends his aim to the "regeneration of the affections" by the deification of the immense and eternal being—Humanity. This passage from the objective method upon which he had based and built the positive philosophy to the subjective method which obtains in the positive politics and the subjective synthesis astonished many of his disciples, and led to a division among them,—M. Littré and his party holding to the philosophical tendencies of the primitive system, and ignoring the claim M. Comte made to be regarded as the founder of the Religion of Humanity; while but a faithful few remained with the great thinker in the latter part of his course, in the "extension of his theories to the fundamental evolutions of humanity."

Amid political difficulties which he foresaw, and under personal privations sharply felt, M. Comte devoted himself to the evolution of positive politics. Events outstripped him. The revolution of February, 1848, brightened for him the horizon of hope. He

* Madame de Vaux's husband had been condemned to the galleys for life.

† G. H. Lewes's "Philosophy of the Sciences," p. 7.

was charmed at the chance it yielded of seeing his thought enhistoried even while he lived. Amid the boom of strife of that terrible time he formed the idea of a Positivist Society in favour of "order and progress: a free association for the positive instruction of the people in the whole of Western Europe," with France as the initial centre and himself as its chief. He offered his submission to M. Arago as a member of the provisional Government proudly as a civic duty, and on 8th March issued on a fly-slip "The Appeal of the Founder of the Positivist Society to those who desire to join it." It was formed, and drew towards it many of the active-minded in revolutionary Paris. From it *reports* emanated:—1. "On Labour," by MM. Magnin, Jacquemin, and Belpaume. 2. "On a Positive School," by MM. Segond, Montégre, and Robin. 3. "On a New Revolutionary Government," by MM. Littré, Magnin, and Lafitte. And at its meetings and discussions, M. Comte presented to the members many splendid glimpses of great thought, much bold philosophizing, and several brilliant panoramic expositions of great events in history.

The pecuniary necessities of M. Comte had been met by gifts or loans from friends. Just at the time when these resources were exhausted three functionaries demitted their charges in the Polytechnic School. M. Comte made application for either. The commission placed his name first for each, but the Council put him second to a pupil of his own whom the Minister chose; while for the other two, they completely excluded his name from the lists. He applied to the Ministry to institute the chair which he had formerly suggested to M. Guizot—that of "The General History of the Positive Sciences," but of his application no notice was taken. He issued, in July, 1848, an abstract of his ideas, entitled "A Discourse on the Totality of Positivism," and to this he attached "An Appeal to the Western Public" against the persecutions to which he was exposed; but this appeal was vain, so far as aid in his material embarrassments was concerned, though it ultimately led to the foundation of a subscription by which the means of existence were secured to him. This was initiated, under an impulse from M. Comte, by M. Littré, and it formed, till the period of his death, the only source of revenue available to the author of the "Positive Philosophy."

But M. Comte did not wish to lead an idle life. With the fervid enthusiasm of a mind profoundly impressed with the importance of the truths he had elicited from nature and history, he felt the zeal of an apostle within him, and he proposed, if permitted by the President of the Republic, to open a free course of lectures on "The General History of Humanity." A hall in the Palais Royal was granted to him, and here, in 1849, his lectures, which became very popular, took place each Sunday at noon, from March to September. They were delivered extemporaneously; they lasted from three to four hours, and often longer, and were listened to not only with patience but delight. Strong thought,

magnificent views of periods of history, language coloured by passion and penetrated with the soul's enthusiasm, touched and enraptured the audience as he expounded the positive theory in its appreciation of the past, its conceptions of the future, and its power to regulate the present. They are yet unpublished, though many *résumés* of them remain in the hands of his disciples, and are considered by them the most brilliant of the labours of the great master. But the relations between Positivism and Socialism appearing to become too close about 1850, the course of that year was interrupted by command. By the persevering efforts of Madame Comte the hall was regranted, and the course was renewed in 1851. The *coup d'état* of December, 1852, closed the course finally. For some time M. Comte believed that he would find in the Emperor a friend, if not a patron, who would restore to him the right of teaching, but in this he was disappointed. The great high priest of humanity was not again permitted to speak from a chair and to an audience.

Meanwhile he had issued the "*Positive Calendar*," which substitutes for the saints of the Church the men who are marked in history by any great title for having aided in the development of humanity; the "*Positivist's Library*," a pamphlet, his "*Positive Politics; or, a Treatise on Sociology*," instituting the religion of humanity, a work in four volumes, the last of which appeared in 1854; and the "*Positivist Catechism*," a brief epitome of the universal religion he sought to inaugurate. He had also delivered and published in 1850 a Discourse, delivered at the tomb of his friend M. de Blainville, and sent, in 1852, a letter to the Russian Emperor, Nicholas, which he has reproduced in his "*Positive Philosophy*." In 1855 he issued an appeal to Conservatives, and in November, 1856, his latest work issued from the press under the title of the "*Subjective Synthesis; or, Universal System of Conceptions Suitable to the Normal State of Humanity*;" a volume containing the "*System of Positive Logic; or, a Treatise on Mathematical Philosophy*."

We have little else to relate; his material wants were few, and these were supplied by the liberality of his disciples and the friends of free thought. He may be said in his latest years to have dwelt in a living tomb, consecrated to the worship of Madame de Vaux, where each day he invoked her memory and prayed. But he also performed the duties of the high priest of humanity; he married those who followed him and administered the sacraments of the new worship to them. He suffered for some time from disease of the heart and cancer in the stomach. He bore his illness with calmness, and, though extremely weak, maintained his collectedness of mind to the last. He died in the presence of some of those disciples who loved him best, on the 5th of September, 1857, leaving behind him a strange and voluminous will, against which Madame Comte appealed, and her suit was successful.

She paid his debts and left his testamentary executors to do as

they chose with his furniture, library, and house. She was willing that her husband should be honoured, but not at the cost of her honour. He was followed to his last resting-place by a select few of his disciples and friends, 9th September. Among others who stood round his grave in the Père La Chaise were M. Proudhon, author of "The Demonstration of Socialism;" M. Fauvety, editor of the *Philosophic Review*; M. Lecouturier, editor of the *Pays*; and some of M. Comte's quondam friends among the Saint-Simonians; M. Littré, &c. Two discourses were delivered over his grave by the leaders of the two factions into which his disciples had been divided. Thus it ended; and the great thinker who had survived revolution and counter-revolution; moderatism, anarchy, and absolutism; in whose day the Papacy fell and rose, Napoleon I. reigned and died, and Napoleon III. seized the throne in his stead; in whose lifetime Puseyism, pietism, and eclecticism flourished; while St. Simon, Fourier, Owen, &c., passed away—died and was buried, leaving behind him the memory of a chequered career, of laborious work, of sad endurances, and prophecy of the future—which has been as yet insignificantly fulfilled in the sociology of our time.

I. BIOGRAPHICAL.—"Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive," par E. Littré; "Notice sur l'Œuvre et sur la Vie d'Auguste Comte," par le Docteur Robinet.

II. EXPOSITORY.—"Auguste Comte and Positivism," by J. S. Mill; "Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences," by G. H. Lewes; "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte" freely translated and condensed, by Harriet Martineau; "De la Philosophie Positive," par E. Littré; "Exposition abrégée et populaire de la Philosophie Positive et de la Religion Positive," par Celestin de Blignières; "Aperçus Généreux sur la Doctrine Positive," par M. de Lombrail; "Réflexions Synthétiques au Point de Vue Positiviste sur la Philosophie, la Morale, et la Religion," par M. de Constant Rebecque; "Cours Philosophique sur l'Histoire Générale de l'Humanité," par M. Pierre Lafitte; "History of Philosophy," by G. H. Lewes; "A General View of Positivism," by Dr. J. H. Bridges; "The Catechism of Positive Religion," translated by R. Congreve, M.A.; "Comte's Positivist Calendar," by Henry Edger; "Conservation, Révolution, et Positivisme," par E. Littré; various reviews and magazines; and "Les Ouvrages d'Auguste Comte," as detailed.

III. CRITICAL.—J. D. Morell's "History of Philosophy in Nineteenth Century;" and his "Lectures on Philosophical Tendencies;" G. H. Lewes's "Aristotle;" J. H. Stirling's Translation of Dr. Schweigler's "Handbook of Philosophy;" Herbert Spencer's "The Genesis of Science," in his Essays, Series First, and his "The Classification of the Sciences;" J. S. Mill's "Auguste Comte;" "La Crise Philosophique," par Paul Janet; "La Philosophie de l'Histoire," par Odysse-Barot; "Critique et Histoire de la Philosophie," par E. Saïsset; "Histoire et Systematization de la Biologie," par L. A. Segond; Duke of Argyll's "Reign of Law;" various papers in reviews and magazines, English, French, and American.

Religion.

IS RITUALISM CONSISTENT WITH AND NECESSARY TO TRUE CHRISTIANITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

RITUALISM: what is it? Semi-Romanism, papal error, and papal superstition disguised,—the wolf in sheep's clothing beneath,—with which clever, designing, and unscrupulous men seek to bring again the pure reformed Church of England beneath the hard yoke and cruel bondage of the Roman see. Away with it—away with it! Down with it—down with it even to the ground! Touch not the unclean thing, lest ye also be defiled. Such are the replies and ejaculations given at this present time by three-fourths of those who are questioned on the subject, or who hear of it for the first time. And yet it will be seen that the reply is given without any study of the subject, and often without the least knowledge of it at all; the word has been taken by certain parties, made a bugbear of; invested with the scarlet robe, grizzly beard, glaring eyes, bloody face, and ferocious expression of an ogre whose chief delight is to prey upon the bodies and souls of those he can ensnare into his cave, and then held up as a thing which Christians would do well to shun. And so, indeed, they would, if the reality corresponded with the image. But this is not Ritualism—only a grotesque and hideous caricature. What, then, is Ritualism? It is the solemn, beautiful, and reverent performance of religious rites.

Is this consistent with and necessary to true Christianity? Can it be otherwise? The question seems at once decided affirmatively, and among Christians—especially among catholic Churchmen—ought never to have found a place. Two causes have unhappily contributed to bring this question thus prominently forward. The first is the state of apathy and torpor into which, in the course of the last three centuries, the Church of England especially, and Protestant churches generally, became sunk; and secondly, the excesses of a few honest, zealous, and enthusiastic men who were and are the leaders of a noble band whose mission it is to awaken the Church from her nearly fatal lethargy, to arouse her to a sense of her privileges and destiny, and to stimulate her to a more thorough and efficient discharge of her duties.

When men are comfortably asleep, the least noise which arouses them seems a thunderclap; and when they have been settled for a long course of time in any groove of action, he who oversteps it seems to them rushing headlong to destruction.

I shall not in this place enter into any defence of what is called now-a-days the Ritualistic party in the Church, but only observe that, had the Church of England remained as she was left by the reformers in the time of king Edward, we should never have heard anything about Tractarian, Evangelical, High Churchman, or Ritualist. It was the gradual departure from primitive, apostolic, and reformed ritual which has caused the men of this age, who so zealously strive for a revival of the catholic ritual, to be branded with the name of Romanizers and innovators; whereas it is those who have allowed this ritual to become almost obsolete from disuse, or have glozed it with their own interpretations, that truly deserve the name.

No service can be conducted without some order. Let all "things be done decently and in order," is the apostolic injunction; that order is the *ritual* of the service. Every religious service, whether it be in a conventicle or in a cathedral, has, and must of necessity have, some ritual; there must be in every case some accustomed mode of performing divine service. We all know by experience that this is so. What, then, shall be the nature of Christian ritual? Shall it be plain or florid, meagre or elaborate, poor or costly, repulsive or attractive, meaningless or symbolic?

Which is most scriptural? The plain, the poor, the meagre, the meaningless, reply at once a score or so opponents. The simpler the better. Throw away symbolism; it is only fit for the infancy, not for the manhood of the Church's history. We are not babes, but men. Besides, the law and its ceremonial are done away in the gospel. Is it so? The mind of the Supreme Being, upon the nature of the worship most acceptable to Him, can be learned in three distinct ways—from Nature, from Man, and from Revelation.

From Nature.—"The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof." "The heavens declare the glory of the Lord, and the firmament sheweth His handywork." Snow and ice, wind and rain, fulfil His word. The Psalmist exhorts everything that hath breath to praise the Lord. And what are the products of nature? Are they meagre and barely sufficient, repulsive and purposeless? Are they not, on the contrary, scattered over the earth in the most luxuriant abundance, full of beauty and order, alluring and pleasing the eye by their rich and glowing harmonies of light and colour, shedding around perfumes more fragrant, more precious than incense, delighting the ear by their sweet linked cadences of song? Nature speaks with an unmistakable voice,—The Lord has made all these rich and varied things for our enjoyment. Shall we then offer unto Him of that which costs us nothing? It was not so in olden times; shall it be so now? No; let us, at least, the creatures of His hand, and the dependants on His bounty, endeavour to express some small portion of our thankfulness to Him for all His benefits by the care we take, and the sacrifice and self-denial we make in offering Him our tribute of praise.

From Man.—That is, from the natural disposition, the *mental religion* of man, as one may call it. What could a heart full of love and gratitude prompt its possessor to offer to its Benefactor but that which is most rare and costly, and which measures most plainly the extent of the offerer's gratitude, and the self-denial practised in expressing it? The very idea of a beneficent Creator awakens in a man a corresponding sentiment to thankfully offer unto Him the best he has. It was so with the heathen of old; it is so with the heathen in every land now. No need to detail the offerings of Hindoo or Parsee. Each and all proclaim that they at least would not offer unto their gods of that which cost them nothing. Knowing, or fancying they know, the things in which their protecting deity delights, they think no exertion too great, no sacrifice too large, to make in order to obtain them and present them in his temple. And shall we, who live not in heathen darkness, but in gospel light, whose God is not a God of vengeance, but of longsuffering mercy and goodness, insult Him and slight all His benefits by offering unto Him the refuse? We would not do so with an earthly sovereign; let us not do it with our heavenly King.

From Revelation.—No one will deny that the ritual service of the Old Testament was solemn, grand, instructive, and impressive. Every particular of the ceremonial was laid down by Jehovah himself; and every particular shows splendour, costliness, elaborateness, and significance. Some would call it gorgeous, pantomimic, unnecessary. From the building and adorning of the tabernacle to the bells and pomegranates on the high priest's robe, the same magnificence and almost reckless profusion and expenditure of wealth is manifested. And all was found by a willing and obedient people, ordained and accepted by a loving God.

One point in the Mosaic ceremonial deserves notice: the necessary offerings were graduated according to the means of the offerer. If he be rich he shall offer a lamb; if poor, a pair of turtle-doves or two young pigeons: showing that though the offerings of all were accepted and required, yet none were to appear before the Lord empty.

Again, when David proposed and Solomon accomplished the building of a house to the Lord, what do we find the characteristic feature of that temple? Magnificence and lavish display, wholly regardless of expense. No previous building was equal to it, nor has any appeared since. At the dedication festival the number of animals sacrificed was enormous, and to many may appear wasteful and unnecessary. Yet Jehovah commended Solomon, and showed His acceptance of the offering by deigning indeed to dwell upon earth, and so filling the house with His glory, as displayed in the cloud, that the priest could not stand to minister by reason of the glory; and further, saying to Solomon, "I have heard thy prayer and thy supplication that thou hast made before Me; I have hallowed this house which thou hast built to put My name there for

ever, and Mine eyes and Mine heart shall be there perpetually." Again, when the apathy of Israel had allowed the house of God to be neglected, and the service to be lightly esteemed—in much the same way as the Church of England since the Restoration,—the LORD thus speaks by the mouth of Haggai:—"Consider your ways. Go up to the mountain, and bring wood, and build the house; and I will take pleasure in it, and I will be glorified." And this very neglect of and indifference to God's due honour and worship is assigned as the cause of their national declension:—"Ye looked for much, and, lo, it came to little; and when ye brought it home, I did blow upon it. Why? saith the Lord of hosts. Because of Mine house that is waste, and ye run every man unto his own house. Therefore the heaven over you is stayed from dew, and the earth is stayed from her fruit. And I called for a drought upon the land, and upon the mountains, and upon the corn, and upon the new wine, and upon the oil, and upon that which the ground bringeth forth, and upon men, and upon cattle, and upon all the labour of the hands." And when the people obeyed and feared it was promised "that the glory of this latter house should exceed the glory of the former." Thus far the Old Testament revelation, which is, I think, sufficient to convince every candid inquirer that the service required by God of His creatures, and acceptable to Him, is one that is magnificent, elaborate, and costly,—in other words, the best that man can offer. The proof can easily be extended, but I have purposely omitted many smaller links—as the case of David in augmenting and arranging the singers; of Jehoshaphat, of Josiah, and Hezekiah, in keeping up the temple worship and the spiritual life of the people—in order that the stronger points may be more clearly discerned.

To come to the New. The old dispensation is passed away. We live under a new. The fathers lived under a covenant of works, we under one of grace; to them it was said, "*Do this, and live;*" to us, "*Believe, and thou shalt be saved.*" Granted that the letter is done away. Doth grace make void the law? God forbid. The spirit is the same, though the letter of the ceremonial is altered. It is the same God which has given both covenants. With Him is no variableness, neither shadow of turning. The spirit of that which was pleasing or displeasing to Him in one age cannot fail to be acceptable or the reverse in another. And further, the Mosaic ceremonial itself was not an earthly invention, but a pattern of things in the heavens (Heb. viii. 5). The spirit of the temple service was not done away by the coming of the Messiah, though certain parts of it—as sacrifices, which were but types and shadows, undoubtedly were. The temple worship consisted of a great deal besides mere sacrifice. The whole multitude of the people were praying without at the time of incense (Luke i. 10). Peter and John went up into the temple to pray. Christ continually attended the services (Matt. xxi. 12; Mark xi. 27; xii. 35; Luke ii. 46; John vii. 19), and so did the apostles, even after the

day of Pentecost, and the small company of early believers (Acts v. 20, 42; xxi. 26).

Christian worship, besides, was founded upon the temple rather than upon the synagogue service; and though there may be a slight admixture of the latter, it is not, as some would have us believe, a distinguishing feature of it. To the Jew the synagogue was only a makeshift, a convenience, never a complete substitute for the temple. It was not legally recognised as such, nor would any pious Jew fail to attend the three great festivals of the law held at the temple. The Christian dispensation is not a very different thing from the Jewish one, but is the same magnified and adorned. "If the ministration of condemnation be glory, how much more doth the ministration of righteousness exceed in glory?" (2 Cor. iii. 9). If God chose to be served formerly with a costly, ornate, and ceremonial worship, He cannot mean to be served now in a bare, cold, and careless manner.

Enough has been said to show that Ritualism is at any rate consistent with true Christianity. Is it necessary to it? What is the object of Christian worship? To glorify God, not to please ourselves. And this is done when we "render thanks for the great benefits we have received at His hands, set forth His most worthy praise, hear His most holy word, and ask those things which are requisite and necessary for our bodies as well as our souls." Is it not necessary, then, to devote all our energies to the accomplishment of this duty? We pray that God's will may be done on earth as it is in heaven. How is He served in heaven? By ten thousand times ten thousand angelic spirits who are ever before the throne, clothed in white with palms in their hands, and singing, "Worthy is the Lamb to receive honour and glory and power; Alleluia, Alleluia, for the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth." See Rev. viii. 3; v. 9; xiv. 3; xix. 4. Nowhere throughout the Bible is there the least intimation that anything but what people would now-a-days call excessive ritual was prescribed or practised, none that any other kind of public worship was certainly used by Christ and His apostles, none in church history that any other was used in pre-Reformation times, and none that the reformers ever meant any other to be practised in the Church of England; while the testimony from their acts and words in favour of Ritualism is as clear, strong, and decisive as any testimony can well be.

It is necessary, lastly, as it is the only form of worship which gives to the laity their full share in the worship of almighty God. The less ritual, the less is done by the people, and the less heartily—as any one can prove if he but trouble himself to attend once or twice the services of a ritual and of a non-ritual church,—until we come down to the Dissenting chapel, where the minister has both prayers and preaching to himself, and the people do comparatively nothing. Ritual is Romish or Romanizing, say some; this is the head and front of the offending. But is it catholic? is it scriptural? We are not to condemn everything simply because it is Romish.

There are very many good things in the Church of Rome, as there are also many bad ones; let us make use of the good and throw the bad away. We have, as professing to be a part of the church catholic, no right to abandon any primitive practice in accordance with or not repugnant to Scripture. To do so is to proclaim ourselves at once as schismatics, and as those who by their divisions rend and tear the Lord's body. In judging the Ritualists let us remember that it is the evangelical party which has departed from primitive practice, catholic teaching, and Reformation ordinance, and that it is so-called Ritualists who are endeavouring to restore this, and to give unto the Lord the honour due unto His name by worshipping Him with a holy worship. We are to worship God in spirit and in truth, it is true, and formalism and ceremonial are useless without the spirit; but where we can get—and who will say the Ritualists do not give us both?—shall we not by all means take them?

In conclusion, let us bear in mind that Ritualism has awakened the spiritual life of the people, filled our churches with those most needed there—and what if a few have left the Anglican for the Romish Church? many more have been retained in it than driven out,—and besides the number of perverts to Romanism is getting less and less every year. R. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"The hour cometh, and *now is*, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth: for the Father seeketh such to worship Him. God is a Spirit: and they that worship Him *must* worship Him in spirit and in truth."—John iv. 23, 24.

Of all things hateful to man, formal politeness is perhaps the most disliked. Though there may be prescribed forms and pre-arranged ceremonials according to which business should be conducted and interviews carried on, it is certain that nothing gives more pain to an honest and hearty spirit than an over-attention to the *minutiæ* and *punctilios* of etiquette; and nothing is more galling than the interception of civilities and friendly greetings by the mere usages of society. Why is it that the unrestrained interchange of thought, feeling, and fancy, are so much prized above the courteous phrase, the measured tone, the formal finicalness of company manners, as it is called? Is it not because there is no room left in such formal intercourse for any manifestations of the feelings of the heart, and of the pure affections of life?

Now if we lift this experience of our own in our minds up to the throne and majesty of the Most High, we shall find it probable that formal etiquette, perfumed prayers, and intercessions graced with changed raiment and measured marchings, genuflexions and intonations, dictated more by art than heart, cannot be acceptable to Him who is no respecter of persons (personal, outward appearances), but who judgeth of the heart. Formalism is the very poison of death to earnestness, enthusiasm, and heartfelt devotedness; it

is not the outgrowth of true worshipfulness, it is the mere veneer of social intercourse, the mere outward trappings of religious worship. Ritualism, as an endeavour to symbolize devotion, does, just in as much as it succeeds in its symbolic perfection, destroy the heartiness, spirituality, and spontaneousness of earnest prayer, praise, or service. Ritualism is the etiquette with which men attempt to regulate the ceremonies of admission to the court of the kingdom of heaven, though its Sovereign has declared, "Who-soever cometh unto Me I shall in no wise cast out." Ritual ceremonial is inimical to the hearty and absorbing love and reverence which we ought to feel towards God in the homage we pay to Him. When we come to pour out our soul in thanks and praise to the God of mercy, can it be that we shall only approach Him with acceptance amid incense, with theatrical gesturings and the vesturings of the *costumier*? Did Jesus on the lone hill-sides of Galilee, and on the mountains round about Jerusalem, change His vesture and indulge in posturing? What incense perfumed the prayer which He offered in blessing the bread with which he five thousand were fed? What gesturings and genuflexions, vesturings and incense-burning, accompanied the institution of the holy Supper? Surely the life of Christ, which was given for our example that we should follow His steps, was not one of mocking monkery, of aping priestliness, of formularies and of show. It is to Him, as we thought, that we owe the most earnest deprecation of any endeavour to appear unto men to worship and to put on the outward raiment of eyeservice, or the seeming of godliness by the wearing of phylacteries.

Jesus dissuaded men from putting their trust in the outward ceremonials of worship—of the saying unto Him, Lord! Lord!—of considering anything as acceptable to our Father in heaven as of so much importance as repentance. What did the prodigal son do to propitiate his father, but obey the holy injunction to change our hearts and not our garments, and to return to the Lord our God? The Canaanitish woman took no formal means of extracting grace from the Saviour's heart; nor was the ruler notably punctilious in his manner of asking the grace he sought for his daughter,—his earnestness, not his courtesy, we should think, won the Lord's commiseration. Blind Bartimæus cast aside his beggar's garb, it is true, when beseeching Jesus to restore his sight, but we do not find that he put on robe, stole, or chasuble; that he lighted candles to symbolize that Jesus was the Light of the world; or burned incense that he might be gratified by the delicate hint thereby conveyed that He is the Saviour of life unto life of all those who believe, and only the savour of death to those who are faithless.

The only ritualism which Scripture legitimates is loving earnestness; if we have that, all will be well with us in our intercessions with the Almighty, for we have not a High Priest who cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. Let us, therefore, come

boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy and find grace to help us in time of need" (Heb. iv. 15, 16), without caring for the robes we wear, the intonings of the voice in which we utter our prayers and praises; they will assuredly be perfumed with the much incense of the Redeemer's righteousness, and if they have that they shall need no other censuring. All Christian devotion, as every Christian duty, is to be performed, "not with eyeservice, as men-pleasers; but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with goodwill doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men," Ephes. vi. 6, 7. Formalism, which is the root of Ritualism, destroys earnestness, by taking away the serious concern of the soul from the thing to be done, and directing the chief attention to the manner of doing it. He who knew the infirmities of our frame, our constant tendency to get into bypaths and be lost, could not surely have insisted on a code of ceremonies, such as was only the shadow of good things to the ancient Church, for the Church of the fulness of time! "Come unto Me"—only on bended knee, after due censuring, while candles are lit on the altars, and prostrations such as are My right have been offered to me by those who are dressed properly according to the divine though unrevealed rubric of a becoming Ritualism,—“all ye who labour, and I will give you rest,” contains a terrible interpolation; but it is only an interpolation in words, which Ritualism insists on introducing in acts, and it does not at all seem to be in harmony with the invitation of Him whose yoke is easy, and whose burden is light.

Indeed, if there be anything zealously and rigorously proscribed by the Divine Being, it is the resting in forms and trusting in rites, which is so strangely the tendency of unredeemed humanity. Listen to the solemn denunciation of the ritualism of ancient times. It is the voice of Him who saith, "I am the Lord: I change not:"—

"To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto Me? saith the Lord: I am full of the burnt offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he goats. When ye come to appear before Me, who hath required this at your hand, to tread My courts? Bring no more vain oblations; incense is an abomination unto Me; the new moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, I cannot away with; it is iniquity, even the solemn meeting. Your new moons and your appointed feasts My soul hateth: they are a trouble unto Me; I am weary to bear them. And when ye spread forth your hands, I will hide Mine eyes from you: yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear: your hands are full of blood. Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before Mine eyes; cease to do evil; learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow" (Isa. i. 11—17). This is emphatic; and similar testimonies against sacerdotalism occur throughout the whole word of God. The single priesthood of Jesus; the absurdity of any priestliness after His sacrifice; the completeness of the priestly functions of Christ, and

the thoroughness of His performance of them, is the great topic of the Epistle to the Hebrews; and the great practical lesson of the whole is contained in these remarkable and heart-thrilling words,—“Wherefore seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus the author and finisher of our faith; who for the joy that was set before Him endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of God” (Heb. xii. 1, 2). In this we are told to disencumber ourselves: Ritualism, on the other hand, recommends us to increase our burthens, and multiply the things whereby we may forget God; in short, to disobey Christ that we may be the better Christians.

The only ritualism sanctioned by the Saviour is sublime in its simplicity. Baptism initiates the believer into the number of the members of the visible Church, and is no more than the washing with water “as a symbol of Christ’s cleansing influence upon the soul.” It has neither show, pomp, nor circumstance. It is, in fact, a rite, as far as possible divested of ritualism. It is the same with the sacrament of the holy Supper—the eucharistic feast. That was instituted in a God-like simplicity, whose chief charm was the immediacy of the closeness with which it brings the simple soul to Christ. No splendid temple opened its portals to the celebration, but in an upper room, in a poor house, with no gorgeousness of silver chalice and gaudy robes, with no waving of censers or marching of ministering servants, only the dear love of the Master and the loving feelings of disciples made that humble roof and that frugal meal full of “riches fineless” to the members of Christ’s Church in all ages. Love is the transfiguring power of the gospel; and we have the command of the Master to “take no thought, saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewithal shall we be clothed?” (Matt. iv. 31); for through His righteousness it is that we are to be clothed in “the fine linen, which is the righteousness of the saints.”

Ritualism raises up a partition between the soul and the Saviour, and destroys the simplicity and godly fear which ought to regulate all our approaches to the Most High. It is not pleasing to God that we should array ourselves in worldly braveries and showy garments before we present ourselves to Him as worshippers—least of all is it according to the gospel that we should seek to commend ourselves and our worship to Him by our divers apparels and devices in dress. It is not profitable to ourselves that we should trust in the cleansing of the outside of the cup and platter, or the whitening of the sepulchres of our sinful hearts. We are unwise to think that in this way we can move the heart of God to love us more than He does, or move our hearts to repentance by sacerdotal millinery and ecclesiastical court guide etiquette. “Lines” (p. 15) defines Ritualism in such a way as does not include that which the word usually signifies, and defends Ritualism as scriptural because the sacraments

are holy ordinances instituted by Christ. This is not the Ritualism against which the people of England are up in arms ; this is not the Ritualism against which our Puritan forefathers zealously contended, and hence is not the Ritualism against which we contend. The Ritualism which consists in incense, prostrations, processions, lighting candles on the altars, change of vestments, the assumption of priestly functions, and the general introduction of ecclesiastical æsthetics and clerical millinery is something very different. "Lines" has argued illogically, for he has set himself to prove that the ritualism *instituted by Christ* is consistent with, and necessary to, the advancement of Christianity—a proposition that few will deny ; but he immediately transforms it into the very different proposition, that the ritualism *determined on by the incumbents of individual churches* is consistent with and necessary to the advancement of true Christianity, and so evades the incidence of argument.

The importance of ritualism in worship, so long as it is revealed ritualism, and having Scripture sanction, or even if it were proved to be requisite to the fulfilment of the apostolic injunction, "Let everything be done decently and in order," is not disputed. Is the Ritualism which agitates the country, which turns Christian assemblies into bear-baiting pits and unruly crowds, essential to the progress of the faith once delivered to the saints ? "Lines" has sophisticated in his argument, and has endeavoured to mislead the unwary ; but he has not yet proved that *clerical* Ritualism is Christian Ritualism, which, in order to get a proper middle term, he must do.

The praise of etiquette, architecture, &c., used by "Lines," is quite beside the question ; the Ritualism which forms the topic of interest in our day is that which has been plainly defined by S. S. (p. 17) ; and his historic argument is quite conclusive of the question. Our own conviction is, that Ritualism is unscriptural and unchristian, leads men into temptation to forget God and our own sinfulness, perverts the spirit from worship, and converts the church into a sort of hybrid of a concert-room and a theatre.

W. C. C.

PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF MAHOMET.—Mahomet was a little above the middle height, strongly but sparsely made, with broad shoulders and a slight stoop ; his hair was black, and, in the prime of life, clustered over his ears ; his moustache and beard were also black, the latter abundant and reaching some way down his chest ; his forehead was large, with a vein on it, which swelled when he was angry ; his complexion was fair for an Arab ; his eyes were large, black and piercing, bloodshot and restless ; his teeth were white and well-formed, but stood apart ; his walk was so rapid that people had to run to keep up with him, and his gait is described as being like that of a man striding down hill. He was simple in his apparel. He was not addicted to any of the games or sports of which the Arabs are so passionately fond, and was in all things most unlike the heroic ideal of Arabic character.—*Historical Facts.*

Politics.

IS A CONSERVATIVE SUPERIOR TO A WHIG MINISTRY?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

GOVERNMENT by property. The right divine of aristocracy. Keep things as they have been, and let the titled and landed gentry rule. These are the practical precepts of the Conservatives. Restore cash payment, and double the weight of taxation upon the labouring classes, at the same time that ample room and verge enough is allowed for panics, profitable to the propertied bankruptcies, inimical to traders, and irregularity of labour, irritating to workpeople, but useful as tending to keep down their numbers by starvation, and keep their hearts humble by their being steeped in poverty to the very lips. Retain the Corn Laws with the most tenacious grasp till the last moment at which resistance is possible. Keep the slaves bound to their chains in the West Indies, and do not mind the cry of the oppressed, though it should rise to heaven, if the ear of the rich can be closed against compassion here on earth, and the sugared sweets of the slave's labour may be had by the wealthy according to the requirements of their style of luxurious living.

Such is the style of managing things under a Conservative Government; and if a Whig Government could do anything and did do anything to lessen the grievous selfishness of such a method of government, it must be superior to a Conservative Government. In all ages a Conservative Government moves by compulsion from without. It cannot initiate reforms. So soon as it does so it ceases to be a Conservative Government, and becomes Whiggish in reality. It has sometimes happened that a Conservative Government has passed a beneficent measure, and it is now the way of the Conservative party to quote these instances as evidences of the advantages of Conservative rule. But these are not instances in point; for they were forced on their acceptance by the Whigs, and so were essentially Whig measures, though passed under a Conservative ministry. And even when a Conservative Government grants any reform they generally contrive so to clog its working as to reduce the advantage to be gained by the concessions made to a minimum, and make it necessary for the Whigs to disencumber it of the *brakes* put on by the Conservatives.

Look at the Reform Bill just passed as a Conservative triumph. Listen to the cackling jubilations of the third-rate Conservative members about it. Hear the claims advanced by such men for

their party as conquerors of the difficulties of the reform question. The difficulties of the reform question were the Conservative party. They had resolved to oppose to the utmost the imparting of power to the people, and the extension of the elective franchise. They constituted the obstruction; they would not clear themselves out of the way for the Whigs; but they agreed to take themselves out of the way, and the thing became possible. They wished to gain the glory of passing the measure which had become inevitable. They saw that resistance, if persisted in, would lead to a speedy sweeping away of the obstructions from the paths of progress, and that not only would the Whigs triumph, but they themselves would be swept out of being by the hate and amid the hissings of the enraged people. They wished to save themselves, and hence they dished the Whigs by recanting all their principles and swallowing all the objections they had made to reform.

But with that singular obtuseness and want of perspicacity which marks every Conservative measure, they took away all look of grace in their giving, and gave what they did in the only way which leads an Englishman to despise a gift and condemn its giver—they showed that they gave it with a grudge—they resolved to inflict a pecuniary fine upon the enjoyment of the privilege they asserted they were conferring. This is the secret of the rating clause. The Conservative party could not think of doing what the public opinion of the time had made irresistible in a straightforward English manner. They required to introduce foreign chicane into the laws of England, and to withhold by the one hand what they appeared to bestow by the other. They abrogated privileges conferred by many Acts of Parliament regarding rates, that they might perplex, embarrass, and humbug the plain Englishman who wished to exercise the franchise; and they surrounded the placing of one's name on the electoral roll with the possibility of an Englishman's *bête noir*—a lawsuit.

To all this there was added the *landlordly* element, that a vote could be had only through the acquiescence of the proprietor of the tenement in which one lived—that, of course, was quashed by the vigorous opposition made to it mainly by Whigs; but a great part of the evil of the intent remains uneliminated from actual experience, though not observable in the wording of the bill. Well, then, though our friends may argue that the Conservative government under which we now live is superior to that under which we did live—that the Derby-Disraeli government is superior to the Russell-Gladstone one, because the one has given us the Reform Bill, which the other could not manage to pass,—we have only to say, “Thank you for nothing;” for the bill, we well know, was granted because it could not any longer be withheld, and was granted, too, with so bad a grace as to restrain and hinder as much as possible the free exercise of the freedom which it appeared to confer, and which we should have had but for the Conservative opposition from the Whigs, without the spider-web ingenuity of

the rating clauses, and from whom we would have got whatever we did get freely and unrestrainedly. Wherefore we think the Whig Government, which would have given us a moderate but plain, straightforward, honest bill, is superior to such a peddling, cheeseparing sort of franchise-fine as encumbers the enjoyment of the franchise under the Conservative Reform Bill.;

But even this same Reform Bill gives conclusive evidence of the superiority of a Whig to a Conservative Government, for the Whigs brought in a bill; but the Conservatives would not come honestly out with their intentions—indeed, showed that they had no intention whatever higher than the retention of office, the dishing of the Whigs, and the deceiving of the people. There was something English in the straightforward proposals of the Whigs; but the Conservative Reform Bill was a series of cat-like tentatives; it was ungenial, it was unwillingly granted, and it was carried by trickery.

The financial state of the nation under a Conservative Government is always worse than under a Whig one. The Conservatives always contrive to leave the finances in a state of hyper-exhaustion, with however large a balance they may begin their *régime*. They seem as if they liked to manage a parliamentary *coup d'état* when the Whigs have got the public purse well filled, to exercise the thoughtless spendthriftness of heirs-at-law; and having exhausted the whole available pickings the Treasury affords, having scattered pensions, titles, and places like halfpence, and seen no means of replenishing the Exchequer, to plan a defeat which will give the odium of increasing the taxation to the Whigs, while the Conservative favourites enjoy the national *plums* got out of the Conservative budget at first, but requiring to be paid thereafter by the Whigs. No Conservative ministry within our memory has ever been able to accumulate a balance; they have always to lead a hand-to-mouth existence; and they never leave the Treasury with any reserve for their successors.

An impartial survey of our history from the commencement of the present century will most assuredly show that a Conservative ministry is inferior to a Whig one. It is not only so in actual administration, it is the same in individual talent. With the whole aristocracy to choose their select ones from, the Conservatives cannot match the national names which the Whigs can quote. With blood, birth, culture, *prestige*, heritage, descent, and name on their side, the rolls of the great Whig ministers are wealthier far in great thinkers, orators, administrators, financiers, officials, &c. The deathless names of the patriots and statesmen of the past, the most brilliant and solid of those who fulfil the duties of the present, are mostly all to be found on the Whig side of the Legislature. We think, therefore, that in all points it has been pretty well shown that the Whigs are as governors, and even in opposition, superior to those sticklers for stationariness, the Conservatives.

A. T. H.

In Memoriam 1867.

DEATH is a commonplace—a commonplace, however, of eternal interest. The shadow of death is near the writer as he pens these lines ; for in the next house to his a gifted one in intellect, eloquence, and literary talent, rests,—

“The vase of earth, the trembling clod,
Ordained to hold the breath of God,”—

“ready unto burial;” and thereby another friend of years has become to him a memory. How the beat of the heart slackens when one thinks of the man of yesterday being the dust of to-day ! one to whom to-morrows of aspirations, plans, endeavours, labours, endurances, come no more ; to whom the hopes, the aims, the loves, the charities of yesterday are as if they were not ; and for whom the tear is shed, the sigh is heaved, the heart is pierced, and “the mourners go about the streets” uselessly and vain. “In the midst of life we are in death,” and in the midst of death we are in life ! and we know not which sand-grain in the glass of time shall fix our fate for ever ; for we are of those—

“Things which are made to fade and fall away
When they have blossomed but a few short hours.”

Change is the law of life, and the last great change is death—mysterious death, whose viewless might is everywhere, and outdarts upon the victim he has chosen.

There is as truly “a time to be born and a time to die” as there is for the lark to make its nest in the corn-field, and anon to flash up into the flush of the new-arisen day to become in the blue heavens “a sightless song.” The day of man’s nestlement near to the earth is not to be for ever ; he is to wing his flight far hence, and to be removed. In the valley of humiliation he is to be laid, the fruit of the tree of life is to fall from the branch, the husk is to be laid in the grave ; but the quick kernel is to be transferred to another country. The day of mortal care is to close upon the eye, and the light of another morning is to bring to the human ear a song of deliverance,—

“When, freed from earth, unlimited its powers,
Mind shall with mind direct communion hold,
And kindred spirits meet to part no more.”

As “the footmarks of time” increase in number, so do the mounds which fill the churchyard’s hallowed soil ; so do the memories of the heart ; so do the reckonings of the dead aboundingly multiply, and the loneliness of life becomes the more striking to us because of the footfalls that are heard no more by us ; the voices which were music to our souls we listen to only in dreams, the loose and unknit nerves which quiver with the agonies of separation. This it is

which causes the eye to turn from the earth as a field of graves to the sky as a glory of God-set stars,—from earth as the home of sadness to eternity as the home of hope. Thus the soul sings,—

“ My hopes are with the dead ; anon
With them my place shall be,
And I with them shall travel on
Through all futurity ;
Yet leaving here a name, I trust,
Which will not perish in the dust.”

For eight years now this hand has acted as the registrar of death, numbering the departing lights whose brilliancy has gathered into fame—a fame which, like the light of the space-distant stars, comes to us and gladdens us, cheering our lonely nights long after they have removed from the place whence their outflash left them. In none of these eight years, however, has the hand of death been laid so lightly on the roll of renown which holds the names of those who have attained eminence in the records of literature, science, and culture.

The earliest rays of the New Year's morning sent their level slants of struggling light into the sick room of one who had been but a short time before stricken with the grave-chill, to which he rapidly yielded. In the home of love which artistic taste had beautified, poetic genius had embellished, the hearty charities of life had sanctified, and the hopes of a country surrounded, Alexander Smith lay in the struggle of the “strait betwixt two”—home-staying and home-going—to which the spirit at the mid-journey of life's pilgrimage is prone. He had not passed a week of his thirty-seventh year (he was born 31st of December, 1830) before the dreamthorp of earth was exchanged for the dreamlessness of the grave. He was one of the favourites of the gods—the poets ; but he was much more : he was a free, fresh, frank, friendly spirit, whose most earnest wish was to fill his place in the universe and fulfil the duties of that place. He had found the world a hard school, with privation for the master of it, but he determined to learn the taskwork of life and to prepare for being a man. His early genius was lyrical, like that of the lark, but he sobered down into a thinker, and seemed to be maturing faculties which might have made him one of the keenest-witted of critics in literature and philosophy. He did a terrible amount of bread-winning work in a calm, useful way, and he let his heart sing its own songs only in the hours of leisure and in vacation days.

From the time when as a stripling we first met him in the early years of his life, when the “Life Drama” was unwritten and he was a member of one of those self-culture training schools to which he owed much—debating societies,—till the last time we saw him in the quadrangle of the university to which he was secretary, his mind was ripening. He heard Lord Rector Carlyle's address on the 22nd of April, and was told therein,—

"The future hides in it gladness and sorrow ;
 We press still thorough :
 Nought that abides in it daunting us—
 Onward !"

But he could scarcely guess then that "the dark portal, goal of all mortal," was so near to him. The poetry of life gladdened his home and heart, the everlasting epic of fatherhood and love was ringing and singing within him, but around him the catastrophe of the tragedy of death was thickening. The voice said, "Come," and his spirit arose and went; earth said, "Farewell" to him, eternity greeted him with welcome, the outstretched plans of futurity were left behind, and he entered into a land of new and continual song without fear, for he knew the Elder Brother of men.

Another of the large family of Smith shortly afterwards (January 17th), too, went down before the resistless mower. James Smith's researches into "The life and travels of St. Paul," and his endeavour to discover the route by which he was taken along the Mediterranean, are known to all who value Biblical studies, and was one of the earliest works which attempted to realize the narrative of the holy Word by bringing it into contact with the actual experiences of life. He was an old and valued patron of the boyhood of the writer, and in his splendid library he has often learned the wealth and luxury of thought which books contain, and not a little of the book-greed of his soul is due to the days spent in shelf-laden repositories of thought which were opened to him as a boy in the library of the laird of Jordan Hill.

Among the other losses of the month we may record William Kidd, the genial gossip about animals, the friend of the animal creation, and the humane and kindly expositor of beneficence to the lower order of created things; Solomon Munck, the blind Hebraist, who succeeded Rénan; and Dr. Robert MacPherson, one of the divinity lights of Aberdeen University.

Among the losses of the literary world in February Frederick Kohlrausch is perhaps the greatest. For more than half a century he had held a high place among German historians for his ability to present a vivid and succinct account of the eventful course of time, to awaken a sympathetic interest in the results of life, and to narrate with impartiality and justice the facts of history. In his History of Germany—nearly a quarter of a century ago translated by our able and earnest teacher of German, J. D. Haas—he has composed a book for the young which has met the wants of Protestant and Romanist alike in its graphic pictoriality and its freedom from prejudice. A long life of industry was his, and he departed from this scene of time into the realm of reality like an autumn fruit fully ripe. One of Britain's most learned Egyptologists, R. S. Poole, also resigned his studies in the far past of the era of the Pharaohs for the knowledge that is to be found "beyond the veil." We shall only note a friend's name more, that of one of the humbler

toilers in the field of letters; a grammarian, a lexicographer, and a preacher, in all of which characters the Rev. John Oswald did good though unobtrusive service to scholars, and to the generations who were taught by his help the growth of words, the structure of sentences, and the methods of God's grace in the salvation of mankind. To Mr. William Dargan a word of remembrance is due. He did not write books, but he has inscribed his name on the heart of Ireland as one of her self-raised sons and one of her most notable patriots, for he taught all men not only the art of making a successful career, but of making—what is much more difficult—willing self-sacrifice. Like his master, Telford, he had genius, industry, and nobility of spirit; and had Ireland a few Dargans among her children, a nobler independence than she ever dreamed of would be hers before many years had clad his grave with the glorious green of his native island.

If in March—the month of boisterous winds and preparatory dust and industry—we mention only one name as that of national concernment, it shall be because that one man in his heroic heart had a wealth and plenitude of life, of productiveness, of energy and power which few can equal. On 20th March the Rev. John Campbell “fell on sleep.” It is difficult to conceive his restless spirit quieted even by the all-compelling might of death, he seemed so gladiatorial and massively minded. He certainly never lost the sense of the swing of the sledge-hammer, or the verity of the lesson learned in his youth of striking the iron while it is hot. The indomitable energy and the flagless perseverance which led him from the forge and the anvil to the University of St. Andrew's, and enabled him to attain a living recognition in London which spread itself into all the corners of Christian civilization, speak to his power more emphatically than words can. Clear in his aim and unwearied in the exertions he was called on to make in the gaining of it, he was a sort of St. Peter of the Nonconformists, full of earnest love to Jesus, but rash, headlong, and headstrong; mighty in the ardour of his faith, narrow in his interpretation of the doctrines of his Lord, but willing to follow to the utmost verge the results to which they led or seemed to lead him. He was not perhaps altogether “the British standard” of Christian life, but he was an able “ensign” bearer in the Church militant and a “Christian witness” against many of the errors of the age. His was a keenly controversial spirit, and he wielded the whole armory of argument with dexterity, force, fearlessness, and guileless faith, and it must be confessed that he “fought a good fight.” He has “finished his course,” and the peace of eternity rests in his heart.

To the memory of the Very Rev. Richard Dawes, Dean of Hereford, perhaps a word is due, as an earnest and enthusiastic educationist, and a man not only of culture, but of singularly lucid intelligence. He was not, so far as we are aware, a brilliant writer or an engaging, popular preacher; but he was a dutiful, earnest, and thoughtful worker in the cause of man, and for the glory of his God.

A highly meritorious, versatile, and able journalist, playwright, novelist, and literary critic passed away from among his busy compeers. Though all his efforts had not been able to place his foot, except in imagination, on a "ladder of gold," he has effectively inscribed his name on the roll of literary celebrities. He was a native of Cork, but early transferred to Dublin, and in his youth had a Civil Service engagement; but he loved literature, the stage, and oratory, and he revived the Historical Society of Dublin, as well as produced comedies for the theatres. He outgrew Dublin, and went eager-heartedly to London, where he entered upon a course of hard, bread-winning work, and yet found time to do a little to gain the favours of fame. He was a working editor of singular efficiency, and almost exhaustless fertility. He finished the naval history left incomplete by Southey, and the "History of England" which Sir James Mackintosh was called away from by death. Histories, comedies, novels, memoirs, travels, &c., seemed to rush from his pen-point with equal facility. His "Lives of the English Poets," and his edition of their "Works," give him a claim to the gratitude of all to whom poetry is dear and honest work is precious.

A brain as versatile and as active was taken away from France,—the author of "Eloges" on Montaigne and Montesquieu, the biographer of Cromwell and of Gregory VII., the critic of criticism, and the Cicero of modern France,—Abel François Villemain. Possessed of an inimitable style, remarkable for purity of diction and attractiveness of phrase, for extent of knowledge and ingenuity of thought, for clearness of perception and uprightness of sentiment, he has attained an almost unrivalled place among the modern classics of France. He is moderate yet independent, and free at once from the rashness of unreason and the timidity of over-scrupulousness; and the singular equability of his faculties have led to his being allotted a first place among the notable thinkers and writers of France in which country letters are so often the ladders of statesmen.

The surly cold of an ungenial May struck its fangs into the lungs of one of Britain's most eminent historians, essayists, and lawyers; and on the 23rd thereof, after a fortnight's illness, he expired. Well born and highly cultured, Sir Archibald Alison "scorned delights and lived laborious days," doing, as the work of his leisure, that which is ordinarily looked upon as the most difficult task to which the human mind can be set. His "History of Europe," with its immense array of facts, statistics, geographical description, resonant with the shouts of revolution, with the march of armies, and the collision of host with host, was only begun in the quiet of an advocate's study, but was afterwards continued amid the busy avocations which fall to the lot of the sheriff of Lanarkshire, and the social and civic engagements which such a position involves. Yet, after days in the crowded court-house, amidst the squabbles of petty dealers and their customers, listening patiently to the mass of details, intrinsic and extraneous, which enter into the evidence given in

sheriff's courts, or in the assemblies of the guardians of the peace, considering the means by which property and the order of society might be preserved, he lit the lamp of research during the night, and caused the events of the preceding century to unroll itself to the mind's eye in winding narrative and vigorous picture, in ingenious generalization and copious flow of words, in splendid speculations on the course of empires and the prosperity of states, and in brilliant descriptions of courts or detailed ground-plans of battles, on which he exhibits with due circumstantiality the pomp, glory, and horror of war. Europe in his pages reassumes the activity of the past, and he epitomizes the babble and Babel of rumour, correspondence, bulletins, reports, newspapers, and histories with skill, address, adroitness, and readability—though without expressing thence all its verbosity. His "Life of Marlborough" added a new page to British biography; and his "Essays" in *Blackwood* show industry, fertility, extensive reading and research, and a marvellous fluency of expressive words for thoughts of much clearness, if not depth. He was notable as an administrator, and his professional works, though produced in early life, have stood the tests of time and law, frequent republication and practical use. The rapidity with which he wrote was immense, and the high average of literary workmanship he displayed is perhaps unparalleled by any one who has written so—to use Sheridan's phraseology—luminously and voluminously. History survives, but the historian is gone, and the biography of his being has been already written in the archives of eternity.

We owe to Dr. John Anster a translation of the weird and fascinating "Faust" of Goethe, which is of rare excellence for felicity of phrase and vigour of transfusive grace. The correctness and admirable rhythm of this version attained the admiration of the strange old poet, and it retains much of its value still. Though not perhaps the most capable of giving an idea of the force and fragrancy of the original, it has the advantage of reading like an original poem, and bears no traces of the withering influences of transplantation. His "Xeniola," if it contains few pieces which rise to the first rank of poetic inspiration, gives evidence of careful culture; while his many contributions to periodical literature show that the width and range of his powers were singular even in our age of versatility. He was besides a most painstaking professor of "civil law" in Dublin University. In his life he united many dissimilarities, and so transposed them into a unity, that, like the rainbow, they gave off a radiance greater for their harmonious variety. And is not human life a rainbow, an intermixture of variety and unity? as Goethe has said,—

"Well paints the varying bow our life's endeavour,—
For ever changing, yet the same for ever."

"The Nestor of British Surgery," who died 5th July, was one of the favourite pupils of Abernethy, and one whose reputation as a

writer on physiological subjects goes back to nearly the beginning of the century, at which time "Lawrence on Man" created almost as great a sensation in scientific and theological circles as Combe's work on the "Constitution of Man," the "Vestiges of Creation," Darwin's "Origin of Species," or Rénan's "*Jésus*." This excitement was greatly due to the clear expository style adopted, the general readableness of the work, and the simple form in which it was cast. Its popularity very speedily extended beyond the profession, and it appeared at a time when the materialistic inductions, to which he as a surgeon confined himself, were calculated to make a strong impression upon the public mind. He has written largely on almost all professional subjects, and he did much by his translation—augmented and corrected—of Blumenbach's "Comparative Anatomy" to increase the attention given to scientific education in England. He held some of the highest offices and honours available to one of his profession; was one of the most earnest of self-culturers, and one of the hardest of workers in his profession and in general schemes of benevolence. He had only recently received the honour of baronetcy from her Majesty when he was stricken down by a paralytic seizure beyond the aid of mortal surgery.

On the same day John Pitcairn Trotter, sheriff-substitute of Dumfriesshire, and a man who mingled with the sterner duties of his calling under Themis some of the lighter pleasures attainable under the favour of Minerva. He was a novelist of considerable talent, and had a genius for writing singular weird stories, for composing ballads, and for smart criticism. He lent light to *Blackwood's Magazine*, and supplied several useful translations from the German to the English public. He was singularly philanthropic, and though somewhat cynical in speech on ordinary occasions, was warm-hearted in his love of all literary men, and especially those who were zealously battling against the stern opposition of poverty. He died in the full hope of another and a brighter being, in which the face of mystery creation wears would be flung aside, and his Lord should reveal Himself.

Three days afterwards one of the famous men of the Scottish borders expired. He had devoted himself to the collecting of the "Traditions of the Covenanters," and had told their story so sympathetically and well that he stirred the hearts of the land of the Covenant, and the name of the Rev. Robert Simpson, of Sanquhar, had become a household word for many years among the pastoral regions of Scotland. He was a faithful and zealous minister of God, and died in the good old faith for which the Covenanters fought and suffered, and in the promotion of which he laboured and wrote, and in the firm assurance that he would receive God's "covenanted mercies." On the same day—8th July—the Countess of Blessington's niece, Miss Marguerite Power, a minor novelist of the day, who added little to our knowledge of life and its purposes, though she opened up some peeps into the practices of society, also died. We

shall not affirm that her chief productions were employed as a waste-time, but they certainly never rose much higher in utility than a pass-time (or pastime); and perhaps, even as such, in certain spheres of social life it is good done to enable its *monde* to pass time over imaginary perplexities rather than to be engaged in producing the truth which is stranger than fiction. *We* therefore shall restrain our hand from throwing any stone against her reputation, and pass on. But only three days thereafter our footsteps are arrested by an opening in the necropolis, prepared for the body of Richard Huie, M.D., one of the minor bards, who sang, and sang contentedly, a simple lay to act on simple hearts, and some of whose "Sacred Lyrics" are precious as the "dew on Mount Hermon."

To the French drama the unlucky 13th brought a great loss. On that day died Francis Ponsard, who had but a little while before composed a tragedy on one of the most notable individualities of history—"Galileo Galilei," a name which recalls "the tragic issue which is always going on, the conflict of new thought with old belief," and the merit of one who—

"Unfurled the bannered victory of mind,"

the performance of which, under the influence of the clergy, was forbidden by the Government; though, duly excised, it was brought upon the stage. Ponsard was an earnest student and a great admirer of Shakspeare, whom he was much laughed at for once calling "the divine Williams." From the splendid ballad of our mighty dramatist he borrowed the idea of his first victory over *romanticisme*—his "Lucrece." In his "Agnes de Meranie" he delivers himself of an anti-papal bulletin; while in him the French Revolution has found one of its most skilful reproducers. In "L'Honneur et l'Argent" and "La Bourse" Ponsard endeavoured to fulfil the Shaksperian object of the drama, and to use it "to hold as 'twere the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure," by lashing the vices, exposing the profligacy, and denouncing the greed of the society of the empire of the third Napoleon. He carried this further in his "Pleasure of Women," and showed how the horrors of society react on human happiness in his "Amorous Lion." Ponsard was a sterling spirit, a man of principle and worth, whom France could ill afford to lose, for he made the living lies of fashion feel how contemptible life is when it is a lie. May he have seen and found the true life, which is seen behind

"That curtain of obdurate roof
Which limits mortal vision, whose dim folds
Peperpetually do stir, but never rise."

To the same month, though to the last day of it, belongs a note of the demise of a Transatlantic favourite of ours, Catherine

M. Sedgwick, whose quiet but telling descriptions of the joys and sorrows of home life, whose homely wisdom and healthy morality, whose disregard of sensation and trust in the interests of life's realities, charmed us in those days when we had leisure and inclination to peruse works of fiction. We could scarcely think it right to close our record without a word of kindly remembrance of the graceful author of "Home," "Live and let Live," "Hope Leslie," "Means and Ends," "The Linwoods," &c., with which, long ago, we used to lighten the fireside with interest, and feel our hearts stirred as our imagination followed the fortunes of her heroes and heroines, and the expression of a hope that she may have found herself going "home."

On the 3rd of August the great German philologist and critic, whose name fills so much of the literary annals of classical literature—Auguste Boeckh,—forsook the study of Greek antiquity and speculations on the "cosmic system of Plato," to behold the cosmic system of God. His was a splendid conception of the duty of a classicist; it was no less than that he should revive the entire life of the olden times, its literature, religion, art, science, politics, history, commercial and domestic life; and this he proposed should be done, not in isolated efforts, but as an organic whole, whose oneness could be felt as it has formerly been experienced. A most extensive and beneficial influence has his example had on the scholars of Germany, England, and France. His works are a mass of critical acumen and vast erudition, of subtle thought and able controversy, and are a powerful argument for that thoroughness without which scholarship is vain. His academical speeches are full of good sense and genial enthusiasm, of living thought and hearty love of knowledge. No longer shall he descant on the lunar cycles of the Greeks, but he may, in endless cycles of thought, develop his soul in the great light of eternity.

Mrs. Sarah Austin was greater as an influence even than as a literary lady. The friend of Cousin and Comte, of Bentham and J. S. Mill, of Grote and Senior, of Sydney Smith and Carlyle, of Leigh Hunt and Bickersteth, she carried into all societies the heirdom of intellectuality which, as one of the Taylors of Norwich, she possessed, and as the husband of the most thorough jurisprudentist of our times it was fitting she should possess. She was a woman of almost universal accomplishments, speaking French and German with the utmost conversational fluency, and holding in her mind the finest thoughts of the greatest masters of politics, philosophy, history, and science. She could bring the varied resources of a capable mind, and the tact of a genuine feminine spirit into play in the best assemblages of thinkers—British and foreign—which ever adorned the drawing-room of a London or country residence, in which competence had to bear the burden of ill-health, and mind made up—rare fortune—for money. Like a true wife, she subordinated every personality to her husband's reputation, and devoted the years of her sorrowing widowhood to honouring his memory.

by bringing before the world the evidences he had been able to leave of a noble and fertile mind. In long ill-health she was a patient and hopeful sufferer, and she looked with an eye of desire on the spot in Weybridge churchyard which should hold her ashes in close proximity to her husband's precious dust. As the seed wraps up its best powers in the winter's cold, and lays them under cover in the mould, to give blossoms of brightness forth in after summers, so she has gone to the winter sleep of the grave in hope of a glorious rising again in eternal health of being.

"The science of electricity" is, in its modern form, indissolubly connected with the name of Michael Faraday, who was not only the foremost of scientific thinkers, but the most modest of men, and the most eager Christian spirit of the age. The son of a smith, himself trained to bookbinding, he was able by self-culture, industry, genius, and love of truth, to extend the horizon of men's thoughts, and to unravel in some degree the mysteries of nature—seeing always in the phenomena under his eye the presence of a divine will, and beholding in all that is observable by man the law of the Creator, by whose decree all things subsist. He had not only light of the clearest, but insight of the purest and foresight of the truest. The extreme simplicity and trustingness of his mind led him to be carefully inductive, while it made him singularly skilful in seizing upon ideas which reposed on hidden truths, and which called the proofs of these truths out of nature's recesses into the light of observation and experiment. His simplicity extended to his style, because it was the normal condition of his thinking; and his noticeable earnestness and scrupulous integrity of speech were, in our day of extreme and intense hunger after novelty of expression, almost as great a marvel as his own discoveries. Though one of the most illustrious of those who have investigated nature and made science the object of research, he has not left the God of nature unhonoured, or given to science a faith only due to revelation. Though versed in "the various forces of matter," he was equally well skilled in the forces of argument, and knew not only the practical application of the methods of investigation, but also the requisites of proof. He tested not only nature, but faith, and he found out many of the hidden truths of each. But his eye is now enriched with the special gifts of seeing which belong to those who have been admitted "within the veil,"—whose hopes have borne fruit, and whose science has become sight, and not sight only, but "the substance of things hoped for."

When, in 1851, F. G. Tomlins, knowing our ardent desire to promote the culture of the masses, applied to us to aid him in the labour of preparing "Help to Self-Educators; interpreting subjects of History, Arts, Politics, and Literature," we readily agreed, because we thought it a scheme well fitted to advance the "public good;" and we had proceeded so far as to draw up a sketch and outline of an "Analytic History of the Literature of England," in which the substance of the chief works of the chief

authors were to have been given in their own words, though in the briefest terms, and had prepared a specimen of our intended work in an abstract of Bacon's "Novum Organum,"—we had no thought of being called upon to note his death. He was an energetic enthusiast, and had a nimble elasticity of spirit and intellect which won the admiration most of those who knew him best. He was a clever compiler, a versatile and ready writer, whose pen was swift and whose brain was full. He was an art-critic and an artist, and though engaged in supplying the insatiable press from day to day, he found time to read and think, "to understand the words of the wise and their dark sayings;" and he had ambitions beyond that: but there is an end to all things, even to earthly ambitions; and that came to him on 21st September.

In October another great foreign philologist finished his course; one whose very name marks an epoch, and whose linguistic researches have been acknowledged as successful and valuable by the highest authorities. The most important addition made to the science of comparative philology in our times was assuredly made by Franz Bopp, the Orientalist, whose early work on "The Foundations of Philosophy in the East" awoke an interest in that topic which is yet unexhausted, and whose labours upon comparative grammar have gained for him glory, not only for the completeness with which grammatical forms have been analyzed in it, but for the clear summary he offers of their principles, and his lucid statement of their laws. He too has gone from among living men, and his works, and his memory, and his dust, and his example alone remain of the eager searcher into the mysteries of speech, and of that philosophy which speech involves.

William Martin, the "Peter Parley" of England, and one of the compilers of books for the young, whose efforts found much favour with the public, died 23rd of October; and two days thereafter a well-informed and capable contributor to literature, F. Lawrence, whose place is marked alone by a Life of Fielding, and who, as he says of his hero, "calmly beheld the approach of death, marked his upraised dart, and yielded without a shudder," and passed into "the lit darkness" of the grave.

The cosmogony of Laplace and the theory of nebular condensation advocated by the famous Sir William Herschel held a high place in the scientific world at one time, and were in fact regarded as hypotheses capable of explaining much of the system of the architecture of the heavens; but the telescope has been brought to dissipate these nebulous errors, and the far-distant curiosities of space which led to these explanations were resolved into clusters of binary and trinary stars, while the nature of the surface of the moon was made the subject of careful observation. To William Parsons, third Earl of Rosse, we owe the rectification of these plausible expositions of the set taken by night's sublime "jewelry of stars;" and we owe to him besides that the distances of space have been shown to stand off from the human dwelling in which we

are at expanses of length which exceed all the conceivable computations of mankind, and made the palpable infinity of the universe more wonderful than ever, and a vaster testimony to the glory of Him who "counteth the number of the stars, and nameth them every one;" whose "kingdom ruleth over all." On the 31st October, Earl Rosse closed his eyes upon the light of sun, moon, and stars, and found an ampler ether for his spirit in the Presence whose law is in heaven.

Philoxene Boyer was one of the eccentrics of Paris, and was even among French wits a notable modern literary man. He gave himself to the translation of Greek poems, the composition of satires, and the production of dramas. With a wild sort of irregular philanthropy he combined a considerable acerbity of temper. On him, on 10th November, the curtain of death fell. On what has it risen? When the lights are extinguished is the play ended? and is there no life but that which is enacted before the scenes in this theatre, wherein "all the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players"?

At Aberdeen a man of indefatigable industry, unweariable studiousness, whose life was spent in the dullest of labours—the compilation of dictionaries,—but who lightened the gloom of his fate by flirtations with the Muses, Dr. John Ogilvie died 21st November. He was a man of much geniality of mind, of most persistent laboriousness, and undaunted by difficulties. His life is one to which the writer on "Toiling Upward" might turn, for he never slackened an aim while a higher possibility rose before him.

But "life in earnest," a life "not slothful in business, fervent in spirit, serving the Lord," was brought to a close after long endurance had given place to Christian activity and ardour in the demise of James Hamilton, D.D. Born in murky Paisley, brought up in the brilliant valley which is surrounded by the pleasant—ah, how pleasant!—"braes of Strathblane," educated in Glasgow, ministering in Edinburgh, and dying in London, how much of the prime of life had he gathered in at them all! and how much was he able to give out! He was an embodied Christian "Excelsiorist." He "*pressed* towards the mark and prize of his high calling in Jesus Christ." He was a great soul set on flame with the very love of God. He had little passion but much enthusiasm, little fear and much love, little hesitancy and much boldness in Christ. How wide and varied were his loves among books and men! and how sterlingly honest were his words of criticism, warning, encouragement, and consecrated imagery! How living he made the whole gospel seem, and how he poured into the soul thought, insight, conduct, faith, hope, and humility, yet withal gave energy to every fibre of his being! "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord: Yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours; and their works do follow them." On 24th November he fell asleep in Jesus, and the sickle of the great Reaper cut him down for the garner of the Most High.

Fitzgreene Halleck began his poetical life by endeavouring to become the Byron of America. He got through a good deal of merry malevolence, introduced a little light scepticism, and made a good many uncouth rhymes and far-fetched jests, but he soon found out that the glitter of such poetry is cold and tinselly, not rich with the living light of stars, and graced with the ripe pleasantness of flowers, and learned to see a solemnity—

“In sorrow’s pomp and pageantry,”

which gave higher virtue to his after efforts. His is not—

“One of the few the immortal names

That were not born to die,”

but it is one which America may well seek to keep green till some higher voice arise and bid the lyre of Columbia awake to a nobler strain and a holier “soul to dare” the upward paths of poesy.

Professor Daubeny made the flowers of earth speak not only the results of science, but the truths of heaven—languages these which flowers are capable of speaking “full well.” He has also made chemistry unfold new truths regarding the laws which regulate the lives of plants. He was Oxford’s great scientific thinker, and his vocation was to interpret the phenomena of nature by the aid of the facts and principles of chemical science. He was an early disciple and an able expounder of the atomic theory, and he wrought it out to good uses. He was an erudite man of science, an earnest navigator, and an original thinker. His papers are very numerous, and are full of excellent matter gracefully expressed. The admiration and gratitude of men of science for his long services have been freely rendered by those who are capable of appreciating the full result of his efforts, and they seem to bear testimony to the thoroughness and vigour of his thinking.

Such are the names of those who have entered into the haven of rest during the course of 1867, so far as our memory serves us, and the space allotted to us permits commemoration. Amid the annals of death we can only name those whom memory and interest cull out from the “lost” of the earth. We have not probably mentioned all who are noteworthy, but we have endeavoured with honest impartiality, in the shadow of the grave, to speak the truth in love of those whom the world has lost, and for whom it rightfully mourns.

As we sum up, in some measure, the losses of the year, we can scarcely avoid reflecting how sad a thing it seems that it should so frequently happen that just at the moment when, as it appears to onlookers, a thinker has ripened and matured his mind, and is, as it were, ready to bestow on the world some of the results of his life-labours, the functions of being should cease, and he should become like a casket wherein rare jewels are enclosed, but which are locked for ever from the touch of others—only a husk and a shell, out of whom all virtue is gone. Nature’s prime work cannot be perfected thus for nought! Such fruits of the tree of life cannot surely drop from the branches of being for useless decay! Does not rather the

ripened seed of the spirit flash forth from the environments of earthliness, and leave the bodily form to seek the skies in radiant immortality, because its time has come to pass into "that world where the things of our present faith are the visible sources of joy, and where praise and adoration, and the other outpourings of ecstatic hearts, are the exercises most congenial" to the ripened soul? Is there not a peculiar deliciousness in the thought which gratifies the soul and makes it strong for action and suffering, far more than in the dismal spirit-groan which wails,—

"Take me, mother earth, to thy cold breast,
And fold me there in everlasting rest.

The long day is o'er—
I'm weary, I would sleep;
But sleep, sleep
Never to waken more"?

Even upon earth and among us how mighty are the dead! They give us our laws, letters, customs, education, faith, and hope; they excite our gratitude, admiration, memory, reverence, emulation, and love; they are the pioneers of our career and the heroes of our aspirations; they have given us being, and they are gone before us to the haven of spirits. Verily the dead are powers and principalities and potentates, who rule our spirits from their urns! They have fashioned the Past, and the Present is the long result of their living forces, and into the little interspace between the two eternities of Past and Future we have been introduced to take up the web of time, and to weave out our shuttleful of days, like them to be received thereafter into the Future and to become as they. Our fathers worked hitherto, and we work now. Let us so work that our lives may be influential on the future, and may be successful in securing a divine "welcome" into the mansions of Immanuel. N. L.

SLEEP.—There is no fact more clearly established in the physiology of man than this, that the brain expends its energies and itself during the hours of wakefulness, and that these are recuperated during sleep. If the recuperation does not equal the expenditure, the brain withers—this is insanity. Thus it is that, in early English history, persons condemned to death by being prevented from sleeping always died raving maniacs; thus it is also that those who are starved to death become insane—the brain is not nourished, and they cannot sleep. The practical inferences are three:—1st. Those who think most, who do most brain work, require most sleep. 2nd. That time "saved" from necessary sleep is infallibly destructive to mind, body, and estate. Give yourself, your children, your servants—give all that are under you—the fullest amount of sleep they will take, by compelling them to go to bed at some regular, early hour, and to rise in the morning the moment they awake; and within a fortnight, nature, with almost the regularity of the rising sun, will unloose the bonds of sleep the moment enough repose has been secured for the wants of the system. This is the only safe and sufficient rule; and as to the question how much sleep any one requires, each must be a rule for himself.—*Dr. Forbes Winslow.*

Coiling Upward.

THORVALDSEN.

"From the crowd of young artists, a poor lad of lowly birth stepped forth;—half a century passed away, and he was found on the pinnacle of fame."—J. M. THIELER.

SCULPTURE is the realization of ideal form. It is the ennoblement of stone by mind, the enrichment of matter by thought, the outcome and result of the shaping spirit of Imagination. It is the enshrinement of beauty, and the immortalization of the fleeting fancies of the spirit. It is conception, not life; but it is conception arrested and fixed to a life beyond life. Sculpture is frozen thought; by it, as Michael Angelo said, "marble is made flexible;" and we may add, the ideal is by it incarnated in marble. It is a mighty achievement thus to seize and fix into corporeal statuesqueness, the beams of beauty which flash across man's vision in the universe. Sculpture unites in one discipline the material which is made plastic to beauty's slightest grace or sublimity's most awe-inspiring excellence, and the soul which subdues that material to unresisting submission; and it glorifies labour, self-denial, patience, and thought, by the evidence it yields of their transforming might—their subjugating power.

As pure form sculpture arises in the artist's mind; as material form it issues from his hands; in it as a completed whole—a trinity of thought, labour, and marble, standing forth in a unity of sense-impressing shapeliness—"airy thought" concentrates and solidifies into actual form; soul and sense coalesce in wedded grace and divine unity. This singleness of sculpture is one of its most striking characteristics. Nothing—letters, painting, or science—so concentrates and concentrates "all thoughts, all feelings, all delights" into a special impression, possessed of universal power to stir and move, affect and influence. Sculpture is form at once inspirited and spiritualized; an equipoise of mind and matter, unified in form at a moment of perfected ideality. In it the very essence of outwardness is given, with the utmost simplicity and with the least adventitiousness. From it the complications of colour, time, progress, development, perspective, and associativeness fall away; it registers a constant present, an ever-during *now*. Sculpture is thought, passion, incident, soul, eternized in a specific moment—a dead yet deathless embodiment of a state of soul. The artist—the statuary of God—drops from his nerveless grasp the fashioning chisel, and chills into a monument of death; then corrupts into clay, and crumbles into dust; and can we believe, that while

* Memorandum furnished by the Rev. J. G. MacVicar, M.A., D.D., author of "An Inquiry into Human Nature," &c.

the workmanship of Phidias, Philoclytus, Praxiteles, and Laches endure for ages, the workmanship of God passes into nothingness or the rottenness of the grave,—all their life, activity, and thought gone like the shadows of a dream, faded like the tones of a delicious melody, or the delicate aroma of a lily on the banks of Cnidus, in the time of Alexander the Great? Nay verily! the *bildnerkunst* or image-work of man cannot surpass in longevity the God-like spirit of him into whom the breath of Deity has been breathed, and to whom the grace of the Supreme has been manifested, that we might be changed into the image of Christ, “from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord.” But we are permitting ourselves to be led from our purpose, and we must return to our subject.

Genius is a divine gift; and with the true impartiality of Him who “is no respecter of persons,” the power of being original—or rather we should say of being originative—is scattered with a bounteous hand in all classes of society. The seed of fresh and influential life is sown among mankind by the All-wise, for us to culture into fruitfulness and beneficence. It is given us, and it is to be accounted for with usury; for only by usefulness is the purpose of the Giver of all good gifts properly fulfilled. In the lowly dwelling of a somewhat dissipated, and greatly discontented wood-carver, Thorvaldsen had his birth; but he has enriched Copenhagen with miracles of genius, and the world with forms of beauty, radiant with the eternal repose of art. What a toil of soul is implied in the progress of this single mind—little cultured, little cared for, often a prey to poverty and suffering in his youth, even in manhood requiring to labour with more assiduity than a common workman! In the Thorvaldsen Museum in Copenhagen, containing so many of the works of a master hand, and in which—superb mausoleum—the body of the sculptor rests his hand idle, his brain insentient, and himself a handful of dust, while the results of his genius give reality to the ideas which rose in the visions of the dead whose ashes reposed in the long-made receptacle for his body and the repository of his works. If the eternal ice of sculpture imprisons the pure forms of the artist’s thoughts in a visible immortality, is it probable that the conceptive soul of the worker has been swept into the chaos of non-existence? We may at least make an after being and influence for him, if we heed his story and learn the lesson of industry from his life, to which we direct attention.

Carlo Alberto (commonly called Bertel) Thorvaldsen, son of Gotskalk Thorvaldsen, a wood-carver in Copenhagen, was born in the Danish capital 19th November, 1770. His grandfather was an Icelandic clergyman, who was compelled to send his son to the shipyards to gain a livelihood. The sculptor’s mother, Karen Grönlund, was a pretty stout little woman of peasant birth, a native of Jutland, who was greatly kept down in the world by the indolence, mediocrity, and drunkenness of her husband. Despite her industry, poverty kept a hard hold on the family. Carlo was, at irregular intervals, taught a little reading and writing by his

father, who had been fairly educated, but he is not known to have been at any school for the acquirement of rudimentary instruction. When he was about eleven years of age admission was procured for him in the Arts Academy School. He passed the first sketching class in 1781, and was promoted to the second in the following year. The talent he displayed in his drawing induced his father to endeavour to profit by his labours, and after school-time he had to assist in the carving of the figure-heads of ships in Larsen's "plads." This materially interfered with the lad's progress under the instruction of Löffler at the Academy.

In 1786 Thorvaldsen was advanced by Rector Wiederwelt to the modelling school, and under Nicholas Abildgaard made great progress in copying from nature and working in clay. He won the Academy's small silver medal, January, 1787, and after a little religious training among other poor boys by C. F. Höyer, Archdeacon of Holmen's church, he "was publicly confirmed in his baptismal covenant, 15th April, 1787," though he was unable to pay the fee for his certificate for more than a month after that date. Thereafter he was taken to act as apprentice to his father, and this he continued to be for nearly two years. On 30th May, 1789, Thorvaldsen competed for and gained the Academy's large silver medal for a bas-relief of "A Sleeping Cupid." Next, a friend and school-fellow of his—Nicholas Wolff—asked him to assist in the decoration of a triumphal arch, erected at Copenhagen in honour of the entry of the Crown Princess, Maria Sophia Frederika, into that city. Thorvaldsen executed three models of the tutelary deities of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, of which honourable mention was made, though without naming the artist in the records of the rejoicings. With the design of making this state ceremony subserve his need, Thorvaldsen resolved on preparing a portrait medallion of the Princess, and he diligently attended all public places where she could be seen to catch the perfect likeness he required. In this he succeeded, and Regoli bought the copyright at a sum which gratified the artist and helped to stave off the wolf from the door of his poverty-besieged home, where there was not comfort enough for him to have a room to himself, either to be seen by visitors or to work in quiet.

There was at this time in Copenhagen a Mutual Improvement Art Society, the members of which met in each other's rooms. Of this association, by special grace, Thorvaldsen, though unable to give his night in due course like the rest, was constituted a member. At these meetings designs on subjects from the Old and New Testaments were determined upon, and sketches made by the members; these were then subjected to mutual criticism, after which frugal refreshments were partaken of, and select pieces of poetry were recited. Among these self-training students he was notable for speed, vigour, and freshness of conception. Everything took a pictorial form in his mind.

After an examination, to undergo which he was incited by these
1868.

self-improving associates, Thorvaldsen gained the small gold medal of the Academy of Arts, 15th August, 1791; and on 14th August, 1793, the great gold medal was awarded to him for a bas-relief of "Peter healing the Lame Man." This success involved a right to a travelling stipend for three years, but he had of late begun to paint portraits, to produce illustrations for the booksellers, and, along with his father, making picture-frames, which they hawked. He also had, through Professor Abildgaard's influence, a few commissions for modelling bas-reliefs for the decoration of the New Palace. His mode of modelling was somewhat peculiar. Instead of forming his model in clay, and then taking a plaster cast, he built up his models with stones set in stucco, which latter substance he scraped before it had time to dry into the required form. One day, Professor Sergell, the Swedish sculptor, was taken by Abildgaard to see his pupil at work. Scraper in hand, Thorvaldsen stood before his lump of stone and stucco, working the mass into form. "How does the gentleman manage to execute such beautiful figures thus?" said Sergell. "With this," said Thorvaldsen, with seeming artlessness, holding up the scraper to his forehead. His reputation gained him the favour of Counts Ditlew and Bernstorff. The latter, the famous Minister of State, commissioned a bust from him; and now Thorvaldsen's friends pressed upon him more and more the advantage he would gain by travel, especially by a sojourn in the paradise of sculptors—Rome. His father disliked the idea of losing his son's profitable aid, and his mother dreaded the drunkenness and laziness of her husband, should her son depart; while there was—

"A nearer one
Still, and a dearer one,
Yet than all other,"

who feared that the greater loss should be hers; for if he went to sunny Italy could he remain true to his Margarete? But "the advice of friends" and the whisper of ambition prevailed. On 20th August, 1796, he set sail for Italy in the Danish frigate *Thetis*, and left it, at Malta, where it was performing quarantine a second time, in a small sailing-boat bound for Palermo, whence he took a packet-boat for Naples; and thence, after a stay of six weeks, he set out for Rome, where he arrived 8th March, 1797, which he accounted his second and true-art birthday.

Of the numerous letters of introduction which he brought with him to Rome, Thorvaldsen delivered one only, that to George Zoega, whose studies in archæology, numismatics, and fine arts are known to all who interest themselves in these departments of knowledge. By his advice Thorvaldsen spent the earliest months of his sojourn in the imperial city in the inspection of the art collections in the capital of art—many of whose chief treasures were then, however, confiscated by Napoleon, for the adornment of the capital of revolutions. In a short time after his advent at Rome he hired a

studio—one which had been formerly occupied by the epic sculptor, Flaxman—in the Strada Babuina, but he had scarcely commenced his tenure of it when he was attacked by fever and prostrated in health. Signor Zoega, in these circumstances, invited the ailing artist to spend a convalescent visit with him in his country house at Genzano. This fever, which was followed by a relapse, and the unsettled state of the city shortly before and some time after the institution of the Roman Republic, interfered with work and Thorvaldsen had little to show for his three years' travelling stipend (400 rix-dollars per annum) except a bust of Rothe, and a cast of Bacchus and Ariadne. These he forwarded, and, after some accidental delay, they were brought before the directors of the Academy, who expressed their approval, and in consideration of the circumstances continued his stipend for two years longer.

On receipt of this welcome news he modelled his famous statue of "Jason," but being dissatisfied with it broke it in pieces. He next completed his bust of Bernstorff and some other minor works, which he transmitted to Copenhagen, and thereafter determined to return home. He was prevailed on to wait for Zoega, who intended also to visit his native land, and he was enabled by a new grant of his stipend for another year to do so. He remodelled "Jason," and it became the admiration of Rome. Canova proclaimed it to be a work in "a new and grand style," and Thorvaldsen determined on letting it precede himself to Denmark. He was again accidentally disappointed in being able to leave Rome, and on the very day on which he should have left, Thomas Hope, of Deepdene, near Dorking, afterwards author of "*Anastasius*" (1819), asked permission to see his studio. He was struck with "Jason," and asked what it would cost to execute it in marble. £300, was the reply. "You shall have £400," said Mr. Hope, and he ratified the commission at once by an advance of about £65. The verdict of the young English connoisseur was fame, and Thorvaldsen became known in higher circles. Schubart, the Danish Minister at the Neapolitan Court, Baron Humboldt, Countess Worangoff, &c., became admirers and friends. He was looked upon as likely to become the Praxiteles of his age. This success delighted the Danes, and the king sent him a *douceur* of 300 rix-dollars. This good news was tempered by the sad intelligence that his mother was dead. He was appointed professor in the Academy of Florence in 1804, and as a birthday gift to the Baroness Schubart, he executed a bas-relief of "The Dance of the Muses on Helicon." In May, 1805, Thorvaldsen was elected a member of the Academy of Copenhagen, and in a month thereafter, he was promoted to a professorship—entitling him to a yearly income of 400 rix-dollars, and apartments in the Charlottenburg. News of his father's death—in an asylum for aged and decayed poor—reached him in the autumn of 1806. He expressed sore grief at the cruelty of fortune, which denied him prosperity until his parents were beyond the reach of help or the joy of his success. In the midst of his sadness he produced his

"Achilles in despair as Agamemnon's heralds are bearing off the beautiful Briseis,"—a bas-relief which found an immediate purchaser in Count Rantzan Brietenburg, a nobleman of Holstein, who had just visited Rome. During 1807 he was engaged in correspondence about and designs for the new Palace in Copenhagen, for which he modelled four colossal statues, Hercules, Minerva, Nemesis, and Æsculapius, as well as two bas-reliefs on Justice, Truth, Prudence, and Strength. In 1808 he produced the statue of "Adonis,"—

"Stone to all nymphs more lovely than a man,"

which Canova considered to be "beautiful, noble, and full of sentiment." Of this the Crown Prince of Bavaria ordered a copy for £500. In the same year Zocga died, and Thorvaldsen mourned for his early patron and adviser. To compensate in some measure for this soul's loss Oehlenschläger, the Shakspeare of Danish dramatists, came to Rome, and they became fast friends, a friendship which induced the poet to produce the art drama "Correggio," which has been translated into English by Theodore Martin.

The summer of 1810 he spent at Montenero, and here a singular escape befell him. A studio in which he had been working, but which he had left at an unusual part of the day, was, during his absence, stricken with lightning, passing through the identical spot on which he had stood while working, and actually grazing the damp bas-relief on which he had been engaged.

Napoleon I., in the midst of his conquests, had announced an intended visit to Rome in 1812, and the Quirinal was ordered to be restored for his reception. Sterni the architect asked Thorvaldsen to undertake a frieze-work, and in less than two months he modelled a bas-relief of the triumphant entry of Alexander into Babylon, a work consisting of many figures, and extending to fifty English feet in length. This work excited the greatest admiration, and the Romans proclaimed its author to be "the patriarch of bas-relief." This intense fit of industry was followed by a fierce fit of fever, from which his recovery was slow. He visited the baths of Lucca, and tasted the air of Florence, as a guest to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Having returned to Rome, the Duke of Bedford commissioned from him an "Achilles and Briseis," and a statue of Lady G. E. Russell, his daughter, which is known as "Fanciulla."

He was now urgently invited to return to his fatherland, but the "terror of war" having been extinguished by Waterloo, the Continent became safe to travel in, and crowds of distinguished visitors came to Rome, many of whom were anxious to commission works of art. Thorvaldsen therefore declined immediate compliance with the invitation. Three copies of his "Venus" were ordered for England. The Crown Prince of Bavaria bought seventeen statues recovered from the temple of the Panhellenic Jupiter in the island of Ægina, and ordered them to be sent from Zante to Rome that they might be restored by Thorvaldsen. This he accomplished so

satisfactorily that the modern additions could not be distinguished from the ancient fragments. Thereafter Canova and he were appointed by the papal Government to arrange the public collections of the city.

Lord Byron was in Rome in 1817, and at the request of Hobhouse Thorvaldsen executed a bust of the poet, which was afterwards frequently copied. "The kneeling Ganymede and Eagle," "The Shepherd Boy," "The Women at the Sepulchre," and "The Life of Jesus upon Earth," were among the chief works of this year, as well as a "Monument to Caroline Von Humboldt."

There are few men, especially eminent men—perhaps because they are most subjected to remark, and we have the best knowledge of their ways and doings—whose lives are harmonious. In them the laws of the human mind often display what is excusingly called the eccentricity of genius. The true man's life is a whole, and ought to contain in it no injurious influence, and as an example it should inspire and exalt. The conjunction of the names of Byron and Thorvaldsen suggests to us here to note that though Thorvaldsen had been inspired by a pure passion in his early years, the sublime purity of innocence did not cause him to sculpture his own soul into perfectness of life. He had, shortly after his arrival in Rome, contracted an alliance of an unhallowed nature, common enough in Italy, with Anna Maria Magnani, lady's-maid to Signora Zocga. Though he had intrigued with her, yet he permitted her to become the wife of a person of property, with the understanding that she should still be entitled to his protection; and in 1803 Signora Maria Uhden, banished from her husband's home, took up her abode in Rome as the friend of Thorvaldsen. In 1812 she became the mother of a daughter, whom the sculptor adopted, and for many years her jealous and phrenetic passion caused him much sorrow for neglecting his father's advice "to be careful of the shrine of Venus." Having slighted honest faith once he was prepared to sin again; and though some friends, earnestly desiring that he should settle in life, brought him into contact with Miss Frances Catherine Mackenzie, of Seaforth, and he had engaged to marry that lady, he was drawn aside from the fulfilment of that promise, and that on account of a new transport for a lady who resembled "a setting sun in autumn, but with all the enchantment which the evening sun possesses." From that second dream of unworthy dalliance he woke, but only to find his affianced resolved never to ally herself to one whose moral principles were so feeble as his had proved to be. We now dismiss this topic from our thoughts, for we have noticed it only to protest that our admiration of the sculptor's genius does not blind us to his faults, any more than we forgive the vices of the lord on account of the genius of the poet.

On 3rd October, 1819, Thorvaldsen visited his native country, after an absence of twenty-three years. After a brief period devoted to sight-seeing, friendship, and regrets for the lost, he set to work in Copenhagen to the especial delight of his countrymen. His first

work was to model a bust of the king, the queen, the royal princesses, and Prince F. C. Christian. He also resolved to model a pair of bas-reliefs on "The Baptism of Jesus" and "The Institution of the Lord's Supper" for the Free Kirk. To the commissioners of that kirk he proposed to execute figures of Christ and the twelve apostles.

On his way in returning to Rome he visited Warsaw, where Thorvaldsen asked permission to model a bust of the Emperor of Russia, who was in the Polish capital at the time, and the favour refused to Canova was granted to Thorvaldsen. On his re-arrival in Rome pupils flocked to his studio, and as he had many commissions, he gave the preliminary business of modelling into their hands, and having directed them how to prepare the material for receiving his conceptions, gave only the finishing touches to the clay before they were cast in plaster, as a preliminary to their being permanized in marble.

He spent upwards of six months in preparing his figure of Christ, and persevered even against his own keenly felt despair of success. It was modelled in Jan., 1822, and simultaneously with it he was occupied with his bas-relief of John the Baptist in the wilderness. In the autumn of 1822 Canova died; and by the accidental discharge of a pistol by a boy Thorvaldsen was nearly "erased from life." As a recognition of the providence of his escape he prepared a font—a kneeling angel bearing a shell in her outstretched arms—for the Free Kirk of Copenhagen. He was asked by Cardinal Consalvi to execute a design for a monument to Pope Pius VII. At this time he had his hands full of engagements, and it was not till March, 1825, that this design was modelled; and no sooner was it seen than admiration greeted it; though great scandal was felt "that a heretic should execute a monument for the foremost Church in Christendom to the memory of the head of that Church." He was elected president of the Academy of St. Luke, Pope Leo XII. himself suggesting that when any ceremony of the Church took place in which the president usually took part Thorvaldsen might "announce himself as *indisposed*."

Thorvaldsen opened the year 1828 with his "Cupid leading a Crouching Lion," completed the "Jason," which Mr. Hope bought in his days of poverty, and sent off to Copenhagen plaster models of "Christ and the Twelve Apostles," works on which he had been more or less engaged for seven years. In 1829 he was asked to produce a statue of Lord Byron, which he did. This was intended for Westminster Abbey, but it was refused a place there; it was also rejected at St. Paul's, and it is now in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge. In 1831, Sir Walter Scott visited Italy, and was anxious to make acquaintance with Thorvaldsen, and the sculptor immortalized their intimacy by a bust of the poet-novelist. He also produced a bust of Horace Vernet, who painted his portrait as a return compliment. In this year he formally adopted his daughter Elise, who was afterwards married to Colonel Von Pulsen.

In 1832 cholera broke out in Rome, and great consternation was felt throughout the city, from which many—and among them Thorvaldsen—tried to escape; but the *cordon sanitaire* was closely kept, and he was compelled to return to the risk he wished to avoid. His next years were distinguished by great industry, inventiveness, and lofty ideality. Among the works of this period we may note—a bas-relief for a monument to Gutenberg; “Parnassus;”—a frieze; “The Four Evangelists;” “Raphael;” “Nemesis;” “The Seasons;” “Faith, Hope, and Charity;” Statue of Frederick Schiller; a series of bas-relievs in illustration of Homer’s poems; a number of classical statues and bas-reliefs; a statue of Goethe, with bas-relief medallions; Homer Singing to the Greeks; “Adam and Eve;” “Vulcan;” &c., &c. This was a time of earnest, persistent, and elevated life with him; he was at his best in thought and executive skill, and he felt the thrill of a passionate joy as he saw the labours of his hands fill the souls of others with gladness. In these days he held the highest rank among the men of mark in Rome, and few of the thoughtful and high-minded entered Rome without endeavouring to gain a glimpse of the artist and admission to his studio. At this favourable moment we have been fortunate enough to obtain the following personal look at him, through the kindness of the author of a treatise “On the Beautiful, the Picturesque, and the Sublime;” “the Philosophy of the Beautiful,” and many other works of intense philosophical interest—whom kindredness of taste and an early acquired reputation for a knowledge of the principles of æsthetics made welcome to Thorvaldsen’s friendship:—

“Whether it be that the mass of brain which is needed for the development of genius demands so much nourishment as to starve all the other organs, or that the mobility of mind which accompanies genius constantly tends to eddy into egotism, it is at any rate certain that men of genius are often eccentric beings, strange to look at, and very egotistical in their talk. To meet a favourite author for the first time, until the eye becomes accustomed to his figure and the ear to his tongue, is often one of the disappointments of life.

“But this discord only enhances the charm that is felt when a man of genius is met with, who has also a noble appearance and a dignified yet modest and genial presence; and such are to be met with sometimes. Thorvaldsen was such a one. His head and shoulders were Jupiter-like, and his whole figure was very solidly built and well-proportioned, but not tall enough to be grand. If John Wilson and he had been seen together, by one who did not know who either was, it might have been reasonably concluded that they were brothers—

‘Par nobile fratrum;’

Wilson being the younger brother, who had to do for himself in the world, and Thorvaldsen ‘the laird.’ They were very like each other: but yet there was a great difference between them too. Wilson was all enthusiasm and muscular action. He was an athlete, who even in bronze required to be put in an attitude implying action, as the sculptor Steel has so successfully done in his statue of Wilson in Edinburgh. Thorvaldsen, on the

contrary, was all repose. His habitual movements might even be said to have been slow. Still there was a remarkable similitude between these two admirable men. But their spheres of life and their elect fields of action were so dissimilar that great differences also were inevitable. Wilson lived in a field which was quite congenial to him, and he needed not to put his natural impetuosity under any restraint. But of Thorvaldsen, as Principal of the Academy of St. Luke at Rome, it was expected that he should be often at court, and therefore he had to be reserved in society; for the whole system of government at Rome was most hateful to his soul. But silence and reserve were not unnatural to him. In his own studio, or in that of some brother artist whom he could trust, he soon became very genial and confiding, and even dreamy and careless as to what he said. He was very much beloved by all who knew him; and no wonder. Along with a superiority to all which every one felt, he took pleasure in listening to others, and was full of sympathy with the endeavours of all who were aiming at the creation of the beautiful. This was his own elect field of action; and it may be safely affirmed that in the creation of pure or abstract beauty, as a sculptor, he has never been equalled since the days of ancient Greece. Several other sculptors have equalled, if they have not even surpassed him in modelling forms of individualized beauty—youths, women, heroes, senators, &c. But no one has equalled Thorvaldsen in clothing in marble pure ideas such as those of the Grecian mythology and of Christianity. The nearest approach to him is perhaps our own John Flaxman.

“He is often spoken of as the greatest sculptor since Michael Angelo. But the two can scarcely be compared, except as to the excellence of both as men. Michael Angelo’s genius as a sculptor (for he was much more than a sculptor) displayed itself chiefly in rendering tolerable and even pleasing to the eye those very features which Thorvaldsen endeavoured to suppress to the utmost extent that truth would permit. The greatness of mind and force of character which Michael Angelo knew how to impart to his statues reconciled the eye to an amount of muscular development and action, and even strain, which can be pleasing only to the anatomist. Thorvaldsen, on the contrary, smoothed down all that and every salient point, or light, or shadow, that might distract the mind of the spectator from the unity of the idea which he desired to embody in the marble.

“This we think he sometimes carried too far. In beholding his Christ in the Free Church in Copenhagen it is necessary, in order to enjoy the statue, to avoid considering the form which alone could possibly be beneath the drapery, and to confine the eye to the contemplation of the marble as a whole. Yet this statue, with the accompanying Apostles, is his greatest work. And a truly great work it is, whether we simply consider the marbles as they stand there, or call to mind how they came to be there in marble instead of terra-cotta, which was ordered as alone answerable to the funds at disposal. This present to his country, and that at a time, too, when the Danes were upbraiding him year after year with an utter want of patriotism unworthy of any Dane, was one of the fine manifestations of his truly elevated and generous nature; and Copenhagen may well be proud both of them and of him who was their creator.

“Thorvaldsen was the first sculptor who succeeded fully in realizing in marble the idea of an apostle. Canova and others before him had made many statues for apostles; but though they were a great improvement on those of Bernini and those of his style, yet they were all either Grecian

senators or heroes. No one but Thorvaldsen has fully succeeded in giving in one form at once the manliness and the gentleness of redeemed humanity, the harmonious synthesis in marble of the lines which express now justice, now charity, the two virtues of which all the virtues are but different forms. Not only did Thorvaldsen succeed in this, however. He succeeded in sustaining this idea through the whole apostolate, and working it into at least ten different forms. In his own estimation, at least, he failed in two out of the twelve. And in putting himself in the year 1835 to no small trouble in order to put the writer of this notice in possession of the first engravings of his Apostles, he refused to allow him to carry from his studio two of the twelve."

After this agreeable reminiscence we pass on to our narrative of his doings.

In July, 1838, he left Italy for Copenhagen, where he arrived in September. He was received with demonstrations of joy, and numerous congratulatory addresses were presented to him. His principal works in Christian art were to be collected into the Free Kirk of Copenhagen, and all his collections of books, coins, paintings, statuary, &c., were to form a *Museum Thorvaldsenianum*. He took up his residence in his apartments at Charlottenburg, erected spacious studios there, and brought out the treasures of art he had created in Rome to decorate the workshop he had established in Copenhagen; and here people flocked to see the pride of Denmark, easel in hand, bringing the beautiful into being. On Whit Sunday, 1839, the Free Kirk was consecrated; all the statues were in their places; the font was in front of the altar, and at that font which he had made Thorvaldsen stood, holding in his arms the infant daughter of his pupil and friend Freund in the character of sponsor.

From Copenhagen he reired to Nysö, and there he prepared his prizes for the chief entrance of the Free Kirk, Christ's entrance into Jerusalem, and Christ's progress from Pilate's hall to Golgotha.

His Majesty Frederick VI. offered a site for the Thorvaldsen Museum on Christianborg, and the plans of Bindesböll having been accepted, the erection of the building was proceeded with. After enjoying a home visit, delighting his countrymen with the sight of his many decorations, attending innumerable parties, playing at his favourite game of the lottery, listening to Andersen's improved stories, Oersted's physico-philosophy, and Oehenschlager's autobiographical narrations, he began to bethink himself of his unfinished works at Rome, and to long to be there again. In the summer of 1841 he set out, and going by way of Berlin, Dresden, Frankfort, Stuttgart, Munich, &c.—in all of which he was received with almost princely honours,—reached Rome in September. Here he executed "The Shepherds worshipping Jesus in the Manger," suggested by a Christmas Eve entertainment; Vulcan, and his favourite piece, "The Graces;" produced second models of those two apostles whom he would not allow Dr. J. E. More, vicar, to take the engravings of from his studio, "St. Andrew," the patron

saint of the doctor's native land, and "Thaddeus," and a great many Scripture bas-relievos.

In Sept., 1842, he left Rome for Copenhagen, travelling overland by Marseilles, Strasburg, Mannheim, Mayence, Frankfort, Altona, &c., reaching home at his daughter's (Elise Von Paulsen) 23rd Oct. Next day he visited the museum, which had just been covered in. During the year he took a likeness of his son-in-law, Albert Von Paulsen, as a hunter; executed statues of "Æsculapius" and "Hercules," and bas-relievos of Justice and Strength, Architecture, Painting, and Sculpture; Thalia and Melpomene; Science and Art; The Nursing of Justice; Hymen with Torches, &c. During the winter of 1843 he was very unwell, and on the dawning morning of 1844, though he wished to commemorate the new year, as usual, by some work of art, he was unable to do so. About the middle of June he was able to sketch his "Genius of Peace;" afterwards he prepared his "Genius of Poetry," and made two sketches of the "Genius of Sculpture." He gradually declined in health during the month of March, and became seriously disposed towards death. On the 24th of March, after a sleepless night, he took breakfast and began to work at his bust of Luther. He dined at Baron Stampe's, with Andersen and Oehenschlager, and after dinner went to spend the evening at the theatre.

There he seated himself in his accustomed box, and saluted his friends as usual; the curtain was as yet unraised; he leaned his head upon his hand, and at that moment death lifted up for him the curtain which disclosed to him another world and theatre than that which his soul had left. It is not ours to penetrate into "the theatre of God's judgments," and we shall not venture into that Presence before whom angels veil their faces with their wings.

On the 26th his remains were carried by loving artist hands into the great room of the Academy, and here his corpse was watched day and night. On the 30th his coffin was received into the Free Kirk, where it lay till 6th Sept., 1848, when it was removed to the museum which he had endowed, and to which he had contributed the products of his art-life. Here, at his own request, Bindesböll had prepared in the centre of the open court. Into the dark depths of this he had once looked. He saw then only the grave. Death was invisible though near. He stilled the heart, unnerved the hand, and froze with his icy touch the thinking brain. Over him he had power, but his works are deathless. We know they remain; can we believe that their former is from the book of being razed quite? Is it not true, as he said, "the sculptor must go up higher"?

The Essayist.

DEBATING SOCIETIES.

DEBATING societies, the offspring of free speech, have, and are exerting still a very powerful influence on the tone and condition of society. By them thought has received a mighty stimulus, deeply cherished prejudices an overpowering blow, whilst energies long latent have been called forth to do vigorous battle with the many moral obstacles that clog the pathway of the human soul in its strivings after the truth and peace of God.

But with the advantages which they thus offer up to all men, and especially to those embarking in the stirring life of our great cities, there are also certain dangers which, if not carefully avoided, may greatly neutralise their just influence upon character.

Archbishop Whately says, in his "Elements of Logic," that "debating societies are certainly free from the objections which lie against the ordinary mode of theme-writing, since the subjects discussed are usually such as the speakers do feel a real interest in; but then that which is the proper object of true eloquence—to carry one's point, to convince or persuade, rather than to display ability—is more likely to be lost sight of when the main object avowedly is to learn to speak well and to show it."

It must be admitted that too often such fears are fully realized, and a ready tongue, aided by a few stock quotations, seems more sought after than the honest and feeling, though it may be rugged sentences of a thoughtful mind.

On the other hand, it is foolish to close our eyes to the fact, that those whose great object it is to cultivate their minds, and tune their tongues to sing with melody the high praises of righteousness and truth, always in the end command respect and confidence.

They may never dazzle, but they will give light, or point to its dawning; they will not with presumptuous haste pass opinions on things whose dimensions are too great for them, but wait for opportunities when well-digested thought may be expressed with the abiding influence of conscientious belief.

And these are they who avoid the quicksands spoken of by the writer to whom reference has been made, when he says,—

"If, while young men's faculties are in an immature state, and their knowledge scanty and imperfectly arranged, they are preternaturally hurried into a habit of fluent elocution, they are likely to retain through life a careless facility of pouring forth ill-digested thoughts in well-turned phrases, and an aversion to cautious reflection."

A man will thus have been qualifying himself only for the lion's part in the interlude of Pyramus and Thisbe :—

Snug. "Have you the lion's part written, pray you? if it be, give it me, for I am slow of study."

Quince. "You may do it extempore, for it is nothing but roaring."

The suggestion follows that "none should introduce themselves to this kind of practice too early, always taking care at the same time to pay particular attention to the general cultivation of their minds."

Advice like this, coming as it does from one thoroughly conversant as he was with the various temperaments and peculiar foibles of young men, cannot but call forth the most earnest consideration: Yet the task is one that amounts almost to an impossibility—to settle at what time a young man may with modest confidence presume to express his opinions, and declare his principles in public. Here it is well to remember, as Dr. Watts has it, that "the mind's the stature of the man." William Pitt was Prime Minister of England before completing his twenty-sixth year; Mozart attained European fame when scarcely a youth, and poor; wonderful Chatterton left the world, and with it the works that were his death and yet are his immortality, when less than twenty years.

In the world of literature and eloquence, as in that of business, there must be free trade and healthy competition. The capital of mind when wisely used always yields a large per-centage. Not a few feel the influence of nervousness too strongly to allow them to stand up and openly dissent from positions taken by the older and more prominent members. But if anything is to be accomplished in this world worthy of effort, there must not only be a modesty that shall preserve from rash and foolish designs, but an amount of self-confidence that will execute the demands of duty, without which it is impossible to rise sufficient to the emergencies of life. Dean Swift said, with as much truth as sarcasm, that "it is a short way to obtain the reputation of a wise and reasonable man,—whenever any one tells you his opinion, to agree with him. It is undoubtedly most pleasant to stand on the winning side of a debate, to see the flood of feeling carrying on to victory that which you believe to be true; but to speak the mind's convictions, though in the face of a multitude, is something which will act like a tonic on the whole of a man's moral nature. The art of reasoning has been supposed by some to be nothing more than an easy way to prove black white, or a quick method of demonstrating anything and everything. We have to thank our diplomatists, and many of our theologians, for this common error; but for such there might have been a more hearty reception of the grand aim of reasoning, which is to discover the order and beauty of the divine laws. Debating societies give an impetus to the search in bringing together many minds of various capabilities and powers, and striking out from each by the

intermingling of thought the light by them possessed. For honest minds are always near to the kingdom of truth, by possessing that sensitive condition of nature on which the image of Him who is "the Truth" may be most indelibly engraven.

The contact of different opinions is productive of another excellent result, in enabling a man to throw off mere habits of thought, and to begin to act from motives founded on great principles. To accomplish this is an important advance in the development of character, for to be led by mere tradition is a bondage of the living to the dead, which being a yoke unintelligently espoused, neither honours them whilst it debases and confounds the wearers. Froude says, "Most men live and think by habit; and when habit fails them, they are like unskilful sailors who have lost the landmarks of their course, and have no compass and no celestial chart by which to steer their way."

The most important time to a man is the "living present," and certainly the days through which we are now passing betoken an extraordinary development and excitement of intellectual and moral action. On the results proceeding from this revival of the higher forces and sympathies of our nature depends the quality of the birthright our children will inherit from us.

Debating societies, then, especially when conducted on Christian principles, advance the highest public good, by clearing the mind from miserable narrowness, and by showing the necessity for self-help and mutual help in the culture of the head and heart. They will send forth to the world men of thought and action, who, acting in the noble consciousness of high moral purpose, and who, believing the continual presence among men of a living and loving God, will do that which all find so difficult to succeed in—their duty.

F. C. S.

SIR JOHN BROWN.—The name of John Brown and Co. has become so familiar to the public through its imprint upon the armour-plates of our navy, and through the wide reputation of the varied manufactures of the Atlas Works at Sheffield, that no one would think of inquiring who John Brown and Co. are. Nor, now that the head of that respected firm has had the honour of knighthood conferred upon him, would many require to be told why it was so conferred, there being circumstances in the development of the armour-plating of our navy, well known to all, which are amply sufficient to justify the honour. Sir John Brown is a self-made man in the fullest sense of the words. He commenced life with very slender means, but in course of time, by diligence and perseverance, he was able to open works of his own on a moderate scale. Subsequently he erected the building from which the present extensive works have sprung, and which now cover an area of twenty-one acres of land, and employ about 4,000 hands in the manufacture of armour-plates, ordnance forgings, railway bars, steel springs, buffers, tyres, axles, &c., &c. In addition to the introduction of the iron manufacture, Sir John was the first to successfully develop the Bessemer process. To Sir John is also due the introduction of steel rails, guaranteed to outlive ten iron rails of equal weight, at very slight extra cost.

The Reviewer.

English Reprints. JOHN MILTON'S "Areopagitica." Edited by EDWARD ARBER, F.R.G.S., &c. London: Alexander Murray and Son.

HERE is a capital idea auspiciously commenced. The editor, an Associate of King's College, London, where he was a distinguished student under Professor H. Morley, in this series of publications—

"Designs to place the masterpieces and the minor works of our mighty past, in their original dress, within easy reach of every reader of the English tongue. By issuing reprints of productions of our English writers, selected—indifferently as to sect, school, or party—either as a noble setting forth of truth, or as in some way illustrating the progress of our national discovery, history, philosophy, literature, or language. Except that the original *corrigenda* will be previously applied to it, and its abbreviations expanded; the text (taken, in all possible cases, direct from those editions which appear most fully to represent the mind of the author) will be given in the old spelling, punctuation, misprints, &c. The reader will therefore possess the work as originally issued; which, for all purposes of the study of our language, is highly important. The unadulterated text will be left to make its own impression, to speak for itself. A short introduction, &c., by way of forerunner; and not many notes—chiefly biographical, historical, or of manners and customs—as attendants, will wait upon it. The series will be, to a large extent, a *sixpenny* one; but this price would exclude many most valuable and curious works, simply on the score of their bulk. Many of the reprints will therefore appear in shilling volumes. Even this will be insufficient when some of the large folio works are undertaken, such as Lord Berners' *Translation of Froissart*, 1523-5; Edward Fairstfax's *Godfrey de Bulloigne*, 1600; or works somewhat smaller than these, such as John Lilly's *Euphuus*, 1580 and 1581; Jeremy Taylor's *Discourse on the Liberty of Prophesying*, 1647; John Bunyan's *Holy War*, 1682; and others. In these cases—the same standard of unusual cheapness being uniformly maintained—the price of the reprints will vary with their size. Channing says, 'Milton's most celebrated prose work is his *Areopagitica*; or, a Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,—a noble work indeed, a precious manual of freedom, an arsenal of immortal weapons for the defence of man's highest prerogative, intellectual liberty.' 'Many passages in this famous tract,' Hallam avers, 'are admirably eloquent; an intense love of liberty and truth glows through it; the majestic soul of Milton breathes such high thoughts as had not been uttered before.' Macaulay speaks of 'the sublime wisdom of the '*Areopagitica*,' and equally high encomiums might be quoted from the works of our noblest modern writers. This great treatise, 'preceded by illustrative documents,' a carefully composed introduction, and a few notes, may now be had, by any reader anxious

to enrich his library and his soul with 'the sustained, cheerful, and majestic calmness' of this stately [unspoken] oration, this gem of 'English'—the language of men ever famous and foremost in the achievements of liberty—for *sixpence*."

It may be interesting to the reader to gain a glimpse of the occasion, the purpose, and the character of this notable tract, and this we shall present to them in the words of James Montgomery:—

"The occasion was this:—the Presbyterian party in the Commonwealth, having planted themselves in that power from which they had uprooted both the monarch and the nobles, became as tenacious of continuing the bondage of the press as they had been indignant against the yoke when it was found galling and intolerable to themselves. This is probably the most complete and perfect oration in our language, a few only of Burke's masterpieces being so successfully elaborated as to stand in competition with it. Between the eloquence of Milton and that of the 'old man eloquent,' whom the French Revolution did not indeed destroy, but converted into a prophet, as inspired as Cassandra, and by the multitude as little regarded when he gave note of evil tidings, there is considerable resemblance. The characteristics of both are intellectual strength, exuberant imagination, and impassioned utterance, while the style of each is marked by implicated sentences, with frequent parenthetical clauses breaking out, as though safety-valves of over-pressed thought, into additional illustration, or matter unexpected by the reader, and apparently unpremeditated by the writer himself.

"This specimen of Milton's rhetorical power as an advocate presents a galaxy of current thought, thick sown with stars, clustered or single, of every lustre, hue, and magnitude. Argument, illustration, fancy, wit, sarcasm, and noble sentiment, are here so closely arrayed, arranged, and concatenated, as are not often found in Milton himself; while the temper of the whole—except in a few passing strokes at the prelates—is not only blameless, but commendable. The theme is magnificent—the vindication of man's prerogative on earth above the brutes that perish—his realm of reason, and his sovereignty of speech. No brief quotations can give a just idea of the force and authority of plain truths with which the undaunted republican addresses the rulers of his own party, when they were meditating to impose on the people whom their prowess in the field had set free, the most hateful of all tyrannies, the enslavement of the press. 'Give me,' he exclaims, 'the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely, above all liberties.'

"This treatise exemplifies all the excellences of Milton's manner, with fewer of its perplexities of syntax and encumbrances of phrase; whereas, on other occasions, his sentences, in verse as well as in prose, too often resemble trees so loaded with fruit, that their branches are bent down to the ground, and sometimes even trail along it; while the symmetry and grace of his finest periods are disfigured by lumbering parentheses. In many passages of his polemics, there is an intensity of eloquence that seems to fuse the multitude of his thoughts, and send them glowing white from the crucible of his mind into the mind of the reader, scarcely able to contain them in the mould of his narrower conception."

We surely could not adduce better evidence of the worth of this defence of the press than that of James Montgomery, the advocate of reform, of civil and religious liberty, of the abolition of slavery,

and who himself underwent an imprisonment in York Castle, in futherance of the liberty of the press, in 1796; and who had, besides these political, many poetical sympathies with Milton.

We regret that the author has not been more considerate of the general ignorance of readers in his notes, which are all contained on one page. We would gladly have learned who was meant by "him who went about to impair your merits with a trivial and malignant *encomium*" (p. 32), Henry the VIII.'s "Vicar of Hell" (p. 47), the "Discourse written at Delft," by which Arminius was "perverted" (p. 47), &c. The present writer is not quite sure, but he is almost certain, that the *Imprimatur* quoted by Milton appears in Bernardo Dovanzati Bostichi's "History of the Schism in England," to which we would refer the editor, who may be able to verify our suggestion. It might also, perhaps, have been usefully noted that this splendid "appeal was not successful; and it was not till 1694 that England was set free from the censors of the press."

The volumes which are intended to succeed this—Hugh Latimer's "Sermon on the Ploughers," Stephen Gosson's "Schoole of Abuse," Sir P. Sidney's "Apologie for Poetrie," &c.

We wish the editor and the scheme all success.

The Formation of Tenses in the Greek Verb. By C. S. Jerram, M.A., Oxon. London: Rivingtons.

THE verb is the keystone of the sentence, and therefore a thorough knowledge of the verb is essential to the correct composition of any language or the accurate comprehension of the precise signification and implication of sentences. The Greek verb is very elaborate in its forms, and is most metaphysically built up. This small treatise does not deal with the metaphysics, but with the mechanics of the structure of the verb. It treats of it as an element in word-building, not in thought-expression. Indeed, a similar treatise to this on the philosophy of the tense-formations of Greek verbs would be a very valuable help to students. This work concerns itself with nothing of that sort, but is notwithstanding one of great utility, as an endeavour to reduce to principle that which has for a very long time been taught empirically. It is in part a supplement and in part an exposition of the rules of the ordinary grammars; but it is also in part an application of the philosophy of speech to the explanation of the mysteries of verbal growth. According to the author's opinion—one in which we thoroughly agree with him—the theory of the formation of the Greek tenses contained in the old grammars is arbitrary and unscientific in the extreme; and he therefore endeavours to show that all the tenses are in reality formed from the pure stem of the verb, and that the changes which each tense makes in the stem proceed on fixed and intelligible principles, being chiefly regulated by what are called the *Laws of Euphony*. To those who know the ordinary rules of aug-

ment and reduplication in the Greek verb this small treatise will be found of great service. It traces the formation of the tenses upon a uniform principle, provides an appendix of irregular forms, and subjoins miscellaneous questions for examination. To those who wish not only to know but to understand Greek we commend this book. Its author deserves the thanks of scholars, and especially of self-culturists, for lessening difficulties and lightening the burdens of students of Greek.

THE CREED OF "CIVILISATION" BUCKLE.

This is the creed (let no man chuckle)
Of that great thinker — Henry
Buckle.

"I believe in fire and water,
And in Fate—dame Nature's daughter ;

Consciousness I set aside ;
The dissecting-knife's my guide.
I believe in steam and ice,
Not in virtue nor in vice ;

In what strikes the outward sense—

Not in mind or providence ;

In a stated course of crimes ;

In Macaulay and the *Times*.

As for truth, the ancients lost her ;

Plato was a great impostor.

Morals are a vain illusion,

Leading only to confusion.

Not in Latin or in Greek

Let us for instruction seek ;

Fools like Bossuet that might suit,

Who had better had been mute.

Let us study snakes and flies,

And on fossils fix our eyes.

Would we know what men should do,

Let us watch the kangaroo ;

Would we learn the mental march,

It depends on dates and—starch.

I believe in all the gases

As a means to raise the masses :

Carbon animates ambition ;

Oxygen controls volition ;

Whate'er is good or great in men

May be found in hydrogen ;

And the body—not the soul—

Governs the unfathered whole."

An anonymous skit quoted by "*The Flaneur*," in *Tinsley's Magazine*.

LOOK AT BOTH SIDES OF THE SUBJECT.—"There is a soul of goodness in things evil," I said to a neighbour, an American lady of English parentage who had come to our verandah ; "and the all-wise Creator has made nothing in vain. Yet, with the fullest faith in this doctrine, I could never find out of what use the mosquito was, or what were its purposes in the great scheme of the world." "Perhaps not," replied the fair one ; "but may not that be your own fault, Mr. Philosopher? In the first place, mosquitoes breed in the marshes. May they not warn us of the necessity of draining the marshes, and carrying off the stagnant waters, so as to increase the arable surface of the land? In the second place, mosquitoes, in countries where there are no marshes, breed in the running streams ; and larvæ of the mosquitoes are the favourite food of young trout. And if you are fond of trout, why should the trout not have his dinner of mosquito larvæ, to be fatted for your enjoyment? In the third place, the sting of the mosquito inoculates, as I have heard say, against the attacks of fevers that are prevalent in all marshy and undrained countries ; and surely a mosquito-bite is better than a fever, Mr. Philosopher?" It is always in vain to argue with a lady, so I said no more, inwardly content that so much could be urged in behalf even of the pestilential little creature, which was in those days a veritable thorn in the flesh of me and mine.—*All the Year Round*.

1868.

L

Our Collegiate Course.

STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.

MILTON'S MINOR POEMS.

ON TIME.

(Intended to have been set in a clock-case.)

[The probable date is 1630. The tone is high and solemn, and the measure—consisting of verses of five feet with some of four feet interspersed—is finely modulated, and shows great mastery over the language of verse.]

*Fly, envious Time, till thou run out thy race ;
 Call on the lazy leaden stepping hours,
 Whose speed is but the heavy plummet's pace ;
 And glut thyself with what thy womb devours,
 Which is no more than what is false and vain,
 And merely mortal dross ;
 So little is our loss,
 So little is thy gain !
 For when as each thing bad thou hast entombed,
 And last of all thy greedy self consumed,
 Then long Eternity shall greet our bliss
 With an individual kiss ;
 And joy shall overtake us as a flood,
 When everything that is sincerely good
 And perfectly divine,
 And Truth, and Peace, and Love, shall ever shine*

Helps to paraphrasing.

- Line 1. Pass quickly ; ill-natured ; exhaust ; course.
 2. Summon to greater swiftness ; indolent.
 3. Haste ; merely ; weighty ; rate of progress.
 4. Sate ; consumes.
 5. Deceptive ; worthless.
 6. Nothing more than perishing trash.
 7. Insignificant ; the damage we suffer.
 8. Advantage.
 9. Because that ; evil ; engulfed.
 10. Insatiable ; brought to destruction.
 11. At that time ; welcome us to happiness.
 12. Inseparable.
 13. Delight ; come upon ; like.
 14. Indisputably advantageous.
 15. Altogether God-like.
 16. Constantly cast light.

*Above the supreme throne
Of Him, to whose happy-making sight alone
When once our heavenly guided soul shall climb
Then, all this earthy grossness quit,
Attired with stars, we shall for ever sit,
Triumphing over death, and chance, and thee, O Time !*

17. Around ; unlikenable seat.
18. Blessed and bless-giving countenance only.
19. As soon as ; God-led spirits ; attain unto.
20. Worldly ; weight of sinfulness ; cast off.
21. Arrayed ; hold our allotted place.
22. Victorious.

ON THE DEATH OF A FAIR INFANT DYING OF A COUGH.

[“Towards the end of 1625, or about a year after the marriage of the poet’s sister with Mr. Edward Phillips, of the Crown Office, there has been born to the young pair a little girl, making the scrivener (John Milton, sen.) for the first time a grandfather and the poet an uncle. But the little stranger has appeared in the world at an untoward time. It is in the winter, when the pestilence is abroad. Not to the pestilence, however, but to death in one of its commoner and less awful forms was the child to fall a victim. The poet has just seen her and learnt to scan her little features, when the churlish and snowy winter nips the delicate blossom, and after a few days of hoping anguish over the difficult little breath, the mother yields her darling to the grave. Ere he goes back to Cambridge for the Lent term, Milton writes the little elegy, which helped to console the mother then, and which now preserves her grief. The heading ‘Anno Ætatis 17’ fixes the year, and the allusions in the poem determine the season.”—*Masson’s “Milton,”* p. 144. So far as is known to us, this elegy is Milton’s earliest attempt at original poetic composition. It did not appear in the collection of verses published by him in 1645, but nearly half a century after its occasion, in 1673.

“Milton commences by representing the subject of his verse under the figure of a flower, and he supposes that Winter, envious of the success of Aquilo (i. e., Boreas), his charioteer, in carrying off Orithyia, resolved to purvey himself a wife in like fashion. Mounting then his ‘icy-pearled’ car, he wandered through the air till he espied this fair one ; but unaware of his ‘cold, kind embrace,’ he ‘unhoused her virgin soul from her fair biding-place.’ The poet consoles her by calling to mind the parallel fate of Hyacinthus ; but he cannot persuade himself that she is really dead, and he prays her to inform him whether she has become a dweller of Empyrean, or of Elysian field, and what was the cause of her so speedy departure. He asks if she was a star fallen from the sky, which Jove had restored to its place, or a goddess who had fled to conceal herself on earth during a late attack of Earth’s sons on the ‘sheeny heaven ;’ was she Astræa, or Mercy, ‘that sweet smiling youth,’ or the matron ‘white-robed’ Truth, or any other of ‘that heavenly brood,’ or finally one of ‘the golden-winged’ host of angels come down to show to mankind ‘what creatures heaven doth breed.’

In the close he consoles the mother for her loss, and assures her that if she bears patiently, God will give her another offspring, that will make her name live 'till the world's last end'—an assurance verified at least by this poem.

"The language of this [elegiac] ode is exquisitely poetic, and the imagery and sentiments give evidence of the first faint dawn of the 'Paradise Lost.' The measure is the poet's own formation; for adopting the seven-lined stanza used by Chaucer in his 'Troilus and Cressida,' and some of his other poems, and by Sackville in his *Induction* to the 'Mirror of Magistrates,' he changed the last line from the original form of five feet to one of six feet, as in the Spenserian stanza."—*Thomas Keightley's "Life, Opinions, and Writings of Milton,"* p. 252. We think it is highly probable, from the peculiarly Shaksperian phraseology employed in the poem, that Milton's more immediate model in versification is 'The Rape of Lucrece,' improved for his purpose by having added to it the flowing sweep of the Alexandrine close of the Spenserian stanza.

I.

O FAIREST flower, (1) no sooner blown but * *blasted*,
Soft silken primrose fading *timelessly*,
Summer's chief *honour*, if thou hast *out-lasted*
Bleak Winter's force that made thy blossom *dry*;
For he, being *amorous*, on that lovely *dye*
That did thy cheek *envermeil*, thought to kiss,
But killed, alas! and then *bewailed* his *fatal bliss*.

II.

For since *grim* Aquilo, (2) his charioteer
By *boisterous* rape the Athenian damsel (3) *got*,
He thought it *touched* his *deity* full near,
If likewise he some fair one wedded not,
Thereby to wipe away the *infamous blot*
Of *long-uncoupled* bed and childless *eld*,
Which, 'mongst the *wanton* gods, a foul *reproach* was *held*.

(1) That the "fair infant" of this poem *was* the child of Milton's sister there is nothing in the poem itself to prove; but the fact is decided by a reference to the poem in Philip's "Life of Milton." "The poem was written," says Philips, "upon the death of one of his sister's children (a daughter), who died in infancy (p. xix)."—*Masson's Milton*, p. 145.

(2) Aquilo or Boreas, the north-wind, called also clear weather producer or frost-bringer, son of Astræus (*starry*) and Eos (*dawn*). He fell in love with Orithyia, and carried her off to his dwelling in a cave in Mount Hæmus. The Athenians describe the destruction of Xerxes' fleet to the favourable regard for the country of his wife felt by Boreas, and erected altars to his honour, instituting thereafter the festival *Boreasmi*.

(3) Orithyia, daughter of Erechtheus, king of Athens and Praxithea, whom Aquilo abducted.

* Modern grammar requires "than" after a comparative.

III.

So, *mounted* up in icy-pearlèd car,
 Through middle *empire* of the *freezing* air,
 He wandered long, till thee he *spied* from far ;
 There ended was his *quest*, there ceased his *care* ;
 Down he *descended* from his snow-soft *chair*,
 But, all *unawares*, with his *cold*, *kind* embrace
Unhoused thy virgin soul from her fair *biding*-place.

IV.

Yet art thou not *inglorious* in thy *fate* ;
 For so Apollo, (4) with *unweeting* hand,
Whilom did slay his dear loved *mate*,
 Young Hyacinth, (5) born on Eurotas' (6) strand,
 Young Hyacinth, the pride of Spartan (7) land ;
 But then *transformed* him to the purple flower ;
 Alack that so to change thee Winter *had* no power !

V.

Yet can I not *persuade me* thou art dead,
 Or that thy *corse corrupts* in earth's dark womb,
 Or that thy beauties *lie* in wormy *bed*,
 Hid from the world in a *low-delved* tomb ;
 Could heaven for *pity* thee so *strictly doom* ?
 Oh no ! for something in thy face did shine
 Above *mortality*, that showed thou wast divine.

VI.

Resolve me then, O soul most *surely* blest
 (If so it be that thou these *plaints* dost hear),
 Tell me, bright spirit, where'er thou *hoverest*,
 Whether above *that high first-moving sphere*,
 Or in the Elysian fields, if such there were ;
 Oh, say me true, if thou wert *mortal wight*,
 And why from us so *quickly* thou didst take thy flight !

(4) Apollo, who, as the god whose arrows produce all sudden deaths, is here personified as Winter. See below stanza, iv., line 2.

(5) Hyacinthus, son of king Amyclas, a beautiful youth, beloved by Apollo and Zephyrus. By the jealousy of Zephyrus, Apollo's quoit was, while they were playing, caused to hit Hyacinth on the head. He died instantly, and from his blood sprung, by Apollo's decree, the purple flower which bears that name.

(6) Eurotas was the chief river in Laconia ; on the right bank of it, about 20 miles from the sea, Sparta stood.

(7) Sparta or Lacedæmon, the capital of Laconia or Laconica, in the Peloponnesus, bounded east and south by the sea.

VII.

Wert thou some star which from the *ruined* roof
 Of shaken Olympus (8) by *mischance* didst fall ;
 Which *careful* Jove (9), in Nature's true *behoof*,
 Took up, and in fit place didst *re-install* ?
 Or did *of late* Earth's (10) sons *besiege* the wall
 Of *sheeny* heaven, and thou some goddess (11) fled,
 Amongst us here below to hide thy *nectar'd* head ?

VIII.

Or wert thou that just maid, who *once before*
 Forsook the hated earth, O tell me *sooth*,
 And cam'st again to visit us once more ?
 Or wert thou [Mercy] that sweet-smiling youth ? (12)
 Or that crowned matron sage, white-robed Truth ?
 Or any other of that heavenly *brood*
 Let down in cloudy throne to do the world some good ?

IX.

Or wert thou of the *golden winged host*,
 Who, having clad thyself in human *weed*,
 To earth from thy *prefixed* seat did *post*,
 And after short *abode* fly back with speed,
 As if to show what creatures heaven doth *breed* ;
 Thereby to *set* the hearts of men *on fire*
 To *scorn* the *sordid* world, and unto heaven aspire ?

X.

But oh ! why didst thou not *stay* here below
 To *bless* us with thy heaven-born *innocence*,
 To *slake* his *wrath* whom sin hath made our *foe*,

(8) Olympus, a mountain range between Macedonia and Thessaly, on the summits of which the gods had their several palaces ; but in the poets later than Homer the vault of the sky is made the dwelling of the gods.

(9) Zeus or Jupiter, the greatest of the Olympian gods.

(10) The Titans, children of *Uranus*, heaven, and *Ge*, earth and their descendants.

(11) Astræa, the goddess of justice. She lived among men in the golden age ; but when human wickedness increased on the earth she withdrew in disgust, and was placed in the heaven as a star—*Virgo*.

(12) It will be seen at once that the fourth line is short by a foot, and it can hardly be doubted that the missing word is "mercy," which we have no hesitation in restoring to the text—though Warton was more scrupulous, when it was suggested to him by a gentleman named Hiskin—for in the "Ode on the Nativity" (stanza xv.), Truth, Justice, and Mercy are placed together, and the last as here occupies the middle station. Mercy and Truth were also associated in the Scriptures—see *Psa. xxv. 10* ; *Prov. xxvi. 6*.—*Keightley's "Life, Opinions, and Writings of Milton,"* p. 254.

To turn *swift-rushing*, black *Perdition* hence,
 To drive away the *slaughtering* pestilence, (13)
 To stand 'twixt us and our *deserved smart*, (14)
 But thou canst best perform that *office* where thou art.

XI.

Then thou, the mother of *so sweet* a child, (15)
 Her *false-imagined* loss cease to lament,
 And wisely learn to *curb* thy sorrows wild;
 'Think what a *present* thou to God hast sent,
 And *render* Him with *patience* what He lent;
 This if thou do, He will an *offspring* give,
 That till the world's last end shall make thy name to live.

Helps to paraphrasing.

I.—1. Destroyed by a sudden force. 2. Much too early. 3. Ornament (*decus*); survived. 4. Wither and exhaust. 5. In love with; tint. 6. Make of a pale crimson. 7. Lamented; death-bringing; self-enjoyment.

II.—1. Ill-featured. 2. Blustering; seized. 3. Affected. 4. God-like power. 5. By that means; disgraceful stain. 6. Continued singleness; age. 7. Lascivious; fault; thought.

III.—1. Ascending. 2. Region; chilly. 3. Saw. 4. Search; difficulty. 5. Dismounted; chair[iot], car, conveyance. 6. Unexpectedly; loving but chilling. 7. Dispossessed; dwelling.

IV.—1. Still; without honour; destiny. 2. Unintentional. 3. Formerly; friend. 6. Changed.

V.—1. Make myself believe. 2. Body rots. 3. Repose; resting-place. 4. Deep-dug. 5. Loving sorrow; sternly sentence. 7. Humanity.

VI.—1. Reveal to; certainly. 2. Murmurings. 3. Dwellest. 4. The airy firmament. 6. Human being. 7. Speedily.

VII.—1. Broken. 2. Ill-luck. 3. Loving; advantage. 4. Reset. 5. Recently; make an onset on. 6. Brilliant. 7. Immortal.

VIII.—1. In an early age. 2. Truthfully. 6. Race.

IX.—1. Angelic multitude. 2. Raiment. 3. Long-settled; hasten, 4. Residence. 5. Produce. 6. Enflame. 7. Disdain; worthless.

X.—1. Remain. 2. Rejoice our souls; guilelessness. 3. Satisfy; fierce anger; enemy. 4. Avert quick-coming. 5. Destructive. 6. Merited sufferings. 7. Duty.

XI.—1. Delightful. 2. Mistakenly regarding; bewail. 3. Restrain; grief excessive. 4. Gift. 5. Restore; resignation. 6. Progeny bestow.

(13) This phrase was probably suggested by the plague of "the Black Death," being suggested to Milton's mind by the "slaughtering pestilence" which was raging in England, and especially in Cambridge, at the time the poem was written, and to which he refers in the next line.

(14) Job i. 21.

(15) The beauty and appropriateness of the compound epithets in this poem can scarcely escape notice, and, indeed, the general Shaksperian tone of the language and turn of the expression. It is to be recollected that the first folio edition was published in Milton's fifteenth year, and that he was an early reader and admirer. The prevalency of the idea of rape in this poem—one not naturally suggesting itself to a youth of seventeen—still more strongly inclines us to believe that Milton's model was "The Rape of Lucrece," of which an edition in 16mo. was issued in 1624.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

748. The writer being anxious to become acquainted with the leading events in ancient and modern history, and not having sufficient time to read elaborate works on these subjects, should like to know if there are any very condensed histories, say, of Europe, Greece, Rome, England, and Scotland; and if so, where they may be found.—A. W.

749. Who are the greatest *living* German historians, philosophers, poets, and scientists?—FAUST.

750. Which is the best German-English and English-German dictionary?—FAUST.

751. Is there any translation in English of the following works of Kant?—1. "Ein Leitung in die Metaphysik der sitten." 2. "Tugendlehre."—FAUST.

752. Is the conclusion to which T. Emley Young has conducted his readers, in his essay on "The Test of Truth" (Nov., 1867, pp. 381—389), a right one? If so, what becomes of the authoritativeness and absoluteness of the claims of Christ's gospel upon the race, as presented with varying force in the pages of the Old and the New Testament Scriptures?—O. D.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

740. The Sunday School Union has published a book entitled "First Fifty Years of the Sunday School Union," by W. H. Watson, price 2s. There is no other.—R. R. Y.

742. Potts's Euclid's Elements (Cambridge), price 4s. 6d., contains, in addition to the text and a variety of useful notes and questions, nearly

700 geometrical exercises set in the University examinations, with hints for their solutions, which are of great service; but a student should make it a rule to avail himself as little as possible of this assistance. This work is recommended as a textbook for the Society of Arts examinations. Colenso's "Geometrical Problems" and Key, price 3s. 6d., contains 500 problems of a similar kind to those in the other work mentioned.—M. E. Y.

744. "Jodell" would find probably D. Page's "Introductory Text-book of Physical Geography," Herschel's "Physical Geography" (first published for the Encyclopædia Britannica), and Maury's "Physical Geography of the Sea," suited to his purpose.—FAUST.

746. The following are the best modern works known to me on Education:—1. "Education; intellectual, moral, and physical; by Herbert Spencer. Williams and Norgate. 6s. 2. J. S. Mill's "Address on Education," people's edition, 1s. Longmans and Co. 3. James Mill "On Education," Encyclopædia Britannica. 4. "Modern Culture," a series of Addresses on Scientific Education, by various authors. Edited by W. L. Yonmans. 5. "Essays on a Liberal Education." Edited by F. W. Farrar. The writers are with one exception Cambridge men, and engaged in the work of tuition. They are consequently both theoretically and practically valuable. 6. W. Whewell's "Essays on a Liberal Education." Perhaps "S. W. Young" will consider the above-mentioned books sufficient for his purposes.—FAUST.

The Societies' Section.

A LIBERAL EDUCATION.—Professor Henry Thomas Huxley has become the Principal of a new institution—the South London Working Men's College, which was formally opened on 4th Jan. by an inaugural address delivered to intending students, and in presence of several friends of the movement. This address, on account of the honest and earnest character of the speaker, and his eminence as a naturalist, has attracted much attention, and we think it advisable to supply our readers with the main elements of it; and also with the substance of a critique upon it which appeared in the *Edinburgh Courant* of 9th Jan., which we have heard attributed to the "blood and culture" defending pen of James Hannay, the scholarly essayist, the popular novelist, and the active journalist, who now rules the issues of *Temple Bar*.

[Professor Huxley, F.R.S., LL.D., son of the late George Huxley, was born at Ealing, Middlesex, in 1825, and was educated at the celebrated school of his native place. Subsequently he studied at the Charing Cross Hospital Medical School, and was in 1846 appointed assistant surgeon in H.M.S. *Rattlesnake*. In that vessel he made a surveying cruise of the Southern Pacific Ocean, Torren's Straits, &c., and returning to England in 1850, was engaged in the geological survey of Great Britain, of many of the reports of which he was the author. On the advancement of the late Edward Forbes from the Government School of Mines to the Professorship of Natural History in Edinburgh, his fellow "Red Lion" was chosen to succeed him, and the lectures of Professor Huxley at the Govern-

ment School of Mines since 1854 have been exceedingly popular, lucid, and informing. Professor Huxley is one of the smartest and readiest debaters in the meetings of the British Association. He is a decided Darwinian in his scientific opinions, and he propagates this theory with power, ability, and sincerity. His lectures at the Science Classes, in the Kensington Museum, at the British Institute, &c., have always been remarkable for the intrepid declaration of his ideas on the subjects on hand, and his numerous contributions to the scientific journals, and to the literature of science, are acknowledged on all sides to be clear, thorough, and able. He neither flinches when getting, nor hesitates at giving, a good argumentative blow. To the Bishop of Oxford no one has ventured to address himself in such tones of rebuke for "speaking unadvisedly with his lips" upon science and scientific men with the illiberality of a presumptuous orthodoxy. He claims and takes the rights of free thought and thorough inquiry.]

In the course of his address he asked, What do those higherschools, those to which the great middle class of the country sends its children, teach?—1. There is a little more reading and writing of English. But for all that it is a rare thing to find a boy who can read aloud decently, or who can put his thoughts on paper in clear and grammatical—to say nothing of good or elegant—language. The ciphering of the lower schools expands into elementary mathematics; in the higher—arithmetic, a little algebra, a little Euclid. But I doubt if one boy in five hundred has ever heard the

explanation of a rule of arithmetic, or knows his Euclid otherwise than by rote. 2. Of theology the middle-class schoolboy gets rather less than poorer children, less absolutely and less relatively, because there are so many other claims upon his attention. I venture to say that in the great majority of cases his ideas on this subject when he leaves school are of the most shadowy and vague description. 3. Modern geography, modern history, modern literature—the English language as a language, the whole circle of the sciences, physical, moral, and social, are even more completely ignored in the higher than in the lower schools. Now let us pause to consider this wonderful state of affairs; for the time will come when Englishmen will quote it as the stock example of the stolid stupidity of their ancestors in the nineteenth century. The most thoroughly commercial people, the greatest voluntary wanderers and colonists the world has ever seen, are precisely the middle classes of this country. If there be a people which has been busy making history on the great scale for the last three hundred years—and most profoundly interesting history—history which, if it happened to be that of Greece or Rome, we should study with avidity—it is the English. If there be a people which, during the same period, has developed a remarkable literature, it is our own. If there be a people whose prosperity depends absolutely and wholly upon their mastery over the forces of nature, and upon their intelligent apprehension of, and obedience to, the laws of the creation and distribution of wealth, and of the stable equilibrium of the force of society, it is precisely this people; and yet this is what these wonderful people tell their sons:—"At the cost of from one to two thousand pounds of our hard-earned money we devote twelve

of the most precious years of your lives to school. There you shall toil, or be supposed to toil; but there you shall not learn one single thing of all those you will most want to know directly you leave school and enter upon the practical business of life. You will in all probability go into business, but you shall not know where or how any article of commerce is produced, or the difference between an export or an import, or the meaning of the word capital. You will very likely settle in a colony, but you shall not know whether Tasmania is part of New South Wales or *vice versa*. Very probably you may become a manufacturer, but you shall not be provided with the means of understanding the working of one of your own steam engines, or the nature of the raw products you employ; and when you are asked to buy a patent you shall not have the slightest means of judging whether the inventor is an impostor who is contravening the elementary principles of science, or a man who will make you as rich as Croesus. You will very likely get into the House of Commons. You will have to take your share in making laws which may prove a blessing or a curse to millions of men. But you shall not hear one word respecting the political organization of your country; the meaning of the controversy between Free Traders and Protectionists shall never have been mentioned to you; you shall not so much as know that there are such things as economical laws." Said I not rightly that we are a wonderful people? I am quite prepared to allow, and, indeed, it flows necessarily from what I have already said, that education entirely devoted to these omitted subjects would not be a liberal education. But is an education which ignores them all a liberal education? Nay, it is too much to say that the edu-

education which should embrace these subjects and no others would be an education though a narrow one, while an education which omits them is really not an education at all, but a more or less useful course of intellectual gymnastics. 4. For what does the middle class school put in the place of all these things which are left out? What is usually comprised under the compendious title of the classics—that is to say, the languages, the literature, and the history of ancient Greeks and Romans, and the geography of so much of the world as was known to these two great nations of antiquity. Now do not expect to hear me depreciate the study of the classics. But if the classics were taught as they might be taught—if Greek and Latin were taught, not merely as languages, but as illustrations of philological science; if a living picture of life on the shores of the Mediterranean two thousand years ago were imprinted on the minds of scholars; if ancient history were taught, not as a weary series of feuds and fights, but traced to its causes in such men placed under such conditions; if, lastly, the study of the classical books were followed in such a manner as to impress boys with their beauties instead of with their verbal and grammatical peculiarities, I still think it little proper that they should form the basis of a liberal education. What is to be said of classical teaching at its worst, or, in other words, of the classics of our ordinary middle-class schools? I will tell you. It means getting up endless forms and rules by heart. It means turning Latin and Greek into English for the mere sake of being able to do it, and without the smallest reference to the worth or worthlessness of the author read. It means the learning of innumerable, not always decent, fables in such a shape that the meaning they once

had is dried up into utter trash, and the only impression left upon a boy's mind is that the people who believed such things must have been the greatest idiots the world ever saw. And it means, finally, that, after a dozen years spent at this kind of work, the sufferer shall be incompetent to interpret a passage from a book he has not already got up; that he shall loathe the sight of a Greek or Latin book; and that he shall never open, or think of, a classical author again until, wonderful to relate, he insists upon submitting his sons to the same process. These be your gods, O Israel! For the sake of this net result (and respectability) the British father denies his children all the knowledge they might turn to account in life. If what I have said touching the ideal of a liberal education be correct, and if what I have said about the existing educational institutions of the country is also true, it is true that the two have no sort of relation to one another;—that the best of our schools and the most complete of our University trainings give but a narrow, one-sided, and essentially illiberal education—while the worst give what is really next to no education at all. Our college could not adopt or copy any of these institutions if it would. I am bold enough to express the conviction that it ought not if it could. For what you want is the reality and not the mere name of a liberal education; and this college must steadily set before itself the ambition sooner or later to be able to give you that education. At present we are but beginning, sharpening our educational tools, as it were, and except physical science we are not able to offer you much more than is to be found in an ordinary school. But as it is one of our principles to be self-supporting, you must lead and we must follow in these matters. If you take to heart

what I have told you about liberal education, you will desire these things, and I doubt not we shall be able to supply you with them. But we must wait till the demand is made.

It is beyond dispute that education is the question of the day. A systematic agitation—the general preliminary in this country to parliamentary discussion and legislation—is in full force, and within a week three prominent men have lent their weight to it by delivering orations on the subject. Sir John Pakington, in addressing the members of the Droitwich Mechanics' Institute, prescribed education as the only effectual antidote to Fenianism; Professor Huxley, in opening a Working Men's College in London, spoke with his wonted brilliancy, enthusiasm, and exaggeration; and Mr. Forster defined his views and policy to the Reform Leaguers with that emphasis, dogmatism, and candour which characterize all his public utterances. With the bulk of the opinions expressed by all three gentlemen we almost entirely coincide; the general tone of the speeches is healthy, and calculated to have a beneficial effect upon the mind of the public. The three postulates, in the reiteration of which they all unite—(1) that we must have universally diffused elementary education, (2) that we must have an improved middle-class education, and (3) that we must have both of these quickly—are admitted by the public with perfect unanimity.

Passing to Professor Huxley, while we admire his scientific enthusiasm, and admit the truth of what he says as to the incompleteness of any education calling itself liberal that does not embrace a knowledge of the physical sciences, we must protest against his onslaught upon classics, and their

right to constitute an essential part of middle-school education. For what is education, and what does it include? Surely it is not, as Mr. Huxley would have us believe—and we are taking his opinions chiefly from representative utterances—the mere amassing of a quantity of useful information, in case that information may be required in future life. Is it not, from a philosophical as well as an etymological point of view, the leading out or training of the powers of the mind? We suppose that Mr. Huxley and the educationalists of the so-called "practical" school will admit that the teaching of geography is a useful thing. Yet, does a wise teacher teach the geography of a particular country simply in case we may happen some time or other to go to war with it, or lest some boy in his class may in the future have commercial dealings with it? Is it not rather that he may train the eye or the memory, or both? In fact, does he not teach geography, as well as everything else, chiefly because it is a means of *discipline*? It is just in regard to this point of discipline that we are at issue with the "practical" school. They say, Give us a knowledge of facts that will be of use to us in our future life, and ignore discipline; we say, By all means give us this useful knowledge if there is time for it during the educational part of our life, but at all events train our powers. Mr. Lowe waxes merry over the man who is ignorant of the exact whereabouts of Gondar, but what man of ordinary enlightenment and education, with a good map of Abyssinia before him, finds any difficulty in quickly mastering enough of its geography to suit his purpose? Again, whose ideas would be the preferable regarding the propriety of engaging in a war with Abyssinia,

those of the follower of Mr. Lowe and Mr. Huxley, who know the name of every miserable little village in the country, or those of the man whose training enables him to bring to the consideration of the question a clear, acute, and accomplished intellect? Taking it then for granted as a general principle that discipline is a more important portion of education than information, we come to the more immediate question, what part do classics play or ought to play in middle-school education? We shall take even Mr. Huxley's opinions on the subject. Classical teaching, he maintains, "means getting up endless forms and rules by heart. It means turning Latin and Greek into English for the mere sake of being able to do it, and without the smallest reference to the worth or worthlessness of the author read." This is an exaggerated statement of a truth. "Rules and forms" *are* got up; Latin and Greek *are* turned into English; but Professor Huxley forgets to add for what purpose. Rules are got up, at least in all schools where anything like common sense prevails, with the view that the pupil may himself *apply* them. And it is in the application, not the getting up of rules, that the discipline lies. It gives the rudiments of definiteness and precision, two essentials of accurate thinking, and if classics did nothing else than this they would still be worth preserving. We may be told that mathematics are the training *par excellence* for the reasoning power; but it is an indisputable fact that there are many minds to which mathematical training is perfectly unsuited; and, moreover, even *they* are not "useful information." We admit that an average boy at a middle school, when translating a piece of Latin or Greek into English, does

not care a straw for the ideas he is unconsciously manipulating; but if he is taught properly—and that is not part of the question—he learns at least accuracy of expression. Inasmuch, therefore, as classics, even as at present taught, form an admirable discipline, producing definiteness of idea and accuracy of expression, they ought to be retained as a portion of middle-class education. Their adversaries have not as yet been able to provide a substitute, and until they are able to do so, Latin and Greek must retain the place they have so long held in our schools. Upon the utility of the higher classical study we do not enter, as it is admitted by all whose opinion is valuable that no man deserves the name of cultured whose mind has not come under the influence of classical ideas, and who has not drunk from the Castalian spring of ancient sentiment.

SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Has ancient or modern poetry afforded art the greater number and the nobler class of subjects?

Do the fine or the useful arts produce the greater amount of delight?

Does music, sculpture, painting or the drama most completely fulfil the ends of art?

Is feeling the standard of the artist?

Does the painting [music, sculpture, &c.] of France excel that of Britain?

Is Kugler or Waagen the better art guide?

Do Pre-Raphaelite paintings rightly represent nature?

Is photography favourable to art?

Is science inimical to poetry?

Is painting on the decline?

Is sculpture more realistic than painting?

Has the memory of Nelson been duly honoured?

Was Henry VIII. superior as a monarch to Charles V.?

Was Luther essential to the Reformation?

Had Charles V. or Luther the greater share in producing the political results of the Reformation [the sixteenth century]?

Was Charles V. the greatest sovereign of his age?

Has the invasion of Europe by the Turks been advantageous to the Continent?

Is the character and life of Clive as well given by Lord Macaulay as by James Mill?

Was Sir Thomas More legally condemned?

Has Carbonarism justified its friends or its enemies?

Did the Medici family do more good than ill to the European nations?

Was the French siege of Rome (1849) justifiable?

Did Bonaparte procure the death of Pichegru?

Has O'Connell been properly appreciated as a politician?

Has the history of the Revolution influenced Napoleon III. for good or evil?

Was the 18th Fructeder, 4th Sept., 1797, or the 2nd Dec., 1852, the better conducted *Coup d'état*?

Was Marius superior or inferior to Sulla?

Are Thomas McCrie's biographies as trustworthy in their inferences as in their statements?

Was the Insurrection in Canada (1838) justifiable in itself or justifiably repressed?

Were the Civil Wars in France advantageous in their results?

Did Leo X. merit the admiration of his own times and the wonder of posterity?

Was Napoleon's Mexican scheme as foolish as it has been vain?

Was the Emperor Theodosius superior to Constantine the Great?

Was Swedenborg an impostor, a deceiver, or himself deceived?

Has the eighteenth century a just claim to human admiration and interest?

Did the sixteenth or the eighteenth century proclaim the more powerfully the right of truth to govern the world?

Did science or civilization make the greater advancement in the eighteenth century?

Did Erasmus or Reuchlin do the greater service to the Reformation?

Has monasticism conduced to Christian life?

Was Butler a better bishop than Warburton?

Was the career of Pelissier (Duc de Malakoff) [upright, honourable, or] commendable?

Have the clergy been the opponents of science?

Have the confusion of tongues and the dispersion of man been verified by modern discoveries?

Was Guizot right in interdicting Michelet's lectures on history?

Is there a true distinction between history sacred and profane? *

Has the English nation been guilty of selfish injustice to Ireland?

Did Richelieu or Mazarin do the greater amount of good to France?

Were the wars of the Fronde beneficial to France?

Has the reign of Charles V. been fruitful in good?

Did the domination of the Arabs in Spain produce more good than evil?

Was Palmerston as a premier superior to Peel?

Was the career of Cavour praiseworthy?

Was Alexander the Great worthy of the power he gained?

* See Vol. XXVI.

Literary Notes.

LITERARY ACTIVITY OF THE YEAR 1867.—During the past year there have appeared 4,144 new books and new editions, which may be thus classified:—Religious books and pamphlets, 849; minor works of fiction and children's books, 535; novels, 410; annuals and serials (volumes only), 257; travels, topography, 212; English philology and education, 210; European and classical theology and translations, 196; historical and biographical, 193; politics and questions of the day, 143; poetry and the drama, 150; science, natural history, &c., 133; medical and surgical, 121; law, 101; trade and commerce, 63; agriculture, horticulture, &c., 62; illustrated works (Christmas books), 62; art, architecture, &c., 53; naval, military, and engineering, 42; miscellaneous, not classified, 352: total, 4,144. Last year the total was 4,204.

"The History and Antiquities of Lancashire" are receiving great attention from its literati. The reprint of "Roby's Traditions of Lancashire" has been followed by the "History of the Forest of Rossendale," by Thomas Newbie Gray, an original work, &c. "The History of Lancashire," by Thomas Baines, is promised at an early date. In addition to these, "Baines' Lancashire," an old and authoritative work, is passing through the press under the editorship of John Harland; and we are informed that new editions of "Whittaker's History of Whalley" and Gregson's "Fragments" are contemplated under the editorship of John Harland and Canon Raines.

James Hannay, author of "Satire

and Satirists," is engaged on a volume on "The Literature of Satire," of which a sketch has been furnished to the readers of *Temple Bar*, which is now under his editorship.

A new philological journal—the successor to *The Philological Museum* and *The Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*—has been projected, under favourable auspices, at Cambridge.

V. A. Huber (born 1800), author of a work on "English Universities," which was translated by F. W. Newman, is engaged on a work on "Co-operation and Social Science."

"The Literary Remains" of the late Rev. John Mitford are being asked about for publication.

The *London Student*, a university magazine, is projected.

"A Selection from the miscellaneous and unedited poems of the late Rev. John Keble," and as a companion volume a Memoir by Sir J. T. Coleridge, are to be issued by Messrs. Parker shortly.

The Savage Club papers are henceforth to be issued as an annual, the profits of which are to form a literary charitable fund for unfortunate brethren, without parading their names and calling public attention to their distresses. This is kindly Savagery. God-speed.

Our interesting contemporary, *Notes and Queries*, has commenced its *fourth* series with the present—its eighteenth—year.

"The Dialogues of Plato," translated by the Rev. B. Jowett, Regius professor of Greek, with Introductions, Analyses, and Notes, in three vols. 8vo., are in the Clarendon press.

A new edition of Chaucer's entire works, under the supervision of John Earle, A.M., and others, is in preparation.

"The Minor Works of Wycliff" are in the press.

E. M. Cope is preparing a revised edition of the Greek text of Aristotle's "Rhetoric."

An Homeric Society has been suggested for the investigation of all questions regarding "blind Maimonides," his writings, and such collateral matters as might arise.

M. Athanase Cocquerel, author of "The Preacher's Counsellor," died 10th January. [See *British Controversialist*, October, 1867, p. 301.]

Ex-president Filmore is preparing "Personal and Political Recollections of his Administration."

John Timbs, author of 120 vols., is engaged on "Collections and Recollections of his Literary Life," containing details of authors, publishers, books, &c.

Herr Strodtmann has issued the first volume of a work on "The Life and Works of Heine."

A critical and chronological edition of Schiller's works, under the editorship of Karl Gödeke, has been begun; and first draughts of five projected tragedies have just been added to the materials of such a work.

The German Shakspeare Society is issuing a revised edition of Schlegel and Tieck's Translation. When will our Shaksperians unite as a body to give us a complete and thorough historical, critical, bibliographical, explanatory, and glossarial text of England's pride?—which might become the trade edition.

It is known that Mr. Theodore Martin is preparing a translation of Goethe's "Faust," part II., in continuation of his version of part I.

A Bibliotheca Canadensis—a list

of the writers of books, pamphlets, and papers relating to and connected with Canada—has been published by H. J. Morgan, of Ottawa.

Rénan's "St. Paul" has been put in the printer's hands.

Dr. Stratmann, of Krefeld, has made a good addition to English lexicography in his "Dictionary of the Old English Language, 13th to 15th Centuries."

A collection of the ancient and modern historians of Armenia is in course of publication at Paris, by order of the Viceroy of Egypt.

Dr. J. H. Stirling, author of the "Secret of Hegel," is about to republish "Essays on Jerrold, Tennyson, Macaulay," &c., contributed to *Meliora*, Leigh Hunt's *London Journal*, &c. Professor J. C. Shairp, author of "Kilmahoe," will reprint his papers on Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Keble for the *North British Review*; and S. S. Laurie, author of "The Philosophy of Ethics," has in the press Notes, expository and critical, on certain British theories of morals—all as witnesses in behalf of their fitness for the chair of Moral Philosophy, Edinburgh.

A "Standard" four-volumed edition of Tennyson's "Poems," carefully revised, with additions, is promised. When will he issue a "people's" edition?

A series of "Essays on Modern Religious Thought" has been commenced.

Kinglake's "History of the Invasion of the Crimea," vols. iii. and iv., are in the press.

The public libraries of Europe contain 20,000,000 books. A selection from the ten published Lectures and Sermons of Theodore Parker, including a series of sketches of "Great Americans," in preparation.

Epoch Men.

THE HON. ROBERT BOYLE.—EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE.

"No one Englishman of the seventeenth century—after Lord Bacon—raised to himself so high a reputation in Experimental Philosophy as Robert Boyle; . . . the most faithful, the most patient, the most successful disciple who carried forward the Experimental Philosophy of Bacon."—HALLAM.

PHILOSOPHY signifies an affectionate desire for Wisdom. Wisdom implies a twofold knowledge,—knowledge of that which thinks, and that which is thought of. The proper co-ordination, reconciliation, and progressive development of each of these forms of knowledge, either as a unity, or in parallel consentaneousness, is the great aim of genuine culture. Science presents to our view not only the sensible phenomena of Nature in Static immobility, but also an infinitely varied series of actions, interchanges, and resiliences in Dynamic manifestations as forces. But that which reasons out the truth from phenomena to force, and reduces the entire conception of creation to that of a *Cosmos* in which law is the guarantee of regularity, permanence and order, is Mind. Science transcends sense, and not only systematizes, but interprets experience by the supremacy which mind claims and aims at exercising over all phenomenal being.

Physical Science is not a mere record of observations; it consists of facts marshalled in categories arranged for experimental investigation, subjected to the grasp and operation of the speculative faculty, and brought by scrutiny of reason, added to the educated perceptions of the senses, to show their relationships, consecutions, and antagonisms—in other words, science consists both of a knowledge of facts and of the laws of their operation. Sense does not affirm law, sensation is panoramic. Science substantiates experience by grouping *perceptions* into conceptions, and by bringing into the vision of the mind the laws which govern the phenomena of experience. Phenomena exist to sense, they *subsist* to science; they are the preparatory materials which are by the intelligence of man developed into science. "Science is a growth. The future must issue from seeds sown in the past." . . . "From the small beginnings and successive growths of knowledge, there emerges a more comprehensive and more complex science. The advance is not one simply of *addition* but of new *development*—a development rendered possible by the addition." But what *addition* is it that imparts fertility and developability to knowledge so

that it may become science? The generative factor is mind—mind through its interpretative conceptiveness. “Science may result *from* experience and observation *by* induction; but induction is not therefore the same thing as experience and observation. Induction is experience or observation *consciously* looked at in a *general* form. This consciousness and generality are necessary parts of that knowledge which is science;” for science is the result of careful observation or investigative experiment leading to the correct colligation of facts by “right conceptions supplied by the mind in order to bind the facts together.” Science systematizes, harmonizes, combines, forms the facts of phenomena into new unities, but “the point of agreement (among various facts) visible to the discoverer alone, does not come even into his sight, till after the facts have been connected by thoughts of his own, and have been regarded in points of view in which he by his mental acts places them.” Hence it is that we affirm that there are two distinct elements in human knowledge, which require to co-operate in harmonious activity before we can attain to true science—mind thinking and experience thought about, in other words that science results from inductive observations or experiments with an interpretative conception added to them by the observing or experimenting mind.

Science is investigated experience. Experience may be investigated by observation or by experiment; and the results of the investigations made may be criticized and verified, or disproved by induction or deduction. Observation accepts, notes, and records the facts of experience which are given either in sense or consciousness; experiment directs, definitizes, and supplements observation. “Experiment by varying the circumstances which usually accompany phenomena, endeavours to disengage the conditions which are *coincident*, from the conditions which are *causally related*.” “Experiment adds nothing to the certainty [of observation rightly made], but renders the fact precise and quantitatively appreciable. Although experiment is an instrument of immense importance, it is one which derives all its value from *the mind directing it*. Used at haphazard, its results are fortuitous.” “Experiment is an art and demands an artist.”* Experiment is in fact intelligent and intentional observation. “It is intentional observation combined with a physical mastery or manipulation of the object observed. In all cases where we are able to dispose of an object according to our pleasure, to reduce it into our power, to render it subservient to our will, to handle it, to change its place, to isolate it or combine it with other substances, to vary its concomitant circumstances, to subject it to any physical treatment which our choice may dictate, the method of scientific experiment is applicable. Scientific experiment can be employed, whenever we can bring the subject of experimentation under the cognizance of our senses, and within the grasp of our hands. According to the philosophical poet, the phe-

* G. H. Lewes’ “Aristotle,” p. 50.

nomena of physical causation are reproduced at the will of the experimenter :—

“ Rise at *Volition's* call, in groups combined,
Amuse, delight, instruct, and serve mankind.” *

1. Scientific and light-bringing experiments are of two sorts,—*Experimenta lucifera*. “ Their very essence is to shed light upon something which was dark before ; to furnish a key to some hidden mystery of nature.” 2. Artistic, practical, or fruit bringing,—*Experimenta fructifera*, “ intended to subserve some merely useful object ; and to yield a profit to the experimenter, not [purposely] to enlarge the knowledge of mankind ” ; which “ bring with them immediate gain and a present harvest.” Of course as science is intellectual insight, only light-bringing experimentation fulfils the primordial purpose of science. “ The art of [scientific] observation is a late development. Science depends greatly on this art for its progress, and yet the art is only to be evolved during the slow advances of science, the two go hand in hand ; they act and react.” Science suggests observations or experiments, and the results of these light up the path of progress, or show the places where failures have occurred ; thus it at once encourages the spirit by illuminating the region of discovered truth, and economizes effort by indicating where, at least, it has been sought without being found. “ The introduction of experiment distinguishes the modern method of investigating Nature from that of ancient times and of the middle ages.” Aristotle was the logician of Reasoning ; Aquinas of Conception ; and Bacon of Experiment. The *Novum Organum* is the work of an epoch-making thinker, and the works of Robert Boyle are the earliest offspring of that luciferous and fructiferous experimentalism, which has done so much for the advancement of learning and the restoration of the sciences. Boerhaave speaks of “ Mr. Boyle ” as “ the ornament of his age and country,” who “ succeeded to the genius and inquiries of the great Chancellor Verulam ; ” and “ it has even been remarked,” says Hallam, “ that he was born in the year of Bacon's death, as the person destined by nature to succeed him.”

The reformation shook the fabric of scholasticism to its foundation. An era in the world's history had arisen when Change had become essential to civilization. Enfranchisement of soul gave effort impulse, so that discovery and invention became the issues of the tendencies and aims of the spirit of activity which stirred within mankind. Bacon comprehended the age of reform and sought to make philosophy conformable to it by the projecting of a logic corresponding to the wants of the times—a logic whereby a man might deliberately achieve by intention and invention what had previously been for the most part the result of lucky hits and stray occurrences. He sought to change chance into design, and to

* Sir G. C. Lewis, “ On Observation and Reasoning in Politics,” i. p. 159.

induce the mind of man so to think that it would invent experiments, and thereby conquer for itself the mastery of nature;—for “science and human power coincide.” Science is to be pursued not merely for the satisfaction of the restless ingenuity and the speculative vivacity of scholastics as a solace for a student’s lonely hours, as a quickener of the dull edge of rich men satiated with all that is old, and yearning for sensations that are new, but for the purpose of making the life of man wiser, nobler, happier, and fitting him to be a worthy denizen of this wondrous world in which science reveals itself.

Coming after Bacon, feeling all the beauty of the system of experimental science suggested by him who, much more correctly than Hobbes, could be called “the great Columbus of the golden lands of new philosophies,” Robert Boyle practised what Bacon taught, and was a sedulous investigator of nature by experiment. In the strength of his genuine common sense he appreciated the discoveries of Galileo and his compeers as well as the writings of Bacon, and while he took guidance from the latter he received his practical impulses from the former; Bacon gave laws to Boyle. Boyle illustrated these laws, and Newton—who was born in the year of Galileo’s death, when Boyle was fifteen,—captivated by the brilliancy of the illustrations made by him, found in them his earliest inducement to enter upon those splendid experiments by which he has glorified science. As the earliest thoroughgoing experimentalist, the first who designedly accepted, adopted, and promoted the Inductive Logic, as a man whose thoughts have since given birth to sciences, and laid the foundations of discoveries, and as an influential and reverential inquirer after “truth for its own sake,” a notice of the life of the Honourable Robert Boyle seems to be an especially appropriate theme for this time, when science is held in such honour and claims so much of the admiration and homage of mankind.

In a magnificent castle, originally built by King John in 1185, and subsequently possessed by Sir Walter Raleigh, Richard Boyle—in early life one of the under clerks of the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, but then “the great Earl of Cork”—had been holding high Christmas holidays. His second wife, Mrs. Catherine Fenton, daughter of Sir Geoffrey Fenton, principal Secretary of State in Ireland, had loyally assisted at the festivities of her lord whose spouse she had been for nearly twenty-three years, in the course of which she had brought to him six sons and seven daughters. The guests had all departed and family repose had been restored within the recently enlarged and strengthened pile which overlooks the Blackwater and the Owenshad from a height of one hundred feet, at the west end of what is now the town of Lismore, in the province of Munster, Ireland. Here on the 25th January, 1626, the earl’s seventh son and penultimate child—Robert Boyle—was born. His earliest childhood was passed under the care of a nurse away from home. He lost his mother at an early age, and was taken

charge of when a boy a good deal by his sisters. He learned, when young, to speak French and Latin. He was studious and truthful, and these qualities endeared him much to his father, who, however, was engaged in such various and engrossing pursuits that he was little able to expend parental assiduity on his expanding mind. At the early age of eight he was sent, in company with an elder brother, to Eton—whose provost, Sir Henry Wotton—statesman, diplomatist, scholar and poet—was his father's friend. He was placed under the immediate care of one of the masters—Mr. Harrison—to whom he became much attached, and who had discernment enough to see the tendency of the boy's mind and the skill to direct its capacities to right efforts, alternately exciting and gratifying his curiosity, combining regulated exercise with profitable study, and especially using conversation as a means of communicating knowledge, and of culturing taste and expression. His love of study under this tutorage became intense, and his passion for reading grew so absorbing that he required to strengthen the relaxed tone of his mind by a thorough course of mathematics, in whose precise relations, close reasonings, and resistless conclusions he found the bracing culture of attention of which he stood in need, and owed his rescue from becoming a castle-building dreamer, dawdling and dallying with the delights of novels and poetry, to the seductive fascinations of which he had well-nigh yielded up his intellect—in a sort of delicious voluptuousness of desire which coloured life with the hues of imagination.

At Eton he acquired the elements of classical learning, and attained considerable acquaintance with the best writers of antiquity—his taste in these matters having been first excited by "the accidental perusal of Quintus Curtius," whose attractive history of Alexander the Great, though somewhat rhetorical and sensational, is well calculated to affect the glowing fancy of a boy, by giving the enchantment of vitality to the dead past.

On his father's leaving Ireland to reside for a short time at Stalbridge, in Dorsetshire, Robert Boyle was taken from Eton and placed under the private tuition of the rector of that Cale-watered parish, who seems to have excited in his mind a considerable amount of religious reflectiveness. In his thirteenth year he and his elder brother Francis were entrusted to the care of a Genevese named Mr. Marcombes, to be taken through the usual course of Continental travel, which at that time formed a portion of a high class education, as it cultured the observative faculty, necessitated or aided the acquisition of spoken languages, supplied a fund of interesting visible experience, and was, in fact, the study of history, geography, and life from reality rather than from books. They travelled leisurely through France, passing by way of Paris and Lyons towards Geneva, and on the way he acquired a tolerable fluency in the use of the language of Arnauld, Richelieu, and Descartes—a skill which was greatly increased by an after-course of romance-reading indulged in as a recreative exercise in the intervals of a three years'

range of studies in logic, rhetoric, mathematics, political geography, &c., which, together with fencing and dancing, occupied the main portion of their time in Geneva. Here he also continued his Greek studies, and commenced to learn Hebrew—that he might be able to read the originals of the scriptures and to “pay God the respect usual from civil inferiors to princes with whom they are wont to converse in their own languages.”

In September, 1641, Mr. Marcombes and his wards set off to Italy, and after visiting Venice he determined on wintering in Florence, where Francis and Robert Boyle employed themselves in the study of the Italian language, and the latter engaged in investigating “the new paradoxes of the great star-gazer, Galileo, whose ingenious books, because they could not be so otherwise, were confuted by a decree from Rome.” At Arcetri, near Florence, on 8th January, 1642, Galileo died, and doubtlessly the renown of his discoveries, as well as the obsequies performed in Santa Croce in honour of him, must have awakened in a young quick mind like his a wholesome sympathy, not only with and for

“The starry Galileo and his woes,”

but also an earnest interest in the problems which he had suffered for attempting to solve—the problems on which Viviani and Torricelli were engaged, and in which their master and themselves were the precursors of the young Englishman who was afterwards to link the logic of Bacon with the experimentalism of Galileo, and pass on the torch of observative science, caught up at the grave of Galileo, to that puny, sickly, posthumous child which a week before had struggled into being at Woolsthorpe, near Grantham (we rectify the style in our calculation), but was afterwards to become one of the master thinkers of the universe—Sir Isaac Newton,—

“Sagacious reader of the *works* of God,
And in His *word* sagacious.”

From Florence, Boyle proceeded to Rome, where he passed for a Frenchman, and managed to evade the law which prohibited the residence of Protestants within its precincts. He wintered again in the “Etrurian Athens”—“in the great town on the fair river of Arno” where Dante was born and from which he was exiled; and “where Machiavelli’s earth returned from whence it rose.” In the spring the two English lads took their homeward route by Pisa—with its wonderful “leaning tower;” Leghorn—with its strange summer-life and commercial activity; Genoa—with its memories of the crusades, the Moors, and Columbus; and Marseilles suggesting Greek civilization, Roman might, and modern commerce. Here the brothers anticipated remittances, but instead of that they got only a notice of scantiness of funds, in consequence of the difficulty of collecting money in Ireland during the rebellion in 1641, and even this, through the dishonesty of the merchant to whom it was intrusted for remittance, did not reach them. In these circumstances they made the best of their way to Geneva, where Mr.

Marcombes provided them with board and lodging for nearly two years, during which time they neither received news nor money from home. Despairing of other means Mr. Marcombes bought, on credit, a quantity of jewellery, which they took with them, and by disposing of portions of it in the several places they came to on their route, they managed to reach England, where they learned that their father had died September 15th, 1644, in the 78th year of his age. By his father's will Mr. Robert Boyle became the possessor of the estate and manor of Stalbridge in Dorsetshire, and several considerable properties in Ireland; but owing to the disturbed state of that island he was unable for a time to visit his newly-acquired possessions in it. As a lad of eighteen, he took up his residence for a season with his sister, Lady Ranelagh. By this excellent lady his convictions on religion were in a great measure settled, and his morals were sedulously watched over, and his whole nature was subdued to piety, virtue and knowledge.

After some time spent in settling his affairs, securing Parliamentary protection for his Irish estates, and gaining permission from Cromwell—through his third brother, Lord Broghill, who had become romantically attached to the Protector—to visit France for the payment of debts contracted there by his brother Francis Lord Shannon and himself in their straits abroad, Mr. Robert Boyle resolved to retire to his Dorsetshire residence, and there to devote some years to serious study and close investigation. His chief intellectual industry was given to ethics—"being desirous to call them from the brain into the heart and from the school to the house;" compositions in prose and verse; mechanics and natural science, paying especial attention to chemistry. "Geography, history, and travels, were his amusements." He was master of the mathematics of his time, he was conversant with the ancient letters, and had perused the Rabbinists and the Fathers; but his favourite pursuit was the investigation by experiment of all matters capable of being observed with care and art, with the design of comprehending the principles of Nature and the method in which she worked in the composition of things and in the production of results. This continued to be his sole aim in all that splendid series of scientific researches and discoveries which have secured immortality for his name as "the father of experimental chemistry," as well as "the brother of the Earl of Cork."

"The excellent Mr. Boyle," says Mr. Hughes in *The Spectator*, No. 554, "was the person who seems to have been designed by nature to succeed to the labours and inquiries of that extraordinary genius, Lord Bacon. By innumerable experiments he, in a great measure, filled up those plans and outlines of science, which his predecessor had sketched out. His life was spent in the pursuit of Nature, through a great variety of forms and changes, and in the most rational as well as devout adoration of its Divine Author." "Few men, if any"—in the opinion of Bishop Burnet—"have been known to have made so great a compass, and to have been so exact

in all parts of it, as Boyle ;" and Dr. Craik informs us that " Science indeed was as much his occupation as if it had been literally his business or profession. No temptations could seduce him from his philosophical pursuits. Belonging as he did to one of the most powerful families of the kingdom, having four brothers in the Irish peerage and one in the English—the highest honours of the state were open to his ambition if he would have accepted them. But so pure was his love of science and learning, and, with all his acquirements, so great his modesty, that he steadily declined even those worldly distinctions which might be said to be strictly within the sphere of his pursuits," and he was the only one of the fifteen children of the " great earl of Cork " who did not bear a title—as he steadily refused to accept a peerage, though it was urged on his acceptance. His special interest in the advancement of experimental science and in the promotion of those researches into the constitution of nature whose results had awakened the ardour of reflective men, though it was doubtlessly initiated in Italy under the influence which the paradoxes of Galileo and the investigations of Torricelli exerted on a mind imbued with the spirit of the Baconian restoration, dates most definitely from 1646, in which he was brought into contact with many of those vigorous intelligences who commenced about that time, what Boyle calls " our new philosophical or invisible college," and which afterwards became a visible and effective corporation of the new cultivators of special branches of science or learning, as *The Royal Society* (of London) for the promotion of mathematical and physical science—a society not of teachers but of investigators, not a " school where some might teach and others be taught, but rather a sort of laboratory where all persons might operate independently of one another," free from the prejudices of sects, and the bias of partiality.

The weekly meetings for the consideration of questions in natural philosophy, in which the Royal Society originated, were begun, at the suggestion of Mr. Theodor Haak, a German, as a club expressly instituted for the purpose of communicating to each other the results of their researches in chemistry, medicine, geometry, astronomy, mechanics, magnetism, navigation, and such other departments of investigation as lay open to analysis and experiment, so that thoughts might be exchanged, facts registered, experiments recorded and criticised, the bearings of these on practical life considered, and encouragement given to the survey of the laws and facts of nature, free from the embarrassments of the old logic, and the subtleties which hindered the progress of sciences, in such a way as to make them helpful in the improvement of the material existence of man and the whole state of modern civilization. Mr. Boyle became connected with the society early, and though he found it requisite to reside at Stalbridge, he did not slacken his interest in analysis, experiment and registration of facts and results, but devoted much of his time in his retirement to the observation of nature, and the invention of means for testing the qualities of things; all of

these observations he made accurate notes, and of the results of his experiments he kept a careful account.

Varying his seclusion with a run to London to unfold the budget of his investigations to the members of the invisible college; or to Oxford, for a similar purpose, after the chief and leading spirits of that club had removed to that centre of studious learning;—to Paris, where the discoveries of Gassendi, Roberval, Descartes, &c., were published and discussed;—or to Holland, where Van Huyghens, Snellius, and Grotius, were making researches into natural philosophy, mathematics, jurisprudence, and cognate branches of study; he kept himself in constant communication with the most active and original intelligences of the age, and held his place among them as an equal. In 1652 he visited his Irish estates, and remained there nearly a year, during which time, as “chemical spirits were so ill understood there and chemical instruments so unprocurable” in that rebellion-disturbed land, he was induced to occupy his mind with anatomy, in which, under Dr. [Sir] William Petty, he made competent progress in a knowledge of the human frame, and satisfied himself as to the correctness of those new and striking views concerning the circulation of the blood, with which the name of William Harvey is indissolubly associated, and “of the variety and contrivance of nature and the majesty and wisdom of her Author,” which the human body displays better than all the books that could be written upon it.

Shortly after his return from Ireland, Mr. Boyle took up his residence at Oxford as the headquarters of his philosophical friends, and while there his lodgings formed the scene of the meetings of those earnest men who took an interest in the promotion of inductive science, and who formed then the embodied Baconians, to whose efforts we owe the origination of the experimental sciences, the vitalization of what the “great chancellor” had left comparatively a speculative science. Early impressed as Mr. Boyle had been by the discoveries of the Florentine thinkers, he was anxious not only to follow out but to confirm their views, and for this purpose he exhibited a variety of experiments in public, indicating great fertility of inventiveness, which not only excited much attention, but which kindled in the hearts of others a zeal which tended considerably to the progress of many sciences. Here he particularly devoted his investigations to the elucidation of the mysteries of pneumatic chemistry, which first brought him into general notice, and are reckoned among his chief contributions to natural science; and here, in 1660, he published his “New Experiments, Physio-Mechanical touching the Spring of the Air and its Effects.” In a second edition of this work, in 1662, Boyle answered the objections raised to his theory by Linus and Hobbes. A third edition of the same book was issued in 1682. It is written in the form of letters to his nephew, Viscount Dungarvon, and details the course of his reading, reflections, experiments, discoveries, and inventions, regarding the mechanical, chemical, and other properties of the atmosphere. It supplies special

record of his re-invention of the air-pump, suggested to him by an account of the instrument contrived by Otto Guericke, which he found in the "Physica Curiosa" of Gaspar Schottus. This instrument he subsequently greatly improved, and by the help of Robert Hooke, whose worth Boyle had the sagacity to see, and whom he employed as his assistant, he performed with it a variety of new experiments illustrative of the properties of air. It may be here recorded too that, greatly through the influence of Boyle, Hooke was appointed Curator of Experiments to the Royal Society, Professor of Geometry in Gresham College, Surveyor for the City of London, &c., and that he fully proved Boyle's prescience by turning out one of the most inventive of English experimentalists.

It would be quite impossible in our narrow space to epitomize and criticize all the works of the Honourable Robert Boyle—amounting in all to upwards of eighty distinct publications—which, in his own day, not only imparted knowledge and excited admiration, but which impressed upon the face of science that solemnity which indicates "the veneration man's intellect owes to God," the mighty "Opificer," who is "wonderful in counsel and excellent in working." It may be enough to mention some of the chief of those additions which he made to the literature of science and theology during his residence at Oxford, 1654—1668, and to note a few of the main treatises issued thereafter by him in the furtherance of the philosophy which seeks "the glory of God and the relief of man's estate."

Prior to 1660 he had issued remarks on "Mistaken Modesty," and a "Free Discourse against customary Swearing;" and in that year he published an essay he had completed twelve years before "On Seraphic Love." In 1661 "Certain Physiological and other Essays" were printed and republished with additions in 1669. In 1662 his "Sceptical Chemist" appeared, and headed a movement against Van Helmont's school of Paracelsian philosophy. To 1663 belong his "Considerations" on (1) "the Style of the Holy Scriptures," (2) "the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy," and (3) "On Colours,"—the latter a work which led Newton to make those experiments which resulted in his decisive discoveries regarding the composition of light, to the pleasure resulting from which Mark Akenside thus alludes—

"Nor ever yet
The melting *rainbow's* vermeil-tinctured hues
To me have shone so pleasing, as when first
The hand of Science pointed out the path,
In which the sunbeams gleaming from the West,
Fall on the watery cloud, whose darksome veil
Involves the orient."

In the "Transactions of the Royal Society," which had been incorporated by charter granted by Charles II., in 1662, Mr. Boyle entered notices of many important experiments in the phenomena

of heat and cold, and in 1665 he published "New Experiments and Observations on Cold," and "Occasional Reflections upon several Subjects,"—works which show him to us in the modest guise of a collector of continuously sifted materials for the interpretation of subsequent thinkers, and as carefully abstinent from the advocacy of premature theories upon the facts presented to him in his investigations; forbearing, scrupulous, and moderate, hating deception, disliking error; firm in resisting hasty conclusions, and of great moral integrity, alike in his self-restraint and in his conscientious accuracy. In 1666 he published his "Hydrostatical Paradoxes," &c.—which was reissued in Latin in 1669. This is a work in which the author illustrates and confirms the true principles of inductive science, by many curious experiments of great originality in their own day, though quite commonplace in ours; and what was of far more importance then, he proved the error and absurdity of the opinions of the schoolmen on substance. Error prevented in the early days of science is nearly as valuable as truth discovered. It at least diminishes human uncertainty, by showing where proof of a theory, though sought for, was not to be found. In this year, too, there appeared "A Brief Account of Mr. Valentine Greatrakes and divers of the strange cures by him performed; written by himself, in a Letter addressed to the Hon. Robert Boyle, Esq.; whereunto are annexed the testimonials of several eminent and worthy persons of the chief matters of fact there related, London, 1660." The author of this letter, an Irish gentleman, belonging to the County of Waterford, had begun, about four years previously, to fancy that God had endowed him with the power of curing the king's evil, agues, and other diseases, by touch, and attracted much attention by the seemingly marvellous recoveries he had effected. In January, 1666, at the request of the Earl of Orrery (Lord Broghill), author of "Parthenissa," &c., Greatrakes had come over to England to attempt the cure of Lady Conway at Rugby, Warwickshire. In this he failed, although he performed many other remarkable cures upon those who, hearing of his mission, came to him for help. Greatrakes seems to have been fully persuaded in his own mind as to the reality of his power, and to have been of unimpeachable integrity. His singular pretensions became the theme of daily discussion among philosophers and physicians, and even attracted the attention of the Royal Society. Mr. Boyle was elected referee by both parties, and hence the publication of the letter above-mentioned. His judgment is given in a letter replying to one written by Dr. Henry Stubbe, a clever, rash, and voluble practitioner of medicine at Stratford-on-Avon, who was incessant in his attacks on the Royal Society. "In this letter he takes the philosophic ground of neither admitting nor denying without adequate proof. He neither rejects the facts as miraculous or as irreconcilable with natural facts, but taking the precise and moderate ground of admitting the possibility of the gift or the physical quality, he objects to the insufficiency of the proof in favour of

either. Upon the power of the patient's imagination, or of the mechanical effect of the operation, he dwells sufficiently, yet, from his unwillingness to involve theories, less than might now be expected. This letter, written in a morning, obtained general notice and approbation. It is remarkable for the wide compass of its learning, as well as for the cautious and sagacious spirit which it breathes, and it may be regarded as an excellent comment, on the golden maxim, against rejecting as untrue what we cannot understand." After this investigation the practice of Greatrakes fell off, and he passed out of the sight of the philosophical world. He died in 1699.

In 1667, the Royal Society was made the object of a smart attack by the partizans of the Aristotelian physics. This was "in reality the era of a great revolution in the intellectual world; the conflict between the darkness of the scholastic age and the light of the Newtonian day then dawning upon the world;" and the new school and its supporters were assailed with the charge of impiety. The impulse given to progress by the free inquiries of the experimentalists alarmed pedants, and a controversy, almost as bitter as those of the dark ages, was raised against the investigation of Nature in the mere light of human reason. Henry Stubbe and the Rev. Robert Crosse were the most violent of these assailants; but the satirical shafts of Samuel Butler, author of "Hudibras," who thought the researches of the Society whimsical and absurd, were also discharged at them in his poem, "The Elephant in the Moon;" and, with special aim at Boyle, in the paper in his "Remains," entitled "Occasional Reflection on Dr. Charlton's feeling a dog's pulse at Gresham College;" a piece of ironical writing which Dean Swift imitated in his "Meditations on a Broomstick," many years afterwards; and even Hobbes sneered at "the gentlemen at Gresham College." In this controversy Boyle took an active share in defending the lawfulness of philosophical investigations into the truth of God's works as well as God's word; and one of the leading controversialists acknowledges "that in his writings are to be found the greatest strength and the sweetest modesty, the noblest discoveries and the most generous self-denial, the profoundest insight into philosophy and nature, and the most devout and affectionate sense of God and religion."

In 1668 Boyle left Oxford and settled in London, taking up his residence with his sister, Lady Ranelagh, in Pall Mall, and pursuing his studies with unflagging energy, though his health, which had always been delicate, was rapidly failing. In 1671 a severe shock of paralysis caused him much suffering, though by great caution and temperance, with sisterly nursing, he recovered and renewed his labours in science and letters, publishing from time to time the results of his inquiries. In addition to the numerous productions mentioned already, we may note, as showing the fertility and facility of his pen, "The Christian Virtuoso"—showing that "by being addicted to experimental philosophy, a man is rather

assisted than indisposed to be a good Christian," "A Discourse of Things above Reason," "A Free Inquiry into the vulgarly received Notion of Nature," "The Reconcilableness of Reason and Religion," "A Disquisition into the Final Causes of Natural Things," "On Quicksilver Growing Hot with Gold," "An Invention to Estimate the Weight of Water," "A Discourse of Absolute Rest in Bodies," "A Continuation of the Experiments on Air," &c. Though his works are voluminous enough to fill six bulky quarto tomes—edited by Dr. Birch, 1744, 2nd edition 1772,—yet in the year 1681, Mr. Boyle published an account of various works which he had by accidental causes been prevented from giving to the press,—many had been made the prey of felonious depredators among his visitors, and some had been destroyed by mischances occurring amid his experiments. His treatises on "Seraphic Love," "Considerations on the Style of the Scriptures," and "On the Great Veneration that Man's Intellect owes to God," "have a place in the Index of books prohibited by the Roman Church.

It ought to have been mentioned that Lord Clarendon, historian of the Rebellion, strongly urged Mr. Boyle to enter into holy orders; but, in the belief that the maintenance and defence of revealed truth would be more powerful if he remained a layman, he refused to assume the office and ministration of a priest. The Provostship of Eton was offered to him by the King, but he declined that office because it might seduce him from science. In 1680 he was chosen president of the Royal Society; but declined the honour from scruples of conscience about the tests and oaths required from that officer. He was President of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England. He printed at his own expense the Church Catechism and the New Testament in Irish; the Four Gospels and the Acts in the Malay tongue; published Pocock's translation of Grotius' Treatise "*De Veritate*" for circulation in the Levant; shared the expense of a Turkish version of the New Testament with the East India Company, upon whom he earnestly impressed the duty of promoting Christianity in the East. He contributed largely to the expense of the publication of Bishop Burnet's "History of the Reformation." He settled an annuity of £50 per annum on Dr. Saunderson, who lost his preferments through loyalty to the king; and he was besides a munificent patron of science and rewarder of unsuccessful though meritorious men; it was through him too that the forfeited impropriations in Ireland were secured for the support of the poor and the maintenance of religion; while to every institution for the promotion of knowledge, the relief of want, or the furtherance of Christianity, his hand was freely extended—with something helpful in it. He procured the repeal of an old Protectionist law "against the multiplying of gold and silver" (5, Henry IV.), and several other relaxations of obnoxious statutes. He was wisely to act in an age when toleration was unknown; was a wit among wits, as Davenant and Cowley testify; and, though allied to the peerage on every side, and

the personal friend of three successive kings, he was a true friend of the people and especially of the poor. He was tall, slender, emaciated, often sickly, carefully abstemious, an excellent conversationalist, a ready debater, and a rapid writer. He was never married; he was wedded to science. Though he believed in alchemy, yet what Newton calls "the great wisdom of the noble author" restrained him from the credulity common among "Hermetic Philosophers." He was a diligent and skilful scrutinizer of facts, a trustworthy recorder of phenomena, and an experimental inquirer in an age of theorists.

Though the main object of this sketch is to mark out Mr. Boyle as one of the earliest and most fertile inductive philosophers, yet it would be unfair to science, history, to fact, and to his fame, to omit to notice his claims on the regard of metaphysical students, not only as the instituter of the Boyle Lectures, but also for his substantive influence on the philosophical opinions of his age. The Lectures—"for proving the Christian religion against Atheists, Deists, Pagans, Jews, and Mohammedans, not descending to any controversies among Christians themselves"—have been the means of adding to letters, among other productions, Richard Bentley's "Confutation of Atheism" (1692), Dr. Sam. Clarke's "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God" (1705), Dr. Butler's "Religion no Matter of Shame" (1729); and more recently, F. D. Maurice's "Religions of the World" (1846), Charles Merivale's "Conversion of the Roman Empire and Conversion of the Northern Nations," &c.; and were the forerunners of Bampton's, Hulse's, and other bequests of a like nature. The metaphysical position is thus stated by the most competent authority:—

"Mr. Boyle's speculations in regard to the classification of corporeal qualities probably suggested to Locke the nomenclature which he has adopted, but, in adopting, has deformed. In his treatise entitled 'The Origin of Forms and Qualities,' published at Oxford in 1666, Boyle denominates 'matter and motion' 'the most catholic principles of bodies' (p. 8); 'magnitude (size, bulk, or bigness), shape (figure), motion, or rest,' to which he afterwards adds. 'Texture,' he styles 'the *primitive moods or primary affections of bodies*, to distinguish them from those less simple qualities (as colours, tastes, odours, and the like) that belong to bodies upon their account' (p. 10). The former of these he likewise designates 'the *primitive or more catholic affections of matter*' (pp. 43, 44); and in another work, 'Tracts' (1671), p. 18, 'the *primary and most simple affections of matter*.' To the latter he gives the name of 'secondary qualities, if' (he says) 'I may so call them' (p. 44). In reference to the difficulty, 'That whereas we explicate colours, odours, and the like sensible qualities, by a relation to our senses, it seems evident that they have an absolute being irrelative to us; for snow (for instance) would be white, and a glowing coal would be hot, though there were no man or any other animal in the world' (p. 42). And again (p. 49),—'So if there were no sensitive beings, those bodies that are now the objects of our senses would be so *dispositively*, if I may so speak, endowed with colours, tastes, and the like, but *actually* only with those more catholic affections of bodies, figure, motion, texture, &c."

As he felt his end approaching, Robert Boyle became more and more intent on the husbanding of his efforts and the economization of time. He refused all friendly visits except at stated periods. His last years were spent in the preparation of several works for publication and the composition of several treatises on morals, theology, and natural science, some of which have been mislaid, lost, or suppressed, by the neglect or prejudice of his executors—among these was a work containing his most recent chemical speculations. Labour and study formed his delight while they exhausted his strength, but he persevered in them to the end. In the summer of 1691 he felt his vital powers on the wane, and under the conviction that his end was near, made his will. His devoted sister, Lady Ranelagh died, 23d December, and on the 30th he followed her into the realms of death. On 7th January, 1692, he was interred at the upper end of the south side of the chancel of St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, Westminster, near his sister. Dr. Burnet preached a funeral sermon upon the life, labours, and hopes of the Christian philosopher.

Boyle improved the air-pump and the thermometer, though the latter was first made an accurate instrument of investigation by Newton. He also discovered the laws of the air's elasticity—namely, its bulk is inversely as the pressure upon it. For some of the principles of hydrostatics we are indebted to him, though he did not possess much mathematical knowledge. The "Philosophical Transactions" contain several valuable papers by him on this science. By his "Sceptical Chemist," published in 1661, he did much to overturn the theories of Van Helmont's school, that commonly called of the Iatro-chemists, which was in its highest reputation; raising doubts as to the existence not only of the four elements of the Peripatetics, but of those which these chemists had substituted. Boyle holds the elements of bodies to be atoms of different shapes and sizes, the union of which gives origin to what are vulgarly called elements. It is unnecessary to remark that this is the prevailing theory of the present age." He "was both very laborious and intelligent; and his chemical pursuits, which were various and extensive, and intended solely to develop the truth without any regard to previously conceived opinions, contributed essentially to set chemistry free from the trammels of absurdity and superstition in which it had hitherto been confined, and to recommend it to philosophers as a science deserving to be studied on account of the important information which it was qualified to convey."*

Boyle's crowning glory was that he insisted, above all things, that verification was necessary to the genuine progress of science, as a guarantee, either direct or indirect, of the conformity of thought with fact. The imperial law-giving genius of Aristotle strove to reduce all experience, whether of nature or of mind, to science, so that men might by regulated observation bring under the dominion of certainty the diverse phenomena of nature; and he economized

* Hallam's "Literary History," vol. iii. p. 580.

the intellectual processes of discovery by the introduction of an organon of reasoning; scholasticism exhausted all the forms of inference possible to thoughts and words. Bacon proposed an organon of investigation, and worked out a speculative scheme of inductive science. Boyle saw that either organon was imperfect unless we attended to effective verification. Men had been credulous and careless; he saw that their safety lay in circumspect scepticism and cautious investigation, and that, however perfect thought might be, error was possible, if facts were not verified; while, however accurately facts might be tested, if logical thought was not employed, a theory apart from and unrelated to the facts was possible. To verify logic by science, and science by logic, to employ each as the critic of the other, was his chief aim in experimentation, and there can be no doubt that the Baconian induction, as well as the Aristotelic syllogism, demands verification if we would find truth. That an independent man and thinker like Boyle should have arisen to illustrate and consolidate experimental science, and prepare the way for the splendid future of discovery open to human thought in all the separate sciences, must have been of immense advantage to thought; for he had ample command of means and influence to make science fashionable and secure its incorporate existence in the Royal Society. Bacon taught, Boyle practised, the circumspect method of science, but Boyle alone insisted on keeping theory silent and speculation passive until the thoroughly wary vigilance of verification had been exercised on every fact—every fact, we say, for Boyle accepted the facts alike of Scripture and of science, and aimed at subjecting all to verified investigation. Having seen the Royal Society established for the one, he instituted the “Boyle Lectures” to aid in the carrying forward of the other. Robert Boyle was sincere in his convictions, true to science, submissive to nature, honest to men, and faithful to God. “No man had more thoroughly considered the extent and limits of the human understanding; none perhaps ever combined more perfectly the characters of the theologian and the philosopher;” and he is justly entitled to rank as the first and foremost of the noble band of thinkers, who have cultivated with an honest love of truth the investigation of all the facts of human life, as far as may be, according to the verificatory methods of Experimental Science.

Literature.

IS CARLYLE OR MACAULAY THE GREATER WRITER?

CARLYLE.—IV.

A COMPARISON between Macaulay, the popular historian and reviewer, whose volumes sold by the hundred thousand while yet warm from the press—and Carlyle, the mighty thinker, the bold, unflinching, and powerful “censor of the age,” the idol of a select few, presents great difficulties. The two men appear on a *prima facie* view so dissimilar, so unequal. It is almost as unfair to measure Macaulay by the standard of Carlyle, as it would be to measure Mr. Tupper or the “poet” of a provincial newspaper by the standard of either. Indeed, the coupling together of these two names can, I think, be only due to the circumstance (I might almost write the *accident*) of their both being historians, and both masters of style; and as these are the only two points in which we can trace any resemblance whatever between them, it is to these two points alone that our comparison should be restricted.

As M. T. has pointed out in his opening remarks, Macaulay was many things that Carlyle is not—Reform orator, Secretary of the Board of Control, President of the Law Commission of India, &c., &c. So, of course, it would be absurd to compare Carlyle with Macaulay, as a parliamentary speaker and a busy politician; but then, on the other hand, it would be equally absurd to compare Macaulay to Carlyle as a thinker, moralist, philosopher, and poet.* We can only *compare* them where they resemble, no end could be gained by *contrasting* them where they differ.

First, with regard to their literary styles; and surely, if Macaulay is superior to Carlyle in any respect, it ought to be in this—his style being, as whist-players would say, Macaulay’s “strong suit.” It is principally on his style, so clear, vivid, and picturesque, that his fame will eventually rest. He is not *great* in anything else. He is not particularly accurate or impartial as a historian; he is not possessed of a greater amount of critical acumen than dozens of other reviewers; his “views and opinions” are seldom strikingly bold or original, and his logic is often woefully at fault. But there

* Macaulay’s “Lays and Ballads” are, doubtless, fine specimens of spirited, *rhetorical versification*, but many critics, among whom Wordsworth may be counted, deny that they are *poetry* in any true sense of the word. None, however, have ventured to question the beautifully poetical character of Carlyle’s prose.

is a fascination and freshness in his language which covers a multitude of sins. Though clear, nervous, and pointed, it is of a highly ornate character, abounding in metaphor and antithesis, and enriched by a singular wealth of quotation or rather allusion, drawn from the stores of a marvellous memory, which, it has been said, "knew no twilight."

Fine as it is, however, the cultivated reader tires of it after a time. Beauty of diction is a great recommendation to a book; but after all, matter is of more importance than manner, and the reputation of a great writer can not be made out of a perpetual showy blaze and parade of cleverness.

Now, if for this reason alone, I would hold Carlyle to be the greater writer of the two; with him style is not everything. Not that I yield the palm to Macaulay here, either. Carlyle can beat him on his own ground. Is Macaulay animated and vigorous and life-like? So is Carlyle. Is he brilliant and figurative? Carlyle is more brilliant and more figurative. Does Macaulay possess a richly cultivated mind, and a varied store of classical and literary knowledge? Carlyle has the same qualifications in a greater degree, and has furthermore the great field of German literature to work upon, which was to Macaulay (comparatively speaking) a sealed book. But it is in what are not unfrequently called his peculiarities and defects, that the great excellence of Carlyle as a writer consists.

There is an effect of rugged grandeur produced by the strange use of trope and figure, the passionate apostrophe, the stern denunciation, the terse, strong, dogmatic assertion, and the startling fantastic word-creations. It is all characteristic of his mode of thought. As the currents of his thought run in strong, deep channels, so when they do break forth it is with the rush and the roar of a mighty cataract, sweeping all obstacles, great and small, from its path, like the paper-boats of children. His convictions are so earnest and profound, that they can only find adequate expression in language of extraordinary depth and passion. As he feels so he speaks. His thoughts are not the thoughts of common men, and could not be fitly clothed in the language of common men. His style is perfect, inasmuch as it is perfectly adapted to the tone of thought it conveys. It is a purer, a better, a greater style than Macaulay's, for Macaulay's is a gaudy dress equally fitting for fact, fancy, or fallacy; but Carlyle's is fitted only for the embodiment of such great thoughts as stir the soul of such a man; it is the true style, the genuine expression of the mind and character of the author.

In the second of the two questions into which I have ventured to separate this debate, viz., Is Carlyle or Macaulay greater as a historian? the advantage is with Carlyle to a still greater degree. Is not Macaulay's history notoriously prejudiced and unreliable? Is he not ever ready to colour or twist the facts for the benefit of the party on whose side his sympathies and interests were always enlisted—the Whigs? And is it not the first essential of an histo-

rian, that whatever direction his comments and reflections may take, his narrative, at least, should be free from bias?

Indeed, if we accept Macaulay's own statement of the qualification of the historian, as quoted by M. T. on page 114, he himself is not a historian. When he writes, "the historian must possess sufficient self-command to abstain from casting his facts in the mould of his hypothesis;" he pronounces his own condemnation.

In his essay on Machiavelli, however, he speaks in quite a different tone on this point, and lays down the principles which seem to have guided him in his own system of falsifying historical facts. The passage runs thus:—

"The classical histories may almost be considered romances founded on fact. The relation is, no doubt, in all the principal points, strictly true. But the numerous little incidents which heighten the interest, the words, the gestures, the looks, are evidently furnished by the imagination of the author. The fashion of later times is different. It may be doubtful whether more exact notions are conveyed to the reader. The best portraits are those perhaps in which there is a *slight admixture of caricature*; and we are not certain that the best histories are not those in which a *little of the exaggeration of fictitious narrative* is judiciously employed. *Something is lost in accuracy, but much is gained in effect.* The fainter lines are neglected, but the great characteristic features are imprinted on the mind for ever." *

This, at least, is a candid confession of faith. The bare truth, it seems, is dull and prosaic. We will introduce a *slight admixture of caricature* into this monarch's uninteresting portraiture, and perhaps a spice of *the exaggeration of fictitious narrative* would improve the relation of that event. Make the history a little more like "a fictitious narrative," and it will be far more interesting, dramatic, and readable than the productions of those dull, scrupulous gentlemen who preserve a strict adherence to the truth. People like the opportunity of enjoying a novel, and flattering themselves, at the same time, that they are reading the history of England.

It would but be degrading Carlyle's magnificent historical genius to compare him with one who will thus sanction and *practise* a wilful perversion of the truth, in order to heighten the interest of the story, and openly avow his belief that the historian is justified in sacrificing veracity to effect.

I have thus endeavoured to show that Macaulay is inferior to Carlyle in every way that it is possible to compare them, and on what grounds he can be considered a greater writer, I am at a loss to determine.

E. D.

* "Essays," People's Edition, vol. i., page 50. In the *Times* review of the 3rd and 4th vols. of Macaulay's History, which appeared on the 11th of January, 1856, there is a searching and elaborate inquiry into their inaccuracies and partialities, the results of which fully bear out all that is said here. It may be advantageous for reference purposes to state that this Review has been issued in a volume entitled "Eminent Men and Popular Books," pp. 57-86, by Routledge, London.—Eds. B.C.

MACAULAY.—IV.

THE very first sentence of H. K.'s paper on this question grants and admits the whole matter as against his client, and he ought, immediately after penning it, to have thrown up his brief. "Of all the writers of the present day," he says (Aug. 1867, p. 90), "Mr. Carlyle is probably the most misunderstood." If Mr. Carlyle is to be defended by admissions of such a sort, he may well exclaim, "Save me from my friends!" Does not true greatness consist in making one's self felt and understood? Is not true greatness the force of mind that overcomes all obstacles, impediments, and hindrances? Such is Carlyle's own estimate; we quote his own words:—"The great man, with his free force direct out of God's own hand, is the lightning [out of heaven]. *His word is the wise healing word which all can believe in*" ("Heroes and Hero-worship," p. 20). Unintelligibility is weakness; intelligibility alone is greatness. If this is so, H. K. has condemned his own case and shut out his client from any chance of a verdict in his favour by the very first words he utters in his behalf. How unfavourably does the opening sentence make Carlyle contrast with Macaulay—the universally understood, the pellucid thinker, the clear writer, the close and cogent reasoner, whom, however we may incline to dispute what he says, we can never misunderstand. Now who can understand Carlyle, whether with the eye of a vulgar or of an unvulgar logic? H. K. admits that he "is probably the most misunderstood" man of his age. It is very different with Macaulay; he is constantly plain, forcible, clear, and comprehensive. Of this there is perhaps no better judge than Henry Hart Milman, himself a master of "English undefiled," whose evidence we shall quote:—

"His copiousness had nothing tumid, diffuse, Asiatic; no ornament for the sake of ornament. *As to its clearness, one may read a sentence of Macaulay twice, to judge of its full force, never to comprehend its meaning. His English was pure, both in idiom and in words—pure to fastidiousness;* not that he discarded or did not make free use of the plainest and most homely terms (he had a sovereign contempt for what is called the dignity of history, which would keep itself above the vulgar tongue), but every word must be genuine English, nothing that approached real vulgarity, nothing that had not the stamp of popular use or the authority of sound English writers, nothing unfamiliar to the common ear. . . . In all his writings, however his opinions, so strongly uttered, may have given offence to men of different sentiments, no sentence has been impeached as jarring against the loftiest principles of honour, justice, pure morality, rational religion." ("Memoir" prefixed to People's Edition of Macaulay's "History of England.")

R. S. affirms that style "is not a very important matter" (Nov. 1867, p. 345); in this instance negating the time-honoured maxim of Lord Chesterfield, that "the manner of speaking is as important as the matter." We contend that style is not a superficial merit. It is the very form and flexure of a statue which, unless it is duly

proportioned to its aim and indicative of the idea to be expressed by it, merely disfigures the matter, whether it be wood, granite, marble, or gold. No great permanent work has ever issued from a human mind which is not as remarkable for its excellence of manner, its charm of style, and its uncloying delightfulness of phraseology as for the value of its matter. Take Homer and Virgil, David and St. John, Tacitus and Hume, Thucydides and Montaigne, Dante and Spenser, Æschylus and Shakspeare, as examples, and then compare the writings of Macaulay and Carlyle in point of style, and say if the former does not possess far more than the latter the grace and excellence which promise immortality? R. S. justly acknowledges that "it is strange and unlike the majority of writers;" but projects this *caveat*:—"Though at first it *appear* barbarous and uncouth, it is honest, original, unartificial, and highly suggestive." Habit can reconcile the human eye to the view of monsters with complacency; and associations may even bring them to be the objects of admiration and of love, but mere deformity has no claim to admiration on the ground of its inability to be concealed; neither has Carlyle's style any claim to tolerance in itself and for itself.

H. K. thinks that one of the greatest qualities a writer can possess is "originality of thought" (p. 93); but he is much nearer the possession, or at least the expression of a correct opinion, when he says, "A great writer should be a greater teacher of truth." Originality is easily attained if truth is not attended to. Original fictions, original history, original poetry, are cheap and easily-raised products, if there is to be neither circumscription nor confine, except to the attainment of originality. Hence Voltaire's epigram, "Nothing is less common in the world than common sense." Carlyle's originality is bought at the cost of caricature, grotesqueness, and misrepresentation. Look, for instance, at his histories; do they contribute to the comprehension of the times of which he writes? Has he not the trick of labelling—we had almost said *libelling*—every man with a nickname, and every event with a pseudonym—a trick which Dickens has borrowed from him; but we ask who has ever understood the history of the French Revolution from the pantomimic pictures in blue-fire painted by Thomas Carlyle? We call an adequate witness:—

"Mr. Carlyle entitles it a *history*, but it is no such thing. Any gentleman of respectable business habits, average intelligence, and moderate leisure, who should repair to this work for a consecutive and clear account of the great Revolution in France, fraught with its own unmistakable lessons of philosophy, would become sadly bewildered at the very outset. The riddle of the sphinx, proposed in Ethiopic, or written in hieroglyphics, would be nothing to the threatening problems of that strange wild book. Let the initiated few belaud it as they may, and speak of its occult and rare philosophy, true history is written so that he who runneth may read; true learning is simple as well as sublime in its results; true wisdom com-

municates the lore of genius in the language of a child.—“*Essays on English Literature*,” by Thomas MacNicol, *On the Writings of Mr. Carlyle*, p. 119.

“Every man,” says H. K., “ought to read *Sartor Resartus*.” With this view of the complete duty of man we entirely disagree. Men ought only to read what there is a fair chance of comprehending, and that from which no distinctly prejudicial consequences can flow. The philosophy of Old Clothes which Mr. Carlyle teaches in this book is in despite to, and irreverence of, all the old thought of the world, especially of the thought contained in the Hebrew Bible and in the Christian Gospels. We do not think it is profitable for men to read lessons of irretrievable woe to their own souls. To read H. K.’s opinion, one would think all truth and holiness—a perfect modern revelation of the truest, newest truth—was contained in this book, and that it was a triumph of genius beyond all that was ever written. We do not coincide in this lofty estimate. We admit the fantastic quaintness, the marvellous sneering power of the author, but we do not recognise the more than heavenly wisdom which H. K. invites us to see, to admire, and to go into raptures about. Against its intelligibility and its inefficacy as reasoning, we quote the following paragraphs:—

“It is impossible to convey any adequate notion of this book, the ‘*Sartor Resartus*,’ by means of abstract or synopsis; and this, also for the old reason, it is mainly unintelligible. As a rational being soon wearies of the most agreeable jargon, so it is impossible to carry away the substance or meaning which it never had. Neither the beauties nor the absurdities of our author are properly transferable or translatable.”—*MacNicol’s Essays*, p. 125.

“If Mr. Carlyle is the greatest thinker of our times, alas for the country of Bacon and of Butler. Nay, we have, in that case, sadly degenerated from the dialectic genius of the time of Hume; for, however sophistical were the arguments, carefully addressed to reasonable men, and thus frankly offering the opportunity of refutation, which has since been freely accepted and made good. But Mr. Carlyle offers no such opportunity, and deserves no such praise. It has been remarked (with reference, we believe, to the style of Gibbon) that it is impossible to refute a sneer; and a similar reflection is constantly rising in the mind of the reader of Mr. Carlyle’s productions.”—*MacNicol’s Essays*, p. 167.

“Instead of solving the riddle of existence, he repeats it time after time with every doleful emphasis, and turns it upside-down, that we may not lose its meaning through treating it with too much reverence. We read on, without advancing; and go further, only to fare worse. Sometimes the title of a chapter promises much, and then we are certain to be disappointed most; till at last the repeated evil works its own cure, and a brilliant heading, like the starry nucleus of a comet, prepares us for a cloudy and attenuated tail. At one time we see written, *The Everlasting No*, and wonder what deeper or what wider vacuum has been discovered by this prince of negative philosophers; but it proves only to be a labelled specimen of his great gaping universe. With some faint hope we come upon

another chapter, and read *The Everlasting Yea*; but after the most intent listening, the noisy oracle is found to have confused, but not informed the mind. Many high-sounding words, as 'sanctuary of sorrow,' or 'divine depth of sorrow,' come unexplained upon us; and many scriptural precepts, as, 'Love not pleasure—love God,' 'Whosoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might,' are thrown into our path, but to enjoy—or even rightly to appreciate—them, we must shut our eyes to Mr. Carlyle's 'dream-grotto,' and remember the fulness of evangelic truth which is stored up in the briefest line of inspiration—Love God! This is indeed 'the Everlasting Yea,' for it is the primal law of our creation, and the ultimate perfection of saint and angel. Truth is truth, even upon the lips of presumption. But what does the precept mean in the mind of Mr. Carlyle? Is it with him anything but a time-honoured phrase, hallowed by the unsuspecting faith of eighteen centuries, and embodying, in the superstitious formula, the vague longings of a hundred million hearts? We fear not. Belshazzar drank wine with his princes, his wives, and his concubines, out of the consecrated vessels of the temple: *they drank wine, and praised the gods of gold, and of silver, of brass, of iron, of wood, and of stone*. And in like manner the symbols of a yet purer faith, the language and precepts of the same and jealous God, are dishonoured and profaned in our own day, if with less insolence of manner, yet with only the more profound contempt, by men who call upon His name in one breath and question His existence in another, and who dare to distribute His incommunicable attributes as the property of trees and stones, deifying if not adorning the insensate forms of nature. . . . Our author's tone is sceptical throughout, and can only be defended from the charge of gross profanity by the frank avowal of unbelief. That avowal is not made; on the contrary, the armoury of Scripture is pillaged for a traitor's purpose, but in the guise of an adherent to the sacred cause. Yet Mr. Carlyle is the great eulogist of sincerity, the denouncer of all hypocrisy and 'cant.'—*MacNicol's Essays*, pp. 132-4.

In the following passages of strong and serious condemnation we most thoroughly coincide. We agree with their writers as to Carlyle's power, and, in our distinct feeling, that it is not a power calculated, or used, for good in our day:—

"Christianity as understood commonly, perhaps everywhere except it may be at Weimar and Chelsea, and church formulas, certainly as understood everywhere, he is in the habit of classing under a category which in his hands has become an extensive one.—that of *shams*. He calls them by various forcible but ugly names,—'as old clothes,' 'spectral inanities,' 'gibbering phantoms,' or, with plainer meaning, 'huge untruths and unrealities.' . . . For good or evil, Mr. Carlyle is a power in the country; and those who watch eagerly the signs of the times have their eyes fixed upon him. What he would have us leave is plain enough, and that too with all haste, as a sinking ship that will else carry us—state, church, and sacred property—down along with it. But whither would he have us fly? Is there firm land, be it ever so distant? Or is the wild waste of waters, seething, warring round as far as eye can reach, our only hope?—The pilot stars, shining fitfully through the parting of the storm-clouds, our only guidance? There are hearts in this land almost broken, whose

old traditional beliefs, serving them, at least, as moral supports, Mr. Carlyle, and teachers like him have undermined. Some betake themselves to literature as Sterling did; some fill up the void with the excitement of politics; others feebly bemoan their irreparable loss, and wear an outward seeming of universal irony and sarcasm. Mr. Carlyle has no right, no man has any right, to weaken or destroy a faith which he cannot, or will not, replace with a loftier. We have no hesitation in saying that the language which Mr. Carlyle is in the habit of employing towards the religion of England and Europe is unjustifiable. He ought to have said nothing, or he ought to have said more. Scraps of verse from Goethe, and declamations, however brilliantly they may be phrased, are but a poor compensation for the slightest obscuring of 'the hope of immortality brought to light by the gospel,' and by it conveyed to the hut of the poorest man, to awaken his crushed intelligence, and lighten the load of his misery."—*Brinsley's 'Essays,'* pp. 252—254.

"As for Carlyle's 'faith,' it has no truth, much less a system of truth; it has no worship, and it has neither a life nor a rule of practice. It cannot speak, it cannot kneel, it cannot work. Who ever saw or heard of it in connection with a positive doctrine, a tangible ceremony, or a visible fruit? And if, among philosophers, and even with its philosophical author himself, it is an undeclared and unshaped nonentity, how is it to take possession of, stir, and rule the common but various world? If it have no book, no altar, no code for the esoteric, what can it be or have to the vulgar millions?" —"*Studies and Sketches in Modern Literature,*" by P. Landreth, p. 335.

It is a matter of great pain to us to write as we have done. We see in H. K.'s indiscriminate admiration of Thomas Carlyle only one evidence more of the misleading power of sophistry over the mind. He is evidently subdued by the novelty, rather than by the truth of the thoughts he has found in the writings of the sage of Chelsea, and not being an extensive reader, seemingly has given himself in rapture to the first strong mind that he met. He has certainly not acted fairly as a controversialist, as he has only praised Carlyle, and has not criticised Macaulay. As he has done so we have been in a measure compelled to follow him. We are the less concerned to do this now, as M. T. has most luminously made out a case for Macaulay; and much of E. N. A.'s able article corroborates our view of the question, that Macaulay is a greater writer (and man) than Carlyle is. If R. S. were to reflect that "Quantity was no test of greatness," he would probably thrust himself less upon the notice of readers of the *British Controversialist*; but when he states that Carlyle exceeds Macaulay in quality, power, and object, he ought not to do so without adducing proof, and that he does not we assume is because he cannot. He has made no mark in this debate, and we believe that we may still affirm that Macaulay is a greater writer than Carlyle. W. W.

Politics.

IS A CONSERVATIVE SUPERIOR TO A WHIG MINISTRY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

BEFORE entering into any polemical arguments on this question, let us pause for a moment on the threshold of the past, and look back over the last half century or so, that we may be guided in our judgment as to the relative merits of each party, by the historic record of its actions.

Such a retrospect will disclose a phenomenon in the tactics of political parties, which may at first sight appear unaccountable; but a deeper inquiry, a more searching investigation, will convince us that it is not merely the result of any fortuitous combination of circumstances, nor yet can it be ascribed to the action of that unseen law which is commonly known as “chance,” but that its cause exists in a deep-rooted and dangerous evil, inherent in the Whig party.

That party has, at various intervals during the last fifty years, advocated changes in the laws and constitution of the British Empire, which have evoked the bitterest hostility on the one hand, and the warmest espousal on the other; and, consequently, during the time these changes have been under discussion, the country has been in a state of the greatest excitement and agitation, most injurious to its social and commercial interests. Nothing but the sincerest conviction of the righteousness of their cause, the firmest assurance of the benefits that would accrue from the adoption of their policy, and the intensest determination to carry it into effect so soon as they were able, would have induced any party that laid claim to the slightest vestige of patriotism or honour to involve the country in a civil contest, so dangerous and uncertain of result. That no such “conviction” impelled the Whig party to action; that no such “assurance” cheered and sustained them in fighting the battle of “Reform;” and that they were “determined” only to postpone these changes so long as they could satisfy the people with empty promises; the humiliating story of their conduct, when the hour for mere words had passed away, and the moment for action had arrived, most indisputably demonstrates. The party that, while boasting and promising, declared itself to be, and was to all appearances united, disinterested, and sincere, was now divided into immovable petty factions. The thoroughly “disinterested” motives which animated them were exhibited on their part by an endeavour to divert the measures, of which they had assumed the

charge, from a national to a party purpose, and the only visible signs of their "sincerity" were the pertinacity with which they endeavoured to smother their progeny under plausible pretences, and by all possible means in their power prevent practical or immediate legislation on the question. There were crises in our national history, during which, at any time, we might have drifted into the stormy ocean of revolution. A people that had laboured and struggled for "reform," for many long and weary years, according to the laws of the Constitution, and at the moment when victory was within their reach, discovered that—through the duplicity of their chosen leaders and representatives—it could not possibly be obtained by such means, had a very tenable excuse for resorting to other and less peaceful ways of attaining their object. Possibly this would have been the result on more than one occasion, had not the Conservative party, perceiving the danger, stepped forward, and by obeying implicitly the dictates of the people, restored the country to its wonted peace and order. They saw that these changes—whether for better or for worse—were infinitely less hurtful than continued agitation, and the dangers agitation involved, and more than that, that they were already *inevitable*.

In abandoning their old grounds—an action which the circumstances fully justified,—the Conservative party pursued a policy which was truly statesmanlike and patriotic. The repeal of the corn laws, Catholic emancipation, representative reform, as embodied in the Bill of 1867, are all measures which have been advocated by the Whigs, but for the final passing of which the country is indebted to the Tories.

These historic *facts* can bear but one construction, and that one most damaging to the Whigs and humiliating to the nation whose destinies they have essayed to rule, namely, that with the Whig party liberal *professions* are a reality, but liberal *principles* a myth. And now let us leave the past, referring to it only when necessary to substantiate those arguments which we shall bring forward. In further consideration of this question, we will grant the Whig party the credit of sincerity of purpose, convinced that, regarding their conduct in whatever light you will, it is incompatible with the existence of those qualifications which are necessary to the formation of an able and efficient administration, and will therefore consider their conduct as the result of legislative incapacity, rather than that of political dishonesty. It must be admitted that it is *essential* to the existence of a good government that it should be composed of men, and supported by men, who hold broad and comprehensive opinions; men who, whether the professed object of their administration is to conserve the constitution of the country, or to reform it, are willing to sink all minor considerations in which principle is not involved, that they may work harmoniously for the common end they have in view. This is necessary in order to secure unity, for without unity there can be no real strength, and of all governments the one most to be avoided is a government

weak in itself. Weakness (of this sort) means hesitation, vacillation, and indecision in all the affairs of the country,—sure prelude to a termination in national humiliation and disgrace.

There have been—and there will again be—times in the history of every nation in which promptitude and decision are absolutely necessary to its honour and well-being. With a government in which every individual member has narrowed down his opinions to an extreme point of detail this is impossible. Such a government must be for ever “between the horns of a dilemma.” Haunted at every step by the phantom of doubt; in every action aware that the ground they stand upon may at any moment disappear beneath their feet; in all its undertakings trembling, hesitating, compromising, delaying. Yet this has been the position of the great “united” Liberal party heretofore, and that to such an extent as to *incapacitate* them from carrying on the Queen's Government at the time its responsibilities are heaviest,—when some alterations in the great principles of the constitution are meditated. In proof of this we will take one notable instance,—the parliamentary session of 1866. When the campaign opened, the Whig government were in possession of an immense majority; one large enough to have enabled them to have settled the franchise question as they pleased, had they and their party regarded the question from a more comprehensive and liberal-minded point of view. The Liberal party would then have considered nothing as a *principle* in their bill, but the extension of the franchise to the working classes, and that object provided for, the ways and means of providing for it would have appeared a minor consideration. But the Liberal party did not regard it in this light, and in consequence, before the Government took any steps in the question, they perceived that any decided course would alienate a section of their followers, both in the cabinet and out of it, and probably convert their majority into a minority. There were then but two courses open to them, either to sacrifice their party by exposing its true weakness, or to sacrifice their country by betraying its true interests. They preferred the latter, and in place of the *settlement* of the question demanded and expected by the nation, they, to save their party, endeavoured to substitute a measure which was large enough to act as a “lever” in the hands of the advocates of manhood suffrage, but falling far short of anything like a permanent arrangement—a measure which, instead of stopping all agitation, would have given to agitation impetus sufficient to have carried us eventually to the goal of the Radicals. But why did the Whig party reject the measure? Not because it *was* a bad measure, but *because it extended the franchise by means of rental instead of a rating qualification*. Was ever there a picture of more stupendous folly and suicidal madness?

The foreign policy of the Conservative party is consistent and in accordance with our national character; that of the Liberals, not only crude and ill-defined, but antagonistic to the spirit which animates the British people. It is a policy which does not stand upon

any intelligible basis. If we, as a people, declare our determination never to resort to an armed interference in the affairs of other States, we only do that which is indisputably just and right. But from that moment our political influence abroad is dead. We have, then, no moral right to interfere in any way with the quarrels of cotemporary States, and to do so will only be the means of bringing ourselves into contempt, without the possibility of achieving any happy results. This is the policy of the Liberal party. They have declared over and over again, when quarrels or difficulties have arisen between other nations, that England would not, under any circumstances, take up arms on either side, and still they have persisted in poking their advice, and their despatches, and their kind offers of mediation in the face of the nations intimately concerned. That is a policy worthy of Mrs. Gamp, not of John Bull. What I would point out is this:—That when we decline to back our words with actions, our interference becomes the action of an impertinent, pettifogging busybody, instead of that of a great responsible nation. In other matters, too, foreign questions directly concerning ourselves, the policy of the Liberal party has been such as must tend to bring us into contempt. Under their guidance England is fast losing that dignified position in the scale of nations which she once held. Latterly it has been our policy to treat weaker and smaller states with peremptory insolence, and to cringe and lick the dust in the face of powerful nations like America and France.

But these vagaries sink into insignificance when compared with our own conduct on the Danish question. One of the foulest pages of British history will be that one which records the part that England took in that transaction. That was conducted under Liberal auspices, with Lord John Russell in the Foreign Office. There can be no doubt but that the position England took on that question was *intended* to convey to other nations the impression that she was willing to go to war on behalf of Denmark. The Liberal party thought that by so doing they could frighten Prussia and Austria into foregoing their intention of attacking Denmark. When they saw that Prussia and Austria were not to be frightened, and that the only result of the attitude they had assumed had been to cause the Danes to enter on a hopeless war, which they would not otherwise have done, it was clearly our duty to see them safe out of the difficulty. Surely, if we may fairly judge of the spirit of the Liberal policy by this affair, that policy is anything but calculated to conduce to the happiness, honour, and lasting prosperity of the British Empire. On the other hand, we regard the foreign policy of the Conservative party as eminently satisfactory; as one suited to the times in which we live, and well fitted to maintain our position as one of the first among European nations. That party has acknowledged the folly of endeavouring to isolate ourselves from the rest of Europe—to do so is to refuse to wield that vast influence

for good which we possess, and yet they have consistently avoided all unnecessary interference in the affairs of other states.

The Conservative policy on what we may call home questions is such as deserves the confidence and approbation of the country. When in office they have shown that they appreciated the great importance of our navy as a national institution. In their programme they have given great prominence to the question of social reform, which the Whigs have totally ignored. That is a most important matter. On the question of Education they are, as Lord Stanley the other day observed, "not one whit behind their opponents." They have treated the questions of retrenchment and economy in a more *practical* manner than their opponents. Their economy has not been at the expense of the *effectiveness* of our national safeguards. They have certainly not talked so much about "purity of elections," and "the evils of bribery," but have acted rather upon the motto that "*example* is better than precept." To them the country owes the "Ten Hours' Bill"—a measure that has been productive of much good. Many other measures of national usefulness we could enumerate which have been passed by the Conservative party, which have contributed in no small degree to the present happy and prosperous state of the country. It is a practice much too common with many people to overlook or totally ignore all social questions, and regard only the "great questions of the day;" and people of this sort are in the habit of attributing all our present prosperity to the passing of those great measures which have been advocated (not passed) by the Whigs. We should, however, have been in a different position now had not the Conservative party meanwhile been engaged in effecting measures of useful and practical legislation.

The connection of the Liberal party with the extreme Radical faction must tend to weaken their hands, when dealing with disturbances of any kind which find their motive power in the opponents of the present state of the English law and constitution. The extreme Radical faction have openly encouraged the object of Fenianism, if they have not assented to the means by which the Fenians would attain that object. They have in fact endeavoured to *justify Fenianism*. If the wrongs of Ireland really are as great as that party assert them to be—then the wickedness of Fenianism is slight, in comparison with the wickedness of British rule in Ireland. If all Ireland's misery, and all her poverty, and all her wretchedness, are due to her connection with England—as Mr. John Bright infers when he says,—“If Ireland were removed 2000 miles away, she would be a happy and a prosperous nation,”* then, I say unhesitatingly that Ireland having failed by moral force, is justified in resorting to physical force, to free herself from a connection which has proved such an unmitigated curse. But that connection has been, we believe, a blessing rather than a curse.

* I am quoting from memory.

If Ireland were "removed 2000 miles away" to-morrow, she would be in a state of anarchy and hopeless confusion the day after.

What form of government would she adopt. Not the monarchical, because the Orangemen would never submit to be governed by a Romanist. And the Romanists would never allow a Protestant to rule over them. Suppose she adopted the Republican form, would it be possible that a legislature could exist composed solely of Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants. Only a few months ago, a Catholic body decided to organise a procession for some purposes connected with their religion. This came to the ears of a portion of the Orange party. It was decided by them that the procession, if held, should be waylaid and dispersed. Accordingly when the day, on which it took place, arrived, a number of Orangemen—equipped with loaded firearms—concealed themselves behind a hedge, on the road which it was expected the procession would take. When the unsuspecting processionists came within gunshot they were met by a volley from the guns of the Orangemen. A short struggle ensued, in which the Catholics, being totally unarmed, were severely defeated. Several persons were killed, and not a few injured. Now this gives us some idea of the disastrous results which would ensue if Ireland were an independent nation.

The Radicals then, in declaring England to be the cause of Ireland's unhappy condition, make an assertion not only unwarranted, but directly opposed to the truth,—an assertion which, if believed by those large masses of intelligent Irishmen who are now loyal to the Queen, would cause them to regard these Fenian rebels as patriots. And this Radical party, which has spread broadcast over the length and breadth of the land statements so dangerous and so false, is the political partner of the Liberals. The Radicals do, in the present state of parties, hold in their hands the "balance of power," and on them in a great measure rests the question of Government or Opposition benches, for the Liberal party.

Look to the important divisions of the last ten years, and it will be seen that, in the great majority of cases, the Radicals could have turned the scales. The exceptions are few and far between. Is it not likely then that the Liberals will, in a great measure, be guided by them? And if so, can the Liberal party efficiently deal with that turbulent element, in our population, which is constantly resolving itself into such insurrectionary organizations as Chartism and Fenianism?

The Conservative party, through its somewhat unpopular position, possesses a guarantee that the men who enter its ranks, are drawn thither not by any selfish motive, but by sincere and honest conviction of the truth of their cause. No rational man, whose only object in entering the political world was to attain to greatness, popularity, or office, would think for a moment of professing Conservative principles. Such a man would join that party which was most likely to further his objects, and that confessedly is the Liberal one. Therefore while the Liberal ranks are yearly recruited

with men of this stamp, the Conservative party is free from such worthless and unprincipled adherents. Perhaps this, in some degree, accounts for the large majority which the Liberal party possesses.

To say more would be superfluous, what we have already advanced proves satisfactorily—that the Liberal party, by their broken and divided ranks, by their narrow and illiberal opinions, by their dishonourable foreign policy, by their connection with extreme politicians, is prevented from advantageously governing this land, and history fully bears this out.

That the Conservative party, by the unison which exists among its members, by the principles professed by them, and by the national character of its policy, is well qualified to act as the representative of a great and honourable nation. T. L. H.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

The very great talent usually manifested in the debates in *The British Controversialist* has surely failed egregiously in the present instance, or else a much more sprightly, animated, and continuous discussion might have been secured for a question of so much importance as this is. It cannot be a matter of indifference surely to the thoughtful readers of this serial under what sort of a government we live. They surely do not think that the reigning ministry, like the reigning dynasty, must have nothing said against it, so long as its power lasts. There is no treason in contrasts between parties, and there need be no personalities indulged in which would call into operation the law of libel. Free discussion upon the acts of Her Majesty's responsible ministers is now freely permitted, and we do not require to speak with baited breath, and parenthetically exclaim, "No treason against Queen Victoria, I hope," when we speak of the claims of parties to the regard of men. If any such foolish fear has restrained anybody from taking part in this debate, it is reason for regret, for no fitter topic, we think, could have been selected for discussion.

The object of government is the happiness of the people, and the main end to be kept in view by all rulers is the well-being of the great body of the community. If government has any use at all, it must be that it should promote and secure "the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible numbers," and do this, not by patronizing and privilege, by favour or by grace, but by law and inalienable right. To be governed does not mean to be tyrannized over, but to be led right; not to be the subjects of arbitrary power, but of legal rule and trustworthy rectitude. Government is not intended to restrain and prohibit the political life and energy of men, but to weld the entire interests of the whole commonweal into oneness by settlement and security of rights. Conservatism means the right divine of the nobility to govern wrong, to retain over a country emancipated by industry the powers of a military and monied oligarchy, to look upon the people not only as sub-

jects but subjugates, who must not only be put but be kept under the yoke, and to look upon the State as being formed for the benefit of the rulers not of the ruled.

To those who think that we ought to look to results rather than rights, we admit that there is some plausibility in the propounding of the present question; but surely these can only be few,—for who would be contented with the granting of an act of justice as the conferring of a favour. Justice is not a matter that depends on the favour of any one, and hence it is not a matter to be intrinsically grateful for, though incidentally we may be glad we get it at all. The mere results of Conservatism might have been much more advantageous than all that the Whigs gave us, and yet they might not be justly entitled to either praise or gratitude for their reforms, while the Whigs might have given literally nothing and been yet as a government preferable to the Conservatives: for the Whigs have striven for justice to man as justice, while the Conservatives fling it only as a sop, at the latest possible moment, to the agitators who have risen in their might to demand it. The Whigs, for instance, hold the injustice of taxation without representation; the Conservatives hold that he should take who has the power, and he should keep who can, and therefore that because they are the stronger they shall keep all that they possess as free from the tax-gatherer's gripe as they are able. Though therefore under Whig rule as heavy taxation must be borne as under the Conservatives, yet as the former advocate taxation on principles of justice, while the latter maintain taxation on the principle that might is right; a Whig Government is preferable to a Conservative one; for it is better for mankind to live under a government which struggles to incorporate justice with law and life, however unsuccessfully, than to live, even with greater present ease, under a government which is uninfluenced by any such holy principle.

We have only to look at history for the proof that Conservatism is inimicable to mankind. All our rights have been wrested—absolutely wrested—from the Conservatives. Remonstrances against taxation, without consent or opportunity of dissent, through representatives, have often been presented to governments, and the Conservative portion of the nation has never willingly listened to any terms or proposed any method of so regulating representation as to give the people a protective right against unjust or oppressive taxation, but have tampered with the representation at all times so as to secure to their own side the majority of actual votes in the senate, however unjust was the proportion of taxation proposed to be thrown upon the people.

R. S. asserts (Sept. 1867, p. 191) that "the Englishman is naturally a Conservative." I place against this assertion the whole history of England to prove that Englishmen are more progressive than any other race, that their struggles have been more frequently renewed, that their sacrifices have been greater, and that the intensity of their desire for freedom has been more marked than any

other race. I call to witness the Magna Charta, the Commonwealth, the Bill of Rights, the Reform Bill, the Chartist Movement, the Corn Law Legislation, the Financial Reform associations throughout the Country, and I think I have replied to R. S. most thoroughly.

R. S. charges the Whigs with being willing "to do anything to obtain power" (p. 194). Does he not see, then, that that implies that the Conservatives will do anything to *retain* power; for if that is not the case they would reduce Whig legislation to a *reductio ad absurdum* by giving the Whig party a chance of working their will to the discomfiture for ever of the principles of liberty they advocate.

A Conservative government, R. S. asserts, is able to furnish better men for the various offices of the State (p. 194). Can anybody sum up the great statesmen of Conservatism! Does not the whole history of society show the men of progress to be the men who have won the earnest admiration of their countrymen in every age and time? Cannot everybody show two men fitted for office in the ranks of the Whigs for one in that of the Tories—a party that requires to undergo a thirty years' education of feats under one man, and that man the Honourable Benjamin Disraeli, cannot surely be quite so prolific in great men as R. S. asserts! Besides, if the Conservatives are so great, so clever, so able—being more powerful than the Whigs (p. 192) too—how is it that the Conservatives have, as we all know, "not been in power above a tenth of the time during which their opponents have revelled in the sweets of office!" (p. 195). Oh, R. S. restrain your illogical spirit a little, and let us see how these things are to be reconciled—that Conservatism being the centre of strength, wields only a tenth part of the power which Whiggery attains and manifests!

The Conservatives, indeed, nominally repealed the Corn Laws, gave Catholic emancipation, and granted a Reform Bill such as it is; but who made these reforms necessary, who imposed the Corn Laws, who restrained and narrowed the representation, who enacted the penal statutes against Catholicism as a safeguard for the retention of the property they had stolen?—the Conservatives. Who taught them the need for the way to manage the repeal of them—the Whigs? Doubtless the Whigs are preferable to the Conservatives, whether *out* or *in*, and they must always win.

T. B. W.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE labour of reply to the articles which have appeared on the negative side of this question is neither difficult nor tedious. Few in number, short in extent, and strikingly similar in character, they will require but brief notice at my hands. Owing, no doubt, to the concurrent carrying on in the pages of this magazine of a debate on a kindred topic—"The Qualifications of Gladstone *versus* Disraeli for Party Leadership"—in which nearly the same ques-

tions were involved, and in which the expression of identical sentiments was certain to be evoked, this debate, unlike that just alluded to, cannot boast of numerous or vigorous combatants, and has in some measure hung fire. Despite the number—three—affixed to the articles in the January and February numbers, the utmost research on my part has only discovered two opponents, and the objections of these I proceed at once to examine:—

“M. T.,” unable to cope with the weight of evidence meeting him at every turn, to show that the Conservatives, as legislators, have accomplished great and lasting results, or to refute it in any way, very quietly turns off its force by remarking that it is a mistake and a fallacy to imagine that success is any measure of power or good intention. A present success, we are told, may in reality be a defeat. Wycliffism, Nonconformity, and Chartism, are adduced as illustrations. Now, in this world we have only one measure of power, and that is success. When the State put down or kept down Lollardism, Nonconformity, and Chartism, it was more powerful than these combinations, and showed it in their suppression; when it tolerated them it showed either its contempt of their power, or, if it made the concession through fear, its own powerlessness. But further, this is a two-edged sword, and involves the wielder of such an argument in rather an uncomfortable dilemma. If present success be in reality a defeat, how do we know but that the present and temporary success of Chartism and Nonconformity is in reality a defeat, and that the triumphant psœan which these are now singing is not the funeral dirge of impending dissolution? But if, as I, and as “M. T.” in part of his article also maintains, success is a measure of power, then the Conservative, which can, as he says, “oppose the legislation of the Whigs successfully, must be the superior government. But, these men do nothing except let things alone.” Granted. The Whigs have a political programme, and to this they steadily adhere. For the sake of argument, granted. Does this prove the Whigs superior to the Tories? Assuredly not. It only proves they are more meddling than their opponents. They are fond of the “meddle and muddle” policy, and they are welcome to all the credit such a course will bring them. But does the acme of statesmanship consist in ceaseless meddlings, continuous innovations, and a perpetual putting to rights? What is thought of a family in which such plans prevail? That there never is any order, decision, or consciousness of what is really needed at all. The same holds good of a state. There is a time for change which time itself will bring, and, therefore, the party which successfully resists the action of those who are unceasingly hankering after some new thing is as decidedly superior to it in statesmanship as it is in power. When a party has a set of fixed principles which it desires to see put into practice we are bound to give it every attention and consideration; but when a body of men want laws altered, just for the love of change, or that they may form a precedent for further innovations,

the nature and extent of which have hereafter to be agreed upon, we do well to beware of such, and to resist them with all our force. And this leads me to remark that the assumption that the Whigs really have a political programme must be accepted with great qualifications. They may have one now, and we may know its complexion, but who can tell what it will be next year, to say nothing of ten or twenty years hence? No one. It will be perpetually changing. Even now the Whigs, as a body, have not a united programme, and they are at sea upon the most important points. Some deem the ballot essential, others are pledged to resist it to the utmost; on reform, education, church matters, the greatest contrariety of opinion prevails.

The church, army and navy, have been as stoutly preserved and as disgracefully jobbed by Whigs as ever they were by Tories, perhaps more so. "M. T." had better, therefore, keep off this ground. Whatever induced "M. T." to quote Lord Cairns' speech to prove the superiority of Whiggism? I must requote part of it, as it shows so clearly the way in which the Whigs misrepresent the Conservative party, and impose upon the credulity of the people. He (Lord Cairns) does not object to the Whigs believing that they have a monopoly of reform bills, but, adds the noble lord, "Accompanying that article of faith is another which I do object to, and that is—that it is the bounden duty and occupation of the Conservative party to be always opposing the reform bills which the Whig party can always bring forward. And there is no doubt that the Whig party think very little indeed of a reform bill, unless it be a reform bill which they are to have the credit of carrying, and in regard to which the Conservative party have performed their duty by opposing it. For otherwise they are unable to represent the country at all in its proper light, and character, and colour." The *Scotsman* is pressed into the service, to show that when the mob was against reform, the Conservatives, finding the path of opposition profitable, opposed it; but we are told nothing about the Conservatives opposing reform when the people's shouts were long and loud for "the bill, the whole bill, and nothing but the bill." Were they less staunch in their opposition then? and is it not a fact known to all that it was only by strategic action, a threatened *coup d'état*, that the bill became law?

I turn for a brief space to the article by "A. T. H." This writer, like "M. T.," dwells almost exclusively upon the question of reforms, as if that were the only one upon which the question could be decided, though I admit it is almost the only one the Whigs have ever attempted to deal with. He also tells us that the Whigs brought in a bill, but that the Conservatives would not come out with their intentions. Has "T. H." forgotten the Conservative reform bills of 1852, 1859, 1867. The old English principle of "scot and lot voting," or voting in virtue of contributing to the burdens of the country introduced into Mr. Disraeli's reform bill is stigmatized as "foreign chicane."

The concluding paragraph of "A. T. H.'s" article is so peculiarly rich and self-confident, that I cannot pass it without notice. Had I heard it uttered at a public meeting I am certain I could not have refrained from crying out, "oh! oh! name, name." The most radical portion of the press is forced to admit the administrative ability of Lord Stanley, Sir Stafford Northcote, Mr. Hardy, &c., and its immense superiority to that shown by Earl Russell, Sir C. Wood, or Mr. Villiers. Yet "A. T. H." writes the following glowing and bombastic sentence:—"With the whole aristocracy to choose their select ones from, the Conservatives cannot match the national names which the Whigs can quote. With blood, birth, culture, prestige heritage, descent, and name, on their side, the rolls of the great Whig ministers are wealthier far in great thinkers, orators, administrators, financiers, officials," &c. I breathe freely once more, pass it by, and, in conclusion, observe that the press of the country is at last awakening to the truth as to the superiority of Conservative to Whig administration. Here is a quotation from one:—

"Mr. Disraeli has made us perceive that it is not the Conservatives who fear their countrymen, or who had any interest to serve in maintaining the representation as settled five-and-thirty years ago. This is refuted by the triumph more absolute and thorough than it ever was the good fortune of any English minister before to win, that notion—to the Liberals very profitable—that the policy of the Conservatives is essentially, in some way or other, bound up with the restored franchise and exclusion of the lower classes."

As the *St. Paul's Magazine*, in its first number, observes, and, as I had already stated in my former article, the foreign policy of the two parties is entirely different. The Whig pretends to non-intervention, yet is ever ready with his so-called moral support to every people rising against their rulers, and struggling, as they think, for unity and liberty. Thus Garibaldi and the Poles were supported morally and pecuniarily. This, I need hardly say, paves the way for civil discord and rebellion. How could the Whigs consistently accuse the French or Americans, for example, of wrongdoing were they to aid Fenianism in this country, when they themselves sowed the seed of which Fenianism is the natural result in aiding Garibaldi in Italy.

The Conservative, on the other hand, seeks to keep the country free from foreign quarrels, and to maintain the authority and respect of the Government both at home and abroad. That the Conservatives have succeeded in this where the Whigs failed is abundantly manifest, and is sufficient of itself to prove the superiority of a Conservative to a Whig ministry.

R. S.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THIS is a question which should be argued on fixed principles; not by quotation of events and proceedings in which principles have had no place. The entire spirit of Conservatism came out in the adage of Lord Castlereagh,—“The people have nothing to do with the laws except to obey them,” while the counter adage of

Whiggism is given in that celebrated aphorism of Thomas Drummond,—“If property has rights it has also got duties.”

Conservatism means the privileges of the higher classes, the dignity of the nobility, the wealth of the Church, pensions and places for the scions of the aristocracy—especially if they are illegitimate, well-paid but ill-officered standing armies, a floating navy getting itself and the nation into a sea of troubles and involving it in oceans of debt, game laws, entails, primogeniture, land-changes made impossible, law expensive, and peerages only for the noble's son, or the soldier, sailor, or colonial governor, heavy taxation, and the leaving of law-making to the knights of the shires and the peers of the realm.

Whiggism means progress led by intelligence; the reign of justice and peace, politics founded on philosophy, not on prescriptive right, the freedom of the press and the enfranchisement of the people, religious toleration, considerate legislation and taxation, as well as the due representation of all who are to be called upon to aid the Government by labour or taxes.

Conservatism has made the wealthiest country in Europe the land of the most widespread poverty. The terrible debt which hangs like a millstone on the neck of Britain, the costly annual expenditure which Conservative extravagance has imposed, make taxation almost co-extensive with every movement of the body and thought of the mind; but these heavy burdens Conservatism scarcely suffers herself to pay a tithe of, while it willingly absorbs all that can be collected from the necessities of the poor and the few luxuries they can get. Whiggism has striven to alter this in every possible way—by advocating and enforcing economy and retrenchment, and above all by insisting that those who have to pay the taxation shall have the control of the policy of the nation. On principle, then, I hold that a Conservative government is inferior to a Whig one; the latter aims at right objects, while the former claims unjust privileges. No wonder, then, R. S. declined to “attempt to give the articles of belief of the two parties” (September 1867, p. 191); he would have lost his plea at once had he done so.

He carries the matter out of the region of mere principle as an insignificant matter into that of experience, practical legislation, personal characteristics, &c., but this only seems to mislead. Let us buckle to our task, R. S. Thou has appealed unto history, unto history we shall go. See here!

The question of education, even yet one on which agitation has been a necessity by the Conservatives, was systematically shirked by the Tory Government. They opposed Brougham's proposal to institute a commission to investigate the abuse of public charities (1819), and his scheme for the instruction of the poor in England and Wales (1820). All the efforts of the friends of the people to secure economy and retrenchment in the army and navy, the Church and the State, met opposition from the Conservative Governments, and Vansittart repelled the financial advocacy of Hume.

Why are the names of Burke, Fox, Horne Tooke, Major Cartwright, Cobbett, Hunt, Hume, Col. Thompson, O'Connell, and O'Connor written in history?—because the Conservative Governments of Britain refused redress to the people and made agitation a necessity. Why are Clarkson, Wilberforce, Sharpe, Stephen, and Z. Macaulay, written with a pencil of light in the annals of philanthropic effort, but because Conservative Governments would take no active part—till they were forced—to mitigate and abolish slavery? It was only after a stormy discussion had ended in a vote of 237 against 193 in favour of the relief of Dissenters that the Conservative ministry, after prayers for delay and modification, consented to stand aside and let the bill pass. Grattan and Plunkett, O'Connell and Sheil, have won fame for compelling the Conservatives to grant, “without benefit of clergy,” Catholic emancipation.

From 1770 to 1830 the Government of Great Britain was almost entirely in the hands of Conservatives. Lord North gave us the American War, with all the disaster, defeat, debt, and woe which the very words recall to men's minds; in just disgust at the humiliation brought upon the worthy successor of the infamous Grafton he was brought to the necessity of resigning. Shelbourne, ominously named Lord William Petty, succeeded him, and fell before a coalition in 1783. Pitt, whom Shelbourne introduced to office, held the helm of State for eighteen years, and during that time prosecuted the free expression of public opinion at home, and endeavoured fruitlessly to arrest the progress of liberal opinion abroad. He opposed the French Revolution, and misspent the blood and treasure of England in a vain attempt to restore the effete royal family of France to their official, but no other dignity. Having brought humiliation upon England by their crusade against French freedom—he shirked the official registration of his own folly by getting up the puppet ministry of Mr. Addington—to make peace with France. After thus showing Napoleon the might of the power he wielded, and suggesting to him the amount of despotism people will bear as a ground for his own aggrandizement, Pitt was obliged to plan the Continental coalition against the French Emperor, but Austerlitz brought defeat to his schemes and death to himself. Then we had the ultra-Conservatism of Percival, Liverpool, Castlereagh, and Eldon, endeavouring to prop up dynasties abroad and to augment the might of tyranny at home, with the episodes of the Peterloo massacre, and of England as the truckling agent of the Holy Alliance, demanding so much humiliation of soul, that Castlereagh fled into the presence of his Maker by his own hand, as a shelter from the need of doing the dirty work of Conservatism. Then we had Wellington and Peel opposing Catholic emancipation, and Canning's modified Conservatism going on without them, till his heart broke with vexation at the sad task of opposing every good measure proposed by the thoughtful, imposed upon him by the Conservatives. Yet after all the twenty-five years

of fighting for absolutism abroad by the Tories at home, and the terrible humiliation it brought with it, so fiercely depicted in the early orations of Lord Brougham, we find that party insisting on a new congress of allied sovereigns, and only prevented from consummating it by the intense opposition it met. The Conservatives supported the slave trade till Wilberforce, Clarkson, Sharpe, and Brougham, made resistance an impossibility. Eldon opposed law reform against Romilly, Mackintosh, Brougham, Denman, &c. In various forms Catholic relief was placed before the Government for approval between 1805 and 1819 fourteen times, and was opposed by the Conservatives. Peel strenuously resisted the motion made by Plunkett in 1821, but was defeated by a majority of six, yet seven years elapsed before that was wrung from the fears of the oppressors which their sense of justice could not prevail on them to grant.

Cartwright, as the modern inaugurator of the advocacy of Parliamentary reform and the institutor of the Society for Political Inquiry, was only the first of a noble band whom Conservatives made the idols of the people, because they foolishly resisted the correction of abuses till force rushed on them and compulsion made it inevitable. In 1816 the Conservatives suspended the *habeas corpus* act, adopted the "six acts," pilloried and deported patriots; but "that old heart in London, from which the veins of sedition in the country were supplied," went on in his career. Cobbett, England's mightiest peasant born, engaged in the contests of the people and the Conservatives, and became great because Conservatism was mean. Sir Francis Burdett held a high place in the keen contests of pre-Reform times. He lived when Lord John Russell began to take up "the cant of reform," and was able to twit him afterwards on the recant of reform; but Sir Francis would have been a political nobody had not Conservatism, by its stupid stubbornness, given him the opportunity. Wellington declared in 1830, and that on behalf of his party, too, that "so long as he held any station in the Government, he should resist to the utmost any such measure" as that which granted Parliamentary reform. Sir R. H. Inglis designated the Reform Bill of 1832 as "revolution not reformation"—indeed revolutionists and traitors were but the least offensive names given by the Conservatives to the Whigs who carried Reform. But Wellington and his party were taught then that lesson which they have been so slow to learn and so dull in remembering, that

"Cannon balls may aid the truth,
But *Thought's* a weapon stronger."

This is what history says in regard to the affirmation made by R. S. (p. 191), that Conservatism, holding the reins of government, is superior to a Whig ministry, because it is more in accordance with the spirit of the nation! Why, the nation had been in arms against Conservative governments for nearly sixty-five years prior

to the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, and has been the same ever since whenever a Conservative ministry gets in. "The ministry which best upholds the honour of the nation" is that which is best, says R. S.; and he asserts further that "this is the distinguishing character of a Conservative government" (p. 193). The loss of America, the woes of the Continental wars against freedom, the mismanagement of the Crimean expedition reply, in tones louder than thunder, a negative to that assertion. "The Whigs have failed in almost all the great enterprises on which their hearts have been set" (p. 197). Slave trade abolished, Catholic emancipation gained, parliamentary reform gained and regained, national education in Ireland, corn laws repealed, courts of justice purified, colonial government remodelled, India pacified, and some economy and retrenchment, with endurable budgets, form the "confirmation," scarcely *apropos*, which history yields.

Take the question of the repeal of the corn laws, for which R. S. asserts we are indebted to a Conservative government (September, 1867, p. 196). Surely R. S. knows what equivocation is? Are we truly *indebted* to those who unwillingly, under vast pressure, grudgingly, and at the cost of an immense disruption of the good feeling of the country, consented to resign the unjust bounties to the Conservative interests, wrung from the taxes imposed on the food of the people by the Conservative influence in 1804, 1814, and 1828? But the matter may bear a little further consideration, which we may induce the reader to give, if we ask him—as well as R. S.—if that great organization for educating the people of Britain in the political economy of food and famine, with which the name and fame of Mr. Cobden are identified—the Anti-Corn-Law-League—would consent to it as a veritable historical fact that we are *indebted* to a Conservative government for a repeal of the corn laws?

On the 29th March, 1839, the Anti-Corn-Law-League was formally instituted at Manchester. In 1843 Sir Robert Peel proposed to modify the sliding scale, in the hope of calming the agitation aroused by it. Instead of accomplishing this great hope of his, the attempt only caused Messrs. Cobden, Bright, and other leaders of the Anti-Corn-Law-League to redouble their efforts, and by reiteration of the truths of political economy upon which their agitation was based excited men to an earnest and vigorous effort to gain the repeal of these obnoxious statutes.

To oppose this, and put down the irritation by a counter-irritant, the Conservatives determined upon a retaliatory crusade, and in February, 1844, they instituted "The Agricultural Protection Society of Great Britain," in the hope that by the expenditure of money they might be able to maintain these land-protecting taxes on food. But hence arose a splendid proof of the practical benefits of controversy. The counter-agitation excited discussion; discussion led to inquiry, and the people were induced to work out the question for themselves, which they did in a manner quite unlooked

for by the aristocratic opposers of the League. The League saw that this discussion was a step in the right direction, and they resolved to carry on their educatory movement, when suddenly the Conservatives became aware that however controversy may advantage truth its awakening power defeats error, and Sir Robert Peel, avowing himself at last a convert to free trade, carried a measure to put an end to the corn laws. But was this anything to be *indebted* for to the Conservative government? It was extorted from them by their fears, and it was relinquished with a grudge. The threat of the League to raise a quarter of a million in six months, as a testimony of the earnestness of the people, convinced them of the policy of yielding, but did not convert them to a juster state of mind.

Similarly we might go through the whole mass of what R. S. calls our indebtedness, and show that the Conservative governments of the country had never given any boon to the people unasked, unforced; but that they have uniformly been so stupidly blundering that they could not even grant the concessions they felt compelled to make, with grace and readiness. Besides, we might show that all these acts of legislation on which R. S. lays so much stress, were borrowings from the Whigs. It is well known that initiative legislation is a thing unthought of by Conservative statesmen. The only instance of a really beneficial measure introduced by that party and carried by them—the Ten Hours' Bill—was in reality the suggestion of Liberals, and was adopted by the Conservatives in revenge for the agitation got up by the League, was indeed a retaliatory slap at the commercial interest for venturing to interfere with the vested interests of the Conservative proprietary of this country. The Bankruptcy Bill was passed by the Conservatives with like intentions to avenge themselves on the active-minded financial reformers who had driven them into straits, and was made use of by that party to secure the privileges of commercial men whose incomes are precarious, to themselves who make their incomes precarious and inefficient only by their gambling and extravagance. So trite is this Conservative game that the best men in the Government are determined to oppose its further progress, and are resolved no longer to allow the shameless appropriation by the Conservatives of the laurels which the Liberals have been at the pains of planting and watering. In Earl Russell's Letter to the Right Honourable Chichester Fortescue on the State of Ireland the following illustrative passage occurs of the superiority of Conservative over Whig government:—

“Let me take an illustration. When our troops landed in Abyssinia, it was found that the mountain paths were so obstructed by rocks, and were so narrow, that the horses, mules, and animals of inferior dignity could not pass along them. Engineers and pioneers were sent forward, and smooth wide roads were made, along which all the animals can pass. We Liberals are these engineers and pioneers. And as the horses, and mules, and animals of inferior dignity, when they reached the green pastures and clear streams, were heard to neigh and bray with delight, so the party for whom we have

smoothed the rocks and opened the road to the pastures and the streams, were heard to huzza, to cheer, and to yell at the Bristol banquet. There is one difference. Sir Robert Napier has, in handsome terms, thanked the engineers for opening the roads for his beasts of burthen; whereas those for whom we cleared away the obstacles find a pleasure in heaping abuse and foul language upon Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Bright, and the rest of the Liberals who have been the pioneers of Reform. So that when Mr. Hardy goes to seek for re-election at Oxford, he may boast of having swept away the Irish clergy, and gain great applause by the abuse he will not fail to cast upon you and me as aiming at no less than the ruin of the church, and a change in the home office."*

If our readers will weigh the question as one of principles—of principles illustrated by history, they would see that it is only by the utmost sophistication that R. S. can call upon them to believe that Conservatism is superior to Whiggism.

The advocacy of D. B. E. is very weak, and when he says (p. 46) "the Whig Moloch is expediency," he states what is precisely the opposite of the fact. Conservatism is government by principles—of selfishness and aristocratic aggrandizement, and they yield only when expediency proves to them that it is more advisable to give a little than that all should be lost. Whiggism has always based its legislation on principles favourable to popular freedom; but that they have had to be content with taking what they could get rather than want all, was the result of Conservative action not of Whig expediency. We are sure that this debate has proved that a Conservative government is not superior to a Whig one. M. T.

* "Sir Robert Peel, officially speaking, passed the Roman Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, which he and his party had always opposed; but the name to which the Roman Catholics have always given gratitude for that work, has been not Peel's but O'Connell's, and Peel's party, though it did not quite rend asunder, decayed from that hour. Sir Robert Peel, again in the official sense, though with different immediate results as to party, also repealed the Corn-Laws, which he and his party had previously maintained; but, though at the end of the work he put up two prayers—one that the name of Richard Cobden might be connected with the event, the other that his own name might be remembered with good-will among those who earn their daily bread by the sweat of their brow—only one of the two prayers can be said to have been fully effectual, and not Peel but Cobden is the name which rises to the popular lips when allusion is made to that great service to the State. So far as Peel's name is more connected with Corn-Law repeal than with Catholic Emancipation, it is owing to Peel having in regard to the Corn-Laws, changed his policy not only upon motives undoubtedly patriotic, but with the result of great damage to his party, and final deposition for himself. In the case of Parliamentary Reform the change was made in hope of party gain, and not in hope but in fear of any other or better result. The Conservatives, or their leaders, or their, one leader and educator, having long found themselves placed at a disadvantage by their opposition to the great and greatly successful Reform Bill of 1832, resolved to "take the wind out of the sails" of their rivals—less metaphorically, to adopt their opponent's principles and policy, and apostatize, or rather affect to apostatize, from their own."—*Scotsman*.

Religion.

CAN INDEPENDENCY AND ORTHODOXY CO-EXIST?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

INDEPENDENCY is the system of church government which is maintained by Independents or Congregationalists. It is the doctrine that each separate church or congregation is independent of all other (*i. e.*, external) authority and control, and fully competent to choose its own ministers and other officers, and to regulate all its own affairs in accordance with the Scriptures.

Orthodoxy is soundness of doctrine. The question for discussion is the compatibility with each other of these two things—independency and orthodoxy. But here another question presents itself. In the present discussion, what doctrines are to be regarded as orthodox? By all who believe the Divine inspiration of the Bible, that book is received as the standard of religious truth, the test of orthodoxy, I believe. But whose views of the doctrines of the Bible are to be regarded as orthodox views? It is a fact patent to all, that persons of the most diverse sentiments believe their own opinions to be the doctrines of the Bible. Trinitarians and Unitarians, Calvinists and Arminians, each and all believe their doctrines to be correctly drawn from the sacred Scriptures. It appears to us, therefore, that the signification of the question propounded for debate cannot be, Can independency co-exist with the doctrines of the Bible? for who is to decide what the doctrines of the Bible are? But we understand the signification of the question to be, Whatever may be regarded as orthodoxy, is the nature of independency such as to render it incompatible therewith? In other words, is the nature of independency such as necessarily to render it liable to departures from any standard of orthodoxy, to prevent its co-existence therewith, and of itself to lead to uncertainty, fluctuation, and variability of doctrine? To this view of the question we shall first apply ourselves. The absence in independent churches of what are often looked upon as securities for orthodoxy does not necessarily make independency, any more than any other form of church government, incompatible with orthodox doctrines. What are viewed as securities for orthodoxy in the Church of England are chiefly these things: the possession of a fixed, immutable standard of faith, to which all the clergy are compelled to subscribe; the placing of pastors over the people without reference to the wishes of the people; the clergy's independence of their congregations for temporal support; the power

of deprivation possessed by the rulers of the Church. That the absence of these things from independency does not make independency more than episcopalianism incompatible with orthodoxy, is evident from the great amount of what is called heterodoxy (*i. e.*, alleged departures from the Church standards) which occurs where they exist. Where can we find greater latitude of sentiment than in that very Church of England which requires a uniformity of belief in all her clergy? There we have High, Low, and Broad Church, and the differences of opinion and practice between these are too great for them all to be in the same sense orthodox. There we have Trinitarians, Unitarians, Arminians, Moderate Calvinists, and High Calvinists, and these differ so widely from each other, that it is impossible to regard the doctrines of all of them as in any one sense orthodoxy. As, therefore, the possession of fixed articles of faith does so little towards preserving orthodoxy, how can it be alleged that independency is necessarily more liable to departures from orthodox doctrines than is episcopalianism?

The dependence of congregational ministers on their congregations for election to the pastoral office, and for temporal support, does not make independency inconsistent with orthodoxy. An honest man will not preach contrary to his belief, nor will he conceal what he believes, because he receives his call to the pastoral office, and his support from those to whom he preaches; while a dishonest man, who has chiefly in view a living and emoluments, will, for the sake of such things, preach contrary to the faith to which he has subscribed, though he be hedged round with ever so great a multitude of fences—through them all he will break. It is well known that a great number of the clergy of the Church of England do not preach, with assent and consent, those articles of faith in which they have declared their belief, and consequently, judged by the standards of their own Church, they are to be regarded as heterodox. It is, likewise, well known that the clergy avowedly sign those articles in various senses, and with certain mental reservations. Whatever doctrines may be maintained to be orthodox by any of our opponents in this debate, they cannot affirm that the independence of the episcopalian clergy of their congregations secures orthodoxy, seeing that there are in the pale of the Established Church such contrary doctrines preached. And as to the power of deprivation possessed by the rulers of the Church of England, the cases of Gorham, the Essayists and Reviewers, Colenso, and others, have shown how impotent are the episcopal and archiepiscopal governors of the English Church, to eject from her communion even such as have been guilty of the most glaring departures from the letter and spirit of the faith subscribed by them. It is impossible for congregationalism, or any any other ism, to be more powerless for the maintenance of orthodoxy than episcopalianism has, in recent times, manifested itself to be in all her recent appearances, either in civil or ecclesiastical courts.

Having viewed the question under debate in the sense which we believe it is intended to bear, and having shown that all the safeguards with which the Church of England is fenced do not preserve her any more free from heterodoxy than independency does the communities which observe that form of church government, let us now take another view of orthodoxy, and in this view, too, we shall see that independency can co-exist with it.

We have shown that independency is not more than episcopalianism necessarily incompatible with orthodoxy; that it is impossible for it to open a wider door to latitudinarianism and diversity of doctrine than the Church of England affords scope for, let us now view orthodoxy as it is set forth in the standards of the two Churches established in Great Britain—the Episcopalian Church of England and Ireland, and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. These standards are confessed to be orthodox by a large portion of the people of Great Britain. The doctrines of these standards are in substance the same. They have the age of centuries upon them, and must be confessed to be the doctrines maintained by Calvin, Luther, and other eminent Reformers, both in England and on the Continent, who were the instruments of effecting that deliverance of the countries in which they lived from the blighting influences of Roman Catholicism, the glorious results of which are felt to this day. Under such auspices these doctrines must be admitted to have some fair pretensions to orthodoxy. Where then are the doctrines of these standards more fully, more clearly, more decisively preached at the present time than elsewhere? We hesitate not to affirm that these doctrines are preached with fulness, clearness, and decision in a far greater number of congregations maintaining the independent system of church government, than of congregations under any other form of church polity whatever. The clergy and members of the churches of whose standards we now write, maintain the orthodoxy of their articles of faith, but the clergy have extensively departed therefrom in their preaching, and the doctrines which they have subscribed as true have been preserved and advocated chiefly by Congregational Churches. Thus according to both the Episcopalian and Presbyterian standard of what is orthodox, independency *can* co-exist with orthodoxy, because it has done so, and does still do so.

We have a yet more powerful argument to adduce in proof of the affirmation that independency and orthodoxy can co-exist, Independency being the system of church government which was established and carried out by the apostles, it necessarily follows that it can co-exist with orthodoxy. The Greek word *ecclesia* signifies either the whole body of Christians, or a particular congregation or society of Christians, and the word church, in our English New Testament, invariably means one of these two things. For the establishment of this point we will adduce higher authority than our own. Speaking of this term, Dr. Campbell, in his *Lectures on Ecclesiastical History*, says, "In any intermediate

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sense between a single congregation and the whole community of Christians, not one instance can be brought of the application in sacred writ. We speak now, indeed, and this has been the manner for ages of the Gallican Church, the Greek Church, the Church of England, the Church of Scotland, as of societies independent and complete in themselves. Such a phraseology was never adopted in the days of the apostles. They did not say the Church of Asia, or the Church of Macedonia, or the Church of Achaia; but the Churches of God in Asia, the Churches in Macedonia, the Churches in Achaia. The plural number is invariably used, when more congregations than one are spoken of, unless the subject be of the whole commonwealth of Christ. Nor is this the manner of the penmen of sacred writ only. It is the constant usage of the term, in the writings of ecclesiastical authors for the two first centuries." That a single congregation of believers forms in a scriptural sense a church is admitted by the Church of England, in her Article No. XIX., which is as follows: "The visible Church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men, in the which the pure word of God is preached, and the sacraments be duly administered according to Christ's ordinance in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same." As then independency was the system of apostolic Church government, it evidently can co-exist with orthodoxy.

S. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

NAMES are continually changing, though the things of which they are representatives remain the same; individual words also are capable of several significations, and hence arises frequently long arguments and bitter contention between those who in truth are of the same opinion, though they have different modes of expressing it. Hence too an argument is often raised upon a wrong foundation, and the writer finds too late that he has been combating giants which have no real existence. I am led to these remarks by one of the words used in stating this question, viz., independency. My first impression was that it referred to independency of thought, or, as it is sometimes called, freethinking; but on second thoughts, and after communication with the conductors of this serial, I am inclined to set it down as synonymous with congregationalism, and I shall consequently discuss the question with more particular reference to this title, which had much better, we think, have been used; but lest I may perchance be pursuing a wrong tack, or may not seem to bestow upon the question that attention and thorough examination which it deserves, I shall turn aside for a very brief space to show that independency of thought, or free thought, and orthodoxy cannot co-exist.

And here on the very threshold I have to examine and define other terms, orthodoxy and co-existence. For the first—many freethinkers among them have wittily but irreverently declared that orthodoxy means *our doxy* or opinion; in other words, that as

each religious sect claims to be orthodox, and all clearly cannot be so, therefore there is no such thing as orthodoxy or correct opinion at all. These follow, or profess to follow, the *dictum* of the poet,—

“Let zealots rage and bigots fight,
He can't be wrong whose life is in the right;”

—though how a man's life and actions can be in the right when he holds erroneous opinions, and is guided by wrong principles, it is somewhat difficult to conceive. The question is—is there a body of belief or doctrine clear and dogmatic in its character laid down in Holy Scripture, or is there not? I believe, and have on former occasions (see debate on “Belief in Miracles and Personal Christianity,” vol. xxi., and on “Standards of Faith,” xxv.) endeavoured to show, that there is such a collection of matters of doctrine and discipline, and there is, therefore, the less need to enter on it here, especially as I think it will be evident to any candid inquirer that there are several important and fundamental doctrines clearly enunciated; and we find that the various Christian sects endeavour each to show that their doctrines and method of discipline are those most in accordance with Holy Scripture and primitive custom; and it will consequently be evident that free thought cannot be consistent or co-existent with any body of clear, well-defined, dogmatic belief. The two are totally opposed. Wide as the Poles asunder; they have no more agreement than light and darkness. But secondly, can Congregationalism co-exist with orthodoxy. That is, as I take it,—Are the Congregationalists orthodox? Have they most certain warrant of Scripture, the only test of orthodoxy, for any or all of their doctrines or peculiar tenets?

Who are the Independents, and what are their peculiar doctrines? They were the original of the Puritans, and took their rise, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, from those exiles returning imbued with the Genevan practices and doctrines, who, feeling themselves aggrieved at the apparently small progress made in the way of reformation by the Church of England, and by the use of the vestments, the Book of Common Prayer, the sign of the cross in baptism, &c., called for a purer form of worship. Agreeing in nothing but in antipathy to the Church, without any settled doctrines, they soon became divided into numerous sects, of which the Brownists—so named from Robert Brown—was the most famous; he, in fact, was the first Independent, and maintained that every congregation was to all intents and purposes a church, and ought to enjoy all the privileges of an ecclesiastical community, and be entirely exempt from episcopal or other jurisdiction. Each congregation was competent to decide by a majority of voices what should be its doctrines; and the minister was no more than another man, receiving nothing by ordination, so that any of the members who thought fit to instruct the brethren was indulged in the liberty of prophesying or preaching. Their church officers, both for preaching the word and taking care of the poor, were chosen from

among themselves; and as the vote of the brotherhood made a man a minister, with authority to preach and administer the sacraments among them, so the same power could discharge him from his office and reduce him to a mere layman again. As each congregation was independent in itself, so its authority was circumscribed by itself. When persecution overtook this sect, they fled into the Netherlands, and on their founder abandoning them, split into various factions. The more moderate of these were united into one by John Robinson, one of their pastors, and as he, too, insisted upon the independency of each church, they took the name of Independents. With the loss of the old name they lost much of their fanaticism and hatred against the Church; and though they considered their own form of ecclesiastical government as of divine institution, and as originally introduced by the apostles themselves, or with their authority, yet had candour and charity enough to acknowledge that true religion and solid piety might flourish in communities under the jurisdiction of bishops or the government of synods and presbyteries. They were also much more attentive than were the Brownists in keeping on foot a regular ministry in their communities, having a certain number of ministers chosen respectively by the congregation, where they are fixed; nor was any person among them permitted to speak in public before he submitted to a proper examination of his capacity and talents, and had been approved of by the heads of the congregation. The title was first publicly assumed in 1644; but afterwards, to avoid the odium of sedition and anarchy charged on the sect, the genuine Independents again changed their name to "Congregational Brethren," and their religious assemblies to "Congregational Churches." They attained great power and influence during the Protectorate, but gradually declined after the Restoration. No sect, perhaps, has been more heavily or unjustly accused, arising chiefly from their being confounded with the Brownists, &c.

Their tenets are—

1. No creed or confession of faith drawn up by fallible men, however *holy*, ought to be imposed upon any congregation. They who do so reject Christ as their master, and set at nought his gospel. The Spirit of God had already done this; and the doctrines stand proved both as to matter and words in the scripture. It is sufficient for a church and its ministers if they acknowledge the Scriptures to be the Word of God, the perfect and only rule of faith and practice.

2. That though the ministry was instituted by Jesus Christ for the gathering, edifying, and government of the Church, yet there is no virtue whatever in the rite of ordination; and the qualifications necessary to constitute a pastor are,—“A firm belief in the gospel, a principle of sincere and unaffected piety, a competent stock of knowledge, a capacity for leading devotion and communicating instruction, a serious inclination to engage in the important work of promoting the everlasting salvation of mankind, and ordinarily

an invitation to the pastoral office from some particular society of Christians.

3. That every congregation is as I have already stated, a church, and quite independent of any jurisdiction extraneous to itself; empowered to choose, retain, and discharge its own pastors, and having full authority in all matters of doctrine and discipline. There is no subordination between particular churches, they are all equal and consequently independent; but the pastors of these churches "ought to have frequent meetings, that by mutual advice, support, encouragement, and brotherly intercourse, they may strengthen the hands and hearts of each other in the ways of the Lord. It is also needful in weighty and difficult cases, that the ministers of several churches meet together in order to be consulted and advised with about such matters, and that particular churches ought to have a reverential regard to their judgment so given, and not dissent therefrom without apparent grounds from the Word of God." Their authority of course would only be that of moral force or persuasion.

4. That the office of deacon is of Divine appointment, and that it belongs to his office to receive, lay out, and distribute the stock of the church to its proper uses.

This is as fair and full an account of the tenets of the Independents as I have been able to obtain, but I am quite open to correction in any particular. Supposing, however, these stated correctly, the question is, can they co-exist with orthodoxy? that is, as I understand it, are they consonant with the plain teaching of the Word of God, which, as the Independents themselves admit, is the only standard of faith and practice, the only test of orthodoxy.

1. As regards creeds. Scripture doctrines they think should be expressed in Scripture language, and all summaries of it are reprehensible. Now though this is apparently a minor point, since the Independent must have some set of doctrines which he truly believes, and to which the members of each church give their assent, though this may not be expressed in a set form of words, else if there be not some recognised confession, how do congregations censure and reject ministers and members as they do,—yet I think I shall be able to show that forms of faith, or in other words creeds, are specially mentioned in Scripture as in use in the apostolic age, as they certainly were in that immediately succeeding them.

Timothy is exhorted by St. Paul to "have or hold fast the form or type (*ὑποτύπωσιν*) of sound words which thou heardest of me in the faith and love which is in Jesus Christ." That the apostles had a distinct body of doctrine which they taught and delivered to the churches founded by them, is I think evident, and will certainly be admitted by the Independents. But the passage quoted (2 Tim. i. 13) proves not only this, and that there was a distinct form embodying such teaching, but by the use of the word *ὑποτύπωσιν* shows that this creed was a model or type from which others were

to be struck or copied. In Rom. vi. 17 the apostle thanks God that his converts who were once the slaves of sin, now obeyed from the heart that form or type of doctrine in which they were instructed, and in 1 Tim. vi. 3, "A man that does not consent to the words of the Lord Jesus Christ, and to that doctrine which is according to godliness, is a fool."

Christians are exhorted to contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints. Thus it appears that the church as existing under the apostles, had a creed, that it had one under their successors can be easily shown, and that therefore the possessor of a creed, which to me seems an essential of one body of believers, is most in accordance with Scripture authority, apostolical practice, and primitive usage. I fail to appreciate the force of the objection to that which is drawn up by man, because even the belief of the Independents allowing each congregation or even individual to judge for itself or himself what shall be matters of faith, and what not, is no less so, and the only essential in each case is that the creed "may be proved by most certain warrant of Holy Scripture." If all Scripture doctrine must, as they phrase it, be expressed in Scripture language, is not the exposition of scripture in the language of the minister which the Independents sanction wrong? and is not preaching wrong? The truth is, the Bible, though the rule, and sufficient rule, of faith, must be supplemented as to its interpretation by the knowledge we have of the opinions of the Fathers and of primitive custom. And such has been the rule with most churches.

2. *As to ordination.*—It cannot be disputed that the heads of churches or overseers of flocks mentioned in the New Testament were appointed and ordained by the apostles themselves, or those intended to be their successors, and so received something more than a mere call to preach to a particular church. Titus was commanded to ordain elders in every city (i. 5); and Timothy is cautioned to "lay hands (1 Ep. v. 22) suddenly on no man." The deacons (Acts vi. 6), though chosen by the believers were yet ordained to their office by the imposition of the hands of the apostles. Even the apostles did not attempt to preach till solemnly commissioned by their Master (Mark iii. 13; and vi. 15); and this ordination to preach was distinct from the call to the discipleship recorded Matt. iii. Timothy was ordained by St. Paul with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery. Even Paul and Barnabas were ordained for their special work (Acts xiii.); and in the early days of the Church the candidate, though chosen by the laity and presbyters, was ordained by the bishop or bishop and presbyters, always something more than a mere invitation to minister to a particular congregation.

That some power or gift was received by the ordained appears certain from a consideration of the case of Timothy, who is exhorted by St. Paul (1 Tim. iv. 14) not to neglect the gift that is in him by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery; and

(2 Ep. i. 6) "therefore, I put thee in remembrance that thou stir up the gift of God which is in thee by "the putting on of my hands," &c. The whole of the apostles just previous to the ascension were again specially set apart for their work, by their Divine Master (John xx. 21), "As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you. . . . He breathed on them, and said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained."

3. *That every congregation is a church independent of any extraneous jurisdiction.* This the independents endeavour to prove by asserting that the word *ἐκκλησία*, rendered church, is always used to signify a *single congregation*, or the place where the congregation meet. Many texts are quoted to support the argument which I leave my opponents to produce; but in reply I may observe that this use of the word, though very general, is not universal. Thus the first epistle to the Corinthians is addressed to the Church of God which is at Corinth, whereas the Independents, assuming that there was only one congregation at Corinth, conclude that this congregation, and therefore every other single congregation, is a church. But we have no right to assume that there was only one congregation at Corinth. The contrary seems the fact, for St. Paul, in the same epistle, commands that *your women* keep silence in the *churches* (xiv. 34); it is a shame for women to speak in the church (35), so that the church of ver. 35 plainly includes the churches of ver. 34; and the churches are synonymous and co-extensive with the church of God which is at Corinth of chap. i. But leaving this, which is merely a quibble on a word, not worth half the strife it has occasioned; it is evident that however the word *ἐκκλησία* be translated, the churches or congregations were not independent in government. The church at Jerusalem was the foundation of Christianity, it was in existence at the time of the first general council (Acts xv. 4). There were also (ix. 31) churches in Judea, Galilee, and Samaria, and (xiii. 1) at Antioch, flourishing at the same time, yet we find on the first critical question arising, the churches did not determine it for themselves, but sent to Jerusalem. And the council at Jerusalem, consisting of the apostles, elders, and the whole church, decided the question, making Paul and Barnabas the special messengers of their decree; and not only was the church at Antioch to be bound by the decree, but we read, chap. xvi. 4, Paul and Silas travelling through the cities of Asia Minor delivered them the decrees for to keep, that were ordained of the apostles and elders which were at Jerusalem. And so were the churches established in the faith and increased in number daily. This is one of the clearest instances of extraneous jurisdiction over churches on record. That churches likewise did not choose their own ministers is evident from Titus, in the passage before quoted, being commanded to ordain elders in every city and to set in order the things wanting in Crete, which must have comprised several congregations. Again, Paul sending for the elders of the Ephesian church to meet him

at Miletus (Acts xx. 17), shows not only that they were under his jurisdiction, but that the flock or charge over which they were "overseers," and of which they were to take care, must have consisted of several congregations, or they would not have been so many, as the context leads us to suppose they were; at any rate more than two, and this would not have been needed for one congregation, so that one flock or church may consist of several congregations. Timothy also, as I have stated, though not an apostle, was like Titus invested with supreme power, while St. Paul himself had coming upon him daily "the care of all the churches." The proviso that ministers should meet for counsel and encouragement, and different congregations unite to decide on weighty matters, is all very well in its way, but is destructive of the principles of Independency; for it is plain this decision can have no legislative force—it may influence opinion, if it had there would be an end of Independency alone.

No doubt it is essential to the proper fulfilment of the ministerial office that the overseer of a flock should have a firm belief in the gospel; though without some recognised interpretation of the gospel, or some summary of its distinctive truths, it is difficult to conceive how there can be any test of orthodoxy, or rather to say, how far and in what particulars there is a departure from the truth; but that there have been distinct orders of pastors in the Church is evident, not only from the facts already stated, but from the summary given by St. Paul (Eph. iv. 11). He (Christ) gave some apostles, some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ. It is also requisite that He should be unblameable before men, but though sometimes "the evil have chief authority in the ministration of the Word and sacraments, yet forasmuch as they do the same not in their own name but in Christ's, we may use their ministry both in hearing the Word of God and in receiving of the Sacraments; neither is the effect of Christ's ordinance taken away by their wickedness. The mere call of a congregation, too, is not sufficient, according to the doctrine of Scripture, to constitute a right to the pastorate. In fact, this is sometimes a disqualification. St. Paul (2 Tim. ii. 3) warns Timothy that "the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine, but will heap to themselves teachers (preaching) according to their own lusts."

In concluding this part I may note, that from 2 Tim. ii. 2, it is plain, that not only were ministers to be ordained, but that provision was made for a constant succession of them. "The things which thou hast heard of me by many witnesses, the same commit thou to faithful men, who shall be able to teach others also."

4. *Concerning the office of deacon.*—This we are told was of divine institution. Grant it; it certainly was of apostolic. But, then, the deacon's office in the Christian Church was, as is evident from the Acts of the Apostles and epistles, to say nothing of the

testimony of the early Christian fathers, much more enlarged than the Independents allow or permit at the present time. His office was, no doubt, at first what the Independents say it should be now, "To receive, lay out, and distribute the stock of the Church to its proper uses." For this end (Acts vi. 3) I freely grant they were originally appointed, but this was soon merged certainly in the case of Stephen and Philip with preaching, or the ministry of the Word, to which it seems (vi. 4) the apostles more especially gave themselves. "Stephen, full of faith and power, did great wonders and miracles among the people," things quite inconsistent with the notion of a deacon in a congregational church. Philip (plainly from viii. 14), one of the seven, preached in "Samaria, and converted many of the inhabitants, and baptized them and the Ethiopian eunuch" (ver. 37), functions also not permitted to deacons by Independents. And this same Philip, in Acts xxi. 9, "which was one of the seven," is emphatically styled, not the deacon, but the evangelist or preacher. Of the other deacons we know little or nothing. Nicolas appears to have become a preacher, and (Rev. ii. 6—15) to have founded the sect of Nicolaitanes. But it is further manifest, from St. Paul's detailed account of the qualifications requisite in a deacon, that the office was then an established one in the Christian Church, as few, if any of the seven originally appointed were alive then, and only on the supposition that there would be future candidates for the office was the distinction needed. So that, on this whole section, my conclusion is not that there were not officers among the early Christians holding an office similar to that which the Independents claim for their deacons, or that such an office is unnecessary at the present day. It is I think doubly so, but that the functions of the seven deacons to whom the Independents look to for their warrant, was soon enlarged, and the office of deacon, for which there was a continued succession of candidates, even when the purpose for which they were originally appointed was accomplished, and so when we should expect to find it cease, was made a distinct order in the Church corresponding very closely with the same order in the Church of England. The sum is this—there is an orthodoxy of church government discipline or doctrine to be found in the New Testament or there is not. If not, the discussion is out of place. Any *δοξή* is orthodoxy; but if, as I and the Independent^s believe, there is such a sound rule, then it must be left to each individual reader to compare the tenets of Independentism, and what I have set forth as being the Bible rule on the subject, or what he himself thinks to be so, and so decide the question for himself. To that ordeal I leave the subject, firmly believing myself, whatever others may do, that Independency cannot co-exist with orthodoxy.

R. S.

IS RITUALISM CONSISTENT WITH, OR UNNECESSARY TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF TRUE CHRISTIANITY?

CONSISTENT.—III.

ST. PAUL, in his earnest discourse to the church of believers at Corinth, supplies two supreme laws for the regulation of public worship, the first relating to the *matter* of it is, "Let all things be done unto edifying" (1 Cor. xiv. 26), in order that men should be rooted and built up in Christ, and be established in the faith as they have been taught, abounding therein with thanksgiving as he explains it to the Church at Colosse, and as Jude also enforces in these words, "Building up yourselves on your most holy faith, praying in the Holy Ghost, keep yourselves in the love of God, looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life" (20). To this ought all the instructions communicated in the sanctuary tend, viz., "godly edifying, which is in faith" (1 Tim. i. 4), in order that all the worshippers "holding faith and a good conscience" may be made "wise unto salvation, and be thoroughly furnished unto all good works." Hence the reading and the preaching of the Word are employed in public worship as "effectual means of convincing and converting sinners, and of building them up in holiness and comfort through faith unto salvation," to use the wise words of the "Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism," with the object, as our prayer-book hath it, "that the hearers thereof might continually profit more and more in the knowledge of God, and be the more enflamed with the love of His true religion." This is the dominant law of public worship as to the matter of it, that men may be so edified that they may worship God who is a Spirit in spirit and in truth. "Let all things be done unto edifying," therefore, is a reasonable law in the Church of the Lord Jesus.

Then as to the manner of it, the supreme law is this—"Let all things be done decently and in order" (1 Cor. xiv. 40), as it is given in the authorised version, or as it is given in the prayer-book, "Let all things be done among you in a seemly and decent order," that is, as we apprehend it, "according to all the rites of it, and according to all the ceremonies thereof" (Num. ix. 3). This supreme law, it is plain, requires the use and employment of "forms of worship," in so far as of such a kind as may "most tend," as the preface of the prayer-book hath it, "to the preservation of peace and unity in the Church; the procuring of reverence, and exciting of piety and devotion in the public worship of God." Christ's gospel is indeed "a religion to serve God, not in bondage of the figure or shadow, but in the freedom of the Spirit; being content only with those ceremonies which do serve to a decent order and godly discipline; and such as be apt to stir up the dull mind of man to the remembrance of his duty to God by some notable and special signification

whereby he *might be edified*." This is the Christian and apostolic justification which Ritualism presents for itself in opposition to the appeal made in favour of anti-Ritualism made by "S. S." (p. 20) to "the practice of Christ and His apostles." Our Church contends that Ritualism is necessary to fervent, devotional, orderly worship, and affirms that "there is no remedy but that of necessity—there must be some rules" for the proper conducting of divine service, and that "the same was not ordained but of good purpose, and for a great advancement in godliness," and hence that Ritualism is necessary to the progress of Christianity and consistent with it.

But our church does not hold that any uniform stereotyped set of rigidly imposed ritual is essential to Christianity. It is content that they be "of godly intent and purpose devised;" and the Church expressly declares "we think it convenient that every country shall use such ceremonies as they shall think best to the setting forth of God's honour and glory, and to the reducing of the people to a most perfect and godly living without error or superstition." S. S., in opposition to this maintains, that "Ritualism is unnecessary to the advancement of true Christianity" (p. 20), but he has entirely failed to show how decent and orderly worship is possible without any public or common order in Christ's Church. "God is not the author of confusion, but of peace" (1 Cor. xiv. 18), but if there is to be no common order, form of divine service, or ritual, and every man is to be left to do as he pleases and what he pleases in places of public worship, what can arise but confusion and unquietness? Some ritual therefore is necessary, and if some, surely it should be of such a nature as may be "most easy and plain for the understanding, both of the readers and hearers," and that, in fact, "they pertain to edification, whereunto all things done in the Church (as the apostle teacheth) ought to be referred" Indeed, it is one of the chief arguments for the divinity of the religion of Christ, that He has not fixed a ceremonial binding upon all disciples, but has left them free to adopt such ritual as may seem to the Church most agreeable to the glory of God and the edification of man,—the glorious liberty of the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ.

But this liberty is not to be made a cloak for license, disorder, or neglect of proper forms of addressing the almighty God in prayer and praise; neither is it to be made the occasion of tyranny against others, for we are bound by the holiest law of God to "do unto others as we would have others do unto us." If, therefore, S. S. seeks freedom of ritual for himself—freedom *from* ritual I presume he does not really seek or take,—he ought to allow others the like freedom whereunto he is himself prone. Well, this is the charitable and scriptural view of Ritualism which, since the Reformation, the Church has taken. In proof of this, S. S. has only to read the introductory words of the preface to the Book of Common Prayer, where he will find it written,—"*It hath been the wisdom of the Church of England, ever since the first compiling of her public Liturgy, to keep the mean between the two extremes, of too much*

stiffness in refusing, and of too much easiness in admitting any variation from it. For, as on the one side common experience sheweth that where a change hath been made of things advisedly established (no evident necessity so requiring) sundry inconveniences have thereupon ensued; and those many times more and greater than the evils that were intended to be remedied by such change. So, on the other side, the particular forms of divine worship, and the rites and ceremonies appointed to be used therein being things in their own nature indifferent and alterable, and so acknowledged; it is but reasonable that upon weighty and important considerations, according to the various exigency of times and occasions, such changes and alterations should be made therein as to those who are in place of authority should from time to time seem either necessary or expedient."

W. C. C. is wilder far in his aberrations than S. S. He changes "Ritualism" into "formalism," and argues against the latter as if it were the former; and he appears to suppose that worship is a precious sort of etiquette regulating the approach of the worshipper to God, instead of a series of provisions for the benefit of man's own soul in the art of worship by bringing the habits of his life into conformity with the public performance of an orderly divine service. Of course no worship is acceptable to God which is not spiritual, but every act of worship is symbolical—even prayer itself—in its human words uttered forth from the lips, is a symbol of the outbreathed desires of the inward man "for grace to help him in all time of need;" praise, as the melody of vocal organ or instrument of concord, is only a symbol of the acceptable harmony of a holy life of which it is the expression. The only thing that man can do in regard to public worship is just that which W. C. C. argues against, "an endeavour to symbolize devotion" (p. 106). The instances of condemnation of Ritualism to which W. C. C. refers, are against those which are performed pharisaically, without love of the heart; God could condemn these, and so could Christ, because our Lord knew what was in man, and needed not that any man should testify of "Him," and God seeth all hearts, and knoweth what is in the mind of every spirit. W. C. C. cannot condemn Ritualism as hypocrisy, without violating that charity which "thinketh no evil."

We may draw our remarks to a close. We need not attempt to prove too much, we do not affirm that "*all* Ritualism is necessary to Christianity, and essential to its progress." So long as our opponents regard the Lord's Supper and Baptism as ordinances of Christ, they must admit that "*some*" Ritualism is necessary to Christianity and essential to its progress. Our only difference therefore is, in the extent of the word "*some*." The questions about the form and colour of the vestments of officiating priests; the use of incense and lights; the employment of genuflexions and crossings of the person; and of modes of prayer, praise, and the administration of ordinances are all included in that interpretation,

and may be all settled in Christian charity in accord with the two supreme laws of public worship which we have referred to in our opening remarks; and the consistency of our church with whose divinely inspired wisdom we have attempted to show. It is true, as our Church affirms, that "there never was anything by the wit of man so well devised, or so sure established, which in continuance of time hath not been corrupted." Ritualism may have been so, and the extent to which it has been so, may be matter of just difference of opinion, but this will by no means help S. S. and W. C. C. to affirm that "Ritualism is inconsistent with and unnecessary to the advancement of true Christianity." The converse of this we have endeavoured to show to be reasonable and scriptural, and so we leave the matter in the hands of the readers of the *British Controversialist*. CLERICUS.

UNNECESSARY.—III.

As religion is a matter of faith and not sight, as we cannot grasp religion by means of our senses in a direct manner—it has frequently been the object of religious teachers to enable mankind to realize more fully the great truths of their religion by adding to the impressiveness of their worship by means of rites and imposing ceremonies, to invoke the aid of the five senses by presenting religion in a garb which the senses can take cognizance of. Jehovah, in presenting a religious code to the Israelites, made use of imposing ceremonies. Religion pertains to the soul, and has no relation to carnality, but as man is an admixture of soul and body, and is in some degree enslaved by the desires of the flesh, it has been thought that religion might be served up to mankind spiced with such things as pertain to the body, thus improving upon genuine spiritual religion and making it better adapted for that mixed being, man. Thus the Pharisees connected bodily ablutions with spiritual cleansing, and other religionists avoided spiritual sorrow for misdeeds by incurring grievous penances.

Rites and ceremonies are found to increase as the substance of religion becomes clouded. Thus the Ancient Britons who had but very indistinct and vague ideas concerning the spirituality of their false religion possessed a creed which abounded in ritualism. The Grecian Pagans paid obeisance to their gods with numberless ceremonies. It is a peculiar fact, that the demiurgic religions possess rites very similar to those of more honourable creeds. In many cases the lack of glory in the ideas taught by a religious code is made up by gorgeous rites. Reverence for an object faintly perceived cannot be secured without the aid of cleverly arranged rites. A splendid ritualism inspires the mind with awe and reverence; beauty and splendour affect the mind in a peculiar manner; a rural swain is almost afraid to tread upon the tessellated pavements of the beautiful cathedral, and is overawed whilst seated in the gilded saloon of a baronial mansion. The resonant strains of an organ engender emotions quite different

from those caused by the notes of "a vile demi-flute." But the feelings above alluded to are not *the* feelings which a pious worshipper of the true God entertains, nor will they benefit the soul of the person entertaining them and render him more like his God. If they did, the Ritualism of St. Alban's would be supported by the fact, and *if* they did the opera would be a more prolific source of pious devotion than even the most exacting ritualism. Devotion is not synonymous with admiration.

The ceremonies of the Levitical code were widely distinct from any others. They emanated from the fountain of knowledge, and even if studied as minutely as anything proceeding from the Creator ever was studied, would reveal nothing but truth. The teachings of the ceremonies of the Jews formed the religion of the people; in Pagan countries the people form the ceremonies; and in Christendom the principles which are known are moulded into ceremonies. The ceremonies introduced into Christianity are based upon the known principles of that religion, and are therefore incapable of teaching any more than what may be already patent to all readers of the Bible. The Levitical ceremonies were in all strictness a means of revelation; the ceremonies of Christian sects (there being no *Catholic* church—every denomination is a sect) are a superstructure on revelation, or rather upon opinions concerning (not knowledge of) revelation. Worship should not be opinionated; therefore, it should not be ritualistic. The ordinances of religion are not rites. An ordinance is a positive injunction of the Author of our faith; rites under the new dispensation are injunctions of a community of Christians. But no Christians have a right to enforce as obligatory that which is unnecessary.

The very fact that religion has existed in the hearts of hundreds of our fellow-men who never thought of Ritualism proves that Ritualism is not necessary to the advancement of religion. Ritualism advances quite as much in Wales and Scotland as it does in Spain or Ireland.

Are the gorgeous robes and gaudy toys of the Ritualists consistent with the religion of Him who wore the purple robe in mockery and bore the crown of thorns? Pure religion and undefiled before God is to visit the fatherless and the widow. It may be urged that nothing is too glorious for the religion of Christ; this is quite true, but there are many things not sufficiently glorious for Him. Does a bit of tinted silk and crimson woollen add to the glory of "joint heirs with Christ?" Do the angels of heaven think as much of the golden crucifix as the misers in hell do?

I cannot understand how the consciences of people force them to bow their knees at the name of Christ when within the consecrated (?) walls, whilst they scarcely feel abashed at uttering the most flagrant oaths when without them. Were not the prayer and praise of Paul and Silas while in the stocks in the inner prison as acceptable to our Redeemer as those of the choristers who gain enough on Sundays to get drunk on week-days? Are the hearts

of those whose legs are governed while passing the altar by the alleged supernaturalism governed entirely by the principles taught by Christ? If not, religion should in such a case purify the heart before it bends the knee.

If the truths of the gospel are not sufficiently glorious to be presented in their nudity, they had better not be presented at all. I cannot perceive any necessity for making Bible truths palatable unless they are inherently so. "Christ, and Him crucified," is the heart motto of every Christian. I can admire the motives which may bring the atoning crucifixion into our memories by the displaying of pictures of the cross, &c. A true Christian need not be reminded of the cross in such a manner, for the eye of faith can see the real cross and feel its efficacy. Every man has a cross in some trial allotted to him. The meek disciple of Christ who bears the sturdy cross of affliction and tribulation with calm confidence on the efficacy of Christ's atonement, honours his Lord in so doing more than the shaven and shorn stipendiary who parades a church aisle bearing a silken cross upon his back. Pastors of churches should therefore labour more earnestly to secure *real* cross-bearers among their flock than to obtain the embroidered needlework of ritualistic milliners.

The Prayer-book may enjoin the celebration of these rites. Such a fact heaps shame upon those who derive the benefits of conformity thereto without conforming to its injunctions, but does not one whit strengthen the cause of our opponents. What can be thought of the catholicity of the Ritualist who extends the hand of fellowship to the semi-barbarous priest of the Russian Church, but contemns and despises the humble, poverty-stricken Dissenter? The fuss made about the Catholic Church is not grounded upon the principles of the gospel or any other principle whatsoever, but a result of the hankering after the carrion flesh of a corrupted church and a hatred of the living mystical body of Christ.

Let us look around and behold what Ritualism has led to in bygone ages, and contrast the spectacle with the results of Protestantism.

R. F. G.

The Reviewer.

Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately, D.D., late Archbishop of Dublin. By E. J. WHATELY. London: Longmans, Green & Co.

Memoirs of Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin. By W. J. FITZPATRICK. London: Richard Bentley.

"BIOGRAPHY is allowed on all hands," said Archbishop Whately, "to be one of the most attractive and profitable kinds of reading." We scarcely think that either of the records of his doings and

strivings noted at the head of this article would have commended themselves to that notable man as a model biography; and indeed we think the life of Archbishop Whately may be regarded as practically unwritten. The single qualification of *fitness* is wanting alike in each of the writers who have essayed this great task. The biographer of Whately ought to be acquainted with the scholastic life of the universities; learned in the state of the teaching of logic in the schools of the times; fully conversant with the antecedents of the Tractarian movement, its procedure, and its results; capable of estimating the consequences of the Reform Bill in the three kingdoms; especially endowed with a knowledge of Irish ecclesiastical history and the position of parties, political and religious, in that land of civic difficulties and sectarian incompatibilities; able to take into consideration the education question and the social condition of Ireland, as well as the relations between the English Government and the Irish episcopal bench; and, above all, a thorough theological scholar, to whom the state of religious matters was an open and thoroughly traversed tract, as well as a man trained to the good usages of society among civic dignitaries and church potentates. Besides all these broad and general qualifications, many special requirements arise as necessary to the full elucidation of Whately's career. For instance, it is curious that so acute a mind as Whately's should constantly and ostentatiously be avowing incalculable obligations to Bishop Coplestone; and the relations between the ideas of Coplestone and the productions of Whately require elucidation. So, too, the connections between Newman and Whately have been singularly noteworthy, and seem to be capable of having some further light shed on them than has yet been. German neology and rationalism in Oxford, as well as the patristic influences of Dr. Pusey, must have had some influence on Whately, but this point has been left unexplained. Whately and Arnold interchanged many confidences and much thought, but the Arnold-Whately *concursus* has never been brought into due prominence. Whately's connection as an *Edinburgh Reviewer* under Jeffrey, the contemner of Oxford, and co-worker in the pages of a serial in which he had been most damagingly assailed by Sir William Hamilton, is another strange episode in an extraordinary life. Whately's support of Peel and the Emancipation Act was, in the state of Oxford then, almost as remarkable an event as his occupation of the chair of political economy; and we have scarcely yet got into the secret of Whately's preferment to Dublin being regarded as more politic than the advancement thereto of Lord Augustus FitzClarence, son of Mrs. Jordan and William IV. Then what of Bishop Philpotts and his attack on the new Bishop of Dublin? and, still more, what of the relations between the late respected Roman Catholic Archbishop Murray and his state-endowed Protestant episcopal brother? Whately's views on the Sabbath question and on the Evangelical Alliance, are not in either of these books brought out in a reasoned or a reasonable form.

No adequate account is furnished in either of these books of the national education system of Ireland, and of the whole course of colleagueship, collusion, collision, and intrigue in which the Commission on that subject engaged. The "Hampden controversy" was one of great moment, and one in which the Archbishop of Dublin took special interest, but it is not recorded in any comprehensible way, although referred to in several places. It is almost equally difficult to extract from these volumes any definite knowledge of the relations of the Rev. Blanco White and his archiepiscopal patron. The *reticency* shown by Miss Whately is all the more singular because what she does give of letters and replies really requires a distinctly narrative interpretation to give them interest and make them understood. Archbishop Cullen is not named in Miss Whately's work, and yet it is pretty well known that he contributed not a little to the chagrin with which Whately saw his life-labours on common-school education thrown away. There is, too, in Miss Whately's notices of his works a strange suggestive tone, as if Dr. Whately had been a life-long intriguer with the press.

We do not object to Fitzpatrick's Memoirs that they are unauthorized and composed by an adherent of the creed to which Whately's public life was opposed, but we condemn the work as a hasty bundle of anecdotes gathered together and thrust prematurely upon public notice, in such a way as in some measure to frustrate the interest of a sanctioned work, and in a greater degree still as calculated to make the production of a faithful biography free from the animus of controversy very difficult. That Miss Whately has treated his Memoirs with the contempt of leaving them unnoticed is perhaps wise; but there are so many topics on which he has given his opinions, or contributed his anecdotal stores, which she has left unmentioned, that not only a sense of incompleteness is given to her "Life," but sometimes a sense of suppression creeps into the mind. It would have been more prudent, we think, to have given distinct statements and explicit explanations of all such matters as he had touched on, than to have left readers to suppose that he had supplied veritable details, or that his statements or views were sufficiently correct as to be accepted by after-historians.

Of Miss Whately's "Life" we have not so much to complain of the disadvantages arising from her near relationship as of the deficiency of collateral explanatory matter, and of the over-ladenness of the narrative portion with long extracts from commonplace books, letters, &c., without due subordination to the substance of the narrative. On the whole—it is a pity to think so, but it so strikes us—between these two Memoirs there has been produced a biography such as is scarcely more unsatisfactory than the life of Wordsworth, the memoirs of Thomas Moore, or the biography of James Montgomery,—the three most inchoate books of biography produced during the last half-century. This we say regretfully, because we think that no man of the half-century had so good a right to have

had a lucid, straightforward, plain-spoken, well-arranged biography as Archbishop Whately; and few lives surely could have been made so productive of high teaching in honour, consistency, perseverance, and faith as a private character, and in public life as a pattern of resolute dutifulness, self-devotion, and spirituality, combined with practicality.

The model biography which ought to have been followed in regard to Whately is John Forster's "Goldsmith," or Lewes' "Life of Goethe." We do not see why the life of the Archbishop of Dublin should be inferior in interest to that of Dr. Thomas Chalmers—lumbering and heavy as it is; Dr. Thomas Arnold, though it is somewhat restrained on some points of interest; or Rogers' life of John Howe. We do not ask that we should have Whately Boswellized; that his story should possess the weird fascination Carlyle has given to his brief "Sketch of John Sterling;" that in fulness of detail and multifariousness of matter it should rival Lockhart's "Scott;" that in marvellous audacity of carelessness it should equal Moore's "Byron;" that in elucidative minuteness it should contest the palm with Chambers' "Burns;" that in overflowing historicity it should err as much as David Masson's "Life of Milton;" that in flow and sequence it should excel Smiles' "George Stephenson;" or that in taste and selectness it should outmaster Sterling's "Charles V.;"—but we have surely a right to expect that it shall not be as maundering as the "Life and Correspondence of Southey;" as prosy as Muirhead's "Watt;" as colourless as Henry's "Dalton;" as over-heaped with crudities and inedited matter as Napier's "Montrose;" and as dateless in many instances, or as gossipily anecdotal as Campbell's "Lives of the Chancellors."

Fitzpatrick's Memoirs are the notes of an outsider, the clippings and collections of a clever man thrown hastily together, apparently without any direct or personal knowledge of the Archbishop,—of an outsider too of different opinions on religious and political affairs,—and one who does not profess to have any settled views upon the questions incidentally rising up as matters for discussion or comment. Miss Whately's book is too evidently got up under the home-influence, and devotes more of its space to the man and his friendliness than even to the thinker, the author, the politician, and the Episcopal tenant of a St. Stephen's Green Mansion. The portrait presented is rather that of the man as the authoress would like him to be thought of than of the man as he was. We miss in it much of the intellectuality and the whole of the individuality of the Bishop. We sincerely regret that either of the books were published—the first because it is distinctly unappreciative, and a mere stop-gap, if not a catchpenny, huge pamphlet, in the disguise of a substantive book; the second as partaking a great deal too much of mere pamphleteering, but chiefly as occupying the market so as to make it seem almost indecorous to make a new venture. Perhaps a quarter of a century may elapse before the biography of Whately can now be fittingly written.

We know that Miss Whately intends to produce a story of her father's life, a condensed narrative of his doings and works; but we do not think she is so able to tell it with fulness, independency, and freedom as some man who has had to do with the state policy and church *finesses* in which Ireland abounds; nor with the breadth of spirit which the biography demands. The example of the Archbishop himself in his "Memoirs of Coplestone" would perhaps be the best model she could adopt; but certainly the interest-dissipating style of the present memoir is of all things to be avoided if she desires to compose a popular biography. We know of no man's biography which it would be more difficult to write properly than Archbishop Whately's, except that of his great rival, Sir William Hamilton—and our estimate of the difficulty of the latter undertaking is corroborated by the fact that a dozen years have nearly elapsed since the great logician's death, and that an official biography, announced as forthcoming shortly after his demise, is not yet out; while the third biography of Whately is represented to be *in the press*. Had Dickinson or Senior lived to provide the presentment of the Archbishop as he lived we might have got a satisfactory result. Was not the Rev. Dr. Wm. Fitzgerald, Bishop of Killaloe, the man from whose pen the national biography of Whately should have proceeded?

The Battle of the two Philosophies. By AN INQUIRER. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

THIS book took its rise from the publication in 1865 of John Stuart Mill's "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy and of the principal philosophical questions discussed in his writings"—of which notice was taken in October of that year in a leading paper, and to which attention was again given in January, 1866, in a notice of [now Dr.] James Hutchison Stirling's "Sir Wm. Hamilton: being the Philosophy of Perception." Unfortunately this book did not come under our critical eye then, and indeed only recently came into our hands through the kindness of a philosophical friend. Had it done so our review would have been somewhat more in season than it can now be. We are of opinion, however, that it is of sufficient importance as a contribution to philosophy to merit even now an outline of its matter, and an indication of its worth.

In his introduction the author compares the two combatants, and remarks that "it is impossible to allow the same man to be at once the accuser, the judge and the jury, in a cause which he has so energetically made his own," as Mr. Mill has done. The two questions which he considers as raised by Mr. Mill's polemic are—(1) What is the real worth of Sir W. Hamilton as a thinker and educator of thought? (2) What is the truth of the transcendental system of philosophy. He points out that Mr. Mill seems to argue that to refute Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy is to refute the *a priori* school in its most complete form, and he maintains that his

overthrow would not be the overthrow of transcendental philosophy, and he complains bitterly of the apparently personal rancour which the younger thinker exhibits towards the elder. The three main questions of transcendental philosophy—"the turning points of the battle"—are (1) the philosophy of the conditioned; (2) the doctrine of Free Will; and (3) the doctrine that mind and matter, an *ego* and a non-*ego*, are original data of consciousness; and he proceeds to examine the respective methods of Mill and Hamilton in dealing with the chief points involved in them. In this he seems, in regard to the first, to accuse Mr. Mill of employing the Indefinite attached to the word Infinite, and in regard to the second as making conceivability equivalent to believability, while "consciousness in its last analysis, in other words, our primary experience, is a Faith" lying at the base of all conceptiveness. The author's concise definition of the three possible theories of will, as the motive power, the efficient cause of men's actions, is deserving of quotation:—

"There are three hypotheses to be considered; for, either man originates, or causes his own actions, which is the first hypothesis; or those whose actions follow certain moral antecedents; namely, desires, aversions, habits, and dispositions, combined with outward circumstances, with the same uniformity as physical effects follow physical causes; and all these again are effects of other moral causes, as education, or other moral and physical influences. The second hypothesis traces all these causes through a longer or shorter chain, back to the universal or first cause, the creative cause of man and all his circumstances. The third, denying any first cause, carries back the whole series into the unknowable, and finally into infinite non-commencement."

The criticism of Mr. Mill's views in regard to these theories is in the earlier part acute and in the latter part peculiarly smart, and a clever *argumentum ad hominem* in reference to the "Essay on Liberty" seems to put the politician in opposition to the metaphysician. In discussing the question "Can we explain the facts of consciousness alone?" and Mr. Mill's affirmative answer, the author charges the great logician with postulating the human mind, as "a permanent possibility of feeling;" a rapacity of expectation in it; a principle of association, and a memory:

"Together with the following *à priori* or unaccounted-for elements: 1, an ultimate belief that in the same circumstances I shall have the same sensations; 2, another ultimate belief—to which we are impelled by the laws of our minds—in reality, or a substratum; 3, the power of imagination; 4, of generalisation; 5, the notion of order and idea of causation; 6, of duration; 7, of existence; 8, of power; 9, of conditions; 10, of possibility. And then comes this very remarkable statement. We find that the modifications which are taking place—in our possibilities of sensation—are mostly quite independent of our presence or absence."

And he objects, that the mind "cannot bring about its own conception," "act before it exists and by its acting cause its own

existence." We subjoin the following remarks on Mr. Mill as a metaphysician as indicating the power and spirit of the polemic here raised. The work will be found indispensable to all those who wish to attain a thorough view of the greatest metaphysical controversy of our age. If read in connexion with Dr. MacCosh's Examination of Mill's Philosophy—a work shortly to be brought under the reader's notice in a paper on that eminent modern logician—it will be found to afford good material in favour of a spiritual as opposed to a material philosophy.

"We cannot but think that Mr. Mill in this, his first work in pure metaphysics, has disappointed just expectation. In leaving the fields of philosophy he seems to have left his genius behind him. Even the peculiar 'cunning of his right hand'—even his unexcelled logical power avails him little, so continually does he fail to see distinctly the conception with which he is fencing. The deficiency of analysis throughout the whole work is simply intolerable; what few analyses there are, are either taken from Sir W. Hamilton, or if begun by himself, are left half completed; in general, he wholly refuses this drudgery. And the result is, he can make nothing of complex conceptions; even so simple a rule as that a negative conception is no conception, with which, as a logician, he must have been perfectly familiar, produces a mere indistinct haze when he tries to work out its result in a complex conception. Again, closely as he has studied Sir W. Hamilton's opinions in detail, we have shown some reason for thinking he has failed to see the tendency and aim of his work as a whole. Mr. Masson has given us, in a couple of pages, a far more complete view of this than can be gained from Mr. Mill's whole work. And if he himself understands the tendency of his own psychological system, it is more than he has enabled his students to do, seeing that in keeping out one *a priori* datum of consciousness, he has called in a host of others; in much to be admired disorder it is true, and not taking them on board at the outset, but straggling in on the voyage, just as he finds one or another necessary to keep experience from stranding on the shallows.

"There is another feature of Mr. Mill's philosophy to which we must advert, however briefly, because we believe it will be found generally characteristic of this whole school. The great difficulty of the experiential philosophers is the chasm between mind and matter. They do excellent service in pushing up matter to its most subtle nerve currents; but still these are material; and in reducing mind to its simplest elements of consciousness; but still it is conscious mind. Having thus brought up their forces on each side, as near as they can come, they get over the chasm—which is as wide as ever—by the easy process of ignoring its existence; and first confusing, then changing the names used, first speaking of nerve currents as though they might possess some of the attributes of thoughts, and then roundly calling them ideas, they land themselves on the other side; and then turn round, in wonder we do not follow them, telling us they are the only philosophers, who follow science fearlessly, whilst those others are only preachers, seeking, not for truth, but for safety. But science has not as yet led us over that chasm, and we fear to cross it on a bridge of words. Though not so broadly evident, yet not less really is this characteristic of the school to be found in Mr. Mill's writings. He too is ever charging his opponents with being unscientific and unphilosophical; he too is continually

driven, however reluctantly, to attribute their persistence in error to a cowardly fear of the evil consequences of admitting demonstrated truth. He, too, seems as if he could not see the difficulty, which they seeing, cannot leap over to join him.

"As long as he is applying given principles to the solution of practical questions; as long as he has to do with the process of an argument, he proves himself a most able instructor and guide. But when he has to grapple with a metaphysical problem, it almost invariably arrives that the central, the metaphysical difficulty, escapes him in discussing the question whether or no we can comprehend what is infinite—the infinite element of the conception—the only one which presents any metaphysical difficulty, slips out of his grasp, and leaves him battling about the indefinite. In building up his own theory, he shows very clearly what results, sensations, and experience of sensations, combined and worked up together, can produce; the only purely metaphysical question—of what nature is that which works them up and combines them—this never occurs to him. In showing how the sensations of muscular flexes may give us the notion of extension, every part of the process is quite beautifully worked out except the one part that needs explaining—how a passive sensation can change into the notion of movements without the idea of space. So it was in his treatise on utilitarianism. Whilst successfully defending the utilitarian theory of morals from all practical objections and all possible misconceptions, the metaphysical question—which, as he says, must be settled before any science of morals can be built up—this he never once sees. He makes no attempt whatever to reconcile the utilitarian superstructure with the existence in our minds of that internal sense of duty, that idea of right and sense of obligation to do right, which is the essence of conscience, and underlies all possible standards of morality. He admits its existence, but gives no account of its origin. How the idea of 'tending to happiness,' got changed into the now wholly distinct idea of 'being right,' this, and all the other metaphysical questions involved, he merely ignores. And yet on his own showing, no system of morality can have a true basis which does not solve them."—Pp. 78-82.

"Must it then be admitted, as is so often asserted, that the discussion of such questions as Mr. Mill has here brought before us is altogether useless; that it can only serve to show the idle skill of each metaphysician who overthrows the fame of his predecessor, only to be overthrown in his turn, so that the dispute may go on for ever, with no more profitable result than this—the raising matter for fresh disputes? By no means let us allow this. That the discussion of these and similar questions will go on—if not for ever, yet until the present dispensation itself ceases—we most sincerely hope, nay, we firmly believe it. Anything more fatal to the best interests of mankind than their being, under the present circumstances, put into possession of absolute truth, cannot be conceived; unless it were their being able to rest without it. But the discussion has many positive and practical results of the highest value, and progress is made by its continuance.

"Every well fought attack produces its quota of real progress, though it be not always that which the assailant intended. It not only clears away confusion and error, it confirms all that is true in what it assails, and shows what is still wanting to its complete demonstration. If it should prove, as we believe it will, that so thorough and able an attack as Mr. Mill

has made on Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, has failed to shake its fundamental principles, then he has done more to establish its truth than even he could have done had he written folios in its defence."—P. 83.

The work is published anonymously, but it has been attributed in some philosophical circles, to T. Collyers Simons, a gentleman of most acute and metaphysical intellect, well known as perhaps the most devoted Berkeleyan in our country, who, though for some years of late resident in Edinburgh, is a Norfolkensian, widely regarded as one of the men to whom philosophy is likely to owe much in the future. We mention this as an *on dit* though not in the secret.

The Topic.

IF EDUCATION IS MADE COMPULSORY, OUGHT IT ALSO TO BE GRATUITOUS?

AFFIRMATIVE.

If we attempt to compel people to take what they do not want, we ought not surely to compel them also to pay for it, because that would be doing a double injustice; therefore if education is to be made compulsory it ought also to be made gratuitous.—G. G.

It is not usual to discuss hypothetical questions, and I very much question the general expediency of such a course. Doubtless the ruling spirits of the *British Controversialist* had good grounds for departing not only from *the* but from *their* usual practice. The great force given to the necessity of compulsory education in that great centre of political thought, Manchester, and in that great centre of political activity, Glasgow, has probably induced them to look on compulsory education as in some measure a foregone conclusion, especially when viewed in relation to the recent legislation concerning factories and workshops. In this state of matters we think it is a distinct and reasonable demand that if the State takes to itself the right of overruling all parental control [or negligence if you please] it ought also to accept the burden. A man with a large family, if compelled by

law to pay for the education of his children, might find himself hampered to do them, or himself and his wife, justice in the matter of food, ought not to be compelled to starve at the State's behest. If the State claims education as a duty let it defray it as a right.—B. F.

NEGATIVE.

ONE of the most important duties of a parent is the education of his children, and no right-minded parent grudges the money expended for this purpose. Yet it is a fact that much of the ignorance which prevails arises from the culpable neglect of many parents, who wrong their children by denying them that education which they are both able and in duty bound to give them. If, in order to remedy this evil, the education of children should, to a certain extent, be made compulsory, I am of opinion that the principle of parental liability should be maintained.—M. M.

Gratuitous? No! What pauperize half the nation? That would be precious education indeed which made pauperism a condition of human existence! Not only ought education to be compulsory but the payment for it should be made imperative on all who can afford it by

the most summary process. If the people cannot pay, then let the poor-rate intervene and make such payments as are required, but not till *then*.—B. L.

Self-reliance is the highest education, and any education which interferes with that does grievous wrong. Hence it would be most unwise to introduce any general form of gratuitous education. To be able to read, write, and cypher are good things enough, but if they are to be gained at the cost of an infusion of poverty of spirit into the people and the breaking down of self-reliance it will be bought at too high a price.—G. D. Y.

No! for whatever is got for nothing is thought to be of little worth, and that which is acquired without sacrifice gains little favourable hold on the mind.—L. F.

"What is the worth of anything but just as much as it will bring?" says the satirist. Teach people to look on education as a thing of nought and yet compel them to accept of it, and what will ensue? Besides, if the education is nominally gratuitous, it will be really costly, for the rate required will have hanging on it an army of collectors, each intercepting sums that would pay for a good deal of education as fees.—GEORGE.

Our Collegiate Course.

STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.

MILTON'S MINOR POEMS.

AT A SOLEMN MUSIC.*

["Though we have no means of accurately determining the date of this poem, we may, from the turn of the thought, and its similarity in tone and phraseology to other verses known to have been composed during the latter years of Milton's residence at the University, regard it with safety as one of the author's juvenile productions, and may approximately refer it to sometime near the Christmas tide of 1629, or the Easter of 1630, and thus holding a place in time probably near the 'Ode on the Morning of Christ's Nativity,' or his fragment on 'The Passion.' It was as Professor Masson thinks, 'evidently written on the occasion of some great cathedral service, on hearing which the poet thinks of a still higher triumph of sound,' that,

"Aye sung before the Sapphire-coloured throne."

Milton's passion for music was intense. Hallam says, 'he feels music. The sense of vision delighted his imagination, but that of sound wrapped his whole soul in ecstasy.' Hence Coleridge is inclined to define him as 'not a picturesque but a musical poet.' At the time of its composition

* "Here will be found power of the most rare and beautiful conception, choice of words the most exact and exquisite, the most perfect music and charm of verse. Above all, here will be found that ineffable something—call it imagination or what we will—wherein lies the intimate and ineradicable peculiarity of the poet; the art to work on and on for ever in a purely ideal element, to chase and marshal airy nothings according to a law totally unlike that of rational association, never hastening to a logical end like the schoolboy when on an errand, but still lingering within the wood like the schoolboy during holiday."—"Essays" by D. Masson, p. 45.

Milton was probably meditating systematically on theological topics, and keeping his thoughts turned towards the requirements of his intended profession—the church. “The poem consists of only twenty-eight lines; the measure is five-foot, in general with one couplet of four-foot, and one single verse of the three-foot measure.”—*Thomas Keightley's “Life, Opinions, and Writings of Milton,”* p. 266.]

*Blest pair of Syrens (1) pledges of Heaven's joy,
Sphere-born harmonious sisters, Voice (2) and Verse (3)
Wed (4) your divine sounds, and mix'd power employ,
Dead things with inbreathed sense able to pierce;
And to our high-raised phantasy (5) present
That undisturbed song of pure concent, (6)
Aye sung before the sapphire-coloured (7) throne
To Him that sits thereon,
With saintly shout, and solemn jubilee; (8)*

Helps to paraphrasing.

- Line 1. Delight-yielding; twin-born; proofs; happiness.
2. Heaven-descended; melodious.
3. Unite indissolubly; pleasant; mingled might; use.
4. Lifeless; inspired; vitality; penetrate.
5. Excited imagination show. 6. Perfectly attuned; holy harmony.
7. Forever; around. 9. Sacred outburst; holy rejoicing.

(1) The Syrens were sea-nymphs, who had the power of charming by their enchanting melodies all who heard them, and hence the word is used figuratively to signify anything having special powers of fascination, but specially possessed of that specious bewitchment which induces to evil; there the word is equivalent to angels.

(2) *Voice* seems to be here used technically for harmonized music, in which treble, tenor, and bass voices have respective parts assigned to them, and it may include the instrumentation employed in rendering the music.

(3) *Verse* probably means poetry, metrical language arranged by art, labour, and rule, to the expression of the ideas to be conveyed in a manner answering to the emotion, which they are intended to excite.

(4) Compare

“airs

Married to immortal verse,

Such as the meeting soul may pierce,” &c.

L'Allegro, 136-8.

(5) “The productive or creative imagination is that which is usually signified by the term *imagination*, or fancy (phantasy) in ordinary language.”—*Sir William Hamilton's “Lectures on Metaphysics,”* xxxiii., vol. ii., p. 262.

(6) Concord of sounds; accordancy. sympathy, now usually spelled as, and confounded with, consent; though concent comes from Latin “*concentus*,” *singing* in harmony, and consent from “*consensus*,” *feeling* in harmony. The difference is seen in—

“Whose power hath a true concent,

With planet or with element.”—*Il Penseroso, 95.*

And

“Fill free consent the gods among

Make her his eternal bride.”—*Comus, 1007.*

(7) Ezekiel i. 26; x. i.

(8) Jubilee, an exalted sabbatical year, having for its objects the constant

Where the *bright* seraphim, (9) in *burning* row, (10)
 Their *loud-uplifted* angel-trumpets blow ;
 And the cherubic *host*, in thousand *quires*,
 Touch their *immortal* harps of golden *wires*,
 With those *just spirits* (11) that *wear victorious* palms,
 Hymns (12) *devout* and *holy* psalms (13)

Singing *everlastingly* :

That we on earth with *undiscording* voice,
 May answer *rightly* that *melodious* noise ;
 As *once* we did till disproportioned sin
 Jarred against Nature's *chime*, and with *harsh din*
 Broke the fair *music* that all *creatures* made
 To their *great Lord*, whose love their *motion* swayed,
 In perfect diapason, (14) *whilst they* stood
 In *first obedience*, and their *state* of good.
 Oh, may we *soon* again *renew* that song,

10. Shining ; blazing order.

11. Resonant.

12. Multitude ; choral bands.

13. Play upon ; deathless ; strings.

• 14. Perfect redeemed ones ; carry ; conquerors'.

15. Showing fervour of heart ; pure.

16. Continually.

17. Not interfering with the perfection of the music.

18. Properly ; take up our part ; sweet hymning.

19. Formerly.

20. Made a disagreeable sound in opposition ; musically pitched tones ; distressful clangour.

21. Spoiled ; melody ; beings engaged in.

22. Mighty God ; feeling ruled.

23. So long as they maintained their place.

24. Earliest submissiveness ; condition ; happiness.

25. Speedily ; once more ; take up.

preservation among God's people of moderate competence and general comfort. All loans, pledges, &c., were restored ; and hence the word is employed to indicate a high, holy, long-continued time of joy.

(9) *Seraphim*, brilliant ones ; angels of the highest order in the celestial hierarchy, who serve Him " who maketh His angels spirits, and His ministers a flame of fire." See Isaiah vi. 2 and 6.

(10) *Cherubic hosts*, the order of spirits next to seraphs, who were symbols of God's love, as the seraphs were of Divine wisdom.

(11) *Just spirits*, redeemed men, Hebrews xii. 23.

(12) A song of praise or honour addressed to Deity.

(13) Pious lyrics, calculated to exercise an abiding influence on the heart and life, as the expressions of the holy emotions of lovers of God, generally restricted to that series of sacred poems edited by David. See Matthew xxvi. 30 ; Mark xiv. 26 ; Ephesians xv. 19 ; Colossians iii. 6.

(14) According to ancient usage the octave, or interval, which includes all the tones and semitones in a musical composition ; in modern use it denotes the range or compass of a voice or instrument.

And keep in tune with Heaven till God, ere long,
To His celestial concert (15) us unite,
To live with Him, and sing in endless morn of light!

26. Preserve strict harmony ; in a short time.
27. Heavenly ; assembly of the perfect ; join.
28. Exist ; glorify him ; everlasting ; splendour.

(15) Musical assembly, where concerted pieces are performed by many parties ; here used for "The Choir of Heaven."

(16) Amos v. 8 ; Hosea vi. 3.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

753. In reading the able and informing paper on Auguste Comte, which in its brief space communicated more information regarding "the Messiah of Positivism" than I had ever seen before, I was somewhat surprised to see no reference to any American writer who has taken up the Positive Philosophy, except the mention of the appearance of a translation of Littré's work in the *Democratic Review*. I cannot suppose the learned author of those philosophical productions, which add such value to the pages of our "Young Men's Best Companion," the *British Controversialist*, to be ignorant of the Positivist literature of America ; and yet I am at a loss to think that that country of singularities in intellectual development has been wholly unaffected by the great wave of thought which the word Positivism implies. Will the writer, or any other adept in American literature, be so good as to inform me if Positivism has made any progress in America, and in what substantive works any indication of this has appeared ?—REFLECTOR.

754. Which is the best book from which to get an idea of the merits and demerits of living statesmen ?—JAMES F.

755. What is the literary and philosophical value of the works of W. E. Channing ?—JAMES F.

756. Are there any good books published on the subject of "lay preaching" ?—JAMES F.

757. Who was Lindley Murray, of great notoriety as an English grammarian ?—W. F. C.

758. Would some of your readers kindly explain the words, "Which of you have done this?" spoken by *Macbeth*, in Shakspeare's play of that name, act iii. scene 4 ?—W. D.

759. Can any of your readers inform me how the marriage ceremony originated ? We never read in the Old Testament (to my recollection) of any ceremony being performed ?—J. T. F.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

748. A. W. will find vol. vi. of the *Instructor*, published by Longmans and Co. at 2s., a condensed but good account of the world from the formation of the first great monarchies to the fall of the Roman empire ; also vol. vii., giving the elements of mediæval and modern history from A.D. 406 to A.D. 1862. Dr. Smith's smaller histories of Greece, Rome, and England are very good and cheap (about 3s. 6d.).—J. R. H.

A. W. cannot do better, in my opinion, than procure the series of student's histories, edited by Dr. Smith, 7s. 6d. each volume: Murray. They consist of—"The Student's Hume;" "The Student's History of France;" "Rome," by Dr. Liddell; "The Student's Gibbon;" "The Student's Greece." White's and Ince's "Outlines" are also good, cheap, and useful.—J. B.

750. *Faust*.—Flügel's is usually considered the best. Grieb's is very good; but both are large and expensive. Black's 7s. 6d. will be found very useful and trustworthy.—J. B.

753. I am afraid that "Reflector" has caught me on the weak side. Although the general tone of American literature has been much affected by Positivism, and many of the periodicals contain ideas evidently bearing on Comtean suggestions, and several of her professed social regenerators have furnished themselves with themes from the works of the great social reformers of France, I am unable to quote any very remarkable book or writer noteworthy for the exposition or advocacy of Positivism.

As, however, it may form a sort of note to the authorities quoted in the paper referred to by "Reflector," I may mention that I possess the tract on Positivism issued by Henry Edger, who dates from Long Island, New York, and who speaks of himself in the preface as "poor, obscure, and devoid of social influence," and as laying aside "for a moment his habitual employment in rural industry;" who acknowledges himself to have been indebted to the series of papers on the Positive Philosophy which appeared in the London *Leader* newspaper in the year 1852 [since republished in G. H. Lewes's "Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences," 1853] as the immediate means of his own acquaintance with the new faith;

and who has received the congratulations of M. Comte for having given "a practical indication of the spirit and tendency of Positivism, clearer and more full than anything I have hitherto elsewhere seen." This book is entitled "The Positivist Calendar," and contains "a summary exposition of religious Positivism;" "a concordance of the calendars;" "the Positivist's library;" "a succinct narrative of the rise and progress of Positivism," and consists of 104 pp., price 2s. 6d. It is dedicated to Horace Binney Wallace, a young American, who took M. Comte as a philosophic guide, and has made some observations on his tenets and faith, which appear in a posthumous work, entitled, "Art, Scenery, and Philosophy in Europe," 1855. Henry Edger announced, in a note to his work, that he would probably soon publish a translation of Comte's "Philosophy of History," which forms the third volume of his system of Positive Polity; while on the wrapper of the pamphlet he promises a tract on equitable commerce, an examination of modern socialist schemes, with a brief exposition of the industrial constitution of Positive social order. On the same wrapper appears an advertisement of "Catholicism, Protestantism, and Positivism," by John Metcalf. I am not aware that any of these works have been published. Henry Edger's book impresses me as the work of a youthful enthusiast, who has not read much, and who is charmed at finding a new order of ideas in Comte's Positivism. The translated portions are fairly done, and the remarks made, while not vividly striking, are pertinent, and in some measure amiable. He seems to be a thorough religionist. He complains, 1856, of the little progress made by Positivism in America.—S. N.

The Societies' Section.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P., ON THE WRITINGS OF SIR WALTER SCOTT.

AT a musical and literary entertainment given in the Hawarden Literary Institution, Mr. W. E. Gladstone, M.P., gave a reading from the works of Sir Walter Scott, with comments.

Mr. Gladstone said that in one of the most striking parts of that most striking town, Edinburgh, in Princes Street, in full view of the Castle, there was a Gothic structure erected in honour of Sir Walter Scott. It was very elaborate and lofty, not altogether unlike what the ancients used sometimes to make their temples; and within that structure was a sitting figure of the great poet and novelist, or, as he used to be called, the Great Magician. It was very well that the inhabitants of this island in general, and of Scotland in particular, were known to be not at all given to idolatry; because unquestionably that statue, placed where it was, might look to a person totally unacquainted with the religious belief and the usages of the country as if it were placed there to receive the worship of the passers by. However, it received everything but worship—respect, admiration, gratitude, affection. It was impossible to describe in terms beyond the truth the nature of the feeling with which Scotsmen regard Sir Walter Scott. His attention had been lately drawn to the subject of Sir Walter's works and character by an admirably written article in the number of the *Quarterly Review* that had just appeared. In the first page of that article he found

an expression of opinion in which he was afraid there was some truth. The writer of the article said:—"Not Lockhart only, but Scott himself, both as a man and a writer, seems to be in danger of passing, we cannot conceive why, out of the knowledge of the rising generation. Doubtless there will be found at most railway stations cheap copies of Scott's poems and the Waverley novels, which travellers purchase one by one, that they may read them on the journey, as they read any worthless trash, and then throw them away. But the instances are rare, we suspect, in which, even among educated persons, young men and young women under twenty-five years of age know anything at all of what Scott wrote or of what he did. Now we look upon this fact, if fact it be, as a great public misfortune." He was afraid that Scott was for the moment less in fashion than he was during his lifetime; and he cordially concurred with the writer when he said that that fact, if fact it be, was to be looked upon as a great public misfortune. The article went on to say that the Scotch capital had the honour of claiming Sir Walter Scott as one of the most illustrious amongst the many illustrious sons whom she had reared. In his opinion that was a very modest claim. Scotland had produced many distinguished men. Excepting ancient Greece, and Italy in the Middle Ages, with neither of which could Scotland compare for a moment, there was no other country of the same population, probably,

that had produced so many distinguished men; yet amongst all those great and eminent names, in his opinion, Scott stood far away and clearly at the head.

Mr. Gladstone rapidly sketched the childhood of Scott, and said—

That the lameness which affected him was not a mere accident—it was a providential dispensation, which had a great influence upon his future career. It caused him to live much in the open air, and thereby contributed to imbue him with that profound love of nature in general, and especially of nature as it is developed in the scenery of his own country, which formed so essential a feature in his works. The same cause led him into paths in which he acquired that unbounded store of legendary knowledge of all kinds, but in particular of legendary knowledge connected with the history of Scotland, which gave to his subsequent life and literary career some features that probably had never been equalled. There was yet another point in which that dispensation of the lame limb had a most important effect on his future career, and it was this: having in all other respects a strong frame and high animal spirits, and a soul and genius within always urging him to what was great, it became the means of exercising in him that strength of will, in order to recover bodily power and energy, which became a distinguishing feature of his character, and enabled him to perform herculean labours, and took effect in great part, though not exclusively, in the enormously voluminous works he produced. In his studies for the bar, and the severe course of training which he undertook, Scott displayed that *self-mastery and power of will which was one of the great secrets not only of success in life, but of all usefulness and of all excellence of character.*

Scott himself acknowledged that his classical education was not at all complete; but the truth was, that with a mind so rich, so active, so incessantly busied in storing itself with materials, with such a wonderful digestive as well as accumulative power of turning them to account, whatever the education was, it could not come out very ill. It was only just, both to the promoters of that old-fashioned system of education against which so many were now disposed to cry out, and to Scott himself, to point out in what manner he regarded his want of some part of that education. He had acquired some knowledge of Latin, and with his powers and talents he readily caught the meaning of his author, but he said, "I have forgotten the very letters of the Greek alphabet, a loss never to be repaired, considering what that language is, and who they were who employed it in their compositions." And Scott went on to say that it was with the deepest regret he recollected in his manhood the opportunities of excellence which he neglected in his youth, that he constantly had cause to deplore his own ignorance; and that he would (and that was written when he was in the height of his renown) "give half the reputation it had been his good fortune to acquire, if by so doing he could rest the remaining part upon a sound foundation of learning and science." That confession showed that, along with the other elements of greatness, Scott possessed in an eminent degree that important element, a true and genuine modesty. There was no doubt that if Scott did not stand in the first class of English poetry, he stood in the second. He spoke then of what might be called a versifying poet; because he should contend that in his prose writings, in his romances, Scott was as much a poet as he was

in his writings in verse. While he always produced delightful works, rich with every kind of beauty, he occasionally rose in his verse even to sublimity. He knew of nothing so sublime in any portion of the sacred poetry of modern times as the "Hymn for the Dead," which Scott had embodied in the "Lay of the Last Minstrel :"—

"That day of wrath, that dreadful day,
When heaven and earth shall pass away,
What power shall be the sinner's stay,
How shall he meet that dreadful day;
When shrivelling like a parched scroll,
The flaming heavens together roll;
When louder yet, and yet more dread,
Swells the loud trump that wakes the dead.
Oh, in that day, that wrathful day,
When man to judgment wakes from clay,
Be Thou the trembling sinner's stay,
Though heaven and earth shall pass away."

Simple as the words, and few as the lines were, the very composition of those lines was enough to stamp with greatness the name of the man who wrote them.* With the publication of the novel of "Waverley" began a new era in British litera-

* "After reading this passage two or three times over, we felt almost driven to believe that Mr. Gladstone must be unaware of the origin of the stanzas, and that he supposed them to be Scott's own, instead of an adaptation of the 'Dies Iræ.' Had the speaker been any one but Mr. Gladstone, we should not have thought twice about the matter."—*Pall Mall Gazette*.

ture. Romances were an important element in the literature of many countries; in none perhaps more important than in the literature of this country. In the last century, in the hands of Fielding and Smollett, romances became popular; but their tales, or novels, although very full of masculine force and life-vigour, having many merits, were disfigured and depraved by a great deal of coarseness. After Fielding and Smollett came Richardson, a very excellent writer, of high moral aims, of great fame in his day, and a very considerable painter of manners, but one, at the same time, who did not give the vividness and interest to his works which writers of greater original genius had been able to impart to them. After Richardson came a school of what might be called sensational novelists, best known under the name, very famous in its time, of Mrs. Radcliffe and her chief work, "The Mysteries of Udolpho." Castles, goblins, ghosts, long corridors, dark nights, daggers, assassins, knights, maidens, and a multitude of other elements of that kind all thrown together in a certain proportion, could, it might be conceived, be so handled as to produce a very exciting effect. After that school, which was essentially of a temporary character, there came a writer of the very greatest merit—Miss Austin, who, probably, would always keep her place in literature; but her novels, though still very deservedly read, were within a somewhat limited circle of life and manners. They were not as broad as human life and human nature; they were excellent of their kind, but their kind was within bounds. Those might be marked as among the principal stages of romance-writing in this country before the time of Scott; but when Scott took his pen in hand, he formed a school and a description of romance for himself. It was in

his romances, even more than in his versified works, that Scott showed himself a great poet; it was by his romances that, in many most important particulars, he might be thought to take his place among all but the greatest poets of the world. A romance had the essence of poetry; it had everything of poetry except the versified form. In considering the character of Scott as a writer of romances, he would observe three things. In the first place, Scott was a great purifier. He was one of those who might claim for himself in prose that honour which belonged in great part to Wordsworth in verse, of elevating and purifying the aim of poetry, of directing it to nobler objects, and excluding from it whatever might be the temptation to pander to more depraved tastes, whatever tended to defile and to debase. Another quality, in which Scott was more remarkable still, was his power of reviving antiquity. He did not know whether he was right, but his belief was that in that extraordinary power of calling forth from the sepulchre the dry bones of former ages, of clothing them with sinew and with flesh, causing them to live and move before our eyes, and us to live and move among them, as if we belonged to them and they belonged to us,—in that peculiar and very rare power Scott was unrivalled among all the literary men the world had ever produced. Scott grew up with Jacobite predilections; and it must be admitted that in respect to one conspicuous character he had drawn a picture that was not true; and that was the picture of Mary Queen of Scots. It was not his fault; it was the revelations that had been made by historical inquiry since his time that had chiefly tended to draw down that queen from the elevation upon which her lamentable death had mainly availed to place her, and

to exhibit her to the world in the character of a very beautiful, a very clever, but at the same time, though we might hope she was purified by the affliction of her later days, a very bad woman. Scott did not know that; and one was almost glad that, with his affection for the Stuart family in all generations of it, he was spared the pain of those disclosures. He himself grew up with something like a worship of the Queen of Scots, which was entirely due to the novels of Scott; and undoubtedly the caution ought to be taken by the readers of Scott's works with reference to that one particular instance of character, which he, not knowingly, for he was a genuine lover of the truth, had been led to draw in colours different to the true ones. In considering the Jacobite predilections of Scott, it should be borne in mind that when he was a boy Scotland was yet full of horror at the cruelties which had attended the suppression of the rebellion of 1745. And that was an example that went to show how cruelty, like every bad and vicious thing, tended to produce a reaction unfavourable to the very purpose it was intended to serve. A Jacobite, with regard to his ancient politics, Scott was a strong Tory with regard to his modern politics. It was a very great honour to the Tory party in the 19th century to have been able to call their own such a name as that of Sir Walter Scott. Scott especially excelled in his power of drawing character. It was generally admitted that the very greatest exercise, perhaps, of poetical power was in the delineation of human character, and there were very few indeed, even among great writers, who had been able to achieve marked success in that department. There were two great and memorable names that were allowed to stand at the head of human kind. One was Homer, who lived probably three

thousand years ago; the other was Shakspeare, whom we were allowed in this country to call our own. The verdict of the literary world was nearly unanimous that those two were by far the greatest painters and portrayers of human character that had ever lived. He believed he should not be too audacious if he claimed for Scott the third place amongst the poets and the writers of all the nations of the world. He should be more than courageous, he would be presumptuous, if he were to give a confident judgment; but as far as his limited knowledge went, he would not hesitate to say that in the breadth and depth of his knowledge of human nature, and the diversity of its forms and shades, in his power of embodying all the characteristics and feelings of human nature in individual figures, after the two incomparable and unapproachable names, there was no name that could bear comparison successfully with Scott. Scores of portraits had been drawn by the hand of that extraordinary man. It was a question which used to be constantly discussed, and which would be, he believed, discussed to the end of the world—which was the finest romance of Scott? Everybody was entitled to have his opinion, however little that opinion might be worth; and he submitted as his own impression that the two finest and greatest of Scott's works, although there were formidable competitors, were "The Bride of Lammermoor" and "Kenilworth." The first was a most extraordinary romance, full of national character and historic features; a romance which that wonderful man produced in the very same year (1819) in which he also produced another work almost equally extraordinary, "Ivanhoe," with the scene laid in a different country, in a different age, and among totally different associa-

tions. In the "Bride of Lammermoor" there was much that deserved particular attention. Its greatest feature, and that which he thought gave to the novel its transcendent place, was a tragic grandeur and pathos such as was not exceeded in any work or any period of literature, and certainly such as was not exceeded, in his opinion, even by the noblest tragedies of the Greek poets. Another remarkable feature, in which he was inclined to think it stood alone, was this—though it was not a romance of a very great compass, it contained, along with the deeply and intensely tragic, some of the most remarkable comic development, in the character of Caleb Balderstone, that was to be found in the whole of his works; but such was the skill and great power of the artist, that, although he had thus done what hardly anybody else had ever ventured to do, namely, to place broad humour side by side with the intense darkness of calamity, yet the harmony of the work was not in the slightest degree disturbed. The broad humour of Shakspeare was to be found chiefly in the historical plays; it was hardly to be found at all in his most remarkable and deepest tragedies; but that achievement of placing one side by side with the other, had certainly been accomplished by Scott in the "Bride of Lammermoor." The novel of "Kenilworth" was distinguished by one great character that might be called august. It was a deeply, profoundly tragic work, full of historical character, such as Shakspeare himself might probably have exceeded, but such as he believed no other person ever born in these islands in modern times, except Shakspeare, could have equalled. Among the long list of Scott's works might be mentioned "Old Mortality," "Ivanhoe," "Waverley," "Guy Mannering," and many

others, any one of which almost would have been sufficient to make the fame and fortune of, if not to secure immortality for, an ordinary man. Sir Walter Scott poured forth those great works year after year; and naturally it would be conceived that, having, as he had, most winning, attractive, and genial qualities,—enough to have made him the most popular man of his day, even if he had not had a spark of genius—he had a high social position, the public appreciated his works, money flowed in by thousands for everything he wrote, and it would have seemed that he possessed everything that was required to constitute human happiness. But there was a cankerworm in it all. In his earlier days Scott seemed to have had a turn for commercial speculation in connection with literature. There was nothing base or ignoble in that; his mind could not harbour anything base or ignoble. His connection with Mr. Ballantyne proved fatal to his worldly prospects. When the firm failed, Sir Walter was involved in debt to the extent of £117,000, but he reduced it to £54,000 in his lifetime, and the balance was eventually paid in full. In the effort to redeem himself Sir Walter mercilessly wrought his faculties, and put a strain upon them such as it was impossible for them to bear. The remainder of his career was, if not as tragic, certainly as touching, as any of the marvellous pictures he himself had drawn in his romances. Sir Walter Scott was dragged down from his prosperity and glory through all those stages of disaster, under the pressure of labours he had voluntarily undertaken, until he was brought at last to a death that was certainly premature. In conclusion, he said that Sir Walter had left us a double treasure, the memory of himself and the possession of his works. Both of those

would endure. The recollection of a character so noble, so simple, so generous as his could not pass away. All that was best and highest in the age of chivalry was brought down by him into the midst of an age of invention, of criticism, of movement, of increased command over the powers of external nature, and possibly of an increasing servility to the wealth and luxury which by the use of those powers we were enabled to attain. As to his works, they were immortal. Nothing but the extinction of civilization could possibly extinguish Scott. If we did not now appreciate him as we ought, it was our misfortune, not his. The fashion of the moment might prefer the newest to the best; but as the calm order of nature was resumed after a storm, so the permanent judgment of mankind would regain its equilibrium, and would render the honours of poetical and literary achievement where they were due. These remarks were hasty and familiar, and would but ill bear criticism; yet he should not regret having made them if what he had said should tend in one willing heart or mind to produce a more reverent, a more just, and a more affectionate appreciation of the great Sir Walter Scott.

SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Ought "Communion" to be weekly?

Are the objections to the union of Church and State more political than religious?

Is political agitation consistent with Christian citizenship?

Does London regulate taste, fashion, opinion, and thought?

Is Fenianism an incorporation of "the roughs"?

Is doctrinal unity desirable?

Is England the Queen of the World in manufactures?

Ought railway accounts to be audited by the State [or by agents of the State]?

Should the Prime Minister of England be a peer or a commoner?

Would the alienation of the endowments of the Irish Church be justifiable?

Should the revenues of the Irish Church be employed as an education fund?

Does mental power depend on weight of brain?

Ought "criminals by profession" to be permitted to reside "at large"?

Would it be advisable to cause every inhabitant to register himself, with due authentication, as a person either of means, substance, independence, or industry?

Ought all the sects in Ireland to be endowed?

Literary Notes.

We have a Shilling Peerage, Baronetage, Knightage, and House of Commons; why should we not have a Shilling Handbook of the eminent in Literature, Science, and Art?

"The Collected Works of Leopold von Ranke," in 22 vols., has been begun in Germany.

A uniform and complete edition of the works of the late Rev. Dr. James Hamilton, in 8 vols., is announced.

Sir David Brewster, Principal of the University of Edinburgh, one of the most distinguished physicists in Europe, biographer of Newton, author of "Martyrs of Science," &c., died 11th Feb.

Mrs. Cobden intends to publish a collection of her husband's letters on the subjects which engrossed his political life.

There is a Smollett Street in Leghorn, where the author of "Humphrey Clinker" died.

M. Ladislaus Mickiewicz has just translated into French a manuscript of his father Adam, and publishes it under the title of "Les Premiers Siècles de l'Histoire de Pologne."

A book called "Revelations on Mexico," written, it is said, on

documents and information furnished by the late Emperor Maximilian, has just appeared at Stuttgart, but, as may be imagined, it will not be allowed to enter France. The author of it is an officer named Montlong, who was at one time secretary to his Majesty.

An American paper gives the following statistics of private libraries in the neighbourhood of Boston:—The library of the late Mr. Everett contains 7,000 vols.; of the late Mr. Prescott, the historian, 6,000 vols.; of the late Abbot Lawrence, 10,000 vols.; of the late Daniel Webster, 5,000 vols.; of the late Thomas Dowse, the learned leather-dresser, 4,000 vols.; of the late George Livermore, rich in Bibles and Biblical works, 4,000 vols.; of the late Theodore Parker, 10,000 vols.; of the late Rufus Choate, 7,000 vols.; and of Mr. Adams, the present American Minister in England, 18,000 vols.

As a means of estimating the progress of our nation, few things are likely to be more useful than "Other Times: the Liberal Leaders of Douglas Jerrold furnished to *Lloyd's Newspaper*, 1852-7," the publication of which is in a state of forwardness.

Goldwin Smith goes to America for the purpose of gaining on the spot the materials for a history of that "Great Plantation" of Anglo-Saxons.

Lord Brougham has been for some time engaged in preparing a History of his life and times as an autobiography.

The Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, after having finished his novel, "Norwood," is said to have commenced a "Life of Jesus Christ."

A translation into German of Chaucer's "Canterbury Tales," with Introduction and Notes, has been published by Hertzberg at a lower price than the Globe Shakspeare.

The Percy-folio Ballads and Romances is completed as a republication by subscription.

"Annals of the Bodleian Library," by Rev. W. D. Macray, M.A., is in the press.

Hefele's "History of Councils," a valuable contribution to Church History, is to be issued, translated, shortly.

The *Mastery Series*—"French" and "German," are announced as "now ready."

J. R. Magrath, M.A., has in the press "Selections from Aristotle's Organon," after the model, we presume, of F. A. Trendelenburg's "Elementa Logices Aristotelicæ."

It is reported that Thomas Carlyle is engaged on a work "of an autobiographical character." We think there is more likelihood that he may attempt, as his latest great work, to fulfil his mother's dearest wish, that he should write the "Life of Luther."

Mr. John Plummer is superintending a condensed embossed edition of the Life of the Prince Consort for the use of the blind; he has also in hand a biography of Dr. James Gale, inventor of the non-explosive gunpowder process, &c.

The original MS. autobiography of Franklin has been discovered at Paris. Large omissions had been made in the edition of 1817, and Mr. Bigelow is about to issue it in *extenso*.

It is said that a people's edition of the Queen's "Journal in the Highlands" will be published at *one shilling*.

At a book sale in the United States, a short time since, a copy of John Eliot's Indian Bible fetched 800 dollars, and a Dibdin edition of Milton fetched 1,300 dollars, or £300 sterling.

"A Life of David Garrick" is shortly to be issued, probably as a revised reprint from some excellent recent papers in the *Dublin University Magazine*.

"*Last Leaves*," being sketches and criticisms by the late Alexander Smith, are to be issued, with a memoir by P. P. Alexander, author of "Mill and Carlyle," &c., shortly.

A work on "Greece and Phœnicia," by the Hon. William Gladstone, M.P., is spoken of as nearly ready.

E. R. A. Serres, member of the French Academy, Professor of Anatomy and the Natural History of Man, author of many elaborate physiological treatises, died 22nd January.

Edward Viles has in preparation a "Glossary of Staffordshire Words and Phrases," in which he expects to supply several illustrations of Shakspeare.

Adelbert Stifter (born 1806), poet and novelist, died 28th January.

"The Physical Geography of Greenland" is to be described by the Arctic voyager, Robert Brown.

Book I. of Hooker's *Eccelesiastical Law*, is in the press as one of "The Clarendon Press Series."

A new and uniform edition of the Poetical Works of Robert Browning, in 6 vols., is projected.

The Conduct of the Understanding.

"Temples have their sacred images, and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind. But, in truth, the ideas and images in men's minds are the invisible powers that constantly govern them, and to these they all universally pay a ready submission. It is therefore of the highest concernment that great care should be taken of the understanding, to conduct it right in the search of knowledge, and in the judgments it makes."—JOHN LOCKE.

"THE Conduct of the Understanding!"—has not John Locke in one of those treatises of his, unparalleled for their weight of argument and mass of solid sense, devoted himself to the thorough exposition of that subject? He has indeed, and that too in a work of most concise yet full and lucid nature, left us a legacy of practical wisdom and potent argument; which, though written after his "Essay on the Human Understanding," and published posthumously, has been correctly characterized as "not unworthy to usher the mind into the great and magnificent building of which it may be regarded as the vestibule." Is the reader, on our giving him this reply, inclined to inquire, why—since the fact is as we have stated—we venture to choose for our present theme a topic on which one of England's master-thinkers has already uttered the pith and essence of his reflections? In such a case we might put him to the question thus:—Have you so thoroughly studied, so entirely incorporated, and so perfectly practised and applied the exquisite advice of that tract, as to be not only enlightened in intellect and fortified in character, but free from ignorance and prejudice, protected against the frauds of sophistry, and endowed with the combined adroitness and vigour of mind to bring about which, in all his readers, was the object of John Locke in the composition of this treatise "Of the Conduct of the Understanding?" If so, of course, we do not write for him; for he requires not from us any guidance, invitation, counsel, or encouragement; although, considering that it was one of Locke's chief aims to humble the pride of human intellect, by dwelling upon the insignificance of man in himself, and his weakness in regard to the acquisition of all knowledge, but especially of self-knowledge, we might safely question the discipleship to Locke of any one who would make such an averment. We write for those who feel the need of guidance in the employment of the faculties of which they find themselves possessed; who are conscious in themselves of the want of power to think rightly, to measure the exact proportions of aim and means, and to regulate the activities of their thinking faculties. To such persons we propose to offer a few remarks on the means of training which may best be adopted to enable them to qualify their intellect for such an acquisition of

knowledge, and a mastery over it as may fit them for pursuing study with interest, pleasure, and profit. We cannot give any exhaustive exposition of the whole topic. We expect our readers to supplement by their own reflection the necessary deficiencies of a brief paper on one of the most important subjects of practical philosophy and personal culture. We calculate on thoughtful readers, who are willing to accept of directive hints, and to think out the indications given. To condense the essence of reflections which might aptly supply material for a large metaphysical volume into a few pages is no easy matter. Of course we lay no claim to originality of subject, and scarcely even to freshness of matter. We have read the best treatises our literature possesses on the subject in hand, and it is not unlikely that much may recur to us, in our course, due primarily to these; but we hope that both in form and aptness the following observations may aid many of our readers in forming just views, and instituting right practices in "the conduct of the understanding."

The word Understanding (*verstand*) in the German philosophy is employed to denote the *dianoetic*, not the *noetic*, faculty—the faculty of relations or comparisons, not that of principles, of reason (*vernunft*). It is the power of thought which unites the diversity furnished to us by the senses into one whole—the possessor of conceptions arrived at by its own appetencies for the thinking of objects, the capacity of giving distinct envisagement to the impressions made on the senses by experience, as conceptions derived from and dependent of outward facts, but rendered by abstraction and generalization the signs or marks of many individuals in common. This signification, though adopted and employed to a certain extent by Coleridge and Sir Wm. Hamilton, as well as several of their followers, and possessing in some regards great value, is not suitable for our present purpose. In this paper we rather employ the old sense which it bears in the native schools of thought, in which as Reid says, "The Understanding comprehends our contemplative powers—by which we perceive objects, by which we conceive or remember them, by which we analyse or compound them, and by which we judge and reason concerning them."* Locke curtly defines the Understanding as meaning "the discerning faculties of man," and remarks of it that, "like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object."† Though with Isaac Watts, the writer might say, "By Understanding I mean that faculty whereby we are enabled to apprehend the objects of knowledge, generals or particulars, absent or present, and to judge of their truth or falsehood, good or evil." Yet, he thinks with Coleridge, that "perhaps the safer use of the term, for general purposes, is to take it as the mind, or rather as the man himself considered as a concipient as well as a precipient being.

* *On the Intellectual Powers*, Essay I., chap. vii., Hamilton's Edition, p. 242.

† "The Human Understanding," Book I., chap. i.

and Reason as a power supervening."—"Statesman's Manual," Appendix B, p. 264.

It is true that man is really a compound unity of being; that he consists of (1) a body, in which the capacities of sensation are lodged; (2) an understanding or intellect, by which he acquires his knowledge of external objects, investigates truth in the sciences, combines means to attain the ends he has in view, and shares with or communicates to his fellows the acquisitions he has by these means gained; (3) a will or power of determining on or withholding from action; (4) a conscience, i.e., a faculty or combination of faculties, by the action of which we acquire ideas of right and wrong regarding actions, and feel within ourselves (as the result of these) emotions of approbation or disapprobation of such actions—it yields a sense of duty to our moral relations. But it is not in this sense of entire manhood we purpose now to speak of the understanding, we must limit our aim by the space at our disposal, and hence can at present for the most part treat of the conduct of the understanding in relation to *intellectual* culture rather than in *moral* training, as that power which examines, arranges, and compares conceptions; reflects upon and thinks about them with the design of gaining a knowledge of the truth regarding them. The understanding as intellect may be considered as comprising all those powers of mind which are exerted in the acquisition and the elaboration of knowledge; *sensitivity*, or the capacity of feeling the impressions of experience; *perceptivity*, or the power of envisaging, representing and forming notions or cognitions of phenomena in the outward world; *consciousness*, or the faculty of knowing the changes which take place within our being; *abstraction* and generalization, activities by the combined operation of which our impressions or notions of individual things are transformed into a knowledge of classes; *memory*, or the store house of the mind, in which all past knowledge is preserved, returned at call, and made available for present use; *imagination*, which vitalizes conception and constructs or reconstructs images of them; *induction*, which collects the materials of proof and ranges them under explanatory forms of thought; *deduction*, which applies the general principles of thought to the elucidation or explanation of the circumstances of experience; *reason*, the subordinating power of the mind, the ruling faculty of thought as thought, the faculty of *principles*, in the search for which reasoning is undertaken, for the application of which reasoning is employed. "All our cognition begins from the *senses*, proceeds thence to the *understanding*, and finishes in *reason*," as Kant says, or as Coleridge expounds it,—“the understanding yields the science of phenomena and their subsumption under distinct kinds and sorts (genera and species). Its functions supply the ends and constitute the possibility of *experience*; but they remain mere logical forms except in so far as materials are given by the senses or sensations. The *reason*, on the other hand, is the science of the *universal*, having the ideas of *oneness* and *allness*, as its two

elements or primary factors. In the language of the old schools—unity, omneity, totality.”—“*Statesman's Manual*,” Appendix C, p. 251.

Sensations supply the initiative; perceptivity shows the mind to be appreciative: memory and imagination are representative faculties: the understanding is administrative and the reason is legislative. Each power possesses and exercises its own special function, and the human mind would be fatally defective or at least ineffective if any one of them was wanting. Equally defective or ineffective must the mind be, if, through want of culture and exercise, some of its powers have been neglected, been left untrained or been mistrained. The wholesomeness of the understanding is only possible when all the faculties are cultivated, and cultivated most thoroughly. It is the self-developing wholesomeness of culture which we are desirous of advocating and enforcing in this paper on “the conduct of the understanding;” and we wish to advise such a mode of proceeding in all study and life as shall conduce not only to the mature growth, but also the skilful discipline of the whole of the intellectual capacities of man.

Culture implies both development and discipline, perhaps we ought rather to say, disciplined development: and the conduct of this process of controlled growth requires that we should encourage the vitality of the mind, give scope to its energies, inspire its efforts, direct, train, and regulate its powers, educate its inherent capacities, teach it the best forms of activity, induce it to muster all its might to the management of its aims, drill all its specialities to orderly submissiveness, set it constantly and vigorously to the execution of duty under such intellectual generalship as may excite while it overmasters all the endowments of the spirit. With the intent, and some hope of being able to supply a few concise, sound, and practical hints on the means and method of the generalship requisite to excite, control, and invigorate the intellect, we shall now proceed to the advice-giving which has suggested itself as likely to be beneficial in the present state of the public mind on general but especially self-education.

1. *Observation is the necessary starting point of knowledge, and educated observativeness is one of the primary and essential requisites of correct thinking.*

To the observant mind the world is full of wonders. The barren rock bears in its bosom the treasures of truth, the mere air becomes an entire magazine of science, the flowers receive a new life and add intelligible pleasure to their beauty and the delight of knowledge to their fragrance, the river teems with suggestions of discoveries and illustrations of the mysteries of force and motion, the pebbles on the sea-shore speak of immense processes of change, and the ocean itself communicates a whole circle of associations extending from the momentum of the waves to the heavenly mechanism which regulates the tides, and the very sand-grain or dust-atom contains

within its tiny core the very secrets of the morning stars and the space-careering comets. But it is impossible for us now to pursue this theme, tempting though it is; nor are we able here to undertake to tell "what to observe," or "how to observe" with any effectiveness. "The observer is not," J. S. Mill says, "he who merely sees the thing which is before his eyes, but he who sees what parts that thing is composed of," or the precise qualities of which it is possessed. "There is not properly an art of observing: there may be rules for observing." "They do not teach us how to do the thing but how to make ourselves capable of doing it." "No general rules can, however," as Sir George C. Lewis remarks, "be given applicable to the mode of conducting observation in all sciences. Each science must lay down its peculiar canons of observation, and direct the attention of its followers to the proper objects of observation, and the best means of observing them." Passive observation employs itself on the objects which come unsought for into the presence of, or in contact with, our senses. Active observation is an investigative process, the observer has a definite purpose, and puts himself in the most favourable position for acquiring the information of which he is in search by close, steady, accurate, and intentional examination. Such observation is not an easy and spontaneous exercise of the sensitive faculties, but an exertion of discriminating vigilance over phenomena and the impressions they make. The agents or instruments of observation are the sensitive capacities.

Sensations are—

- | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|---|-------------|
| 1. Common
(Coenesthetic) | { | a. General, e.g. organic life, muscularity, tone or atony of the System. | |
| | | b. Determinate, e.g. hunger, thirst, nausea, titillation, resistance, &c. | |
| 2. Specific, | { | a. Semi-emotional, | { 5. Touch. |
| | | b. Intelligental, | |
| | | { 1. Taste, | |
| | | { 2. Smell, | |
| | | { 3. Hearing, | |
| | | { 4. Sight, | |

The senses of man stand between the phenomena of the external world and the inward world of thought. They constitute, as it were, the windows through which man looks out upon the domain of Nature. If we wish to know correctly what lies without us, still more, if we desire to enjoy the creation around us, we must neither keep these sensitive avenues of information and enjoyment closed nor impeded. Every sensibility of man is capable of education, of being made more acute and systematic, more exact and more capable of truly representing and interpreting the facts brought before them. If the vision be impaired, the hearing dull, the touch paralysed, we all know that great inconveniences arise, and yet it is asserted to be demonstrable that all our senses are educable and capable of a far higher degree of sensitiveness, and hence that we are voluntarily insensate to a large extent, and so far cut off from provided sources of knowledge and delight.

We ought to set ourselves carefully to acquire the skill of habit

in the use of our senses, and should train them invariably to note and mark with accuracy and particularity everything that is brought into envisionment by the senses. Hence the observative sciences demand more attention than they usually receive; so do drawing as an educative agency, and musical culture as means of adding not only to pleasure but to sensitive aptitude; and we may add to these the exercise of the constructive faculty in making diagrams or forming models.

2. *Experiment ought to be employed wherever possible, as a test of, and a supplement to, observation.*

Knowledge requires to be determinate and trustworthy; to be so, it must be both qualitative and quantitative. The senses, though ordinarily able to serve the common purposes of life, are scarcely ever reliable, still less infallible in their notices of facts—they cannot precisely estimate time, weight, degree, shades, momentum, or even number. Hence, the impressions they yield are vague, inadequate, and insufficient to form the data of exact inductions. We require experiment to enable us to make them precise, and reduce them to calculable evidences, as well as to give the means of repeating them readily and correctly, as frequently as we need or please. By instrumental aids and contrivances this observation may be greatly facilitated and thoroughly verified. Hence, it is of high educative importance that experience should be tested, verified, and reproduced by experiment, so that truth may be the outcome and flower of our researches, and man may be enabled to reduce nature to servitude, and phenomena to law. Such a regulated and educated apprehensiveness ought to be productive of great advantage in culture.

Simple Apprehension is	1. Observative,	1. Sensation,	{ Impressions.
		2. Perception,	{ Names.
	2. Experimental,	1. Reproductive,	{ Ideation.
		2. Reproductive similarity,	{ Terms.
			{ Definition.
			{ Memory.
			{ Recollection.

3. *We ought to endeavour to form perceptions at once definite and precise, carefully avoiding the extension of the precept beyond the actual sensations felt and apprehended. We must accept what is given in the sphere of experience, and must neither add thereto nor diminish from it. Whether a percept is on one side a *presentation*, and on the other a *representation*, or the former or the latter alone it is equally essential to truth that no falsification or sophistication intervenes between the impression made by the object and the effect produced thereby in the consciousness of the thinker. The perception ought to affect the percipency in exact harmony with the fact of its being. It may be of importance to note that all our—*

Perceptions may be, .	{	1. Obscure,	{	Indefinite or Confused. Imperfect.			
		2. Clear,		{	1. Complex		{
					2. Distinct.	{	

In seeking to grasp up into unity the various qualities by which it is characterised, by which it impresses and affects us, we ought to endeavour after the attainment of clear, positive, and adequate views of all that inheres in the objects perceived and transformed into concepts both in their parts and in their entirety, of the inclusion and exclusion of objects in certain classes, and of the reproductive accuracy of the perceptions we form from the sensations we experience. Exercise in definition, classification, and comparison materially aid the mind in the attainment of distinct, precise, and perfect conceptions, not only of realities but of the words which are employed as their signs.

Sensation and	{	reveal to us what lies	{	1. External and Relative Nature,	{	Duty
Perception		beyond ourselves, as		2. External and Absolute Law,		

4. *The whole contents of Consciousness requires accurate investigation.* Self-knowledge is possible only by persistent personal examination. To some extent "material nature furnishes a screen against which the human spirit projects its own image, and thus becomes capable of self-inspection;" and such a form of self-research is often of high value as a corroborative of consciousness, and its revelations to us. Consciousness is the power of self-recognition, the fundamental function and condition of intelligence, and it contains within itself all the phenomena of the thinking subject. "Consciousness," says Sir Wm. Hamilton, "lies at the root of all knowledge. Consciousness is itself the one highest source of comprehensibility and illustration." "Consciousness, thus in its simplicity, necessarily involves three things:—1, a recognising or knowing subject; 2, a recognised or known modification; and 3, a recognition or knowledge by the subject of the modification." "Consciousness, in its relation to the subject or person conscious, is," according to H. L. Mansel, "of two kinds; or rather is composed of two elements, (1) the presentative or intuitive, and (2) the representative or reflective. The phenomena of the former class may be distinguished by the general name of *Intuitions*, those of the latter by that of *thoughts*." "Presentative consciousness," says the same author, "contains two constituent elements—(1) the conscious subject, and (2) the object of which that subject is conscious. Representative consciousness contains three elements:—(1) the subject, (2) the object (*i.e.*, the image), and (3) the concept or general notion mediating between them." *Intuitions* are "all those states of consciousness in which the actual presence of an object within or without the mind is the primary fact which leads

to its recognition, as such, by the subject." *Thoughts* are "all those states of consciousness in which the presence of the object is the result of a representative act on the part of the subject." "In the former case the object is *given to*, in the latter it is *given by* the conscious act."

Sensation, remembrance, apprehension, conception, every actual energy or exerted passion of the mind, gives an inward feeling—which may be cultivated into a perception—of the capacity, energy, or passion which is exerted in or which excites the mind. Hence the possibility of educating consciousness and of training it to that vigilant observativeness which makes it a useful revealer of the truth of things regarding ourselves. Most men while cognizant of the streams of phenomena constantly pouring along the channels of the senses, and more or less observant of the activities they exert, leave the flow and pressure of the phenomena of consciousness almost wholly unobserved; and hence it is that so frequently appeals made to the consciousness of men fail in their effects. Consciousness is to many a blurred and blotted, unread and unreadable scroll, on the decipherment of which they have expended no pains, yea, rather on the proper outwriting and registration of which they have made no effort. Like as, if in the faint mist of a dream, sensations, recollections, energies, passions, experiences, blend into indeterminateness, and human personality appears but a shadowy congeries of phenomena—joyous or unpleasant.

The phenomena of human nature are far more wonderful than even the phenomena of the vast and glorious external universe, in which the tent of our life is pitched awhile. Yet, how few know what manner of men they are; if they can forget the appearance of their natural face after beholding it in a mirror, how much less likely are they to know themselves in their inward being, upon which they only look, if they look at all, in the reflection given from the lake of consciousness ruffled by the storms of passion, or stirred by the oar-strokes of experience along its surface? Hours of quiet ought to be devoted to self-examination, to search into the nature and operations of our own minds, to acquire a knowledge of our own likes and dislikes, habits of feeling and thought, general tendencies and special appetencies, capacities for thought or work, and the purposes we most frequently encourage within us. Besides this, we should frequently watch the progress and growth of thought and feeling in ourselves, observe how ideas interlink and associate themselves in us, how passions arise and affect us, what concepts have the greater affinity to our minds, as a help in our endeavours after self-culture. Above all, we ought to keep before ourselves the various operations of thought, whether they come into consciousness by choice or by involuntary associations in order that we may be able to curb or chide, contradict or encourage, favour or despise, control and regulate all the activities within us.

Such a culture of the consciousness will make us masters of our minds in a large measure. Sensations will hold their power from

us, not exert it in or over us as lords; perceptions will form themselves before us maturely, and memory will more frequently manifest itself as remembrance than require coercion to recollection. The associations which act so important a part in life will be brought under control, and the sympathies we form for certain emotions will be regulated by a knowledge of their results and consequences. Our personality will become individual life.

5. *The judgment is in need of training to precision, power, pertinence, and impartiality.* The late Prof. Faraday declared as his experience, that "generally mankind is willing to leave the faculties which relate to judgment almost entirely uneducated, and their decisions at the mercy of ignorance, prepossessions, the passions, and even accident." "Even judgments on sensations are vitiated," he says, "by our applying ordinary solutions to extraordinary impressions, by want of keeping correct remembrance of former impressions, by the power of one impression to occupy the whole available sphere of consciousness, and to hinder our being consciously impressed by weaker ones equally truly, present, and experienced; and by our being too hasty in our conclusions on data too scanty or too imperfectly examined."

If we are subject to mistake in the interpretation of our self-impressions, we are much more liable to error when we proceed to deduce from these impressions (as supplied to us by our ordinary experience), the relation of cause and effect; and the accuracy of our judgment, consequently, is more endangered. Thus our dependence should be upon carefully observed facts and the laws of Nature. By the self-examination proposed in our preceding division, a conviction of ignorance respecting many things known to others will arise in the mind, and this conviction will incline us to keep our minds open to correction on any point whatever, a good reason being offered. We must learn to know the conditions of knowledge, get clear ideas of the possible and impossible in regard to it, comprehend the true interest and force of the language employed about the subject of our inquiries, and proportion our judgment precisely to the evidence afforded—not hesitating at *reservation* when caution demands suspension of judgment, on account of defect of evidence for a decision. Patience, labour, and humility of thought are to be cultivated. "Because the education is internal it is not the less needful." Indolence should not tempt us to neglect it, nor vanity or weariness induce us to evade it. It is requisite to the perfection of our nature and to the comfort and worth of our daily life.

According to Aristotle—

Judgments are	{	1. Demonstrable, 2. Assertive, 3. Problematic,	}	resulting in	{	1. Science. 2. Belief. 3. Opinion.
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But Kant makes only a twofold classification of them:—Analytical, explicative or explanatory; and Synthetical, extending or

additive, that is, bringing together into a new unity two notions which do not necessarily demand of us to think the one as contained in the other. Of course the laws of logic regarding judgments must be observed and duly obeyed, habits of deliberation must be formed, and the reflective consciousness must be exercised if we would become capable of judging accurately, or deciding rightly.

6. *The associative faculties require regulation and culture.*—Association is one of the most subtle and powerful of mental acts. Ideas consociate themselves according to (1) *proximity*, (2) *similarity*. The Law of *proximity* is that “actions, sensations, states, ideas, emotions, &c., which occur together or in close succession, tend to cohere suggestively in such way that when any one of these recur to or arise within the mind the others are apt to rise into the sentience;” and the law of similarity is that “actions, sensations, states, ideas, emotions, &c., tend to revive *like* impressions, &c., previously experienced.”*

These laws of association are now admitted to be genuine inductions from the facts of mental phenomena, and a large number of the operations of the mind are found to be explicable by them. According to the predominancy of one or other of those modes of mental activity a different type of character emerges, forming as they do the ground elements of origination and imitation respectively. Besides these main forms of associated thought there may be many compounds of them, such as *selective* association, *contrastive*, *constructive*, *obstructive*, &c.; all of which, as they are operated on by time, place, circumstance, intent, &c., excite the mind diversely. The guardianship and overmasterment of our associative activities are of paramount importance, not only in an intellectual but in a moral point of view. It is on all hands admitted that the regulative government of our associations are the chief elements in education, and exert an admirable effect on the habits and the life. Over the arrangements, connexions, and recurrences of ideas it becomes us to be watchful and to be careful to avoid the companionship or association in our minds of any thoughts or states which are opposed to the interests of the intellect or the character.

7. *The reasoning capacities ought to be diligently, fully, and faithfully trained.*—It is not only in the *induction* of thoughts from facts, of laws from phenomena, or of opinions from circumstances; nor in the *deduction* of fresh explanations, applications or regulations in thought, life, or skill from previously acquired truths and general principles; it is not merely in the critical investigation of scientific inquiries, of political or moral questions, or in researches into history, antiquity, literature, or other forms of thought, nor in

* For a full discussion of this subject *historically*, we must refer the reader to Sir Wm. Hamilton's edition of Reid's Works, Note D * *, pp. 889—910; and for a *theoretic* exposition, to Prof. Alexander Bain's “The Senses and the Intellect,” from pages 348 and 451 of which the two laws in the text are almost verbally reproduced.

colligation and exposition of the views which may have arisen in our minds in the course of our investigative researches, that reasoning is required. It is needful for the arrangement of thought and the attainment of truth, as well as for the guidance of life and the regulation of practice. In fact it is the duty of man, in all the circumstances and relations of life, to be and to act as a reasonable creature. Reason ought, therefore, to be the legislator of life.

Most of the great questions which interest and agitate human life, and make it busy with concerns of moment, present themselves as many-sided, showing reasons on each point of view for the acceptance or rejection of one or other of the opinions that may be entertained upon them. The power of decision is in such cases put in difficulty, the natural shrewdness of the mind is incapable of estimating the evidence without formal culture, or of calculating watchfulness. On this account logic has been constructed, and much of the highest intellect of every age has been devoted to the exposition and exemplification of the laws which ought to regulate reflective thought, when engaged in the endeavour to discover truth in any of the varied forms in which it has interest for man. We have often exhorted our readers to acquire a mastery over the forms and processes, not of argumentation only, but of all the legitimate forms of thinking; and we have not unfrequently expounded the views of the highest intellect on these subjects. We shall not now give any abstract of the positive teaching of logic, but shall bring together a few hints likely to aid in the prevention, dispersion, or detection of errors in thinking.

In the culture of the understanding it is undoubtedly beneficial to know the proper uses and processes of reasonable thought, and to possess such a habitual watchfulness of mind as to keep the intellect always acutely sensitive to the formal and conventional modes of mental activity, which the greatest thinkers have found to be and have described as the laws of thought. But it is scarcely less beneficial to the earnest student to be made acquainted with some at least of the most frequent errors committed in reasoning, not through intentional fallaciousness of thought, but through the natural proclivities of the mind when untrained and unrestrained. One or two of those which suggest themselves to us as being of special concernment in the present condition of intellectual culture, we shall endeavour to indicate with as much brevity as is consistent with pertinent statement and precautionary accuracy.

(1.) *Arguments from analogy are apt to be delusive* (a) in themselves, (b) in suggesting possibilities as if they were probabilities, (c) in inclining us to deduce positive conclusions from observations based on negative and contingent particulars, (d) in leading us to assert certainty where we have only grounds for probability.

Analogy does not mean similarity in *qualities* but in *relations*. The former gives rise to example or metaphor, and often leads to false analogies. The latter alone gives logical satisfaction. The trustworthiness of reasonings from analogy depends upon the

accuracy of the observations made, the number of the relations noted to be similar, the intrinsic and essential character of the relations observed, and the certainty that the relations thought of actually belong to and manifest themselves in the matters to be or being analogically compared.

Similar co-suggest each other, and we are liable to form the idea that those things which we think together subjectively must possess an objective likeness of cause or effect, of means or end, or of concomitancy of qualities. These suggestions may thus be erroneous *in themselves*; but they may be still more erroneous by leading us to form an idea regarding the possibility that such analogies, seeing they are thinkable, are also probable; or that because there is no radical incompatibility, in thought, between the analogies we find suggested, there is, in the nature of things, no radical incompatibility between them. Whereas this is deducing a positive thought from a merely negative supposition, and from a mere contingency affirming a likelihood in essence. From this we are readily inclined to think as certain many things which so far from being even probable are only thinkably possible. We ought always to remember that "though a useful stimulus and guide in investigation analogy is by itself a very doubtful guarantee of truth." As suggestions, analogies may lead the mind to the discovery or acquisition of useful knowledge, but as the sole ground of the belief or acceptance of any idea as truth, it never of itself communicates to thought more than a high degree of probability, while it may only supply evidence of the mere thinkability of the analogy accepted from the suggestive faculties.

(2.) *We have a tendency to accept the thinkable as the credible, and the credible as the probable, which requires restraint.*

The constructive activity of thought is seldom intermitted, and the hypothetical capacities of man are wondrously agile. Thousands of hypotheses lie like wrecks and ruins along the whole coastline of science. But the Logic of Imagination is not the Logic of Nature. The categories of the thinkable, although they may have direct relativity to all experience, do not create the phenomena which experience impresses upon the human mind, and we must receive experience with submission to the laws of perception under which they are given. The fancies of the poets and the characters of novelists are all thinkable, but they are not therefore actual; many of the facts they relate and the incidents they describe are credible, but they are not on that account to be admitted into our minds as probable in experience, nature, history and life; so with the progeny of thought which circumstances excite in us, they are thinkable, and as such may be pleasant or painful in the impressions they make; but the fact of their thinkability, though it may incline us to give them credence, is no proof that they are credible, still less can we infer their probability from their conceivableness. The possible in thought is not necessarily the probable in experience, or the credible in reality. Conceivability by us is, indeed, a con-

dition of knowledge, but it is not necessarily either a condition of existence or an evidence of actuality. Yet, how frequently has a plausible, i.e., simply thinkable, explanation of phenomena been elevated into a conclusion of science and a criterion of truth! Against this rash tendency of mind the man who would rightly conduct his understanding must diligently guard, especially in new investigations.

As an argument *against* impossibility thinkability is potent; as an argument *for* possibility it is quite irrelevant. To say, for aught we know, a thing may be true and in accordance with "the world's incessant plan," though a common, is not a reasonable form of thought. Our duty, as the possessors of thought, is to search and examine every concept of the mind, and every impression received from the external world, that we may find the truth that is in them, and the truth regarding them, to avoid with equal sedulousness assumptions and presumptions.

(3.) *We have a tendency to lay great stress upon and to give undue weight to the little we know—especially when little is or can be known*, and hence to draw wide inferences from narrow premises.

Logic tests reasoning and measures the amount of credence due to the inferences deduced from given statements of facts. Its chief educative benefit is to restrain the too hasty and inaccurate reasoning to which men are prone. Fancy, conjecture, and analogy are so fertile in their productiveness that they can provide "reasons as plentiful," though seldom so good even, "as blackberries," and that too without Falstaff's abhorrence—"compulsion." But these rapidly extemporized and gourd-like growths require to be carefully investigated, and must not be fallen in love with at first sight—either for their beauty, their convenience, or their originality. They must be submitted to due tests and proper verification, and in regard to them the maxim of the late amiable and estimable Faraday is especially to be considered as conveying the highest truth, "that point of self-education which consists in teaching the mind to resist its desires and inclinations, until they are proved to be right, is the most important of all, not only in things of natural philosophy, but in every department of daily life." The hot impatience of the mind is curbed with difficulty, but curbed it must be if we would attain self-progress, and gain the proper landing-places of thought. When we know little we must infer with great caution, and measure every inference carefully with the foundation on which it rests, lest we build our pyramid upon its apex, and find it impossible to get it to preserve its balance and to conform to the general laws of things, while perched so fancifully on the narrow pivot of substantial knowledge, which slight observation or imperfect experiment has cleared off for its erection.

(4.) *We are apt to forget, neglect, or measure erroneously the degrees of probability in the evidence we reason from.*—The degrees of probability form a series beginning with mere possibility and rising up to a moral certainty, which only stops short at infallibility

by not attaining demonstration. But we have no *metre* of probability exactly marked off and specially constructed to show with an invariable irrefragibility of indication the precise degree of likelihood to be attached to any given idea or sequence of impressions. In great minds endowed with the tremulous sensitiveness of genius this is felt by the fine instinctive tact of their spirits, and noted with the accuracy of mathematics; but in common minds degrees of probability make slight marks, and supply faint indications of their nearness to deficiency or sufficiency of proof. We seldom carefully or even distinctly mark in our own thoughts, still less do we announce or correctly express in our language, the degree of probability which is or ought to be attached to our inferences, and hence there is covered by this one word so large a field, that there is ample scope for sophistication, intentional or unintentional, inasmuch as it stretches from the doubtfully possible to the morally certain, and varies in the amount of credence of which it is worthy from mere indifference to assent, opinion, belief, and faith. To acquire a conception of the probable, more accurate than that possessed by the vulgar, is the duty of every person who educates himself with any degree of philosophic completeness, and to learn to avoid the common indefiniteness attached to those terms in which contingency is involved, is a prime requisite in a judicious thinker.

(5.) *We are prone to believe any fact or opinion which is favourable to our own views, ideas, or plans.*—Into our thoughts we inject a portion of our own vitality, and with it a portion of our self-love. Hence, we cherish our opinions with something like the love we bestow on our children, our property, or our bodily frames; we love them because they are *ours*, and learn to attach ourselves to them with the intensity of a possessory feeling. Hence it is that so few men can discuss any difficult point with good nature and respect for the understanding of those against whose opinions theirs collide, and hence the bitter personality often injected into debate when we seem likely to see the reasons which had previously determined our views swept away from us by sound logic, and to find ourselves convinced either of ignorance, carelessness, or imbecility. To be calm and strong, to be prompt to perceive an opinion, and ready to withdraw from the maintenance of an argument when its falsity or ineffectiveness has become apparent, are marks of a high moral order of mind—a mind which recognises truth as the best of all things for the intellect, and counts the worth of gaining it an ample reward for the loss of his pet ideas and favourite views. To be able to ascertain and comprehend the ideas of others, and to know and appreciate the reasons on account of which they are favourably entertained, and to be capable of weighing, estimating, and comparing the evidence on which belief is given to them, are both requisites in the mind of any one who would keep his understanding fairly, fully, and impartially open for the reception of truth, and be free from the opinionatedness

which inclines one to love and welcome all that seems to favour the views to which he has made up his thoughts, or the tenets he may have embraced. We ought, on the contrary, to look with the gravest jealousy on every statement or fact which chimes in at once with our foregone theories and anticipatory desires.

(6.) *An overweight is frequently attached by us to the authority of men of genius, distinction, and note.*—We are very far indeed from being desirous of undervaluing the rightful authority of the first and foremost men in the files of time. But it is very requisite, both for their true fame and our own good, that we learn to admire wisely, and consent to reverence the mighty men of olden time, or the distinguished thinkers and writers of our own age, discreetly. When the vote of eminent men is presented to us as, in itself, a ground of belief, we have a right to examine the nature of the vote in question—to inquire, for instance, if the matter on which any such judgment is quoted was one on which the main might of the person's intellect was exercised, if the opinion was delivered deliberately, and regarding a subject of which the investigation was full, if it was given with disinterestedness and without motive for, or probable liability to mistake, and if it was expressed forthright on the merits of the question, or on some accidental phase of it. Moreover, we are entitled to ask whether, in either its grounds, reasonings, or results, it is quite impossible to submit the opinion given in some form or other to the ordinary examination of common sense, or the investigative effort of the logical powers or the analytic faculties.

We find that we must now seriously restrain our pen, though the matter we intended to comprise in these jottings has not been nearly exhausted. We had intended to include a few words on habits of thought and modes of study, on the art of reading books, on mental sympathies, on the formation of summaries and epitomes of knowledge, on the way and need of getting to the sources of information or the authorities for facts, on the employment of experience at home, among relations and friends, in society, and for the benefit of others; and on the advantage of co-operative efforts, companionship and emulation in reading, study, investigation, and reproduction. Such matter as may appropriately be brought before our readers at an aftertime we shall note down and mature further, but our present paper would be incomplete indeed did we omit to insist on our two next propositions.

(7.) *We should endeavour to methodize thought, reading, acquisitions, and efforts.*—Methodization is the grand secret of concentration. Knowledge methodized packs well, and is always available. We must summarize, epitomize, even, if it is possible, epigrammize our knowledge; get it set down in essences, and put into the least possible bulk, and have it so definite and precise that on occasion the acquisitions of our studies may come to us at once, when we do call for them. We must settle in our minds the essential, the collateral, the subordinate, and the subservient. We must carefully

discriminate the *why* and the *how* from the *wherefore* and the *what for*. Dates must be accurately allocated, doings correctly assigned, doctrines, discoveries, dogmas, and designs, fairly arranged; duties plainly and palpably inferred and settled; plans exactly marked, persons individualized, sayings precisely remembered, characters honestly judged, events properly estimated, opinions duly distinguished from beliefs, facts kept separate from fancies, inference be eliminated from incidents, speculations held aloof from science, and realized knowledge from recorded or recollected information. Method is essential alike in science and art, history and biography, literature and life. Method is the curator of the acquisitions of the mind.

(8.) *We ought neither to expect unity of belief nor community of opinion in men.*—Belief depends on evidence; and the estimation of evidence depends (1) on the qualities and powers of the mind, (2) on the culture it has received, (3) on the opportunities of investigation afforded or employed. Belief is firmest, though it is not therefore most correct, when there is no opposite consideration effective in the mind against its being held. The want of opposite considerations, however, may arise, (1) from their not having been presented, (2) from their not having been looked at investigatively, (3) from incompetence to see their incidence or feel their force, (4) from the activity of a passion or prejudice against change or inquiry. Doubt, in its form of disbelief, is liable to similar definition and characteristics. Doubt and belief are alike impaired by the number of contrary considerations suggested to, brought before, operating upon, or active within the mind. On this account it is that it is so necessary that man should endeavour to keep his mind as a clear glass *through* which all thoughts may pass, and be seen as they are without voluntary distortion or incompetent misapprehension. Due investigation will produce true results exactly in the proportion of the honesty and sobriety with which they are pursued. But, inasmuch as minds differ, and the capacities of men for receiving, colligating, and finding the consequences of thought, vary, beliefs and doubts, may, perhaps must, be different in degree, vividness, importance, and results; and hence men are not justified in expecting, still less in enforcing, unity of belief and community of opinion. This should teach charity of judgment, prevent dogmatism, and induce to kindly controversy and just criticism, founded on the merits of the thought, not on the supposed demerits of the person entertaining it.

We halt here and now. We feel assured that to the intelligent and earnest we have said enough. We shall not attempt to enforce, by exhortation, the hints we have endeavoured to set forth, though all the resources of rhetoric might well be exhausted in commendation of the conduct of the understanding.

Literature.

IS CARLYLE OR MACAULAY THE GREATER WRITER?

CARLYLE—V.

It is with great pleasure I am able again to make common cause with my erst antagonist R. S., and to thank him for an able addition to this debate. What he has said is, notwithstanding the vulgar and impertinent observation of W. W. in last month's Magazine, worth saying, and well said. Indeed, his contributions to the *Controversialist* are always welcome and deserving of attention, however different our own views and principles may be. I make these remarks the more readily, as having even now to encounter him in another place, and will here do my best to act as his squire in defence of an ill-understood and much mis-represented writer, to whom my obligations are many, in the matter not only of high enjoyment, but of real and enduring profit derived from the perusal of his works. Whether, then, does Carlyle or Macaulay stand on the higher level of intellectual power? and which exerts the wider and better influence upon thought and on endeavour? Such is the true definition, in my view, of the question before us. It is an estimate of the relative character, and spirit, and strength of the two authors, as illustrated by their written and spoken words. Speeches are in the present day as truly publications, or means for moving the minds and feelings of men, as those which are directly committed to type, without passing through the intermediate stage of oratorical delivery.

Comparison between the two is extremely difficult, and would in all probability never have been instituted but for the *accident*, as E. D. puts it, of both having been occupied in historical presentation, and both having come prominently before the public eye as masters, according to their individual styles, in the writing of English prose. They are wholly unlike, moving in distinct planes, and because of the dissimilarity in their purposes, and in the powers requisite for the fulfilment of these purposes, must be judged according to different canons, and measured by different standards.

Carlyle is a teacher, a prophet—proclaiming its great want to a materialistic and indifferent generation, with something of the force and fervour of the old Hebrew seers, and developing with philosophic insight the great lessons of the past, and the light they throw upon the duties and destinies of humanity. Macaulay is simply a narrator of external facts. He seldom pierces below the surface, and in consequence sees little and exhibits less of the great

forces operant in the world, and gradually shaping out its history and future.

The one gives principles to the soul, to stimulate and guide its growth into true nobleness and service, in faithful, earnest performance of the duties which lie nearest to his hand. The other only seeks, on the common level of ordinary criticism, the adjustment of outward opinions, having little if any connection with the inner life and spirit of the man. If he represents nobleness, it is approached only from the historical or literary side, and though admired, is not sought out and set forth with the glowing strength of like-souled appreciation for an example and attraction. Compare the different treatment of the Puritans in the pages of the two writers, and Carlyle's power and fulness of enthusiastic sympathy and vivid reproduction will be found far in advance of that exhibited by Macaulay. Thus, as we have said, the planes in which the two minds move are distinct,—one far above the other, and not to be brought into competition with it. Their functions and aims are widely separate, and call different faculties into use.

But at the same time it is to be noticed that Carlyle is not an ordinary moralist, retailing the stereotyped ethical phraseology and commonplaces of the creeds. His teachings break forth with the native power of conviction, and of vivid realization of their transcendent necessity and importance. They are as part of his own soul, which has fought its fiery way to the essentials—the central principles and laws—of all true worth and rightness. Hence the force with which they are urged, and the greatness of the influence which they have exerted. Their very simplicity often causes this real force to be ignored, or mistaken for sound and fury, but on fair consideration it will be seen that few authors indeed have shown a prophetic insight like Carlyle's, able to separate between essentials and non-essentials—or rather, between internal spirit and exterior form—in a matter so bound up with prejudice and surrounded with tradition, and to set forth the former in such wise as directly to appeal to the higher nature of his readers, and to receive immediate and spontaneous recognition.

When we come down from the region of absolute, ideal truth, and its stern and strong enforcement, Macaulay, in our view, has largely the advantage. This is simply by the fact of his dealing more with the circumstantial life of man, and becoming conversant with social and political phenomena of the minor class to a degree which Carlyle has never attempted or appreciated. Looking at these honestly, he could but note the determination of events in the direction of popular power; and finding this to accord fully with what he had learned of the deeper history of our nation and of the world, he devoted his fine and brilliant talents with genuine faithfulness to advance the great progression. Carlyle's defence of the Jamaica atrocities, and hostility to the late extension of the suffrage, have certainly been the reverse of this. But while politically siding with Macaulay, I hold that the opinions and conduct of Carlyle,

relative to these and similar matters, are not a legitimate outcome of his philosophy, but rather the result of an exaggerated, unbalanced development of one side alone. An error of judgment and of feeling does not in any appreciable degree affect the question as to the comparative spiritual and mental grandeur of the men.

Contrast "Heroes and Hero-Worship" with the "Essays," the "French Revolution" and "Cromwell" with the "History of England," and the truth of my remarks will become apparent. The one writer seems to deal with things themselves, and to present them with the striking distinctness of reality; the other only with their appearances,—the waves and commotions of society and life, rather than the powers at work beneath the surface, from which alone these receive their being and importance.

The influence of Macaulay in determining the calibre and character of his readers can scarcely be appreciated, by reason of its smallness; that of Carlyle is unsurpassed, perhaps unequalled, by any contemporary thinker. Who goes to the former to renew his spirit for the strain and stress of life, to nerve his arm for the battle of rightfulness and truth, or to increase his faith in the final issue of the world-wide struggle between the heroic and the selfish, the holy and the impure? But in studying Carlyle, his clarion calls thrill along the blood, quickening it into worship and ardour for the noble and the high, and we become conscious of inflowing vigour, and imparted enthusiasm, constancy, and courage.

Carlyle has toned the thought of his generation, and given an upward impulse to its preaching, its literature, and its work. Weak imitators he has doubtless had, and many; but this is, more than otherwise, a testimony to his greatness. The undistinguished are not honoured by even such a disagreeable and unworthy witness to their strength. But in Macaulay, there is no sufficiently distinctive and striking characteristic to be copied.

In point of style, the diversity and inequality is singularly great. Macaulay's sweet, clear, simple diction is beautiful, but has little substance to satisfy continued familiarity. What it contains is for the most part fully seen at once. The thoughts are not such as to need a re-perusal for their more thorough comprehension. Carlyle is very different in this: His sentences are weighted with important meaning. His thoughts are deep, laying hold upon eternal truths; instead of unbroken clearness and simplicity we have, it is true occasional obscurity; but with it all there is a continual glow of genius along his pages, irradiating the solemnities through which the author pierces his earnest and fearless way. There are flashes as of the serried lightning leaping from its dark thunder-lair, and here deep quiet tracts as of the infinite azure seen between the blackness of the gathering clouds. Beauty, terror, tenderness, are present everywhere—products of a lofty imagination blended with a genuine emotional "possession" by the thought and theme.

The versatility of Macaulay speaks but little in his favour. He was able to do everything up to a certain point, and to do it well,

but that point marks where talent ends and genius begins. Carlyle is a free citizen of the one realm, Macaulay of the other. From this come "practical" men, who can do the things that have to be done *now*; but from that poets, revealers, men of genius, who seize hold of truth and bring it down to men, that little by little it may work, and transform, in due time, the current notions, and the very actions, laws, and objects of communities and states.

While sensible of Macaulay's manifold high qualities, and that in many respects he is to be considered great, I am compelled to place him in the former, or *temporary* class, while acknowledging Thomas Carlyle as belonging to the latter, and to *the ages*; and therefore I must answer the question as to which is greater emphatically in favour of Carlyle.

Oswestry.

W.

CARLYLE.—VI.

CARLYLE'S pre-eminence we thought was indisputable. What literary man is it possible to place in the same rank with Goethe's friend, Cromwell's defender, and the only preacher by whom the true lessons of the French revolution have been sounded in men's ears so as to re-echo into their souls? Macaulay's is a name worthy of much admiration, but he occupies a lower place by far than that on which Carlyle stands, secure of an everlasting memory. Both Macaulay and he are remarkable for extent and copiousness of acquirement; for pictorial vividness and vigour of memory; for immense reading; and avid eagerness for knowledge. But Macaulay is a man of acquisitions; Carlyle is besides a man of thoughts. Macaulay could construct an elegant model of the life of the past; Carlyle re-creates and revivifies history. No language like his has ever been able to tell the "truth clad in hell-fire," of that terrible mixture of sin and sorrow, effort and endurance, suffering and luxury, holy indignation and unholy revelry, or rather, devilry; quivering grief and fiendish rage, falsehood overtaken by fate and pride flung down to perdition, royalty become reckless, revolution grown remorseless, and patience itself made pain—the incarnate Satanism of that wild epoch. It was with a good deal of contempt, we admit, Lord Jeffrey spoke of him as "a person of talent," but the critic himself would now be thought to have described himself and not Carlyle in that phrase of moderate praise. If in a company of thinkers the question were proposed for consideration—What man among the authors of Britain is most undoubtedly possessed of genius?—we are sure that no second name would be mentioned, but that with one consent the name of Carlyle would be that which would be fixed upon. If we were to ask, Who is the most notable historian of our age? though some might think of Macaulay, Hallam, Arnold, Alison, Froude, Prescott, Mottley, all hesitation would vanish when they came to the name of Carlyle; for the intense fascination of poetry, combined with the marvellous research which history demands, are united in his works into a

transfused mass of "riches fineless." We have only to look at the literary labours of his forty-five years of toil as a "bookmaker" to see what a wonder-worker among authors he is. He has founded a form of history so sculpturesque, or rather we should say, so livingly dramatic, that Shakspeare alone excels him in historical creativeness.

M. T. complains that this "question is by no means fairly put" (August, 1867, p. 111), because Macaulay's entire life is not to be compared with Carlyle's, and he seems to think that Carlyle has done no work in his day but in literature. He forgets the arduous toil which was required of Carlyle to rise into his position at all. He was a farmer's son—a farmer blessed with but a small portion of this world's goods. Macaulay was the son of a wealthy man, his relations were influential, and his pathway in life was smoothed for him in all sorts of ways. All that wealth, influence, interest, sectly connection, and party prepossessions could do for Macaulay was done. He had Hannah More for an intellectual nurse; he was the pet of Clapham school, of which his father was patron in chief; and he was provided with the best "coaching" that could be had to fit him for a "run" through "Trin. Coll. Camb." He had Brougham for an adviser in oratory, he had the literary conductors of the *Christian Observer* as his "schoolmasters" to bring him up to *Knight's Quarterly*, and when he became a lawyer and politician of the Whig party, he had the *Edinburgh Review* set to welcome him into their coterie. With Carlyle all was different; a boyhood of privation, with the run of the parish school and a short stay at Annan; then his studies in Edinburgh University, where he sustained himself by private tuition, walking by slow stages from the metropolis to Ecclefechan, to save the costs of transit; and when he turned his steps from the Church, he became a hack compiler for a cyclopædia, and supported himself as a teacher of mathematics. His way in life was full of the briars of opposition. His father was a member of "the most straitest sect" of Dissenting Calvinistic Presbyterians, but he pursued his studies for the National Church. His views in that regard collapsed, and he left the priesthood of sects for the priesthood of letters—touched, we have been told, by the eloquence of Fichte and the influence of Goethe. He took to literature as a makeshift at first, but became convinced, in the after-space of his career, that in that lay the core of effectiveness for a man like him. His literary career was commenced amid difficulties, and continued against the entreaties of friends, the protestations of critics, and the intimations of exhausted finances. With Schiller he made his first start on the road to fame contemporaneously with the great Miltonic essay with which Macaulay leaped into fame—and never rose higher. For the first time, in 1827, the circles of their lives touched in the *Edinburgh Review*; for therein Macaulay discoursed on "Machiavelli," while Carlyle gave his impressions of "Jean Paul Richter" and "The State of German Literature." In 1828 again they flourished

in the same pages, the former making *Hallam* his topic, the latter *Burns*. No one can peruse these reviews without feeling the difference between Macaulay and Carlyle, and yielding immediate assent to the affirmative of the question here proposed, "Is Carlyle or Macaulay the greater writer?" Let M. T. allow for the toil of endeavour which brought the Ecclefechan-born peasant up to the same platform as the Rothley Temple child. Side by side after this we may read their works, and as we do so the fact of the superiority of Carlyle to Macaulay becomes more thoroughly established in one's mind. Indeed, M. T.'s argument comes all over to our side, for T. B. Macaulay had an opportunity of enlarging the sphere of his experience of men and things far beyond that granted to Thomas Carlyle, and he ought therefore to have been the more able to "create a soul under the ribs of death" for historic studies. But it is not to the legislator and the parliamentarian that we owe philosophical views of the nature and progress of history; it is to the earnest student who settled in Chelsea, and devoted himself to the thinking out of this grand problem which history involves.

In this *Weissenichtivo* (I know not where) history came to him as *Devil's Dirt* ("Teufelsdröckh"), and he cast upon it the spells of genius, whereupon it became transformed into a revelation of *Nemesis*, and a manifestation of the glory of the righteousness of God; whereas Macaulay made history appear a long and prosy argument for the essential Whiggery of the Divine Being.

M. T. charges Carlyle with unreality, and asserts for Macaulay a due attention to realism. But it is patent to every reader that Macaulay aggregates where Carlyle congregates, and exhibits where Carlyle dramatizes. No quotations could prove these more pertinently, perhaps, than those which M. T. brings forward; and if anything is able to refute M. T.'s opinion, the odious comparison he has instituted will amply suffice. Similarly, we shall leave the passages M. T. has quoted to form the best possible condemnation of his own decision. We do not, of course, attempt to rival M. T.'s smartness—flippancy, we might call it, did not a sense of editorial oversight warn us that the language of disparagement is not argument. We cannot believe that any one who reads the able *catena* of extracts which H. K. has produced in proof of the superior merits of Carlyle can possibly adhere to M. T.'s estimate of Macaulay.

But we must pass on now to the paper of E. N. A., whose strange conceit of quoting Macaulay's notice of Gulliver as a colossus in Lilliput, and a manikin in Brobdignag, seems to us a singularly out-of-place sort of thing,—to be, in fact, quite irrelative—unless, indeed, he intends tacitly to compliment himself and his companions in opinion on being the Brobdignagians, in whose company Carlyle is Grildrig, and his opponents on being the Lilliputians, among whom he stands as a colossus. We only guess that this is his intent from the big style he adopts.

He says Carlyle has "paltered with his conscience" (p. 352).

Could mortal man aver any charge against Carlyle which is less supportable by evidence? The man who forsakes the sect of his father and beloved Zion of his mother to study for the kirk from which it was a secession; who, when he found that kirk to which he had gone demanded an allegiance which he could not yield, threw up the chances of life, and would not utter the *credo*, I believe, of the reverend hierarchies on whom his progress in the world depended; the man who in isolated bravery courts Literature to his side in Craigenputtock, and secures servitude to her in Chelsea—a lifelong servitude,—palter with his conscience! Why, snow is black, frost is a furnace seven times heated, sunshine is blank darkness, and roses are cuttings from cucumbers, if Carlyle is a moral sham! Read his works from beginning to end, survey his life from its dawn in the shadow of Birrenswark Hill to its lonely widowhood of sadness in Chelsea, and not an atom of proof of insincerity stains the white radiance of the page of his life. "The supreme worth of silence" he proclaims assuredly, but not when God's truth is to be spoken, or man's history is to be told, that he may learn from the past to abstain from the gratification of "the *dæmonic* nature in man." Aberdeen was a university on which he had no claim, but Edinburgh was the place of his own university education, such as it was. "The case being altered alters the case," and Carlyle might justifiably accept the status of rector in the Reformed University of Edinburgh, while he would not accept the rectorship of the moribund Marischal College in which he had no interest, and with which he had no connection.

E. N. A.'s quotations from Carlyle and Macaulay prove only that Macaulay displayed himself and gave a chapter of his History to the youths of Glasgow, while Carlyle's autobiographical reminiscences helped to change his university, and to make it worthy of his being its rector; the former was a *laudator temporis præsentis*, while the other refused to flatter even his living masters—though he loved them well.

E. N. A. speaks of the singular defection of Carlyle from Reform (p. 361). He has forgotten or neglects that Carlyle has never looked on Government otherwise than as "true guidance in return for loving obedience," and loyalty as the right of royalty when the "true guidance" was given; and we may note that Carlyle has always preached self-reform as the chief and prime of duties: from this theory he has made no defection. The cry of Reform so popular in our day is either "an imbecility or a Machiavelianism,"—shows either that the Government is no longer *rex*, that good sense is no longer *lex*, and that in the *grex* only is wisdom to be found, though that is known to be sadly untrue; or that the Government think that by persuading men they are ruling themselves, they may drive them any whither they choose. In either way, the reform as we have it is not the reform Carlyle advocates, which is all summed up in the words, "Be sincere!" We cannot admit the righteousness of E. N. A.'s objections, and we feel that

his paper must have the effect of proving how hollow and shallow the advocates of Macaulay must be.

We certainly would have been glad to quote some of our favourite passages from this our favourite author; but an editor's edict, we presume, is like the laws of the Medes and Persians, and cannot be effectively traversed. Hence we are put to a disadvantage as compared with M. T. and E. N. A.: we shall not, however, complain, far less remonstrate, for we acknowledge that in these articles quotation has been carried too far.

In every point of view we think Carlyle excels Macaulay—in original power, in acquisition, in energy of intellect and character, in consistency of life, in moral courage and reliability, in nobility of life and in worth of effort. We cannot think how any one is able to regard the historian of a party superior to the historian of purity, and the essayist of Whiggism greater than the essayist of Intellectualism. We have given our reasons, and now we give our vote—that Carlyle is greater as a writer than Macaulay. R. M. A.

MACAULAY.—V.

It is not wonderful that this question should have arisen in an age like ours, when so many are led astray by gaudy glitter and extravagance. Do we not see the same thing in all its forms, viz., the predominant attractiveness of sensationalism? In novels, sensationalism is triumphant; in poetry, only the spasmodic can gain a hearing; in the drama, the upholsterer and the machinist do more for the successful run of a play than the genius of the author or the talents of the player; in amusements, the posturer and the gymnast must risk life and limb before he can win praise or pudding; in journalism, too, startling effects are aimed at as indispensable to popularity;—the entire purpose being to get hold of what will (as the phrase goes) "take." Even History, the stately, the solemn, the decorous, "philosophy teaching by example," has been brought to this same low pitch, and has been compelled to exhibit herself in the spangles, posturings, and sudden magic-wand changes of a pantomime. Hence the "French Revolution" has been written by Carlyle as a tragi-comedy; and "Frederick the Great" has been manufactured into a monstrous six-volumed panoramic masquerade. We have glimpses of marvellous insight into human motives, splendid scenic reproductions, with streaks of poetry stretching over them occasionally, like the colourings of the rainbow against the dark sky; sometimes we have humour of a grim, saturnine, scoffing character; and often grotesque portraits, quaint remarks, and exaggerated estimates of men or events, in the works of Carlyle. But we find nothing consistent, nothing elaborated into such artistic unity, that we can apprehend the entire sum of the product brought before us. Impetuosity, fervour, impulsive vehemence, audacity of phrase, and violent contortions of circumstances, we find; a sort of maniacal strength and wanton digressiveness makes itself felt; but the graceful poise and

subtle compositeness of healthy vitality we do not think is often to be seen in the writings of Thomas Carlyle. In Macaulay all is different. He is clear in diction, logical in the consecutiveness of his story, and vigorous in his narrations. His epithets are well chosen, his illustrations are clever, and his antitheses, alliterations, and allusions are almost always happy. His critical insight into life was, it is true, more that of a politician than of a philosopher. But this, so far from being a drawback in an historian, is a notable gift; for men seldom act as philosophy dictates, they much more frequently act from policy. It may be said that he knew men, not *man*; and the saying would be to a great extent just, but so far as it would be just it would be a commendation, for an historian has to deal with men, while the philosopher deals with man.

It is not a little remarkable in the character of these two great authors, whose names are brought into juxtaposition in this debate, that they should have written on so many points, bringing the same material facts under review. The reader who is conversant with the articles written by both on "Johnson," can scarcely fail to see that, able as both articles are, and, in fact, almost essential to a full estimate of the strange dictator of letters in the seventeenth century, the characters of the writers ought to be put in contrast rather than in comparison with each other. Carlyle writes a "Johnsoniad" rather than a biography; and Macaulay alone gives us a true presentment of the man in his habit as he lived.

In their opinions on Protestantism and on Puritanism they seem to me to be equally orthodox; and at the same time Carlyle appears to me to write as an outsider, as one who had not felt in himself the fervid religiousness of the revolutions in which these forms of life took their rise; while Macaulay, though naturally phlegmatic, and averse to the exhibition of emotion, warms up when he requires to recite any noble deed, inspired by religious feeling; he may sneer at the style of it, but he never scorns the spirit from which it emanates. In this he excels Carlyle, who reserves his bitterest contempt for the religious spirit, and scoffs at the holiest of the soul's possessions; who speaks of the traditions and incredibilities of Christianity and of its doctrines as, if stars, only "certain old Jew ones *which have gone out*." Carlyle exiles Christianity from the human soul as a "creed outworn." Macaulay always spoke of it as the creed of hope, the mainstay of humanity, and the mightiest missionary momentum in the agencies of earth. Macaulay fought for freedom for the slave and enfranchisement, while Carlyle looks on Reform as "shooting Niagara."

Macaulay's "Essays" stand favourable comparison with Carlyle's "Miscellanies," inasmuch as they are more akin to human life, and are handled so as to be explanatory, not enigmatical. They possess, too, in a great measure, a unity of interests. They form, for the most part, chapters in modern history, so brilliant and full as to be unapproachable in excellence; while Carlyle's are shreds

and patches from studies in German literature, or *chiaroscuro* portraits etched amid the flare and flicker of the French Revolution. Macaulay is *the* great historian of our age, pleasant as a novel, brilliant as a gallery of illustrations, and exciting as a drama. His history is yet minute in detail, perspicuous in order, abundant in materials, varied in narrative, translucent in style, and full in the contents of it. E. D. quotes a youthful production (p. 179) which happens to contain a passage that may be misconstrued, and following a *Times* critic, seeks to make it appear that this irrelevant quotation was expressive of a fixed theory of historical composition, but he has not substantiated his opinion, got at second hand for this old *Times* critique. Macaulay's History has been subjected to the most searching and microscopic criticism by the enemies of his opinions, and so long as he was alike few found themselves able to bring proof of any charge of the sort alluded to by E. D., which, out of the enormous receptacles of his memory, he was incompetent to defend himself against, and prove himself to be in the right. E. D., too, forgets to quote the same critique which contains those words most thoroughly opposed to his view of the question in debate. It is said in it, "What a grasp it evinces! what a light it sheds frequently on the obscurest *data*! what a welcome shock it gives to our torpid recollections! *No man living could have written two such volumes,*"—thus expressly excluding Carlyle from being able to compare with Macaulay as a writer.

Here is the opinion of the judicious and trustworthy Prof. Wm. Spalding, on the merits of Macaulay:—

"Our illustrious historian unites to a degree very seldom attained, extensive and various information with his extraordinary power of impressive representation; and there is not, perhaps, in the range of our literature any parallel to the readiness, and aptness, and fulness with which his stores of knowledge are poured forth in illustration of the objects he contemplates. Macaulay's great work has already shown that history may be written as it never was written before; at once telling the national story with accuracy and force, making it as lively as a novel, through touches of individual interest, and teaching precious truths with fascinating eloquence, whether by individual hints or in elaborate dissertation."—"History of English Literature," p. 402.

And here is the opinion which the *same* calm thinker and great master of a knowledge of style has formed of the rival in this debate, set up by H. K., E. D., &c., for superior admiration:—

"The language and the thoughts [of Thomas Carlyle] alike set at nought all hereditary rules; the one as much as the other compounded of elements English and German; with elements, predominant over all, which no name would fit except that of the author. In respect of opinions, Carlyle himself perhaps, and certainly his most ardent disciples, would scorn that he should be suspected of orthodoxy, or acquiescence in doctrines generally admitted, on any question whatever. In sentiment, again, a generous expansiveness alternates painfully with despondent gloom and passionate restlessness and inconsistency. But it is impossible to hear, without a deep sense of original power, the oracular voices that issue from the cell;

enigmatical like the ancient responses, and like them, illuminating doubtful vaticination with flashes of wild and half-poetic fantasy."—" *History of English Literature*," p. 403.

These appear to us to be correct opinions; they show, on the part of Macaulay, clearness; on that of Carlyle mist: on the one hand, accuracy, judicial impartiality of view; on the other, passionate and stubborn disregard to all that is held as proved. Macaulay is safe, sound, orthodox, painstaking, and comprehensible; Carlyle is erratic, *outré*, impulsive, unsettled, indeterminate, and at war with the past in its religious aspect. Macaulay, therefore, in our opinion, is the greater writer and the more trustworthy thinker; though Carlyle may have the greater force and the more stirring and mysterious influence. Hence our voice is given in favour of Macaulay.

P. B.

MACAULAY.—VI.

TWENTY years ago (1848) the first two volumes of Macaulay's "History of England from the Accession of James II." appeared. The popularity of that work might have made even the most successful novelist envious, and distrustful of the power of sensationalism which fiction possesses, and of the fascination it can exercise. No historical work—except, perhaps, Gibbon's classical and deathless production—ever so completely took the reading world by surprise, and overmastered it with delight. Edition after edition was issued from the press, and the ousted Member of Parliament for Edinburgh, whose fame was in all reviews, quietly enjoyed in his chambers in the Albany the signal revenge he had taken on the zealots of the grey metropolis of the north, in becoming the representative historian of the age, instead of the representative of Edinburgh, or rather, of—

"A sullen priesthood and a raving crowd."

The enthusiastic love of the public grew to impatience year after year. For seven years they eagerly repeated their longing inquiries when they were to have more of Macaulay's History,—so intense was the admiration felt for a work which combined so wondrously learning, eloquence, representative, fancy, and penetration into character and circumstances. He would not hurry his volumes out, even to gratify the hunger and thirst of the great multitude, until it had received the patient touches of unwearying art, and been made as thorough as his capacity permitted. But when at length, in 1855, two other volumes of that History were issued from the press, there were racing and chasing, rushing and crushing, such as the annals of Paternoster Row seldom equalled, never surpassed. The publishing houses could not satisfy the reading world, so great and enthusiastic was the excitement among those who had perused the former issues. That was a noble testimony to the author's greatness, to the overmasterment, if we may so speak, of the genius

of the historian. But other evidence of his greatness and might of mind succeeded: as, immediately after the issue of his two earliest volumes, he had been chosen Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow, and Professor of Ancient History in the Royal Academy, London; so now, repentant "Edina," in sackcloth and ashes, bemoaned her sectarian stupidity and clergy-worship, their asinine following of the preacher breed and servile-heartedness, and uttered their supplication that he would return once more to Parliament for their sakes, and, forgiving their former injustice, seal his acceptance of their profound sorrow by accepting freely the office of representative for the literary capital of Scotland. He freely forgave them all, and wiped at once the tear and the shame from the face of the lady who had jilted him under clerical advisings. I call this noble conduct in Macaulay, at a time when he was the admired of all, to condescend to leave the pinnacle of greatness, and to sacrifice his very fame to show the perfection of his Christian forgiveness. Ah, how much has the world lost by Edinburgh's gain! It has lost the continuation of that History which proved most thoroughly that truth is stranger than fiction.

Never before had the history of England been made epic—been done on a ground plan so thorough and so masterly, or been written with so much of the philosophy of events incorporated in the narration. This History exhibits a sustained interest, and did not disappoint its seven years' suitors and waiters. It was felt to be the work of a consummate master. The aptitude of its phrases, the harmony of its sentences, the consistency of its paragraphs, the fulness and completeness of the chapters, the satisfyingness of the whole works charmed and entranced.

Besides, it must always be remembered that we are judging Macaulay by an unfinished work, while Carlyle's historic works are complete. If we compare the grace, force, point, ease, and purity of his style, the felicitous adaptation it takes to the subject of discourse, with Carlyle's boulder-rough, harsh, dissonant, and heterogeneous composition, we cannot hesitate to give Macaulay our suffrage. If we compare them in the mastery of facts, they may be held to be pretty nearly equal in their extraordinary command of vast numbers in simultaneous movement. But how inadequate is Carlyle in the marshalling and methodizing of his facts! being compelled every now and again to get hold of an interlocutor to utter objurgations against, and ever getting up a sort of dramatic opportunity for epigram about the subject, instead of going on steadily, marching on like one who—

"Wears all his load of learning lightly as a flower."

All the critiques, pamphlets, and even volumes that have been written against Macaulay have not been able to show any real and substantial inaccuracy in his views and narrative, though he was exposed to the criticism of the entire Conservative, Liberal, and religious press.

Too little has been said in this debate about Macaulay's poetical powers, poetical powers, too, employed in putting to the test of experiment the theories of Niebuhr and his school, and which greatly aided Arnold in forming correct views of Roman history. These poetical exercises of his are the most vital realizations of classical times that have ever been produced. They are sonorous and graphic: like the Homeric lays, they have a movement and energy, a thrill and a trumpet-like clearness of expression, such as only Scott in modern times has equalled. They stir the blood like the battle-call of a bugle, and they bring reproductively before the mind the life of the far-away ages of Roman story; or the more near and therefore more dear vigour and energy of the grand old Elizabethan days, when men felt the spur of strong thought, and made their entire life as glorious as Shakspeare's dramas vitalized. He alone of modern poets has ventured to be at once philosophic, antiquarian, historical, and emotional, all in one. He alone has pressed the juice of the grapes that grew by Tiber's banks into English beakers of hippocrene.

From an able paper in the *Pall Mall Gazette* we quote this argument in his favour as against Carlyle:—"He at least produced his effects without departing from the established standards of classical composition." "His men are the men, not of the parliamentary history, the State trials, and the memoirs only, but of Grub Street pasquinades, catchpenny biographies, forgotten novels, and newspapers of which few but the historian ever heard." "We admire the unflagging vivacity which permits no page to be weak; the stern morality which tolerates nothing which he believes to be base; the sense so keen as to read like wit, and the wit that is always allied with sense; the colour often gaudy, but never meretricious; the wide erudition, the strong love of letters, the strong love of England." Can any one assert that Carlyle's compositions are as pure in style and unexceptionable in morality, as varied and as easily understood, as thoroughly digested and so nobly formed, as those of Macaulay? or can any one write about Carlyle without the need of apologetic language? Well, then, is not Macaulay, by these very answers, proved to be greater than Carlyle?

COMMON SENSE.



Religion.

CAN INDEPENDENCY AND ORTHODOXY CO-EXIST?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

To R. S.

Dear Sir,—Permit me for once to abandon our ordinary style of controversy, and to adopt a more familiar mode of replying to your observations in last month's Magazine, and of expressing my own thoughts upon the subject which is before us.

First I would, in all courtesy, state my conviction that you have most completely mistaken the whole question to be debated. Your first thoughts were nearer to the truth, but even they do not appear to me to have actually grasped it.

The subject of Congregationalism *versus* Presbyterianism, and both *versus* Episcopacy, was considered in this serial fourteen years ago, and the respective merits of these systems as forms of church government were very fully set forth and criticised. If this topic is again fairly brought up, I shall have pleasure in joining issue on some points which have been raised in your article, and in admitting the force of others, while asserting that yet more are simply misconceptions as to the true character of Dissent and Independency. As it is, though I hope briefly to recur to this, the subject really before us is an entirely different one, having reference to the existence and nature of authority in matters of religious belief.

Here I call to mind that the essence of the question has already been discussed between us and others. As we did not agree then, it is scarcely probable than we shall arrive at one conclusion now. In the controversy upon "standards of faith," an avowal made in replying to your antagonists first enabled me to see your actual principles, and I wished that it had been expressed in the opening paper, as I should then have attempted a more direct attack upon your central, and apparently strongest and most trusted position—the "testimony of the fathers."

And here, my dear sir, let me say, with Pharaoh's butler, "I do remember my faults this day." In that debate, to which reference is made, a stupid blunder of mine appears, by which I ridiculed one of your arguments as but an example of "reasoning in a circle." I saw plainly enough afterwards that such was not the fact, though I yet continue to consider the mode of reasoning pursued as of little logical force.

But there must be no further preliminaries, and it is needful at once to proceed with an attempt at least to define the exact scope and purpose of the debate.

"Independency," then, is the system of church government based upon the irresponsibility of any association of Christians to an external personal authority, whether individual or collective. This, again, results from the belief that no system of doctrine drawn up by human hands is of any binding authority upon the soul, which has, in its inquiries after truth, to appeal for itself to the Scriptures, in which the divine message and teachings are embodied. Of course in this you will understand that no light which can be obtained from the "fathers," or from learning and study of any kind whatever, is to be refused, the object of our search being the pure and simple teaching of Christ and His apostles.

To conserve "orthodoxy," is there need for an external human authority—bishops, presbyters, or councils,—declaring what is Christian truth, and ordering its acceptance by individual churches and individual Christians? To come more closely to the point: I am personally unable to discover any such authority, and feel it a conscientious duty to go direct to the Scriptures for enlightenment and doctrine, using all means which God has placed within my reach for obtaining the true meaning and fulness of the Word. I may thus claim to be a typical Independent. Is there anything in my position which necessitates heterodoxy? Is it possible for orthodoxy to co-exist with principles like these?

In answer to this, does it not strike you, my dear sir, that if the creed you profess is true, mine is the exact method by which such must be found to be the case? I admit that light may be thrown upon the meaning of the apostles' words, as these are given to us in the writings of the early Christians; but that these latter are in any sense of the word authoritative, common sense, noting their manifold contradictions, teaches me emphatically to deny. If, then, the doctrines you profess and account "orthodox" are to be found in the Scriptures, I too, unless my independency separates me from the guiding influence of the Holy Spirit, shall be able to find them there like you. But even if I were thus cut off, independent inquiry would be necessary for me to ascertain it, and to learn the steps necessary for me to take in order to obtain the full light which I desire and seek! So, after all, the *first* attitude of the mind is that of independency, unless it is expected that each soul shall bow itself to the first authority it meets, though this be untested and uncertain. On such a principle, friend R. S., had you been born in Turkey, it would have been your plain duty to receive the dogmatic assertions of the Koran interpreters; in Rome, reverently to accept the absurdest and most fatuous declarations of the Pope; in Ceylon, never to doubt the Gooroo, when he told you strange and comical stories about the size and adventures of his many and detestable gods. This is a pretty outcome of the doctrine of authority in matters of religion! I feel sure you will agree with me that independency is at least necessary in beginning the honest quest after truth and right. If not for doctrine, at any rate for the dis-

covery of a reliable source of doctrine, whether that source be human or divine, the ultimate is appeal to the blended spiritual, moral, and intellectual consciousness. If no spiritual sense, however latent or obscure, exists within us, to which doctrine or authority may appeal for recognition, and which imparts a consciousness of truth, there is no real difference between the faith even of the most highly cultivated mind and that of the most degraded fetich-worshipper of Africa, or wherever else man has sunk furthest from the divine ideal of humanity.

You will surely agree with me thus far. Well, it follows that though I may in searching have overlooked the truth, yet it is either by reason of imperfect faculties or imperfect revelation, for neither of which, but only for honest use of such means as are within my reach, can I be held responsible. I am thus *morally* orthodox, at least, notwithstanding my failure to find the doctrines or authority which you accept.

But also, if I thus by earnest endeavour to know the truth become convinced that your belief is erroneous, and feel that I am right, the consciousness of orthodoxy is on my side, and I cannot help accounting you heterodox in fact, though your *moral* orthodoxy, your purpose to find and follow truth, may be as unimpeachable as my own. Thus the definition of *my* doxy and *thy* doxy is shown to be essentially true as well as witty. You have no right to assume authority over me, and to declare that *yours* is the standard by which rightness is to be tested. I must transpose the line of our most thoughtful poet, and say,—

“It is but for *yourself* you *know*.”

We are each, at least *in finding out authority*, free from all responsibility to man, and the honesty of our inquiries must be judged by God himself. So far, then, our principle must be the same: I feel assured that perfect “independency” of thought and investigation will characterize us both.

The system founded upon this principle can therefore co-exist with *moral* orthodoxy at least, or full allegiance to what is perceived to be the truth; and there is no sufficient basis for declaring it other than orthodox in reality, for this becomes a simple matter for the individual judgment.

I may now take a somewhat different, and while more general, less definite interpretation of the term orthodox. Traced to its source, it can only mean what the so-called authorities of one's own school of thought or of dogmatic teaching decree to be the truth; and, primarily, our own personal conviction of their authority. But, as you are well aware, the general significance of the term in our day is—agreement with that which, by the almost universal testimony of Christians, appears to be the plain teaching of Christ and His apostles,—those particulars of faith which, being accepted, are manifestly the power of God unto salvation. Such are the doctrines of the divinity of Christ, His sacrifice for sin, His re-

urrection and present and future exaltation, His spiritual presence with His people, forgiveness upon repentance for His sake.

This use of the term is very loose, I know. But it is much nearer the popular acceptation and use than that which you adopt. Your interpretation was directly and unmistakably—That which agrees with *my* rendering of the Scriptures and the Fathers'. Mine now is—That which agrees with the general sense of the Christian Church. You must, however, bear in mind that I only assert this to be the ordinary acceptation, not receiving it myself as a full and proper one, for even this is easily resolvable into agreement with that section of the Christian Church to which *we* belong. You see it always comes back to a question of *my* doxy, *my* belief.

Well, then, is there anything in "Independency" to prevent orthodoxy of doctrine in the ordinary sense? I see nothing. The truths of Christianity plainly revealed to man in the word of truth will be as plain to us as to any other section of religious men. I may even say, that supposing there were an authority in the world revealing truth, and showing itself as such by intelligible and sufficient evidence—there is nothing whatever in our system and position to prevent our seeing it, and receiving its declarations. We should do this on our own principles.

But much more when it is admitted that the only criterion of doctrine is contained in the Scriptures, read in whatever light can be obtained as to their veritable meaning. In this case, I may even claim a superior possibility for the co-existence of orthodoxy and Independency. Taking my faith directly from the Bible, I can be much more sure as to its truth than you can be in receiving it on the testimony of your supposed authority. That authority has itself first to be tested by the Bible, and its determinations must, therefore, come considerably modified in importance and reliability. You cannot feel so much confidence in it as you can in the Bible, to which it must itself appeal for a warrant to judge and decree at all.

Perhaps you say, We test its decisions by the Bible after they are made, and accept them only upon ascertained agreement with that ultimate standard of appeal. But in so doing you give up the principle of ecclesiastical doctrinal authority, and, in fact, rely upon your own convictions as to the teaching of the Scriptures. This is just what we do as "Independents," and your position is no better than ours, ours is no worse than yours, for the discovery of the truth—in fact, for orthodoxy. If the Scriptures do not teach the common "orthodox" opinions which I have named, or any others which are so-called, then "orthodoxy" is in fact heterodoxy—truth is on the side of the dissentients.

There is nothing in our principles to prevent our acknowledging the authority of the "fathers" as interpreting and supplementing Scripture, could they be clearly shown as authorized and authoritative. As it is, we may and do take what light they can afford us as historical witnesses to the early Christian faith. In

the same way, any expression of opinion on the part of the bishops of the Established Church respecting the meaning of any portion of the Bible, would be received by us, just as much as by Episcopalians themselves, with a consideration based upon their acknowledged general power as men of thought and of learning.

Thus, then, "Independency" shuts up no avenue of light, and places us in no position of hostility to truth. Indeed, it does, or should do, the contrary—making personal inquiry and conviction the first duty of us all, to a degree which none of the other systems of church government, accustoming their adherents to depend so much upon external direction and control, are ever likely to advise.

There may be doctrines received by us which you may account erroneous, but the old and troublesome question again arises, Is your interpretation authoritative, or is it not? If not, my friend, it is again a question of *your* doxy or of *mine*.

But do Congregationalists receive the great truths of spiritual religion as fully as Episcopalians, or other sections of the Church? I am really not aware of any difference except in our favour, for the agreement upon these outside of your church is very far greater, both in appearance and reality, than that displayed within it.

Or suppose you substitute any other doctrines for these as representing the true orthodox faith—again I say, that if they are founded upon a basis which appeals to man's *conviction* instead of throughout and primarily resting on unproved assumption of authority, there is nothing whatever in the system or procedure of Independency to prevent our ascertaining and acknowledging them as such, but rather everything in favour of us and them.

But I must not forget that you hold our very form of church government to be heterodox. To this aspect of the question nearly the whole of your able paper is devoted. I hope that such prominence to what I must consider a very minor matter, does not indicate that you attach a superior importance to the form above the doctrine which is taught. Surely the former, which meets us but externally, is of *much* importance only as regards its influence upon the faithful conservation and proclamation of the latter, which enters into the very centre of our being. As regards these, I have shown that Independency is, if anything, of superior value; for a true conservation is not the retention of an ancient creed because it was held before, but renewed adherence to it because of its ascertained agreement with the Bible.

In taking this ground, friend R. S., you have really removed the subject beyond the range of "orthodoxy," as usually understood. The general mind has at least felt that the doctrines I have cited, and similar ones, are in reality of vital import to the soul, and that variations from them may well have serious and fatal results. But with the instinct of common sense, it has recognised that there is not even an approximate agreement between Christians upon this further subject, which it treats as of comparatively little import;

and it has refused to exalt any method into a standard of right, by which all others are to be condemned.

I am not unwilling to argue this matter with you, but when are we to close? Suppose I proved that Congregationalists were orthodox as to the nature of the pastor's and deacon's offices, you might raise another point, and again another, in an interminable series, and the issue would never be decided. Instead of being a discussion upon "Congregational Independency" in relation to "orthodoxy," it would become an inquiry as to the scripturalness of our mode of choosing and ordaining ministers, of observing the Lord's Supper, of admitting members, and so on without end. None of these has any essential connection with the principle of self-government, which is the essence of Independency. Nor do I think you would care to enter upon so wide an undertaking.

I will, however, take note of the two most important points which can be raised against the scripturalness of our organization; though even here the old issue appears in all its force: Whose opinion as to the teaching of Scripture is to be taken as the test of orthodoxy? I interpret it upon this subject differently from you, and dare not yield any precedence in respect of earnest wish and effort to know the truth. Were it *only* my opinion, yet, if founded upon diligent search, it would be incumbent upon me to hold it until God should convince me of my error, and grant me further light, even though all men besides should give it contradiction. The opinions of an honest, faithful seeker are not in his power at all; he cannot help the conclusions to which he comes.

From the main principle of my letter an objection to external authority may be derived. The ultimate test has been shown to lie in man's own consciousness responding to the truth. Is there an external authority about which there can be no mistake? I know of none. Claimants there are, and many,—but *certainly* is what the inquirer craves for and really needs. I do not speak of doctrine now, as that matter has already been discussed. The reasoning, then, may be followed up:—Given an external authority; if it declares contrary to what we find by personal examination in the Bible, we are entitled to repudiate its determinations. Thus it may err. How then can we know that it does not err on other matters which the Bible does not enable us to test? We cannot do so, and can only rest in the conclusion, the certainty that, nothing is authoritative but what is found in the book itself.

If you say that the authority extends to the interpretation of the Bible, and that we cannot thus judge it, I reply, Then it is my duty to examine carefully, closely, patiently, into its credentials; and to require, for demands so vast, an equivalent unmistakable support.

Then I find none, as I remarked just now. This is not my fault. Either the evidence is too intangible for my understanding, it does not appeal to my common sense, or it is found unequal to bear the burden of so great a superstructure. I get what light I can. Others may get more by wider reading and greater acuteness. But of

these, some hold the same view that I do, and of their love of truth, their piety, their intellectual power, there can be and is no question. Others take your position. Why should I choose to follow *them*? My own convictions correspond with those of the others. So again the ultimate appeal is to my own conscience and consciousness of honest endeavour to know the truth.

I can only say, with reference to your claims of pastoral—I beg pardon, episcopal, apostolical succession, that they are vague and shadowy in the extreme. Did the tenure of the vast possessions of the English Church ever depend upon the definite legal proof of this, step by step, from Paul or any one else of the actually known apostles, they would not long continue in her hands. The evidence of character—by their works ye shall know them—is wanting, or shared only with those who repudiate such materialistic succession altogether.

Finding no line of teachers, we likewise find no line of churches or congregations, to whom superior position has been delegated. Proof—proof—of which the ultimate judgment is committed to us individually, is wanting in every case. This is so, however the few hints in the New Testament may be interpreted. But when we find these to correspond fully with a totally different hypothesis, or that by taking them alone they will not give any basis for such a system as that which you uphold, your claim of orthodoxy and attempted charge of heterodoxy against Congregationalists is fully overthrown, at least for me. And again, who is to judge between us?

Congregationalists, then, rightly require complete, massive, unmistakable proof of any authority claiming to have received power over them from Christ. Not finding such, they remain individually in subjection to the word of truth. They exercise no rule over each other, but unite on mutual terms of equality and fellowship. Their association is voluntary, or rather, founded upon the will of the divine Master that His followers should abide in brotherly love. They exercise no restraint upon any member of their society, but retain the freedom to withdraw from his fellowship in case of an unworthy walk and conversation. I, for one, hold that no other terms of communion can be rightly imposed than love to the Lord Jesus in sincerity and truth. Each Christian is responsible for his opinions and practice to God alone. In this we have a true freedom, without licence, for that is restrained by responsibility to One who reads our inmost souls, which we dare not exchange for any earthly possessions or secular position. Our acceptance of any power overruling or supplementing this individual life, unsupported by the clearest evidence of a divine origin, would, on our principles, be idolatry, and fatal to spiritual force and manhood. "Faith" does not lead us to see such a power in any body or institution whatever. Our spiritual sense, though quickened, we trust, by the Divine Spirit, in this case responds to none of the claimants for its allegiance and submission.

I must now close with one parting observation. However you may realize the love of God striking into your soul through the forms of your belief and worship, beware of falling into the schismatic error of denying a like experience to those whose church principles are far other than your own.

When the Lord Jesus Christ has revealed His love in my heart, taught me to know Him as *mine*, and given me some experience of the peace which passeth knowledge; when I know that by His Spirit He has taught me to shun evil and to strive after nobleness like His own, and that, in spite of all my waywardness and stubbornness and folly, He is leading me into conformity with His will; when this has been done, as my clearest consciousness will tell, by the ordinary ministry of His word and the study of His revelation, apart wholly from apostolical, ecclesiastical succession, apart from forms and ceremonies and observances, apart from episcopacy and every form of priesthood; and when, forbidding and scorning the interposition of all things earthly, my wearied soul can fly straight to His loving breast, to find there sweet sympathy and peace, it is not possible for me to disbelieve an experience so certain, and to say that "independency" of spirit and "independency" of system cannot co-exist with the fullest orthodoxy, with the most perfect allegiance to the truth of God.

I am, my dear sir, very faithfully yours,

Oswestry.

W.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THERE are many people now-a-days who say that their religion is the Bible, that they will have nothing but scriptural truth, and will allow no intermediate creed to come between their souls and the word of eternal life. They profess that all their desire is to know and to feel the supremely important verities of God's holy law actively working in their souls, and causing them to reform their lives as regards this world, to conform their characters to the heavenly requirements of the divine will, and to be transformed in the spirit of their inward minds by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in them. These persons cry out for the Bible and nothing but the Bible, and feel chagrined or offended if any one endeavours to speak a word in favour of creeds, confessions, formularies, modes of worship, ritual observances, or the like. It is, of course, quite right that the Bible, as the word of God, should have full sway in our hearts, and that there is nothing to despise, but rather everything to commend in these intense upholders of the Bible as the rule of faith and practice. We shall not venture to call them Bibliolaters, even though they do not hesitate to call Ritualists profane idolaters. But it may do no harm, perhaps, to present them with a somewhat analogous case, and to ask them what they would think of any one who should say, The universe is my science? Do men ever say they will allow no intermedium or interpreter, *i. e.*, creed-

monger, to make up for them an outline of the laws of revelation of the works of God? Do they insist on constructing for themselves, out of the isolated phenomena of nature, all the sciences and the arts, i. e., the faiths and the practices which nature commends or commands? Most undoubtedly they do not; they accept all the help which man can offer, and they receive gladly the formula, the instruments, the experiments, the settled laws, the prominent or predominant opinions of men of science. The decisions of men who have devoted their lives to the study of law, finance, medicine, geology, mineralogy, botany, &c., are accepted gladly, reverently, undoubtingly, as interpreters of nature and the instructors in the orthodoxy of science. The man who would attempt to set at nought all the discoveries, requirements, and settled truths of science, and to become the interpreter of the universe to himself, would surely go far astray. Right thinking, which is orthodoxy, is not attainable by the exercise of the right of private judgment. This right, though inalienable in thinking man, can only in the general run of cases be exercised in judging of the evidence on which truths are believed; it can very seldom go to the grounds of these beliefs themselves. Nor can men in general take the pathway of independence, and walk in it for themselves. How few are there of all those whom we know in our own circles to whom we can rightly attribute independence of *character*, still less independence of thought! When men think for themselves, how often do they go astray! How delighted are men in general to ask for advice, and to follow the fashions of their times! All this is evidence that orthodoxy is felt to be inconsistent with independence or singularity. The minds and the general powers of men are very much of the same sort.

Independence is a grand word, and one which we love. It is a grander acquisition, and we admire and value it; but it is never fully attainable by man. Above all, religious independency is an impossibility. We are all under influences of one kind or another,—parents, companions, tutors, social circles, &c., who lessen our independence, and give us an emotional bias towards a given church or style of religious belief. This constitutes a sort of minor orthodoxy, which we gain and which we love. True independence in most men would lead to error, not to truth; for few have the power of *discovering* truth for themselves, though many are quite capable of *discerning* it when pointed out to them and arranged for them in the order in which it is most easily understood and comprehended. I do not think that Independency can possibly co-exist with orthodoxy, for orthodoxy signifies a right belief commonly accepted and regarded as true, while Independency seeks for singularity and self-sought opinions. I think that it is no more possible for the Bible to be the religion of a man, self-searched and self-arranged, than I believe that the universe will yield up all its secrets, as science to one man, however effortful he may be, however independent.

N. Q. N.

The Essayist.

SELFISHNESS.

PART I.—ITS RELATION TO THE MIND.

THE object of this essay is to trace the vice to which the epithet heading our remarks is applied to its source, to define its nature, to describe the mode of its operation in the mind, and the manner in which it exhibits itself in our conduct to man and to God.

The germ of selfishness seems to be contained in creation itself, which, resolved into its ultimate notion, may be described as the transmutation of universality into individuality, or the bringing of the infinite into the finitude of *self*. Selfhood is ascribed by us to whatever we perceive to exist; indeed, its selfhood makes it be at all to us, for perception itself is but the cognizance of this selfhood or individuality. All individualities possess through their very separateness or distinctness of being, through their selfhood, an increased force for their necessary preservation, inasmuch that besides it each has a tendency to extend itself and invade the selfhood of others; incessantly tending on from change to change, only standing still in appearance, ever advancing and receding, never out of harness, for "there is no discharge in that war;" non-resistance means individual annihilation.

We, then—as the highest physical and spiritual creation of Him to whom I must cry, as I peer into this mystery,—

"These are Thy *works*, *Thyself* how wondrous then!"—

have an apparently independent existence, each in himself, distinct from the life of each and every other creature of man, beast, flower, or thing; and from Him who, in making us, putting us, so to speak, out from Himself, gave Himself a personality outside of us, and yet remains the unfathomable "All in all."

Proceeding from this personality in its activity, that is, in the mutual interchange of influence between being and being, we discover what we call quality or worth, which we are capable of appreciating, and which we ascribe to each fact or thought as it presents itself to our God-like faculty of judgment. Now, as each entity which we discern is made up of many others, the attributes that belong to it seem to be dependent on the relation of its composites to each other, the distribution of repulsion and attraction in its parts. Ideas being subject to the same rule, the notion of selfishness, as imputed by us to expression of mind, is discoverable in all other qualities as a sort of ingredient in them, whenever there is an inequality in the amounts of the absorbing and resisting forces which its atoms, so to speak, are putting forth.

Selfishness, then, we may describe as an overweening conceit and self-assertion of any one individual to the hurt of others, as an assimilation of properties or a destruction of them, which oversteps the demands of justice and equity, and breaks the equilibrium which is essential to the harmony and perfect well-being of the whole.

As a moral attribute it is at least co-extensive with humanity, so that in order to discover how it shows itself in human thought and conduct, and to appreciate fully the extent of its operation, we must glance at the position which each man holds in the plan of the world, and consider the work which is given him to do.

We have before us mankind as a whole, and man as an individual, participating in a scheme in which it seems to be the intention of the originator, that from the depths of ignorance each unit and the various collective groups of family, clan, nationality, and race, shall develop first themselves as individuals, then the numerous and diversified combinations of which they are capable, that is, as society, and lastly, fulfil the great task which embraces both the others, of eliminating truth from the imperfection and uncertain suggestions of mind and matter, or, in other words, of completing the revelation of God. To each of these man owes an allegiance, and we have to try to decide wherein and how this loyalty is misplaced or over-esteemed.

In the ocean each drop has its significance and its work to perform, according to its relative size, as the masses of water are drawn hither and thither by the monitions of their changing faith, lashed into storm by the tempest of on-sweeping passion, or soothed into indifferent placidity by the lullaby song of a zephyr, but under all these changing phases are being drawn in impalpable vapours to the sky. A man is no more to humanity, nor is he less, than one drop of water is to all the water that holds to this terrestrial globe; so that if he, as one amongst millions, asks for more than the fraction of influence which justly belongs to his magnitude, or exerts too much force in any one direction, putting it forth, not because the equilibrium has been destroyed, and this exertion will help to set it right, but because it suits his own inclination,—then selfishness dominates in his soul.

Were man perfect in his mental endowments (I do not mean in the sense in which all the emanations of the divine Limner are faultless), that is, for the purpose which they do subserve, as the story runs, that a French preacher replied to a hunchback, who asked if he were perfect, "Yes, for a hunchback." The thorn on the bush is perfect as a thorn, but it is an undeveloped bud, (which we say it ought to be), but I mean in the complete balance of his faculties, their action would be one harmonious concert, and the conduct of the man absolutely blameless. But it is otherwise; the mind is biassed, inclined hither or thither, which bias we call character. There are dominant and subordinate faculties, between which an ever-recurring struggle is maintained, and which can only be terminated by each one allowing to the other its just and lawful

share in the whole man, or by the mightier ones crushing the others beneath their feet, where such faint struggles as they still make to assert their own may become so impotent that the writhings of a worm under our boot would affect the mind as much. This state we call madness, the most horrible form of the malady of selfishness which gradates from this depth, through all the innumerable stages and varieties which humanity exhibits, to the height where it is quenched in the fulness of light and love, in truth.

Selfishness, then, I contend, as it exhibits itself in the conduct of men, has its source in the unequal exercise of force or will by the different organs of mind, either separately or in the groups into which they may be generally divided, of intellectual, moral or spiritual, and social faculties. Hence it may be of as many different kinds and shades as there are possible combinations of separate organs, and that in every degree of will-force with each other save one—that is, their complete and uniform co-operation. But we cannot, in our general conduct, nor even in our most searching inquiries, discover at what point selfishness begins or ends, and must content ourselves with a more general statement, in which its characteristics are sufficiently palpable.

It consists, indeed, in excess, of whatever kind it may be; in the misappropriation, by a clique of the faculties, or by one only, of rights belonging to other participators in the constitution; in their attempting absolute irresponsible government, and subjecting some sections of the community to a degrading slavery. Not less does selfishness result when the moral part of man practises tyranny, or the intellect arrogates the undivided direction of sentiment and affection, than when the passions of the animal carry it with a high hand over reason and conscience. Montaigne writes, "Those who say that there can be no excess of virtue do but play upon words: if there be excess, it is no longer virtue." True, the swelling love to man, the aspiring faith, the obedient reverence, the active reason, or the keen, hungering perception, may be as boundless as the universe, if all the other loves, indicated by the other faculties of the mind, but equal them; else should we reason that God, in that He is the infinitude of all of which our minds contain the time-limited transcript, ceases to be good and perfect. But benevolence itself—out of which good-will to man and God issues, which prompts to do for others' sake and not for our own—may and does produce at times the abortion of selfishness—by becoming so wrapped up in its own exercise as not only to forget, but to hinder the execution of all other duties but that of giving; transforming the many-gifted soul into the dead mechanism of an automaton almoner.

"Undone by goodness, strange, unusual blood,
When man's worst sin is, he does too much good!
Who then dares to be half so kind again?
For bounty, that makes gods, does still mar men."

"Timon of Athens."

From this point of view it seems as if no human action could be free from the stigma, however lofty or noble, kindly, or wise, or single-minded it should be ; and, indeed, it is hard to point to a deed or uttered thought in the history of human development which is spotless white, that breathes but God without a taint of self. For, as all the operations of the mind and body depend upon the combined or counter-activity of the mental faculties,—and, as is indicated in the word character, some of these are more forceful than others,—the conduct of the whole man will bear the impress of their handiwork. He will lean towards, desire, seek, and cherish that for which his mind has the most affinity : in thought and conduct he will prefer the objects to which his chief powers have reference, and leave to others those for which he has not such an aptitude, intellectual, spiritual, or affectional.

This partiality of the faculties, by giving direction to the whole mind, has, in the finitude of our physical organization, produced results for society through what we call genius, which it may be doubted would have been worked out by the same men if their minds had been more even. We have thus examples of the expression of each single faculty, represented sometimes by individuals, sometimes by nations, which are a splendid marvel to those whose character has not this special kind of brilliant bias, and yet almost always tinged with selfishness from the same cause that gave them their greatness. The attention being turned so much to the beauties of one mental attribute, by the desire and love of its quality and its exercise, it is not seen as a medium, through which all the rest of its fellows should altogether and harmoniously express themselves, as simply the key in which their music is to be discoursed : the mind becomes insensible to the impression that it is only a mode of mind, and it appears as the chief matter which is to be expressed. On the other hand, when, in the outgoings of the heart and head, there is a just appreciation of the amount of vigour which the specially directing faculty should display in seeking to further truth—or, in other words, the weal and enlightenment of men, the extension of God's interest in the world,—the way of the doing it may in some measure contradict the motive, by laying too much stress upon some parts of the vocal or manual utterance, and too little on others : for every thought or action is more or less compound in its nature ; and while one faculty is in action, others, to which habit or innate character has given a prominence, speak again and again, whilst some which are inert from the same causes are scarcely audible. Out of this habitual relation of the loves of the mind springs the standard of virtue, by which all internal or external activities of moral beings will be judged ; and so the predilections or antipathies of the individual will ground themselves generally, with regard to character and conduct, not on the assumption of their excellence or depravity *per se*, but on the sensation of like or dislike which their selfhood experiences, either in the sympathy with that which it sets store

by, or the converse. And this is selfishness, the germ of all the caricatures of manhood which the stages of vice disclose, from the first aberration from strict self-negation (which signifies also self-culture, in overcoming the lassitude and dulness shown by the enslaved faculties) to rampant, unchecked lust; which results when the motive that affects the mind affords sufficient of that quality for which there is the greatest penchant in the mind to eclipse, after it has been assimilated by, and has thus strengthened an already too powerful organ, the light which the others should dispense within.

Intellect can and does frequently exhibit this lust, manifested in its weakest degree, perhaps, in an impatience that religious or social calls should lay claim to the attention, the desire, and the operative will, and varying in intensity according to the measure of the enchantment which the magician of science or philosophy has been able to cast around the soul. Conscience, too, may give forth such loud tones as to produce a similar dissonance, which is only another mode of selfishness, sometimes even taking its victims to bedlam; but in its less intense forms, demanding too large a proportion of its own peculiar qualities in every emotion or utterance of those in whom it tyrannizes; who again are usually displeased, at least, or unfavourable to each word or act of others, which does not coincide, in its relative volumes of conscience, intellect, and affection, with their prejudices.

It is, then, because of difference in character and motive that men are continually censuring each other as selfish; sometimes altogether wrongfully, inasmuch (if our judgment be a true one) that whatever in the man is opposed to the true well-being of mankind, and of natural consequence to the reign of the God of majesty and love and truth, is alone deserving of the epithet, and so the censure, or rather the censor, may frequently be more worthy of being styled selfish than the man whom he has condemned.

But we demur to the conclusion, that since we are all by nature imperfect, therefore every act of ours must have the same degree of faultiness in it. The action of each individual faculty in relation to the others is, under true government, only a mode of these others; a special direction which is given to their united operation, and through which, as an outlet, they may singly and altogether exhibit as much rightful force as if the mind were uttering itself through each several one of them. Hence, although an imperfectly balanced organisation, under ordinary every-day influences, would in its expression be tainted with the heresy of selfishness, yet, under the influence of some motives, this might be almost, if not altogether expunged from the fair purity of virtue. For motives partake of the compound quality of the mind, do not appeal indifferently alike to each faculty, and so they modify, by the varied energy of the kinds of potentiality which they bring to bear upon thought and feeling, the character of these and their expression;

sometimes effecting a complete reversion in the mental constitution, —now for good, now for evil. These motives may consist in the circumstance of verbal exhortations or temptations, or in the striking vividness with which the enacted drama of events or physical spectacles flash back upon the witness's soul some hues of the untainted light which divinity pours in constant streams over all creation; by them deficiencies of perception, of desire, and of will may be corrected or intensified, and result in a state of mind in which defects have no part, since the whole is touched, by the magic of the surrounding, to harmony, and in which there is thus no room for selfishness; or it may culminate in the direful opposite of this, according to the susceptibility of the recipient.

Total self-negation is then as possible to imperfect man as complete self-abandonment, the last form of selfishness.

Again, it will be seen from our setting up the harmony of the parts of the mind as the test of the absence of self-seeking, that we cannot concur with those who argue that as all activity of the faculties proceeds from them, is an expression of their selfhood; it must be selfish because it gratifies them, and is prompted by a desire for such gratification.

This is only true when applied to the perverted, overstrained activities of the imperfect mind, under given influences, and then only in proportion as one or some of these misuse or over-exert their function; it has ever less of verity in it the nearer we approach to concord; applied to the perfect mind it is altogether false, inasmuch that each faculty is necessary to each and every other; and in ministering justly to itself by energy, is not only taking nothing from them which they are not seeking to impart, but is striving to afford to them what they desire to receive,—operating, indeed, that the others may have a just opportunity of acting also; thus *self* is so completely absorbed in *other*, that there can exist no selfishness, which means *self-love* overtopping or standing alone, without *love to others*.

The faculties of the perfect man would estimate their own worth in relation to each other, and so at all times, under all circumstances, in his influence through self-assertion on others who were biassed, would know just to what degree he ought to reduce or increase the comparative strength of their faculties, and would desire, and hence will, to do this, and not more or less; bearing himself in the warfare with the universe of falsehood rightly, both in method and in aim. There would be no substitution of affectional for intellectual love or condemnation, no attraction to or repulsion from those who differed intellectually or morally from such a one, excepting just in that in which their beauty or error consisted, whether intellectual or moral, and never would the whole man attract or repulse because he manifested in one or two elements of character that for which the other had a strong affinity or aversion. But this is how the selfish man does ordinarily feel and act, as we have attempted to show, and from which state of injustice he

must endeavour, by the aid of motives, soul-stirring and effective, to win his path.

"Long is the way,
And hard, that out of hell leads up to light."

But it is not necessary, therefore, that we should walk in the darkness of blind obedience to the impulses of the warped soul; it is possible to "go on to perfection" by looking unto the highest ideals for instruction and inspiration, endeavouring to follow them, and by schooling our biassed mind in which the tendency is to utter itself on favourite themes, to modify this utterance by infusing into it the other tones of the soul.

By this course of conduct we may still exhibit speciality of direction in our expressions of mind, which being thus tempered and attuned, shall be practically devoid of selfishness; for, as we have already pointed out, the Deity is the infinitude of each and all our attributes; and if our finitude compels us to give a special direction to our utterances of self, this direction alone does not constitute them selfish, but the preference of it, by engendering neglect of the others, does that.

There is, then, an innate selfish tendency in man, which is affected by motive-supplying circumstances, which in themselves possess character, and are powerful to incite either to the adjustment of the faculties, or their further derangement, and which, if they succeed in operating thus correctively, supply us with instances of emotion and conduct which tally altogether with what would be the constant action of a perfect mind, and are, because such a mind must be free from the taint, in themselves really and truly disinterested.

The application of these ideas to the discovery of the selfish element, in social, political, and religious life, and the elimination of a few practical truths, will form the subject-matter of a second chapter on this theme.

ALBERTI.

ON THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH.—"Men, in general, do not understand or appreciate the difficulty of finding truth. All men must act, and therefore all men learn in some degree how difficult it is to act rightly. The consequence is that all men can make excuse for those who fail to act rightly. But all men are not compelled to make an independent search for truth, and those who voluntarily undertake to do so are always few. They ought, indeed, to find pity and charity when they fail, for their undertaking is full of hazard, and in the course of it they are apt to leave friends and companions behind them, and when they succeed they bring back glorious spoils for those who remained at home criticising them. But they cannot expect such charity, for the hazards and difficulties of the undertaking are known to themselves alone. To the world at large it seems quite easy to find truth, and inexcusable to miss it. And no wonder! For by finding truth they mean learning by rote the maxims around them."—"*Ecc Homo*," p. 73.

Poetic Critique.

"What is poetry? Why, sir, that is not so easy to say. We know what light is, but it is not so easy to say what it is."—*Dr. Samuel Johnson.*

"THE beginning of art is (1) *architecture*. It belongs essentially to the symbolical form, the sensuous material being greatly in excess in its case, and the true adequacy of form and matter being still to seek. Its material is stone arranged in obedience to the laws of gravitation. Hence the character that belongs to it of mass and massiveness, of silent gravity, of Oriental sublimity. After architecture comes (2) *sculpture*, still in subjection, indeed, to a stiff and unyielding material, but an advance nevertheless from the inorganic to the organic. Forming it into a body, it converts the matter into a mere vehicle, simply ancillary. In representing body, this building of the soul, in its beauty and purity, the material completely disappears into the ideal; not a remnant of the crasser element is left that is not in service to the idea. Nevertheless the life of the soul, feeling, mood, glance—these are beyond sculpture. The romantic art, κατ' εἰκόνα (3) *painting* is alone equal to them. Its medium is no longer a coarse material substrate, but the coloured plane, the spiritual play of light; it produces only the show of solid dimension. Hence it is capable of expressing the whole scale of feelings, moods, and actions—actions full of dramatical movement. The perfect sublation of space, however, is (4) *music*. Its material is tone, the inner trembling of a sonorous body. Music quits consequently the world of sensuous perceptions, and acts exclusively on inner emotion. Its seat is the womb and the well of the emotional soul whose movement is within itself. Music is the most subjective of arts. But the tongue of art is loosened at last only in (5) *poetry*, or the literary art; poetry has the privilege of universal expression. Its material is no longer sound simply, but sound as speech, sound as the word, the sign of an idea, the expression of reason. Poetry shapes not this material, however, in complete freedom, but in obedience to certain rhythmico-musical laws of verse. All the other arts return in poetry; the plastic arts in the epos which is the large complacent narrative of picturesque national events; music in the ode which is the lyrical expression of the innermost soul; the unity of both in the drama, which exhibits the conflict of individuals absorbed in the interests of opposing sides.

"*Religion*. Poetry forms the transition of art into religion. In art the idea was present for perception, in religion it is present for conception."*

* Schwegler's "History of Philosophy," translated by Dr. J. H. Stirling, p. 342.

Hegel's "*Ästhetik*" is a wonderful production in its singular combination of philosophic form with historic exposition and critical analysis, and the outline of it now quoted from Schwegler conveys a very just and concise epitome of the views held by the great German logician. We have thought it right to preface our own remarks with this quotation because it helps to keep both before our own and our reader's mind that idea that poetry has a place and a purpose in human life and culture, and that it possesses an essential vitality and reality which we ought to recognise in all educational effort. But we are unable to pursue to its ultimate the many lessons to be derived from the philosophy of art, and we must now come to the performance of our official duties of critics of concrete verse, not abstract theories.

A poet is a maker—his genius is creative. The harmony he imparts to the offspring of his soul constitutes him a singer. To be a singer, however, is not to be a poet unless the song is the realization of some specific thought of which he is the procreator, the parent and the producer. Song is the vesture of poetic thought; but it must investure some true and veritable idea, and it must not be thrown, however artistically, round a lay figure. Life must beat beneath the garment, and the might of vitality must be that by which the harmony of the drapery is arranged. Poetry is emotion caught, and not only transfixed, but transfigured. Sculpture is *form* permanized, but poetry is *soul* immortalized—the very flash of the spirit's vitality arrested, made visible by embodiment and transmissible by song. Poetry is the outbreking of feeling, the utterance of or giving of outwardness to the fleeting evanescence of inward impressions;—the realization in some sort of the ideal which takes its birth in the spirit, and "that come and go with endless play" in ordinary minds, but gain envisionment in the dedicated spirit of the poet by "an auxiliar light" which weds "winged words" to viewless thought, and produces by their union—

"The two-called heart beating with one full stroke—
Life."

We often question the poetry we read thus:—Can it excite a feeling akin to experience in us? Does it enable us to *see* what it portrays? Has it the power to refill the memory with bygone emotions, or does it realize to our hopes the suggestions it makes? Or does it only chime out familiar phrases and re-echo bygone voices, or bring the shadowy reminiscences of other poems back to our view? If the verses when read bring out the emotion with vigour and vividness, if it is able to make its impression felt, we re-read it with hopefulness, and test it again with careful re-perusal. If it, on the contrary, produces no effect upon the mind but that of chimed phrases, awakes none of the emotion intended, and excites only the question—Why comes it here? we re-test our impression, but seldom find cause to revoke our decision. If there is life in any production, it can scarcely fail to make itself felt. Wax may

take but it cannot make the impression of life. We may illustrate this by quoting a few lines which read to us as *centos* of oft-heard hymns, a sort of conjuration with familiar diction, possessing a possibility of poetic treatment, but, to our thinking, not reaching the true standard of poetic vitality. The idea which seems to be in the lines of M. W. G. has not classified itself; and though we have endeavoured, as he will see, to make something of the verses, we fear that they scarcely can bear the name of poetry.

THE WORLD IS WIDE.

THE world is wide, and friends *may* part [must
Who ne'er *may* meet again ; [shall
But ties once *graven* in the heart [knit around
Unbroken still remain.

The world is wide, but sparks of love
The electric fire excel ;
From heart to heart they instant move,
And *bear* to each a spell. [work in

The world is wide, and days of joy
Have passed mayhap for e'er ;
But cloudy days can ne'er destroy
The memory of the fair.

The world is wide, but wider still
Is *the* great world on high, [yon
Where, through unmeasured space, the thrill
Of *music* ne'er will die. [love shall never

In that wide world no parting song,
Nor sorrow's wailing sound,
Shall e'er disturb the happy throng
The eternal throne around.

To that wide world Hope lifts her hand,
Its portal Mercy opes ;
May we meet in *a* world so grand ! [that
On *this* rest all our hopes. [Christ
M. W. G.

Our next quotation is one less perfect in rhythm and in mastery of words, but one in which the poetic lies hidden like fragrance in the heart of a violet which has grown up ill-formed but sweet, from the crevice of a hill beside a lake.

THE WISH OF A DYING CHILD.

MOTHER ! when I am dead,
You'll lay me gently where [Pray
The birds are gladly singing,
And *rich* odours fill the air ; [sweet
Where in circles midges dance
To the humming of the bees,
And *the* latest sunbeams glance [day's
Through the branches of the trees.

In the stillness of the evening,
 When the sun has sunk to rest,
 And gloaming with its mellow light
 Is stealing o'er earth's breast;
 When the evening star is peeping
 From out the western sky,
 And each pretty flower seems weeping,
 With a teardrop in its eye:
Then fold my hands upon my breast [Folding
And lay me gently down to rest. [Mother, pray lay
 [me thus
 ROCK.

Neither of the foregoing sets of verses, perhaps, justify their publication on their own merits as verse, but as illustrative of our meaning when we say that true poetry must have an inner life, not a mere external symmetry; they may be regarded as not unprofitably laid before our readers and their writers.

In the sonnet next given there are power and poetry, but the last line, contrary to the express necessity of sonnet-writing, is feeble instead of strong. Could that line be strengthened into something epigrammatic, it might bear comparison with many modern productions of the same sort; but as it is, a sad flaw spoils its gem-like unity. We suggest the only thing that has occurred to us.

PERICLES.

THE stars of heaven look glorious in the night,—
 Wonders of space; but in the night of time
 What star shines like the sage's brow sublime?
 Few orbs so bright as Pericles. The sight
 Of Athens, glorious, active, great, and free,
 Sailing down Time, as down an unknown sea,
 And this brave pilot at the helm—whose voice
 And eye bring triumph—gives me stern delight.
 Men are not in his hands like gamblers' dice;
 He knows the subtle laws that govern mind,
 And battling for the greatness of his kind,
 In few short years weaves Greece a statelier crown
 Of living lustre and of far renown
 Than ages wove for Persian slaves so blind. [round—
 [brows to bind

There is a good deal of ability in the "ensuing" sonnet by the same writer:—

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.

FIRM, tender, just—sad in his very smile,
 Tears in his wrath—a godlike noble king:
 Let us join hands with Marcus, who did bring
 For crown, a soul of truth, hating all guile,

Vain shows, luxurious living, every wile
 Lying in ambush for a monarch's feet,
 To trip him. Sun, rain, snow, and sleet
 Saw thee, poor king, on that wild horse of thine,
 The Roman people—an uneasy seat :
 For the rough Barb—ill-trained, though strong and fleet,
 Kicked, plunged, and bit thee. But an aim divine
 Upheld thee, stronger than applause or wine ;
 "Life is full short—work well while it is light :
 No riot! harvest must be home ere night."

J. S.

The spirit of the closing lines of this able sonnet suggests to us the quotation of a much less perfect production, but one which has a ring and clang of phrase which, though somewhat uncommon in the sonnet, is energetic and stirring.

FORWARD AND ONWARD!

FORWARD! Life's warfare before us is waging ;
 Let not our hearts be with selfish fears chilled,
 Let not our souls be with cowardice filled,
 Let us with force in the forefront engaging
 Give all our help to the cause of our race :
 Onward! with vigour undaunted in danger,
 Let us with energy rush to our place ;
 To hopeless despondency each man a stranger.
 Forward and Onward! despite all the shouting
 Enemies raise, or the evils that harry ;
 Far from our spirits be fear, care, or doubting,
 Forward and Onward! we seek not to tarry :
 Girt are our loins, hopes bright and hearts steady,
 Now for the onset our spirits are ready !

M. A.

The lyrical rhythm of the sonnet just quoted detracts from its worth and point, but the one we now place before the reader, though excellent in spirit, is prosaic, and might have been made, with judicious revisal, much happier in expression and pertinent in phrase.

TRUE GREATNESS.

WHAT is true greatness? Wealth, or power, or fame—
 A life-long leadership of other men
 In war or science—or the loud acclaim
 That greets the poet's all-subduing pen?
 Glory derived from wisdom or from worth ;
 Might used to cause the false and vile to fail ;
 Thought given to spread the truth throughout the earth ;
 Effort employed to make the good prevail ;
 The championship of some great human cause ;
 Devotion given to learn the laws of God,

To teach mankind on sin's sad path to pause,
 And lead the soul, by holiness o'crowded,
 To live for truth or for the truth to die,—
 For God is truth, and life in Him alone reality.

M. A.

A want of affectionate fervour, the overflow of the soul in sorrow, strikes us as remarkable in the verses which follow. They have not the fond recurrence of emotion in them which we think ought to be expressed in lines on such a subject. The style is harsh and inflexible, made-to-order-ish, and yet there is a sort of likableness in them when read, which indicates that the feeling may be restrained, lest the sob should out-gurgle, and the heart lose command of itself in its great sorrow. We have gone carefully over the lines, under the impression that their writer is young, and that he may be teachable. Though we have not been able to make suggestions which would dissipate all the objections we felt to the diction, we subjoin a few, in the belief that if our readers test the phrases, they will see valid reason for our proposing some alterations in the lines, and they may greatly benefit themselves by endeavouring to make other emendations of a better kind in consonance with the general spirit of the verses. W. L. may see that there is at least some advantage in revisal, and may be induced to polish his next verses with more care and greater lovingness.

LINES ON A FATHER'S DEATH.

FAREWELL, fond father! from thine eyes
 The light of life has vanished now;
 The cruel death-frost firmly lies
 Upon thy *dull care-shaded* brow. [now unshadowed

Not all the tears that love can weep—
 Not all affection's softening art—
 Avails to break thy dreamless sleep,
 Or *thaw* the *numbness* on thy heart. [stir—stillness

No more I'll hear thy voicings sweet
 When *sorrow's darkening shadow* lowers; [threatening sor-
 No more the sunny glances meet [row darkling
 That cheered my childhood's happy hours.

Close-chambered shall my memory keep
 Thy humble deeds unnursed by fame,
 With all the cherished *forms* that sweep [thoughts
 Around a loving father's name. [my

You sought no fame where trump and fife
 Called forth red war's fire-sweeping van,
 But through a long *care-battled* life [wrestling
 Maintained the honour of a man.

For thee no cloud-kissed pile may rise—
 No cenotaph with tinselled dome ;
 Far better God's approving eyes
 That *lured* thy pilgrim spirit home. [called

Ay, starward went thy soul, I ween,
 To anthem with the spirits just ;
 Thine end was, as thy life had been,
 A rest on Christ—thy spirit's trust.

Soul of my father ! ere I run
 The *giddy* round that life may crave, [care-tried
 Accept this tribute that a son
 Breathes o'er a cold and sunless grave. [thy

W. L.

The verses on "Spring," forwarded by "Alpha," are too irregular in their structure to satisfy the demands of criticism, and we, although approving of the moral and of the idea they contain, cannot regard them as "up to the mark." The lines on "The Sabbath Morn" touch our sympathies more, perhaps, from an incident which occurred to us when wandering, some twenty summers ago, on a Sabbath morning along Loch Lomond's margin. There came on our ear the church chimes of five different parishes, and we heard the whole harmonized by the lapping waters and the lake-softened winds. Passing a cottage on the road-side shortly afterwards, we overheard the voice of praise pealing from the family altar, and thereupon we composed a few verses which were, by request, inserted in an album in the manse of a country parish abutting on the loch. These we have not seen since, but the memory of the morning, the bells, the worship, the manse, and the church, with its graveyard, are held as indelible in the memory of our hearts. We quote lonely Alpha's verses :—

THE SABBATH MORN.

How sweet and calm *the* sacred morn ! [this
 All looks *tranquil*, serene, and still ; [so calm
 Nature in beauty seems to smile,
 And mild the sun shines o'er yon hill.

The lark, sweet songster of the dawn,
 Is soaring high his heavenward way,
Singing to fields, and woods, and flowers, [Greeting o'er
The hallowed morn, *the* sacred day. [This—Christ's

The lily sweetly hangs *its* head [her
 And listens to the lark's clear lay,
 Smiling amid its dewy tears,
 As if to greet *the* sacred day. [God's chosen

The flowers all hail the hallowed morn ;—
It wafts them back to Eden's bowers, [They waft thought
 When all was holy, bright, and pure ;—
No sin then marred this world of ours. [And no sin

And in yon cottage in the east, [Hark! from
 On which the sun so sweetly smiles,
 A sweeter sound than song-bird's lay, [raise
It all my earthly care beguiles. [A song that all earth's

The poor but happy family lift
 Their grateful hearts to God in praise,—
 To Him who made the Sabbath morn,
 And decked with beauty Nature's face.

And sweet, oh! sweet the church bell's chime,
It echoes through that straw-roofed shed, [Which
 Bidding *the* pious ones prepare [Christ's
 Their church-way path *to calmly* tread. [in peace to

Solemn to steal at this calm time
 Where *kindred friends* forgotten lie; [friends all un-
 And muse on Sabbaths with them spent,
 Swift, swift, alas! they have gone by!

But oh! how sweet to think we'll spend
 In heaven a never-dying one, [ending
 Where friends ne'er *meet* to say Farewell, [part or
 That land where parting is unknown!

O Sabbath morn, hail, sacred light!
 Thy winged hours, O may I love;
 When nature fades, then may I hail
 That never-ending one above,
 Where all is love, and joy, and bliss,
 A far, far brighter world than this.

ALPHA.

It is not wise in Alpha to change the form of his verse at the close, and we think he might have thrown his six lines into four, thus:—

Hail, Sabbath morn! O may I love
 Thy joy-winged hours; and may their bliss
 Make me long more, life done, to reach
 A far, far brighter world than this.

The under-quoted sonnet is too overfraught with thought. It is rather enigmatical than epigrammatical; and yet it has a value of suggestiveness which inclines us to place it before our readers as it has come to hand:—

WHAT IS TRUTH?

A CHRISTLESS Christendom some men have taught;—
 Laying doubt's cold hand on the human heart.
 Can these, indeed, have "chosen the better part"?
 And is heaven's choicest gift thus "set at naught?"

Of "the chief builders" of our world of thought?
 The thorn-crowned Martyr of sad Calvary,
 The Holy One who man's salvation bought—
 A dream, a *myth*, and not a verity?
 Then causeless rise old history's gravest scenes,
 Life's purest impulses and noblest hopes;
 Then folly's tale with that of wisdom copes;
 While morals upon human frailty leans.
 Can that grand life which makes "all old things new,"
 And calls for truth of soul, itself be all untrue?

N.

A sweet little poem, of a style much more in vogue in the latter half of last century than in our day, comes next to hand. We shall ask the reader to peruse it before we place our remarks upon it before him. He will find it finely expressed and fairly poetical.

THE VIOLET.

MODEST, unassuming flower,
 Sweetest-scented of the bower,
 Thy charms ~~is~~ invoke my lay; [e-
 How can I ~~leave~~ the cushioned bed
 That half conceals thy lowly head,
 And not ~~some~~ tribute pay? [my

Full many a flower may bloom serene,
 With velvet coat of glowing green,
 And leaves of rainbow dye:
 What though they boast a brighter hue,
 And yield *exquisite* fragrance too? [delicious
 Thou canst them all outvie.

It is not that thou has the power
 To rival every other flower
 In beauty and in bloom;
 Yet still thou dost a joy impart
 To almost every human heart,—
 A joy without a gloom.

For when thy fairy form appears,
 My thoughts revert to bygone years,
 When life was in its spring:
 I think of childhood's happy hours,
 When, revelling in a world of flowers,
 I made the woodlands ring.

And though since then Time's sombre wings
 Have cast a gloom o'er earthly things,
 And left me little joy;
 What wonder if I still possess,
 When *first* I view thy loveliness, [Oft as
 The feelings of a boy?

Old Time has tried, by age and cloud,
 To throw o'er thee oblivion's shroud,
 Unsprinkled by a tear :
 The young, the old, the good, the brave,
 Have rescued thee from memory's grave,
 And made thee doubly dear.

And thou hast had sweet sonnets sung,
 By every bard, in every tongue,
 From Homer's time till now :
 And after full three thousand years
 Each smiling spring thy form appears
 In valleys green and low.

Flowers rich in odour, rich in hue,
 Have passed away like morning dew,
 And left us but a name ;
 But thou returnest year by year,
 And like the friend we hold most dear,
 Our sympathy shalt claim.

[nought—their

Then still bloom on, *intrinsic* gem,
 Supported by thy slender stem—
 Exhale thy fragrant myrrh :
 There's not a flower perfumes the vale,
 Or *wafts* its incense *with* the gale,
 To thee we would prefer.

[loved floral

[breathes—on

W. M.

Well, now that we have read it, why is it that we feel as if there were something about it we did not quite relish? It is not that we remember the opening lines of Burns' verses on the "wee, modest, crimson-tippit flower;" nor Gray's line, "Full many a flower is born to blush unseen," and other seeming echoes, for these are livingly incorporated with the theme. If it is anything, it is a sense of old-fashionedness. The rhythm and rhyme smack of the olden time, and do not seem to throb and thrill as the verse of our age does. If read till the lines become familiar, and this sense of Gray, Goldsmith, Cowper, and Wordsworth wears off, so that they may be judged on their own merits, we think they will be regarded as very fair, pleasing, and readable verses—scarcely, perhaps, so affluent of emotion as they might be, but calling into memory some of the associations we love to have before us when looking in the early summer-time at the violet—a flower to which it is impossible "to add fresh perfume."

We must adjourn now our interviews with the poets: we have many pieces yet on hand to which we hope shortly to direct the attention of our readers.

The Reviewer.

The Philosophy of the Senses ; or, Man's Connection with a Material World. By ROBERT S. WYLD.

The World as Dynamical and Immaterial ; and the Nature of Perception. By R. S. WYLD, F.R.S.E. Edinburgh : Oliver and Boyd.

WE read the latter book which has just newly been issued with lively remembrances of admiration felt during the perusal of Mr. Wyld's earliest philosophical work, published sixteen years ago, as one which contributed considerably to fix our attention on the phenomena of sensation, and on the various theories on the relations between the mind and the universe which had been laid down as affording an explanation of the intermediate agencies, processes, or effects, which lie between the external world and the percipient mind of man. It contained many facts, arguments, illustrations, and statements of high value, and started questions in the spirit of the reader which he hopes have in some measure been beneficially effective in his philosophical training. At that time the present writer projected and prepared an analysis of the work for this serial, but circumstances now forgotten seemed to make it unadvisable then to insert the critique in the form it had assumed, and it was consigned to the hateful limbo of "rejected contributions." It is impossible to give with fulness our impressions of that early work. We may, however, give the following indication of its nature and its contents :—

"Perception is indeed a *miracle* ; we accept the title which has been given it ; but it is not a miracle wrought by ourselves by an exercise of our mind, and independent of the chain of appointed means ; it is a miracle wrought on our minds *through the appointed means* ; namely, through the medium of the organs of sense, and the action of the external physical agencies, created for the express purpose of connecting the intelligent principle with a material world. According to the view of those holding immediate perception, the case may be stated thus :—the *object* and the *perception*, the *miracle* ; according to us it is *the impulse of the brain* produced by physical causes, and the perception the miracle."—" *Philosophy of the Senses*," p. 483.

Of this book, "*Part First* contains considerations on the physiology and psychology of matter, of plants, of animal organs. *Part Second* gives the laws of sound and light, as applicable to the purposes of light and vision ; and contains a description of the organs of sight, and of the brain and nervous system. *Part Third* discusses the phenomena and laws of the different senses. *Part Fourth* contains an historical sketch of opinion regarding the material world, and the nature of our cognitions of

it—reflections on the nature of the connection between mind and matter—a discussion on the theory of perception," &c.

The several chapters of this book supplied many facts in psychological physiology of great interest, and helped to lighten up and explain not a few of those statements, notes, distinctions, and discussions over which we had puzzled ourselves in the celebrated *Note D** on "Perception," in Sir William Hamilton's "Reid," pp. 876—888; while the history of opinion thus furnished a brief epitome of the ideas of men whose views we had not been able to bring together in our own mind. As a work well worthy of perusal, as a book to take one over the threshold of metaphysical study, and to excite interest in what was likely to be seen and done in the palace of speculative thought, "The Philosophy of the Senses" is of very considerable value, and may be very serviceable to those who wish to study the subject by passing from the world of matter into the world of mind.

The second book, the title of which is quoted at the head of this notice, is just out, takes a far higher range of thought, and is much more thoroughly metaphysical than "The Philosophy of the Senses," and is much more suited to the present times and the state of speculation in our day. In this work the author accepts "the philosophy of force" as expounded by Grove, Faraday, Liebig, Helmholtz, Mayer, Bray, Thompson, Tyndall, &c., and proves that the latest utterance of physical science, instead of silencing metaphysics, forms a firmer basis, and that "experimental investigation, instead of excluding, rather solicits the help of metaphysical thought." With such a basis he affirms, "We do not require to say that the power is the occult cause of the object and of its qualities, or that the object is the result of the power, but the one and the other are the same—the power is the object, and in perceiving the object we perceive the power" (p. 182); and he represents life as "the battle of the spiritual with the physical—things subject to entirely different laws coming into collision—the self-moving, self-willing, self-conscious being encountering the unwilling, unmoving, unconscious entity" (p. 153).

The work contains notably in its author's opinion (1) "peculiar views regarding the physical constitution of the world;" (2) an exposition of "the bearing which the experiments of Hirsch, Bezold, Schelske, and others, on the rate of transmission of volition and sensation, has on the subject of perception;" and (3) an "application made of the new theory of force," which shows that the investigations on which it is founded "have elicited views in the highest degree important not only to natural science, but to mental philosophy." "The metaphysician," he says, "must not recoil from this invasion of his province; rather let him hail the fact that a point of contact has been established between phenomena which have hitherto been considered as destined to remain for ever apart" (p. 195).

We can scarcely be mistaken in supposing that many of our

readers would be glad to know the nature of this work, to gain a glimpse of its prime tenets, and to form some idea of its value, not only from our opinion of it, but from specimens culled from its pages. To this let us proceed. In his preface the author asserts,—

“Every theory of perception has hitherto been unsatisfactory and incomplete, and that of one of our most eminent philosophers in recent times has signally broken down. Philosophy thus stands, as it were, discomfited; and, as a natural consequence, metaphysics fall into disrepute. A childish idealism, as it appears to us, and a very objectionable form of materialism, have the field left open to them, and they have not failed to avail themselves of their opportunity. . . . Rising among the ruins of overthrown philosophies, and, with an exultant air, claiming to be the only rightful expositor of truth, we behold positivism, or the philosophy of fact. This French philosophy has already proceeded some length in the erection of its huge and gaunt temple—if temple that can be called, within whose walls are to be stored as our only philosophy nothing but the bare records of the past, the present, and the future,—within whose walls no ray of heaven’s light is to enter, nor any instincts of the human soul are to whisper,—from whose precincts, religion, God, the unseen in every form, are to be carefully excluded; and in their stead, the fact only that a belief in such things once existed is to be registered, in order to preserve from oblivion this past phase in man’s moral history.”

In this state of matters difference of opinion is quite inevitable, he thinks, and the only possible outlet for thought is by critical argument—that is, debate. In regard to the need and the nature of discussion, every reader of the *British Controversialist* will be at one with him when he says,—

“It is by examining critically the views of others, and by placing fact against fact, and argument against argument, that we can best elucidate and enjoy the subject. If, in the act of doing this, there should appear a lack of reverence, we fear this cannot be always avoided. The subject is pre-eminently one on which there can be no compromise; each man must speak as he thinks, and with the consciousness that his thinking, if it be examined at all, will be subjected to a like unsparing criticism. In conducting all such examinations we may or we may not feel the temptation to be trenchant; but we must feel that there is the obligation to be honest” (p. 131).

There would have been great pleasure in following this thinker into the fields of controversy; in showing, on the one hand, his stern opposition to the materialistic school; and, on the other, criticising his relation to the great thinkers on the theory of perception,—to Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Reid, Schelling, Cousin, Hamilton, Ferrier and Bailey, Mill and Bain, Lowndes and Fraser, &c.: but in a review where the author or his disciples have not a fair chance of reply, other laws rule than in debate. We shall, therefore, rather be expository than critical, and shall place together before the reader a few passages indicative of the prevailing theory of the work, and of the power and talent displayed in it.

"When, therefore, we perceive no *physical or visible cause*, and can imagine none, for the stone falling, we have no alternative, but are compelled of necessity to believe in an *invisible, immaterial, or spiritual cause* of this great law of the physical world. . . . The philosopher is not a mere chronicler of facts; reason imperatively demands a *cause* for every interesting event; and because the man of science cannot find one, he is not entitled to present us with what comes first to hand, and to say that the fact of proximity is a sufficient explanation. . . . He wishes to compel no belief—he shall only endeavour to show that the highest, the soundest, and most consistent arguments are to be found on the side he espouses; while inconsistencies, contradictions, and absurdities range themselves thick on the side of the believer in matter. At the same time, in a case like this, where there is no possibility either of a visible proof, or of a mathematical demonstration, he will be content to be allowed to present the appeal, leaving it to reason to pronounce its own decision upon it. . . . The idea of *matter or substance—that which remains or stands under the properties*—implies, to every man who considers it, the possession of certain specific qualities permanently inherent in each substance or elementary body. This idea, inseparable from the conception of matter, is found to be the reverse of a true one. . . .

"The following facts and considerations of a more specific nature, derived from physical science, when followed up by the reflections they suggest, lead us step by step to the same conclusion—that matter does not exist.

"1st. All objects in nature act *external to themselves*. The sun acts on the earth, and the earth acts on the moon. The power of attraction between these large bodies, considered as a mechanical force, is enormous. Now, as we know of no *material link* between these bodies which can explain so strange a fact, we are compelled to believe in the existence of this tremendous mechanical or physical force, without the existence of a mechanical agent to produce it.

"2nd. In like manner, it is evident that chemical atoms, when they act on each other, if they be material atoms, must also act *external to themselves*.

"3rd. It can be proved that no one portion of matter ever touches another. The elasticity of all bodies proves this.

"4th. A ray of light falling on a polished surface, *e. g.*, on coloured glass, or on a polished mahogany table, is reflected, without acquiring any of the colour of the body reflecting it.

"5th. We shall give some more elaborate proofs that matter does not act on matter, but force on force. It is known that light, when it falls on the polished surface of a transparent polished body, part of the ray is reflected, and part is refracted, and passes through the transparent body.

"6th. In the case of refraction, again, the bending down of the ray R R, it is equally apparent, is commenced not at the surface of the glass, but at a certain distance above it, in the zone of force F F. . . . Neither light, nor any other moving physical body, can impinge obliquely upon solid bodies at rest, without being deflected from its course. The fact that the constituent parts of the ray are not so deflected and scattered in passing through the upper and under rough surfaces, is to us a proof that no matter, according to the usual conception we have of matter, is *there* to deflect them.

"7th. The rapidity of the vibrations of luminiferous ether, and the free passage of the ray of light through transparent bodies, if they do not afford

a proof, at least strengthen the probability of these bodies being dynamical and immaterial.

"8th. Our inability to interrupt the attracting or repelling action of the magnet by the intervention of numerous plates of non-magnetic dense bodies, such as glass, copper, lead, pasteboard, &c., either singly or in combination, affords another presumption that these bodies interposed do not consist of solid matter, but are the combinations of material forces.

"9th. And lastly, and to illustrate as far as possible the universality of the principle we have been enforcing, we instance the operations of some of the most important laws of nature. All the forces exerted on the earth's surface, if we consider them in detail, are found to operate without the destruction or alteration of a single elementary atom, and a good deal of heavy work has been and is still being accomplished. . . .

"The universe, then, in this light, becomes a vast and glorious exhibition of POWER, acting and displayed according to those laws which have been designed and appointed by the Creator, and which laws and system we designate *the laws of nature*. . . .

"1. The existence of matter cannot be proved. We never see it, nor feel it, nor can we form any distinct conception of it.

"2. Physical objects we imagine to consist of matter; but their active properties indicate much more rationally their possessing a spiritual than a material essence.

"3. Reason does not sanction the existence of an insensible, unconscious, intelligent *entity* possessing active powers. . . .

"4. *Power*, when we reflect closely on its nature and meaning, appears an attribute of an intelligent spiritual being, and not of an unconscious inanimate thing.

"5. Physical phenomena, when examined closely, prove that physical objects acting in the mass—and physical atoms acting chemically—act external to themselves, and therefore through the medium of an immaterial copula.

"6. We have adduced several physical phenomena which are quite incompatible with the belief in matter as an impenetrable entity.

"7. We never see the cause of any physical phenomena. We never see a physical cause sufficient to explain or account for any one fundamental *law of physics*. Hume's essay brings this strongly out. We are therefore compelled either to assign an immaterial cause for these laws, or to believe that physical events occur without a cause.

"8. If, again, we assume, as the believer in matter does, that the powers of nature are connected with matter, and sustained in it by Deity, we reduce ourselves by such a supposition to the absurdity of believing in the existence everywhere throughout nature of a thing which has no power of its own, and which is therefore superfluous; and we involve ourselves in the double absurdity of believing that the Deity has created a thing which has neither power nor utility—which, in fact, occupies space, and yet does nothing in it.

"9. It has been declared by philosophers in all ages that it is impossible to conceive the creation of an entity like matter out of nothing, by a being having himself a different or spiritual essence, and Sir William Hamilton homologates this opinion.

"10. Lastly, let us remember that it is admitted by all philosophers that we never acquire any direct knowledge of matter, or of any other thing, *as a thing in itself*. We merely know of things and learn to describe them by their actings. . . .

"The theory of *perception*, which has so much puzzled metaphysicians, becomes simple; for by the dynamical and immaterial theory of the world we are brought everywhere in contact with *external power*, whereby our bodily senses are acted on, and the necessary sensation is evoked in the mind. . . . If the only source of power is Deity, then in perception we are brought into direct contact and connection with the Deity. . . .

"The most interesting and important discovery of our time has probably been the connection of heat with *physical force*. They are identical. The one is exactly commensurate with the other, and they are convertible the one into the other. A given quantity of physical or mechanical force produces a definite quantity of heat, and this amount of heat, again, if it can be preserved and applied, is reconvertible into exactly the original quantity of mechanical force."

It is to be remembered that these are but *disjecta membra* of the author's thoughts—jottings from the repositories of speculation—he opens up to us. We have preferred to allow the writer to speak in his own behalf to the bestowal of praise of ours on him. His work is worthy of the attention of the thoughtful. It stands right at the junction-point of physics and metaphysics. The ideas it broaches are of high value, and the manner in which they are laid before the reader is clear, plain, and comprehensible. Another opportunity may shortly arise for our directing the reader's attention to the results of the meeting proposed by our author of the force-philosophy on its own field, and proving that without metaphysics, physics is an unreality. To any one who delights in the progress of original thought, and in the furtherance of speculation, this volume will be welcome. Its author is, we believe, a gentleman of property, reputation, and position, in Fifeshire, of great honesty of character, of thorough independence in thinking, and of most original mind, educated as a writer to the signet, but freed by fortune from the necessity of practising in the courts of law, he has been led by the activity of his mind to search into philosophical questions, and in the very metaphysical atmosphere of Edinburgh, redolent of memories of Hume, Smith, Stewart, Brown, Jeffrey, Hamilton, J. H. Stirling, W. Smith, and Professor A. C. Fraser, he is known as a thinker worth listening to. The thoughts contained in this volume are matured, and they have the soberness of age on them as well as the fresh juvenility of new speculations starting from the highest tide-mark of the ideas of our age.

English Reprints: Mr. Hugh Latimer's Sermon on the Ploughers.
London: Alexander Murray and Son.

This is the second of Mr. Edward Arber's cheap and excellent Reprints of Old English Literature. "Latimer's Sermon" is valuable not only in itself, but as a specimen of early preaching. This edition is rendered more valuable by its possession of a table of contents, some notes, and the quotations made from the Scriptures in use in Latimer's day, set at the foot of the pages in the Authorized Version. But there is besides all this, "A Chronicle of the

Life, Works, and Times of Latimer," which is worth much more for its informingness than the whole cost of the tract. An introduction is prefixed to the work, and an elaborate Bibliography of the Ploughers' Sermon, preached in the Shrouds, at Paul's Church in London, January 18th, 1549. Mr. Arber deserves the thanks and encouragement of every student of English literature.

Austria a Constitutional State. London: Dulau and Co.

THIS *brochure*, of which we ought to have taken earlier notice, contains a brief sketch of the rise, progress, and development of constitutional life in the Austrian dominions. The recent history of Austria as an empire is but indifferently known to the general reader, but here the changes and characteristics of this vast segment of Germany are detailed succinctly, and brought before us up till the middle of last year. Such a concise summary it is very advantageous to have as a sort of supplement to history, and as a knitting together of the information gained from day to day from the newspapers. We quite agree with the following expression of opinion:—

"Austria, one of the oldest monarchies in Europe, has during the last few years undergone so many territorial and political changes, that she can scarcely be said to have remained the same empire. As to the political changes, they have been so numerous, so complete, and are so little known in detail, that a succinct history of them has become almost a paramount necessity; and since very few persons in these newspaper-ridden realms have leisure to wade through the number of documents and papers requisite to find out the information collected in this *brochure* within a comparatively small compass, it can scarcely fail to form a welcome addition to the pamphlet library of the statesman, inquiring politician, and public men generally."

Notes and Queries: a Medium of intercommunication for Literary Men, General Readers, &c. London: W. G. Smith.

OUR chatty contemporary has entered into a new lease of life with the new year, and has already brought into its repositories not a few important items of intelligence in history, literature, folk-lore, and other matters of a kindred nature. Though a *fourth series* is now in course of issue it appears as fresh and full of interest and vitality as when the motto of Captain Cuttle was placed before the public for the first time,—“When found, make a note of.” The fertility of such a scheme may be seen in the numerous volumes in which critical research, antiquarian learning, the sagacity of skilful annotation, &c., have been combined to compose a work which is indispensable as a repertory of chit-chat, and of the odds and ends of history, social life, &c., on which men are at a loss to lay their hands just at the moment when they are wanted. Every reading-room and book club should take it in.

Our Collegiate Course.

STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.

MILTON'S MINOR POEMS.

L'ALLEGRO.

*Hence, loathed Melancholy, (1)
Of Cerberus (2) and blackest Midnight (3) born,
In Stygian (4) cave forlorn,
'Mongst horrid shapes, and shrieks, and sights unholy.
Find out some uncouth cell,
Where brooding Darkness (5) spreads his jealous wings,
And the night raven (6) sings;*

Helps to paraphrasing.

Line 1. Avaunt, abhorred sadness.	4. Hateful forms; screams;
2. Darkest; begotten.	visions sinful.
3. Den; frightful and forsaken.	5. Get into; dreadful dungeon.
	6. Hovering; stretches.

(1) Of the melancholy of common life there are two species that have little resemblance. There is a sullen gloom, which disposes to unkindness and every bad passion; and there is a gentler species, a sadness which arises from the sight of the sufferings of mankind. It is against the former of these that Milton apparently inveighs. This gloom of spirit has been described in its influences by Pope, thus:—

“Black Melancholy sits, and round her throws
A death-like silence and dread repose;
Her gloomy presence saddens all the scene,
Shades every flower and darkens every green;
Deepens the murmur of the falling floods,
And breathes a browner horror on the woods.”

“*Epistle of Eloisa to Abelard*,” 164—170.

(2) The three-headed watch-dog of hell, whose den is on the further side of Styx. Warton correctly enough notes that Erebus, son of Chaos, was the legitimate husband of his sister, Night; but Milton here invents his own mythology, and supplies his own idea of the parentage of “loathed Melancholy.” We do not approve of “emending” Cerberus into Erebus.

(3) Nyx, daughter of Chaos, sister and wife of Erebus.

(4) *Bordering on Styx*, the principal river in the lower regions, round which it flows seven times; from the verb *στυγέω*, I hate or abhor, = *horrible*.

(5) Erebus (Darkness) is, as a *place*, the dreary, dark, and cheerless region of after-death, wandering in the dull space beyond the stream of the ocean; and as a *person* is the husband of Night, and here, according to Milton, the step-father of Melancholy, who, being illegitimately begotten, keeps up his jealousy.

(6) *Corvus corax*, a remarkably large-sized crow, of a uniform black colour, somewhat metallic in its lustre. It is about two feet long from bill-

There, under *ebon shades* and *low-browed* rocks,
 As *ragged* as thy *locks*,
 In *dark Cimmerian* (7) *desert* ever dwell.
 But come, thou goddess *fair* and *free*,
 In heaven *yclept* Euphrosyne, (8)
 And by men *heart-easing* Mirth;
 Whom *lovely* Venus, (9) at a *birth*,
 With two *sister* Graces (10) *more*,
 To ivy-crownèd Bacchus (11) *bore* :

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| 8. Dusky umbrage; o'erhang-
ing. | 12. Called. |
| 9. Torn and worn; ringlets. | 13. Delightsome. |
| 10. Grim; loneliness continually
abide. | 14. Handsome; effortful throe. |
| 11. Advance; beauteous; frank. | 15. Kindred; besides. |
| | 16. Produced. |

point to tail-tip, from wing-edge to wing-edge nearly four and a half feet. It is an omnivorous bird, is generally seen solitary or in pairs, and is reckoned of ill omen, perhaps on account of its colour, as well as of its harsh, croaking voice. The sound it emits resembles the syllable *croc*, or *cruc*, with an occasional similarity to *clack*. Even by poetic licence it can scarcely be said that it "*sings*."

(7) *Cimmerian* has become proverbial as intensely dark. Homer makes the ship of Odysseus (Ulysses) come—

"To the bounds of deep-streamed Ocean,
 Where is the race and town of men Cimmerian,
 Hidden in mist and cloud: nor e'er on them
 The cheerful sun looks with his beams resplendent—
 Not when he up the starry heaven is climbing,
 Nor when again the earth from heaven he seeketh,
 But o'er the witches night hangs brooding ever."

Homer's "*Odyssey*," by Dean Alford, xi., 13—19.

(8) The eldest of the three Graces—goddesses who enhanced the enjoyments of life by refinement and gentleness. Milton here again purposely departs from the older mythology. "Zeus," says Hesiod ("*Theogonia*," 907), "was by Eurynome, the daughter of Ocean, the father of the three fair-cheeked graces—*Aglaia* (splendour), *Euphrosyne* (joy), and lovely *Thalia* (pleasure). From their eyes," continues the poet, "as they gazed, distilled care-dispelling love; and they looked lovely from beneath their brows. They presided over social enjoyments, the banquet, the dance, and all that tended to inspire gaiety and cheerfulness."

(9) Aphrodite, daughter of Jupiter and Dione, the goddess of love and beauty, wife of Vulcan, but guilty of faithless intrigues not only with Mars, Bacchus, Mercury, and Neptune, but even with the mortals Anchises and Adonis (on the last of which see Shakspeare's "*Venus and Adonis*").

(10) The classical "sister Graces" are *Aglaia* and *Thalia*, but Bishop Warburton says that Milton meant meat and drink,—somewhat singular graces to elicit his admiration, seeing that "temperance was one of Milton's favourite virtues," but of course most truly congeners of such mirth as has jest and jollity for her companions.

(11) Dionysius, the young, beautiful, effeminate god of wine. In the

Or *whether* (as some sages sing)
 The *frolic wind* that *breathes* the spring,
 Zephyr, (12) with Aurora (13) *playing*,
 As he met her *once a-Maying* ; (14)
 There, on *beds* of violets *blue*,
 And *fresh-blown* roses *washed* in dew,
 Filled her with thee, a daughter *fair*,
 So *buxom*, *blithe*, and *debonair*.
Haste thee, nymph, and *bring* with thee
 Jest and *youthful* Jollity,
 Quips, and cranks, and *wanton* wiles,
 Nods, and becks, and *wreathèd* smiles,
 Such as hang on Hebe's cheek,
 And *love* to *live* in dimples *sleek* ;
 Sport that *wrinkled* Care *derides*,
 And *Laughter* *holding* both his sides.
 Come and *trip* it, as you go,
 On the *light fantastic* toe ;

17. Else ; others more wisely
 chant.

18. Mirthful breeze ; gives forth.

19. Toying.

20. While ; formerly.

21. Bunches ; azure-hued.

22. Newly opened ; wet.

23. Impregnated ; lovely.

24. Sprightly, sportive ; light-
 some.

25. Come hither quickly ; fetch.

26. Juvenile.

27. Merry.

28. Coming in close and plea-
 sant succession.

29. Similar to those which clus-
 ter.

30. Delight ; dwell ; smooth.

31. Haggard ; scorns.

32. Pressing.

33. Dance daintily.

34. Agile frisking.

earlier times the Graces were his companions, but Milton here makes them his daughters—illegitimate offspring of love and wine.

(12) "The frolic wind that breathes the spring, Zephyr," exactly defines the west wind, child of *Astræus* (starry) and *Eos* (dawn), husband of *Chloris* (yellow-green), whom he saw roving in the fields of spring, loved, and married.

(13) Goddess of the dawn, daughter of Hyperion and Theia.

(14) That is, as Spenser phrases it (Eclogue 5),—

"To fetchen home May with their musical."

In the sixteenth century it was still customary for the middle and humbler classes to go forth at an early hour of the morning in order to gather flowers and hawthorn branches, which they brought home about sunrise, with accompaniments of horn and tabor, and all possible signs of joy and merriment. With these spoils they would decorate every door and window in the village. By a natural transition of ideas they gave to the hawthorn bloom the name of the May ; they called this ceremony "the bringing home the May ;" they spoke of the expedition to the woods as "going a-Maying." The fairest maid of the village was crowned with flowers as the Queen of the May, "the lads and lasses met, danced, and sang together, with a freedom which we would fain think of as bespeaking comparative innocence as well as simplicity."

And in thy right hand *lead* with thee
 The mountain nymph *sweet* Liberty
 And if I *give* thee *honour due*,
 Mirth, *admit me* of thy crew,
 To *live* with her, and live with thee,
 In *unreprovèd pleasures free*;
 To *hear* the lark *begin* his *flight*,
 And *singing*, *startle* the dull Night
 From his watch-tower in the skies,
 Till the *dappled dawn* doth *rise*;
 Then to come, *in spite* of *sorrow*,
 And at my *window bid* good morrow,
Through the sweet-brier or the vine,
 Or the *twisted* eglantine.

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| 35. Bring. | 41. Listen to; commence; soaring. |
| 36. Precious. | 42. Warbling, arouse. |
| 37. Greet; homage justly thine. | 44. Freckled day-spring; issue. |
| 38. Make me a member; company. | 45. Without heed; grief. |
| 39. Abide. | 46. Lattice say to thee or hail thee with. |
| 40. Innocent happiness privileged. | 47. Between the interspaces of. |
| | 48. Spiralled or convolved. |

LITERATURE OF ENGLAND;

BIOGRAPHICAL, CHRONOLOGICAL, CRITICAL, ETC.

TABLE IV.—IMAGINATIVE WRITERS.
1600—1700.

- | <i>Names and Dates.</i> | <i>Events and Works.</i> |
|-------------------------------|---|
| 1. JOHN MILTON,
1608—1674. | <p>Son of a scrivener, of an ancient Roman Catholic family, who was disinherited on becoming a Protestant; was born 9th December, in Bread Street, London; taught privately by a Scotsman, Young; sent to St. Paul's School, London, and to Christ's College, Cambridge, 1624—1632, where he passed M.A.; lived at his father's country residence at Horton, Buckinghamshire, for five years, in learned leisure, perusing classical authors, and writing "Comus," "Arcades," "Lycidas." In 1637, on his mother's death, he went a tour on the Continent, visiting Grotius, Galileo, &c., and studied the language of Italy, so as to be able to compose sonnets in it. As he learned that politics was disturbing his own country, he returned in 1639, and failing in finding other suitable employment, he took a house, and engaged in the education of young gentlemen. The controversies of the times became highly interesting, and John Milton, in 1641 and the following year, issued as his contribution to them his treatises of "Reformation," "The Reason of Church Government urged against</p> |

Prelacy," "Prelatical Episcopacy," and "An Apology for Smeectymannus," &c. ; in 1643 he married Mary, daughter of R. Powell, a royalist, of Oxfordshire, but she shortly afterwards left his austere and puritanic company for the gay society of her relatives and the king's officers. Milton on this composed his "Tetrachordon," four treatises on Divorce. He was afterwards reconciled to her, and they lived with tolerable complacency till her death in 1652-3. In 1645, Milton's "Tractate on Education," and his "Areopagitica" appeared. Shortly after the execution of Charles I. and the institution of the Commonwealth, he was appointed Latin Secretary to the Council of State (£290 per annum). Eikon Basilike (ascribed to Charles I., but generally attributed to Bishop Gauden) being published, Milton issued a reply to it, entitled "Eikonoclastes," and in his "Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio" he assailed Salmasius (Claude de Saumaire) so bitterly that he is thought to have died of chagrin, at the same time that the author thereby so impaired his sight as shortly afterwards to become totally blind. In 1656, Milton married his second wife, Mary Woodcock, who died in little more than a year thereafter. He continued to serve under Cromwell, whose piety, genius, and moderation he seems to have admired, and who appears to have known the character, if not the real poetic greatness of his secretary. On the Protector's death the dark days arose for Milton—days of vice and sensuality, of mistressdom and misrule. In these days Milton lost his office, without pension, and nearly lost his life. He hid for some time in a friend's house, and, in a while, the Act of Indemnity having secured him against danger as the consequence of his former occupations under the Commonwealth, he retired to Jewin Street, London, and there commenced—blind though he was—the sublime epic, "Paradise Lost," which forms the main pillar of his poetic fame. It was completed in Chalfont St. Giles, in Buckinghamshire, whither the plague of London had driven the poet and his family, then increased by his third wife, Elizabeth, daughter of Sir Edward Minshull. This poem, originally planned as a "mystery," then sketched as a "drama," afterwards took its present form, and was published in 1667. Having returned to his house in Artillery Walk, Bunhill Fields, London, he composed his "Paradise Regained," "Samson Agonistes," &c., and in 1670 published his "History of England," and several other works issued from his remarkable mind. In his latter years he suffered much from hereditary gout, notwithstanding his temperance of life and moderation of habit. His mind was bright and calm to the last. He died on Sabbath, 8th November, resigning in perfect peace a life, according to his earnest aspiration, employed to inbreed and cherish in a great people the seeds of virtue and public civility ; to allay the perturbations of the mind, and set the affections in right tune ; to celebrate in glorious and lofty hymns the throne and equipage of God's almightiness, and what He works and what He suffers to be wrought with high providence in His Church ; to sing victorious agonies of martyrs and saints, the deeds and triumphs of just and pious nations doing valiantly through faith against the enemies of Christ ; to deplore the general relapses of kingdoms and states from justice and God's true worship."

Epitome of Critical Opinions.

1. "John Milton, a man in whom were illustriously combined all the qualities that could adorn or could elevate the nature to which he belonged,—a man who at once possessed beauty of countenance, symmetry of form, elegance of manners, benevolence of temper, magnanimity and loftiness of

soul, the brightest illumination of intellect, knowledge the most various and extended, Virtue that never loitered in her career nor deviated from her course,—a man who, if he had been delegated as the representative of his species to one of the superior worlds, would have suggested a grand idea of the human race, as of beings affluent in moral and intellectual treasure—raised and distinguished in the universe as the favourites and heirs of heaven.”—*Dr. Symmons*. “He had not only every requisite of the Muse, but every one of the highest order and in the highest degree. His invention of poetical fable and poetical imagery was exhaustless, and always grand, and always consistent with the faith of a cultivated and sensitive mind. Sublimity was his primary and unfailing power. His characters were new, surprising, gigantic, or beautiful; and full of instruction such as high wisdom sanctioned. His sentiments were lofty, comprehensive, eloquent, consistent, holy, original; and an amalgamation of spirit, religion, intellect, and marvellous learning. His language was his own; sometimes a little rough and unvernacular, but as magnificent as his mind: of pregnant thought, naked in its strength, rich and picturesque, where imagery was required; often exquisitely harmonious where the occasion permitted, but sometimes strong, mighty, and speaking with the voice of thunder.”—*Sir Egerton Brydges*. “When to these lofty and most richly deserved encomiums we add that in moral character he stands among the noblest and the best; that his spirit was as holy and his heart as sanctified as his writings; and that he so spent his mighty strength in the holy cause of liberty, and for the best good of man, that he sat in darkness ‘amid the blaze of noon,’ who can hesitate to place him AT THE HEAD OF THE RACE?”—*C. D. Cleveland*. “Milton’s blank verse, both for its rich and varied music and its exquisite adaptation, would in itself almost deserve to be styled poetry without the words; alone of all our poets, before or since, he has brought out the full capabilities of the language in that form of composition. Indeed, out of the drama he is still our only great blank verse writer. Compared to his, the blank verse of no other of our narrative or didactic poets, unless we are to except a few of the happiest attempts at the direct imitation of his pauses and cadences, reads like anything else than a sort of muffled rhyme,—rhyme spoiled by the ends being blunted or broken off. Who remembers, who can repeat, any narrative blank verse but his? In whose ear does any other linger? What other has the true organ tone which makes the music of this form of verse—either the grandeur or the sweetness?”—*G. L. Craik*.

The Topic.

SHOULD THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TO BE INCREASED?

AFFIRMATIVE.

CERTAINLY if necessary. Progress demands improved representation. This must be effected either by re-

distribution or by increase of numbers. We have already more than enough of legislators, yet if redistribution cannot be carried out, the

number of members must be increased. There is nothing cabalistic in the present number of the House of Commons. Adequate representation of the national voice cannot wait the petty objections of selfish and intriguing statesmen.—S. W. YOUNG.

If "in a multitude of counsellors there is wisdom," then assuredly we ought to be glad to increase our House of Commons so as to be a fair company of representatives.—P. D. E.

It cannot be doubted that the House of Commons does not represent the mass of the nation. It would interfere with the use and want of our nation's customs to confiscate the representation of any place—not guilty of bribery or other political crime—already represented, and hence any new constituencies must have new members allotted to them.—G. W.

Increased representation is a nullity if we are not to have an increase of the representatives; for as long as we adhere to the old-fashioned and stereotyped number, it will always be difficult to make any remarkable change in the *personnel* of the House, because the majority of those who now hold seats are so situated in regard to their places, that they would in all probability be returned for them however enlarged the constituency might be made.—M. N.

NEGATIVE.

It is generally admitted that the number of members is already large enough for all purposes,—both sufficiently to represent the electors, and do all the work required of them. It must also be admitted by every candid mind, that the northern division of the United King-

dom should have from fifteen to twenty-five additional members, as has been clearly proved over and over again by numerous statistical members. Evidently, then, an increase for its own sake is neither wanted nor required, but a more equal distribution of the present number. Disfranchise ten or fifteen of the smaller English boroughs, and correspondingly increase the number for Scotland, and you at once sweep away the anomaly of their representation, and do justice (in part at least) to Scotland in the only sensible way in which it can be done.—J. B. T.

There is no indication that the present number of members is insufficient for the proper performance of the functions of the House of Commons. The mere addition of a certain number of members would not add to the strict scrutiny to which the action of the Government is subjected, nor to the watchful jealousy with which each of the multifarious interests of the country is guarded. On the other hand, I believe that it would render unwieldy and cumbrous a machine which at present does its work efficiently. The present number of members is so large that it is not an unusual occurrence for a member, who may wish to address the House on some particular subject, to be compelled to forego his intention through being unable to catch the eye of the speaker; and this inconvenience would be more frequently felt if the members were increased.—M. M.

As mental stands pre-eminent over numerical force, let us be content with few men in the hall of St. Stephen's, and have that few of the right sort, to which party soever they may belong.—RANDOLPH.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

760. Can any one favour me with any information respecting the Rev. George Oroly, author of "Salathiel," &c.? or can they refer me to any published life of him? Is a complete edition of his works obtainable?—G. F. S.

761. Will any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* kindly inform me what are the published works of the late Rev. F. W. Robertson, of Brighton; prices, &c.?—A STUDENT.

762. In the course of an interesting paper on Herbert Spencer, in No. 1 of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, the following statement occurs:—"Though the Kantian doctrine soon gave place in Germany to deeper insights, it found its way slowly to other countries. Comte and Sir William Hamilton have made the negative results very widely known—the former in natural science, the latter in literature and philosophy." Will S. N. or some other contributor kindly indicate the amount and nature of Comte's indebtedness to the philosophy of Kant?—F. G.

763. Where can an accurate account of the Essenes be found?—F. G.

764. Will any competent reader inform me whether in the Trinitarian v. Unitarian controversy, as represented by the existing writings on either side, the former or the latter are supposed by the more candid, catholic, and philosophic class of minds, to have the best of the argument? I next modestly

query of our highly esteemed editors, why, during the past lengthy existence of "our magazine," this solemnly interesting and vastly important question has been omitted or ignored?—O. D.

765. Unitarians, with some degree of triumph, claim Milton as an illustrious member of their brotherhood, but can this claim be consistently supported?—O. D.

766. Is it credible, and not open to dispute or doubt, that Unitarianism (as repeatedly asserted by Unitarians) was the veritable Christianity of the immediately post-apostolic, early Church? Answers of a scholarly and informative character are, with great earnestness, respectfully solicited on these several points by—O. D.

767. What is the best plan to adopt to "master the lexicon of a language"?—J. P.

768. Is there any French or German work which contains a classification of the words of these languages on the same (or any similar) plan as Roget's "Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases"?—J. P.

769. A Sunday school teacher wishes to acquire so much of a knowledge of Greek as would enable him to read the New Testament in the original. What work would most facilitate his progress?—EFFORT.

770. I notice that in the controversial department there are very seldom any debates in science; and I have often wondered how this happens. Is there any good reason for this? does it only occur by

chance? or does it show that there are few debatable questions in science?—M. M.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

758. In asking, "Which of you have done this?" *Macbeth* (Act iii., scene 4) addresses the company, and seems at first sight to imagine that the ghost of Banquo is a mere trick devised for his discomfiture,—that it is a "made-up" apparition, especially as he is pointedly directed to the seat occupied by the ghost, and not to his usual post at the table. His following speech is addressed to the ghost.—S. W. YOUNG.

769. There is indeed no royal road to the learning of Greek, any more than any other thing, without effort; but "Effort" will not, we presume, be wanting in that. Greville Ewing, one of the founders of Independency in Scotland, at one time gave lessons in the Greek of the New Testament to Sabbath school teachers in Glasgow; and with great popularity, even in the days of Sir D. K. Sandford, prelected on the language of the Gospels and epistles; and to aid those who were desirous of pursuing his method, he composed a "Greek and English Lexicon of the New Testament" for self-education. It was well adapted to its purpose. Greenfield's annotated Greek Texts, and Lexicons to match, published by Bagster, London, are very helpful when a little elementary knowledge of Greek grammar is possessed by the student. "The London Greek Grammar," 1s. 6d. (Walton, London), is capital for self-culturists; but beyond all the books we know for the successful pursuit of the object which "Effort" has set before him, we recommend the works of which a description is given below—a description which, besides being trustworthy, is so full in regard to details that no one can fail to see from it whether the books named are

likely to suit him:—I. "The Englishman's Greek Concordance of the New Testament;" being an attempt at a verbal connection between the Greek original and the English translation. Uniform with the "Englishman's Hebrew and Chaldee Concordance." Third Edition, revised. Royal 8vo. Price £2 2s. (London: Walton.) This work contains—1st. Introductory matter. 2nd. The appellatives A—Z. Under each Greek word, the list of all the passages in which it occurs is exhibited, in the order of the books of the English Testament, and in the phraseology of the Authorized Version. In each passage the English word that answers to the Greek word which is under elucidation is printed in italics. 3rd. The proper names. 4th. The index—English and Greek, by means of which any one who can read English may see of how many Greek words any English word is the representative. 5th. Index—Greek and English. This, which is a *résumé*, under each Greek word, of all the English words by which it is rendered in the Testament, gives us, in fact, nor more nor less "than the Greek and English Lexicon of the English Authorized Version." 6th. "Appendix upon the Particles." II. "The Greek Testament Roots," in a selection of texts, giving the power of reading the whole Greek Testament without difficulty. With grammatical notes and a parsing lexicon, associating the Greek primitives with English derivatives. By G. K. Gillespie, A.M. Post 8vo., 7s. 6d., cloth. (London: Walton.) The following is an enumeration of the means by which this work proposes to facilitate the study of the Greek Testament:—1st. The text involves all the primitive words of the New Testament. Therefore, if the pupil has become master of this very limited quantity of text—about 360 verses—he cannot meet,

in the whole of that volume, one word with which he is not more or less acquainted. 2nd. The notes contain an etymological or critical solution of every grammatical difficulty which occurs in the text. 3rd. By means of this plan the roots of the Greek language are learned by association with a text, instead of in the dry form of a vocabulary. 4th. Each primitive Greek word is illustrated by some English derivative from it, wherever the Greek root has been incorporated into the English language. 5th. Every word presenting any difficulty is carefully parsed; and each word is referred to its primitive. 6th. The lexicon is so contrived as to serve as a vocabulary of roots to be committed to memory when that mode of learning the roots is preferred. 7th. The extracts being taken proportionally from every writer in the New Testament, the student, by using this book, will in a short time become acquainted with all the styles employed in the sacred volume, and will not feel the difficulty usually experienced in passing from the historical books to the epistles. 8th. Besides the advantages of becoming acquainted with all the words and all the styles of the New Testament, and with the connection of the Greek with the English language, this book affords an easy method by which a knowledge of the Greek Testament may be revived and kept up. The student's attention is concentrated on the difficulties, and these are placed before him in a compact form, with sufficient explanation to enable him to conquer them. 9th. This work forms an effectual introduction to Greek in general, as well as to the New Testament; and it is evident that the Greek Testament, from the simplicity of its style, and the knowledge generally possessed of its subject-matter, is the best book to begin with for those who intend to pursue

the study of Greek farther. 10th. The numerous and increasing classes of adults who desire not to remain in ignorance of the original of the Greek Testament, while they are willing to content themselves with as much Greek as will enable them to consult that volume with discrimination and advantage, are here furnished, in the most compendious possible form, with an instrument which, accompanied by a Greek grammar, will enable them soon to accomplish that most desirable object. With the diligent use carefully and prayerfully of these, "Effort" cannot fail of success.—R. M. A.

770. M. M.'s query is very natural. The inferences he is in a difficulty about might have been set down as answered by a paper on "The Logic of Opinion," which appeared in this serial in Dec., 1867; but we may quote the following passage from an extraneous source as being likely to satisfy M. M. better than any reply we could frame:—"Those points in physical science on which any controversy can be raised, require such an acquaintance with the subject as can be expected only from the first men of the times. Our knowledge of the material universe advances with a sure and steady step, and it is in general only at the farthest point of the progress, reached perhaps by none but the most eminent philosophers, that there is room for doubt and hesitation. It is therefore not easy to find questions, in these sciences, admitting of more than one solution, except such as lie far beyond the range of ordinary minds, and are on that account scarcely suitable for general discussion. It is different with moral and political inquiries, for which the requisite preliminary knowledge is more universally possessed, and where many difficulties arise simply from the vagueness and ambiguity of terms,

in the accurate analysis and more correct use of which no man of sound understanding needs despair of some degree of success." This extract is taken from the preface to an excellent and somewhat scarce work by Samuel Bailey, Esq., of Sheffield, entitled, "Questions in Political Economy, Politics, Morals, Metaphysics, Polite Literature, &c., for Discussion in Lite-

rary Societies or for Private Study." M. M. will easily see that if the character of science is certainty, there can be few matters capable of discussion afforded by it; and he will equally see that scientific debatable points require a culture which few possess, and excite an interest much less vivid than those which concern affairs on which we all think we can think.—R. M. A.

The Societies' Section.

YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION, KYNETON, AUSTRALIA, SECOND ANNIVERSARY.

THIS interesting festival took place in the Mechanics' Institute, 11th Dec. Considerably over 300 attended it. The arrangements were admirable, and reflected the highest credit on the directors. It was by far the pleasantest, most varied and agreeable entertainment held in Kyneton during the year. The tables were amply supplied with comestibles, and gracefully presided over by young ladies.

After the doxology was sung, the President of the Association, the Rev. G. O. Vance, M.A., took the chair, and delivered a most interesting, practical, and suggestive address, from which we make the following quotations:—Our Association includes much that is common to both school and college. This celebration serves as a balancing day, not only of our financial accounts, but of the work done and the progress made by the society. In this light our annual gathering must be allowed to be most useful. Associations that profess no worthy purpose, or that, professing one, miss it, and are contented to miss it, I care not by what name they may be called, are of no more service to the country,

and demand no higher respect at our hands, than the worshipful Company of United Knife-grinders, or the Roast-goose Club at the "Blue Boar." A calm review of our proceedings convinces me that the society has been doing real work, and has gained important ground. It was an understood thing that we were to make the attainment of facility in public speaking our principal object. The question then is, "Has that object been attained?" Have the members of the society improved in command of words, and in ease and grace of delivery, in proportion to the pains they have been at to attend and take part in our assemblies? Some time ago, partly for the encouragement of novices, partly to defend from attack true masters of oratory, who have chosen to secure for themselves closeness of reasoning, vigour of expression, and felicity of illustration, by the voluntary surrender of mere spontaneity of speech, I stood forward to argue, that while impromptu utterances are not necessarily more original in their words than written addresses, they are less likely, from the very fact of being extemporaneous, to be

original in their ideas, less likely to be drawn from the very depths of a man's consciousness,—a slow and laborious process, more likely to flow from the upper region of his thought, where he keeps common ground for the ideas of his neighbour, his newspaper, his favourite author, his pet party, his particular sect. I had not bargained, however, for having the practice (which I wished to excuse, not to advocate) retained so long or adopted so generally as it has been. It is a matter of great importance, I willingly grant, to get young men, in these associations, to think seriously and closely upon subjects apart from and higher than their ordinary pursuits, and to express their thought, in whatever shape they best fancy, before a public meeting. But there are times in the life of every man, and it is for those times especially that we try to prepare our young members, when the written notes and the studied lecture will be, by the nature of the cases, inadmissible; when his influence, in some grave crisis, upon those round him will depend, in the main, upon the skill with which he has learned to throw his arguments into form at a moment's notice; and the readiness with which he will be able to find words, pointed and forcible, to convey them to his hearers. Some there are who have notably made great proficiency during the last year in extemporaneous speaking. Others, again, who have never yet mustered up sufficient confidence in their memory or presence of mind to venture upon discussion without MS., have yet shown, without intending it, in some time of strong excitement—in the heat, for instance, of reply, when some pet theory of theirs has been rudely handled, or some well-prepared argument mercilessly dissected—they have shown, I say, at such times, that the training they

had received in our society had gone much deeper than I had expected; that, although it still wants some sudden pressure or some sharp stimulus to rouse them to the effort demanded for spontaneous speaking, let them be shown some theme capable of exciting genuine fervour, let their dormant passion be awakened and kindled by some real emergency, and they will find that their practice in our mimic forum has gained for them a mastery over language which they are able to use with effect, when once necessity shall have loosed from their tongue the bonds of diffidence and habit. A society of young men aiming at mutual improvement should try to cover the whole ground of mental and bodily gymnastics. The wider the sympathy we evince, as an association, with all useful tastes and pursuits of young men, the greater in the end will be the number of members, the greater also the means within our reach of influencing and improving them. An objection was urged against the society, that so many of its promoters were not, strictly speaking, young men. This was a very unkind hit at some of us who really believed ourselves to be young, who were trying to keep, if not young heads upon old shoulders, at least young feelings in middle-aged breasts. But whatever force there may have been at one time in this remark, it has none now. The young men have the field entirely to themselves. It is a matter of much regret to me, that so many young men of the educated classes keep aloof from our society, as if it were beneath their notice. My experience of the educated young men of the colony has taught me that they stand as much in need of the peculiar training to be derived from such an association, as the working class from which our ranks are mainly recruited. With all their better opportunities for

extensive reading, and for engaging in conversation upon matters of literary interest, if they have, as they surely ought to have, a large stock of ideas upon general subjects, they are not one whit less unready than the other to clothe their thoughts in graceful and appropriate words, when called on suddenly to make a speech, or even to move a vote of thanks. Their absence from our meetings occasions loss to themselves and to us: we lose the fresh stimulus which their presence might give to our debates; they lose the chance of acquiring, at little cost to them of time or trouble, the fluency and promptitude of utterance which they so much want. They need not fear that, by contact with us in our assembly, they will subject their temper or their forbearance to any severe trial. I can bear that testimony to the demeanour and spirit of our speakers and our hearers, that our debates evince a disposition to be fair and candid in argument, a courtesy to opponents, a moderation in conclusion, a readiness on all sides to acknowledge every palpable hit, every well-turned sentence, every just or manly sentiment, that would do credit to any of the kindred institutions at home,—even to the veteran historical society of Trinity College, Dublin; or the still flourishing unions of Oxford and Cambridge.

At the conclusion of his speech the Chairman called on the Hon. Sec., Mr. John Storie, to read his report, of which we append an abstract:—

SECRETARY'S REPORT FOR 1867.

With very great pleasure the committee of the Kyneton Young Men's Mutual Improvement Association present their second report.

It is unnecessary to enter into details respecting the objects and character of our Association. The establishment of the society is now so well secured as to render any

propagandism needless. All connected with the Association have reason to congratulate themselves on its prosperity, and the improvement that has been manifested by its members.

The art of debating being a prominent study, it may be as well to mention the subjects which have engaged our attention during 1867:—The character of Mary Queen of Scots, teetotalism, the character of Oliver Cromwell, the character and policy of William of Orange, the justifiableness of war, the best form of government, the stage, is intemperance or ignorance the most productive of misery? that sex ought not to form a disqualification for the franchise, the advantages of phonetic spelling, that sectarianism is not necessarily an evil, that voting by ballot is more desirable than open voting, the character of Queen Elizabeth. This list of discussions affords a synoptical view of the proceedings of the society in this department. The debates have generally been treated in a fair and liberal spirit. The essays, speeches, and papers illustrative of them, have frequently evinced research and knowledge; while the discussions themselves, though often lively and exciting, have been uniformly conducted in a calm and rational spirit, without personality or unpleasantness. For the convenience, assistance, and improvement of junior members and others, who might not feel capable of or inclined for taking part in the debates, we determined on devoting every third meeting to a different system of procedure, an essay on some non-debatable subject opening the proceedings, and members thereafter giving readings and recitations. This plan has answered extremely well, and has been productive of good effects. The following essays have been read on these nights:—On charity, the

use and abuse of reading, popular delusions, friendship, Martin Luther, manners, music, the study of history. These essays have been interesting and concise. The reading and recitation movement has been largely taken advantage of by many, and has been profitable and enjoyable. It was determined to give prizes to the best reciters. The subjects for prize essays in verse were, in the senior division, "The death of Lincoln," and in the junior, "Garibaldi." No competition took place for the junior prize. In the other division the judges awarded the first prize to Mr. Joseph Furphy. The elegy, in the opinion of both judges, is exceedingly good. The poem of Mr. John Poustie on the same subject is worthy of a special prize, which has accordingly been awarded to it. One essay was sent in in the senior prose division, on the "Future of Australia." A favourable opinion was expressed on the prize essay in the junior division on the Crusades. For the President's prize, the subject was the character of William of Orange. The Treasurer's statement showed a revenue of £43 15s. 6d., with an expenditure of £37. The roll shows a list of 139 gentlemen as members of the Association. We have, throughout the year, kept ourselves in communication with other societies,—notably with the Melbourne Presbyterian Young Men's. It is also very gratifying to know that our example has, in some degree, induced others in this district to establish kindred institutions, as, for example, the Greenhill and Barfold Debating Societies, whose prosperity we are glad to have an opportunity of recognising.

We conclude the report we now place in your hands with an urgent request for the addition to our working band of all who may have taste, leisure, or inclination for such a

useful work as that in which we are engaged.—JOHN STORIE, Secretary.

The report was unanimously adopted. The remaining proceedings consisted of music, recitations, readings from prize essays, presentations of prizes, and votes of thanks. The music was very good. The prize recitations given by Messrs. W. C. Smith, G. Styles, G. B. Southern, and T. Holding, were extracts from "Marmion," Byron's "Field of Waterloo," Macaulay's "Ivry," "Rollas's Address to the Peruvians." It was impossible not to admire the grace with which the various prizes, amounting to over £15, were presented to the various recipients by the President, and to relish the compliments presented by him to each one, suited as they were so admirably to the merits and aspirations of each competitor. The first vote of thanks was to the ladies, the second to the judges, the third to the singers. The vote of thanks to the Chairman was next heartily responded to. Mr. Vance, in returning thanks, called a special vote of thanks to Mr. Storie, the secretary of the society. The call was cordially complied with, and Mr. Storie thanked them for their hearty and kind appreciation of his services, and said he would do as much again for the advancement of an institution in which he took so warm an interest. The National Anthem having been sung by all the company, the meeting broke up. Next day, we understand, the children attending the national school enjoyed a feast on the remains of Wednesday's entertainment.

The South London Working Men's College.—It may be useful to some of our readers, and it should be interesting to all of them, to know that this institution, of the opening address delivered at which, by Prof. T. H. Huxley, we gave an abstract

at p. 153, has now got into fair working order, and promises a fair measure of success. It is situate in the upper portion of a spacious building, Nos. 54 and 55, Blackfriars Road, the entrance being at the back, in Collingwood Street. The college, which owes its origin to the energetic efforts of Mr. William Rossiter, of the parent institution in Great Ormond Street, is intended to afford the working men resident in South London improved facilities for procuring an education of a sound and practical character, by means of classes in art, languages, mathematics, physical science, political economy, &c.; also lectures by competent persons. At present the principal branches of college work are languages, mathematics, and physical science, which are divided into groups, in any one of which a scholarship may be taken; and into subdivisions—such as Euclid, Newton's Principia, astronomy, organic chemistry, vegetable physiology, mineralogy, &c.,—in which certificates are granted. The examinations are to be held in the January of each year. There is a coffee-room for the use of the members, and a library is in course of formation. In connection with the college, a day school for boys and girls, a school for adults, and afternoon classes for women have been formed, and with an encouraging degree of support. The progress of the college will be watched with much interest by all concerned in working class progress, and its success will probably lead to the establishment of kindred institutions in East and North London.

Ayr Young Men's Association.—The members of this debating society, which has been in existence for about sixteen years, held their annual *conversazione* in the Assembly Rooms on 25th Feb. There was a large assemblage of present and

former members, and other gentlemen interested in the Association; and the meeting was graced by a brilliant representation of the fair sex. The Rev. Mr. Grant occupied the chair. After tea, in the ante-room, the company adjourned to the large hall. Brief addresses were given by the chairman, and Messrs. H. L. Allan and A. Maxwell; but the bulk of the time was filled up with music, recitations, readings, &c. Several of the ladies gave admirable performances on the pianoforte, and a number of songs and duets were sung. A party of ladies and gentlemen, under the leadership of Mr. Allan, also gave a selection of Mendelssohn's part-songs and English glees. A novel feature was introduced by a number of the young men, who displayed their elocutionary powers in the celebrated trial scene in the "Merchant of Venice." All the parts were well sustained, and the speeches of the different characters were recited in nearly every instance with appropriate expression. The leading characters especially were represented in a style that most vividly realized the dramatist's conception. The success of this representation shows that while the members of the Association are diligent in cultivating their mental faculties, they are not unmindful or neglectful of the outward graces of speech. The company at intervals enjoyed a promenade; and a powerful microscope, a galvanic battery, the recently invented wheel of life, and other things of a similar nature, proved sources of interest and amusement to many. At the close votes of thanks were cordially tendered to the ladies who had furnished the music, and to the Rev. Mr. Grant for so genially presiding over the meeting, and for all the kindness the members had experienced from him during the long period that he had been at the head

of the Association. Mr. Grant having acknowledged the compliment, the meeting separated. We hope to hear of a considerable accession of members to the Association.—W. P.

Edinburgh Dunfermline Literary Society.—The anniversary *soirée* of the Edinburgh Dunfermline Literary Society was held March 7th, in the Bible Society's Hall, St. Andrew Square. The chair was occupied by Mr. T. B. Johnstone, M.A., president of the society, in the unavoidable absence of its honorary president, Sir J. Noel Paton, the distinguished Scottish artist, author of "Poems by a Painter," "Spendthrift," &c., who sent a letter expressing regret at his inability to attend, but a hope that circumstances might next year permit of his presiding at the *soirée*, and at the same time offering a prize for the best poem open for competition by the natives of the west of Fife. The meeting, which was numerously attended, was addressed by the chairman, Mr. David Livingstone, Mr. William S. Mackie, Mr. Andrew Blair; and the proceedings, which throughout were of a most enjoyable nature, were enlivened by songs from Mr. Grieve. Mr. Gardiner, Mr. Williams, Mr. Munro, Mr. Thomas Irvine, Mr. J. Keir Bryden, Mr. Lumaden, Mr. W. Dow, and several of the ladies comprising the company. A deputation from a sister society—the Edinburgh Dunfermline Association, with which negotiations are being conducted by the Literary Society, with a view to amalgamation—was also present, and its members, Mr. Traill, Mr. Wardlaw, and Mr. Morris, delivered suitable addresses, and otherwise contributed in no slight degree to the enjoyment of the meeting. The Edinburgh Dunfermline Literary Society was instituted for the pur-

pose of promoting literary tastes, and renewing and preserving friendships among the natives of Dunfermline resident in the Scottish metropolis, includes a considerable number of members, is at present in a very prosperous condition, and annually votes a sum as a prize for the best English essay, to be competed for by the pupils attending the schools within the district represented by the Dunfermline Presbytery.

SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Did the Protestant Reformation retard the intellectual development of Europe?

Is co-operation in the culture of land preferable to the small farm system [or to the large farm system]?

Is the farmer non-essential?

Can national destiny be kept under national control?

Does inheritance confer moral right?

Is population the basis of power?

Ought legislation to lead or follow the voice of the people?

Should the property of the Church of England in Ireland be secularized?

Ought party tactics to be employed when legislation involving great principles is before Parliament?

Are political compromises advisable?

Should the medical profession be closed against women?

Is England in danger from a Russo-American coalition?

Ought *public* worship to be an institution in society?

Does the moral law of Christendom coincide with that of Christianity?

Is free trade in conveyances advisable in large cities?

Literary Notes.

THE *Senatus Academicus* of Aberdeen University has adjudged the Blackwell Prize of £25 for the best essay on "The exact position and influence of Bacon in Philosophy," to the Rev. Gordon Lillie, M.A., of Aberdeen University, Demerara.

Eyre Evans Crowe, journalist, politician, and historian, author of "The History of France," the fifth and concluding volume of which he had just seen through the press, &c., died 25th Feb.

Robert Hannay, a legist and *littérateur*, author of "A Defence of the Usury Laws," died 21st Feb.

M. Eugène Plon has just issued in Paris, "Thorwaldsen; his Life and his Works." A translation is likely to appear soon.

A monument to Uhland is about to be erected at Tübingen. The fifty-second edition of his poems, containing several unpublished pieces, is just out.

The Rev. Chauncey Hare Townsend, a minor English poet, died recently at Lausanne.

A series of *penny tracts*, entitled "Notes on the Faith," is in preparation.

Professor Alex. Bain has in the press "Moral Science: a Compendium of Psychology and Ethics."

Rev. Orby Shipley, M.A., has under his editorial care a third series of "The Church and the World" Essays.

Alex. Robertson, of Dundonochie, is about to issue a third edition of his "Laws of Thought" which, though bearing a close resemblance in title to the Archbishop of York's Logic—of which the ninth edition is just out,—is *not* a logical work.

Rev. Samuel Davidson, D.D.,

LL.D., has nearly ready "An Introduction to the Study of the New Testament," critical, exegetical, and theological, adapted to the use of readers not learned in the original language, &c., in two vols.

The period stipulated by Prince Talleyrand to elapse between his demise and the publication of his "Memoirs" will expire on 17th May.

"Henry Ingall" announces in *Public Opinion* that he possesses the 4to. edition, 1615, of a *new* play called *Albumazar*, written by *Shakspeare* (?), with MS. notes and corrections in the *author's own handwriting* (!). "Albumazar" was issued in 1615, 1634, and in Dodsley's *Old Plays*, where it is attributed, on the authority of Sir E. Deering, to J. Tomkins. The question was discussed in the recognised literary papers about two years ago. The general verdict was, "Not Shakspeare's."

"The Life, Letters, and Posthumous Works of Frederika Bremer" has been issued by her sister Charlotte, and a translation into English is promised by Emily Nonnen.

Wm. Morris, author of "The Life and Death of Jason," has a volume of new poems in the press.

Dr. Wm. Budd has in preparation a work intended to prove that consumption is a contagious disease.

J. Foster Kirk, the American historian, has concluded his "Charles the Bold."

Dr. J. H. Newman's "Parochial and Plain Sermons" are to be re-issued in eight vols. under the editorship of Rev. W. J. Copeland, of Farnham, Essex.

A summary of Theology and Ec-

clesiastical History by various writers, in eight uniform volumes, is announced by Messrs. Rivington.

The Queen has commissioned the Rev. J. Jones, of Llandissilo, to translate her "Journal" into Welsh.

"Contemporary Questions," by Rénan, a volume of essays—some political, and all particularly pronounced—has been published.

Charles August Louis, ex-king of Bavaria, author of "*Poésies*," four volumes of verse, "The Companions of Walhalla," &c., in prose, and "The Inamorato of Lola Montez," died Feb. 28.

Herr Rohl, of Leipsic, has issued 322 hitherto unpublished letters of Beethoven.

A "Handy Volume" series of half-crown reprinted books—Novels, Essays, Biographies, Travels, &c.—is announced.

The *Oxford Undergraduates' Journal* has been commenced. It is issued fortnightly. A similar serial is nearly arranged for at Cambridge, and the students of Owen's College, Manchester, have issued in print No. 1 of their *College Magazine*—formerly circulated in MS. It promises well.

From *Notes and Queries* we learn that the publication of the third volume of the *Athenæ Cantabrigienses* may shortly be expected. This has been suspended for some time, owing to the death of Mr. O. H. Cooper, its chief editor. The continuation of this valuable work, however, has been undertaken by his two sons, Mr. J. W. Cooper, LL.B., of Trinity Hall, and Mr.

Thompson Cooper. It will be printed at the Pitt Press.

Of the Correspondence of Napoleon I., Vol. 23rd has been issued—dating from 12th Nov., 1811, to 30th June, 1812.

J. E. Reade has in the press, "Memnon, and other Poems."

Messrs. Strahan are about to publish Selections from the Works of Dr. J. H. Newman.

Professor Henry Christmas died 13th March.

It has been suggested that J. S. Mill should edit, with annotations, the philosophical works of his father, and that he should himself continue to the close of the mutiny that History of India which "first threw the light of reason on Hindoo society."

Wm. Browne's "Britannia's Pastorals" is to be added to the Roxburghe library.

The *Gentleman's Magazine* is to be made a shilling one.

A re-issue of "Household Words" is announced.

A complete authorized edition of the Speeches of John Bright, M.P., is in the press.

The Queen's book, in an authorized German version, is to be issued by Perthes, of Gotha.

The Cobden Club offer a gold medal for the best essay on "The best way of developing improved political and commercial relations between Great Britain and the United States of America."

A Biography of John Philip, the artist—one of the recent additions to Toiling Upward which Aberdeen has furnished, is expected shortly.

Auguste Comte.

THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

"One of the principal thinkers of the age."—*J. S. Mill*.

"It is in society that man first feels what he is; first becomes what he can be."—*Carlyle*.

POSITIVISM consists of a philosophy and a polity. Its main aim is to generalize real science, and to systematize social life. It seeks to accomplish the practical renovation of the human race by bringing about a mental revolution in its several members, so that a philosophy of science shall become the basis of a faith upon which a social polity may be established. Thus shall be brought to an end the eternal problems which vex and perplex the noblest natures; for when a rigidly scientific theory of human knowledge and of human nature has been made the foundation of a rational polity, having invariably in view the ennoblement and progressive development of every-day life—producing and protecting peaceful industrialism in the temporal sphere, while exciting and inducing a pure morality, the outgrowth of unfettered thought in the spiritual—the clue through the complicated labyrinths of European speculation for the last two thousand years will be attained, and the primeval instincts of love, reverence, and duty, will be harmonized with the furthest reaches of science and the most thorough organization of civil society. Positivism is the first attempt made to effect such a complete systematization of human thought, and to secure its scientific extension to all the possible objects of human knowledge, practical effort, and aspiration. The regeneration and reorganization of society, as a consequence of the remodelling of opinion, must be the result of the progress of right thought. Ideas govern the world, and in the long run the oft-contemned idealities of the sage become the eagerly advocated realities of the statesman. The philosopher co-ordinates the different elements of man's being—whether speculative, affective, or practical—so that it may be thought of as an integral whole, conveying or containing an exact and complete representation of all the relations of humanity that exist, as they exist. The politician, by such necessary interventions as may be requisite to modify all social reconstructions in a systematic manner, has the duty laid upon him of diminishing the deviations, lessening the delays, and repressing the inconsistencies which men are liable to make in their empirical endeavours to work out a state of existence in which love, order, and progress may prevail. The true statesman inherits the past as knowledge and influence; but if he would act

rightly for the living present, he must foresee the future, and devote himself to its improvement. To do this effectively he must apply the discoveries of the philosopher to the exigencies and requirements of the times. Thus true science and sound polity are correlated in philosophic statesmanship.

The appearances which present themselves to man's view in experience he calls *phenomena*, and the common relations which pervade these phenomena and bind them together in co-existence or sequence he terms *laws*. To be able to answer the questions which his mind, when excited to investigation, is inclined to ask in respect of these phenomena, such as, How are they caused? In what cohering contiguity or succession do they exist?—we must remount patiently and carefully from special effects to general principles, and, by close inspection and attentive examination of the causes of nature, learn to distinguish accurately and separate clearly the various effects which present themselves to us in a mingled or confused state in the ordinary occurrences or concurrences of experience. Of these we must note the implied adaptations and subserviencies, and accept these decided revelations of the economy of external Nature as instances of her laws which demand the submission of humanity. This connects into one grand scientific series the whole phenomena of life, whether physical, intellectual, moral, or social, and completes in one fundamental doctrine and universal system the order of nature in such a way that the results of every department of knowledge may be embraced in it.

A philosophic view of things consists of systematic and connected truths. An adequate philosophy must embrace not only the truths which relate to the inorganic universe, but those also which concern our own existence and the connections between the phenomena of nature and the activities of man. The puerile specialities upon which men of science now too frequently and too intently employ themselves are but, in most cases, useless fritterment of mind, because they pursue the disjoint filaments of speculation so eagerly as to lose sight of the co-ordinate facts and the colligating principles which unite into one totality the spheres of thought, feeling, and action, and bring these three primary elements of our nature into one harmonic whole. The positive philosophy alone can bring the entire range of human activity—speculative, affective, and practical—into one series of connected and mutually interpretative truths, not only without lessening, but even with the effect of strengthening every influence which tends to the improvement of the common life of man. It alone starts with and supplies a constructive purpose which combines in one possibility, knowledge and love, order and progress, and concentrates the entire sum of science into one consensus of co-ordinated and coherent doctrine.

All that is known of a subject may be empirical only; knowledge never becomes scientific until it is so connected into a body of truth that the relation between the details of our knowledge and the general principle which explains them is made out with

certainty, and each particular truth adduced may be seen to be deduced from some higher truth or wider generalization. Without this thread of filiation the sciences are but a barren collection of grouped and conglomerated facts, massed together according to the nature of the phenomena they concern; and they cannot be brought to show their bearing upon the social interest of humanity until they have undergone a complete and homogeneous intellectual synthesis into a philosophy. The philosophy of science is a logical hierarchy of truths, not an arrangement of facts and their results merely, but a methodic evolution of these truths so as to secure a full and clear conception of them, of the marks by which they are recognised, of the processes by which the mind acquires them, of the links by which they are connected one with another, and of the means by which they may be most readily made available for use; in short, it is a comprehensive statement of the dependence and interdependence of all knowable truths.

Philosophy is the explanation of the laws of the universe *to thought*. But the Positive Philosophy is something very different; it is the explanation of the whole sum of the actualities of human experiences and capacities. It considers all the so-called sciences—mental, physical, and social—as elements of one sole science, to be investigated by one and the same method, and with one and the same end—the spiritual re-organization of the civilized world and the ultimate regeneration of humanity at large. Hence the universe is to be studied, though not for its own sake, still less for the foolish indulgence of a curious spirit, but for the sake of man, or rather, humanity. Hence the true positive spirit consists in substituting the study of the invariable laws of phenomena for that of their supposititious causes, whether proximate or primordial; and in transferring our investigations from *why* to *how*. Thus it is that philosophy—which is good sense generalized and put into a systematic form—becomes *positive, i. e.*, characterized by reality, usefulness, precision, certainty, organic unity, and invariable relativity; and that the eternal tendencies and workings of the living powers of man, as well as the the multiplicity of intricate phenomena of creation, may be made, at each successive increase of our knowledge of them, an excitant of joyful sentiment, of practical progress, and of trustworthy thought.

Science is the basis, and art is the outcome of the positive philosophy. Science is the torch by which we illuminate the past, illustrate the present, and light up the future. Science is life realized. Science is positive, metaphysics suppositive thought. Science is the entire range of the known; it systematizes the whole of our conceptions, and embraces not only the inorganic world, but also the phenomena of our own existence, and the law or order by which humanity is regulated. Its province is to investigate the past and explain the present, in order that we may foresee the future, and discover the means of improving life. The importance attachable to science depends on the capacity it has to educate pre-

science, for by that alone can we regulate our life's activities aright amidst the onwhirl of the external world's changes and processes. The object to be aimed at, then, is to attain a careful and accurate acquaintance with the irresistible and regular economy of nature, in order that by the study of it we may be enabled to obey its behests and to amend our relations to it by attending to the inexorable requirements of the invariable and immutable, and by gaining true knowledge of the forms which change takes, that we may be able to pre-arrange the results we desire to effect.

A scientific theory, at once of nature and of human nature, demands an organized and systematic exploration and survey of the world around; and a scheme of life, having for its foundation a standard of duty derived from the only firm and trustworthy source—scientific thought. Human affairs cannot be thought to lie beyond the reach of regular laws, and the problem of our age is to bring the moral and social relations of men within the sphere of positive science. This can only be done by penetrating men, with the conviction of the existence and activity of invariable laws in every department of nature, and of the irresistible necessity of his acquiring a knowledge of these laws, if he would attain power over the world around him—for “nature,” as Bacon says, “is only subdued by submission,”—and over his own physical organization, which is to be had only on condition of perfect obedience to the requirements of health. Hence the human intellect must be dissuaded from metaphysical inquiries into causes which are inscrutable, and must consent to study the laws of phenomena founded on observation and experiment. “The true spirit of Positivism consists in substituting the study of the invariable laws of phenomena for that of their so-called causes, whether proximate or primary; in a word, in studying the *how* instead of the *why*.” Besides this, all the exertions of the intellect must be concentrated upon, as well be as bounded by, considerations of human welfare, and all the efforts of investigation must be subordinate to the moral and social requirements of humanity,—not in the spirit of a narrow utilitarianism, but with a full view of all that personal and social life implies. Beyond this any foolish indulgence of the spirit of curiosity requires to be checked and put under disciplinary restraint. We must feel, know, and acknowledge the search for causes to be beyond our reach, and limit ourselves to a knowledge of the laws of things. *We have no knowledge of anything but phenomena; and our knowledge of phenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production of any fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. These relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential*

nature and their ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us.

“All foresight of phenomena, and power over them, depend on knowledge of their sequences, and not upon any notion we may have formed respecting their origin or inmost nature. We foresee a fact or event by means of facts which are signs of it, because experience has shown them to be its antecedents. We bring about any fact other than our own muscular contractions by means of some fact which experience has shown to be followed by it. All foresight, therefore, and all intelligent action, have only been possible in proportion as men have successfully attempted to ascertain the successions of phenomena.” “In the order of nature there are two classes of laws,—those that are simple or abstract, those that are compound or concrete. Positive science may deal either with objects themselves as they exist, or with the separate phenomena that the objects exhibit. Of course we can only judge of an object by the sum of its phenomena; but it is open to us either to examine a special class of phenomena *abstracted* from all the beings that exhibit it, or to take some special object and examine the whole *concrete* group of phenomena. In the latter case we shall be studying different systems of existence; in the former, different modes of activity.

The teachings and the traditions of all those great scientific minds by whose discoveries the race has been ennobled and enriched, when properly interpreted and carried out to their logical result, lead to the evolution of a conception in the mind of a scale of the sciences—rising from the most abstract conceptions of mathematics to the most concrete forms of social life—in the order of their logical dependence on one another, so that the series of these sciences shall arrange themselves according to the decrease in their generality, and the increase in their complication; or, in Hamiltonian phrase, as they are less in comprehension and greater in extension. This is the true law of the evolution at once of thought and of humanity. Glimpses of it had been attained by Pascal and Leibnitz, by Machiavelli and Vico, by Kant, Herder, and Hegel, by Montesquieu, Turgot, and Condorcet; but the full perception of the sociological laws of orderly progress and progressive order dates truly from 1822, when Auguste Comte discovered the twofold law of human evolution which unifies history and philosophy.

The first of these laws consists in this, to quote the author's own words (translated):—

“That each of our principal conceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes successively through three different states of theory,—the *theologic*, or fictitious; the *metaphysic*, or abstract; the scientific, or *positive*. In other terms, the human mind, by its nature, employs successively, in each of its researches, three methods of philosophizing, the character of which is essentially different, and even radically opposed;—at first the theological method, then the metaphysical, and lastly the positive method. Hence three distinct philosophies, or general systems of conceptions on the aggregate of phenomena, which mutually exclude each other: the first is the

necessary starting-point of the human intelligence; the third is its fixed and definite state; the second is destined to serve the purpose only of transition.

"In the *theologic* state the human mind, directing its researches to the intimate nature of things, the first causes and the final causes of all those effects which arrest its attention,—in a word, towards an absolute knowledge of things, represents to itself the phenomena as produced by the direct and continuous action of supernatural agents, more or less numerous, whose arbitrary intervention explains all the apparent anomalies of the universe.

"In the *metaphysic* state, which is in its essence a modification of the former, the supernatural agents are displayed by abstract forces, veritable entities (personified abstractions), inherent in things, and conceived as capable of engendering by themselves all the observed phenomena—whose explanation thenceforth consists in assigning to each its corresponding entity.

"At last, in the *positive* state, the human mind, recognising the impossibility of obtaining absolute notions, renounces the search after the origin and destination of the universe, and the knowledge of the intimate causes of phenomena, to attach itself exclusively to the discovery, by the combined efforts of ratiocination and observation of their effective laws; that is to say, their invariable relations of succession and of similitude. The explanation of things, reduced now to its real terms, becomes nothing more than the connection established between the various individual phenomena and certain general facts, the number of which the progress of science tends continually to diminish.

"The *theologic* system has reached the highest state of perfection of which it is susceptible when it has substituted the providential action of one only Being for the capricious agency of the numerous independent divinities who had previously been imagined. In like manner the last term of the metaphysic system consists in conceiving, instead of the different special entities, one great general entity, *nature*, considered as the only source of all phenomena. The perfection of the *positive* system, towards which it unceasingly tends, though it is not probable it can ever attain to it, would be the ability to represent all observable phenomena as particular cases of some one general fact; such, for instance, as that of gravitation."

"It is easily conceivable that our understanding, compelled to proceed by degrees almost imperceptible, could not pass abruptly and without an intermediate stage from the *theologic* to the *positive* philosophy. Theology and physics are so profoundly incompatible, their conceptions have a character so radically opposed, that before renouncing the one to employ exclusively the other, the mind must make use of the intermediate conceptions of a bastard character, fit, for that very reason, gradually to operate the transition. Such is the natural destination of metaphysical conceptions; they have no other real utility. By substituting in the study of phenomena, for supernatural directive agency, an inseparable entity residing in things (although this be conceived at first merely as an emanation from the former), man habituates himself by degrees to consider only the facts themselves, the notion of these metaphysical agents being gradually subtilized till they are no longer in the eyes of men of intelligence anything but the names of abstractions. It is impossible to conceive by what other process our understanding could pass from considerations purely supernatural to considerations purely natural, from the *theologic* to the *positive régime*."

"This general theorem" (we now quote from J. S. Mill) "is completed by the addition that the theological mode of thought has three stages,—Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism; the successive transitions being prepared, and indeed caused by the gradual uprising of the two rival modes of thought, the metaphysical and the positive, and in their turn preparing the way for the ascendancy of these; first and temporarily of the metaphysical, finally of the positive. This generalization is the most fundamental of the doctrines which originated with M. Comte; and the survey of history which occupies the two largest volumes of the six composing his work is a continuous exemplification and verification of the law."

"Although every branch of knowledge must pass through three different stages, in obedience to the law of evolution, nevertheless the progress is not strictly chronological. Some sciences are more rapid in their evolution than others; some individuals pass through these evolutions more quickly than others; so also of nations."

"Other circumstances being equal, the rapidity varies with their complexity. The simpler phenomena, those embraced in the sciences of geometry or astronomy, are brought into the positive stage first. The more complex, those of animal life or of human society, remain longest under the influence of supernatural or metaphysical dogmas. Thus the three methods of philosophizing may co-exist in the same mind in different departments of thought, and in the same department of thought in different minds."

History shows us the gradual elimination of superstition from men's beliefs, and the dispersion of fantastic creeds before the light of certainty which science carries like a torch before it. Each of the three methods enumerated by M. Comte has numerous exemplifications of its reality and place in the evolution of humanity. The second law of evolution depends upon the nature of the elements of science. Science is either abstract or concrete: the former concerns itself with the laws which regulate the primary elements of nature, and on which all not only their actual phenomena depend, but all the phenomena possible to, with, or by them; the latter regards the particular combinations of phenomena which are found in actual existence and activity. The one looks on phenomena in all their aspects, and all the possibilities of their operation, and the other only as experienced; the former refers to events in the widest signification of the word, and the latter to beings or objects existent. The abstract sciences are formed; the concrete are only in process of formation, and have not yet received their final constitution. A classification of science according to the conditions of nature is all-important:—


"The positive philosophy falls naturally into five divisions, or five fundamental sciences, whose order of succession is determined by the necessary or invariable subordination (estimated according to no hypothetical opinions) of their several phenomena; these are astronomy, mechanics, physics, chemistry, physiology, and, lastly, social physics. The first regards phenomena the most general, the most abstract, the most remote from humanity; they influence all others without being influenced by them. The phenomena considered by the last are, on the contrary, the most complicated, the most concrete, the most directly interesting to man;.

they depend more or less on all the preceding phenomena without exercising on them any influence. Between these two extremes the degrees of speciality, of complication, of personality, of phenomena, gradually increase as well as their successive dependence."

Hence, according to M. Comte's new classification,—

"The 'Course of Positive Philosophy' comprehends *Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, and Chemistry*, or the sciences of *Inorganic Bodies*; then *Physiology and Social Physics*, or the sciences of *Organic Bodies*. MATHEMATICS are subdivided into the *Calculus, Geometry, and Rational Mechanics*. The six lectures on the Calculus contain a general view of mathematical analysis: the Calculus of direct and indirect functions, the Calculus of variations, and that of finite differences. The five lectures on Geometry contain a general view of Geometry, the geometry of the ancients, the fundamental conception of analytical geometry, and the general study of lines and surfaces. The four lectures on Rational Mechanics embrace the fundamental principles of Mechanics, a general view of Statics and Dynamics, and the general theorems of Mechanics. After some general considerations on ASTRONOMY, he divides his subject into *Geometrical and Mechanical Astronomy*. Under the first division he gives a general exposition of the methods of observation; and he treats of the elementary geometrical phenomena of the heavenly bodies, of the theory of the earth's motion, and of the laws of Kepler. Under the second division he treats of the law of universal gravitation, and after a philosophical appreciation of of this law he applies it to the explanation of celestial phenomena. The great department of PHYSICS is divided into *Barology, Thermology, Acoustics, Optics, and Electrolgy*. CHEMISTRY is divided into *Inorganic and Organic Chemistry*. PHYSIOLOGY embraces the structure and composition of living bodies, the classification of living bodies, vegetable physiology, animal physiology, intellectual and *affective* physiology; and under SOCIAL PHYSICS our author treats of the general structure of human societies, of the fundamental natural law of the development of the human species, and of the progress of civilization. This last section, as has been already explained, is subdivided into three heads,—the Theological epoch, the Metaphysical epoch, and the Positive epoch; the first of these epochs embracing *Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism*."

The accuracy, reach, and excellence of this systematization of the sciences arrayed in co-ordinated and methodized series from mathematics to sociology, has been considered by many of the most thoughtful men of the age, and the most thoroughly scientific minds have seen in it much to approve. The exposition given in the preceding paragraph is that contained in a paper by the recently deceased Sir David Brewster, which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* in 1842, and proved highly gratifying, on the whole, to M. Comte. The thoughtful reader may take our following epitome and read it into formal consecutiveness, after perusing the synoptical tables subjoined, viz:—"The theoretical arrangement of human conceptions," p. 329, the most matured form into which the author cast his scheme; and the "synoptical view," pp. 330, 331, which may be taken as a sort of classified epitome of the contents of "The Course of Positive Philosophy."



SYNOPTICAL VIEW OF THE COURSE OF POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

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AUGUSTE COMTE.

- General Preliminaries.** { 1. Exposition of the main intent of the course ; general observations on the Nature, importance, &c., of the Positive Philosophy.
2. Exposition of its plan ; general observations on the arrangement of the Sciences.

- Mathematics.** General considerations. { (1) The Calculus. { 1. General view of mathematical analysis.
2. The calculus of direct functions.
3. The calculus of indirect functions.
4. The calculus of variations.
5. The calculus of finite differences.
(2) Geometry. { 1. General view of geometry
2. The
3. The
4. The
5. The
Rational { 1. The
2. Gene
3. Gene
(3) Mechanics. { 4. General theorems of mechanics.
of analytical geometry.
mechanics.

- Inorganic Bodies.** { **Astronomy** ... { (1) Philosophical considerations on { 1. Geometrical { 1. The universal law of gravitation.
2. Astronomy. { 2. Philosophic appreciation of this law.
3. Mechanical { 3. Explanation of the phenomena of the heavens by this law.
4. Kepler's laws.
(2) General considerations on { 1. The universal law of gravitation.
2. Astronomy. { 2. Philosophic appreciation of this law.
3. Mechanical { 3. Explanation of the phenomena of the heavens by this law.
4. Kepler's laws.
(3) Considerations on positive cosmogony.
{ Philosophical considerations on the totality of physics.
{ Barology (science of weight).

observation. [bodies, phenomena of the heavenly

The Science of	Physics.	General considerations on	Thermology (science of heat.) Acoustics (science of sound). Optics (science of vision). Electrology (do.).	General considerations	General considerations on	{ 1. The experimental study of the phenomena of heat. { 2. The mathematical theory of these phenomena.
Chemistry	General considerations on	General considerations on	{ 1. General outline of organic chemistry. { 2. The doctrine of definite propositions. { 3. The theory of electro-chemistry.			
The Science of Organic Bodies.	Physiology or Biology ...	General observations on the totality of physiology.	{ The structure and composition of living bodies. { The classification of the soul. { Vegetable physiology. { Animal physiology.			
Social Physics or Sociology.	Introduction.	General observations on the need and fitness of social phenomena.	{ Intellectual and emotional physiology { 1. Examination of ancient theories. { 2. Exposition of the positive theory.			
General epitome and conclusion.	Method.	General observations on the general structure of human societies.	{ 1. General observations on the need and fitness of social phenomena. { 2. Examination of the endeavours hitherto made to find { 1. Characteristics of the positive methods applied to the { 2. Relations of sociology with other branches of natural philosophy.			
General epitome and conclusion.	Science.	General observations on the development of the human race as a whole.	{ 1. Theological era. { 1. Fetichism. { 2. Polytheism. { 3. Monotheism.			
General epitome and conclusion.	Abstract of the positive method. Abstract of the positive doctrine. The future of the positive philosophy.	{ 1. Theological era. { 1. Fetichism. { 2. Polytheism. { 3. Monotheism.				

That co-ordination at once establishes unity in our intellectual operations. It realizes the desire obscurely expressed by Bacon for a *scala intellectus*, a ladder of the understanding, by aid of which our thoughts may pass with ease from the lowest subjects to the highest, or *vice versa*, without weakening the sense of their continuous connection in nature. Each of the six terms of which our series is composed is in its central portion quite distinct from the two adjoining links; but it is closely related in its commencement to the preceding term—in its conclusion to the term which follows.

As a whole, therefore, the series is the most concise summary that can be formed of the vast range of abstract truth. The same theory, then, which explains the mental evolution of humanity, lays down the true method by which our abstract conceptions should be classified; thus reconciling the conditions of order and movement, hitherto more or less at variance. Its historical clearness and its philosophical force strengthen each other, for we cannot understand the connection of our conceptions except by studying the succession of the phases through which they pass.

All knowledge is thus brought within the sphere of natural philosophy; and the provisional distinction by which, since Aristotle and Plato, it has been so sharply demarcated from moral philosophy, ceases to exist. The positive spirit, so long confined to the simpler inorganic phenomena, has now passed through its difficult course of probation. It extends to a more important and more intricate class of speculations, and disengages them for ever from all theological or metaphysical influence. All our notions of truth are thus rendered homogeneous, and begin at once to converge towards a central principle. A firm objective basis is consequently laid down for that complete co-ordination of human existence towards which all sound philosophy has ever tended, but which the want of adequate materials has hitherto made impossible. By the doctrine of Positive Science, and by that alone, we are enabled to take a comprehensive and simultaneous view of the past, present, and future of humanity as a continuous and resistless development, subject, like all the phenomena of the universe, to invariable and ascertainable laws, patent to research and potent in producing order and progress.

It will have been seen in the paradigms of positive science given at pp. 330-1 that one of the great merits of M. Comte's scheme of orderly progress consists in his placing the sciences in the order of the complexity of their subject or contents, and so securing a progress which proceeds step by step from the less to the more difficult. As science is ordinarily taught in isolated disjunctness, ordinary observers might justly conclude that the different classes of phenomena of which they respectively treat depended on laws entirely distinct from each other, and that the successful student of one, when he proceeded to study another, could import into the science of his subsequent investigation none of the acquisitions of his previous researches, but must pass into a domain not only of new facts,

but of different laws and fresh uniformities, as well as of strange experiences. They seem and they have been taught as if they were independent of each other—often as if they were mutually exclusive, resting on inductions drawn from diverse phenomena, involving deductions peculiar to themselves, and yielding results entirely apart from their co-sciences. But in M. Comte's classification each science has assigned to it a more arduous ascent of investigation than that which goes before it, and the whole is so arranged that in proceeding from one to another we do not pass beyond the sphere of the laws involved in or discovered in the course of the preceding sciences, but merely pass into a region where other laws come into operation without abrogating or annulling, though perhaps occasionally superseding, those which are implied in the scientific researches of previous studies; so that each science depends on the truths of all those which precede it, in addition to the peculiar truths investigated in its own sphere. Each science, as it becomes more specific, becomes also more complex, and concerns itself with a series of phenomena regulated by a more numerous set of laws, requiring for their proper comprehension not only the truths of the more simple and general sciences, but the methods employed in their development. The positive classification affords, therefore, the most simple and natural co-ordination of all the sciences—according to the conceptions on which they are based—which bear upon or tend to the development of the entire synthesis of the life of humanity. Hence all that is learned is knowledge, and all the knowledge thus attained is power.

This may be very briefly shown to be the case, and the whole hierarchy of the sciences proved to be in admirable accord with the conditions of thought and the facts of nature. Number is true of all things. It is implied in all impressions, and ideation is impossible without suggesting it. *Arithmetic*, as the science of numbers, including not only the art of reckoning, but also the investigation of the principles of calculation, which includes *algebra* or analysis, may be made the object of scientific study without reference to any other science or any other relations of things than that of their calculable numericality. The facts on which *geometry* is based, and the elements with which it pursues its constructive processes, presuppose the laws of number, and include a new set of considerations involved in the ideas of space or extension, and of pure form posited therein. *Rational mechanics* implies numbers and figured extension, but besides these, takes into account the rest or balanced state of bodies, or of the effects of forces known as equilibrium, and of pressure, action, or exertion, producing change of place or motion. Number and space are both latent in the speculations of the student of rational mechanics, and enter essentially into the conceptions of statics and dynamics. *Astronomy* involves in the phenomena investigated by it number, space, and motion; but it adds to these the phenomena of gravitation—that peculiar subtle attraction which aggregates particles and welds creation's masses into systems, so

that they not only cohere in regular figures, but are repelled from or impelled towards each other in the exact proportion of their mass and distance.

All terrestrial phenomena are affected more or less by the influences exerted by the motions of the earth, and by the operations of the heavenly bodies, while it and they alike proceed on their celestial journey along the pathways of the sky; and hence all those forms of matter which are usually comprised among the studies included roughly under the term Natural Philosophy, but which might more properly be denominated physics—*i. e.*, all investigation of the laws of bodies as bodies—in other words, as masses, not as molecules or elements, constituting a science of all the phenomena of things which are unaccompanied by any essential change in the things examined; and all the facts relating to the phenomena of the external universe as composed of minerals, vegetables, and animals, in so far as these result in classification as distinct from explanation. Physics is more properly a correlated group of sciences than in any proper sense one. It includes the phenomena of *weight*, or the quantitative measure of pressure or power (barology); of *heat*, the inexplicable cause of the sensation of warmth, and of so many of the strange though common phenomena observable in nature, and of practical utility in the arts—such as latency, absorption, vaporization, solution, fusion, conduction, radiation, refraction, convection, polarization, &c. (thermology); of *acoustics*, or the phenomena of *sound*—*i. e.*, sonorous vibrations or undulations affecting the ear by determinative uniformity or nonconformity of *tone*, or indeterminacy as *noise*; and by rapidity constituting *pitch*. These are considered in regard to constitution, origin, propagation, and perception, as initiated by Chladni, improved by Savart, and made mathematically explicable by Newton, Laplace, and Bernouilli; of *optics*, or the phenomena of *light* and *vision*, including chromatics, and the various manifestations of light to vision—as reflected explained in catoptrics, as refracted as explained in dioptrics; and in the changes implied in diffraction, dispersion, interference, polarization, depolarization, the various methods of photometry, and of the arts dependent on the laws of light or the peculiarities of vision, and all the experiments possible in these regards; while it brings before us the corpuscular and undulatory theories as a heterogeneous superfoetation, mere metaphysic not as science; of *electrology*, or the whole series of those marvellous, extensive, and important phenomena included under the terms frictional electricity, animal magnetism, galvanism, magneto-electricity, with all the theories they have been the means of evolving, the instruments and the experiments they have been the means of bringing within human knowledge and activity, and all the contributions they have made to human progress, convenience, health, life, and art. These are rather co-ordinate than linear sciences; their speciality and generality are not perhaps systematized in a due ascending scale, and they may be regarded as in a certain sense

independent and related, and to a certain extent co-inclusive rather than forth-steps into differing and wider domains of research. Barology seems to link itself most naturally to the preceding branch—astronomy, whose phenomena of motion suggest pressure, and hence weight; while the phenomena of electrization afford a ready transition to chemistry. The order of the other three may be a matter of indifference, and in fact it may probably be found that a wider view of phenomena—should a Newton of these unknown forces arise—will lend to a conception which shall unify physics, as gravitation unified astronomy.

The chief scientific utility of this immediate and provisional exposition of so many sciences seemingly distinct though linked so closely to each other, is to assist the ultimate realization of a true physic, an important and possible work which may yet be undertaken by those who make such studies their speciality, if they hold to the fundamental idea of a due and true subordination of the more general to the more specific, and of the gradual progression of idea implied in a positive philosophical classification.

On the laws of heat, electricity, &c., included in physics, the phenomena of *chemistry* depend, at the same time that they involve laws peculiar to themselves, and therefore demand the evolution and application of new conceptions. In astronomy we have force made known as motion, in physics we have masses acting at sensible distances in special forms and with peculiar effects; in chemistry we have force resulting in combination and the molecules of masses acting on each other at insensible distances. Chemistry deals with phenomena which strikingly resemble those of vitality. In physics we find the modifications of matter only refer to their arrangement, their substance is unaltered, but in chemistry the changes effected are not those only of a state of aggregation; they are alterations of structure, essential changes in the composition of the particles aggregated, as well as in the state of actual and tactual combination. Chemistry supplies means of acquiring a knowledge of its laws by observation, experiment, and comparative survey, and its ultimate aim may be regarded as being—1, to discover all the properties of all the elements of things; and, 2, from this knowledge to discover all the properties of all the compounds they can form. It shows no change excited in the hidden natures of things not communicated to them. The common division of chemistry into inorganic and organic is baseless; there is no *essential* distinction between them. Chemistry, as a science, ought to be confined only to the consideration of phenomena in which life has no play. It should investigate *structure*, not *function*. The idea of function brings us to life. *Biology* is the science of *life*. Vital matter possesses the power of nourishing and of reproducing itself, and in some of its manifestations that of sensibility and even locomotion. To biology, so far as man's regards go, all the other sciences are preliminary lights; and it sheds over all subsequent science the great central light of humanitarianism. Man is subordinate to the laws

of the great Cosmos, and his existence is only to be explained by a knowledge of the operations of the outward and enviroing world. Life is twofold, organic, and relative, united together by, or rather with regard to function, and the great end of biology ; is from a knowledge of the organism or its organic modifications to find the function and its resultant acts, or *vice versâ*. And this through all the variations and enhancements of life, from the lowest degree of vegetative existence to the highest range of animal vitality ; from earliest vital act of assimilative energy and reproductive manifestation to sensibility, locomotiv, intelligence, morality, and sociological adaptation. This, of course, is to be studied statically in anatomy and dynamically in physiology—taken in their most extended senses. From these we gain our acquaintance with the phenomenal facts of organized vitality with their laws, and their changes from its primitive cellularity, through the processes of growth, maturity, decline, and death. Thought is the highest degree of life knowable by man. In regard to thought, as in regard to all things else, the positive philosophy admits only of one source of knowledge, *phenomena* ; and of one object of inquiry, *laws*. What are the specific phenomena of thought or intellectuality ? and what are the conditions on which they depend, or the methods according to which they operate ? Emotional life manifests itself in personality and in sociality, and both alike endeavour after preservation and perfectibility. Intellectual excitation is due to emotional suggestion. Will is the final impulse of emotional desire. Memory and imagination are compound conditions of cerebration—to them we owe language, *i.e.*, the expression of conceptions. Conception is either contemplative or reflective, respectively yielding *ideas* and *thoughts*. Contemplation is either analytical or synthetical ; the former received from concrete realities, the latter framed by the mind from them by abstraction and generalization. Reflection is inductive and deductive, the former employing itself most on static, the latter on dynamic thought. The conceptive faculties form ideas from the observation of beings and events ; thoughts from the perception of principles and of consequences. Conception in its highest energy requires communication, to the power of effecting which we owe the transmission, the increase, and the preservation of knowledge. The province of language is to translate inner thought into transmissible speech by communicable signs. The practical faculties of the mind are activity and firmness. These all possess a personal value and utility, but they have also a social relation, and it is consequence of this that sociology may be said to root itself in biology and to result from it. We have adopted here the new cerebral theory by which M. Comte superseded his adhesion to Gall and Spurzheim's Phrenology, and we subjoin on the following page the systematic table in which in the interval between 2nd November 1846 and 4th January 1850, the author, after ten revisions, incorporated a synopsis of his final views upon the cerebral functions. It appears opposite p. 726 of the "System of Positive Politics," vol. i.

(LOVING, THINKING, ACTING.)
Act from affection, and think in order to act.

3 Practical Qualities.		5 Intellectual Functions.		10 Affective Motors.	
				Inclinations in the Active state; Sentiments in the Passive state.	
				3 Social.	7 Personal.
				General.	Special.
				Goodness, or Universal Love (sympathy), humanity.....	10
				Veneration	9
				Attachment	8
				Ambition { Temporal, or Pride, desire for Domination..... Spiritual, or Vanity, desire for Approbation.....	7 6
				Interest { Instincts for the Preservation of the species { sexual instinct..... Instincts of Improvement... { by destruction, or military instinct... by construction, or industrial instinct...	5 4 3 2 1
					Regotium.
					Altruism.
					Decrease of energy, and increase of dignity, from behind forwards, from the base upwards, and from the sides to the middle.
					(The Heart.) IMPULSION.
					2
					MEANS.
					Passive, or Contemplation, whence objective materials.
					Active, or Meditation, whence subjective construction.
					Concrete, or relative to Beings, essentially synthetical
					Abstract, or relative to Events, essentially analytical
					Inductive, or by Deductive, or by
					whence Generalisation
					whence Systematisation
					11 12 13 14 15
					provide.
					Knowledge to foresee in order to
					(The Mind.) COUNSEL, EXECUTION.
					16 17 18
					Activity.....
					Courage.....
					Prudence.....
					Firmness, whence Perseverance.....

The total unity of these eighteen cerebral organs constitutes the central nervous instrument, which on the one hand stimulates the life of nutrition, and on the other hand co-ordinates the life of relation by connecting its two classes of exterior functions. Its speculative region communicates directly with the sensitive nerves, and its active region with the motor nerves. But its affective region has nervous connections only with the vegetative viscera, without any immediate correlation with the exterior world, which is connected with it only by the aid of the two other regions. This essential centre of all Human existence is in continual activity by means of the alternative repose of the two symmetrical divisions of each of its organs. In regard to the rest of the brain, the periodical intermittence is as complete as that of the senses and of the muscles. Thus the vital harmony depends on the principal cerebral region, under the impulsion of which the two others direct the passive and active relations of the living soul with the medium.*

Sociology, as a possible science, revealed itself to M. Comte in one of those happy moments of sublime intellectuality when those vast generalizations which revivify science and change the whole thought of an age, gleam, or beam upon the mind. Men had endeavoured to form some sort of science of life; but they had scarcely even dreamed that the social and moral nature of man was able to be brought within the sphere of science. At the utmost it had been little more than guessed that the phenomena of human society—of masses of men grouped and aggregated into communities, nations, and peoples—were subject to laws as definite, fixed, and absolute as those which govern the phenomena of biology, or the varied manifestations of cosmical forces.

Comte held that the events of history were not disconnected results and indiscriminate forthgoings of human energy and effort, but that they were the distinct effects of the imperious conditions of the laws of external nature operating upon human life, and the reaction of that life on the cosmic phenomena amidst which it existed and acted; and by so doing he laid the foundation of a new science, destined to bring about the aggrandizement, the ennoblement, and the ultimate perfection of humanity. "A century ago, thinkers of the greatest emiunee were unable to conceive of a really consecutive progression; and humanity, as they thought, was destined to move in circles [Vico] or in oscillations [Condorcet]." The theory of order as static was known to the Greek speculatists, and was the basis of the Roman government. In the Middle Ages, sovereignty, Catholicism, and feudalism attempted to secure static order; but the dynamic movement was too powerfully inwrought with human life to permit the staticism of humanity, and hence we have had reformations and revolutions, actions and reactions—especially in the Western family of nations, who have always been ardent for progress,—to show that without the theory of progress the theory of order is inadequate to form a sound sociology. It is essential that the two should be combined; the very fact that

* Comte's note to the preceding tabular view.

progress, however viewed, is only the development of order, proves that order cannot be adequately maintained without progress. This fact brings into true synthesis philosophy and history, while it forms the basis of the final science of humanity. In the sociological theory of Positivism, both the statical and the dynamical aspects of society are brought into a veritable harmony; and this unity and trustworthiness of the sociological basis will become more developed, satisfactory, and effectual as our knowledge of its basis becomes more thorough and exact: hence positivism is the only theory for the reorganization of social life, which coincides or is compatible with the real tendencies, as well as provides for the satisfaction of the essential requirements of society in the nineteenth century; for positivism regards artificial order (political, municipal, or domestic) in social phenomena as resting necessarily upon the order of nature—in other words, on the whole results of science as the exposition of the laws of the phenomena of inorganic and organic existence; and it alone secures the concentration of all the knowledge and energy of man upon the one purpose,—the effectual bringing about and steady maintenance of the common welfare. To do this effectually it constructs a definite system of universal morality; thus securing at once the ultimate object of all philosophy and the starting-point of a just, impartial, and effective polity in a single evolution.

Here, for the present, we must pause. We have been able only to give a synoptic outline of the review of the sciences, their filiation and evolution. We have been unable to show the profundity and brilliancy of the historical *aperçus* he supplies in illustration of his theory of the sociological laws. We have done little more than supply a brief abstract of the main argument of the positive philosophy as set forth in the "Course of Positive Philosophy," corrected here and there by the subsequent revisions of the author in "The System of Positive Politics." We hope in another paper to conclude our *resume* by supplying an outline of the positive politics and a synoptical view of the religion of humanity, including an account of the positive calendar.

We have only one word to say regarding the methods of our expository analysis. At first we designed to supply an abstract drawn by quotation from the works under notice, in the order of their occurrence, with specific paginal reference, and for this purpose read and marked the several volumes. On trial we found that this plan was incompatible with the space at our disposal. We then changed the form of our exposition into that, not of an epitomist, but of a reporter. In doing so, we have endeavoured to present our impression of the entire system merely as a transmitting medium, and without indication of our personal views. We believe that Comtists themselves will grant the honesty and impartiality of our *compte rendu*. Our paper, critical of the system, will show our personal standpoint in regard to the opinions proposed for social regeneration of the positive philosophy.

Religion.

IS RITUALISM CONSISTENT WITH OR UNNECESSARY TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF TRUE CHRISTIANITY?

CONSISTENT.—IV.

I do not see that anything is to be gained by pushing controversial questions to extremes. It is one of the great mistakes of disputants that they always go off to the extreme right or the extreme left instead of keeping near to the grand centre. S. S., for instance, appears to found his whole paper—nicely suffused by a spiritual flavour—on a mistaken notion of the simplicity of the gospel and of the gospel scheme, and to speak of Ritualism as if by it men “should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ,” with an equal disregard for contexts and the signification the words hold in Scripture. Again, a zealous debater might reply to this scripture by scripture having an echo of formal contradiction, but quite inept as an argument, by quoting, “O ye fools, how long will ye love simplicity?” as a scornful rejoinder. This is dealing with the outside of the question, and is leaving the entire topic under consideration almost untouched. It is skirmishing in the outworks instead of going into the citadel,—attacking an outpost and calling it a victory. Ritualism cannot really be the foolish, crazy, wicked thing its opponents call it, or it would not number among its adherents so many earnest, pious, aspiring Christian souls.

It seems to me that if we would endeavour to understand Ritualism at its root—if we would try to get at the core and essence of it, we should find that there really was a soul of goodness in it, and that it neither deserved nor required the contempt, aspersion, or ill-feeling, which have been so freely bestowed on it.

Our life at present is one of temporal wants and of sensational longings; we are subjugated by the realities, as we call them, working around us, and of which we form a part. It is an existence in which the sense of the material and the temporal predominates, and in which we are driven by the harsh necessities of social life to steep our souls in material considerations and environ ourselves with worldly cares. The spiritual appears to lie far off from us, and the world is too much with us.

“Earth fills her lap with pleasures of her own:
Yearnings she hath in her own natural kind,
And, even with something of a mother’s mind,
And no unworthy aim,

The homely nurse doth all she can
 To make her foster-child, her inmate man,
 Forget the glories he hath known,
 And that imperial palace whence he came."

We require an intermedium between the senses and the spirit, something that sense delights in and that the spirit can perceive the meaning of. Between our senses and our intelligence science comes as an interpreter, and by her ritual of experiment shows sense what the intelligence beholds underlying the phenomena of this wondrous world. The active emotions of our nature go out in the form of friendship, sociality, love, &c., and in all these man finds it requisite to fix, in all countries and in all ages, on some symbolism or ritual of acquaintanceship, citizenship, fellowship, and affection. It may be maintained, with an appearance of strict truth, that the friendship which depends on etiquette, the love which rejoices in gifts, the acquaintance which is due to interchange of civilities, the social life which is presided over by forms and ceremonies, morning calls, routine visits, evening parties, card-leaving, &c., are not of great value; but it would be hard to show how we could do without them in some form or other. Any kind of union requires in some form communion of some kind; all that is only the ritual of the sort of life that is led subject to the conditions of our human state. Everything has conditions, and the observance of these conditions and all that they imply constitutes the ritualism of the matter with which it is concerned. The poet feels in his inmost spirit the movement of thought and emotion. To convey that he must employ some intermedium, such as words; but these words must undergo a ritualism of adaptation to the suggestions desired to be made. Poetry is the union of *form* in the shape of rhythm, rhyme, &c., and the emotion and thought to be signified thereby. Translate the emotion and thought without adding the adjunctives of versification, and you have—not poetry: the ritual, the expressive form, "is wanting there." So statuary and painting are subject to conditions, and these raise up forms around the spirit which must be observed and attended to on pain of failure. The sculptor must secure unity, the painter perspective; any want of fitness of subject on these points is a transgression of the ritual of these arts. Ceremonial is just as necessary in science, music, poetry, painting, sculpture, oratory, as in kings' courts, and in social life every mode in which spirit seeks to render itself intelligible is subjected to some conditions which form a ritual for it.

If our "induction of particulars" is correct, the entire fabric of the article of W. C. C. fails, for it is proved that all these outward forms of which he speaks so disparagingly and despitely are absolutely essential—that we cannot get beyond them—that they *are*, in fact, ourselves. "Formalism is the root of Ritualism" (p. 107); it cannot be anything else. *Form* is one of the conditions under which we live, and from which we cannot escape. "The *form* of

sound words" is theology; the *form* of a holy life is morals; the *form* of social existence is a polity; the *form* of family life is marriage; the *form* of commercial intercourse is trade; the *form* of knowledge is science; the *form* of worship is a ritual. To the word *formalism* W. C. C. affixes a connotation which is tenable only among the vulgar, and he uses it as almost synonymous with hypocrisy—at any rate, as a resting and a trusting in mere forms as all-sufficient. This is by no means necessarily implied in it. Humanity is so subject to form, that the Saviour himself required to take a form, to conform Himself so far to the conditions of human existence, and to employ the forms of speech, social life, &c., prevalent in the days in which He tabernacled among men. So sensible was He of our human need for *form*, that He supplied His disciples with a *form* of prayer—"the Lord's Prayer;" and a *formula* for baptism—"In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." And He embodied the communion of the saints in a *form*—"the Lord's Supper." Is He not, indeed, the Reformer as well as the Redeemer of human spirits? *Formalism*, therefore, as "the root of Ritualism," is not only essentially a condition of human life, but it is an integral portion of Christianity. If we are to continue fast "in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers," how is it to be done without forms, *i. e.*, ritual? A rite is an outward sign or act employed—in regard to the more immediate question under debate—in religious observances in such a manner as to express, inward feeling, or to excite it. If we are to have a *form* of worship, that is a ritual; if we are to have no form of worship, how are we to act so as not to forsake "the assembling of ourselves together?" for even that would be a ritual, though nothing else were to be settled. How, again, are we to pray, to partake of the eucharist, perform or share in the ordinance of baptism, read or hear the Word, admonish "one another in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs." Ritualism is a necessity of order, as "Clericus" has clearly proved, and is indispensable to true religion, not only as revealed, but also as an essential condition of all life, thought, speech, or common effort.

That we are quite correct in regard to the indispensability of ritualism may be seen in the fact of the prevalency of so many "*rites*." The Roman, the Greek, the Syrian, the Armenian, the Coptic, or Slavonic rite are only various designations referring to the *form* of worship; and we have, again, Lutheran rites, Calvinistic ceremonies, Wesleyan customs, Quaker forms, Nonconformist methods, all signifying the same thing.

The force of this debate ought probably to have been put upon the word *excessive*, which S. S. interjects into his definition of Ritualism; but that would have led to a discussion in regard to the extent to which ritualism is justifiable and useful in the Christian Church. That is a wide question, and could not easily be settled by debate; but *that* is not our question.

We confess that we look with alarm on the false position into which

this question is getting. Ritualism is spoken of as if it were a new invention, and Ritualists are vilified as innovators, when all the while men mean not to abjure ritualism—only to curb it within the narrowest limits. Ritualism is essential to human life—as essential as it is for summer to bud into beauty; but æsthetic ritualism is about as much a question as the propriety of gardening, hothouse culture, &c., which may depend on circumstances. For our own part, we regard the union of all the stimulants to devotional and emotional worship as justifiable, so long as they do not pass from the place of aids and accessories, but retain their subordination to the great object of worship—the reverential adoration and service of our heavenly Father.

“Clericus” and “R. S.” have pretty clearly explained the due place of ritualism; I have principally dealt with the necessity of it—the great aim of ritualism, to see if God may say of our temples as of that of old, “Now have I chosen and sanctified this house, that My name may be there for ever: and Mine eyes and Mine heart shall be there perpetually” (2 Chron. vii. 16).

LAYMAN.

CONSISTENT.—V.

Ours is an age of restless agitation, of various activities, and of eager striving. It is an age of inquiry; even the enduring essentials of Christianity are made the topics of eager debates, and bring earnest stirrings into thoughtful circles. We believe that all this indicates life; that such intense longings of heart and labours of life would not be given to the consideration of religion if it did not seem to the souls that seek to know these things that Christianity was indeed of great preciousness to the world, the Church, society, and individual souls,—is a something that shall, in its effects, at least, endure when heaven and earth have passed away.

The Ritualistic controversies of the present day do not appear to us to be the nonsense which some people affirm they must be. We have witnessed a gradual rising in all the elements of human life, an increase in their beauty, grace, effectiveness, suitability, and acceptableness. Warehouses have been transformed into palaces; shops into exhibitions of art and taste; houses take all improved architectural forms, and their furniture is formed on certain principles of beauty of design and finish of style. Dress has increased the number and variety of her hues, multiplied the shapes and forms it takes; and Fashion has taken under her patronage even the garments of the poor. The efforts of taste have been employed to lend attractiveness and grace to even the most homely of the requisites of existence. Engraving has been popularized. Exhibitions of paintings have made the masterpieces of art familiar to the common people; and even the choicest results of the sculptor's chisel have been brought before admiring crowds. Theatrical spectacle has opened, to many, vistas of gor-

geousness which could not a few years ago have greeted any eye. Art-education has spread among our workmen; and the articles of utility which they were wont to manufacture have now the added charm of being articles of beauty, while the processes of production have been so much cheapened that the meanest honest labourer's cottage may be more of a home of taste than was possible, even a quarter of a century ago, to a man of moderate position and income. It is conceded that all these signs of progress are patent and obvious. Indeed, it is impossible to doubt in any way the accuracy of the statement that progress has been immense, and that it has taken for the most part an artistic as well as an industrial or economic direction. It is a fair question, then, to ask, If architecture, sculpture, painting, decorative design, music, dress, furniture, &c., have all been improved, ought we not to apply these improvements to the worship of God as well as to the gratification of our own luxurious habits and personal tastes? Ought we to retain in their primitive baldness—necessary as it was in ages when these improvements were not—the ceremonial of the Church, and the manner in which her services are conducted? or should we rather bring of our best an offering to the Lord, and give to our worship as much of the attractiveness which art can lend as may keep the state of our worship on a level, in regard to beauty and elegance, with the progress taking place in all our surroundings in park, in garden, in street, at home, in business, and halls of public assembly? In ancient times the rude altar gave place to a sumptuous tabernacle, and this was afterwards succeeded by a temple of the most gorgeous dimensions, splendid architecture, costly equipments, and artistic beauty possible in the time. Whether is greater—the temple, or Him who is worshipped in the temple? To whom, then, ought the best homage of wealth to be yielded?—to ourselves as the receivers, or to God as the giver of every good and perfect gift?

I do not understand how in any way the increased splendour of the ceremonial of the rites of Christianity can detract from the simplicity of the gospel scheme; but I do understand how it may be thought that he who dwells in a sumptuously adorned dwelling himself, and surrounds himself with all the appliances and luxuries of art and invention, can scarcely be regarded as a cheerful giver when he purposely keeps the house of God shabby in exterior, comfortless in interior, unattractive in its appliances, and altogether suggestive of an almshouse rather than the dwelling of the most high God, and the place where our souls pay due worship to Him.

This appears to me to dispose of all the arguments which S. S. derives from the example of the early Christians; for it is evident that the true followers of the examples of the grey fathers of the Church are those who imitate them not in outward, formal deed, but in the spirit of their minds. They gave of their best and costliest—place, position, character, comfort, and even life—to the joy of serving their

God. We are not called upon to make any such sacrifices ; but how many of us begrudge the support of the sanctuary, and condemn the collector for his assiduity and insistingness when he calls for our contributions to the maintenance or spread of gospel ordinances ! Ritualism—as a protest against this greedy narrowness of spirit, this avaricious selfishness, this grudging to God even a scant, often an inappreciable, portion of the good things of this life with which He has blessed us—is worthy of a greater share of the attention of the Church than is given to it. I do not assert that Ritualism of the kind I have hinted at is essential to Christianity ; but I can see nothing inconsistent with Christianity in any endeavour to bring good gifts to God's altar.

I have limited myself to a common-sense and every-day view of the question in debate, because I am not at all a theologian, but a plain, earnest man looking about on society can scarcely fail to see that in the prevalent ideas regarding the house of God there is a great deal of latent infidelity,—as if that were wasted which went to support the ordinances of the Church in any but the humblest way ; as if ritual were an expensive but useless show ; and as if, because the ceremonies of the Church are devoted to the service of “ the King eternal, immortal, and invisible, the only wise and true God,” they need not be anything more than “ tithes of mint, anise, and cummin ” that are rendered to Him. In this way of thinking I am inclined to regard Ritualism as a reality ; and when I hear of the gaudy and expensive ceremonials with which preparations are made to welcome earthly royalty to places of common resort, I cannot help contrasting these with the ceremonies engaged in by the same parties in the audience and presence-chamber of the Lord of heaven, the King of kings, so that I come to approve of Ritualism as an earnest of righteousness. C. K.

UNNECESSARY.—IV.

SINCERELY believing that Ritualism is dishonouring to God, I take the side of this question which bears the title “ unnecessary.”

First of all let me say that I altogether disagree with S. S., although a writer on the same side of this question, in his opinion, as expressed in page 20, that “ the attitude of the worshipper is unimportant.” I think he is very wrong in considering that “ God regards not whether the worship be paid in a sitting, standing, or kneeling posture.” I do not believe that any one, who does not suffer from bodily infirmity, pays proper respect to God when lazily sitting while in the act of prayer ; I will go farther, and say that, in my judgment, a careless and indifferent position necessarily prevents due reverence and devotion.

Having said thus much *en passant*, I now come to the question of Ritualism.

The opener of this debate, “ Lines,” says, page 16, that “ we should give of our best to God.” I reply, of course we should,—not forgetting, however, that He is already the owner of all things.

"Lines" then refers to "the cathedrals of Europe, the paintings and statuary of our forefathers in the Church, the glorious music in which the praises of our God have been enshrined; . . . all show how far we have departed from the good ways of those who felt the flame of holy love in their souls in ancient times." If "Lines" had been permitted—as I was, a few years ago, when Bristol Cathedral was altered in the interior—to see some old carving of first-rate workmanship, yet of the most disgusting description, he would not think so highly of the "good ways" he alludes to. He will, I am sure, excuse me for saying that if he has read carefully and attentively the history of the Church of England, as by law established, he will not think it strange that I say I am all the more surprised that he is ignorant of the real fact that there was very little indeed of "holy love" in the "souls" of a large number "in ancient times."

R. S., in page 104, states that Ritualism is necessary, "as it is the only form of worship which gives to the laity their full share in the worship of Almighty God." This appears to me to be a mistaken view, because "Ritualism" is a very different thing from the liturgical service contained in the Prayer-book, certain portions of which are of a sublime character; consequently the laity can take their "full share" even if no Ritualism existed.

"Clericus" may be really and truly a clergyman: he writes somewhat like a "Priest," it may be of the Church of England,—but as I do not know, I can only guess. Here comes the important part of the whole subject of Ritualism:—Had there never been any priests, there would not have been any Ritualism. Ministers of the gospel, pure and simple, want no Ritualism; but the so-called priests cannot do without it; and why? Because, if Ritualism be abolished, the priestly office must of necessity also be done away with—the one cannot exist without the other.

Take a godly man, as a minister and preacher of the gospel, what has he to depend upon?—his earnestness in preaching, and in praying, and his devotedness to his sacred mission. Take, on the other hand, a Ritualistic priest—as "Clericus" may be,—what does he do? He talks about "holy altars," the sacredness of the "chancel;" he dresses himself up in fine robes of a showy description, and makes those who are foolish enough to do so, believe that in virtue of his office he has a right, which the laity have not, to the "holy of holies" within the house of God—that the service is not rightly conducted if there be not Ritualism, thereby giving to himself a dignity which he has no right to assume. Then there follows, of necessity, a choir of singing-boys, and men in surplices who, as a part of Ritualism, perform certain portions of the service, not "from the heart," but only mechanically; they chant "We praise Thee, O God," or "My soul doth magnify the Lord," and many other sacred expressions, while it is evident to ordinary observers that the whole thing is a farce and a mockery, if not blasphemous. Who can fail to know this to be the fact—of daily occurrence in

many of the cathedrals? And perhaps it is not to be wondered at, because Ritualism is formalism in its very character. It is a fact, also, that there is a church in Bristol—and very likely many others elsewhere,—where the “holy altar,” as it is called, happens to be set up at the west end of the building, and yet persons who attend there turn to it “as a matter of course” while repeating the creeds, the consequence being that, instead of looking towards the east as they suppose, they look towards the west—“Where ignorance is bliss, ’tis folly to be wise!” Then Ritualism is not complete without a decoration of flowers,—as if it could possibly be “necessary to the advancement of true Christianity” to take flowers, which already belong to God’s earth, into a place of worship! If those who assemble do not admire their beauty more than the Almighty does, it would be surprising. It is wonderful how persons of ordinary intelligence can believe that God is honoured by such trifles.

The discussion of this subject is very interesting; but having watched the progress of Church matters for some years past, I cannot help recording my conviction that Ritualism cannot be rooted out from the Church of England so long as the State connection therewith exists. Until the people have more control over their places of worship, the Ritualistic evil will continue in many places to take the place of real heartfelt religion, which can only be acceptable, as W. C. C. well expresses it in page 105, “to Him who is no respecter of persons or of outward appearances, but who judgeth of the heart alone.”

Bristol.

R. D. ROBERT.

UNNECESSARY.—V.

“Be not entangled again with the yoke of *bondage* (Gal. v. 1). In “*Sartor Resartus*” Carlyle devotes several chapters to the exposition of Fichte’s “*Clothes Philosophy*,” a branch of which is assigned to Church Clothes. This discussion has a somewhat similar province, especially when looked at from the affirmative, the opener of which states (p. 14) that “all religion is symbolical.”

From differing definitions this debate has set out with little prospect of a satisfactory solution. “*Lines*” includes in Ritualism those observances which have the sanction of Christ himself, along with ceremonies, &c., not revealed in the Bible as binding on Christians. S. S., on the other hand, takes the term to mean the peculiar system of ceremonial adopted by Ritualists throughout England, as distinguished from the ordinary service of the Established Church. It is Ritualism in this latter sense of which we read so much in the newspapers now; it is this idea that rises in the minds of most readers when they meet the term; and with all deference to “*Lines*,” it is the meaning which alone obviates the absurdity involved in the other definition, viz., the possibility of Christ’s own ordinances being inconsistent with the advancement of Christianity. Surely the affirmative would shrink from seriously supposing

Christians as giving assent to such a doctrine. Ritualism, then, is the use of ceremonials, vestures, and accompaniments of public worship in themselves, or in the manner of using them, different from what Christ and the apostles have enjoined. The principle which governs the determination of the question under discussion may be put thus:—Do we, or do we not, find revealed in the New Testament all doctrines and forms of worship necessary to the observance of Christianity in such a manner as God will accept? If we do, then we must search the Gospels, &c., for injunctions to Ritualism; and, failing its discovery, we are warranted in concluding that Christianity has no need of any such artistic embellishments. If, on the contrary, it is not allowed that all things necessary to the advancement of Christianity are so revealed, we are thrown helpless on the decisions of councils, conferences, and synods, varying in their decrees, which, far from being consistent with Christianity, are not even consistent with one another. It seems beyond question that the divine Founder of our religion would not have left *necessary* matters in a state of indecision; that He has left matters of *little moment* to be dealt with according to individual opinion is another affair, quite apart from what is *essential*. Now what say Christ and the apostles regarding ritualistic worship? Christ's teaching is eminently simple, both in its matter and the mode of its delivery. "Be ye followers of Me;" "learn of Me;" "I am the true Vine;" not more elaborate or abstruse are His discourses. And the sanctuary He used was, by turns, the hill-side, the inland sea-shore, the synagogue, the Pharisee's or the publican's house, and the temple. In all, His devout bearing entranced those about Him. Of the models of worship which He furnishes to us, take the Lord's Prayer, after which manner we are told to pray. There is no mention of varying attitudes during its recital, or the particular position the body should maintain. Its deliverance from a heart really feeling the solemnity of God's audience-chamber, and fervently breathing the various petitions and ascriptions of praise, is all that Christ insists upon. When He had His seasons of prayer, spending whole nights by Himself on the bleak hill-tops, the beautifully simple record is, "And He went up into a mountain to pray." No word follows about genuflexions, chasubles, or any earth-born ceremonial, tending to distract the worshipper's attention from the divine realities He was contemplating. And with what scorching, yet just satire does He picture the devotion of the Pharisee! and how sublime does the publican's simple "God be merciful to me a sinner" appear by the side of the pompous self-glorification of the former,—“I give tithes of all I possess,” &c., as if by that he was doing God service! True as it is that "He dwells not in temples made with hands," the Creator does not lay upon us the duty of spending material wealth or taste on His worship. He to whom the whole universe belongs pierces through outward trappings, and judges according to the disposition of the heart towards Him and towards the work he has

given us to do. His indifference to forms of worship appealing to the senses, and his distaste for sacrifices of wealth in His worship, are clearly shown in the Psalmist's words, "If I were hungry, I would not tell thee; for the world is Mine, and the fulness thereof. This is said in correction of the idea some devout Jews had had of God's jealous care over sacrifices and offerings as means of recommending one's self to Him. "Offer unto God thanksgiving, and pay thy vows unto the Most High," is David's concluding advice to such. And as in our day it is beyond doubt that many of the Ritualists are men of piety, though the direction it sometimes takes may be injudicious, and calculated positively to bring Protestant Christianity into contempt instead of advancing it; so these old Hebrews, even under the Mosaic dispensation, are reproved for making too much of external observances, their piety notwithstanding. Christ interpreted Moses' law in a free manner, as witness His healing the man with the withered hand on the Sabbath, after His having justified His disciples for plucking the ears of corn on that day. It was galling to the Pharisees to have their pet observances thus set aside, and that with so much reason that they could not answer Him a word. The same Lord who declared that He preferred mercy to sacrifice was careful not to give the slightest encouragement to that spirit which has in all ages shown itself willing to pay inordinate attention to mere externals. By His condemnation of the trivialities with which successive Jewish generations had overloaded the Mosaic service, He left a warning to Christians against introducing similar unauthorized matters into His worship, more especially to those who might raise minor humanly devised rites into the rank of observances just as necessary as baptism and the eucharist. The way that leads to life eternal is narrow enough without crowding it with needless obstructions to pilgrims heavenward.

R. S., an able coadjutor of mine in a recent debate, says (p. 103) that "Christ continually attended the [temple] services;" but, on examination, this, instead of being in favour of Ritualism, is rather against it, for we are told at Luke xix. 47 that "*He taught daily in the temple,*" and in no part of the Gospels is it said that He went there to participate in the services. His teaching and His practice which so exasperated the priests had savoured little of Ritualism, or He would have met with better usage from them. At Acts v. 20, 42, it is stated that the "*apostles taught and preached Jesus Christ daily in the temple,*" which, seeing it was the great resort of devout Jews, was the place where they were most certain of large audiences. Luke does not say, however, that they attended ritual, although it must be admitted that Paul went to the temple to be purified, which ended in his arrestment. As a Jew he did that; and that this was unnecessary for Gentile believers is perfectly clear from Acts xxi. 25, where the decision of the apostles on this point is recorded. Ritualism can extract no justification of itself out of these apostles' doings, but rather the reverse.

"Lines" adduces as an argument for his position, that it was on the *form*, not the *fact* of worship that Cain was rejected and Abel accepted (p. 16). Scripture gives a very different version of the matter. God said to Cain, "If thou doest well, shalt not thou be accepted? and if thou doest not well, *sin lieth at the door*" (Gen. iv. 7). St. Paul tells us that "*by faith* Abel offered a more excellent sacrifice than Cain" (Heb. xi. 4). Likewise St. John, 1st Ep. iii. 12, "Because Cain's works were evil, and his brother's righteous." Thus unquestionably it was the *fact* of sin on Cain's part which drew down God's displeasure, and the *fact* of Abel's *faith* which gained God's countenance, the *form* being purely accidental, and not influencing God's decision. Hence we affirm that Ritualism finds no footing here.

As to the ritual of the wilderness and temple, it was only suited to a people whose minds as to spiritual things were *tabulae rase*, and who required to be trained by a gross palpable system to the perception of spiritual truth; but Christ removed the need for that (Col. ii. 14). It was imposed on the Jews till the time of reformation" (Heb. ix. 10). To adduce it as a reason for an elaborate ritual in our day is as sensible as it would be to contend for the existence of the present day prophets because prophets formed part of the old dispensation. Moreover, if you claim the incense-burning, &c., of the temple, on what principle can you reject the sacrifices? It must either be the whole Mosaic economy or none of it. St. Paul, writing to the Galatians, strongly insists on the latter course. As we are told at Col. ii. 17, these Old Testament rites were but "the shadows of good things to come;" the good wine has been kept to the last." Who would prefer the shadow to the substance? The Christ has come in bodily shape to the world; men have seen Him; and the fourfold account of His earthly sojourn received in faith, and acted on, is the "*nunc dimittis*" to the Jewish ritual and its like; "the vail of the temple was rent;" no more on this mountain alone, nor at Jerusalem, but everywhere shall He be worshipped (John iv. 21), and with as much acceptance in the meanest hovel where faith is as in the gorgeous cathedral with full choral service. It is right that a Christian should often ask himself, "What shall I render unto the Lord for all His benefits?" but we should be careful that our responses conform to the objects the gospel sets before us,—greater purity of life, faith in Christ, and more faithful diligence in making known His salvation to others. It may be safely said that there is in every man's life plenty of scope for the manifestation of thankfulness, without lavishing fortunes on palatial churches, and accumulating a large assortment of church vestures and other eye-pleasers. Micah (vi. 6, 9) gives some useful counsel on these points. R. S. attempts to show (p. 104) that Ritualism is essential to true Christianity because we should "glorify God," quoting from the Prayer Book the familiar passage about "rendering thanks for the great benefits," &c., and urging our imitation of the heavenly

host in our worship. We may do all that and yet not have the least tinge of Ritualism. In fact, if the rendering of thanks and praise, hearing the gospel preached, trying to do God's will here "as it is done in heaven," be Ritualism, then it and Christianity are synonymous, and many devout Dissenters who worship in the barest, baldest forms imaginable, may challenge the whole host of reputed Ritualists as having out-ritualized even them.

Many professing Ritualists may be animated by the best of motives, the communion of their hearts with God, sincere and ardent, and their desire for His supremacy over all hearts, earnest as it should be; but it may be seriously questioned whether such scenes as were enacted when Brother Ignatius took his congregation to be blessed by Dr. Gray can tend to the advance of Christianity. Riotous conduct in Ritualistic churches is the effect of Ritualism. If there were no new-fangled ritual going on, there would be no rows there. If Ritualists would avoid public exhibitions, they would remove a stumblingblock which hinders not a few from embracing Christianity when they see it so bedecked with foreign trappings, that the populace are first tickled at its novelty, and then roused by the thought that such practices go on under cover of true Protestant Christianity. Plumes borrowed from Popery may make fine birds: but, as in the old fable, such pretensions only elicit ridicule and court failure. The advancement of true religion in our own hearts, and its establishment in hearts strangers to it, is effected by means quite other than those that Ritualism supplies by all-sufficient means; nevertheless, if the New Testament is to guide us supremely in such matters, our heavenly Father has declared Himself as most praised, served, and glorified by those who strive "to make the wicked forsake his ways, and the unrighteous man his thoughts." "They that be wise [or teachers] shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever." Man has abundant opportunity for the intensest devotion, in opening new living temples for the Holy Ghost, and in adorning these as the Word directs. "In vain do they worship Me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men" (Matt. xv. 9), is our Lord's verdict upon the Pharisees' nice ritual observances. The solemn discourse accompanying it should make Ritualists bethink themselves as to their fidelity to their Lord and Master, in urging the necessity for elaborate ritual, about which He is either altogether silent, or by implication condemns. Let us, by all means, be zealous in Christ's cause, but let "our zeal be according to knowledge" of His example, His precepts and His warnings against needless display in worship (Matt. vi. 1—7). So shall we best work out a consistent Christianity, and, so far as in us lies, insure its advancement in the manner its Author has prescribed.

RUDDY.

Literature.

IS CARLYLE OR MACAULAY THE GREATER WRITER?

CARLYLE.—REPLY.

It is a pity that M. T.'s pen was not restrained within the bounds of the question, instead of being allowed to wander in the manner in which he has permitted it. The entire first page of his article is quite wide of the point. To what is it relevant—to show that Carlyle is an older man than Macaulay? and what is M. T.'s ridiculous parody of Byron's lines supposed to illustrate? For our own part, we cannot see any excuse for wresting them from their meaning. Let us also impress upon M. T. the fact that the comparison to be made in the present discussion is not between the lives of the two authors (although on that point there would be no cause to fear the result as to Carlyle), but their writings. How the enumeration of Macaulay's official labours—which we would not for an instant seek to depreciate—can at all affect this controversy we are at a loss to understand. Macaulay and Carlyle are both historians, they are both essayists, they are both poets, they are both biographers, they are both philosophers,—which is the greater? What little further we have to state upon the matter we hope to say without calling in the assistance of the high-sounding, but, we fear, empty language so needlessly employed by M. T.

We quite agree with M. T., that to be intelligible is one duty of a writer; and it is much to be regretted that he has not himself followed the rule he lays down. What are we to understand by the following?—"Chaotic confusionariness and multitudinous environments: its mystery-shrouded impalpabilities and its hazy nebulosities." Strange to say, this is from the restrained and intelligible pen of M. T.! What is meant by "This is a debate that can only be expiscated by quotations"? We must express our thorough objection to the way in which M. T. has endeavoured to excite a false feeling against Carlyle. It is not the province of a debater to indulge in language of the character to which we shall presently draw attention, although it may do very well for an advocate with a bad case "to throw plenty of mud, because some is sure to stick." M. T. says, "Carlyle has devoted six times as much matter as the Bible contains to glorify and deify the vain, hypocritical, tyrannical, infidel, self-seeking, Europe-disturbing king of scoundrels, Frederick the Great." Here we have an abundance of mud, a plenitude of epithets, but no truth.

Why drag the Bible into the discussion? why not confine the debate to its legitimate ends, and keep within the compass of the subject? We are always loth to attribute an unworthy motive,

even to an opponent; but it seems to us that the only reason for adopting this course must be to endeavour to induce some reader not thoroughly acquainted with the subject, to believe that Mr. Carlyle is an irreligious writer, or, in other words, an atheist, and thus to gain a convert by means of a kind of literary bribe.

It is much to be regretted that so little argument has been used in this controversy, and that a field affording such ample scope for discussion has been comparatively unexplored. We dispute M. T.'s assertion that "it is enough to say Carlyle is the panegyrist of Frederick, and Macaulay is the expositor of William; to prove the wrongness of the sympathies of the one, and the rightness of those of the other,—for the more noble sympathies constitute unquestionable proof of the greater and the nobler soul." It is not enough to say this; we want some sort of proof; and not one tittle of demonstration does M. T. offer us. M. T. seeks to base the question on the comparative worthiness of the heroes of each respective author. Although this is not the true ground upon which to contest, we will for the nonce meet him on that ground, and at once we claim the victory. What has been Carlyle's object from beginning to end? To wipe off ignorance—that great demon of the human race. And where, we ask, can be found a more worthy array of heroes than those whose characters he has put before the world, cleared from the bigotry and prejudice with which previous ages have enveloped them. Luther, Dante, Knox, Shakspeare, Cromwell, Burns, are a few of the number, and we ask M. T. to point out one of Macaulay's heroes who is at all comparable with any of these. Again, we will accept M. T.'s own ground—viz., the quotations he makes from the two authors,—and upon these quotations we contend that Carlyle is the greater writer. Because Carlyle does not attempt to blink the facts disclosed by human life and experience, but meets them hand to hand, he is, in M. T.'s opinion, inferior to Macaulay, one of whose defects is, in our opinion, that he treats his subjects more as an advocate than a philosopher. This is one reason why we contend that Carlyle is the greater writer, viz., because he discloses to the reader's view the subjects which he handles just as they are in their native ugliness, and does not attempt to detract from that ugliness by any spurious attire. We refer to the article of R. S. as a disproof of many of M. T.'s assertions.

It would be simply impossible to follow the course recommended by E. N. A., and give quotations from both Carlyle and Macaulay on subjects on which they have both written. Our object must be now almost entirely confined to an examination of the articles of our opponents. We look in vain through E. N. A.'s article for proof of his points. He charges Carlyle with having "paltered with his conscience"; and on what ground, think you, does he base this most serious accusation? Simply on this fact, that Carlyle in his writings praises silence and decries mere empty talk, but has in the course of a life of upwards of seventy years

worked so unremittingly that he has written a goodly number of books. Again, E. N. A. seeks to compare the writings of Carlyle and Macaulay on the Reformation; but the way in which he sets about his task is unjust. He quotes from Carlyle's "Frederick the Great," his "Essay on Voltaire," and his "Essay on Diderot," neither of which is professedly to the point; but on Macaulay's part he quotes from his "Essay on Ranké's History of the Popes," which is a criticism of an admittedly theological work.

Why does he not quote from some works of Carlyle's on the Reformation or Reformers, if he wishes to make a fair comparison? But, judging from the passages quoted, give us Carlyle's view of Protestantism and the Reformation in preference to Macaulay's!

In the quotations from Macaulay we cannot see anything comparable with the following, which E. N. A. quotes:—"Protestant or not Protestant. The question means everywhere, Is there anything of nobleness in you, O nation? or is there nothing? Are there in this nation enough of heroic men to venture forward and do battle for God's truth *versus* the devil's falsehood at the peril of life and more? men who prefer death and all else to living under falsehood, but having drawn the sword against it (the time being come for that rare and important step), throw away the scabbard, and can say in pious clearness with their whole soul, 'Come on, then! Life under falsehood is not good for me. Let it be to the death between us, then!'" And again, "All epochs wherein belief prevails, under what form it may, are splendid, heart-elevating,—fruitful for contemporaries and posterity. All epochs, on the contrary, wherein unbelief, under what form soever, maintains its sorry victory—should they even for a moment glitter with a sham splendour—vanish from the eyes of posterity, because no one chooses to burden himself with study of the unfruitful."

We maintain that the greater author is he who iterates and reiterates the truth, however unpleasant that truth may be; and in this, to our mind the greatest of all respects, Carlyle excels Macaulay. Carlyle's writings have in them a spirit and life; Macaulay's are clever pieces of mechanism, no doubt excellent in construction, and beautiful to look upon, but they want soul. No doubt in this age of sham creeds and spurious religions Carlyle's plain language is distasteful. Speaking of Luther, Carlyle says,—

"One hears with a new interest for poor Luther, that at this time he lived in terror of the unspeakable misery,—fancied that he was doomed to eternal reprobation. Was it not the humble, sincere nature of the man? What was he, that he should be raised to heaven?—he that had known only misery and mean slavery: the news was too good to be credible.

"It could not become clear to him how by fasts, vigils, formalities, and mass work, a man's soul could be saved. He fell into the blackest wretchedness—had to wander staggering as on the verge of bottomless despair.

"It must have been a most blessed discovery—that of an old Latin Bible which he found in the Erfurt library about this time. He had

never seen the Book before. It taught another lesson than that of fasts and vigils. A brother monk, too, of pious experience, was helpful. Luther learned now that a man was saved not by singing masses, but by the infinite grace of God—a more credible hypothesis. He gradually got himself founded as on the rock. No wonder he should venerate the Bible, which had brought this blessed help to him. He prized it as the word of the Highest must be prized by such a man. He determined to hold by that; as through life and to death he firmly did."

The above quotation, without going further, contains a much truer view of the Reformation and its causes, and its apostles, than can be deduced from any of Macaulay's writings on the subject. We do not hesitate at once to take issue with G. M. S. The definition we gave of a great writer was not a definition of what the great writers of the present age are, but rather a definition of what a great writer should be, and we still adhere to that definition. We fixed that standard with the object of ascertaining which of the two authors we are discussing came the nearer to it, because he who comes the nearer to it will in our estimation be the greater writer. But G. M. S. says the definition quoted has little or no meaning. For our own part, we cannot conceive a graver or more comprehensive definition. It appears that our opponent considers that any person who writes according to the acknowledged rules of composition, and places on his writings the varnish of rhetoric, forming the whole into an elegant piece of workmanship, is a great writer. This we cannot admit; otherwise, our opponent says, Hume is not a great writer.

Suppose we admit that statement as a correct conclusion, should we be far wrong? Hume may be a great narrator of facts and events, a great logician, a skilful compiler, and an able debater, and yet be far from a great writer. We insist that the claim to be a great writer must be founded on qualities far deeper than those just enumerated. G. M. S. says that "a great writer is known by the influence that he may have had over his fellow-men, and by the way in which his works have been received by the people." If these be the two *criteria* on which we are to form a conclusion, then indubitably Carlyle is the greater writer; for his influence has been much greater on his age than has that of the writings of Macaulay.

Our opponent disputes our statement that "a great writer must also be a great thinker." It may be true, as he avers, that a man may be a great thinker, and yet unable to put his thoughts into fitting words; but it is still more certain that no man can be a great writer who has not great thoughts to put into words. We do not dispute that a man may be a writer, may retail other men's thoughts, and even do so advantageously to his readers, and be at the same time very far from having a right to be considered a *great* writer. In the eyes of G. M. S., Carlyle's great fault appears to consist in his "violating the recognised construction of the English language; that he twists, contorts, and ill-uses the Queen's

English"; and, according to G. M. S.'s own admission, his chief or only ground for considering Macaulay the greater writer is "on account of the practical stamp which he has given to all his productions." But, we ask, where is this practical end and sum-total of Macaulay's writings? In what respect are they more "practical" than Carlyle's? It is to be presumed, from our opponent's context, that this great practical superiority consists in this, that "we can follow with ease and satisfaction to ourselves that which may be embraced in a work." This we consider not a merit of Macaulay, but a positive fault. His writings can be followed with too much ease and satisfaction; they do but please and cause mere admiration; there is little or nothing in them to strike the mind with a lasting impression: while Carlyle's works abound with writing of the description last named. It is not good to be always pleased and persuaded with what you read; this is, in fact, a sign of mental sluggishness: but it is proper, and an indication of mental health, to be startled—or even offended—and convinced, instead of persuaded by your author. G. M. S. is wrong in thinking there is an inconsistency between the opinion of the *North British Review*, that Carlyle entertains "a very deep disdain for the robes and trappings of antiquity and prejudice," and Carlyle's own expressed opinion, that "the true literary man is a priest from age to age," &c.; for, as G. M. S. may have seen, neither the *North British Review* nor we ourselves ever were mad enough to say that Carlyle entertained a deep disdain for antiquity, but simply for its robes and trappings, and for prejudice, and this is a fact in which we greatly rejoice. With our opponent we much admire Macaulay's essay relating to Milton and the Puritans, but we would have him remember that it is stated by some that that essay—beautiful as its language is—was written more as a sarcasm on Milton and the Puritans than as an expression of genuine admiration.

G. M. S. has quoted a portion of Macaulay's review of "Ranké's History of the Popes," but we certainly cannot see in what respect that gives any proof of Macaulay's greatness as a writer. Our opponent sarcastically asks, "From what source has Carlyle got all his wonderful thinking—his bomb-shell flashes of thought?" We reply, from a natural insight not possessed to such a degree by Macaulay; from a culture better fitted for that object; and last, but greatest, from his study of truth, and unremitting pursuit of undisguised facts. According to our opponent's statements even, Macaulay's greatness consists more in method and criticism than anything else. We would ourselves have awarded him a much larger share of greatness than this.

Carlyle possesses all the qualities which our opponent says are necessary to make a great writer, and on which he says Macaulay is greater than Carlyle; and he does not assert that Carlyle does not possess those literary qualities. How, then, does he make out that Macaulay is greater than Carlyle? He says, "The highest

qualification that a writer can attain is to make himself intelligible. If a person does not understand all that is contained in a book, how can he maintain that it is ably written, or that its author is a great writer? The question, no doubt, is well enough meant, but G. M. S. is wrong in his premises. We should much regret it if intelligibility were the highest quality for a writer. We contend that the utterance of undisguised truth is the greatest virtue for a writer, its being put into an easily intelligible shape being quite a secondary consideration, and of minor importance. But even were it as G. M. S. asserts, can our opponent point out to us one passage of Carlyle's writings which cannot be understood? We have read Carlyle carefully and with vast satisfaction, but we do not recollect a paragraph which is not easy of understanding, clear, and apposite.

The principal part, or at any rate a great part of G. M. S.'s case against Carlyle and for Macaulay seems to be that he considers that *some* of his works are not practical, and that *all* Macaulay's are. What he understands by the words "practical and useful" he does not define. According to our opponent, Macaulay is the greater writer because he "never wrote unless he knew that which he wrote about was thoroughly true—he was practically truthful." G. M. S. would circumscribe all writing to the mere relation of ascertained facts and the detailing of circumstances. Carry this wretched principle out to its legitimate extent, and farewell to all discoveries or inventions. Henceforth Dante, Shakspeare, Milton, and Bunyan must be banished. But although Carlyle's works do not all consist of mere narrative, they are all thoroughly useful, as indeed anything which tends to the dissipating of ignorance must be.

One great quality they have which Macaulay's do not possess and which would be sufficient to give Carlyle the palm, even if Macaulay excelled him in language, and that is—they make the reader *think*, which is a very necessary thing, especially in these frivolous, unthinking times. We are happy to differ from G. M. S.'s definition of history, as that which he describes as history is merely one portion of it, and we still adhere to our former expressed opinion that Carlyle is the greater historian; but although they express a wish to controvert that point, it is somewhat singular that not one of our opponents quotes a single passage from any of Macaulay's historical works to demonstrate his alleged superiority. G. M. S. says that we have no proof that Carlyle would adhere to his principles if tested before the public in the same way as Macaulay was on the question of the Maynooth, as to which he lost his seat in the House of Commons. We would like to know what better proof of consistency and adherence to principle can be given than a long life like that of Carlyle, consistent and persistent, and adhering unswervingly to the great principles which he has always advocated, notwithstanding all manner of obloquy heaped upon him by writers wise in their own

conceit, and reviewers. It is no particular merit for any man to prefer losing his seat to proclaiming himself false; but it would be an immense disgrace to himself to prefer to retain his seat on an ignominious dereliction from duty and principle such as that indicated.

W. W. strives to be ingenious. He starts with quoting one of our opening sentences, in which it is said that Carlyle is probably the most misunderstood of the writers of the present day; and he forthwith seeks to convert this into an admission that Carlyle is *unintelligible*,—i. e., incapable of being understood. The meaning of the sentence referred to is obvious. Carlyle is perfectly and easily intelligible to all except to those who start with the foregone determination not to understand, as it appears our inventively inclined opponent has done. But he should recollect that most great men are misunderstood in the age in which they live. This is a rule almost without exception. The strength of our case enables us to leave the would-be sarcasms of W. W. to their natural fate without expediting it. It is not for a moment to be imagined that any man who has thought upon the subject will concur with him in his opinion that "manner is as important as matter." But we assert that Carlyle's manner, if not always elegant according to the standard of W. W.'s "fastidiousness," is peculiarly suited to force his writings into the mind and understanding of every reader, and was probably adopted with that object. The nicknames of which W. W. complains are masterpieces, and frequently enable one to ascertain at a glance the character of the person to whom they are applied, and thus their author can dispense with a large number of words. We beg to assure our opponent that, according to H. K.'s opinion, "*Sartor Resartus*"—which, by-the-bye, seems to excite W. W.'s ire to a remarkable degree—is "a triumph of genius," and stands alone in that class of literature.

We may perhaps ease some of W. W.'s "great pain." We express no "indiscriminate admiration" for Mr. Carlyle, nor have we been misled by any sophistry on his part, for none such exists; and, indeed, we should feel obliged by W. W. showing us a little of the evidence to which he refers when he says we have been "*evidently* subdued by the novelty rather than by the truths of the thoughts," &c. With some—nay, many—of Mr. Carlyle's political and theological opinions we do not agree, and would contend against them to the utmost; but this is no bar to the opinion to which we still adhere, that he is by far a greater writer than Macaulay. We have found more food for thought in one of Mr. Carlyle's essays than in all Macaulay's writings. Even were we to concede that for which Macaulay's advocates seem most to contend, we should only be admitting that he is a better narrator than Carlyle. But narrative—to use W. W.'s language—is not the "complete duty" of a writer, but, on the contrary, almost the least important part. We need say nothing further of the "*French Revolution*."

It speaks for itself, abundantly and unmistakably. But we are rather curious to ascertain how W. W. has discovered whether or not H. K.'s reading is extensive. Possibly—nay, probably, judging from the evidence afforded by his article—our reading has been as extensive as, if not more so than, that of our opponent, who should recollect that this kind of writing will never entitle him to rank as a debater, and much less as a great writer.

In concluding our remarks on W. W.'s paper, we must protest against the insult offered to our friend R. S. by W. W. R. S. has for years been a valuable, and, we are convinced, a valued contributor to this Magazine; and we trust that before W. W. again enriches these pages he will mend his manner as well as his matter; for a controversy conducted in the style in which W. W. has indulged cannot be of profit to any one.

We do not wish to say anything that could be construed in the least as disparaging Macaulay's writings. That he was a great writer we frankly admit, and should be very sorry to hear it denied. Our whole point is that, looking at what a writer should be, and viewing the subject in all its aspects, Carlyle is the greater writer.

H. K.

MACAULAY.—REPLY.

So long a time has elapsed since our opening article on this important debate was published (August, 1867), that some of our readers may have forgotten the basis selected by us for discussion, and the statement of the peculiar difficulties incident to the side of the debate adopted by us with which we prefaced our remarks. The bearing of these remarks on the solution of the question has had but scant justice done to it by our opponents, or we might have had a more animated debate; indeed, so long was the interval which took place before the introduction of the second set of papers (November, 1867), that we fancied it was about to lapse or collapse. Though lacking in animation and closeness of antagonism, I think it may justly be said that few of our recent debates have shown such a mastery of the main facts and elements of the question as has been exhibited in this one. The article of H. K.—of which we shall speak again, however—is an admirable one as an introduction to the study of Carlyle's works, and shows a good deal of critical appreciation; that of R. S., despite the sneer of W. W., is, as a literary production, ingenious and clever; if we think E. N. A. more pointed and polished, it may perhaps be thought that we take a friendly view of it because it is on our side. G. M. S., my fellow-champion for Macaulay, does efficient work, though, if we dare venture to say it, a little ramblingly, and with too little regard to the exigencies of discussion, which requires measured words as a duel requires measured swords. For this criticism I shall give G. M. S. the revenge of quoting Shakspeare against myself:—

“A friend should bear a friend's infirmities.”

“A friendly eye could never see such faults.”

H. W., however, quite outmatches him, and, as we shall show, lays himself open to not a few objections; but as a set-off on this head we must confess that W. W. is, if not flippant, yet fast-young-mannish, although, as his arguments are much superior to his style, we may hope better things of him. He is probably the leading character in some debating society in which stinging words are more effective than thinking. E. D. is modest, but inane, and adds little to the argument in Carlyle's favour, though he excites a favourable impression regarding himself, from his calm and moderate tone. P. B. and "Common Sense" are less argumentative than they might have been, but both show considerable ability as writers, and have extended the grounds offered for consideration. W.'s earnest and thoughtful pen we did not expect to find engaged in glorifying Carlyle. The influence of the man whom he looks on as a teacher and prophet, on John Sterling, A. J. Scott, F. D. Maurice, and others, should have given cause for pause before W. spoke of him in the favourable terms he has done. R. M. A. is too depreciatory of Macaulay, and is somewhat cynical in his judgment. All combined, however, these papers cannot fail to throw much light on the subject of this discussion—not only in regard to the elements of greatness in a writer, and the proportions of greatness claimed by each advocate for his own favourite author, but also as to the merits of the writers whose reputation is under debate, their literary qualifications, and the power and energy with which they think and persuade. This we look upon as a matter of great moment; for controversy has not for its province the settling of debatable questions, but the complete statement and advocacy of what may be said in favour of either side of the topic engaging attention. The reader is the judge before whom we plead, and if we bring due witnesses before him, allowing the counsel on the opposite side to cross-examine them, and then present what appear to us to be good and sufficient reasons for our maintenance of the opinions we express, we shall do all that we can to enable him to "judge righteous judgment." It is with no intent, therefore, of adjudicating finally on this important question that we now commence our reply to the observations made by our opponents.

H. K. asserts that "the subjects chosen by the latter (Carlyle) of themselves are sufficient to entitle the writer to the greater prominence,"—August, 1867, p. 92. We may join issue upon this at once. The biographical essays of Macaulay refer to such men as these:—Milton, Machiavelli, Bunyan, Byron, Dr. Johnson, Hampden, Burleigh, Walpole, Chatham, Macintosh, Bacon, Sir Wm. Temple, Clive, Hastings, Pitt, Leigh Hunt, Addison, Lord Holland, Frederick the Great, Dante, Petrarch, Dryden, Atterbury, Goldsmith. Mirabeau, Barère, &c.; those of Carlyle are Richter, Werner, Goethe, Burns, Heyne, Voltaire, Novalis, Schiller, Dr. Johnson, Diderot, Edward Irving, Cagliostro, Mirabeau, Sir W. Scott, Varnhagen Von Ense, Baillie the Covenanter, Dr. Francia, John Sterling, Oliver Cromwell, &c. On comparing these subjects together I

confess that I cannot see any great help they give us in regard the question at issue. Of them we say,—

“Write them together, those are as fair as these,
Sound them, they do become the mouth as well,
Weigh them, they are as heavy; conjure with them,
Macaulay's start our spirits as much as Carlyle's.”

compare the merits of the essays, &c., themselves, we are in favour of the writer whose fame we champion. Macaulay's are indeed full of quaint thought, and striking and un-English expression, of sudden gleams of descriptive passages; but they are irregular, fitful, and not laid out for communicating information. Carlyle's, on the contrary, we have, in splendid mosaic, solid, classic taste, intellectual insight, eloquence, research, imagination, sound reflection, logical thought, and exquisite reproductive capacity. Besides these qualities, which are most valuable, we have a most condensed mode of supplying information—often as much in a single page as would give reputation to a whole volume. How brilliantly the facts are narrated! how fittingly they are arranged! how splendidly are the pictures drawn! how many of the results of wide reading and elaborate thought are given in brief space! and on all how much critical, philosophical, and historical lore and acumen are compacted into his pages! No one who studies Macaulay's works can fail to find the labour expended in doing so otherwise than amply rewarded by the benefit reaped in the process. Carlyle can bear no comparison with Macaulay for instructiveness, and his delineations of character are not brought within the comprehension of the reader with the felicity, and truthfulness, and captivating interest with which Macaulay disposes and paints his portraits of the great men of the past.

We are next challenged by H. K. to produce from the works of Macaulay an equal to Carlyle's essay entitled “Characteristics” (August, 1867, p. 92). Has H. K. forgotten the most striking and admirable paper on philosophy which has appeared during the present century, Macaulay's “Lord Bacon”? H. K. thinks that “one of the greatest qualities for a writer to possess is *originality*” (p. 93). In this we do not agree with him. In originality any madman can outmatch a thousand poets, and nothing is so original in thought as a lie. Ten thousand thousand ways of error open to each thinker, truth has only one. Originality, is therefore, far more easily attained than truthful accuracy and common-sense correctness. Hence H. K. will see that there are really better qualities that a writer can possess than originality; and while he gives the palm of originality to Thomas Carlyle, I claim for Macaulay common-sense truthfulness. Could a greater mistake have been made concerning any writer than H. K. makes when he says, “Suggestiveness is a quality of which we think Macaulay is almost, if not entirely devoid.” He over-teems with suggestiveness. Metaphor

and antitheses sparkle along his pages like dewdrops on a May morning, and these are the very highest forms of suggestiveness. Allusions are in no modern works so numerous and so appropriate as they are in the works of Macaulay. Had he not been a suggestive writer could he have composed "The Lays of Ancient Rome"? Could any man be at once biographer, historian, critical essayist, orator, legist, and poet—popular, too, in all—unless he were a suggestive writer? Truly it is his suggestiveness that astonishes. He brings to bear upon every topic so great an amount of information, such an aptitude of judgment and philosophic culture, so great an amount of illustrativeness, such a masterly array of the facts concerning it, that his productions are gorgeous as cathedral windows shining on the purest statuary, the grandest architecture, and the most admirable paintings, while down the ample aisles the mightiest miracles of music roll upon the ear. He captivates the heart while convincing the judgment, and by the force, splendour, and brilliancy of his thoughts, astonishes, enraptures, elevates, and refines.

H. K. thinks that Carlyle excels Macaulay as an historian. To this we demur; Carlyle is much more of an essayist, we had all but said pamphleteer, than an historian. How crude and ineffective is his introduction to "Frederick," filling a whole volume without getting his hero beyond baby clothes! and how prosy, episodic, and tediously talkative—notwithstanding the many elegances and eloquences it contains—is the entire work! May we not just hint that Carlyle's consciousness gives a different verdict than the judgment of H. K.? Had he believed that he was equal to Macaulay as an historian, would he have left the "Story of the Puritans" to be told by the Lord of Rothley Temple, while he betook himself to be the panegyrist of "Frederick"? He saw that Macaulay had amply preoccupied the field, and thus tacitly he yielded him pre-eminence. "Frederick" is a colossal mistake, not a gigantic success, and its author has endeavoured by bulk of canvas and strength of colour to give his hero an appearance of greatness which he did not really possess. Besides, may we not here hoist H. K. with his own petard? for if the choice of subject show greatness in the writer, which of us will not give the palm to the writer who seeks to elucidate the history of his own country, and make the world marvel at the recital, rather than to him who praises its enemies, and cries up its rivals and opponents?

Unluckily for the interest he has in hand, H. K. has mentioned Carlyle's "Chartism," "Past and Present," "Latter-Day Pamphlets," &c., to which we may add, as of a like nature, his contributions to *Macmillan's Magazine* on the American Question, and on "Shooting Niagara, and After," since reissued in a pamphlet form. These works seem to justify the following strong censure of their author, which we commend not only to H. K.'s, but to our readers' attention:—

"No one class is spared from his catalogue of nuisances that 'offend the

sun' and 'cry out for burial.' All is rottenness and disorder in the social fabric; all is speedily falling back to chaos. With marvellous inconsistency, the man who sees such grace and goodness in every form of human worship—though its incense be the fume of passion, and its rites the solemnization of cruelty and lust—sees only gilded vice and unmitigated folly in every walk and institution of civilized life. Falling from the mad prophetic rant of his former works, he is here exhibited, not as the *Cassandra*, but as the *Thersites* of the age; standing in turn over every silent group of labourers in this earnest century and most earnest country, and voiding his unwholesome abuse equally over all. In these pages every time-honoured virtue that adorns humanity meets with indignant denial or scornful depreciation. Philanthropy is maudlin, and benevolence is weakness, and industry is avarice, and statesmanship is trickery, and liberty a chimera, and religion, cant. England is especially the target of Mr. Carlyle's scorn; the British constitution is the choicest specimen of folly which the sun beholds in all this great 'museum of absurdities.' Indeed, almost the only preference of a positive kind which may be gathered from this book, made up as it is, for the most part, of inexplicable hatreds and dislikes, is the author's hearty preference of a good, strong, iron despotism, to the most elaborate and well-balanced constitutional government. Nothing seems to irritate him so much as the words 'emancipation,' 'enfranchisement,' 'liberty,' 'voluntary principle.' Prison visiting and melioration very evidently disgust him; and as to slavery, so cordial is his regret for the decadence of that ancient institution, that he seems to emulate the zeal of poor Boswell, who declared that to abolish the slave trade would be to 'shut the gates of mercy on mankind.'”*

We have now pretty well gone over all the more noticeable points in H. K.'s paper, which we confess is an able one, and does him much credit by the choiceness of its extracts and by the excellence of its style. The leading paper in every sense, our objections to it relieve us from the necessity of bestowing an examination so lengthy on any of its coadjutors. R. S. comes next into the field. We would suggest to him that we have not only to inquire “which takes the most profound and comprehensive view of the subject,” but beyond all, which takes the view most accordant with truth? Carlyle does not write the history of the “French Revolution,” he does not even give a biography of “Oliver Cromwell,” which can be intelligible to those who have not previously been made acquainted from other sources with the main course of the events of which he writes. I recollect once, in crossing the German Ocean, reading Lord Lytton's “Richelieu” not far distant from the furnace of the steamer; every now and again, as the furnace man fed the fire, a dazzling outflash of light burst luridly red upon the page, and anon a blackness that looked like darkness fell on the page when the furnace door was shut. Carlyle's “French Revolution” always reminds me of that reading within the range of the fitful outgleams and sudden glares of the steamer's firelight, and in such circumstances that in proportion to the brilliancy of

* “Essays on English Literature,” by Thomas McNicoll, M.R.C.S., “On the Writings of Mr. Carlyle,” p. 155.

the fire flare is the black darkness which falls upon the page. In nothing are the writings of Thomas Carlyle more tantalizing than in the fitful irregularity of style and of narrative, and the erratic and wayward self-will with which, disregarding altogether the interest and comfort of the reader, he skips about from place and circumstance, from story to sneer, from remark to reverie, and from narrative referring to the past to allusion to or criticism of the present, or Cassandra-like vaticinations of the future, and the ills that are boded in it.

I am sorry to see that R. S. considers it right to speak of Carlyle's "solemn assertion of the responsibilities of existence" (November, 1867, p. 349); and on this point we are still more sorry to see that W. coincides with him when he says that "Carlyle has toned the thought of his generation, and given an upward impulse to its preaching, literature, and art" (April, 1868, p. 258). This is an opinion that can scarcely be maintained in the face of the very general opinion of adherents of all churches that Carlyle has been the most thorough advocate of scepticism that has arisen in our age. The following quotation refers to this phase of the question:—

"But it is most important to know the nature and extent of Mr. Carlyle's influence in the religious or serious world, and especially among those ardent spirits who are ready to follow the most daring leader into the spiritual mysteries of our nature. His social views are not likely to have great weight with practical men till they shall be more clearly defined, and by this means better understood. But it is not thus with regard to his religious speculations; for, strangely enough, men do not extend the necessity of that practical wisdom to the personal affairs of the soul, which they fail not to recognise in matters of merely temporal concern. In the latter case a man soon becomes convinced that, if he look not after his own business, he cannot share the general prosperity, though he admire and appreciate it never so much. But how many are there who indulge an intemperate curiosity as to the nature of the human spirit—its origin, and essence, and character, and destiny—who yet feel no paramount interest in the safety of their own! Of God, too, they have a certain strange desire to know much that must remain unknown till we can 'see Him as He is;' but to seek a preparation for that transforming vision—by ascertaining His favour, and their personal relationship to Him, and seeking first a renewal of, and then a perpetual growth in, His image and likeness—seems never to occur to them as the first and highest point for their consideration, the chief and only wisdom of every individual soul of man. It is to this class of minds that the writings of Mr. Carlyle are especially alluring. Wandering after a forbidden knowledge, and scarcely expecting to be made certain or satisfied, they do not quarrel with the unsatisfactory nature of his excursions into the mysteries of being, dazzling but unproductive as they are. Reversing the divinely appointed order, they neglect to taste first of the tree of life, and soon find the bitter fruit of that other tree to be the knowledge of their own mortality and misery, and the oblivion of all divine and saving truth."*

* Thomas M'Nicoll's "Essays," p. 155.

That we are not mistaken in assigning this injurious tendency to the writings of Thomas Carlyle, the "Life of John Sterling" is evidence patent enough to everybody and sad enough to think upon. But we are fortified in this idea by the opinions of many writers, though we can only quote just now from a publication which has received the sanction of the Evangelical Alliance for its publication and extensive distribution:—

"In speaking of Mr. Carlyle in this connection we are to be understood rather as indicating the religious bearing of much of his writings, than assigning him a definite place in a particular category. There is no great writer in modern times who is ever speaking of men's beliefs or unbeliefs, of whom it is more difficult to say precisely what his own belief or unbelief is. John Foster once said (whether wisely or unwisely we leave the reader to judge) that it would at any time be a great luxury to him to accompany a few athletic men with poleaxes among the monuments in Westminster Abbey, to be most vigorously wielded, with just here and there an omission, in a process which we might imagine. Mr. Carlyle has a like luxury in vigorously wielding his poleaxe against our churches, as if they were 'mere cases of articles;' and against our Bible creeds, as if they were no better than 'extinct traditions,' 'unbelievabilities,' 'worn-out symbolisms, reminiscences, and simulacra.' We might easily conjecture what Foster's excepted instances among the sculptured memorials would have been, but we are without ground on which to conjecture the exceptions, if exceptions there be, in the case of Carlyle. Multitudes of good men read his writings with strong suspicions that under the cover of assailing the shams, hypocrisies, and formalities, of which there are unhappily too many in the church as well as in the world, he is assailing the very Bible truth itself; and these suspicions are certainly not weakened by his last interesting work, 'The Life of John Sterling.' We know that he has said, 'Adieu, O Church; thy road is that way, mine is this: in God's name, adieu!' We know that he does worship in 'the great cathedral of immensity,' and acknowledge 'the supreme silences,' 'the destinies and the immensities,' and 'the eternities,' and that he is apt to regard our Christian beliefs as a 'stealing into heaven by sticking ostrich-like our head into fallacies on earth.' But beyond this we know nothing positively. We are not going, then, to write him down pantheist. But he has given us occasion to say that the tendency of much of what he has written is pantheistical. He does not, indeed, say anything so offensive on the subject of Christianity as his admirer, Mr. Emerson. He never speaks of it as 'an Eastern monarchy, built by indolence and fear,' nor charges it with the radical defect of dwelling with noxious exaggeration about the person of Jesus. But we are at a loss to gather any better religion from his pages than a kind of man-worship. He sees God-like principles in human nature, especially in great and earnest men who have made any impression on the world, and he falls down himself, and calls upon others to fall down and do them homage. Moses and Zoroaster, Jesus Christ and Mahomet, Saul of Tarsus and Paul the apostle, were, though not in the same degree, alike divinely inspired men. His hero-worship points to the Emerson doctrine of the soul. He says virtually, what the American says openly, that the doctrine of the divine nature suffers perversion in being attributed to one or two persons, and denied to others. God in man, not exclusively in the man Christ Jesus, but God in every man in whom appear greatness and

earnestness, seems to be the religion of this hero-worship. Literature, in short, with him is religion; and 'the true sovereign souls' of literature, the Goethes and so on, are the true prophets and gospel preachers. The contents of religion are accordingly regarded by the men of this school as found within the man, not coming to the man from without; the soul is a revelation to itself. Emerson has said, 'It is not instruction, but provocation that I can receive from another soul. What he announces I must find true in me, or wholly reject; and on his word, or as his second, be he who he may, I can accept nothing.' And says Mr. Carlyle, 'the Maker's laws, whether they are promulgated in Sinai thunder, to the ear or imagination, or quite otherwise promulgated, are the laws of God; transcendent, everlasting, imperatively demanding obedience from all men. This, without any thunder, or with never so much thunder, thou, if there be any soul left in thee, canst know of a truth. The universe, I say, is made by law; the great soul of the world is just, and not unjust. . . . Rituals, liturgies, credos, Sinai thunder,—I know more or less the history of these, the rise, progress, decline, and fall of these. Can thunder, from all the thirty-two azimuths, repeated daily for centuries of years, make God's laws more God-like to me? Brother, no. Perhaps I am grown to be a man now, and do not need the thunder and the terror any longer. Perhaps I am above being frightened; perhaps it is not fear, but reverence alone that shall now lead me. Revelations, inspirations? Yes; and thy own God-created soul, dost thou not call that a revelation?' He tells us that religion is 'no Morrison's pill from without,' but a clearing of the inner light or moral conscience, a re-awakening of our own selves from within; the world has looked to the revelation without, but it was 'when its beard was not grown as now.' And with a sneer at the old churches and the old creeds he says, 'What the light of your mind, which is the direct inspiration of the Almighty, pronounces incredible—that, in God's name, leave uncredited; at your peril do not try believing that.' When such talk as this is indulged in, the law and the testimony is little valued. Mr. Carlyle, accordingly, is disposed to make sincerity or earnestness the test of truth and moral greatness. Christianity is thus reduced from its high position as the only true religion, to a level with the other religions of the earth, and what a man honestly believes and really practises is counted a good orthodox creed. The revelation is made within the man, and the outer light is respected only in so far as it agrees with the inner light. All this comes from a dreamy exaggerated notion about the soul. Mr. Carlyle does not say, with Proudhon and Emerson, that the highest being is man, and thus make theology anthropology, but much of what he does say looks in that direction. And his style of expression is frequently such as to lead many of his indiscriminating admirers to that position, or to strengthen those in it who already occupy it. He does not stop with scowling upon the formalism of the age, and calling upon men to be honest, earnest, and active, but the scowl seems turned towards Christianity and its evidences as a body of fact lying without. He is not satisfied with a natural reverence for what is great and good in any of our race, but the great with him becomes divine or God-like. In a mighty intellect we recognise the presence and power of the divinity. And for such he claims something like worship or religious admiration. His hero-worship is just a kind of intellectual pantheism. It is preaching up, though in a somewhat different way from the men of the Emerson school, the doctrine of the divinity of

the soul. Much as Mr. Carlyle is to be admired for his original vigorous thinking, his liberal and independent cast of mind, and his wish to raise up among us an earnest race of men, we cannot but deprecate the religious tendency of a great deal that he has written as pantheistical."

This is a very serious charge against Carlyle; no such accusation can be substantiated against Macaulay, whose Christian churchmanship remains unchallengeable. This is not what H. W. calls exciting against him the *odium theologicum*, it is a statement of a sad fact; R. M. A. (p. 263) admits it, and claims honour to him for it.

Carlyle's works are indeed those of a man of genius, though it is of a genius distraught and misled, self-willed and erratic; mighty is the fascination of his style, and his earnestness operates like the suction of a whirlpool on those who are easily stirred and moved. He seems to think that the light that leads him astray is light from heaven, but we are afraid it is too lurid and mystical for that. Genius is a dreadful as well as a glorious gift, and it has terrible responsibilities attached to its possession. It saddens us to think that he who might have done so much in the constructive and the instructive in literature, should have shown himself so much of a destructive—so great a denouncer of shams and shames as to have left us little hope or inducement to effort or progress. Macaulay bids us build up and repair, Carlyle exhorts us to pull down in despair, and we take the former to be a greater writer than the latter.

M. T.

CHRIST THE TRUTH IN HUMAN LIFE AND EXPERIENCE.—"1st, human life is truth, and not a lie, when it is consistent with itself. . . . 2nd, human life is truth, and not a lie, when it performs what it promises. But does human life ever perform what it promises? Has it ever yet done so in the experience of any human being? No, never. Sin has converted our life from truth into a lie—ever promising, but never performing. This you have often found, ye who have been ensnared by its enchanting prospects, and deluded by its alluring promises. It pictured forth to you and promised happiness, but happiness has never come to you. Happiness has often, as you thought, been within your grasp: you sometimes thought you seized it and enjoyed it. But how long? Only for a fleeting moment. The promised happiness was no sooner felt than it fled—no sooner tasted than it was swallowed down, and became bitterness and disappointment. Life thus proved itself to be false to you as to all. But would you cease to be ensnared by its deceitful promises? Would you have life promise nothing but what it will perform? Would you have it both promise and perform infinitely more and better than it now does or can do? Then let Christ the Truth become incorporated with your life; let Him have His place in its centre; let Him transform, mould, and fashion it by the truth which He is, and by the truth which He reveals; and what will follow? what will life become? It will become a living to God, and a discipline for eternity; and that change will of itself make life consistent with itself—will make it from shadow become substance—from a false become a truthful promiser. 'Live to God, and you shall live,'—i. e., you shall enjoy life, and never die."—*The late Rev. Geo. Corrie.*

Toiling Upward.

SIR DAVID BREWSTER, K.H., F.R.S.L. & E., M.A.,
M.D., LL.D., D.C.L., &c., &c.

TRUE science is the interpretation to the intellect of the appearances of nature. It accepts the impressions made on the senses, as, for them, valid, and as in themselves fitted for practical life; but it does not rest satisfied that all is known about nature, when the senses have been affected by the magnificent pictures which creation constructs for their delight. Sense accepts, acquiesces, and admires, but despairs; while science receives, realizes, criticises, inquires, and hopes. Sense deadens, science quickens; sense seeks enjoyment only, science longs for employment as well as delight. Existence is to be understood, and the beauty as well as the order of nature suggests that it is not a dead aggregate, but an organic unity ever engaged in evolving phenomena, and fashioning itself into new manifestations in which utility and ornament co-ordinate and co-operate. It demands, therefore, to be viewed as a system. But is the contemplatist to be contented only to concatenate appearances into intellectual unity, confining himself to that which lies within experience, or is he to accept experience as a sign of something beyond itself, and to look through to the indefinite and the changeable for the infinite and the changeless, till contemplation merges into worship?

Sir David Brewster looked at nature as a divine temple, in which dutiful work could be associated with beautiful wisdom and associated with spiritual worship. He had an exquisitely acute, as well as a thoroughly reverent eye. Law, design, beneficence, and love seemed to him to beam out of every object in nature, and to proclaim a presiding and providing Deity. As one of the princes of science, he did fealty to the supreme Sovereign and Disposer of events and things. True science was with him the seeing of the working of God in faith, and imitating it with patience. The Word and the world were to him books written by the same Law-giver; the one regulating and harmonizing the moral nature of man, so that it might be brought into accord with the invariable and wise laws of the physical universe, and the other insisting on a holy and intelligent life as the condition of a happy and lengthy existence. Within the embrace of his sympathies he could fold and hold them both. Both were to him revelations of the Unseen, and that which sense exhibited and science taught, Scripture confirmed.

"Most truly great! His intellectual strength
 And knowledge vast, to men of lesser mind
 Seemed infinite; yet from his high pursuits,
 And reasonings most profound, he still returned
 Home, with an humbler and a warmer heart;
 And none so lowly bowed before his God,
 And none so well His awful majesty
 And goodness comprehended, or so well
 His own dependency and weakness knew."

passage from one of his latest essays, which may be introduced here, not only as being in harmony with advanced in our previous observations, and corroborative of his character, but also as being important in itself, especially applicable to our own times. "To live upon a world wonderfully made, without desiring to know its form, its structure, and its purpose; to eat the ambrosia of its gardens, and drink the nectar of its vineyards, without inquiring where, and how, and why they grow; to toil for its gold and its silver, and to appropriate its coal and its iron, without studying their nature and their origin; to tremble with its earthquakes, and stand appalled before its volcanoes, in ignorance of their origin and of their power; to see and to handle the fossils of animal and vegetable life, without asking where, and how, and why they perished;—to neglect such pursuits as these would indicate a mind destitute of the intellectual faculty, and unworthy of the life and reason with which it has been endowed. It is only the irreligious man that can blindly gaze on the grandeur and beauty of material nature, without seeking to understand its phenomena and laws. It is only the ignorant man that can depreciate the value of that true knowledge which is within the grasp of his divine reason; and it is only the presumptuous man that can prefer those speculative inquiries before which the strongest intellect quails and the weakest triumphs. "In wisdom hast Thou made them all," can be the language only of the wise; and it is to the wise only that "the heavens can declare the glory of God," and that "the firmament" can "show forth His handywork."

Sir David Brewster is acknowledged on all hands to have been an able thinker, an acute experimentalist, an earnest cultivator of science, a noble promoter of study, and a thorough sympathizer with all intellectual and Christian effort. He is known not only as an interpreter of the great marvels of the world in which we live, but also as a discoverer of new truth; more than this, he was an original and inventive experimenter, and an excellent adapter of scientific discoveries to practical purposes. He was a laborious and successful author, an active official in his church, a popular member of society, an indefatigable contributor to the scientific "Transactions," and diligent in the performance of all his duties; in fact, he was an earnest toiler, who made his way up and kept abreast of all progress.

Sir David Brewster was born 11th December, 1781. In that notable year William Pitt, as member for Appleby, had made his "maiden" speech on reform; Lord George Gordon, leader of the "No Popery" London riots, had been tried and acquitted; the charters of the Bank of England and of the East India Company had been renewed; peace with America had become the demand of the nation; the Clarendon Press, Oxford, was founded; the discovery of "Uranus" had added lustre to the name of Herschel; English manufacturers first began to compete with India in the production of those "webs of woven wind" muslins; Cavendish and Watt were experimenting on the constitution of air; Turgot, the French economist, and Maurepas, the statesman who advised the French to aid America in its struggle for independence, died; so far into the past does his biography project the memory. He was the second son of the rector of the Grammar School of Jedburgh, one of the oldest parishes in Scotland of which history has preserved records. The patronage of the school lay in the hands of the magistrates of the burgh and the heritors or landed proprietors of the parish, and was then one of the noted seminaries of the border. David was destined for the ministry of the Scottish Church, and was educated for that office; as were his brothers, Patrick Brewster, of Paisley, celebrated, in the annals of Christian Chartism in Scotland, as the opponent of Fergus O'Connor; Dr. Brewster, of Craig, in Forfarshire, and Dr. Brewster, of Scoonie, in Fife. After a thorough course of training in the English and the grammar, or classical schools of Jedburgh, under the superintendence of his father, he entered the University of Edinburgh as a student. Here he was trained under Professors John Hill, Andrew Dalziel (Porson's correspondent); John Playfair, the highly distinguished mathematician; James Finlayson, a clerico-logician, of much industry and honesty, but little or no originality, biographer of Dr. Blair; Dugald Stewart, the moralist; John Robison, Watt's early friend; Dr. Andrew Hunter, and Hugh Meiklejohn. He made such distinguished progress under these teachers that in his nineteenth year, 1800, he achieved the degree of A.M. "In the first years of this century, 1802-3," says Prof. Sir James Y. Simpson, "he was much with [Henry] Cavendish, connecting us thus with the grand band of philosophers who then lived in the metropolis of England." He had when only ten years of age constructed a telescope, and he had in the closing years of the last century endeavoured to subject to inductive experiment the opinions of Sir Isaac Newton on light. In 1807 the University of Aberdeen spontaneously conferred on him the degree of LL.D. In 1808 he became editor of the *Edinburgh Encyclopædia*, an herculean labour on which he spent the labour of twenty-two years, and in which he deposited the records of many of the original discoveries and observations he was able to make during these years. This work, which extends to eighteen vols. 4to., though perhaps a little too much devoted to physical science, is one of great merit

and value, for the editor, besides his own versatile and able pen, secured as his collaborateurs some of the most eminent thinkers, experimenters, and writers of the day; although, on the whole, it was an unsuccessful pecuniary speculation, embittering his life a good deal by its results, in the conducting of this work he had discrimination enough to bring into literary activity several young writers—notably Carlyle and Chalmers,—whom he incited to authorship with the best results to the public. But the labour of such an editorship, difficult and arduous as it was, was not sufficient to exhaust the indomitable power of work, and the resistless energy of the industry that were in him. His contributions to the Royal Society of Edinburgh had attracted the attention of that learned body, and in 1808 he was elected a Fellow of this the highest philosophical institution in Scotland. In 1810 he married a daughter of James ("Ossian") Macpherson, a lady of fortune, of literary and scientific sympathies. Previously to this he had thoroughly entered into and devoted himself to the study of the science of optics, that exquisite study with which his name is so enduringly associated by his researches, discoveries, inventions, and writings. In 1811, while composing for his *Encyclopædia* the paper on "Burning Instruments," David Brewster suggested that a lens of great power could be constructed out of zones of glass built up of several circular segments, which, from its adaptation to intensify reflection, would be of much service in lighthouses, and therefore beneficial in navigation. In 1812 he pursued the subject, and issued a "Treatise on Burning Instruments, containing the method of building up Polyzonal lenses." In this work he maintained that coast navigation might be deprived of much of its danger, had we a good series of lighthouses properly fitted up with instruments which would increase the effect of light and cast it out to great distances across the waste waters of the deep; and suggested the use of a lens consisting of a central disc with concentric zones built in several pieces around it. Talk followed the suggestion, but Government had war upon its hands, and was more intent upon the intentions of the allied sovereigns regarding Bonaparte than on an alliance with science for the safety of life and commerce. France, incited by Fresnel, was wiser than we, and adopted the means placed in their hands by discovery for the security of the floating wealth she entrusted to the sea.

At the request of the celebrated John Playfair, who contemplated a geological tour through France, Switzerland, and Italy—a request in which the provost and magistrates of Edinburgh, who were then the curators of the university in the Scottish metropolis, concurred—he was brought to consider the acceptance of the Chair of Natural Philosophy, as assistant with the reversion of the successorship, during the great teacher's absence; but his engagements, combined with his absorption in scientific pursuits, caused him to decline the offer so flatteringly made.

In 1813 Brewster sent in to the Royal Society of London a

perfected report of what he had already detachedly read before the Edinburgh Royal Society regarding "the Properties of Light." In this communication he considered the new phenomena of the polarization of light, brought into prominence by Malus, &c., showed how the phenomena might be multiplied, and by acute experiments not only produced some fresh phenomena, but led the way to some subsequent valuable discoveries about the dispersive power of certain substances, and the refractive influences of others. In 1815 he renewed the topic in a paper on "The Polarization of Light by Reflection," in acknowledgment of the merit of which the Royal Society conferred on him the Copley medal, and in consideration of the value of his researches in optics he was in that same year elected a fellow of that association of men whose names ought, according to a panegyrist, to suggest "all that is profound in experimental research, ingenious in discovery, or sublime in speculative science." That this time at least the Royal Society had made a proper choice was borne witness to by the adjudication to him by the French Institute of 1,500 francs, being one-half of their prize for the most important discoveries in physical science made in any part of the world during the two preceding years. In 1816 he produced that popular and pleasing toy called the kaleidoscope, which is to be seen everywhere, but which he invented as an aid to pattern-drawers, and as a help to the promotion of artistic design in manufactures,—an invention by which many profited, but which brought little pecuniary advantage, though much pleasure, and many thanks to the inventor. This instrument he described and unfolded the uses of in "A Treatise on the Kaleidoscope," 1819. The Royal Society of London conferred on Brewster, in 1818, both the gold and the silver Rumford medals, for his discoveries in regard to the polarization of light. Along with Robert Jameson, Professor of Natural History in the University of Edinburgh, David Brewster projected, started, and co-edited the *Edinburgh Philosophical Journal*, of which, up till 1824, ten volumes were issued, when, after a brief interval, its scheme was enlarged, and a new series was commenced under the title of the *New Edinburgh Philosophical Journal*, a serial which took such a high place in science as the representative of the best literature on the subject, that it contains some of the choicest productions of such distinguished men as Blumenbach, Humboldt, Herschel, Prout, &c., in addition to many articles of engrossing interest and great worth from the chief scientific writers of the Scottish capital, and from the pens of the editors—both men of mark—themselves.

In 1822 Brewster published "Notes on [Prof. John] Robison's System of Mechanical Philosophy," and in 1823 a translation of Euler's "Letters" to the Princess of Anhalt-Dessau, in which that celebrated mathematician discusses so clearly the most important facts in mechanics, optics, acoustics, physical astronomy, &c.; while in 1824 he furnished an introduction and notes to a translation of "Legendre's Elements of Geometry;" and of plane and spherical

trigonometry, prepared by Thomas Carlyle, and issued with the sanction of its illustrious author, who favoured the editor with various suggestions for its improvement, and with some additions to the notes which formed the most complete and exhaustive treatise on the subject that had appeared in Britain at the time of its publication. This same year, 1825, too, brought him a higher honour than any he had yet received; for on the death of the distinguished Swedish chemist, J. J. Berzelius, he was elected a corresponding member, and in 1849 he was chosen to be one of the Foreign Associate Members of the National Institute of France, of whom there are never more than eight, and who "are generally regarded as the eight greatest scientific celebrities in the world."

In 1821, at his suggestion, the Scottish Society of Arts was instituted, and in 1841 it was incorporated by charter as "royal." He, too, was the original suggestor of "The British Association for the Advancement of Science." His spirited advocacy of some such method of bringing into intercommunication the men of science whose efforts were employed on specific investigations was unremitting, and in his own "journal," as well as in many other influential quarters, he pursued the subject with the indefatigable indomitability of an earnest man.

The idea of such associations was first broached by Professor Lorenz Oken, through whose exertions, after a good deal of difficulty, including the necessity of resigning his chair, the "Society of German Naturalists and Physicians" met at Leipsic, in 1822, with thirty-two members. In 1828 it had Humboldt as president, and met with distinguished success at Berlin, Charles Babbage being the only Englishman present. Sir David Brewster suggested the establishment of an annual scientific congress, similar to those held in Germany, and he found in Babbage, Davy, Herschel, and others, ready coadjutors. The first assembly was convened at York, in the autumn of 1832, by Brewster, and there the society was established which brings science by turns to the chief towns of the British empire, to show its value, and assert not only the interest attaching to its pursuit, but the claims it has on the honour and encouragement of the best men of the age. The first of these parliaments of science was attended by about 200, but every subsequent year has increased its membership and its patrons, and it is now not only a recognised institution, but has become the parent of many other societies of a similar nature, though for the pursuit of different objects. Prior to this Brewster had produced his "Treatise on Natural Magic"—dedicated to Sir Walter Scott, whose neighbour he had become as a proprietor on the banks of the Tweed. In 1831 he issued a "Treatise on Optics," and his "Life of Newton,"—the former an authoritative exposition of that science by a master in and a promoter of it, the latter a vivid and interesting biography, in which the results of much research were combined with careful explanation of the course and nature of the discoveries of the great English mathematician and naturalist. This book is indeed one of varied

attractions. We have in it science for the scientific, learning for the scholar, gossip and anecdote for the general reader, and a complete view of the man—in his quiet room at home, in his study, at the Royal Society, in the observatory, and in social life. Pleasure and instruction blend so delightfully into one another in it that we gain the one while we take the other. Brewster's interest in this biography continued to increase as he grew in years, and his efforts to secure justice to the memory of Newton led him to undertake fresh researches, in which he was aided by having the family papers placed under his care, and these resulted in the production in 1855 of two superb volumes, entitled "*Memoirs of the Life, Writings, and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton*,"—a work which, though it has not escaped severe criticism, is confessedly of great ability. Professor De Morgan holds harsher views of Newton's moral character, and an MS. autobiography of Flamsteed, discovered by Mr. Baily in 1856, lends some corroboration to the accusations brought against the philosopher, whom Brewster represents as all but immaculate. Almost all the facts that can now be attained about the illustrious physicist may be regarded as being incorporated in the elaborate work in which Brewster has enshrined so much thought and research.

To the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge he wrote two tracts on *Optics*, the field of his favourite explorations and of his highest triumphs, the science of which he has been called by a competent judge, John Pringle Nichol, the Kepler,—a science which, till he engaged in it, was almost in the same state as when Newton left it, but which, by his researches, inventions, and discoveries, may be said to await a Newton to fuse into one great thought, like that of gravitation, the laws of light which Brewster has so beautifully investigated and arranged.

With what a world of animating thought does the topic of his researches concern itself!—the phenomena of light are so varied and beautiful, the experiments capable of being made in it are so neat, exquisite, surprising, and effective. They lead to so many useful practical improvements, and add so much to the securities, comforts, and pleasures of life. The properties of light, reflection, refraction, polarization, absorption, inflection, &c., the laws of vision and the cause of colours,—how infinitely do these connect us with the far-distant spaces of the universe! By the telescope it enables us to voyage out into creation's stretches of glory and light; and nearer this planet's surface it delights us by explaining the mirage, the rainbow, the halo and parhelia, and the varying tints of the atmosphere, flowers, shells, minerals, animals, &c. On the sea it enables the mariner to determine his position and direct his course, assisting him in various ways, and by several instruments, to journey over the trackless waters. It has ten thousand applications to the arts of practical life, and through the microscope and other well-devised apparatus it enables us to investigate vegetable and animal tissues, and to examine the elements alike of the inorganic and of the organic world.

"Hail, holy light! off-spring of heaven's firstborn!"

It was one of the peculiarities of David Brewster to publish all his observations and discoveries immediately on their occurrence. He had an ardour for production. He had no reserve regarding his ideas, for he knew he had always a reserve of others to succeed them. Hence he was one of the most voluminous of modern men of science; and hence, too, the apparent fragmentariness of his efforts to those who do not see the centre whence all these effortful *radii* sweep in their passage through the circle of the sciences. He was, however, no sciolist, but a profound reflector on the works and ways of the Most High. David Brewster always consistently affirmed that the achievements of genius, like the source from which they spring, are indestructible. . . . They are the liberal bequests of great minds to every individual of their race, and wherever they are welcomed and honoured, they become the solace of private life, and the ornament and bulwark of the Commonwealth. It was on this account that men of science rejoiced when William IV. conferred on him the Guelphic Order of Hanover in 1830, and knighted him in 1832. It was regarded as an earnest of the patronage of Science by the Government, and inaugurated a hope—as yet all but unfulfilled—that the heroes of instruction might eventually receive at least equal honours with those of the distributors of destruction. Brewster's opinion was, that "It is from the trenches of Science alone that War can be successfully waged; and it is in its patronage and liberal endowment that nations will find their best and cheapest defence.

The honour thus conferred upon Sir David Brewster, K.H., was due to him, however, not only for his eminence as a man of science, but as a national benefactor; for through the intense persistency which characterized him, he had kept harping at the Scottish Lighthouse Board to adopt the means of illumination, and consequently of safety in navigation which science had placed within their reach; proclaimed the advantages of "the New System for the Illumination of Lighthouses" in a substantive work, and so stirred up the public by a paper in the *Edinburgh Review*, that at length a parliamentary committee of inquiry into the management of British lighthouses had been appointed; and the dioptric system of illumination, which he had invented, was adopted first by the Commissioners of Northern Lights, and thereafter by "the Trinity House," England, and by the Ballast Board of Dublin. The system is now in general use—modified and adapted to the requirements of each case—in all our colonies, and in every part of the world. When we consider the amount of wealth annually afloat and exposed to all the dangers of the sea, around the coasts of Great Britain, and the number of lives at stake in the vessels which ply to and from its ports, it would be difficult to estimate the indebtedness of our country to him who brought science to be a shield and a protection to our men, our vessels, and our property.

(To be continued.)

The Reviewer.

A Sketch of a Philosophy. London: Williams and Norgate.

IN this work, of which we have only seen Part II., relating to "Matter and Molecular Morphology," there is a singular blending of exact conciseness of method with strange gleams of far-reaching poetic thought, which indicate that the writer has been austere and reserved, simple and unaffected, from some other cause than want of inner capacity to give expansion and attractiveness to such speculations—speculations which are here laid before us, we doubt, in a manner too compressed for the careless reader, and even making considerable demands on the intellectuality and patience of those who feel the interest and attractiveness of the subject on which it treats. In this respect the work is rather a registration than an exposition of thought; yet ever and anon there jets out evidences of an indwelling power of eloquence, grandeur, and beauty, which the writer is curbing for the sake of logical consecutiveness and effective ratiocination.

Science avers that she has reached the threshold of the mystery of metaphysics, but that she cannot scale the steps and enter into the temple of nature as a worshipper, though a wanderer. Our author, who has enveiled himself in anonymity at present, takes physics and metaphysics by the hand, and strives to reconcile them by showing that they may be mutually instructive if they would cease to be mutually destructive. Science is fond of affirming that all we can know of matter through our senses or reason are its conditions and its changes; the products of forces of which we become cognizant only by their action and effects. This is the narrow footing on which experimental science places all knowledge, while it affirms that the correlations of force suffice to explain and describe in their ultimate the entire sum of the operations of nature, animate and inanimate, vast and remote, the nearest and the most minute; and are quite capable of setting before us the order, beauty, and symmetry of the grand *cosmos* as a philosophy of nature. Science constructs the universe to intelligence out of matter and force,—the former inert unless operated on by the latter; the latter destitute of the slightest property belonging to the former, yet both blended in their existence in such a mutual and necessary manner that it is difficult to dis sever them in reality, though it is requisite as a convenience in language. The relations and effects of matter and force, science represents as varying at every moment, subject to change, but never to destruction. There are *forces* of gravitation and cohesion, of magnetism and electricity, of chemical affinity and nervility of light and heat; but they all exist under a law of mutual convertibility, and there are elementary forms of *matter*

to the amount of sixty or seventy, which, because irresolvable by man in his present state of knowledge, are regarded as ultimates. Our author, notwithstanding the fact that the most recent researches of modern chemists have tended to augment the number of bodies apparently simple, and for the present irresolvable, believes that "matter in its ground is one and the same in all bodies whatever." This, of course, is as yet little more than speculation, but it seems to be borne out by recent and actually attained results. For instance, lime, flint, clay, magnesia, &c., have been transformed from dull earths into highly inflammable and brilliant metals, through the genius exerted by the modern experimentalist in removing the oxygen they contain. Iodine, chlorine, and bromine are found to possess such close and intimate relations, that we are led to suppose that they have a common basis; or, at least, form a connected and convertible series. The facts concerning the changes which may take place in the allotropic conditions of simple bodies—*e. g.* oxygen, sulphur, phosphorus, &c.—while unchanged as to their component molecules, seem by analogy to tend to some great underlying law of convertibility, or, at least, elementary selfsameness in the constituents of matter. By its researches into the facts of things chemistry has carried us deeply into the mystery of things. Great and important as are its revelations in regard to the transferences, substitutions, proportionate combinations, &c., possible as phenomena of matter, the writer of this "sketch of a philosophy" does not think they reach the pith of the question; and he proposes to construct, as it were—if we comprehend his aim aright—a paradigm of the inner and secret operations of Nature, before she awards visibility to the elements of sensible perception, and to show, from the accordancy of his speculations concerning the most minute atomic unities with definite results of analytic chemistry, that his synthesis of the primordial operations of nature is in all probability correct, explanation of the mode of working which pervades and governs the invisible and far-hidden combinations of elementary atoms in their obscure passage from being the most infinitesimal molecules of unity, to their becoming mouldable into the many forms of possible existence, becoming organizable or organized either in successive or distinct processes of combination. It is this principle of molecular morphology which makes chemistry the very centre of the physical sciences, and which makes its decisions on the grounds and elements of things important in all the regard to knowledge which we endeavour to acquire of the vast and various objects of which nature seems to us to consist. In this, the very centre of science, this author takes his position, and by introducing metaphysics, completes and complements the analytical discoveries of chemistry by a synthetical upbuilding of the elements which form its substratum, till they reach the state of analytical atoms, and by showing the coincidence of his synthesis with modern analysis, proves the probability of the accuracy of his endeavour to make the truths of science which

The Hebræwer

A Sketch of a Philosophy. Lon.

In this work, of which we have
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of exact conciseness of met-
poetic thought, which in-
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lowing point of view:—"As the Creator himself is only one in substance, so also will the creation be to which He awards existence." "Being or substance, and power or potentiality, differ from each other only in conception." "Creation, in obeying the law of assimilation, is expected to be either wholly a spirit-world from the first, or if otherwise to tend continually in that direction." When we attain unto a co-ordination of the synthetic with the analytic force in nature, our conception of a Cosmos is complete. The power-loom provided by the Creator for weaving the beautiful web of nature is complete." "The seeming conflicts in nature" are in reality only the phenomena of co-ordination.

"Since the Cosmos is finite, and the condition of its existence (the cosmic law of assimilation) calls upon it to imitate, even to the impossible undertaking of emulating, the infinite, a seeming conflict in many respects must be unavoidable. Thus the infinite is at once absolute unity and absolute immensity. Now of this the finite conception is that of two opposite extremes, neither of which can be reached,—one extreme all development and expansion, the other all contraction and concentration. Hence nature is all in motion in opposite directions, and often seems to conflict with herself. That this is a seeming only might, however, be inferred from the fact

an account of
word and the law
embracing law," which
to the effect that every
every successive moment
to itself; and secondly, to
the sphere of its agency;
its turn through their action
to them" (p. 10). But this single
divaricated into two sets of three
rise in the twofold fact that the
e hand to the infinite, and on the
ed "in terms which are applicable
e stated as follows:—1. From the
inite we obtain *the law of diffusion*,
and *the law of individuation*, or
1, as their harmonized product in
of *the perfect in form* (symmetry,

te objects each to itself and all
of *the permanence of the properties*
species on the one hand, and the
formation and *the law of generic*
their harmonized product we obtain
gy.

these laws is exhibited by the
with much ability. But the fol-
before we can reach the proper

that all these movements originate in one and the same idea, obey one and the same law (assimilation), and aim at one and the same end. Accordingly, forms one of the integral parts of the philosophy of the inimitable Leibniz, that they never frustrate or extinguish each other, and that the same amount of energy is always conserved in the Cosmos—a principle which is generally admitted, and of which one hears much as a discovery of a day.

The incompetence of that which is finite to assimilate itself to that at once absolute unity and absolute immensity is not the only source of seeming conflict in nature. The Author of all is also at once immutable and ever-living. And hence phenomena in the creation when assimilating itself to the Creator in this respect, which are in their seeming at least still more difficult to resolve. Hence the stability for ages of the crystal on the one hand, and the changefulness from hour to hour of the sentient creature on the other, and that not merely as matter of fact, but as the condition of its well-being: for normal changefulness accomplishing itself without effort in a sentient nature affects the sensibility of that creature as enjoyment."

Such is the close-grasping yet wide-prevailing might of this law over all the great phenomena investigated by physical science, and such its power of showing the striking and beautiful symmetry to which its observance leads. Under it the author proceeds to build up the molecular structures, which, taking their commencement from simple and symmetrical systems of equal and similar forces, yet rise up to and exhibit an agreement with the chemical atoms and molecules of nature, and of the laboratory in every comparable particular.

Its author describes his object in this work as being to ascertain and to show—

"That the synthesis into molecules according to our cosmical laws of our material elements gives stable structures, which in atomic weights, and in chemical and physical properties generally, represent those least particles into which bodies have been divided by chemists, that is, the particles which are commonly called the atoms of these bodies. Our theory, therefore, if accepted, places chemistry for the future on the same basis as crystallography, botany, zoology. It brings its phenomena out of the dark into the light."

And he proposes the following reasonable method of testing the accuracy of his theory and proving its trustworthiness:—

"If indeed no more than two or three of our molecular structures were found to represent the atoms of the chemist (which are between sixty and seventy in number), it might be fairly suspected that such a coincidence was due to chance. But if of these sixty or seventy there are only between thirty and forty which occur in Nature in any abundance, and play any important part in her economy, and if all of these in an orderly way present themselves spontaneously and unsought for among our successive constructions, if all of these are represented by these constructions, in their atomic weights and atomicities, in their every chemical and physical feature, the idea of chance surely as an explanation of these coincidences is wholly excluded."

The position taken up by the writer is that of an original specu-

latist's in scientific chemistry. He admits that the molecular theory advanced in this work "stands in direct opposition to that which is being built up in chemistry at the present moment with no small labour and ingenuity;" but he maintains that "the pleasing and instructive trains of thought in connection with Nature and her economy which it suggests, and the incidental verifications which present themselves on all hands, day after day, compel the belief that in some important features, if not in all, the theory here advanced represents the inner structure and working of material nature."

The work, as we have said, is very condensed and well-packed. It supplies a large quantity of thought on heat and tension, electromagnetism, and molecular action; and gives and provides a rapid sketch of a new chemistry in which the beautiful molecules are represented to the eye in diagrams, nicely executed in wood engraving, with indications of coincidence and harmony between what may be called, as we conceive it, the theoretical chemistry of the author and the experimental chemistry popular among the realists. We confess our deficiency in technical knowledge to test the purely physical portion of the treatise; but we recognise in the book the signs of a master in thought, whose speculative grasp is firm and close, as well as whose acquaintance with the progress and actual state alike of the physical and metaphysical sciences is wide and deep. We believe the book to be a decided addition to the intellectual treasury of British philosophy, and hope that the elder schools will not disdain to give a fair and impartial hearing to this new system. We do not profess to review the production in its scientific aspect, but as "a sketch of a philosophy." From the indications of ability shown in this portion we hope things of great value from the first part, which is in the press, and which is to treat of "Mind; its powers and capacities." Descartes, Leibnitz, and Humboldt were equally at home in physical science and metaphysical speculation—are we to find a successor to them?

Jerrold, Tennyson, and Macaulay; with other Critical Essays. By JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING, LL.D. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas.

THE author of "The Secret of Hegel" is known to our readers as a profound thinker and as a skilful critic in philosophy, as a facile and elegant translator, and as a metaphysical controversialist of pith and potency. It is with great pleasure that we notice the publication of a work which will make him widely known as a critic of no mean order in literature and history, and as a gentleman of catholic tastes, liberal views, wide culture, genial sympathies, and excellent ability in composition. The charm of the simple elegance of the paper on "Ebenezer Elliott, the Corn-Law Rhymer"—though its composition dates back to 1850—is such surely as to captivate the reader and to excite not only an interest in the subject, but an admiration of its author. Its fine pictures are well

chosen and nicely framed together, while they quite suffice to bring out the salient points in the biography of the apostle of corn-law repeal. The opening paper on "Douglas Jerrold" we read, before we knew anything regarding its authorship, with admiration of its freshness, vigour, honesty, and frank statements of opinions on men and things. We only take objection to the opening paragraph, in which it is affirmed that "'The Life of Douglas Jerrold,' by his son, is an excellent performance." Our own notion of it is, that a more namby-pamby thing could scarcely have been written about the smartest wit and the best dramatist in modern England than Blanchard Jerrold has given. Dr. Stirling's own contribution is very different, and if it had been but a little more detailed it would have constituted Jerrold's best memorial. It is full of the *man*, not of the *wit*; and it has the pleasing feature in our day of littleness that it is spoken from the core of the heart. "Alfred Tennyson" has found no critic yet whose loving appreciation is so reasonable and so fulfilled with precious insight as Dr. Stirling is. The very pulse-beat of the author's enthusiasm makes itself felt through his words, and written though they are, they palpitate with intense emotion. Nor is his voice one of praise only. He can blame as eagerly and earnestly, as when he speaks of some of the poems of the Laureate being "as barren as the wind," or showing "the cold emptiness of the negative," and remarks of them that it is "futile to rattle the loom if the shuttle be empty and the warp unbeamed."

"There is one characteristic in which, though it is common to all great writers, Tennyson is unusually eminent,—it is the faculty of conception, or of inner perception, inner vision. He never writes until he has fairly pictured all; and while he writes, his eye never for a moment quits the picture, but passes on from point to point with luminous fidelity and unerring accuracy. The anecdote of Arthur treading on a crowned skeleton, from which the crown rolls into light, and, turning on its rim, flees, &c., will illustrate our meaning. Equally good illustrations may be found in the fall of Geraint, his battles, the scene with Enid in the hall of Doorm, the tournament in Elaine, and the final interview of the king with the queen. In this minute picture-work Tennyson is always particularly vivid. It is no speciality of his, however, but belongs to all great writers. To tell the whole truth, it is the secret of literature in general. Look at it but deep enough, and even the commonest old tub, red-hooped awry, will suggest words to render it interesting. The main characteristics of Tennyson are yet to mention. They are ethical conception and classical execution; the latter being but the necessary concomitant and natural shadow of the former. The central sun of all Tennyson's writings is the heart: this is the reflection that lies in his deepest depths. 'In Memoriam' alone demonstrates Tennyson to possess the richest purest, truest natural heart, perhaps, of any poet on record; and with this natural heart is involved what we name the whole ethical side of him. We know no poet that has ever displayed an equal sense of moral goodness in its two forms of greatness in man and of purity in woman. To all forms of these he rises thrilling, dilating, brimming. He is the most Christian of poets. This is its leading attribute; and the classic execution is but its emanation, but his natural garment."

disappear. We have not, after all, seen what manner of men they were; these sharp and telling predicates gave us them in pieces only, and it is in vain we seek to find them coherent in a whole. How different Carlyle! One word, and we have Robespierre, or Mirabeau, or Danton, or Calonne, or Vergniaud, and we never lose them. They are men and realities to us for ever, and not mere bundles of qualities artfully stuffed out by brilliant predication. This is the difference of art. Carlyle seeks to seize his man in the very centre of his nature, in that one quality that harmonizes all the varieties and diversities of his actions. Macaulay, by collecting all these varieties and diversities *ab extra*, seeks to put together a figure which, unprovided with this central and uniting knot, falls all abroad in pieces again. . . . In this way, indeed, a figure (but in perpetual danger of instant dissolution) may be pieced together, but never an actual human character realized to thought. Such human characters instantly found in what it says *itself*, is seldom or never found in what is said *of* it. And this is the secret of Carlyle's art: he searches for the one look, the one gesture, the one act, the one word that gives ingress to the inner whole, and never troubles himself to gather from without the scattered beams of manifestation, knowing well that no sheaf, however large, collected in that way will ever enable him to restore the original luminary. . . .

"In regard to any character, sense, action, or event, Carlyle strives, nay, we may say convulses himself (so earnest he is) to attain to *the* picture, while Macaulay, for his part, is content in such circumstances to attain to *a* picture. This difference between these two writers is conclusively distinct. Macaulay, again, is certainly always diligent; he reads and excerpts indefatigably; but he does not, like Carlyle, spend days and nights in thought as to what is to be believed, as to how the matter really stood. . . . Another difference between these writers is that Carlyle possesses dramatic art in very great perfection, while in this respect Macaulay is largely deficient. The latter is undoubtedly entitled to the praise ascribed by Carlyle to Hume of 'epic clearness;' but it is Carlyle himself who can alone lay claim to the greater praise of dramatic intensity. The fall of Lom  ine de Brienne, and that of Robespierre, are really very complete dramas. But the most important contrast between Carlyle and Macaulay lies in their immensely different intellectual point of view; Macaulay ignores the metaphysical and spiritual, and seeks to surround himself by a well-understood and well-arranged temporal. He stands as strongly by the philosophy of the conditioned as Sir William Hamilton himself: it is as clear to him as to this philosopher that the unconditioned extremes are mutually contradictory, and he will not waste his time on them. The supernatural element is a problem quite beyond us; and he, for his part, will content himself with this truth, that the really best life for this world is the best life for the next world also. How different Carlyle! The void in that wild longing heart, no *conditioned*, no mere temporality, how wide and splendid soever, could for a moment fill. No; his eyes are Godwards, and his soul athirst for the ampler ether of the other side.

"In subtlety, depth, fertility, in spontaneity of thought, he is infinitely behind his own great prototype, Hume. To the solidity, the comprehensiveness, the completeness, the immensity of range of Gibbon he can have no pretension. To the earnestness, the intensity, the *vision* of Carlyle he is equally a stranger. With men like these he is simply incommensurable. His place is not among the kings; he holds no throne; he sits not by the

sides of Thucydides and Tacitus. In the annals of the world we know but one mate for him—a mate that he would disdain, perhaps, but a mate that if here inferior is there superior; this mate is Sallust."

In the essay on "De Quincey and Coleridge upon Kant," which recently appeared in the *Fortnightly Review*, Dr. Stirling appears as somewhat of an iconoclast. These two writers have generally been held to have been grand interpreting media in regard to German speculation. Dr. Stirling says that they were outsiders, that they had never entered the *penetrabilia* of the philosophy of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel; that they misrepresent them and their theories, and that they professed a thoroughness of acquaintance with the works of the great thinkers of Germany, which they did not possess. The proof advanced is strong and cogent; but the tone is almost as triumphant as Ferrier's paper in *Blackwood*, and it is grating to the feelings of those who have been led to think of these men as great and shining ones to find themselves befooled. Coleridge has many relatives and many disciples who will probably defend his fame so far as it is defensible, and probably Dr. Ingleby, who is the most thorough De Quinceyan we believe in Britain, will perhaps give this essay future attention. We have already indicated our high admiration of the form and style of the essay on Ebenezer Elliott; and we only wish that one or two other essays we know of had been herein given to the public; for Dr. Stirling is a thinker, and our age requires thoughtful writers.

THE BRITISH LITERARY UNION.

THE British Literary Union has been planned and brought into operation with considerable ability, energy, and adaptedness to the wants of many eager aspirants after self-culture and literary companionship. It took its earlier shape in 1867, but it has gradually widened its scope and extended its aims so that now the project covers a very extensive portion of the field of effort. It has for its object the systematizing of the many schemes for literary improvement and intellectual excitement which exist and operate fitfully and disjunctly, and the bringing of the co-operative activities of young men into more united explicitness of endeavour. It recognises the goodness of many of the means of stimulation and thoughtful mutual help, but it regards the isolation of their working and the precariousness of their success as great hindrances to their usefulness and drawbacks to their excellence. Its promoters believe that by judicious co-advisings, helpfulness, and associative agencies of different kinds, suited to the most general wants of the earnest and sanguine spirits who usually take the lead among their compeers in the establishment and working out of schemes for the improvement of their own minds and those of others, not only greater intensity can be imparted to the enthusiasm of self-culture, but a more thorough completeness can be given to the methods employed and plans adopted; while the facilities brought together by their project for attaining the best intellectual comradeship and co-operation will much reduce the likelihood of failure, either through loss of spirits or difficulty of gaining advice. Many young men are now compelled in early life to leave their

native place and gain their livelihood elsewhere. How often does such a youth, though anxious to discipline his "young novitiate thought," feel himself wandering in the place of his adoption—

"'Mid countless brethren with a lonely heart!"

But with this union before him he can always have advice, help, encouragement, and employment, often personal friendship, and, at all events, a haven of hope and trust.

That our readers may be properly informed of the nature of the scheme which has been propounded, and has advanced a certain way towards corporate existence, we subjoin the following epitome of the *Rules* of "The British Literary Union:"—1. That the name of this society be "The British Literary Union." 2. That the objects of this union be the mental improvement and literary culture of its members by mutual help, and the general promotion of literary tastes. 3. That the means for the attainment of these objects be—(1) By supplying a medium for the writing of essays, &c., &c., and mutual criticism of the same; and for holding debates, &c., on literary, philosophical, and other subjects; (2) By the encouragement of literary correspondence among its members; (3) By the organization of a book-lending association; (4) By promoting a closer union between the various manuscript magazines in circulation; (5) By the establishment of local branches wherever practicable. 4. That, for convenience and facility in conducting the operations of the union, they be divided into a fixed number of departments, answering to the principal branches of literature, science, and art. 5. That on any person, desirous of joining the union, communicating with the general secretary, or one of the members, the name of such applicant for membership be proposed, in writing, by the receiver of the application. That the general secretary submit each proposal to the committee, and, on the nomination being seconded and carried, such applicant be elected a member on payment of the subscription; and that each member, immediately on election, forward his or her full name and address to the general secretary, and signify which departments he or she will join. 6. That the subscription be four shillings per annum, payable in advance. 7. That the officers of the union be as follows:—(1) President and two vice-presidents. The president will not be elected till the close of the present year, so that all members may have an opportunity of voting on that matter. The vice-presidents are—Samuel Neil, Esq., author of "Art of Reasoning;" "Elements of Rhetoric;" "Art of Public Speaking;" "Young Debater;" "Composition and Elocution;" "Culture and Self-Culture;" "Shakspeare: a Critical Biography;" "Epoch Men," &c., &c.; Alfred Elwes, Esq., late President of the British Literary Society, and author of "Ocean and her Rulers;" "Paul Blake;" "Frank and Andrea;" "Ralph Seabrooke;" "Giulio Branchi;" "Legend of the Mount," &c.; translator of "Jaufry the Knight," &c., &c.; (2) General secretary and twelve departmental secretaries. The above to be elected triennially, and to be eligible for re-election. (3) Six members, to be elected annually, who, with the above officers, shall form a committee, in whose hands shall rest the government and conduct of the union. Vacancies to be filled up as early as possible. 8. That the committee have absolute power to make and repeal regulations and bye-laws; but that none of the foregoing rules be altered or rescinded, nor any new rule made, except by the written decision of the committee, and the consent of a majority of the members; and that the union do not cease to exist except by the written consent of all the officers, and nine-tenths of the members.

The *Regulations* of the union are very exhaustive, and include several sections. Of these it will be sufficient to quote in full those relating to section I. *Departments*.—1. That the operations of the union be divided into twelve departments, answering to the following names and subjects :—(1) Religion and Theology; (2) Politics and Political Economy; (3) Social Economy; (4) English Language and Literature; (5) Classics and Modern Languages; (6) History, Biography, and Antiquities; (7) Poetry and Fiction; (8) Moral and Mental Philosophy; (9) Geography, Topography, and Travel; (10) Natural History; (11) Natural Philosophy; (12) Art. 2. That each of these departments be conducted by a secretary, who shall make a quarterly report of progress to the general secretary. 3. That in each of these departments be circulated a record, which shall consist of ruled paper to be employed after the manner of a manuscript magazine, and through the medium of which the department's transactions shall mainly be carried on. 4. That the members in each department be divided into three classes—permanent, annual, and temporary. 5. That permanent and annual members only be allowed to vote in the transaction of departmental business, and that in the permanent members alone be vested the election of secretary. 6. That applications from members to change departments, or to join others, be made to the departmental secretaries.

“The arrangement of these departments has been a subject of much reflection and consideration, and it is believed that the present classification is as fair and convenient a division as could well have been made. The object of the promoters has been to sink the usual three divisions of human knowledge in the word “literary.” It is in no inconsiderable degree by the dissemination of literature (taking the word in its more restricted sense) that science and art have attained their present positions; and while assisting its kindred civilizers, literature has benefited herself. It will be seen, then, that literature, in reality, is one of the means whereby the knowledge of the members of our union, in all departments of learning, will be increased. A member of the union is at liberty to join any or all of the departments—an arrangement by which it is hoped to avoid the unpleasantness of members being bored with subjects which are distasteful to them. Each of these departments will be conducted by a secretary. Their transactions will, in the main, be carried on by the aid of an ever-circulating manuscript Record, several parts of which will always be in the hands of the members. It is anticipated in the conducting of these to sustain the reputation for usefulness which has always been possessed by manuscript magazines, and, at the same time, to redeem their character for uncertainty and irregularity in circulation. The plan of managing them will be as follows :—The departmental secretary will issue at regular intervals a number of the Record, which will consist of blank paper, stitched in magazine form, with the necessary cover. This will be forwarded, by post or otherwise, to the first member on the circulating list, who will forward it to the member next in order. We are aware that this method is open to the objection that unnecessary postage is sometimes incurred in the transmission of blank paper. But practically, however, it is found to be the best plan. The regular appearance of the Record sometimes acts as a reminder to the member who receives it, that he is expected to fill up some of the space with a contribution. It is useless here to discuss the merits or demerits of other plans of circulation; this we may do at a future time. We will only add that the matter has had every consideration, and any suggestion for an improvement will receive due attention. After circulation, the

numbers of each Record will be bound in volumes and retained by the departmental secretary for reference; any member of the department being entitled to the perusal of them. There will be introduced into these records — essays, papers, tales, manuscript debates, conversations, and several novelties of interest and utility, according to and dependent upon the nature of the study of each department.

The more important of those in Section II., which concerns itself with the regulation of the correspondence of members, are—That the discussion and debate of all subjects of interest and importance by correspondence be encouraged among the members; that notice of the discussion and debate of important subjects between two or more members by correspondence be given to the general secretary, who shall announce the same in the journal; and that, on the discussion being finished, any member may obtain the loan of the same, or of a copy of the same, on application to the members between whom the said correspondence has taken place.

Section III. institutes a book-lending association, and provides, *inter alia*, that the Book-lending Association be conducted by the general secretary: that those members who desire to obtain the advantages of membership of the association, place at its disposal for loan one or more books; the title, author, publisher, edition, and date of which, together with the price of postage or carriage, the lender shall communicate to the general secretary; that members who have complied with these requirements, desirous of availing themselves of the advantages of the association, apply direct to the owner of any book or work they wish to borrow, enclosing the amount of postage or carriage; and that the borrower, in all cases, defray the expense of carriage or postage, both from and to the lender; that extreme care be exercised in the keeping of the volumes, and in covering them for postage or railway transit; that in case of any damage or loss sustained by a work during its loan or transit, the borrower replace the original, or otherwise compensate the owner for the loss or damage occasioned. That, in case of any dispute arising as to the amount of such damage to be refunded to the owner, the general secretary have authority to arbitrate in the matter, and that his decision shall be final.

Sections IV., V., and VI. concern themselves with details regarding the magazine department, the quarterly journal of the literary union, the management of the general business, and publishing. Any person desirous of gaining farther information may procure a copy of the Rules and Regulations by enclosing two stamps to Edward Payne, General Secretary of the British Literary Union, Huddersfield; from whom also may be had "The Preliminary Number of the Quarterly Journal of the British Literary Union" (which includes the Rules and Regulations), for five stamps.

Gentlemen desirous of taking part in this scheme of united effort, such as, with regard to its members,—

"By sacred sympathy may make
The whole *one self*—self that no alien knows,"—

especially such as are connected with manuscript magazines, essay classes, &c., are requested to make themselves acquainted with the general plan. It is desired to form a few local associations, and hence many are required to join their social sympathies in furtherance of their intellectual interests, and in promotion of the greatest and grandest of human efforts—self-culture, in its twofold parts of information and reformation.

Our Collegiate Course.

MILTON'S MINOR POEMS.

L'ALLEGRO.

49
50

WHILE the cock, with *lively din*,
Scatters the *rear* of darkness *thin*;
And to the *stack*, or the barn door,
Stoutly struts his dames *before*;

Helps to paraphrasing.

Line 49. Vigorous crow.

50. Disperses; remnant; worn
to a shadow.

51. Thatched piles of hay, corn,
peas, &c., in sheaf.

52. Proudly stalks; taking the lead
of.

[The two following notes, inadvertently omitted in our last, refer to lines 29 and 48 respectively of the extract contained in pp. 303—306.]

(15) **HEBE**, the goddess of youth, and cup-bearer to the gods. She was, according to Homer, daughter of Jupiter and Juno. Hesiod also assigns her this parentage, and all probability is in favour of it. She incurred the displeasure of Jupiter by some act of impropriety, of which she was guilty in the presence of the gods, among whom "the radiant Hebe poured the bright nectar out," and was supplanted in her office by Ganymede. Juno, however, retained her in her service, and assigned to her the occupation of preparing her chariot and of harnessing her peacocks. Hercules, upon being deified, made her his wife, and thus gained the favour of Juno. Hebe was mother of two sons, Alexiraes and Anicetus; and at the solicitation of Hercules she restored his nephew, Iolaus, to the bloom and vigour of youth. She is called "honoured" and "fair-ankled." She is generally represented crowned with flowers, with a variegated garment, and with a golden cup in her hand. She was worshipped at Sicyon under the name of **DIA**, and at Rome under that of **JUVENTAS**. According to Pausanias, she was also called **GANYMEDE**.

(16) Skinner and Junius both say that eglantine means the wild rose (*Rosa sylvestris*). It is often said that the eglantine proper is the sweet-briar (*Rosa rubiginosa*), which grows in dry bushy places, and flowers in June and July. In English poetry, however, it may be in general regarded as a common name for any of the smaller flowered species of roses. "'Sweet-briar and eglantine,' says Warton, 'are the same plant: by the "twisted eglantine," Milton therefore means the honeysuckle: all three are plants often growing against the side or walls of a house.' This is true; yet the deduction is hardly certain. The same name sometimes means different flowers in different counties, as may be seen from passages in Shakspeare. *Eglantine*, however, is the French word for the flower of the sweet-briar (*eglantier*); and hence it came to mean, in English, the briar

Or *listening* how the *hounds* and *horn*
Cheerly rouse the *slumbering* morn,
 From the *side* of some *hoar* hill 55
 Through the *high* wood *echoing* shrill:
 Some time *walking*, not *unseen*,
 By *hedgerow* elms, on *hillocks* green,
Right against the eastern gate
 Where the great sun *begins* his *state*, 60
Robed in *flames* and *amber* light,
 The clouds in thousand *liveries* *dight*;
 While the ploughman, *near* at *hand*,
Whistles o'er the *furrowed* land,
 And the *milkmaid* singeth *blithe*, 65
 And the *mower* *whets* his *sithe*,
 And every shepherd *tells* his *tale* (17)
 Under the hawthorn (18) in the *dale*.
Straight mine eye hath *caught* *new* *pleasures*
 Whilst the *landscape* round it *measures*; 70

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| 53. Giving enjoying ear in what
manner; hunting-pack; bugle.
54. Merrily awaken; drowsy.
55. Slope; grey ridge.
56. Lofly forest repeating their ear-
piercing sounds.
57. Strolling about; unnoticed.
58. Fencing; verdant mounds.
59. Opposite.
60. Commences; course.
61. Arrayed; brilliancy; yellow.
62. Servile suits as servants in the
sun's retinue, clad. | 63. Not far off.
64. Gleelessly causes his voice to re-
sound; upturned glebe.
65. Dairy girl; mirthfully.
66. Hay-cutting sharpens; reaping-
hook.
67. Counts; proportion of sheep
under his care.
68. Narrow valley.
69. In another instant; received
fresh delights.
70. Neighbouring scene; scans. |
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itself. Poets are often fonder of flowers than learned in their names; and Milton, like his illustrious brethren, Chaucer and Spenser, was born within the sound of Bow bells."—*Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy,"* p. 253.

(17) Mr. Headley informed Warton that this was a technical word for reckoning or counting up sheep, to see that they were all right. This process took place at dawn of day. This interpretation is now generally received, and is supported by many instances, of which it will be enough to quote here *Exod.* v. 8, 18, "Yet shall ye deliver the *tale* of brick," i. e., the number prescribed as the daily task. *1 Sam.* xviii. 27, "In full *tale*," reckoned number. *1 Chron.* ix. 28, "In and out by *tale*," i. e., correct, according to inventory.

(18) A shrub (*Crataegus oxyacantha*) much planted for ornament and for hedgerows. It bears a small red fruit, which forms winter food for birds. It flowers in May or June. From the time of its flowering it is sometimes in England called the *May-thorn*. To distinguish it from the sloe, or blackthorn, it is often called *whitethorn*.

*Russet lawns, and fallows gray,
Where the nibbling flocks do stray;
Mountains on whose barren breast
The labouring clouds do often rest.*
Meadows trim with daisies (19) pied,
Shallow brooks, and rivers wide:
Towers and battlements it sees
Bosomed high in tufted trees, (20)*

75

71. Reddish brown, i. e., fresh-ploughed; lands untilled or unseeded, of a dun colour — meadows.

72. Grass-cropping; wander.

73. Eminences; sterile peaks.

74. Slow-moving; frequently settle for a time.

75. Fields properly cultured; inset.

76. Streamlets; broad.

77. Turrets or fortress-peaks and bastioned bulwarks; observes.

78. Embowered; branching.

* This is said by Thomas Keightley to be "a kind of guess at nature;" and it is "a feature," as David Masson remarks, "for which the scenery of Horton furnishes no original." But it must be remembered, as Wordsworth—assuredly a close and accurate observer of nature—says, that "after a certain point of elevation, the effect of mountains depends much more upon their form than upon their absolute height. This point is the one to which fleecy clouds (not watery vapours) are accustomed to descend," and then it is possible that they may show—

"Far off,

A surface dappled o'er with shadows flung
From brooding clouds."

(19) The common daisy (*Bellis perennis*) is plentiful almost all the year in pastures, meadows, and grassy places. It is said that it gets the name day's-eye, or the eye of day, because it opens with the sunrise and closes at nightfall. The etymology is seen in Chaucer's line—

"White is his beard as is the daye's eye" (daisy).

See *Love's Labour Lost* (closing scene), Armado's song of "The Cuckoo and the Owl,"—

"When daisies pied, and violets blue," &c.

(20) "That enjoying and truly poetical commentator, Thomas Warton, quotes a passage from Browne's 'Britannia's Pastorals,' that may have been in Milton's recollection:—

'Yond palace, whose pale turret tops,
Over the stately wood, survey the copse;'

and then he indulges in pleasing memories of the old style of building, and in regrets for the new, which was less picturesque and less given to concealment. 'This was the great mansion-house,' says he, 'in Milton's early days. With respect to their rural residences there was a coyness in our Gothic ancestors. Modern seats are seldom so deeply ambushed.'—*Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy,"* p. 254. Professor Masson says these two lines almost evidently refer to Windsor Castle, and he remarks that "a characteristic morning sound to this day, at Horton, we are told, is that of the 'hounds and horn,' when the royal huntmen are out."—"Milton's Life," vol. i., p. 541.

Where perhaps some *beauty lies*,
 The *cynosure* (21) of *neighbouring eyes*. 80
Hard by, a cottage chimney *smokes*
 From betwixt two *aged oaks*,
 Where Corydon (22) and Thyrsis, (23) *met*,
 Are at their *savoury dinner set*
 Of *herbs*, and other *country messes*, 85
 Which the *neat-handed Phyllis* (24) *dresses*;
 And then *in haste* her bower she *leaves*,
 With Thestylis (25) to *bind the sheaves*;
 Or, if the *earlier season lead*,
 To the *tanned haycock* in the *mead*. 90

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| 79. Lovely damsel reposes. | 85. Vegetable produce; rustic dainties. |
| 80. Special attraction; friendly. | 86. Careful and exact; prepares. |
| 81. In the vicinity; emits the visible vapour arising from fire. | 87. Quickly; quits. |
| 82. Olden. | 88. Fasten together; cut wheat, corn, rye, barley, hay, &c. |
| 83. Having come together in friendship. | 89. More forward temperature of the year give cause. |
| 84. Pleasant mid-day meal placed. | 90. Dried fodder-pile; field. |

(21) "*Cynosure* (dog's-tail), for *load-star*, must have been a term a little hazardous as well as over-learned when it first appeared; though Milton, thinking of the nymph who was changed into the star so called (since known as *Ursa Minor*), was probably of opinion that it gave his image a peculiar fitness and beauty."—*Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy,"* p. 255. The story referred to is that of Callisto, an Idæan nymph, daughter of Lycaon, who had dedicated herself to the service of Diana, and vowed the preservation of a perpetual virginity in honour of that deity. Jupiter saw and loved her, changed himself into the likeness of Diana, and set off to the woods with the maiden, to engage in the chase;—and overmastered her vow. Her divine mistress, enraged at her breach of faith, transformed her into a bear. She brought forth her son Arcas in the woods, and Jupiter, in memory of their love, placed her and her son as a constellation (the Great and the Little Bear) in the sky. The story is told variously. The word Beauty in the text probably recalled the epithet of *καλλιστη* (most beautiful), and that the legend of Callisto, and hence the metaphor, which is founded on the fact that the pole-star is the principal one in the constellation of *Ursa Minor*, and that all the other constellations seem to look towards and to circle round that constellation which contains Cynosure.

(22) A shepherd name, culled from the old idyllic writers, as "*Formosum pastor Corydon ardebat Alexis*," &c. "*Corydon, the shepherd, loved the fair Alexis.*"—*Virgil's Eclogues, II.*

(23) Another pastoral name, probably suggested by "*The tuneful Thyrsis*" of the first Idyl of Theocritus.

(24) Phyllis is a name for a waiting-woman or serving-wench, probably suggested by Horace, Odes, II., 4, and IV., 11.

(25) Thestylis seems taken from the second Idyl of Theocritus.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

771. Dr. Reid, in his "Inquiry," speaks of the discoveries of a great mathematical genius rescued from oblivion by Dr. Smith. Who was this "mathematical genius"?—SAMUEL.

772. Is Arnold, author of "The Public Life of Lord Macaulay," related to the Rugbeian historian of Rome?—SAMUEL.

773. Are there any debating societies in the north of London? If so, where are they, what is done at them, and how are members admitted?—A. X.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

738. The Public School Latin Grammar was the cause of a lengthy and angry controversy, which was waged in the newspapers and magazines for 1866-7, and that fact would seem to show that it was not thought invulnerable to attack. It is a good grammar; but it appears to want simplicity, sameness of classification, and good sense in the choice of the lexicon adopted. It has at once too much of the new and too little; it is a compromise, not a settlement.—S. N.

739. "Penny Readings in Prose and Verse," by J. E. Carpenter, have been specially prepared for this purpose, and have been largely employed. They have already been extended to six ls. volumes, and a large type edition has been commenced. Messrs. Moxon publish a series of extracts from their copyright works suitable for Penny Readings; and Messrs. Cassell, Petter, and Galpin have in course of issue under the editorship of

Thomas Hood, an illustrated course of penny readings. Many of the "Miscellany of Tracts," issued by the Messrs. Chambers, would make admirable readings, as would most of the recently republished "Tales from Blackwood," "Tales from Bentley," and the editions of readings from his works issued by Charles Dickens. Our own opinion, however, is that, to make Penny Readings properly attractive, they ought not to consist of old, stale, oft-repeated pieces, but should be the freshest and best that can be got. Hence I would recommend those who design to use these readings advantageously, to keep their eyes open to all the suitable contributions which appear from time to time in the magazines and reviews, as well as in the columns of some of the better newspapers, and to read these, suffused as they generally are with the influences of the living present. Such papers ought to be frequently read in private, to be effectively read in public. Everybody cannot *read* any more than *speak* extemporarily.—R. M. A.

743. Many. There are, for instance, Dr. Wm. Smith's excellent Dictionaries of Classical Biography, Mythology, &c. Thomas Keightley is the author of a very good book on this topic, entitled "The Mythology of Ancient Greece and Italy." The first volume of Grote's "History of Greece" is to a large extent a treatise on mythology. Carr's Classical Lexicon has been remodelled, Tooke's "Pantheon" revised, and Lemprière brought into harmony with advanced scholarship. The German manuals of mythology

are, however, far more thorough and philosophical than ours,—the works of F. G. Welcker, E. Gerhard, L. Preller, J. A. Hartung, K. O. Müller, of which last there is, we think, an English translation by Leitch. While on this subject we may note an excellent article, entitled "The Myth," in Chambers's "Papers for the People;" a paper in the Oxford Essays (1856), by F. M. Müller, on "Comparative Mythology," which is republished, with a companion paper on "Greek Mythology," in the second volume of his "Chips from a German Workshop."—R. M. A.

744. By far the best works on physical geography, as a whole, in the English language for settled study, we would name two volumes entitled, "A Manual of Geographical Science, Mathematical, Physical, Historical, and Descriptive," whose authors are the Rev. M. O'Brien, M.A., F.R.S.; D. T. Anstie, M.A., F.R.S.; J. R. Jackson, F.R.S.; Rev. C. G. Nicolay, F.R.G.S.; Rev. W. L. Bevan, M.A., &c. They were published by Parker and Son, 10s. 6d. each; but we believe they have since been reissued by another publisher at 7s. 6d. Next we would place Mrs. Somerville's "Physical Geography;" Sir J. F. W. Herschel's work republished from the "Encyclopædia Britannica." Guyot's "Earth and Man" is a cheap and ready popular treatise; Wittich's "Curiosities of Physical Geography" is full, well-written, and attractive; David Page's "Introductory Text-book of Physical Geography" is excellently adapted for self-study, and is exceedingly cheap—2s. The papers on this subject in Chambers's "Information for the People" are concise, and yet are "without o'erflowing full." The worth of Humboldt's "Cosmos" (Bell and Daldy) is well known to all readers.—R. M. A.

745. No; there are several hand-books of prayer issued, to a certain

extent, by authority; but they are not allowed to be read in the pulpit, though they may be repeated therein. The recently deceased Dr. Lee used a liturgy in his church in Edinburgh; but a great controversy and agitation was raised in the General Assembly, which threatened—perhaps produced—serious consequences. Dr. Lee has been called from the controversy elsewhere.—S. O. M.

746. Perhaps to the list furnished by "Faust," there ought to be added Carlyle's address "On the Choice of Books," Professor Sedgwick's "Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge," with J. S. Mill's critique on the same in his "Dissertations," vol. ii. A number of excellent papers were published by the Central Society of Education (1838-40), including, I think, three prize essays. "The Introductory Lectures delivered in University College, London" (1828-1860), are very valuable. A series of "Lectures on Education," delivered at the instance of the Society of Arts, in St. Martin's Hall, London, in 1852, issued cheaply by Routledge, deserves perusal. C. Bray's "Education of the Feelings and Affections," Moore's "Man and his Motives," George Combe's works, Stewart's "Philosophy of the Mind," and other books of a similar kind, would all be useful as aids to S. W. G.—R. M. A.

747. J. H. Pestalozzi, born at Zurich, 1745, died at Brugg, 1827, a mortified and heart-broken striver after better things. He wished to combine industrial, moral, and intellectual training; to have everything taught from real objects, and to excite the mind without satiating it. Almost all the normal schools and institutions for primary instruction more or less adopt his system of passing from the concrete to the abstract, and making "object lessons" occupy a large space in early training. J. J. Jacotot (1770—

1840), professor of literature at Louvain, made himself known in 1818 by his new system, which proceeded on the principles—that “all minds are equal;” “everything is in everything;” “he who wishes can,” &c. It consisted more in stimulating to self-effort than in direct teaching. The professor’s aim was to direct endeavour, not to make it needless. A difficulty overcome was worth a thousand lessons taught not done.—S. N.

751. If, as we suppose, “Faust” refers to Kant’s “Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,” there is an excellent translation, under the title of “The Metaphysics of Ethics,” by Semple, published at Edinburgh, 1898. Kant’s “Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre” forms the second part of the above work. We have not read Semple’s version, but characterise it on the faith of some of the first metaphysicians of the day as clear, readable, and accurate.—S. N.

754. A very good book, entitled “Studies in Parliament,” a series of sketches of leading politicians, by R. H. Hutton, has been issued as a reprint from the *Pall Mall Gazette*. It contains seventeen sketches—viz., Lord Russell, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Cardwell, Mr. Disraeli, Lord Derby, Lord Stanley, Lord Cranbourne, Lord Granville, Earl Grey, Lord Westbury, Lord Brougham, Mr. Stansfeld, Mr. Goschen, Mr. W. E. Foster, Mr. Bright, Mr. Cobden, Lord Palmerston. In the *London Review* there has appeared a series of sketches, under the title of “Men of Mark,” in which a number of the most prominent politicians are biographical and characterized, a list of which I have no doubt that the proprietors would furnish on application. Of course, in Walford’s “Men of the Time,” published by Routledge, notices of the facts of the lives of most of the prominent statesmen of the age are to be found;

but it is not to be expected that, from such a book, any idea of their merits and demerits can be formed.—S. O. M.

755. Wm. E. Channing, D.D., son of the distinguished lawyer, Wm. Channing, and grandson of Wm. Ellery, one of the signers of the American Declaration of Independence, was born at Newport, 1780. He was the brother of Walter E. Channing, physician, and of Edward Tyrrel Channing, professor of rhetoric and oratory. Wm. E. Channing entered Harvard University at the age of 14, and graduated with distinction in 1798. After leaving college he became private tutor to a family in Virginia, and in June, 1803, became pastor of a church in Federal Street, Boston. In 1819 he preached a sermon on the Unitarian belief, at the ordination of the Rev. Jared Sparks, in Baltimore, which fired a controversy on the question of Trinitarianism. In 1821 his university, in appreciation of his “Sermons” and his “Address on War,” made him D.D. Thereafter he visited England, and became acquainted with several English writers of repute—e.g., Wordsworth and Coleridge, the latter of whom said he had at once the love of wisdom and the wisdom of love. In 1823 he published an “Essay on National Literature,” and in 1826, his “Remarks on the Character of John Milton,” instigated by Macaulay’s essay. The “Remarks” were made the subject of a severe critique by Macaulay in *Edinburgh Review* (vol. lxi., p. 214). His works consist mostly of discourses, essays, lectures, and reviews; the most remarkable of which are those on “Self-Culture,” “Bonaparte,” “Fénélon,” “The Elevation of the Labouring Classes,” “The Present Age,” “The Slavery Question,” “The Evidences of Christianity,” “On Creeds,” &c. The latest of his public addresses was delivered at Lenox, Massachusetts,

1st of August, 1842, in commemoration of the negro emancipation in the British West Indies. He died October 2nd, 1842, at Bennington, Vermont, and a memoir of him, with extracts from his correspondence, MSS., &c., was issued in 1848, by his nephew, Wm. H. Channing, editor of Jouffroy's "Ethics," &c. See Duyckinck's "Cyclopædia of American Literature," Alibone's "Dictionary of English and American Authors," Dr. Griswold's "Prose Writers of America." Instead of giving any opinion of our own, for which we could not for want of space give reasons, we prefer laying before "James F." and our readers the following extracts from well-weighed criticisms:—

"Channing is unquestionably the first writer of the age. From his writings may be extracted some of the richest poetry and richest conceptions, clothed in language, unfortunately for our literature, too little studied in the day in which we live."—*Fraser's Magazine*.

"The thoughts that breathe and the words that burn abound in his writings more than in those of any modern author with whom we are acquainted. He seems to move and live in a pure and elevated atmosphere of his own, from which he surveys the various interests of society, and pronounces on them a just and discriminating judgment."—*India Gazette*.

"He looks through the external forms of things in search of the secret and mysterious principles of thought, action, and being. He takes little notice of the varieties of manner and character that form the favourite topics of the novelist and poet. Mind in the abstract, its nature, properties, and destiny, are his constant theme. He looks at material objects chiefly as the visible expressions of the existence, character, and will of the sublime

Unseen Intelligence, whose power created and whose presence informs and sustains the universe."—A. H. EVERETT, *North American Review*, Oct., 1835.,—366.

"From the appearance of his discourse on 'The Evidences of Christianity'—a luminous exposition—till the lamented death of this eminent man, the public expectation, which had been raised so high by the character of his earliest performances, was continually excited and fulfilled by the appearance of some new and earnest expression of his thoughts on themes which come immediately home to men's business and bosoms,—religion, government, and literature in their widest sense and application."—*Retrospect of the Religious Life of England*," by John James Tayler, B.A.

757. Lindley Murray was born in 1745, at Swetara, near Lancaster, in Pennsylvania, U.S. He was educated at first in the academy of the Society of Friends, to which sect his parents were adherents, and thereafter at New York, to which city his father, an enterprising merchant, had removed. He was early entered at the counting-house; but he afterwards studied law, having for his fellow-student John Jay, afterwards Governor of the State of New York. He was called to the bar, married, succeeded as a lawyer, and then took to business, in which he made a fortune during the American war. He had just bought a handsome estate on the banks of the Hudson, when he was attacked by a debilitating illness, and was compelled to seek a dwelling where the summers were less relaxing. He came to England, bought a house and garden at Holdgate, a little way out of the city of York, where he spent the remainder of his days. In 1787 he published "The Power of Religion on the Mind;" in 1795 his "English Grammar," of which he issued an abridgment in 1797.

"Exercises" and a "Key" also were added to the outfit of a schoolmaster. The grammar does not deserve its reputation. Its definitions and rules are obscure, and often inaccurate; they are quite empirical, and do not rest on any due basis, historical or philosophical. He spent the proceeds in charity. He died in 1826, aged 81. An autobiographic memoir of him has been published, with a continuation by Elizabeth Frank, 1826. He had no children, and his wife survived him.—S. N.

761. I am happy to inform a "Student" that new and cheaper editions of the works of the Rev. F. W. Robertson, M.A., incumbent of Trinity Chapel, Brighton, 1847—1853, are in course of issue. His sermons appear in four series, in vols. at 5s. each. His "Expository Lectures on Corinthians" are to cost 6s.; his "Lectures and Addresses on Literary and Social Topics," 3s. 6d.; his translation of Gotthold E. Lessing's "Education of the Human Race," 3s. 6d., and his Analysis of Tennyson's "In Memoriam," 2s. His "Life and Letters," edited by Rev. Mr. Stopford, A. Brooke, M.A., honorary chaplain to the Queen (with portrait in one vol.), are also to be had at 12s. The publishers of these works are Smith, Elder, and Co., Cornhill.—R. M. A.

763. F. G. asks a difficult ques-

tion. In English, the question is most fully treated of by De Quincey, who made it a speciality. See preface to his works, vol. i., pp. xii—xiv; article "Secret Societies," vol. vi., pp. 268—310; and paper on "The Essenes," vol. ix., pp. 253—300 (Black's edition). In Taylor's edition of Calmet's "Dictionary of the Bible," Josephus's "Antiquities" and "Jewish War," Jennings's "Jewish Antiquities," Prideaux's "Connection of the History of the Old and New Testaments," Pliny's Natural History, Philo's "Contemplative Life," Strauss's "Life of Jesus," Rénan's "Life of Jesus," Neander's "Life of Christ," Reinhard's "Plan of the Founder of Christianity," there are to be found notices, allusions, references, &c., to *Essenism*, all of which are of interest. But probably F. G. will find as much as will satisfy his curiosity in Chambers's "Encyclopædia," under the word, where the most modern opinions appear to be given, and farther authorities are quoted.—S. O. M.

769. The attention of "Effort" might be called to "The Greek and English Lexicon to the New Testament," by E. Robinson, D.D., author of "Biblical Researches," which was edited by the Rev. Dr. Bloomfield. It is an 8vo. vol., 18s., and is published by Longmans.—S. S. U.

The Societies' Section.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Edinburgh Young Men's Christian Association.—The annual *soirée* of the literary section of this institution was held recently in the Queen Street (Upper) Hall. The chair was occupied by John Tawse, Esq., W.S., president of the society. There was a good attendance, including a fair

proportion of ladies. The chairman in the course of his address referred to two important subjects as being worthy of the consideration of young men—viz., reform and education. He did not think a Young Men's Christian Association had anything to do with the franchise; but he

was of opinion that the literary section had to do with these two matters, reform and education, in their highest and noblest sense. What they sought was an education not only for time, but for eternity; and the consideration of those subjects which would enable them to become better Christians and better members of society were the highest that could occupy attention. He referred to two errors occasionally made: the one was that the literary section was *the* Young Men's Christian Association, and the other that such an association had nothing whatever to do with a literary section. He believed that a purely intellectual training would do more harm than good, and quoted in support of this a remark made by the Duke of Wellington, that such a course would only have the effect of producing a set of "clever devils." Education apart from religion would exercise a baneful influence, hence the importance of having it side by side with a Christian Association.

We take the following from the secretary's report:—

"In presenting the annual report of the literary section the committee are glad to tell of its continued success. . . . The number at present on the roll is 44, the majority of whom are useful and active members.

"Since our last *soirée* the following questions have been decided in the affirmative:—'Is the punishment of death really useful or necessary for the safety and good order of society?' 'Are women mentally inferior to men?' 'Is a man justified in remaining single, if circumstances permit him to marry?' 'Is the present government (Lord Derby's) worthy of the confidence of the nation?' 'Did the crusades exert a beneficial influence on the period?' 'Should education be compulsory?' 'Are bad smells injurious to health?' 'Is reason confined to man?'

Only two debates were decided in the negative:—'Is popular applause a reliable test of merit?' and 'Ought capital punishment to be abolished?' It was further declared by the section that the novelist exerts a greater influence than the poet; and that of ignorance and intemperance, the latter is the greater cause of crime.

"The subjects of the essays have been as follows:—'Martin Luther,' 'Lord Olive,' 'Thomas Carlyle,' 'Lord Byron,' 'John Knox,' 'Literary Societies; their Influence on Young Men,' 'Infidelity; its Aspects and Agencies,' 'Our Condition in Life, and its Lessons,' 'The Siege of Londonderry and its Effects,' 'The Anglo-Saxons,' 'British Liberty,' and 'Moderation.'

"We have also to mention the continued success of a very important feature in our work—viz., the MS. magazine. The monthly appearance of this journal is looked forward to with a degree of interest which tells more for its success than words can. This serial now numbers seven volumes. These we have had handsomely bound, and placed in the reference department of the association's library, as the discussions which they contain guarantee them to be standard commentaries on many subjects of interest and importance.

"From this report you will be able to gather the nature of our work. We have invited you here to-night to tell of our success in the past, and to ask your assistance for the furtherance of our aims in the future. We trust that this meeting may be the means of increasing our numbers, and of spreading our name abroad, not only as a literary society, but also as a Christian association."

Dialectic Society, Edinburgh.—The anniversary of the Dialectic Society took place in the Café Royal,

Edinburgh. The chair was occupied by the Solicitor-General. The croupiers were Sheriff Hallard and Mr. Charles D. Kay. There were also present the Hon. Lord Deas, Rev. W. Ross Taylor, Rev. Alexander Cusin, Rev. Mr. Henderson, Rev. W. Miller, Rev. Mr. Lawrie, Mr. J. Carment, S.S.C.; Mr. Ebenezer Mill, S.S.C.; Mr. Baxter, W.S.; Mr. A. Taylor Innes, Mr. Webster, Mr. Forbes, Mr. J. McCandle, C.A.; and a number of other old members of the society. Apologies for absence were received from the Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Cowan, the Lord Advocate, the Dean of Faculty, the Rev. Dr. Maxwell Nicholson, Professor Robertson, Glasgow; the Rev. Mr. Wallace, Dr. Sellar, Mr. John Boyd Kinnear, and others. The chairman, after the usual loyal and patriotic toasts, gave "The Dialectic Society," of which this meeting was the eightieth anniversary. Such institutions were founded to supply a felt want which the universities themselves could not supply; they were little worlds within themselves, in which those who were yet students might practise for the concerns of real life. Friendships had been formed by the assemblages of these societies which otherwise would never have occurred. The Dialectic Society had had among its members many eminent men. Many of these had passed away, but others still survived, and he was glad to think that one of the most distinguished of its present members was at their table that night—namely, Lord Deas. His lordship had exhibited an interest almost without parallel in the affairs of this and kindred societies. When emergencies arose in any of them he had sacrificed time, and conveniency for the purpose of smoothing away difficulties. His lordship was an ornament to the bench, and an honour to Scotland. Among other living members of whom the society might be proud

were the Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Cowan, the Lord Advocate, and the Dean of Faculty—each and all of whom, in their own spheres, had rendered important service to the country. He was glad to hear, from information which the secretary had communicated, that the society was at the present time unusually prosperous, by which he meant that it had a very large number of ordinary attending members. Mr. A. Taylor Innes next gave "The University," and was followed by the Rev. W. Ross Taylor, who proposed "The College of Justice." Lord Deas, in reply, expressed regret that Lord Cowan was not present to discharge the duty which now devolved upon him. There was not upon the bench a better lawyer or a more laborious and sound-headed judge than Lord Cowan. (Applause.) The Dialectic Society was one in which he (Lord Deas) had always taken the deepest interest. He had always felt, and would continue to feel, a tie between himself and every individual member of it. Had he never been a member of this society, he would never have been a judge, and he promised it his continued support. He had been very anxious upon all occasions to press upon those who had any power over those things, the importance of it and other like societies. Although the Senatus Academicus was certainly much more favourable to these societies than it once was, he did not think it was impressed sufficiently with their importance, or that they were encouraged in the College in the way that they should be. (Applause.) Sheriff Hallard gave "The Clergy," remarking that one of the best features of this society was that men of different theological opinions might meet together to discuss questions of very grave importance, and feel that, above and beyond all their differences, on the more essential points they were entirely agreed. The Rev.

Mr. Lawrie, whose name was coupled with the toast, responded. The Rev. Mr. Henderson gave "The Sister Universities," which was replied to by the Rev. Mr. Tod; and Mr.

Baxter gave "The Associated Societies," to which Mr. Mill replied. Several other toasts followed, and the proceedings were brought to a close in the happiest manner.

Literary Notes.

THERE has just been published by E. Stock, "The Talmud: the Pattern for Romanism, not for Christianity," as an answer to the celebrated "Talmud article" in the *Quarterly Review*, which has already gone through seven editions, and has been translated into French, Danish, Icelandic, &c.

Herd's "History of Four English Kings," in Latin hexameters, has been edited for the Roxburghe Club by Thomas Purnell, author of "Literature and its Professors."

A biography of Rev. J. D. Burns, author of "The Vision of Prophecy," and other poems, which the late Rev. Dr. James Hamilton had just finished before he died, will be published soon.

M. Guizot has in the press "Political and Literary Miscellanies," chiefly republications of contributions to serial literature.

Of the late Rev. John Keble's "The Christian Year: Thoughts in Verse for the Sundays and Holidays throughout the Year," a *fac-simile* reprint of the first edition, 1827, will give the opportunity of collating the early text with that of the recent edition issued by his executors, which led to no little newspaper controversy.

Wm. Chambers, Esq., of Glenormiston, Lord Provost of Edinburgh, publisher, author, &c., has in the press a work of great interest—his *Autobiography*.

M. Jules Lacroix (b. 1809), novelist and dramatist, has exercised his skill as a playwright on a version of Shakspeare's "King Lear," with fair success.

M. Marius Topin, author of "Europe and the Bourbons under Louis XIV.," has gained the Thiers' prize of £3,000.

A work on St. Paul's Cathedral, similar to that of Dean Stanley on Westminster Abbey, is in preparation by Dean Milman.

Joseph Hatton, author of "Provincial Papers," "Bitter Sweets," "Against the Stream," "The Talants of Barton," &c., who has been, we believe, long and honourably connected with the press in Swansea, Bristol, Worcester, &c., has become the proprietor of the seat of power formerly occupied by Sylvanus Urban, the pseudonym of the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine*.

The social life of Scotland between 1500 and 1800 is likely to be illustrated by the publications projected by the Burgh Records Society, which are to contain interesting extracts from official documents. A Record of the Convention of Royal Burghs in Scotland (1597—1614) is nearly ready.

The North German Confederate Council has determined to regard the proper completion of the German Dictionary, commenced and carried on for some time by the Brothers J. L. and W. O. Grimm, as a national affair, and have resolved to place the continuation of it in the hands of the most competent scholars, with due pecuniary consideration for their labour.

A "History of the Middle Temple," with notices of the most eminent of its members, is in preparation.

Auguste Comte.

THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.

THE organization of Man exists amidst a conflux of forces, which act upon it and upon which it reacts in such a way, that when the mutual relations of these forces and humanity are normal, health, virtue, and happiness are the results ; and when these are abnormal, disease, vice, and misery as necessarily follow. So delicate as well as complex is the organization of humanity, that the sum-total of the conditions—material, moral, and mental—essential to its well-being can only be realized by the attainment of a thorough and trustworthy science of man and nature, and the construction and maintenance of a sociology founded on that Positive Philosophy. Only so can the intricate and multiplex conditions of human existence be fulfilled, and the totality of individual and social life be brought into and kept in a wholesome state of orderly progress—a state in which the great vital activities of humanity may not only manifest their capacities, but be quickened to the production of results. Man, while he improves the present, must not only expiate the past, but also elaborate the future. Sociology regards all history and life as collective and corrective, as at once a united whole and a progressive and orderly self-reparative totality—the entire life of man being interknit in society, and yet most intimately interconnected with the vast order of circumambient nature. The only sound basis of sociology, therefore, is science ; physics supplies us with a knowledge of the static conditions of life, while physiology imparts to us the immediate elements of a philosophy of vital dynamics so thorough-going and complete that it provides a social polity, a moral code, an educational system, a practical jurisprudence, a genuine *cultus*, and a positive religion.

We have already shown how the physical sciences outgrow from each other by gradual development and strictly co-ordinated system, and how when the inorganic world has given up its secrets to us, we are prepared for passing on to a study of the series of organic actions and reactions which collectively make up the phenomena of life, with all its capacities of privation and pleasure. Physiology is individualistic, but every polity is more or less socialistic ; and hence we require a science of society which shall not only provide for the free action of individual life, but also for the vital progress of communities and of the race, which shall make society both self-conserving and self-progressive ; be static enough to prevent eruptive change and ill-considered revolution, yet dynamic enough to throw off febrile accumulations, and to attain athletic growth by judicious exercise. In such a sociology the vital interdependence of all classes would be felt, acknowledged, and

provided for, and order and progress would act as harmoniously as the systole and diastole of the heart, by whose alternate action and reaction the orderly progress of life is made possible and productive of pleasure.

"Social phenomena have this special characteristic,—that the object observed with scientific regard undergoes a process of development as well as and along with the persons observing them." This conception of human progress and continuous movement is the basis of sociology. Order or conservative power was formerly made the chief aim and specific property of all social endeavour. The static is an acknowledged element in social life; the dynamic has hitherto been disregarded and even abjured. But the positive philosophy brings it into due prominence and effectiveness. "Without the theory of progress, that of order—even supposing it could be formed,—would be inadequate as a basis for social science. It is essential that the two should be combined. The very fact that progress, however viewed, is only the development of order, shows that order cannot be fully manifested without progress."

"The statical aspect is that of the laws of social existence, considered abstractedly from progress, and confined to what is common to the progressive and the stationary state. The dynamical aspect is that of social progress. The statics of society is the study of the conditions of existence and permanence of the social state. The dynamic studies the laws of social evolution." Static sociology concerns itself with the mutual action and reaction of all the different sections of the social system exercised upon and for each other so as to effect an assent—voluntarily or involuntarily—of the individual dispositions and interests of men,—that is a *community* of sociality. Dynamic sociology takes cognizance of the successions of the phenomena of social existence, endeavours to trace throughout and along the complications of the phenomena of society those lines of force which are effective in producing change and inducing development, and which communicate those indispensable impulses to the social organism which are requisite to excite the feeling of the essential *continuity* of sociality. Here, as in all science, the laws of co-existence are to be first studied as *facts*, and thereafter the laws of successions as *effects*, observed states giving place to observed sequences as consequences.

The mighty onswamp of phenomena in the external world shows us an unchangeable order established in it, and we exist under the immutable necessity of conforming our conduct to that order on which we can produce no radical change. The right understanding of that order must form a chief object of our thoughts; its overpowering influence initiates and determines our state and feelings; and to find our place, and work within it, is our great object. Hence, what must be aimed at in any wise, sociology is a careful development of humanity within the limits prescribed by the irresistible economy of nature, which can only be accomplished by study-

ing the co-existences and successions of phenomena, and subordinating our life to them. Not only without ourselves is there a regulative order, there is one also within; for the phenomena of physiology are as fixed as the phenomena of physics, and as they follow each other in sequence, so does sociology follow on the demonstrated truths of physiology, and presuppose and include them. The irresistible order without secures the essential order of social life; and the irresistible instincts, proclivities and activities within procure the progress in which humanity delights, and which constitutes its glory.

Man is distinguished from the inferior denizens of the globe by the addition to his nature of intellect and affection; the former suggests the problems of social life, the latter solves them. Hence the heart preponderates over the intellect, and a true sociology requires that the suggestive excitements of the affections should overcome the indifference of reason, and surpass the effectiveness of activity. "When it is said that the intellect should be subordinate to the heart, what is meant is that the intellect should devote itself exclusively to the problems which the heart suggests, the ultimate object being to find proper satisfaction for our various wants." Love when real ever desires light, in order to attain its ends. Thus true philosophy and sound polity are brought into correlation, and it becomes a demand of sociology that "thoughts must be systematized before feelings, and feelings before actions;" for "unity of action depends upon unity of impulse and unity of design." Above Animality, therefore, rises Humanity, in all its variety of affections and mental attributes; and humanity consummates itself in an established society—guaranteed by a polity, guided by a philosophy, supported by industrialism, trained by sound education, and crowned by a positive worship. It has been scientifically established by Gall, and others, that man has an irresistible spontaneous instinct for the society of his fellow-beings, independently of all calculation of personal advantage, and not unfrequently independently of the most potent individual interests. Man is, by nature, to a certain extent endowed with a benevolent disposition. But our most peculiarly individual feelings and our least elevated instincts are specially active and easily excitable. Hence our self-appetent affections most usually tend to overreach our social propensities; and the energies of our emotional nature are so much more mobile and active than our intellectual powers, that they constantly incline to overpower our nobler nature. Hence society exists through a constant interaction—hitherto it might have been called antagonism—between our social and our selfish instincts or proclivities. The necessities of man, from those which supply the nourishment essential to his organic nature to those which furnish gratification to his intellectual and æsthetic capacities, are only attainable through labour under the guidance of intelligence. All labour—especially when minutely subdivided and monotonous—is irksome. This sense of irksomeness, com-

combined with the pressure of need, causes a second antagonism or interaction of social forces. Every society is better in proportion to the better power that is exercised mainly in it, and social life is ameliorated by the culture expended on the social proclivities and the intellectual activities, so that they may take the lead of the personal or selfish desires, and inspire the whole being to improvement. Our personal interests and our natural apathy and indolence conduce to static or conservative order; while our social propensities, our deliberate ambitions, and our imperative necessities compelling industrialism urge on to progress, and exert themselves as dynamic forces. This struggle of rest and movement, of state and action, of indolence and desire, constitutes the individual relations of man with man, and conditions the civilization to which humanity can, at any given time, attain.

In society, individualization of function requires for its true development co-operation of function, and the most simple co-operative unity is the family,—at base consisting of the elementary couple, husband and wife, which, like all sociological unities, is a result of the past, constitutes the present, and institutes the future. Marriage is the most elementary and yet the most perfect mode of social life—the only association in which identity of interest is possible. The family is the *norm* of society. The family demands (1) subordination of sex and (2) subordination of age. The equality of the sexes is a chimera, a vain and futile dream. The marriage relation is one of supremacy for man, subordination for woman. “In practical energy and in the mental capacity which usually accompanies it, Man is evidently superior to Woman. Woman’s strength, on the other hand, lies in feeling. She excels man in love, as much as man excels her in force. Self-love and sexual love require to be placed under rigorous and permanent discipline, and marriage—the culture of love—is the safeguard and basis of moral education. Woman’s life should be concentrated in her home and family; and there, as one of the purest and most spontaneous of the moral influences of society, she should perform with rigorous exactness all the conditions which the right exercise of moral force demands. As the sympathetic sex, woman should stimulate and direct the active sex, but ought not to enter into rivalry with men in the pursuits of life, for that would corrupt the very sources of mutual affection. Marriage should be irrevocable (unless a condition arise essentially incompatible with the fulfilment of its aims—as the imprisonment for life of one of the parties) and strictly monogamistic (not even a second marriage being allowed, though the first chosen partner be deceased). The family is the school of social life, in which love and activity are reconciled and refined, and the selfish proclivities are elevated and ennobled into spontaneous and constantly operative social activities.

From domesticism we pass to industrialism. This is the co-operation of mankind, not in material efforts alone, but in all forms of activity and productiveness. Nothing in the actualities of life is

more surprising than the spontaneous organization of an immense number of individuals, each possessed of a distinct existence and personal interest, of differing characters and varying talents, yet all as if unconscious to themselves of any other motive than the bent of their own inclination operating within the circumstances and sphere amid which he is placed, concurring in the division of labour and the interchange of services or commodities to a conciliation of effort and interest such as compacts human society together, and creates a vast and complicated organization of customs, habits, interests, laws, special forms of life and activity, interacting constantly for the unification of social communities, and the inter-knitting of individuals into classes, professions, businesses, trades, &c. This immense common labour exercises salutary influences not only on the personal interests but also on the social sympathies of mankind, individually and collectively, and forms society into a general economy and solidarity of industrial activity.

In giving play to and bestowing culture upon those "dispersive specialities" which the necessities of society occasion, in such a manner as to distribute employments among men so that each person, according to his own vocation, education, and position, may be put in the place he can best fill, there arises a need for having some means of recalling the interests of each to a sense of the unity of civilization, of the need of attending to the ends and aims of society, and of the fatally destructive effects which would result from the engrossment of each in his own small special round of pursuits and minute fraction of the business of social existence. This corrective is furnished by the ever-increasing subordination cultured in the very heart of society, making a government or social solidarity possible and needful, and securing in the very progress of industrialism the conditions of a safe and manageable polity, having due authority and receiving true submission,—a polity not cognizant of material interests only, but of moral, intellectual, and æsthetic capacities as well, an educating as well as a governing spiritual power.

The law of mental evolution has been shown to be firstly theological, next and transitionally metaphysical, and finally positive. Material evolution follows an analogous course. The primitive activity of mankind is military. Human exertion passes successively through the three phases—offensive warfare, defensive warfare, and industrialism. History proves, along its entire course, that there is an unbroken connection between the development of speculative thought and human activity, and that the development of the affective dispositions depends on the combined influences of thought and action. Ancient history in the main is a record of predatory or offensive warfare, and is a complete development of the warrior as governor, and of slavery as the form of submissive industry. Theology consecrated military power. Mediæval history is transitional. In it warfare becomes defensive, and slavery gradually passes into regulated labour. As the might of the

warrior decreased, the power of industrialism increased ; so that burghal rights became rivals to feudal claims, and hence jurists and metaphysicians began to arbitrate between theology and free thought, and between military despotism and industrial rights ; treaties, charters, guilds, municipalities, burghs, leagues, conventions, international laws, &c., took their place as defences of trade and toil against the tyranny of the lord of the sword and the soil.

In modern history the captaincy of humanity is no longer warlike, but industrial. Men seek not to destroy each other, but to employ each other, and so to ameliorate the economy of nature by a wise use of thought and effort, that by industrial discipline each may be benefited by the activity of all, and all by that of each. Industrialism has now its captains of labour, and warfare has become a secondary aid only to commercial civilization. The positive spirit has entered into trade, science has been employed as its servant, and the principles of industrial co-operation are now productive of the most certainly foreseen results. It is now engaged in realizing in a systematic manner the action of man, guided by a competent knowledge of the laws of nature to subdue the universe to use, profit, and delight. Commerce, finance, and legislation have all been touched by the modern spirit of industrialism, and even the tendency of the political systems of our age is to widen power, so as to bring into the governing class, not only the lords of industry, but the various orders of toiling men. The organization of industry on principles of true co-operative partnership will bring industrialism under the combined powers of order and progress.

These are the principal consecutive phases of the historic life of humanity. They present to us a homogeneous and continuous conception, which knits the epochs into unity, the nations into community, and the people of the earth into a veritable confederacy and essential brotherhood. Life and thought are shown to be one, while history and philosophy become inseparable, and science grows into sociology ; and then the mission of positivism will be accomplished, viz., "to re-organize society without God or sovereign, under the normal preponderance alone, in private and in public, of the social sentiment, suitably confirmed by positive reason and real activity," that is, under the instruction of trustworthy philosophic guides, and under the influence of the industrial classes, no longer mere proletarians.

The regulation of opinion is essential to the regulation of society, and temporal re-organization is possible only in proportion to the progress and success of spiritual regeneration. Community of beliefs and habits of life is essential to social unity. To secure this, the doctrine, the power, and the organ of public opinion must be such as to induce and produce unity of sentiment and uniformity of life. This can only be properly done by a uniform system of education, initiated, controlled, and applied by a spiritual power that shall be accepted by all. The management of opinion transcends

all political agitation in importance, usefulness, and necessity. Everything points to the advisability, nay, the essentiality of having a spiritual power, instituted so as to secure the effectual direction of all the means requisite to bring about the extension and reform of opinion and of life in a systematic manner, and with that consistency, persistency, and largeness of view which are needed to effect the permanent and thorough reconstruction of the institutions of society and the improvement of personal existence. "The pride of theorists has always made them wish to become socially despotic." But in a true positive social state the despotism of thinkers will be impossible, for the temporal and spiritual powers of a positive government are entirely separate. The whole course of modern thought and experience goes to prove that there is a necessity for a permanent division between theory and practice, in order that each may be simultaneously perfected, and this separation of the temporal and spiritual power in the social economy is only the transference into the state and the systematization within it of the actual separation which is found so beneficial in procuring the progress of science and of art. The practical authorities in each state are becoming more and more absorbed in the maintenance of material order, and are seeing the advantage of leaving the elaboration of questions referring to spiritual order to the unrestricted efforts of thinkers. By and by they will only be really respected when they adhere scrupulously to the performance of temporal functions without aiming at or claiming any authority over thought. They may, it is true, demand obedience in the name and for the security of order, but they cannot counteract the forces of progress, and hence they will soon find that the enlightenment and organization of opinion by those who do not aspire to political power, but only seek to keep ideas under discussion, are special functions which they can readily allocate to a body of thinkers who will go on with their own work quietly, without taking part in public agitations or mixing actively in politics, but who would deliberately elaborate the principles of safe progress for society, and be the systematic organs of humanity.

A philosopher's business is with general truths and connected views and specialities; details, &c., belong to the practical statesman. Under the regenerating influence of positivism a new spiritual power shall arise, complete and homogeneous in structure, and at the same time coherent or orderly and progressive, because it shall introduce and preserve a unity of method in all our conceptions. It will assist by conscious and systematic effort all the functions, whether of order or progress, which humanity requires to have examined, trained, or elaborated. This incorporation of philosophers would receive a moderate competency from the State, would be looked on with reverence, and would devote its energies to the direction of education, the consideration of all questions having an immediate bearing on social life, would advise, reprove, instruct men in regard to their ways and habits, control

all inquiries and speculations to positive ends, mediate in all cases of social indifference between members of different or the same classes; admonish, especially the rich, on the neglect or violation of any social duty; and should remonstrance and denunciation fail, proceed to moral excommunication against the party or parties guilty of forgetting altruism in egotism—forsaking social duty for selfish ends.

They will possess no political power, must acquire no riches, can be allowed to engage in no occupation except their own monitory, educative, medicinary, and deliberative devotion to the preservation and progress of society. Opinion initiated, regulated, and organized by this spiritual power, shall act on men from lowest to greatest with the unfelt pressure and prevalency of the atmosphere, so that legal obligation may be made needless by moral consent and agreement in regard to all social duties. They shall elaborate opinion as far as possible into a coherent doctrine which shall systematize life, and produce that "state of complete unity which distinguishes human existence, at once personal and social, when all its parts, both moral and physical, converge habitually to a common destination." All the instincts, proclivities, propensities, faculties, desires, and possibilities, included in human existence which may or do contend with each other, must be brought into accordancy; our moral, mental, and energetic dispositions must be colligated in their proper place, and be so arranged as to be at peace with each other, so that instead of conflict there may be unity, and instead of diversity there may be mutuality of interest and community of aim. That which binds back all powers, inclinations, and designs, into peaceful and harmonious unity, constitutes religion, of which the spiritual power shall have the full management, free from the interference of the temporal power—which, however, shall provide properly for its support and ritual. It is essential to the dignity and proper effectiveness of the spiritual power, that its voice should be decisive on all that relates to opinion and the culture of sociality—education, morality, and religion; while it exercises a merely deliberative voice in regard to the active and practical functions of life—executive politics, financial specialities, industrial effort, commercial enterprise, coinage, banking, international tariffs, &c. On the other hand, it is equally indispensable to the proper order of a progressive state that the temporal authority should possess and exercise a decisive voice in regard to all the active and practical requirements of life, and should only sparingly use a deliberate influence over the theoretical principles and the religious practices of mankind. Man exists under a permanent necessity for a certain systematic discipline for his intellectual, affective, and effective nature; and these, though homogeneous, must be distinct. The temporal power is mainly static, the spiritual mainly dynamic, for ideas move the world.

The temporal power must be continually reparative in its function. "The chief object of the practical life of humanity is to

satisfy the wants of our physical nature, wants which necessitate continual reproduction of materials in sufficient quantities." "Each generation produces more material wealth than is required for its own wants; and the use of this surplus is to facilitate the labour and prepare the maintenance of the generation following." The furnishers of this nutritive element to humanity, who collect, prepare, and distribute the materials of life, are capitalists; "capitalists, therefore, are the political leaders of modern society." Society requires innervation. It controls the somewhat blind action of nutrition. Women supply this in its purest and most spontaneous form, and philosophers add the indispensable speculative foresight to the affective sociality which women originate and keep up. The working classes furnish a basis for political action, and supply the only possible solution to the great human problem, the victory of social feeling over self-love. Wealth, which is the basis of political power, cannot be produced without them, and thus they form an intermediate link between the spiritual and the temporal powers. "Man should support Woman, and the Active class should support the Speculative class," otherwise feeling and thought cannot adequately perform their proper functions towards humanity. Capitalists, therefore, must, as the normal administrators of the common fund of wealth, so regulate the distribution of wages that women shall be released from work, and provide besides for the proper remuneration of intellectual labour performed for the public good by those who have as little to do with wealth as with government, in taking part in the formation of public opinion, and in devoting their best judgment to the consideration of passing events. The province of the thinker is education; and as the result of education, counsel; the province of the practical statesman is action and authoritative direction. The general principles of practical life depend on science, but it is not the duty of the elaborator of science to superintend its applications. Politics, when subordinated thus to scientific thought, is the noblest of all arts, and its proper function consists in concentrating all human effort upon the promotion of the interests of humanity in accordance with the demands of morality and the decisions of science.

The principal ultimate seat of the temporal power, properly so called, will necessarily be found among those who guard the accumulation and regulate the distribution of capital, those who hold the high places of the industrial movements; such as bankers, merchants, manufacturers, and agriculturists in the ration of the degree of generality of their conceptions and operations as they proceed from the abstract to the concrete. To this aristocracy of capitalists will be entrusted the practical management of society, so as to make it a school of moral co-operation. The capitalist is a public functionary, whose business it is to manage the largest possible whole of industrial effort which his mind is capable of taking under superintendence,—he is an administrator for society. The body of capitalists, when invested with their official dignity

as the governors of the earth, are to supply adequate provision for the comfortable subsistence of all women, all philosophic thinkers, educators, medical men, inventors, and labourers, so that the greatest possible amount of enjoyment consistent with the state of the society of which they form a part may be attainable by all, and stable and lasting comfort may be secured by thinkers and workers as well as by the *sexes affective*.

The new sociocracy is destined to be essentially industrial; from military captaincy, through theocratism, metaphysicism, jurisprudentism as transitions, we pass on to industrial captaincy. The providence of capital will secure more direct and explicit benefit, and give to the heart a satisfaction at once more noble and more profound than the Providence of the creeds. The real problem of true sociology is not to change the depositaries of power, but to secure its wise and beneficial exercise. Spiritual wealth as be-seems it will be conserved and administered by those who are in reality the capitalists thereof, and temporal wealth will also be stored and employed by captains of industry. Capital in the sociological sense includes all the possessions as well as all the material and industrial activities of men. The institution of capital is the necessary foundation of that division of labour which characterizes social harmony and community of purpose and interest; and capital by rendering possible this division of labour, impels and incites every capable citizen to work not only for himself, but for others, and establishes as an essential of society, altruism instead of egotism, in the organization of modern industry under a rulership of practical directors, capitalists, captains of workmen, not of warriors.

“Positivism, being the only doctrine which embraces the entire sphere of human existence, is the only one which can elevate social feeling to its proper place by extending it to all departments of human activity without exception.” It maintains the oneness of life, and the identity of private functions with public duties, while it secures the preponderance of moral principles over governmental regulations by applying moral agencies to the settlement of all disputes between wealth and labour, and by constituting the spiritual power into a supreme court of arbitration in all matters relating to practical life. True spiritual power confines itself to giving counsel; it convinces, it never commands. But against conviction material force is vain, and practical tyranny is impossible where a philosophic body of known impartiality and enlightenment addresses itself to an educated people. Hence we must have an organization of education as well as of industry. Education should be carried on in such a way as to train to the constant exercise of all the duties of life to self, in the family and in society, and must include the encyclopædic law of classification and the systematic exposition of the laws of social evolution. The whole education of the race must be so conducted as to excite men to the habitual and harmonious exercise of all the faculties of feeling, thought, and

action, in subordination to a sense of social filiation with the past and with the future. The teacher who attempts to govern, and the governor who attempts to teach, are alike censurable as enemies of order and progress. The people must be provided with educators who are free from political ambition, and with dictators who will not aim at spiritual encroachment. Public functionaries of all kinds should nominate their successors, subject to the approbation of their superiors, and with sufficient notice to admit of free criticism and full deliberative discussion before that choice is formally sanctioned and finally consummated. This freedom of speech, writing, publishing, &c., is to be the supreme check upon maladministration. The whole social system of the universe will ultimately come to be placed in a triumvirate of dictators, directing the whole practical energies of men to the best purposes, conjoined with the pontiff of humanity, who will hold the helm of opinion, direct the energies of thought, and control the course of speculation throughout the orb of the world.

Already in the distance the gleams of positive politics rise above the horizon of historic perception. In three-and-thirty years the pontiff of humanity shall hold in his hands the directorate of the public education of France; the Emperor Napoleon or his successor will resign his power into the hands of a triumvirate of proletarians (who shall transitionally hold rule); this triple dictatorship shall prepare society for the grand consummation of its positive destiny, by apportioning the Occident and its appendages into small republics under proper governors, by selecting the three normal capitalist dictators, and by installing with due ritual the head of the spiritual power as the pontiff of positivism. Unhappily, the demise of the originator has somewhat impeded the success of the programme. There is a college of positivists, a director of the religion of humanity, but the pontifical head is gone with his scheme unrealized in aught but thought. We have spoken of a pontiff of positivism, and we have alluded to the religion of humanity; it becomes us now to explain these terms, and to show that sociology is to be crowned and complemented by a faith, a ritual, and a worship.

“Love is the *principle* of positivism, Order its *basis*, and Progress its *end*.” “Thus it is that in the positive system, the heart, the intellect, and the character mutually strengthen each other.” For this, it separates the moral power of counsel from the political power of command, and makes moral force, the force of conviction and persuasion, a modifying influence in life, not an authoritative decision. The great mission of the spiritual power as a priesthood is the subordination of politics to morals. The highest progress of man and of society consists in the gradual increase of our mastery over our defects—especially the defects of our moral nature,—this constitutes human regeneration. To effect this there should be a central point in the system towards which feeling, reason, and activity alike converge. Such a centre we find in the greatest

conception of humanity; by it the conception of God will be superseded, and through it a new doctrine at once gains access to the heart in its full extent and power. In the conception of humanity—which is the only true Great Being and the one supreme—the three essentials of positivism—its subjective principle, love; its objective basis, order; and its practical object, progress—are united.

“Positivism thus becomes in the proper sense of the word a religion; a religion more real and more thorough than any other, and therefore destined to replace all imperfect and provisional religious systems reposing on the primitive basis of theology.” Science, poetry, morality, are all brought into activity in the study, the praise, and the love of humanity, which, unlike the objects of worship entertained by theological believers, is not an incomprehensible, isolated, absolute being, whose existence admits of no demonstration, or is possessed of likenableness to anything real. Humanity is vital. It is capable of mathematical, physical, chemical, biological, and sociological investigation. “Scientifically defined, therefore, it is truly the Supreme Being—the being which manifests to the fullest extent all the highest attributes of Life.” “Existence, in the true sense, can only be predicated of humanity.” This great being—though the most vital of all living beings known to us—is not immutable any more than it is absolute. It extends and becomes more complex by the continuous successions of generations; and in its progressive changes as well as in its permanent functions it forms “a far more sublime object of contemplation than the solemn inaction of the old supreme being, whose existence was passive except when interrupted by acts of arbitrary and unintelligible volition.” “Science is now, in a true sense, consecrated as the source from which the universal religion receives its principles, and as the revealer of the nature and conditions, the destiny and the phases of the development of the Supreme Being.” Poetry, art, music, architecture, &c., will equally receive consecration, and will find in the religion of humanity incitements to and opportunities of progress and power, such as the chimeras of previous worships could never afford, inasmuch as the synthesis founded on the love of humanity is far superior to that founded on the love of God. “The great being, who is its object, permits the most searching inquiry, and yet does not restrict the scope of imagination” as the mother of the æsthetic arts. “The worship of humanity raises *prayer*, for the first time, above the degrading influences of self-interest,” and the morality of the positive religion combines all the advantages of spontaneousness with those of demonstration. To live for others it holds to be the highest happiness. To become incorporated with humanity, to sympathize with all her former phases, to foresee our destinies in the future, and to do what in us lies to forward them, this is what it puts before us as the constant aim of life.” “It prevents alike overweening anxiety for our own interests and dull indifference to them.” “The

morality of positivism excels that of revealed religion in the substitution of the love of humanity for the love of God." "To love humanity may be truly said to be the whole duty of man." "Science, poetry, and morality, are regenerated by the new religion, and form one harmonious whole on which the destinies of man will henceforth rest." "Morality is the worship rendered by the affections; science and poetry that rendered by the intellect. It is our filiation with the past, even more than our connection with the present, which teaches us that the only real life is the collective life of the race; that individual life has no existence except as an abstraction." Continuity is the feature which distinguishes our race from all others, and gives it solidarity of form.

Hence religion is only fully developable in our own species. To constitute a religion there must be a creed claiming power over the whole of life; a belief, or set of beliefs, deliberately decided on and accepted, in regard to duty and destiny, and there must be such a consent of the soul to the creed chosen as shall enforce obedience to it, or a sense of humiliation for disobedience. The faith must be regulative as well as theoretic; and there must be besides a *cultus* or worship. Positivism has both. The positivist creed recognises the invariable order of phenomena as exhibited and explained in the course of philosophy, and it inculcates faith in and obedience to this order. But it recognises, in the midst of this fixed order, possibilities of progress, and an ample range of effort open to hope and energy incited by love; hence love and faith interlace and interweave themselves into a personal religion and a social morality; so that "Politics become really subordinate to Morals, and the feeling of Duty is substituted for Right;" for "the word *right* should be eliminated from the language of politics as well as the word *cause* from the language of philosophy." "Every one has duties, duties towards all; but rights, in the ordinary sense, can be claimed by none;" "in other words, no one has, in any case, any right but that of doing his duty."

The worship of humanity must be as grand and thorough-going as positivism is all-prevailing and all-pervading. All theological beliefs are, scientifically regarded, equally fictitious, and issue only from the imagination; and yet no religious faith is a delusion, it has its own purpose to serve in the moral and intellectual development of humanity, and, so long as it is effective, ought to be respected in the sphere of its own social mission. But positivism, by instituting a triple culture of the heart, the mind, and the activities, provides also a dogma, a regimen, and a worship; and the worship is complete. Positive worship consists in the systematic culture of our nature, and its aim is to develop and consolidate the normal social order, and to provide for the constancy and suitability of social progress. Its means are principally found in the æsthetic idealization of all our conceptions in regard to order and progress, whether these are personal, domestic, or public.

Religion is the indispensable bond of society. It rules and

schools humanity. Its foundations are love and faith, and science is the keystone of the arch which makes it possible to unite love and faith in human life. Religion effects reorganization. Society, by it, becomes not a mass of individualities, but a unity of influences and lives. Religion is a spontaneous outgrowth of humanity. It was, at first, regarded as inspired, or theological *par excellence*—in which state it was fetishistic, polytheistic, and monotheistic, respectively and successively; then revealed or metaphysical, and now it is demonstrated or positive; following in this, the evolution alike of history and science. The religion of positivism derives its creed from the demonstrated truths of science and its law from the same source. It excites and regulates all the tendencies of man's being active, affectionate, and intelligent, and unifies their entire functions in a harmony proper to human life; and hence it not only constitutes a worship, but assumes the presidency of art, politics and philosophy. "The positivist then may, more truly than theological believers of whatever creed, regard life as a continuous and earnest act of worship: worship which will elevate and purify our feelings, enlarge and enlighten our thoughts; ennoble and invigorate our actions."

"Man will in these days kneel to woman, and to woman alone;" "woman will be regarded by man as the most perfect impersonation of humanity."* "As the spontaneous priestesses of humanity, women will accept their position without scruple, and they will fear no longer the rivalry of a vindictive God." As *mother* she will stimulate and exercise veneration; as *wife*, affective love; and as *daughter*, protective love. "While as sister she may replace and reinforce either of these types of ennobling and sanctifying worship. The worship of woman begun in private, and afterwards publicly celebrated, is necessary in man's case to prepare him for any effectual worship of humanity." "The one thing essential to happiness is that the heart shall be always nobly occupied;" but inasmuch as man is more and more governed by the dead, this noble occupancy of the heart may be, and indeed often must be, the beloved dead rather than the loving living. To the living and the dead prayer ought to be made daily at morning, noon, and night; for true prayer is the solemn outpouring of men's nobler feelings, inspiring them with larger and more comprehensive thoughts, and they are to be used for the culture of one's own soul, and the development of our disinterested affections by the acknowledgment of our gratitude for the benefits derived from humanity, in the

* The corresponding and analogous worship suitable for woman is not fixed in Comte's system; he says, "My sex renders me incompetent to enter into the secret wants of woman's heart. Theory indicates a blank hitherto unnoticed, but does not enable me to fill it. It is a problem for women themselves to solve, and I had reserved it for my noble colleague (Clothilde de Vaux), for whose premature death I would fain hope that my own grief may one day be shared by all."

past for its influences, in the present for its social effects, and in the future for the food it affords to effortful hope. Positivism consecrates all human life by *nine* social sacraments. At birth the parents shall bring their child to the priesthood, and shall solemnly engage to fit it for the service of humanity. This is *presentation*. When at the age of fourteen the child passes from home-up-bringing, and is placed under the educational care of the national priesthood, the ceremony of *initiation* will confer a religious impulse to the neophyte. When the seven years of culture preparatory to the proper labour of life is finished, the ceremony of *admission* will impart solemnity to each squire in the chivalry of humanity. In seven years thereafter, when the profession of the person has been definitely fixed, a ritual of *destination* sanctions the career of the manhood—if he has attained normality;—for if he be imbecile or defective he must be retained in infancy, and restrained from attempting the functions of the normal being. Marriage is permissibly undertaken by women at twenty-one, by men after the sacrament of destination has been undergone—but not earlier, except in very exceptional circumstances. *Marriage* must be ennobled as having a spiritual end, and not merely as having vegetative functions by a social solemnity of the most significant character. Marriage once entered into is indissoluble—except for an infamous offence resulting in loss of social position. To the complete development of the individual organism the sacrament of maturity is attached, and henceforth, though not before, an inevitable personal responsibility for all his actions is laid upon him; he is a selfhood prepared by society to do the duties of his station, in full view of duty and fully bound to the service of humanity with all his powers. The sacrament of *retirement* signals the attainment of the grand climacteric. The sixty-third year ends man's practical life, and gives free scope to the theoretical; he then, with the sanction of the priesthood, nominates his successor, and departing from the busy stage of life, becomes an elder and a counsellor. The last ritual in which the individual engages is *transformation*—the positivist designation of death. Ceasing to be objective he becomes subjective, a just appreciation of his life is formed, and the regrets of society are mingled with the tears of the family. But beyond death the influence of the religion of humanity projects itself, and it holds out as a just hope the ninth sacrament, *incorporation*. Each servant of humanity, who invokes from the priesthood a formal apotheosis, shall, if after a lapse of seven years, on a calm and impartial survey of his life be found worthy of such a reward by a sacerdotal vote, be religiously incorporated in the eternal subjective existence of humanity. By incorporation the dead become glorified, and are found worthy of the prayers of the devout; but if the vote be adverse they are excommunicate for the sacred existence.

The ceremony of incorporation naturally leads to the mention of commemoration. To live in others is, in the truest sense of the

word, life; and hence in every week of the year some new aspect of order or of progress will be held up to public veneration. The worship given to our predecessors will stimulate a noble rivalry in order that we too may become incorporate into this mighty being whose life endures throughout all time, and who is formed more of the dead than of the living. Commemoration is a system of hero-worship in which all the benefactors of the human race of every age, clime, creed, or class, are celebrated as the ancestors, intellectual and social, of the present state of man. All true history is incorporated in this fundamental intellectual institution of commemoration.

There are three orders or types of men analogous to gods, heroes, and saints, celebrated respectively, monthly, weekly, daily. There are *thirteen* monthly types, under each of which are ranged chronologically *four* of the weekly—for what used to be the Sundays,—and the ordinary days of the week are consecrated to the *six* best emulators of the type which dominates it. Gratitude towards all the names which truly merit immortality requires a supplementary accessory, and hence it is proposed in each leap year to replace the minor or ordinary names by others of a similar sort. The one day which in each year is left over after the fifty-two weeks have been provided for may be devoted for the next half-century to the reprobation of the three great *obstructors* of progress—Julian the apostate, Philip II. of Spain, and Napoleon Bonaparte,—but is normally due to the celebration of the DEAD collectively, and the extra day in leap year is to be employed for the celebration of *all good women*. All the commemorated belong to the constructive, not the destructive minds, and hence Jesus, Luther, Calvin, Rousseau, &c., are omitted.

This commemorative hero-worship is designed to sanctify practical life by the periodic and systematic culture of the popular mind and the social sentiment. It is intended to inwork with the daily life the whole associative power of the historic and literary past. Besides these suggestive recallings of the mighty and the worthy, positivism provides for the celebration of all the great interests and epochs of humanity. “The most universal and solemn of these festivals, which will be held at the beginning of the new year, will be the festival of humanity, with secondary festivals in recognition of the nation, the province, and the town. Connubiality, paternity, filiality, fraternity, domesticity, would receive celebration in the five succeeding months. These constitute moral festivals; in succession to them would come historic ones—spiritualism, patriarchality, proletarianism, fetichism, polytheism, monotheism, and the future, would cover the sum-total of human memories, enjoyments, and hopes.

The following is a reproduction of the positivist calendar or commemorative system of the religion of humanity.

The symbolism of humanity will be a woman about thirty, with a babe in her arms. Temples of humanity, each adorned with such

a statue, will arise throughout the earth, and shall have their frontage towards Paris, as the capital of the universe. The processional banners of positivism shall bear on one side the holy image of humanity, in white; and on the reverse, in green, the words, "love, order, and progress." On the political flag of the Occident—green, as the colour of hope—there shall be on one side the social and scientific motto, "order and progress;" and on the other the moral and æsthetic motto, "live for others;" the former being the favourite with men, the latter with women; and the carved image of humanity should be placed on the banner pole. There would be an Occidental navy, which would constitute a maritime chivalry for the protection of the seas, and the promotion of geographical and scientific discovery. An international coinage of gold, silver, and platinum, bearing the image of Charlemagne and the positivist motto, should form a common monetary standard. International schools and workshops would soon follow, language would come to be regarded as the currency, and literature as the capital of thought. Art would idealize the representation of fact. Poetry would link philosophy and polity together. Education will supply mankind with all the preliminary feelings and capacities on which the success of sociology depends, and religion will add the crowning graces to human life. Thus a root and branch reconstruction of human life, from the most lowly functions of industrialism, to the noblest of governmental potency, and the highest spiritual position will be made certain, and love, order, and progress be made not only the watchwords of life, but the conditions and results of social evolution. The unity of life and history, science and society, reason and religion, will be seen and experienced by all. The days of anarchy, revolution, social evil and atheism, materialism, formalism, fatalism, optimism, shall vanish to return not, and positivism will be all in all. Industrialism with love for its great motive power, government with public happiness for its object, society in orderly progressiveness, performing all its varied functions harmoniously, science permeating all life, faith based upon demonstrative necessities, culminating in a religion clothed in all the beauty of art, and yet never inconsistent with science, and in a morality which subordinates all affections to the good of others and the delight of ourselves,—such is a faint shadow of the new moral world in which Positivism promises to transform this sin-worn and theologically immoral old world. It surely behoves us then to examine the grounds of the system, and the philosophy whence such growths of promise spring. One Messiah has already been crucified; has a second been contemned?

POSITIVIST CALENDAR, OR CONCRETE TABLE OF HUMAN PREPARATION.

I. MOSES.		II. HOMER.		III. ARISTOTLE.		IV. ARCHIMEDES.		V. CÆSAR.		VI. ST. PAUL.		VII. CHARLEMAGNE.	
INITIAL THEOCRACY.		ANCIENT POESY.		ANCIENT PHILO-SOPHY.		ANCIENT SCIENCE.		MILITARY CIVILIZA-TION.		CATHOLICISM.		FEUDAL CIVILIZA-TION.	
M 1	Prometheus	Cadmus	Hesiod	Anaximander	Theophrastus	Miltiades	St. Luke.	St. James	Theodorie the Great	Constantine	Charles Martel		
T 2	Heracles	Thæscus	Trytus	Sappho	Anaximenes	Leonidas	Saint Cyprian	Pelagius		Theodosius	The Cid	Tancredi	
W 3	Orpheus.	Tyresias	Anacreon	Heracitus	Empedocles	Aristides	Chryseostom.	Basil Richard	Saladin	Chrysostom.	Basil Richard	Saladin	
Th 4	Ulysses	Pindar		Anaxagoras	Thucydides	Aristides	Pulcherie	Marcian Joan of Arc	Marina	Pulcherie	Marcian Joan of Arc	Marina	
F 5	Lycurgus	Sophocles	Euripides	Democritus.	Archytas	Cimon	Genevieve of Paris	Albuquerque	Raleigh	Genevieve of Paris	Albuquerque	Raleigh	
S 6	Romulus	Theocritus	Longus	Herodotus	Apollonius of Tyana	Xenophon	St. Gregory the Great	Bayard		St. Gregory the Great	Bayard		
S 7	NUMA	ÆSCHYLUS		THALES	PYTHAGORAS	THEMISTOCLES [das	HILDEBRAND	GODFREY		HILDEBRAND	GODFREY		
8	Belus.	Semiramis	Scopas	Solon	Eudoxas	Pericles	St. Benedict	Anthony	Leo the Great.	St. Benedict	Anthony	Leo the Great.	
9	Seostris	Zeuxis		Xenophanes	Pythæas	[nia Philip	St. Boniface	Austia.	Gerbert	St. Boniface	Austia.	Gerbert	
10	Mena	Ictinus		Empedocles	Aristarchus	Demosthenes	St. Isidore	Bruno	Peter the Hermit	St. Isidore	Bruno	Peter the Hermit	
11	Cyrus	Praxiteles		Thucydides	[younger	Ctesibius Ptolemy	Lanfranco	S. Anselm	Seger	Lanfranco	S. Anselm	Seger	
12	Zoroaster	Lysippus		Archytas	Pliny the	Lagus	Heloise	Beatrice	Alex. III.	Heloise	Beatrice	Alex. III.	
13	The Druids.	Ossian	Apelles	Philolaus	Arrian	Polybius	of Mid.	Agas	Francis	of Mid.	Agas	Francis	
14	BUDDHA	PHIDIAS		Apolonius of Tyana	Gracchi	ALEXANDER	Arobits. of	Bernard	[Benezet	Arobits. of	Bernard	[Benezet	
15	Fo-Hi	Esop		Diophantus	Eddin	SCIPIO	INNOCENT III.			INNOCENT III.			
16	Lao-Tseu	Plantus		Albategnius.	Varro								
17	Meng-Tseu	Terence		Nassir- Marius	Augustus								
18	Theocrats of Thibet	Phœdrus		HIPPARCHUS [Eddin	Vespasian								
19	Theocrats of Japan	Juvenal		SCIPIO	Hadrian								
20	Manco-Capas	Tasse- Lucian			Antoninus								
21	CONFUCIUS [hæmæ	ANISTOPHANES			Papinian								
22	Abraham	Joseph	Ennius		A. Severus								
23	Samuel	David	Horace										
24	Solomon	Tibullus											
25	Isaiah	Ovid											
26	St. John the Baptist	Uld											
27	H. al Raschid.	Abde- Lucan											
28	MANOMET	VIRGIL											

NOTE.—The names inscribed in Italics designate adjuncts, which in leap years replace the corresponding types.

	VIII.		IX.		X.		XI.		XII.		XIII.	
	DANTE.	GUTTENBERG.	SHAKSPERE.	DESCARTES.	FREDERICK.	BICHAT.	MODERN EPIC.	MODERN INDUSTRY.	MODERN DRAMA.	MODERN PHILOSOPHY.	MODERN POLITY.	MODERN SCIENCE.
M 1	The Troubadours	Marco Polo	Chardin Vega	Montalvan	Albert John of Salis.	Marla di Molina	Copernicus	Ty. Brahe				
T 2	Boccaccio	Chaucer	Jacq. Coeur	Gresham	Moreto	Gullen Castro	Roger Bacon	Lully	Como di Medicis	Kepler	Halley	
W 3	Rabelais	Gama	Magellan	Rojas	Guevara	Bonaventura	Joachim Ramus	Comines	Guicciardini	Huyghens	Varignon	
Th4	Cervantes	Napier	Briggs	Orway				Isabella of Castille	Bernoulli	Rosner	Sauveur	
F 5	La Fontaine	Buras	Lacaille	Delambre	Lessing	Montaigne	Erasmus	Charles V.	Sixtus V.	Bradley		
S 6	Defoe	Goldsmith	Cook	Tasman	Gotho	Campanella	More	Henry IV.	Volta.			
S 7	ARIOSTO	COLUMBUS	CALDERON			THOM. OF AQUINAS	LOUIS XI.					
8	Da Vinci	Titian	Benvenuto Cellini	Tiro		Hobbes	Spinoza	Colligny	L'Hopital	Vieta.	Harriott	
9	M. Angelo	Veronese	Amontons	Wheatstone	Vondel	Pascal	Bruno	Barneveldt	Wallis.	Fermat		
10	Helbein	Rembrandt	Harrison	Leroy	Racine	Locke	Malebranche	Gustavus Adolphus	Clairaut	Poisson		
11	Poussin	Lesueur	Dollond	Graham	Voltaire	Vauvenargues	Lambert	De Wilt	Euler	Monge.		
12	Velasques	Murille	Arkwright	Jacquart	Metastasio	Alfieri	Diderot.	Duclos	Ruyter	Alembert	Bernoulli	
13	Teniers	Rubens	Conte	Schiller		Cabanis	Leroy	William III.	Lagrange	Fourier		
14	RAPHAEL	VAUCANSON	CORNILLER			LORD BACON		WIL. THE TACITURN	NEWTON			
15	Froissart	Joinville	Stevinus	Torricelli	Alarcon	Grotius.	Cujas	Ximenes	Bergmann	Scheele		
16	Canoens	Spenser	Marlotte	Boyle	Motteville	Roland Fontenelle	Mepertuis	Sully	Ozenstern	Priestley.	Davy	
17	Spanish	Romancist	Papin	Worcester	Sevigne	Montague	Vico	Herder	Colbert	Louis XIV.	Cavendish	
18	Chateaubriand	Black	Fulton	De Stael	Edgeworth	Sterne	Winckelmann	D'Aranda	Mazarin	Morveau	Geoffroy	
19	Walter Scott	Cooper	Jouffroy	Fulton	Fielding	Richardson	Buffon	Oken	Turgot	Compomane	Berzelius	
20	Manzoni	Dalton		Thilorier								
21	TASSO	WATT		MOLIERE		LEIBNITZ						
22	Petrarch	[Benyen	Bernard of Palissy	Perrolesi	Palestrina	Robertson	Gibbon	Sidney	Lambert	Harvey.	Ch. Bell	
23	A Kempis	Louis and Guglielmini	Riquet	Sacchini	Grevy	Adam Smith	Danoy	Franklin	Hampden	Boerhaave.	Stahl	
24	Lafayette	De Stael	Dubamel	Bou, gelat	Gluck	Lully	Kant	Fichte	Washington	Kosciusko	Linnæus	
25	Fenelon	St. Francis	Sausure	Bongeur	Beethoven	Handel	Condorcet	Ferguson	Jefferson	Madison	Haller	
26	Klopstock	Gessner	Coulomb	Borda	Rossini	Weber	De Maistre	Bolivar	Toussaint	Lamarck.	Blainville	
27	Byron	Mercœur	Carnot	Vauban	Belhni	Donizetti	Hegel	Germain	Francia	Broussais	Morgagni	
28	MILTON	MONTEOLFINE	MOZART			HUME		CRONWELL	GALL			

Complementary Day Universal Celebration of the Dead.
 Bissextile Day General Celebration of Holy Women.

Religion.

IS RITUALISM CONSISTENT WITH, OR UNNECESSARY TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF TRUE CHRISTIANITY?

CONSISTENT.—IV.

LAW is impossible without forms. Observance must be characterised by attention to the manner in which the law is obeyed. It is clear, therefore, that law not only admits of, but demands ritual. Liberty is only able to be thought of as distinct from licence when we have regard to the manner in which it is employed. Thus form, ceremonial, and rite acquire a signification which marks them off from mummery and nonsense. Indeed, to talk of "ritualistic nonsense" is a contradiction in terms, because a rite is a form of signifying worship, and is the result either of custom, precept, or law, and if it is so it cannot be "nonsense." Then, again, if a thing be nonsense it cannot be a rite, for a rite has a signification. The word rite, too, always refers more or less to religious forms or ceremonials, all of which have some meaning to those who employ them, however ridiculous they may seem to those who do not feel penetrated with the same worshipful disposition. It indicates solemnity, and it is by that very indication lifted out of the region of the nonsensical, and made to a certain extent sublime; being a solemn act of duty performed by the person who uses or takes part in it, it is a fallacy unworthy of refutation to call it ritualistic nonsense, and to argue as if that must be granted by everybody. If Christianity is the love of God in Christ Jesus, and both a life according to law, and a worship according to love, I do not see how it can exist without a given ceremonial and settled rites.

I am astonished that S. S. should fancy that God can be indifferent to the manner in which He is worshipped, as he affirms in the second last paragraph of his opening paper. It must be obvious that God must have a form of worship which constitutes it "acceptable worship," and I cannot think that such a negation of carefulness in regard to the place and circumstances as He appears to advocate could be pleasing to a Being who is declared by holy writ to be "jealous of his honour." The same writer thinks that because Christ did not institute a ritual, that any ritual which has not been sanctioned by express appointment in the scriptures of the New Testament is wrong, and not only unnecessary, but inconsistent with the Christianity which He came to establish. If this were an argument of any power against Ritualism, it would be

equally strong against many things which S. S., we suppose, would not class among things unnecessary to, or inconsistent with, true Christianity. No first day sabbath is appointed in Scripture, and the Sabbath as instituted is not a day of worship, but of rest. It has been adopted as a day of worship, but it is not commanded to be kept as such. Again, we have no creed, or articles of faith drawn out at length and properly arranged and certified; we have no catechism drawn up in the Scriptures, nor have we any but one form of prayer given, and as we are not to use "vain repetitions," S. S. must be at a loss to pray according to a form sanctioned by Scripture, and therefore consistent with Christianity, if he is to be limited in things lawful to be done by the Scriptures alone.

King David, the royal shepherd-singer of the Jews, knew a more excellent way. He could say, "I will walk at liberty; for I seek Thy precepts (Ps. cxix. 45), and so can those who enjoy the "glorious liberty wherewith Christ maketh His people free." They do not fear that any method in which, with true and pure heart, they seek to serve God their Father faithfully will be thought inconsistent with the devotion they ought to cherish in their souls, and they know that all that God has given to man has been intended to progress with him, and to develop itself for him and by him.

Besides, S. S. forgets that in the historical circumstances of Christianity it was impossible, with due regard to development and the safety of His disciples, for our Lord to institute a ritual which should be the same over all and among all those who believe. Had we all, for instance, to follow "the example and practice of Jesus," and to get baptized in the river Jordan, or any other river, or to pray on the mountain side as a habit during the night, we should be in reality using His example as a stumbling-block, and be making Him, not the Rock of our salvation, but a rock of offence. The question cannot be argued in the letter of the New Testament; it must be debated in regard to the spirit of it. The Holy Scriptures are full of Ritualism, and so fully does the Deity recognize the necessity of ritual for man, that He laid down elaborate laws for it, that it might be a trustworthy "schoolmaster" to bring the Jews to Christ. Much of the Scriptures would be unintelligible were it not for Ritualism; and even the holiest of prophets, Ezekiel, and the profoundest of seers, John of Patmos, have introduced ritual into heaven as the very safeguard and glory of angelic worship.

That ritual, as form, is not alien to the spirit of the gospel we learn from the very example of Christ, who taught His disciples, "after this manner pray ye." The institution of baptism and the Lord's Supper show the same thing. S. S., we presume, considers marriage "a holy ordinance," and that it is properly and justly as religious as well as a civil ceremony and contract in the face of the congregation of God's people, but he does so because that harmonizes with the spirit of the gospel, not because it is so sanctioned in holy writ.

We should learn greater tolerance for ritualistic observances, too,

from the example of Jehovah, who, though the Jews brought from Egypt the ritual of the worship prevalent there, did not demand its disuse, but only corrected and refined it; freed it from its errors, and consecrated it by accepting it as conformable to His glory if used for His worship.

I am induced to put these few thoughts before the readers of the *British Controversialist*, in the hope that they may lead to a more liberal way of thought among them, and cause some of them to believe that Ritualism, if honestly engaged in, may rightly conduce to the service of God, and may, therefore, be not only consistent with, but even absolutely necessary, in a greater or less degree, to the progress of true Christianity in certain states of society and stages of civilization.

ABRACADABRA.

UNNECESSARY.—IV.

WHAT is Ritualism? a deeply laid scheme to restore England and England's Church to that state of beatific happiness in which she gloried in pre-Reformation times;—what is Ritualism? The Rev. Orby Shipley, in an essay "On the Reunion of the Church," supplies the answer; he remarks,—“Anglicans are reproached by Protestants with their resemblance to Romanism. It is said, a stranger entering into a church where ritual is carefully attended to, might easily mistake it for a Romish service. Of course he might; the whole purpose of the great revival has been to eliminate the dreary Protestantism of the Hanoverian period, and restore the glory of Catholic worship.” What is Ritualism? it is an attempt to un-Protestantise that noble witness for God's truth which has so long been “the ark of the testimony” in England, an attempt openly avowed by the Rev. James Hunt, of Northmoor Green, who, in a letter to the “Somerset County Gazette,” says, “We belong to an army who, ere five years have elapsed, will have exorcised from our beloved Church the demon of Protestantism, which has already degraded her doctrine and practice to the vulgar level of the sects.”

What is Ritualism? It is the attempt to undo the mistake committed in the sixteenth century; in defence of which “an archbishop, four other bishops, twenty clergymen, and 220 laymen” were burned at the stake; what is it? Mr. Coleridge describes it in his speech in the St. Alban's case. Speaking of the Ritualistic service, he says, “It is not Roman, which is historical and impressive in its way; not Greek, which is historical and impressive too; not English, which is simple, but which is not without its own noble, and even majestic severity; but a hybrid made up out of all these, yet differing from each; a something, all made out of the carver's brain, and tending to display the ingenuity of man rather than the honour and glory of God.” What is Ritualism? An ecclesiastical conspiracy, to establish a hierarchy of sacerdotalism which would seek to pry into our nearest and dearest thoughts; search out with severe scrutiny our inmost desires; and would

place itself, as a sort of half-way house, between our souls and our God, assuming to itself the prerogative of forgiving, or otherwise, the sin which is disclosed in the gloomy recesses of the confessional. It is the opponent rather than the handmaid of true "holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord."

Let us, depending on the guidance and instruction of the Holy Spirit, obey in meekness that sublime command of our Lord Jesus Christ, "Search the Scriptures" (John v. 39). What do we find there? no severe ritual is enjoined; no multitudinous array of fasts to be observed, and penances for sin to be performed. No injunction as to the precise manner in which the "altar" was to be placed, or the exact colour of the cloth with which it was to be decked at the various seasons of the year. Here we find no command with regard to the particular vestment which the "priest" was to wear when he offered the "holy sacrifice." Nothing is said as to the beautifying of the churches, and rendering everything pleasant to the eye, and soothing to the ear, and alluring to the imagination, no, not even the command to revere and cherish Calvary's "accursed tree," on which the guilt of ages, past and future, was to hang, by putting a fac-simile in the place in which worship was to be performed; but the simple plain language of our Saviour falls on our ears, and, by God's grace, wends its way to our hearts, as he says to each of us, as to the woman at the well of Samaria, "The hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in Spirit and in truth. God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth" (John iv. 23, 24). Surely if a gorgeous ritual had been necessary to Christianity, its Divine founder would not have let such an opportunity slip, of proclaiming with exactness its purpose, its plan, and its requirements.

And again, if we turn to that exposition of the Christian religion which our Saviour gives in the sermon on the mount, as recorded by St. Matthew in the 5th, 6th, and 7th chapters of his gospel, we meet with no intimation of the new ritual to be enforced, which would exceed in severity that of the Mosaic economy. But here we find that "inspired rubric" given by our Lord, "after this manner therefore pray ye," "Our Father, which art in heaven, &c." No recapitulation of all the various ceremonies to be performed, which our ritualistic brethren "indulge" in, on account of their primitive origin, together with the testimony of the "fathers." We go further back than the custom of the primitive church, and the testimony, "so-called," of the "fathers," back to the "word of God, which standeth for ever;" back, to listen to Jesus as He teaches the multitudes on the mount, and in the synagogue, on sea and on land, finding nothing to justify the proceedings taking place in, alas! too many churches of our land. The argument of those who contend that the ritual was not likely to be instituted until after the death, resurrection, and ascension of our Lord is based on the principle that what the scriptures "do not forbid they tacitly

allow," and is, in fact, a declaration of the Romish doctrine, with regard to tradition, "that it is to be regarded as on an equal footing with scripture." They assume that our Lord Jesus Christ instituted a form of ceremonial pleasing and attractive to the senses, though Holy Scripture gives no warrant for such assumption, they imagine that Jehovah who had instituted and commanded a typical ritual before he yielded to the craving of man's nature, and manifested himself in the flesh, intended such ritual to be succeeded by one more exacting. How glaring is the inconsistency, a typical ritual after the appearance of the antitype! But we have a ritual of Divine origin, a feast in remembrance of a Saviour's dying love, a pledge of his death, and a remembrance of the same. How beautiful is the account of that royal feast: "and as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessed it, and brake it, and gave it to the disciples, and said, Take, eat; this is my body. And he took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, Drink ye all of it; for this is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins" (Matt. xxvi. 26, 27, 28; Mark xiv. 22-25; Luke xxii. 17-20.) This was a fitting ceremony for that religion which appeals to the heart rather than the eye, whose members "walk by faith, not by sight" (2 Cor. v. 7). And again, the command of our risen and glorified Saviour to his eleven disciples, just before he left them in a weary troubled world, "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Amen" (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20), shows us that he intended that baptism, of which he himself had partaken, to be a sacrament in his Church until he came. But no mention is made of the beauty of the building at all. God's throne of grace was to be everywhere, to such as call upon him by faith. And though it is better that the building in which the public worship of God is conducted should not be used for secular purposes, nay, should be kept sacred for his service, we must not forget that it is not the building, but the inhabitant; not the fabric, but the creature, worshipping there in spirit and in truth, in whom Jehovah delights. It is not the catalogue of the self-righteous Pharisee which God looks for, but the cry, heartfelt and sincere, of the publican, "God be merciful to me a sinner." Let us therefore not extol the building at the expense of the Creator of all mankind; let us not bow down to the table on which the pledges of a Saviour's love are spread, instead of bowing our hearts in thankfulness to the Lamb of God, "that takest away the sins of the world;" let us worship the Lord "in the beauty of holiness," as St. Paul did at Troas, "upon the first day of the week, when the disciples came together to break bread, Paul preached to them, ready to depart on the morrow; and continued his speech until midnight. And there were many lights in the upper chamber, where they were gathered

together" (Acts xx. 7, 8); as did Peter at the house of Cornelius, when he preached a sermon, and also asked, "Can any man forbid water, that these should not be baptized which have received the Holy Ghost as well as we? And he commanded them to be baptized in the name of the Lord. Then prayed they him to tarry certain days" (Acts x. 47, 48); as did the early Christians in the house of Priscilla and Aquila (Rom. xvi. 8-5). These instances show us that it is not the building, but the heart; not the mere outward form of godliness, but the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, which can help and guide us in our spiritual worship of a God who is a spirit. Corporeal worship might be consistent with a corporeal God, but with the invisible Jehovah the true worship is that of the heart. Appeals to man's sense of the beautiful, so far from leading him to the proper estimation of God's character, blinds his powers of reasoning, and blights true devotion in the soul; his ears are enchanted by strains of music, which fall like the gentle tones of the enchantress with an almost irresistible force; his gaze is provided for by a display of light, and all the colours of the rainbow are united in the undertaking to render the scene one of magnificence and splendour. And where, amid all this pageantry and show, is the mind of the believer? Now the music soars through the Church with all-absorbing sound; now the "priest," in his "coat of many colours," which is without a precedent either in modern or ancient ecclesiastical history, half sings, half reads the beautiful communion service. Now the boys with censor fills the air with incense almost stifling. And now the "priest" bows down in lowly reverence before "his God," whom he has just created, each worshipper is now in adoration bent before that something on the "altar," which it is an insult to the Omnipresence of the great "I Am," to call his real presence, and a misappropriation of his creatures, the bread and wine, to use them for purposes of idolatry. Where, we ask, is the mind of the worshipper? is it enjoying that spiritual communion with its Saviour, that realisation that "He is with us always, even to the end of the world." Is the mind filled with thoughts of Calvary, and of the precious body which was extended there for his sin, poor sinful man or woman, and not for "his only, but for the sins of the whole world." Does a flood of rapture fill the soul as the thought of Jesus at his Father's right hand in heaven, "where he ever liveth to make intercession for us," or is his mind absorbed by the mysterious ceremony which is taking place at the east end of the building. He bows in lowly worship, one hand resting on the other is held submissively until the "priest" whispers softly in his ear, his hand is raised slowly, the "priest" places in his extended palm that which he has been adoring, food which may strengthen the body but cannot feed the soul. What a perversion of that loving feast, the expression of a Saviour's love, perverted into a sacrifice which is not required, but is an act of direct opposition to the sacrament, nay, which takes away its nature, and clothes it with garments of

an unfitting and insulting character. But Ritualism is inconsistent with Christianity, because opposed to the doctrines of the Bible. In attempting to make out a case our learned Professors and others must sometimes find it difficult, in the extreme, to forget some of their learning. They tell us that the "priests" of the gospel have power to forgive the sins of men, but they are obliged to forget that the Greek word *ιερευς*, signifying a sacred person who offers sacrifices for sin, never occurs in the New Testament, as applied to a New Testament minister. The word *presbyter*, from which our word priest is a derivation, is derived from the Greek word *πρεσβυτερος*, which signifies an elder. Now, if we read with attention St. Paul's epistles to Timothy, we shall find no mention of elders as sacrificing priests. But if we look around us at the present day, we find great men who have taken great honours at our universities for their learning, actually forgetting, with an ease almost surprising, doctrines which they cannot fail to have learned, and substituting in their places others exactly opposite; to such a length have some of these men been carried by their wilful blindness, that in many cases their right to be regarded as submediators between God and man is not questioned, but admitted; and their power to absolve the criminal of his sins, looked upon as founded upon God's word, which says by the mouth of St. Peter, "Pray God, if perhaps the thought of thine heart may be forgiven thee," Acts viii. 22. Notwithstanding the outspoken language of scripture, we find confession and absolution carried on in our midst by the so-called "priests" of the gospel, as was fully testified by the wail of the poor servant girl, "I shall be lost if Dr. Pusey won't give me absolution." Such a contradiction of terms as a preaching minister, who has power to forgive or retain at pleasure the sins of which he is made the confidant, is indeed a gross perversion of Holy Scripture, for, "as for forgiving of sins, who can forgive sins but God alone."

Following next in the train of priestly assumption, we find the table on which the feast of Jesus is to be commemorated, transformed into an altar. And here again we find no mention whatever of the "altar" of the New Testament. St. Paul, speaking to the Hebrews, says, "We have an altar whereof they have no right to eat which serve the tabernacle" (xiii. 10). He does not allude to God's table, but to the body of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whose sacrificial death and passion inestimable benefits have been obtained, to which they had no right who continued to trust in the Levitical sacrifices. The priesthood being overthrown, the principle of an "altar" without a priest, but with a steward of the mystery of godliness (1 Tim. iii. 16), the mystery of iniquity (2 Thess. ii. 7), the mystery of the union of Jews and Gentiles (Ephes. iii. 3-9), and others, falls to the ground, as having no foundation.

And lastly, the sacrifice, as of necessity it must follow the "altar," is none other than that of our Lord Jesus Christ, as

openly avowed. Mr. Bennet, a presbyter of the Church of England, is reported to have stated, in answer to a question put to him before the Royal Commission on Ritualism, that he believed himself to be "a sacerdos," that is, a sacrificing priest. And what does he purport to offer? None else than the bread and wine which are to become the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ at any moment when he chooses to exert the miraculous power claimed for him and his brother "sacerdotes," by the Bishop of Salisbury. How horrible is the thought that weak, sinful man should have entrusted to him power to create his God at pleasure. It is dishonourable to our Saviour's death on Calvary, it is a denial of the efficacy of its atoning merits. Can such teaching be consistent with the Christian religion, which says, with regard to priesthood, "This man (Christ), because he continueth ever, hath an unchangeable priesthood. Wherefore he is able to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them" (Heb. vii. 24, 25), and rejects the mediation of a self-appointed "priest," saying, "For there is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus" (1 Tim. ii. 5), and rejects the idea of an altar, because the sacrifice on the Cross was complete. "But this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins for ever, sat down on the right hand of God" (Heb. x. 12). "For by one offering he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified" (ver. 14).

We have seen that the Ritual which is claimed to be essential to Christianity has no claim for its authorship from the founder of the Christian religion, no pretensions in its favour are found in God's Word, in too many instances it drowns the feeling of devotion, by attracting the senses, keeping them for the time being so engrossed, that when its enchanting influences are withdrawn, the physical as well as the spiritual constitutions of its devotees are in a state of semi-chaotic spiritual prostration until its energies are aroused again, and its enchantments renewed, gliding onwards in easy stages of gradation, until it lands its followers in doctrines antagonistic in practice and principle to the Word of God.

Let us, then, outnumber these men who are determined on union with Rome. Let us outpray them before a throne of grace; let our action go forward with the motto, "Truth before Peace" enshrined on our banners, and with "Love to Christ" engraven on our hearts, with the memory of our martyred Reformers, and the cause they bled for, before our mind's eye, and trusting in Jehovah, our cause will prosper, false doctrine will be overthrown, priestcraft, with absolution on one side, and the power which makes the Creator subservient to the will of the created on the other, will vanish, leaving the cause of Truth victorious as of old, its principal warriors exclaiming, "Not unto us, O Lord; not unto us, but unto Thy name give glory, for Thy mercy and for Thy truth's sake."

R. S. STRANGWAYS.

HAS THE PAPACY BEEN BENEFICIAL TO THE WORLD?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WHETHER the Pope be in truth as he is in name Christ's vicar upon earth divinely appointed, matters little to the question at issue. The Papacy is, and has been for many centuries, a substantial existence, but into the legality of the supremacy it arrogates to itself I do not pretend to set up the Papacy as the most mild and beneficent government which the world has ever seen; it has, on the contrary, often been a very tyrannous one; but in this world the evil is ever mingled with the good, and the Papacy, though it has done much harm has also in its time done very much good, and rendered important services to mankind. In other words the world would have been worse without the Papacy than with it. The Papacy was a necessity of old and mediæval days, but whether it is a necessity now is altogether another matter. What suits the child is sometimes ill suited for the man. The power of the Papacy was needed in the childhood of civilization, perhaps it is now advisable to cast off our swaddling clothes.

But apart from these general grounds the Papacy has been beneficial to the world.

1. *In preserving Christianity.*—We know as a matter of fact that in the second and third centuries there were flourishing Christian churches independent of the see of Rome, though all paying great deference to her, on all the northern coast of Africa and some distance into the interior, as well as at Jerusalem, Asia Minor, and Antioch. Where are these churches now? And what is there to show for the labours of Origen, St. Thomas, St. Ignatius, and St. Cyprian? Absolutely nothing. Being independent of Rome, and rejecting, especially St. Cyprian at Carthage, the supremacy of the Pope, they have all fallen away from their first love, the majority of the descendants of the thousands of the catechumens of Cyprian embracing the doctrines of Mahomet, and the next holding a mixed and very impure form of Christianity without displaying any vital activity. On the other hand, nearly all the churches over which the Papal See had, or has obtained jurisdiction, have continued firm in their allegiance to their spiritual head, and have not swerved in their obedience to him whom they regard as his deputy. The consequence is, that the Papal See is now more united, more active, more influential than it has been in any preceding age. It has had many conflicts to wage against heretics and Reformers. From many it has come out completely victorious, and in the rest, though worsted for a time, it has either soon regained its lost ground, or at least placed an effectual barrier against further encroachment. The Reformation was, perhaps, the greatest blow received by the Papacy. Yet even here it is a noteworthy fact that during the early

years of the struggle several recusant nations were again brought under the dominion of the Holy See; while "no Christian nation which did not adopt the principles of the Reformation before the end of the sixteenth century should ever have adopted them. Catholic communities have since that time become infidel and become Catholic again; but none has become Protestant." It cannot be doubted, looking at the fortune or misfortune which has befallen the ancient Christian churches, that if the Papacy had not, through the efforts of Ignatius Loyola and his followers, opposed an insurmountable barrier to the further spread of Protestantism, sects, or so-called churches would have multiplied without limit; and, as a consequence, after a short and bitter struggle the one with the other, have gradually become extinct, certainly in influence if not in name. Look at the influence now exerted by the so-called churches on the Continent, Geneva, Zurich, and the German centres of Lutheranism. It is almost nil. Christianity has given place to Rationalism, and will, in a few years, it is to be feared, be practically extinct.

2. *The Papacy has spread Christianity*—and on this account has been most beneficial to mankind. Of the fact of the spread of Christianity by the Papacy, there will, I suppose, be no question. It has literally compassed sea and land, and in so doing has made not one, but many proselytes. It now numbers more adherents than all other Christian churches and sects put together. They are found on the plains of China, on the sands of India and Arabia, on the pampas of South, and in all the rising towns of North America. To Rome solely, our own island—if not for the first introduction, certainly for the effective restoration of Christianity—is deeply indebted. I care not what men may say about British bishops; to all intents and purposes Christianity was dead and powerless, and Paganism active and triumphant. The mission of St. Augustine happily placed Christianity in this island on a foundation which has never been shaken. I care not whether you say the Papacy now holds doctrines different from those preached by St. Augustine, or that he preached erroneously; the fact is the same. Christianity was established in this island by aid of the Papacy. The same with Ireland, and in short the whole of Europe. As before remarked, her missionaries are now found in every quarter of the globe, and labour to the full as zealously, and judging from numbers alone, quite as successfully as those of any Protestant body. Its power, too, over the hearts and minds of men is now, as Macaulay remarks, "greater far than when the 'Encyclopædia' and the 'Philosophical Dictionary' appeared." It is surely remarkable that neither the moral revolution of the eighteenth century, nor the moral counter revolution of the nineteenth, should, in any perceptible degree, have added to the domain of Protestantism. During the former period whatever was lost to Catholicism was lost also to Christianity; during the latter, whatever was regained by Christianity in Catholic countries was regained also by Catholicism.

3. *The Papacy has preserved unity of doctrine*, and has therefore been beneficial to the world—any religion is better than none; if indeed it be possible for men to exist without any. The history of nations has in fact demonstrated that without some measure of religious faith, political security is a dream. That form of religious Government which keeps all its subjects united, and thus prevents schisms, cannot but be beneficial to mankind. In the spread of Christianity among the heathen it is of immense advantage, and we know that the numerous sects and parties among Protestants are attended with a corresponding disadvantage. With them the trumpet is for ever giving forth a discordant if not an uncertain sound, and the intelligent heathen may well be puzzled what to believe, or doubt the divine authority of those who are distinguished only for their divisions and contrarieties, and ask if their God be the author of confusion. Separation once accomplished, becomes in a short time pregnant with schisms, which almost as soon as they are brought forth, bear others, and so the species is kept up and propagated. It may be said that the Papacy preserves a unity of error, or more correctly of superstition, but do the Protestant sects, in their diverse forms, preserve a unity of truth or anything like it. All plainly cannot be right, nor can it be left for each to determine what is fundamental as points of agreement. Considered carefully it will be seen that among Protestants there are errors as grave if not as numerous as those sanctioned by the Papacy. This latter it must also be remembered contains a great body of truth, the truth in fact, though in the course of ages it has been overlaid with error and superstition. Unity is better than division, and as Protestantism has not preserved us from “false doctrine, heresy, and schism,” I cannot but think that the Papacy which has kept its followers in one faith, has rendered an important service to mankind.

4. *The Papacy has preserved civilization and literature*, extended both, and so been most beneficial to mankind. When the Goths, Huns, and other barbarians invaded and overran Italy, it was the church alone which preserved the world from a deluge of universal darkness and barbarianism. The invaders quailed before the sacred and awful power of the church, they refrained from destroying her, and when they were admitted to her membership by baptism, they learnt with the doctrines and morality of Christianity the arts and advantages of civilized life. They depended for their letters and learning entirely upon the church. Thus was it in Italy, so was it in France under Charlemagne, and in Saxon England. So was it among the Patagonians and other tribes in South America. I shall not mention by name the pontiffs who have more especially encouraged learning and the fine arts; they are known to all, while the existence of the library and invaluable MSS. of the Vatican is a convincing proof, if proof were needed, of the truth of the statement. Of the numbers of men distinguished for learning and administrative ability nursed in her bosom I shall not speak, suffice

it to say that our own, in common with many other countries, has again and again been indebted to Romish cardinals to discharge the highest offices of the state, and was never better off than when they availed themselves of their services. In the middle ages the church was the sole depository of learning, and though doubtless many reliable MSS. of classic authors were effaced by monks to make room for lives and legends of the saints, yet we must bear in mind that it is to these selfsame monks that we are indebted for whatever valuable is left to us, and this, though great has been the destruction or loss, is no inconsiderable quantity. The Papacy has diffused a spirit of humanity among various nations. What? I hear some one exclaiming, the Papacy which has put to death men, women, and children, diffused a spirit of humanity? Yes. Remember that if Rome burnt John Huss, Geneva burnt Savonarola, and if Catholics imprisoned and put to death Protestants, Protestants put to death Catholics, when they had the power. Strike off this equal account on both sides, and the statement remains that the Papacy has diffused a spirit of humanity, for in the states of modern Europe civilization was everywhere the offspring of Christianity. During the middle ages its presumptive aspect had disappeared, but something of its spirit still remained. Its opposition to the progress of lawless divorce was too striking to be evaded, and was often urged with success. Wherever published it was called to contend with the custom of human sacrifices, or with the equally cruel practice of infanticide, and it invariably abolished them. The assumed right of self-destruction, under whatever pretence, was solemnly denounced, and by the zeal of Christian benevolence, the nations of the East and West were secured from the brutalizing influence of gladiatorial exhibitions. The civil power was so inefficient for the preservation of public tranquillity, that when a country was at peace with all its neighbours, it was liable to be disturbed by private wars, individuals taking upon themselves the right of deciding their own quarrels, and avenging their own wrongs. No law therefore was ever more thankfully received than when the Council of Clermont decreed, that from sunset on Wednesday to sunrise on Monday in every week, the truce of God should be observed on pain of excommunication. Prisoners and slaves were objects of special solicitation to the church, and it cannot be denied that it was owing to the human exertions of the clergy that the manumission of slaves had made such great progress before the downfall of the feudal system. The church had at that time an almost unlimited power over the minds and consciences of men, and this power, though bad in itself, was used for the benefit of the oppressed of the human race.

I shall perhaps be reminded of the great advances made in civilization, freedom, and human progress, since the days of the Reformation, more especially, if not entirely, in Protestant countries, the Catholic ones having continued in the same state of

darkness and inanition. In the first place it cannot be proved that the decay of Spain, Portugal, &c., is to be attributed to their Catholicism, or the rise of England and the Netherlands to their Protestantism. Our Henry VII., who did as much as any man of that age for commerce and discovery, was a Catholic, so was Columbus himself, so were the early Portuguese discoverers. The fact is the time for advance had come, and when countries more favourably situated for trade embarked in it, it was a natural consequence that others should recede. Russia has made of late years immense strides in freedom and civilization, yet Russia is neither Catholic nor Protestant. Protestant Prussia has a large and powerful army, so has Catholic Austria, and the one nation is now nearly, if not quite as free as the other. Again, has Protestant Sweden advanced or declined since the day when Charles XII. could boldly give battle to the Czar of all the Russias. The question is not to be decided in this way.

I must now leave the question to the further elucidation of opponents and coadjutors, knowing that much remains to be said, feeling convinced that however men may differ in religious opinions, the majority will, after careful deliberation, come to the conclusion that the Papacy has been beneficial to the world.

R. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.— II.

THE papacy or popedom which is to be considered in this question is not the civil government of the Roman states alone; but that wide-spreading spiritual empire which claims supremacy over all the sovereignties of the earth, and avers the possession of power in and influence over the nether worlds of purgatory and the inferno, and even in and over the upper world and region of Paradise—the very dwelling-place of the Most High over all, God blessed for evermore. The daring and blasphemous arrogance of such a claim is terrible to think of, and startles the thinker into asking, How can a government of mortal men, which issues such a programme for itself, be beneficial to human society? If the power is possessed by such a state, the proof of its possession of it ought surely to be made palpable to the meanest capacity; for the awful interests of a futurity exceeding human thought depends on man's acceptance of the fact, if it is one, that to the papacy has been committed the keeping of the three keys of purgatory, hell, and heaven, as well as the preservation of the reign of holiness in the earth. If it exists as the possessor of such a power, and does not furnish adequate proof of its having it, it must be very far indeed from being beneficial to society; because society must reject that as a false assumption which is incapable of proof to it, and hence the perdition of the souls of men, not to say anything of the state of their earthly happiness, is made dependent on the acceptance as a fact of that which is not proved—the spiritual and temporal power of the papacy as a divine institution.

And if the power thus arrogated is not possessed; if it is a mere myth and imposition; if it is a deception and not a reality, a sham and not a fact,—what shall we say of it? Shall we not say that a lie is a crime, but that, above all, a lie in the name of religion must be a continual curse? The papacy by a lie changed a courteously conceded pre-eminence into a cunning predominance, and by a carefully devised system of intrigues placed ecclesiastical dignity before the civil authority, overawed the policy of nations, trampled on the necks of kings, and by threats of a vain and imaginary power to excommunicate, froze up the efforts of men to make progress and secure the happiness for which they longed. Will it be maintained that the papacy which thus “worketh abomination and maketh a lie,” could have been beneficial to society? If so, we emphatically deny it, and hold that a lie lives a leprosed life, and that all that is done through it or by it, or on account of it, is filled with the rottenness of its origin. Such a theocracy—demonocracy, rather!—as the Popes of Rome attempted to found could not but be known to themselves as false; and they could scarcely fail to infer that all that is false must in the long run prove to be mischievous; but they persevered in their horrid scheme of deceit, and reddened the earth with the blood of the saints who chose to obey God rather than man, and to place their faith in Jesus Christ in preference to the Pope.

The attempt to set up an absolute policy in religion, and to compel all men to adhere and cleave to the tenets of a creed defined and laid down for them by a ruling power, whose political might was theoretically co-extensive with the universe, and whose spiritual dominion extended beyond life into the vistas of eternity, was a most pernicious one. It was an endeavour to place a monstrous tyranny upon the souls of men—a tyranny more galling than any or all the pretenders to mere earthly sovereignty could have inflicted on man. This was the infamous and blasphemous attempt made by the Papacy; and in making it it was guilty of a double teachery—treason against the God whose vice-regal sovereignty on earth it pretended to administer and against the humanity they professed to govern for their temporal and eternal advantage. Its evil results were twofold. Such a tyranny having been arrogated by one sovereignty, others thought they were justified in making a claim to the obedience of the people in articles of faith, and that doubt of these creeds and articles which they imposed constituted a punishable act of treason, and demanded the severest penalties able to be inflicted on men. Hence arose the institution of inquisitions, and hence persecutions, fines, imprisonment, &c., for so-called religious offences came to be thought legitimate acts of power. The Papacy sanctioned such inflictions by its nefarious claims, and others followed in the wake of the Pope as a power while dissenting from him as a prelate.

Again, the people of various countries got their ideas regarding human rights confused, and they came to think that the national in-

stitution of religions was not only proper and becoming, but really essential; and from this have sprung our established churches and all the legislative troubles connected with them, as well as the troubles they have brought upon dissenters. Had not the Papacy built up a whole priesthood whose object it was to hold the very souls of men in subjection to their arbitrary power, such an idea never could have got into general usage among men as that they must all have the same creed to a letter, and quench the light of conscience which God had given them to walk before him with. All that detestable nonsense about religious unity and uniformity is but a lot of the remnants of the disastrous effects of the Papacy as a vast mould into which men's thoughts were to be once cast and stereotyped for ever. It is the very nature of man to disagree in opinions from his fellows, just because it is his nature to be thoughtful and inquisitive. It is this very fact of man's originality that is the cause of progress, improvement, and enlightenment. Man thinks, and new ideas enter into his mind; he investigates and discovers new truths, or new relations of old truths. On this account man ought not to be taught, as the Papacy insists on doing, that uniformity in faith is holy and nonconformity is sinful.

The Papacy is the type of all tyranny. It claims a right divine to existence and obedience; it does not justify its right to live by the good it accomplishes, but by the traditions of ages and the misinterpretations of centuries. It demands a submission of the most unhesitating kind. It claims that without any relaxation of its behests, whatever be the honesty of the objection felt to what it orders, obedience shall be given. It thus strikes at the root of all individuality of life or faith, at all independency of mind or act, of all freedom of speech or thought. If such demands can be warrantably made by the very sovereignty which founds its authority on the holiest creed, what must be the effect produced by its example on all the other governments on the earth.

Historically, too, the Papacy has always been a tyrant. Among the nations of the earth its way was arbitrary and arrogant. It won its way to supremacy by fomenting the quarrels of kings and people, and its tender mercies were like those of the wicked, cruelty. We need only point to the long and terrible conflicts waged by the Emperors of Germany against its usurpations; the long series of intrigues by which it disunited and then conquered Italy; the flimsy, false, and often-forged rights it asserted over nations which owed it no fealty, and over people who detested the triple mitre.

Unless the history of the Reformation, its antecedents and its consequences, is a fable and a falsehood; unless the Reformation itself was a mistake; unless the sighs of the Italians from the days of Dante to those of Nicolini have been feigned; unless the Italians have been struggling for a fancy and been fighting in a nightmare trance; unless the records at once of commerce, of polity, of treaties, and of statistics, are fabulous as the "Arabian Nights' Entertainments;" unless the testimony of travellers of all creeds

and languages have with one accord assented to tell lies regarding Rome and the Romans, the Papacy has not been beneficial to the progress of the world. "Look on the world's best glory and worst shame," and it will be seen that the former is found where freedom and Protestantism flourish together, and the latter where the Papacy and all her brood of mummeries, slavishness, and terror are. England, North America, Prussia, Sweden, &c., on the one hand, Rome, Spain, South America, Portugal, &c., on the other (for France, though nominally Romish, is in reality full of the spirit of Encyclopædism), will furnish proof more than enough that the Papacy is treason to God and tyranny to man; that it is the incarnate enemy of man's greatness, woman's purity, mental freedom, and individual effort, and that it cannot be or have been beneficial to the world.

L. Y. S.

CAN INDEPENDENCY AND ORTHODOXY CO-EXIST?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

OUR valued editor having given notice of the necessity for closing the debate on the above-mentioned topic, we avail ourselves of the privilege accorded to us as openers of the debate on the affirmative side by replying to the articles of our two opponents, R. S. and N. Q. N.

R. S. endeavours to show that forms of faith or creeds were in use in the apostolic age; and for this purpose he quotes the exhortation given by Paul to Timothy, to "hold fast the form of sound words." Now, doubtless the form of sound words which Timothy was exhorted to hold fast was the doctrines set forth not in any creed of human composition,—for what creed besides that contained in the Scripture was there then drawn up?—but in the word of God. Likewise the form or type of doctrine mentioned in Romans vi. 17, and "the faith once delivered to the saints," for which Christians were exhorted by Jude earnestly to contend, was that contained in the Scriptures, for we ask again what creed besides that in the word of God had there been at that time drawn up?

R. S. tells us, "the Bible though the rule, and sufficient rule, of faith, must be supplemented as to its interpretation by the knowledge we have of the opinions of the Fathers and of primitive custom." The necessity for this we cannot discern. As Scripture could be understood without the opinions of the Fathers *before* those opinions were given, so it can be understood without them now *after* they have been given. And in regard to the opinions of the Fathers helping us to an interpretation of Scripture, we believe that instead of doing any such thing they will lead the person who has recourse to them into a labyrinth of confusion.

R. S. lays much stress on the fact that ministers were ordained to their office by the laying on of hands of the apostles, and that

some power or gift was received by the ordained. He appears to lose sight of the fact that none, either in the times of the apostles or since then, have occupied their position; therefore the fact that some power or gift was communicated by the apostles to those whom they ordained affords no implication that any such power or gift could be imparted by any individual now ordaining others to the work of the Christian ministry. In 1 Tim. iv. 14, Timothy is exhorted not to neglect the gift that was in him with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery. The presbytery were the elders; and in 1 Pet. v. 1, in 2 John 1, and in 3 John 1, the apostles are called elders. Doubtless no others except apostles joined with Paul in the imposition of hands on Timothy, as a gift of the Holy Ghost came with that imposition of the hands, and it was only through laying on of hands of the apostles that the Holy Ghost was given. Philip, though an evangelist, did not lay hands on the believing Samaritans, but Peter and John were sent from Jerusalem to do it. (See Acts viii. 14—17.) And as gifts have now ceased to be conveyed by this laying on of hands that rite ministerial in ordinations is useless and of no avail. But perhaps R. S. is a believer in apostolic succession. If he be, he will we imagine find it to be an impracticable task to prove that those whom he believes to be the successors of the apostles of the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ occupy the same position as, or anything like a similar position to, their predecessors. If they do, let it be shown by their performance of the same works, for "by their works ye shall know them."

On the signification of the Greek word *ecclesia* we would refer to a higher authority than either ourselves or R. S.; viz. Dr. Campbell, whose remarks on this point we quoted in our opening article. This Dr. George Campbell (1719—1796) was not an Independent, but one of the most distinguished theologians belonging to the Established Church of Scotland established in the preceding century.

R. S. tells us it is evident that the churches or congregations in apostolic times were not independent in government; but what he brings forward as proof of his assertion simply shows that there existed individuals occupying a position which even then was unique, and to which there has been in subsequent ages no parallel. The office of apostle was evidently distinct from every other. The separate enumeration of it in the lists contained in 1 Cor. xii. 28, and in Eph. iv. 11 show this, while 1 Cor. xii. 28 shows that the apostolic office was the highest in the church. The apostles were not confined in their ministrations to any particular church, but had power and authority "in all the churches," not only to preach, to administer ordinances, to counsel, but also to reprove as well. Paul sending for the elders of the Ephesian church to meet him at Miletus merely illustrates the same fact, while the command given to Titus to ordain elders in every city is no proof that churches did not choose their own ministers, for at the present time Independent

churches *choose* their ministers, though other persons *ordain* them.

R. S. concludes that the functions of deacons were enlarged soon after their original appointment; but for this inference of his he brings no scriptural evidence. He speaks too of the purpose for which they were originally appointed being accomplished, so that the office might have been expected to cease; but we cannot understand how the purpose for which R. S. admits deacons were first appointed, *i. e.*, to receive, lay out, and distribute the stock of the church to its proper uses, can ever be permanently accomplished as long as a church remains upon earth. It must still be needful that there should be individuals to receive and expend the stock of the church, and there is therefore no authority whatever for the belief of R. S. that when the office of deacon might have been expected to cease, "it was made a distinct order in the church, corresponding very closely with the same order in the Church of England."

N. Q. N. professes to show the inconsistency of those who will have nothing but scriptural truth, and will allow no intermediate creed to come between their souls and the word of God. He presents what he considers to be a somewhat analogous case. He points out that the persons he speaks of do in science allow interpreters and intermediums, and receive the decisions of men who have devoted their lives to the study of the sciences. And he concludes that as the man who would attempt to set at nought all the settled truths of science, and become the interpreter of the universe to himself, would go far astray; so do those who do not allow their religious creed to be made for them, but who claim the right of private judgment.

Now there is an important distinction between religious knowledge and all other knowledge. This distinction is completely lost sight of by N. Q. N., and the omission of this fact makes the whole of his argument fallacious. For the sciences to be understood some amount of human culture is requisite; but this is not the case with respect to the great leading truths of the Bible. That book itself declares that as respects the way of salvation, "the wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err therein;" and that "God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise." A man who can only just read his Bible, and who is ignorant of the very rudiments of science, may, if he be taught by the Holy Spirit, have a good understanding of the Scriptures, and be able, both on points of doctrine and on points of church order, to confute both masters of arts and doctors of divinity. Again, a man who has received the best classical and theological education which the world can afford may be utterly blind to what the Scriptures teach. The Bible itself declares that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned;" and this declaration is as applicable to a learned as to an unlearned "natural man."

These facts overturn the opinion of N. Q. N., that it is not possible for the Bible to be the religion of a man, self searched and self arranged, for the Holy Spirit's teaching is sufficient to lead a man into the truth without any aid from human instruction.

Neither R. S. nor N. Q. N. has shown that independency and orthodoxy cannot co-exist; we therefore still believe that they can and do. S. S.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE close of another volume of the magazine brings with it the close of this and other debates. Owing probably to the press of matter of a more interesting and important nature, or it may be to the fact that the subject discussed is one upon which most have fully made up their minds, and is not an all-engrossing one, this debate, so far as the articles are concerned, has had but scant justice done to it, though I believe, in the sensibility of the matter and the weight of the arguments brought forward on either side, it will bear comparison with any other now being wound up in the pages of this magazine.

It is now my duty to review, criticise, and sum up the articles written on both sides, and to show why I still think a negative is the only true and consistent reply to the question proposed.

S. S., who opens in the affirmative, gives definitions of independency and orthodoxy with which I entirely concur, but after stating truly enough that the Bible is the text of orthodoxy, he puts the very strange and, to him, damaging question, "Whose views of the doctrines of the Bible are to be regarded as orthodox views?" It is a fact patent to all that persons of the most diverse sentiments believe their own opinions to be the doctrines of the Bible, Trinitarians, Unitarians, Calvinists, and Arminians all believe this," p. 203. It is rather difficult to tell whether S. S. believes the Bible to be the standard of orthodoxy; at any rate I believe the Independents do, and I shall here assume that he, as their advocate, does so to. There is then a *rule of faith*, a sound form of words, a body of doctrine laid down in the Bible to which it behoves all to adhere, and yet the same voice which allows this, asks "Who is to decide what the doctrines of the Bible are?"

On the implied supposition of S. S. that no one can, it would follow that there is a rule of faith laid down, and yet that no one can exactly point out where it is or wherein it consists. It would follow that a revelation of the divine will being vouchsafed, a New Testament bestowed upon man, he is left in doubt as to what to believe or what to disregard. It is a fact patent to all, that all sects believe, or say they believe, their doctrines to be contained in the Bible, but the question is are they so contained? Have they most certain warrant of Holy Scripture for their doctrines and practices? The mere *saying* they have does not in the least affect the faith of their possession or non-possession of such warrant. The fact is, there is a body of doctrines in the Bible, but

Unitarians, Baptists, Calvinists, take just so much as it accords with or seems to accord with the views they entertain. They square the Bible to suit their own views, and are not guided in their "belief" by it. Any student of the Scriptures knows full well that sayings and precepts the most opposite in character and tendency, and apparently the most irreconcilable, are to be found in its pages, but though apparently, they are none of them irreconcilably irreconcilable, and that by comparing scripture with scripture a true and satisfactory solution to all these seeming discrepancies is readily obtained. But such persons never attempt such a course of procedure. They wish not to believe the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, but only so much as suits them; therefore they clutch like drowning men eagerly and violently at the first text which seems at all to fit in with their own views, and parade it on every occasion as quite decisive of the question at issue, forgetting all the time that there are numerous other texts which, when duly considered, quite nullify the construction forced upon this one.

If S. S. assumes that there is no standard and text of orthodoxy in the Bible, then who is to decide what is orthodoxy. Anybody or nobody? Every one believes and does what is right in his own eyes, and holds, it may be with a grain of truth among the dross, a large amount of error. The question would then be narrowed to the mere existence of independency among kindred forms of error, the probability of which no one will for one moment deny. But S. S. curiously and ingeniously evades the alternative, by proposing to discuss the possibility of the co-existence of independency and orthodoxy, not with the doctrines of the Bible, but whatever may be regarded as orthodoxy is the nature of independency such as to render it incompatible therewith. And then he enters into a long discussion as to the condition of the Church of England, into which I do not propose to follow him, showing that all the clergy are not orthodox, and that there are divisions within her. Yet the Church of England, claiming to be an orthodox church, exists with heresies among her clergy and divisions of opinions among her members. Independency requiring no profession of creeds, no subscription articles from its ministers, can but have these heresies and divisions, and therefore is as orthodox as the Church of England. But this is arguing beside the mark, for to prove that even the Church of England, of Rome, or any other church with creeds and formularies, has some heretical ministers and professing members who do not hold her dogmas, does not prove that the Independents with more freedom are more orthodox. They may not depart from their own view of the truth so far as some other bodies, but this does not make them pure. The question still arises, what is the truth? what is to be accounted *orthodoxy*? According to S. S., it is as I have previously stated our *dory*. But further, the fact that there are various parties and some errors in the church does not militate against the fact that the church is orthodox.

The visible church is still "the congregation of faithful men," and the church still "a witness and a keeper of holy writ, although in that visible church the evil be ever mingled with the good," and sometimes unfortunately "the evil have chief authority in the ministration of the word and sacraments."

If the Church of England, with articles and confessions of faith, has in it erring or disreputable ministers, is a system which has none of these safeguards less likely to possess them? The supposition is on the face of it preposterous. Yet it is a common argument with people now-a-days, both in political and religious matters, that because in some exceptional cases the safeguards have been broken through, therefore they are of no use, and you had better remove them altogether rather than, as every sensible man would, set about repairing them. Otherwise we should be as they, "tossed about with every wind of doctrine." Again, we are told that the Independent pastors preach more fully and more faithfully the true orthodox doctrines than do the ministers of the Church of England. Granted that some or even all do. Yet what guarantee have we for it, or if they do now will they do so three or six months hence? Is it not a matter of fact that the doctrines of an Independent minister are dependent on those held by his congregation, or at least by his ruling elders, and that as soon as the pastor gets in their idea the least astray, or his teaching becomes somewhat unpalatable, a church meeting is called, and the unfortunate man required to send in a forced resignation, and seek a call elsewhere. The last and grand argument of S. S. is the quibble on the word "*ἐκκλησία*,"—vain reasoning, impotent conclusion. Grant that it is used as you and Dr. Campbell allege it is, though I doubt it, see p. 211, what does it prove? Does it prove that the churches were independent in government, or were designed to be so, or had the choice of their own pastors who believed what they like? Nothing of the sort. It makes nothing for the claim of the Independents to be a scripture church, and this I have fully shown, p. 211, *et seq.*, and to this I refer S. S. and other readers of this debate.

I have dwelt upon the article of S. S., so long that I fear I must be brief upon that of my friend W., if he will allow me to call him so, though as yet personally unacquainted with him. His first charge is that I have mistaken the whole question to be debated, though how I am at a loss to conceive, seeing that his definition of independency given at p. 271 tallies pretty closely with my exposition of its tenets to be found on p. 208.

W. asks, Is the existence of bishops, councils, &c., necessary to define what is Christian truth, and I emphatically answer Yes. They exist for this very purpose. It is not possible for principles like those he enunciates to co-exist with orthodoxy. N. Q. N., has well shown that religious independence is almost impossible, and that as few have the power of discovering truth for themselves, though all are capable of discovering it when pointed out to them and arranged for them, so attempts on the part of the mass of men

to find truths could only result in error, as each would set up something which he called the truth and adhere to that. It is, as before remarked, the consequence of people endeavouring, or fancy they are endeavouring, to find out what the truth is that causes all the multitudinous religious sects. A Turk or a Hindoo is right in believing what is put before him till something else comes in his way which convinces him that his past belief has been a mass of superstition. I or W. himself would in all probability be believers in Mahomet and the Koran had we been born in Turkey and never heard of anything else, but this does not alter our individual responsibility to accept the truth as soon as it is revealed to us.

The truth is in the Scriptures, and every individual is responsible for his duty, success, and diligence in finding it. Men of most opposite views on religious matters may be, so far as their own consciousness goes, morally orthodox, but they are not *ipse facto* so. The question has a natural tendency, I know, to turn on the hinge of opposing doxies, but then I think it may be resolved by stating the evidence which lead us each to the adoption of our several doxies, and comparing the force of the arguments on each side. This I have done in the opening article, and till my opponents show any flaws in the chain or produce theirs, I must hold that my position remains untouched.

I cannot accept W.'s definition of the general significance, because then we must acknowledge that *Semper vox populi est vox Dei*. The summary of general doctrines given on p. 273, does not contain the whole of the matter. They are orthodox doctrines, but they are not the whole of such doctrines. That body is not orthodox which possesses a part of the truth, but that which possesses the whole. The all important doctrine of the sacraments is entirely omitted; and more, I do attach, whatever W. may think of it, great importance to the form of church government, because as a general fact difference of government necessarily involves difference of doctrine. And therefore I have devoted the best part of my paper to a consideration of the scriptural orthodox doctrine on such matters, feeling convinced that if the Independents can be shown, as I think they may, to err in this respect, it is of little avail to say they hold other doctrines which are orthodox.

W. strangely enough asserts, p. 275, "that the principle of self-government is the essence of Independency. This is what I have all along contended, and endeavoured to show that it is not in accordance with Scripture, so that there is no need to discuss other interminable matter.

But I am forced reluctantly to conclude. My friend W. must excuse my not answering him more fully. It is, I believe, quite possible to have the spiritual experience of W. without belonging to any recognised sect, and I am not so uncharitable as to deny it to any who differ from me, but with my own convictions on the subject, I know I should be acting most unjustifiably to divest myself of those forms and means of grace which it seems to me God has provided for the sustenance of my soul.

R. S.

The Essayist.

WAS SHAKSPERE A SCHOLAR?

"The man Shakspeare as read in his works—Shakspeare as there revealed, not only in his genius and intellectual powers, but in his character, disposition, temper, opinions, tastes, prejudices,—is a book yet to be written."
—G. L. CRAIK.

THIS question has usually been held to be settled by the unanimous testimony of contemporaries and the opinion of subsequent critics. Is it questionable? Scholarship is, of course, a relative term, and a writer may be a man of much thought, information, and genius, without being in the technical sense a scholar. That word has come to signify one acquainted with classic literature and conversant with the Greek and Roman tongues. While we do not affirm that Shakspeare was unversed in many matters of great importance in knowledge, we think it may be fairly doubted that he was so ignorant of the ancient writers and the languages in which they wrote as has been generally supposed. Perhaps sufficient reasons may be even yet adducible for entertaining the opinion, that the learning of Shakspeare, though not acquired in the universities of Cambridge and Oxford, was not of such an insignificant nature or small amount as critics often too hastily assume that it was—especially by Dr. Farmer's "Essay on the learning of Shakspeare," 1767. If the available authorities be properly examined, we have an impression that it will be found that he was "able to hold his own," even in classic lore with the university pens, and that he did not require to blush for his ignorance of the languages in which Euripides wrote and Plautus composed.

Our purpose, in the following Shakspeare's day exercitation, is to investigate the grounds of this impression, in as far as it has not yet been brought directly under our mental cognition, and to endeavour to get at something like a fair decision on the question, which is of so much interest as a critical question and as a biographical enigma. We must endeavour to disencumber our minds of all extraneous matter, and to apply our investigations wholly, or at least chiefly, to the one distinct inquiry—Was Shakspeare a Scholar? in the sense of being conversant with Latin and acquainted with Greek, school-learned although not college-bred, trained in some sort in those languages in which in his age, for the most part, the accumulated thought, fact, and incident of the past were enshrined in books.

Professor Masson asserts, in his lecture on "College Education and Self Education," that "Shakspeare was taught at the grammar school of his native town, where the boys at this day wear square academic caps, whatever they did in his ; so that the proper measure of Shakspeare's education, even scholastically, is, that he was carried as far on by the pedagogy of his time as at least ninety-nine per cent. of his contemporaries." In this opinion we entirely coincide, but we aim at what Professor Masson has left undone, proving that it is a reasonable inference from the facts in our possession regarding him who was the

"Soul of the age
The applause, delight, and wonder of our stage."

Nothing that is not absolutely authenticated can be so safely assumed as Shakspeare's education at the Free Grammar School of Stratford-upon-Avon. Though founded in the reign of Henry VI., it had only received its charter from Edward VI. It was thus sufficiently grand with new interest, and modelled to the temper of the times to be popular. We know of no other school in the burgh or district. This was free to all natives of Stratford of seven years of age, and of it Shakspeare's father was one of the curators. Like all the grammar schools of the time, it was under the mastership of university men, who, being graduates, were qualified to diffuse sound scholarship, as it was then understood among those were entrusted to their charge. Nowhere about could William Shakspeare have got a better and a cheaper education, or held so high a social place among his comrades. The masters of "the King's new school of Stratford-upon-Avon," from the time that Shakspeare was fitted by age for entrance as a scholar were two, Thomas Hunt, curate of Luddington, and Thomas Jenkins. Of these men nothing is known, but Jenkins was probably a Welshman, and therefore may have been an Oxford man. There seems to be no reason for thinking that they did not do justice to Shakspeare, and as little for believing that Shakspeare did not do justice to them.

But we have something more than assumption for our faith, that he was a scholar passing fair, if not indeed a ripe and good one. Thomas Nash, in his "Anatomy of Absurdity," in 1570, one of the leaders of what may called the university wits party, among the dramatists, twits him about his "little country grammar knowledge," and being the writer of new found songs and "sonnets." An evening's admission takes us that length. We have next his free choice of two classic subjects, one culled from Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, book x., Bion's *Idylls*, i., &c., "Venus and Adonis," with a motto from Ovid, distinctly challenging the comparison instituted by the wits,—

"Vilia miretur Vulgus ; mihi flavus Apollo ;
Pocula Castalia plena ministret aqua,"

which may be thus rendered, "Let the mob marvel at base things; to me golden-haired Apollo shall supply cups full of *Castalian* water;" and another from the legendary history of Rome, the historic source of which is Livy, b. i., 57—60; and the poetic Ovid's *Fæsti*, b. ii., 685—852, which contains an argument in prose, forming an epitome of the story on which the poem is founded.

Looking upon the *sources* of these poems, we see the peculiar appropriateness of the commendatory notice of Shakspeare given by Francis Mere, minister and schoolmaster, Master of Arts of both universities, in his "*Palladis Tamia*," *Wit's Treasury*, 1598, when he says "As the soul of Euphorbus was thought to live in Pythagoras, so the sweet witty soul of Ovid lives in mellifluous and honey-tongued Shakspeare—witness his '*Venus and Adonis*,' and his '*Lucrece*,'" &c.

"*Timon of Athens*" is, perhaps, the best drama of Shakspeare's scholarship. It was first published in 1623. It is founded on a passage in Plutarch, one of the most admirable of the dialogues of Lucian, "*The Timon*," and a few additional touches from another of the same author's singularly dramatic dialogues, "*The auction sale of the Philosophers*." The touches in this play are very fine, and the Greek discrimination of characters is excellently sustained. Many of the expressions glow and flash, as if the flexile Greek tongues had again become the medium of the large utterance of the mighty in thought; suggestions not only of Lucian, but of *Æschylus*, *Callimachus*, *Cicero*, &c., come over us as we read, and we think we feel that the splendid appropriateness of the Hellenic languages had raised by personal contact with it an ambition to cope with the close-fitting speech of the early literatures.

We are quite well aware, that North's translation of "*Plutarch*" existed in 1579, and passed into a second and third edition respectively in 1602 and 1603; and that in Painter's "*Palace of Pleasure*" (28), *Timon's* story occurs. But Shakspeare's "*Timon*" is neither that of Plutarch nor of Painter; and has elements in it clearly observable from Lucian as a source. Of his "*Timon*" there was no known translation in Shakspeare's day; though Farmer conjectures, from a passage, which however he does not quote, in "*Jack Drum's Entertainment*," that the "*Timon*" had been on the stage previously, and an old MS. drama. The old play of "*Timon*" (written about 1600?), edited by Rev. A. Dyce, 1842, on the same subject, but bearing a very partial resemblance to Shakspeare's play, is supposed to have been written prior to the "*Timon*" we have from the pen of the great dramatist. Our impression is that Shakspeare having got a copy of North's translation in 1602, reading it at his leisure, and coming upon the "*Life of Antony*," saw the dramatic possibilities of the sketch which Plutarch gives, remembered Painter's "*Palace*;" was confirmed in his views, and studied "*Lucian*" for himself, to get at the proper elements of a worthy drama.

Nor would the proved use of translations by Shakspeare disprove his possession of scholarship; for his was a working mind, and he might fittingly employ them in the lessening of his actual labour, while guarding himself by collation from being misled on important points connected with dramatic effects; on unimportant points of mere lore, it would be his cue to keep as much to what was popular or popularly known and believed as was consistent with his dramatic purpose. The stage in his days was neither spectacular nor pre-Raphaelite.

In every case of adaptation—especially of stage adaptation—the state of the public mind must be consulted as well as the taste and intellectual state of the writer. You cannot reform the scholarship of the general public by stage-plays. Charles Kemble's attempt to introduce such an innovation as a correct and systematic dictionary pronunciation, instead of the conventional stage speech of his day, may be taken as an instance in point; and hence the policy of a playwright, who had an interest in the management of the theatre and in the receipts produced by the introduction of a new play on the stage, would be not to force classics down the throats of the people, as Ben Jonson did in "Cataline," and had his play in consequence thereof exposed to the "noise of opinion," which he uses as a polite periphrasis for "hissed;" but to take the current of popular feeling in his favour as much as possible by not making his hits at their ignorance obtrusive. This, in fact, was the secret, not only of Shakspeare's use of translations, but of his working generally—he always got hold of a popular and notable *fable*; and having that, inspirited it with the superhuman life of his own unapproachable genius. He subordinated a display of scholarship to the attainment of success.

The few quotations in Latin which are found in Shakspeare's play, are used appropriately and quoted with appositeness. But an argument even stronger than this is, the fact that he has employed words of Latin derivation with exactness and propriety, and has fitted them for incorporation with the vernacular of his day, so that his word-mintage has been accepted into the currency of speech, preferentially, and has been found for familiar use and conversation much better than that introduced by the university pens, and hence Mere's justly says, "the English tongue is mightily *enriched* and gorgeously invested in rare ornaments and resplendent *habiliments*" by him. And to the same tenor tends the fact, that he very thoroughly incorporated the *spirit* of antiquity into his Roman dramas, and is not more guilty of violations of the properties of time and form than the Masters of Arts have been. If to this we add the fact, that his classical plays, *e. g.*, "Troilus and Cressida," "Timon of Athens," "Coriolanus," "Julius Cæsar," "Antony and Cleopatra," &c., appears to have been the product of the time when he had attained "the learned leisure" of his prosperity—when he would naturally revert to the studies of his youth, and seek to brush up the lore in which one is so apt to get "rusty," not misty, it is not improbable that, in helping

Ben Jonson with "Sejanus," 1603 (for *he* alone could have been the "second pen," had "a good share" in the composition of it, whom Ben would admit to have had "so happy a genius"), Shakspeare saw that, if rightly selected and done, classical subjects would afford many incidents appropriate as plots for stage-pieces, and he seems to have proceeded accordingly to study classical history for that purpose.

A secondary confirmation of Shakspeare's scholarship is, that his enemies spoke of him as a spoiled lawyer, who had learned "Noverint," and that a tradition exists—probably resting on his being employed by Jenkins as what we would now call a *monitor*, but was designated a "prompter" in his days—that Shakspeare was a *schoolmaster*, a calling which, in his day more even than in ours, implied scholarship. We know that the dramatists of England were almost all university men, that they were as much given to interlard their discourses with Latin phrases as the old divines with these *purpurei panni*, and that Shakspeare could hold his own among them all however the talk might run. One of his greatest rivals in talk, poetic fame, and dramatic popularity—Ben Jonson, conscious of his own "weight of learning," *not* worn "lightly as a flower," informs us that he had "small Latin and less Greek," which implies, not only *some* Greek, but such a use of Latin as would enable him to get such a knowledge of Greek as he had through its help, for there were neither lexicons nor grammars in English in those days by which Greek could be learned without the intervention of Latin; and indeed he says that he so wrote that he—

"Seems to shake a *lance* (=spear)
As brandished at the eyes of ignorance;"

as if anticipating W. Towers' preposterous transformation of his unimpeachable testimony, "little Latin and no Greek." We should like to know who in his own age Jonson would have credited with having *much* Greek—Sir Henry Saville Camden, &c., we suppose.

Towers, indeed, uses the phrase without reference to Shakspeare, and hence, but for Farmer's supposition, that it gave the proper reading of Ben Jonson's line, would require no notice. Suckling, Denham, Milton, Dryden, &c., are only hearsay evidence, not knowledge. Drayton's praise of Shakspeare's "natural braine," Digges' assurance that "Nature only helpt him," and that he neither borrowed, imitated, nor translated, are disproved by his works, though Digges refers specially to his plays; and Hales saying, "if he had not read the ancients, he had not borrowed from them," and his offer to cap anything in the ancients by quotations from Shakspeare are all suggestions from the idea of Horace, that "a good poet is born not made," a saying the fallacy of which Ben Jonson saw that Shakspeare disproved,—

"For a good poet's *made*, as well as *born*
And such wert thou!"

The husband of the poet's eldest daughter, Susanna, John Hall, medical practitioner at Stratford, was, as his monument affirms, "*medica celeberrimus arte*"—most famous in medical practice, and probably moved to it by consideration of the death of his eminent father-in-law—for it commences with 1617—wrote "Select observations on English bodies; or cures both empirical and historical, performed upon very eminent persons in desperate diseases." This work was written in Latin, and by one who prided himself in his Latinity, for he composed two Latin lines as an epigram for Shakspeare's monument, and furnished a verse epitaph for the grave-plate of his mother-in-law. Hall expressly characterizes Shakspeare as,—

"Judicis Pylinus, genio Socratem, *arte Maronem*."

A Nestor in wisdom, a Socrates in genius, a Virgil in *the skill attained by diligent practice*. This allusion, if it has any personal force at all, suggests scholarliness, sedulous thought, elaborate care displayed in "the patient touches of unwearying art," full acquaintance with all the knowledge of the day, and a power of appropriating and assimilating the best results of the best efforts of his predecessors, for these are the characteristics of Virgil.

On the whole, we think we are entitled to conclude that Shakspeare was a well-informed man, trained in classics sufficiently to be suffused with their spirit, able not only to enjoy, but to test translations. Who could *construe* "Ovid" and make out "Homer" with the aid of a crib, and who, in his literary use of classic stories, preferred to write what the public would comprehend, to making pretentious displays of merely scholastic erudition.

Of other erudition than that of mere classicism, Shakspeare had "more than all others"—in the science of his day he was fairly read, in history he would have had few equals, in philosophy he had certainly no compeer but Bacon; his views on art were profound; on state-craft well conceived; on social order and human life moderate and intelligent, and in regard to religion it has been shown by Dr. Wordsworth, in his Tercentenary volume on "Shakspeare and the Bible," that he possessed a familiarity with its truths which few have; and spoke with an energy and earnestness on such themes as it suggests, which are seldom met with in his contemporaries. The plots of Shakspeare with their dexterous interweaving of reflection and event, the livingness and variety of his characters, the fitness of the speech, associative thought and sequence of emotion to the several *dramatis personæ* in their several circumstances, the general purity of the style employed and the allusions made by him, the facility with which he imparts the magic meaning of poetry to the most common phrases, and the skill with which he lays all nature, history, and life under contribution to his genius, proves him to have been a diligent and careful student, and an earnest scholar, not of books or things only, but of men.

I know I may be told in reply to this suggestion, that Shakspeare had no need of classical learning to gain an acquaintance with the subject of this poem, because that, in 1575, "the fifteen books of P. Ovidius Naso, entitled *Metamorphoses*," were translated out of Latin into English metre, by Arthur Golding, gentleman, "forming a work very pleasant and delectable." I admit, that it is quite certain, from the use of some of the very words of Medea's speech in this translation (book vii.), in his "Midsummer Night's Dream," that Shakspeare had read this book, but I cannot admit that this proves an ignorance of the original language; for, mark you, the Latin quotation prefixed is either a claim to classical knowledge in opposition to a current sneer, to the effect that he had little or none; or it was an affectation and a false pretence, or pluming himself with—"purloined feathers," and a virtual confession of the justice of the charge brought against him by Nash, Greene, &c. Besides, the author of the translation did not think it was well-suited as it stood, and without consultation of the original, to form the entire foundation of literary effort—it was only a makeshift for those who could use no original, for he says,—

"With skill, head and judgment, this worke must be read,
For else to the reader it *stands in small stead*."

"I am most reluctantly obliged to confess that I have come to the belief that this wondrous romance of 'Robinson Crusoe' is no romance at all, but a merely allegorical account of Defoe's own life for twenty-eight years. That this allegory will fit everywhere I do not assert. Crusoe's island in the Caribbean Sea does not entirely suit England, for England was not in a state of primitive solitude when Defoe arrived in it. The parrot who awoke him (in the night of Newgate) is scarcely the Earl of Oxford. That his captivity among the Moors was his first bankruptcy, and that the kind hearted Moor whom he threw overboard was Tutchin, is again scarcely credible, any more than that the shipwreck meant the Revolution of 1688, and that William the Third was his umbrella. But that by Crusoe he meant himself, that by the cannibal Caribbees he meant the Tories, and that the name of the first savage he killed with his gun was called Sacheverell, there is no doubt at all."—*Kingsley's idea of Robinson Crusoe, Daniel Defoe.*

Toiling Upward.

SIR DAVID BREWSTER.

(*Concluded from page 375.*)

BREWSTER'S next contribution to the literature of physical philosophy was a "Treatise on the Microscope." But in 1841 he made one of those splendid achievements in scientific letters which add delight to learning, in his work on "The Martyrs of Science; or, the Lives of Galileo, Tycho Brahe, and Kepler." In an excellently flowing narrative he tells the story, sufficiently prosaic sometimes, in reality, of "the starry Galileo and his woes;" of Tycho Brahe, the exiled, noseless, delirium-struck tenant of the city of the heavens (Uraniburg), who died in Benach Castle; and the founder of his own favourite science, optics—Kepler, who narrowly escaped, he sarcastically remarks, being one of "the long list of distinguished characters whom England has starved and dishonoured." Of this work a second edition was called for in 1846.

The possibility of leisure to produce this work, to engage in many other literary enterprises of which he was a great part, and to pursue the discoveries to which he was devoted, was secured to him by his nomination in 1838 to the position of principal of the United Colleges of St. Salvador and St. Leonard's in the city of St. Andrews. Of this position, which was little more than honorary, and chiefly of a routine nature, he performed the duties becomingly; and he held the headship of the literary and philosophical circles of that highly respectable city with ease, suavity, and acceptance. On the occurrence of the great disruption of the Scottish Church, which took place in 1843, Brewster took part with the followers of Chalmers, Candlish, Welsh, &c., in their exodus from the ancient and venerable kirk of the Reformation, and an attempt was made by the residuary party to cast Sir D. Brewster from the principalship, on the ground that its tenure implied that the occupant should be and remain an adherent of the National Church. The endeavour was successfully resisted, and Scotland was preserved in this instance from the disgrace of adding a martyr of science to the many martyrs she has already made at the shrine of mere Molochs of technical theological sectarianism. On the establishment in 1844 of the literary organ which the new sect, which assumed the title of the Free Church of Scotland, considered it requisite to publish, the *North British Review*, Sir D. Brewster became an efficient ally of the editor, Dr. David Welsh. For many years Sir David Brewster's contribution was never absent from a single issue, and

often more than one paper was furnished by his pen. Not only did he write on astronomy, physics, optics, geology, photography, meteorology, physical geography, and other departments of science, he furnished many contributions on historical, biographical, and purely literary topics, and even ventured upon incursions into social science. So great, indeed, was the indefatigability of his industry, that he would fix his subject, the space he should occupy with the paper proposed, and the time at which the paper would reach the editor's hands, that he could be depended on to a page and to a post. The versatility of his talents and the variety of his accomplishments could scarcely be more strikingly indicated than by a collected edition of the papers supplied by Sir David Brewster to the various philosophical transactions of the different societies in all countries—for of all the chief scientific associations he was a valued member,—to the scientific journals of the present century, and to the different reviews to which he was a contributor. Such a list of these papers as would be satisfactory we are unable to furnish, because it is always difficult without access to private records to assign specific contributions with certainty to given individuals, but we know that the mere registration of their titles would occupy pages, and a competent authority has assured us, some years ago, that those known to him would fill twenty goodly octavo volumes. We may, however, faintly indicate the extent of his capacity by quoting the names of a few of those subjects in the biographical portion of the “Edinburgh Encyclopædia,” in which he contributed not merely life sketches of the men, but estimates of the subjects in which they exerted their talents; *e. g.*, D'Alembert, Bailly, Bernouilli, Bradley, Brahe, Buffon, Condorcet, Copernicus, Euler, Galileo, Halley, &c. To the “Encyclopædia Britannica” he supplied a life of Newton, and he furnished besides contributions on hydrodynamics, electricity, magnetism, the microscope, optics, photography, voltaism, &c., to the same extensive repertory of accumulated learning. He was also an extensive contributor to “The Imperial Dictionary of Universal Biography,” the best, the most thorough, and the most exhaustive collection of original memoirs of distinguished men extant in our literature. Along with Prof. J. P. Nichol he supplied notices of the chief names in mathematical and physical science to Griffin's “Comprehensive Biographical Dictionary,” and assisted the same collaborator in the preparation of his “Cyclopædia of the Physical Sciences.” More recently still, we believe, he aided in the revision of the scientific articles in the new issue of “The National Cyclopædia,” which has been so excellently accomplished, quite recently, by Mr. W. Mackenzie, of London, Glasgow, and Edinburgh. This extraordinary amount of literary work was performed in the midst of constant scientific researches, and of course included a large amount of what might be termed acquisitory readings; for productivity on these points implies that the writers keep themselves informed of all the new facts and impulses of the times.

Meanwhile, honours had flowed in upon him apace; Oxford in 1833 had made him D.C.L., and Durham in the following year conferred upon him the same dignity. He was chosen fellow of the Astronomical and the Geological Society, of the Royal Irish Academy, and he had bestowed on him the decoration of a Chevalier of the Prussian Order of Merit, and of the French Legion of Honour. A pension of £300 per annum from the Crown was granted to him,—probably that it might no longer be in his power to say, as he had done, “There is not a single philosopher who enjoys a pension, or an allowance, or a sinecure capable of supporting him and his family in the humblest circumstances. There is not a single philosopher who enjoys the favour of his sovereign or the friendship of the sovereign.” The public recognition and reward of science and scientific men was one of the topics on which Brewster never failed to speak out in tones of reproach to the State, and of encouragement to the cultivators of the sciences. In 1849 he was chosen president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science,” of which eighteen years before he had been one of the founders. This honour was conferred on him in recognition of the distinguished services he had rendered to the scientific world. In 1851—the Great Exhibition year,—when London was filled with visitors from all quarters of the globe, and upwards of a thousand delegates had been commissioned from the chief centres of social activity in the country, Sir David Brewster was elected president of the fourth Peace Congress, at the suggestion of the late Richard Cobden; and not only did he preside over the great meetings in Exeter Hall, but shortly after the Congress he wrote an article on the rise and progress of the Peace movement, and became an occasional contributor to the *Herald of Peace*. He was one of the originators and the first president of the Inventors’ Institute, as well as a contributor to its organ, the *Scientific Review*. He thought it a keen reproach to a nation like ours that “peaceful as science is, in its theoretical as well as in its practical aspect, it has often to wage war against pirates, and with its meagre exchequer to struggle against the hoarded pelf of unprincipled capitalists, or the combined resources of needy speculators. The discoverer or inventor is thus driven into a court of law, and our judges and juries have to decide in the most perplexing suits, where science can be their only guide,” but they have had no training to fit them for profiting from or by its guidance. “To decide against a pirate who has stolen the intellectual property of his neighbour, and can plead only a mistake in the specification of his patent, is a trivial error, even if the decision is unjust; but it is a deeper injustice, and one not to be forgiven, where an inventor is deprived of a property which he had provided for his family, and when the verdict rests either upon the ignorance of the judge, or upon the erroneous appreciation of scientific testimony.”

Brewster’s next work—which had its germ in a paper contributed to the *North British Review*—excited great interest, and within

six months ran through three editions ; while the *Review* in which the foundation paper, or "pregnated nucleus" of the work appeared, had a circulation of upwards of three thousand in a brief period. The works dealt with an old question, one which had effects on theological and scientific sides, and was urged against a controversialist of great power and capacity. This work, published in 1854, was entitled "More Worlds than One the Creed of the Philosopher and the Creed of the Christian." On the interest of the question, the following remarks by Hugh Miller may perhaps be quoted usefully :—

"There does certainly exist a wide-spread desire to know, as far as can be known, the extent of God's living, responsible creation. The planet which we inhabit is but one vessel in the midst of a fleet sailing on through the vast ocean of space, under convoy of the sun. Far on the distant horizon, what seem to be a great many other convoy ships appear, though such is their remoteness that even our best glasses enable us to know very little regarding them. But in the vessels in the same group as ourselves we see evolutions similar to those which our own ship performs—we see them maintain relations similar to our own, to the great guardian vessel in the midst—we see them regulated by her in all their movements, and that when nights fall dark, most of them have their sets of lanterns hoisted up to give them light ; and there is a desire among us to know somewhat respecting the crews of these neighbour vessels of ours, and whether—as we all seem bound on a common voyage—the expedition, as it is evidently under one and the same control, may not have a common purpose or object to accomplish."

The interest in the question—though probably it is never capable of being brought within the range of absolute logical debate—is an old one. Before the Christian era it had been asked, Are the heavenly bodies inhabited ? The Christian fathers discussed but condemned the subject. The revivers of astronomy, Brahe, Galileo, and Kepler, embraced the affirmative, and thought that in the stars "before us lie exhaustless worlds of life." In 1686, Fontenelle published his "Plurality of Worlds," in the form of five conversations—to which a sixth was added in 1719—between himself and the Marchioness of G——. It was read with eagerness, and was translated into all the Continental languages. Three English translations of it appeared, and of one of these, six editions had been issued by 1737. Huyghens in his "Cosmotheoros," 1690, elaborately argued the question, and Dr. Chalmers' celebrated "Astronomical Discourses" gave popular currency to the same views. Dr. J. P. Nichol, who, as De Quincey says, "as a popularizing astronomer, has done more for the benefit of this great science than all the rest of Europe combined," in his "Architecture of the Heavens," sanctions a similar theory ; and Dr. Dick, in his "Sidereal Heavens," summarizes the arguments on the question. That question having aroused in men "the passion of curiosity, the most unspiritual of passions, and of curiosity in a

fierce polemic shape," a work issued anonymously, but generally attributed to the late lamented Dr. Whewell, appeared bearing Fontenelle's title, "The Plurality of Worlds," and urging not only theological, but scientific reasons for believing in the old traditional theory that this is the only world in which life exists. "I do not pretend," the author says, "to *disprove* the plurality of worlds, but I ask in vain for any argument which makes the doctrine probable. . . . It is too remote from knowledge to be either proved or disproved." Sir D. Brewster maintains, in opposition to this, that all analogy countenances the idea, that the entire set of the solar planets, if not indeed all the worlds that whirl in space, are peopled with beings not dissimilar in essence and nature to those which dwell in this corner of creative immensity. These two controversialists were alike animated with Christian reverence, and were both accomplished interpreters of nature and science, men of profound reach of thought and of extensive range of information. On this account we have extended our remarks on this work farther than we would otherwise have done, for it is not often that men so able and so well matched engage in a controversy, nor is it often that controversialists have the opportunity of filling the quiver of argument from such excellent repertoires as are to be found in "The Plurality of Worlds" and "More Worlds than One," and hence we recommend all who read the one to read the other as well.

In 1855 Sir D. Brewster issued a most painstaking and laborious work, for which both literature and science are his debtors. "In consequence of the wide circulation of the life of Sir Isaac Newton which I drew up for the "Family Library" in 1831, I was induced to undertake a larger work, in order to give a more detailed account of his life, writings, and discoveries." He recounts the sources of his information, and acknowledges the help he had from many quarters. This book contains incidentally much matter of great moment; *e.g.*, a history and an epitome of Newton's "Principia," an account of the Fluxionary Controversy, a history of the Infinitesimal Calculus, a discussion of the purity of Newton's scientific and moral character, a notice and abstract of Newton's theological views, and a dissertation on the Baconian philosophy of a somewhat depreciatory character. The preface closes with these words "What the gifted mind of Newton believed to be truth:—I dare not pronounce to be error. By the great Teacher alone can truth be taught, and it is only at His tribunal that a decision will be given on these questions, often of words which have kept at variance the wisest and the best of men. "The Life, Writings, and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton" is a notable work; and it may not be amiss to remark that Augustus De Morgan seems to think that the view taken by the author of that work is too favourable to Newton, so that should they desire to review controversially the character of Newton, it will be necessary to read his sketch of Newton in conjunction with Brewster's.

The serenities of academic life which Brewster had enjoyed in St. Andrews were intermitted by visits to a sweet retirement near Melrose, on the banks of the Tweed, where he wooed the rustic delights of proprietorship, and worshipped the scientific Muses, while he drank into his frame the refreshing influences of nature and life. In 1859, on the demise of Principal Lee, the curator of the university, conferred on the most renowned scientific man in Scotland to the vacancy so caused, and much to the satisfaction of the entire country, called to the headship of the University of Edinburgh the old man, excellent and eloquent, who had brought honour manifold on the place of his training. In this position it was his duty annually to address the assembled students of the university, and this he did most appropriately and with great effect, showing ever a broad-fronted acceptance of scientific truth, and a full appreciation of the movements of the times; but showing still that it is possible to hold within the same heart the new science and the old faith; and like his compeers, Whewell, Herschel, Faraday, &c., proving that true science is only a discovering of what God does, and hence that science and Scripture are only two pages of the one grand record of the will and working of the Father. Brewster's mind was an eminently liberal and progressive one, and he manifested his unselfish love for science by publishing all the observations and discoveries which he thought of any value to mankind, just as they occurred. He did not need to garner his researches to form the pedestal of the monument of his fame. His mind grew, and with the noble persistency of a great thinker, who knew that honesty in the end always showed an indisputable consistency, he uttered what he knew as he knew it and when he knew it, and left the world to trace his course as it listed. Not only in actual might of thought, but in executive delicacy of expression, his spirit grew; and of this there can be no testimony less exceptionable than that of Hugh Miller, who says,—

“In the earlier compositions of Sir David—always severe in style and sternly scientific in form—there is comparatively little indication of that rich flow of fancy and imagination, and that fertility of happy illustration, which his later writings exhibit. In the far west his year of life enjoys an Indian summer, greatly richer and more gorgeous in its scenery than any of the seasons that have gone before. There is a something inexpressibly pleasing in exhibitions of this kind. A vigorous and still youthful mind lodged in a material framework, which has served its purposes during the ordinary term of life; and gives evidences that, though Age presses upon it but lightly, his touch is there, is of itself an argument for the immortality of the better part. Were soul and body to perish together, they would surely exhibit traces of the same decay. Further, too, it is a singularly agreeable sight, as illustrative of that happiest condition of advanced life which the Psalmist could describe as peculiarly the gift of God to His own,—in old age, when others failed and faded, the righteous man was still to bring forth fruit and blossom, as in his

fresh and vigorous years. There were to be sap and fatness in his unshrivelled trunk, and green leaves and bright flowers on all his boughs."

In his devotion to science he proceeded, though old and infirm, to the meeting of the British Association at Dundee, in September, 1867. The heat of the crowded room overpowered his weakly frame, and he fainted. He rallied again, and winter brought on a complicated attack of pneumonia and bronchitis, and his health rapidly declined. Yet he was averse to abandon his habits of industry, and his interest in study. He pleaded even in the last stages of his illness to be allowed just a little time to gratify his eagerness for toil. He knew that Death had laid his rigorous hand upon him. Yet even then he thought that the day of duty was his, and he worked on, the great interests of the eternal world secure he felt; for he had endeavoured to live the two lives in one, living for and in eternity even in time. He toiled upwards to fame, to achievement, to literary eminence, to scientific truth, to loftiness of position, and width of renown, but he did not forget to toil "upwards and heavenwards and Christwards." He expired with the utmost serenity and consciousness on the 10th of February, aged 86; and the great interpreter of light entered into the presence of Him who is light, and in whom is no darkness at all;—the same light beaming on him there as on earth, but now become "the perfect day," even "the light of the glorious gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ."

TENNYSON.—"Tennyson's poetry is not slowly gathered out of meditation on external objects; it springs from a creative force, a vital inspiration and impetuous movement of the brain or heart, or both, which agitates every thought, and constrains every outward form of existence to sympathy with its own varying moods. Nature is compelled to consort with his fervent Genius. Under his dominion she is seldom suffered to rest. All her attributes undergo a change in the transitions of his swift emotion. In one of its phases, Time is a maniac, scattering dust, and Life a fury, singing flame; in another, the stars are innumerable cold, pitiless eyes; in another, blossoms dropped by the laburnum are wells of fire: in almost all there is a stir and a glow, endless vibration, without any apparent point of rest. Goldsmith's 'pensive hour' is unknown to Tennyson; his thought is passionate, not still. All his perceptions are intense. His pictures are coloured as vividly as Turner's; his piercing vision describes objects unseen by ordinary eyes, assembles images from far-off worlds, and concentrates a whole universe of beauty into the space of a single line. In his power of concentration he is equalled by only one other poet, and that one is Dante. But he has not the sustained power of Dante, because he has not the same capability of repose. It is in the prophet's chariot of fire that he ascends his heaven of invention, and woe be to the mortal man who seeks to hang on to that flaming car! Yet how many do seek it! How many, clinging to its blazing wheels, rise but a short way, to fall down in a fatal swoon, which leaves them delirious for ever!"—*St. Paul's, March*

The Reviewer.

Words of Comfort for Parents Bereaved of Little Children. Edited by WM. LOGAN. London: James Nisbet and Co.

INTO the theological controversy which might be raised regarding the salvation of infants it would be quite improper for us as reviewers to enter. The book is one possessed of a sanctity which forbids the exercise of the polemical faculties. It consists of the garnerings of years by the editor of the "Words of Comfort" of which his soul felt need to support a great grief. The emotions do not reason, but they have their place and use in the economy of life, and they must have their exercise and their instrument. This book consists of contributions, original and selected, on "Infant Salvation" and "Consolations," in prose and verse, either furnished by authors or gathered by the bereaved father in his readings, as messages from the Comforter,—preceded by an historical introduction by Dr. Wm. Anderson on opinions regarding the future state of deceased infants, a brief notice of the short life which was the occasion of the work, and letters of condolence sent to the editor by friends. The prose is a repertory of kindly, suggestive, solacing thought; and the verse (136 pp.) is a perfect anthology regarding babyhood, childhood, youth, and salvation—the distilled essence of Christian hearts.

The Philosophy of Evangelicism. Second Edition. London: Elliot Stock.

THIS work belongs to a class of which "The Philosophy of Salvation" was a favourable specimen. "The point sought to be established in this essay is, that Christianity, considered as the doctrine of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, is a primitive element in the world's moral constitution." The author maintains that Christian faith is as intuitive as our other moral ideas, and that we must find Christianity in the living conscience and extract it from the Christian heart. The evangelical system he believes to be in express harmony with natural religion.

"Humanity is constituted so as to IMPLICATE us not only in our own personal moral acts, but also in the moral acts of each other; and in consequence thereof conscience, in its higher exercises, extends beyond the sphere of our individual conduct, and is sympathetically affected by others' conduct. The extension of these principles to their utmost degree unfolds the true theory of the sufferings of Christ for our guilt, and of our partici-

pation in His perfect righteousness. By virtue of His UNION with us in *moral consciousness* a clear avenue is opened between the Christ consciousness and the human consciousness, and we detect in their intercommunion the accord of the atoning act and the believing act. Our Saviour, conscious of our sins, has taken them upon Himself and atoned for them; we, conscious of His righteousness, appear with it in the sight of God and are justified; our sins are His sins, His righteousness our righteousness; *and this union of Christ and His people in moral consciousness is the CENTRAL IDEA OF THE GOSPEL.*"

He sees that herein there is much disputable matter, and he is anxious, next to having his views confirmed, to have their errors, if they exist, detected. Many excellent remarks, illustrations, and ideas occur in the book, which deserves patient perusal and careful thought. The author is much more liberal on the score of contradiction than most professed philosophical theologians. He scarcely expects that his system will meet the ready acquiescence either of "strict dogmatists" or the lovers of free inquiry. He thoroughly acknowledges the right of free inquiry, and thinks that if this is given by the large and intelligent class of the reflective, good may result from his speculations. We quote the following remarks on free thought in proof of what we have stated:—

"Free inquiry, if erroneously conducted, may lead many *from* the truth instead of *to* it. But that fact, instead of being an argument against free inquiry, affords the strongest argument in its favour. Why allow to an enemy the free use of the best constructed and most formidable weapons, and deny the use of them to ourselves? Because inquiry is free, must be free, will be free, our proper course is, in the exercise of a like freedom, to scan the range of universal knowledge, and ascertain whether the facts of the moral world are not such as demand revelation for their complement; and whether, especially, the cross of Christ is not an object which the earnest conscience pursues while unknown, and grasps when recognised, as inartificially and tenaciously as the understanding follows and clings to truth."

The Sunday School Senior Class. By J. A. COOPER, F.R.S.L.
London: Sunday School Union.

THIS is "an essay to which the Sunday School Union adjudged its first prize;" and so acceptable has it been to the constituency to whom it appeals, that it now appears in a "second edition, revised." "Issued in the earnest hope that it may contribute something towards the advancement of true religion among the young men and maidens of this country," it invites the consideration of all who are interested in knowing and considering plans for the improvement of the senior class instruction given in our Sabbath schools. The author speaks with the ardour of an enthusiast, but of an enthusiast whose love for Sunday schools has "grown with his growth and strengthened with his strength," and whose experience, instead of causing him to become cold, has quickened his zeal,

heightened his hopes, and given spur to his endeavours. This is a complete handbook on the subject, and merits the careful perusal and prayerful consideration of all who concern themselves in senior classes. We have diligently read the brief but able tractate, and we can confidently recommend it as a book not to be surpassed by anything written on the topic for cautious wisdom and true energy of thought, for common sense and holy earnestness.

The Debater's Handbook. London: Houlston and Wright.

THIS collection of controversial topics is perhaps the largest that has ever been made, and takes up, we should suppose, the widest range of debates ever brought together in one pamphlet. "Upwards of one thousand two hundred subjects suitable for discussion" are arranged under the heads Art, Education, History, Literature, Philosophy, Politics, Religion, Science, and Social Economy, and references are given to the volumes of this serial in which any of the subjects proposed have been discussed. As a *thesaurus* of debate it should be invaluable to members of Mutual Improvement and Literary Societies, and it may be equally useful as an essayist's guide. An introduction to the collection by the editor of this serial gives good advice on controversy. But we are surprised that in his enumeration of preceding collections he has not named Samuel Bailey's "Questions for Discussion in Literary Societies," which contains many references to good books on the several topics, of which eighty-three are given. It is quite true that this work was first published in 1823, some years, we guess, before "our editor" had come into light, but the work has been at least three times republished. This, in the interest of honest reviewing, we feel bound to say, and we confide in our editor's liberality to give it place in our notice unhesitatingly.

Often, often have we been surprised that no attempt had been made at a moderate rate to provide a catalogue of debatable topics; for during a connection for now a long number of years with literary societies we have generally found that the great difficulty in getting up a syllabus for the season was occasioned by the ever-recurring question—What subjects can we take up? There need be no such question asked now, for here is an almost exhaustless store of materials for thoughtful controversy, from which if a good choice be made, and on which if adequate study be bestowed, debates may be got up which will sharpen the wits, strengthen the mind, enlarge the judgment, educate the logical faculties, excite clear and discriminating thought and speech, improve the heart, affect the conscience, and refresh and animate many a debating society for many a year to come.

Our Collegiate Course.

MILTON'S MINOR POEMS.

L'ALLEGRO.

<i>Sometimes with secure delight</i>	91
<i>The upland hamlets will invite,</i>	
<i>When the merry bells ring round,</i>	
<i>And the jocund rebecks (26) sound</i>	
<i>To many a youth and many a maid,</i>	95
<i>Dancing in the chequered shade.</i>	
<i>And young and old come forth to play</i>	
<i>On a sunshine holyday, (27)</i>	
<i>Till the livelong daylight fail :</i>	
<i>Then to the spicy nut-brown ale,</i>	100
<i>With stories told of many a feat,</i>	
<i>How faery Mab (28) the junkets (29) eat;</i>	
<i>She was pinched and pulled, she said;</i>	

Helps to paraphrasing.

Line 91. Occasionally; certain allurements.	97. Enjoy themselves.
92. Height-crowning villages; induce.	98. Summery festival season.
93. Gladsome peals give forth their sounds about.	99. Lengthy; fade away.
94. Mirthful violins are played.	100. Aromatic, or fragrant; amber-like drink.
95. Lad; lass.	101. Tales narrated; marvel.
96. Tripping; variegated interspaces of the woods.	102. Delicacies consumed.
	103. Nipped; dragged about; affirmed.

(26) An Arabic violin, introduced by the Moors from the East into Spain, where it was a favourite instrument among the minstrels of the Middle Ages, who used it in four classes, treble, alto, tenor, and bass, in accompanying their songs, or as music in the dance. It was narrow at the neck, and unlike the violin, which consists of two hemispherical enlargements, it gradually increased, till at the end it was rounded off. It had three strings, tuned in fifths, set over a bridge, and it was played with a bow. The word seems to be here used as equivalent to dance-music.

(27) Summer festival; a day of joy and merriment.

(28) Queen Mab, the "Fairies' midwife" of Shakspeare ("Romeo and Juliet," Act I., sc. 4); the heroine of Shelley's poem, "Queen Mab." In northern mythology the Queen of the Fairies.

(29) Properly *Juncetas*, from Italian *Girneuta*, cream-cheese, French *foncée de crème*, a green rush basket of cream-cheese; cheese-cake, a sweet-meat of curds and sugar, any nicety—any stolen delight; hence the "cream-bowl" is mentioned four lines below.

And he, by *friar's lantern* (30) led,
 Tells how the *drudging Goblin* (31) sweet.
 To earn his *cream-bowl* duly set,
 When in one night, ere *glimpse of morn*,
 His *shadowy flail* hath *threshed* the corn,

105

104. Will-o'-the-wisp; taken off the road.

105. Relates; hard-working; perspired or wrought.

106. Gain as wages; junket justly put down.

107. Before the first streaks of daylight.

108. Fairy; beat out the grain from the ear.

(30) *Ignis fatuus*, foolish fire; a luminous appearance—frequently seen in marshy places, stagnant pools, churchyards, &c. It generally appears a little after sunset as a pale bluish-coloured light, varying in size and shape, sometimes shining steadily till morning, and at other times disappearing and reappearing at intervals. It floats about two feet above the ground and is sometimes fixed, though more frequently it travels rapidly. It seems to recede on being approached, and yet successful attempts have been made to light a piece of paper at it. The *ignis fatuus* has not, as yet, been artificially produced. In the swampy and moorland districts of the south and north-west of England, and in the lowlands of Scotland, it is often seen, but most frequently in the autumn-time. Under the names of *Will-o'-the-Wisp*, *Jack-a-lantern*, *Spunkie*, or here, as *Friar's Lantern*, &c., it was an object of superstition, and was believed to be due to the agency of evil spirits, desirous of leading poor mortals astray; and, indeed, cases have unfortunately occurred in which wanderers have perished through the misleading light it had shed, as they supposed, on their path.

(31) *Goblin*, *Bogle*, is the name of those demons of popular superstition which lurk about houses. The special "*drudging goblin*" here meant is probably the same as—under the title of *Robin Goodfellow* in England, *Knight Rupert* in Germany, *Brownie* in Scotland, &c., figures in almost every fairy mythology. Sportive roguery is his chief characteristic, and he delights in mad, merry pranks. His special pleasure was to disturb domestic concerns, but if a bowl of cream, milk, curds, &c., were properly laid out as allotted to him, he would willingly perform many of the household duties of the servants, but if he were neglected he would avenge the slight by pinching, and so punishing the inmates. "*The mad pranks and merry jests of Robin Goodfellow*" were very popular *folk-lore* in Shakspeare's time, and out of the gossip talk about him the dramatist created his *Puck*. This question, in its literary aspects, has been fully and learnedly discussed in "*An Introduction to Shakspeare's 'Midsummer Night's Dream.'*" The following quotation from that play (Act II., sc. 1), will illustrate the text:—

"You are that shrewd and knavish sprite
 Called Robin Goddfellow; are not you he
 That frights the maidens of the villagery;
 Skim milk, and sometimes labour in the quern,
 And bootless make the breathless housewife's churn;
 And sometime make the drink to bear no barm,
 Mislead night wanderers, laughing at their harm?
 Those that Hobgoblin call you, and sweet Puck,
 You do their work, and they shall have good luck."

That ten *day-labourers* could not end ;
 Then *lies* him down the *lubber* (32) *fiend*, 110
 And, *stretched* out tall the *chimney's* (33) *length*,
Basks at the fire his *hairy strength* ;
 And *crop-full* out of door he *flings*,
 Ere the first cock his *matin* (34) rings.
 Thus *done* the *tales*, to *bed* they *creep*, 115
 By *whispering* winds soon *lulled asleep*.
Towered cities please us then,
 And the *busy hum* of men,
 Where *throngs* of *knights and barons bold*,
 In *woods* of peace, high *triumphs* hold, 120
 With *store* of ladies, whose *bright eyes*
Rain influence, (35) and *judge the prize*
 Of *wit* or *arms*, while both *contend*
 To *win her grace* whom all *commend*.
 There let *Hymen* (36) oft *appear* 125
 In *saffron robe*, with *taper clear*,

- | | |
|--|---|
| 109. Servants hired by the day ;
finish. | 118. Active bustle. |
| 110. Flops ; clumsy demon. | 119. Crowds ; nobles brave. |
| 111. Extended ; hearthstone's space. | 120. Garments ; tourneys. |
| 112. Warms ; shaggy bulk. | 121. Multitudes ; brilliant. |
| 113. Over-eaten ; darts. | 122. Shed around effective induce-
ments ; decide upon the re-
wards. |
| 114. Morning song. | 123. Wisdom ; might ; strive. |
| 115. Finished ; stories ; rest ; steal
in fear. | 124. Gain ; favour ; delight to
praise. |
| 116. Fluttering ; speedily hushed to
slumber. | 125. Be seen. |
| 117. Grandly built ; delight ; there-
after. | 126. Dress ; shining torch. |

See also *Percy's "Reliques of Ancient Poetry,"* vol. ii., p. 202, for a ballad on this subject.

(32) This adjective is used to characterize one who is inert, inactive, lazy, sluggish, heavy, lumpish, dull, stupid, clumsy, awkward, unwieldy, &c.

(33) Chimney (French *cheminée*) is properly the roadway made for the smoke to pass off by, but here it is used for fireplace or hearth-slab.

(34) *Matin* (French *matin*, morning. *Matins* is the name given to the first of the seven canonical hours fixed for divine service in the Romish church ; they were celebrated shortly after midnight.

(35) This fine figure was probably suggested by Petrarch's 131st sonnet, in which there occurs this line,—

"Du begli occhi un piacer si caldo piove."

From her fair eyes such fervent pleasure rains.

(36) *HYMEN*, or *HYMENÆUS*, was the deity who presided over marriage among the Greeks. According to some writers he was the son of Bacchus and Venus ; and to others of Apollo and one of the Muses ; but it is a more generally received opinion that he was a beautiful Athenian youth, of humble birth, who had conceived an attachment for a noble lady of Athens,

And *pomp*, and *feast*, and *revelry*,
 With *mask* (37) and *antique pageantry* ;
 Such *sights* as youthful poets *dream*
 On summer eves by *haunted stream*.
 Then to the *well-trod stage anon*,
 If Jonson's (38) *learned sock* (39) be on,

130

127. Grandeur; banqueting; and joy.

128. Old-fashioned shows.

129. Visions; imagine.

130. Apparition-visited rivulet.

131. Thereafter; excellently supplied
theatre in a short time.

132. Classical comedies; represented.

which his poverty and obscure condition did not allow him to avow. Disguised in female attire he one day accompanied the object of his affection to the celebration of a festival in honour of Ceres, which the women were accustomed to observe by themselves on the sea-shore. While thus engaged they were suddenly seized and carried away by a band of pirates, from whose violence they were preserved by Hymeneus, who excited his female companions by his example to massacre the robbers while they slept. After the catastrophe he repaired to Athens; and having related what had happened, he offered to restore the women to their country on condition of being allowed to marry the lady of his choice. His request was granted; and the marriage of Hymeneus proved so felicitous, that it afterwards became the custom to invite him to bless with his presence all marriages, none of which were expected to be fortunate if this ceremony were omitted. Festivals were also instituted to his honour. This deity is generally represented as a young man, dressed in a yellow robe, holding in his right hand a torch, and in his left a flame-coloured veil, and wearing on his head a chaplet of roses or sweet marjoram; whence, perhaps, arose the practice of crowning people with flowers on their wedding day. Hymen appears to be the *Thalassius* of the Romans. He is represented as a youth of fair complexion, crowned with the *Amaranthus*, or *sweet marjoram*, carrying in one hand a torch, and in the other a yellow, or rather flame-coloured veil, indicative of the blushes of a virgin.

(37) *Mask*, or *Masque*, a kind of dramatic performance which was at one time a favourite form of private theatricals. They seem to have originated in the custom of introducing masked persons representing imaginary characters into public pageants, processions or spectacles—as in the “*Progresses*” of Queen Elizabeth. Gradually a poetic meaning and a dramatic form were imparted to these shows, and at length they came to be set off with the help of music, scenery, and machinery, and for their own sakes were represented at the court, and in the halls of the nobility, and subsequently in the places of amusement open to the people. Ben Jonson's classic taste, and Inigo Jones' mechanical ingenuity, brought them to a high degree of perfection; Beaumont and Fletcher, Shirley, &c., gave their talents to them, and Milton's “*Arcades*” and “*Comus*” show how interesting, poetical, and instructive they may be made.

(38) “The last twenty-nine years of Ben Jonson's life coincided with the first twenty-nine of Milton's. *L'Allegro* was most probably written, Professor D. Masson supposes, prior to 1634, and therefore in ‘rare Ben's’ own lifetime, though it was not published till 1645, when he had been eight years dead. That Milton published these favourable references to these distin-

Or *sweetest* Shakspeare, *Fancy's child*, (40)
Warble his *native* wood-notes *wild*.
 And *ever*, *against* *eating* *cares*,
Lap me in *soft* Lydian (41) *airs*,
Married to *immortal* *verse*,
 Such as the *meeting* *soul* may *pierce*,
 In *notes*, with many a *winding* *bout*
 Of *linked* *sweetness* long *drawn* *out*,
 With *wanton* *heed* and *giddy* *cunning* ;
 The *melting* *voice* through *mazes* *running*,
Untwisting all the *chains* that *tie*
 The *hidden* *soul* of *harmony* ;

135

140

133. Most delightful ; Imagination's favourite.
 134. Give musical utterance to ; self-taught ; unrestrained.
 135. Constantly, in opposition to corroding anxieties.
 136. Entrance ; pleasing ; music.
 137. Wedded ; undying poetry.
 138. Yielding spirit ; penetrate.

139. Harmonies ; involved turn.
 140. United pleasantness ; continued.
 141. Gladsome care ; coyish skill.
 142. Heart-hushing ; artful intricacies passing with ease.
 143. Disentangling ; hold in subjection.
 144. Unknown essence ; music.

guished dramatists, while his party was so averse to theatrical performances, that in 1648 the Long Parliament absolutely suppressed such amusements, shows that he did not sympathize with the extreme portion of his fellows."

(39) "The actors in *Tragedy* always wore a boot called *cothurnus*, which reached halfway up the leg, and sometimes almost to the knees, with a very thick sole to increase the apparent stature of the performer. The actors in *Comedy* always wore a thin slipper called *soccus* ; and hence *Cothurnus* (*buskin*) and *Soccus* (*sock*) are employed figuratively to denote respectively *Tragedy* and *Comedy*."—*Prof. William Ramsay's "Roman Antiquities,"* p. 356.

(40) This is an allusive phrase, borrowed from Shakspeare's self:—

"A man in all the world's new fashions planted,
 That hath a mint of phrases in his brain,
 One whom the music of his own vain tongue
 Doth ravish like enchanting harmony ;
 A man of complements, whom Right and Wrong
 Have chose as umpire of their mutiny,
 This *child of Fancy*, that Armado hight," &c.

We owe this suggestion to Dr. Maguire, who in reference to this passage says, "The mirthful man desires to see, at Court, *masks*—in which Ben Jonson excelled, and in the theatre his learned comedies ; and as the courtly pageantry summons before him romantic visions, then to the stage he goes to see those poetic *dreams* on *summer* *eves* embodied by the fanciful creations of Shakspeare, sweetly singing free forest ditties, warbling without any other source of inspiration than the sylvan scene around, notes native to himself, and equally native to the wood—the *boscareae inculte avene* of Tasso. (Gier., Lib. vii., 6.) The reference in "L'Allegro" is almost by name to "Midsummer Night's Dream."

(41) Lydia was an early seat of Asiatic civilization, and exerted a very

That Orpheus' (42) self may *heave* his head 145
 From *golden slumber* on a *bed*
 Of *heaped* Elysian flowers, and *hear*
 Such *strains* as would have *won* the ear

145. Lift.

146. Beloved sleep; couch.

147. Thickly strewn; listen to.

148. Musical songs; gained.

important influence on the Greeks. The flute was borrowed from the Lydians by the Greeks, and by the Romans from the Etruscans, a race of Lydian descent. As the birthplace of the oldest wind instrument it is used as a general name here, in a phrase which evidently signifies *orchestral music*.

(42) ORPHEUS. The son, according to fable, either of Cæger, king of Thrace; of Thamyras; or of Apollo and Calliope, or Polyhymnia. Aristotle and Cicero attribute the poems which bear his name to a Pythagorean philosopher named Cecrops; and others to Onomacritus, a poet who lived in the age of Pisistratus. Pausanias and Diodorus Siculus speak of Orpheus as a person equally remarkable for his universal knowledge, and for his talents as a poet and musician. Some consider him to have introduced and established the rites of the gods and all mysterious worship in Greece, to have travelled over many regions of the earth as a priest and a prophet, to have been confounded with Linus, Melampas, and Cadmus, and his wife Eurydice with the most ancient divinities of paganism; others maintain that the religious system of Greece did not originate with him, but that he very much contributed to its formation by the communication of the knowledge which he had acquired in his travels of the mysteries of Egyptian superstition. He is said to have delivered his doctrines in verse, and to have added to their recital the accompaniment of the lyre. From his excellence in playing that instrument, and the melody of his voice, the poets have ascribed to him the power of taming lions and tigers, of arresting the course of rivers, and of rendering the trees and rocks susceptible of the charm of his tones. His affection for his wife Eurydice, or Agriope (who was one of the Dryads), is a favourite theme among the poets. While flying from Aristæus, the son of Apollo and the nymph Cyrene, she was mortally stung by a serpent. Orpheus, disconsolate at her loss, ventured to descend in quest of her into the regions of Pluto. His harp was there attended with its usual efficacy; influenced by its magic sounds, the wheel of Ixion ceased to turn, the stone of Sisyphus to roll, the vultures to tear the heart of Sityns, the Danaïdes to perform their thankless labour, and Tantalus to be afflicted by his perpetual thirst; the Furies themselves were appeased, and Pluto and Proserpine were so overcome by the melody of his strains that they agreed to restore Eurydice, provided he forbore turning his head to look at her until he should have reached the extreme confines of Tartarus. Orpheus, in his impatience to behold his restored Eurydice, forgot the imposed injunction, and she was snatched for ever from his embrace. He endeavoured in vain to re-enter the infernal regions; and his sorrows during the remainder of his life admitted of no alleviation, but from the sound of his lyre amid the deepest solitude. His death is by some ascribed to the Ciconian women, who, irritated at his resisting their solicitations to relinquish his secluded life, availed themselves of the celebration of the orgies of Bacchus to execute their vengeance upon him. It is stated that his lyre and head were thrown into the Hebrus, and that while the torrent impelled them towards the sea, his lyre still emitted sweet sounds, and

Of Pluto, (43) to have quite set free
 His half-regained Eurydice,
 These *delights* if thou canst *give*,
 Mirth, with thee I *mean* to *live*.

15

149. Entirely ; at liberty.

151. Enjoyments ; supply.

152. Intend ; devote myself to thy service.

his tongue never ceased to murmur the name Eurydice. (See Ovid's "Met.," b. x. and xi. ; "Georgic" iv., 451, &c. ; and Story of Orpheus, or Philosophy, in Lord Bacon's "Wisdom of the Ancients," No. 11, &c.)

(43) PLUTO, a son of Saturn and Ops, to whom Jupiter, in his division of the vast empire of the Titans, assigned the dominion of hell. He was the first that introduced the ceremony of interment of the dead, and was therefore denominated the god of deaths and of funerals. Proserpine, the daughter of Ceres, was his wife, and the queen of hell. Pluto is variously represented—death in a car, carrying off Proserpine to his kingdom of the infernal regions : he has a severe countenance ; a dark beard ; occasionally bears on his head a vase like that of Serapis ; has keys in his hand, to indicate that whoever enters his kingdom can never return ; and either holds a fork with two prongs, denoting his wrath against the souls of the wicked, or a spear or sceptre, with which he welcomes virtuous spirits into Elysium (the latter as symbolical of goodness and the economy of Providence) ; being equally the attributes of all the divinities. Pindar describes him as conducting the shades with a red like that of Mercury ; sometimes as carrying a sword, which he once employed, at the entreaty of Jupiter, to deliver Admetus from the unjust vengeance of Acastus. At other times he is seated on an antique car, drawn by four black and furious horses, to which, by different authors, the following names are assigned :—Nonius, Æton, Orpheus, Nycteus, Alastor, Ametheus, Abastor, Abetor, and Methens. In some representations Pluto appears, with Proserpine at his left hand, seated upon a throne of ebony and sulphur, beneath which are the sources of the rivers Lothe, Cocytus, Phlegethon, Acheron, and Styx ; while around him are the Fates, the Furies, the Harpies, and the dog Cerberus. The helmet with which the head of this god is usually covered was fabricated and presented to him by the Cyclops, during the war between the gods and the giants, and had the property of rendering its wearer invisible. By the aid of this piece of armour he carried away Proserpine ; and while wearing it the name of Orous (dark) was particularly applied to him. This helmet was worn by Minerva in her attack upon Mars. From a belief of the inflexibility of Pluto and the infernal deities, few temples were erected to their honour ; and the worship paid to them was attended with ceremonies calculated to increase the awe which they inspired. The sacrifices of Pluto were always observed in the night ; and, contrary to usual custom, it was deemed unlawful for the priests or people to eat any part of the offered animal. The cypress and narcissus were sacred to him, as also whatever (the number *two* being of this character) was considered inauspicious ; and of the parts of the body (every one of which was sacred to some divinity ; viz., the head to Jupiter, the eyes to Minerva, or Cupid, the chest to Neptune, the ear to Mnemosyne, the forehead to Genius, the knees to Mercy, the eyebrows to Juno, the fingers to Minerva, the feet to Mercury, the right hand to Faith, &c.), the back was consecrated to Pluto.

LITERATURE OF ENGLAND;

BIOGRAPHICAL, CHRONOLOGICAL, CRITICAL, ETC.

TABLE IV.—IMAGINATIVE WRITERS (1600—1700).

<i>Names and Dates.</i>	<i>Events and Works.</i>
15. THOMAS OTWAY, 1651—1685.	<p>Son of a Church of England clergyman; born at Frotton, near Midhurst, Sussex; educated at Winchester, and at Christ Church, Oxon, but left without taking a degree, 1671. In London he took to the stage, but failed as an actor; whereupon he became a playwright, and produced "Alcibiades," 1675; "Don Carlos," 1676; "Friendship in Fashion," 1678; "Caius Marius and the Orphan," 1680; "The Soldier of Fortune," 1681; and "Venice Preserved," 1682. He received a cornet's commission and went to Flanders in 1678, but on the disbandment of his regiment he resumed dramatic authorship. He was dissolute and extravagant, and he endured much poverty and neglect, and the misery arising from debt. He is said to have been choked by a morsel of bread eaten in the haste of hunger, but the more authentic statement is that he died of fever brought on by fatigue.</p>
16. JOHN PHILIPS, 1676—1708.	<p>Son of Dr. Stephen Philips, Archdeacon of Salop and rector of Bampton, where the poet was born. Educated at Winchester, and entered Christ Church, Oxon, 1694, to study medicine. In 1703 "The Splendid Shilling" appeared; in 1705 "Blenheim;" and in 1706 "Cider." He was a good botanist, and well versed in natural history. In his early mock heroic he mimics Milton's style, and in the two later poems he imitates, if not the strength, elevation, or poetry, at least the "resounding line" of the Paradisaic bard.</p>
17. JOHN WILMOT, Earl of Rochester, 1647—1681.	<p>Son of Henry Lord Wilmot, subsequently first Earl of Rochester; born at Ditchley, Oxfordshire; entered Wadham College, 1659, and at the age of fourteen was made M.A. by Lord Clarendon; travelled in France and Italy; became attached to the court of Charles II., and was appointed gentleman of the bedchamber and controller of Woodstock Park. In 1665 he served under the Earl of Sandwich, and behaved bravely at Bergen. For the abduction of Miss Mallet, a young heiress, whom, however, he afterwards married, he was committed to the Tower. He was said to be one of the most learned, as he was certainly one of the most depraved, of the nobility. Worn out with excess and voluptuousness, he became concerned about the future, and Bishop Burnet says became a sincere convert to Christianity before his death, aged 34.</p>
18. WENTWORTH DILLON, Earl of Roscommon, 1633—1684.	<p>Son of James Dillon, third Earl, and Elizabeth Wentworth, sister of the Earl of Strafford, under whom he was educated at his seat in Yorkshire. He was sent to Caen, and placed under the care of Bochart, and then travelled in Italy. Returning to England at the Restoration, he was made master of a band of pensioners, and master of the horse to the Duchess of York. He married Lady Frances, daughter of the Earl of Burlington and widow of Colonel Courtenay. He projected a society for the purification and refinement of the English language.</p>

19. **GEORGE SANDYS,** } Son of Dr. Edwin Sandys, Archbishop of
1577—1643-4. } York, born at Bishopthorpe; educated at
Oxford; travelled in the East, and published
an account of his journeyings in 1615; went to America, and succeeded his
brother as treasurer of Virginia, where he completed his translation of Ovid's
"*Metamorphoses*." His other translations were the Psalms, 1636; Job,
Ecclesiastes, Lamentations of Jeremiah, Song of Solomon, 1642; Grotius's
tragedy of "*Christ's Passion*," 1639; and "*Songs selected from the Old
and New Testaments*." He exercised a good influence on the versification
of our literature.
20. **JAMES SHIRLEY,** } Born in London; educated at Merchant
1594—1666. } Tailors' School, St. John's College, Oxford, and
afterwards went to Cambridge. Having become
curate of St. Alban's, he resigned, on adopting the Romish faith, and un-
successfully taught a school. He removed to London, and commenced
authorship, and wrote about forty dramas, some school books, and several
poems. He joined the Royalists, but under the Protectorate resumed his
scholastic labours. He was burned out of his house in Fleet Street in the
Great Fire, and he and his wife died on the same day.
21. **SIR JOHN SUCKLING,** } Born at Whitton, Middlesex; educated at
1609—1641. } Cambridge; travelled abroad; joined the army
of Gustavus Adolphus, and on his return from
the wars became a courtier and man about town. He equipped a troop of
horse at his own expense on behalf of the king, but acquired greater grief
than glory from its services; he was a member of the Long Parliament for
Bramber; joined in a plot for the rescue of Strafford, and fled to France,
where he most probably died.
22. **EDMUND WALLER,** } Born at Coleshill; he was, like Cromwell, a
1605—1667. } first cousin of Hampden's; educated at Eton
and Cambridge; devoted himself to political
life, and sat in Parliament for Chipping Wycombe in Charles I.'s first house,
and for Amersham in his third. He was a member, not only of the Long
Parliament, as well as of its predecessor. He opposed the measures adopted
by the House during the civil war, and in 1643 was arrested as participator
in a plot on behalf of the king. By the betrayal of his friends he escaped
from death, though he was heavily fined and exiled. Cromwell allowed him
to return to England, and he thanked him in verses superior to those with
which he greeted the Restoration of Charles. His *Sacharissa* was Lady
Dorothea Sidney, and his *Amoret*, Lady Sophia Murray. He married about
1640 Miss Mary Bresse, or Breaux, as his second wife,—his first, Ann Banks,
having died about 1630. He was one of the best speakers in Parliament, in
which he held a seat to the last, and in which he took an active share in the
debates till close on the Revolutionary period.
23. **GEORGE WITHERS,** } Only son of John Withers, of Brentworth,
1588—1667. } near Alton, in Hampshire; educated at Col-
mere, under John Greaves; and Magdalen
College, Oxon; entered Lincoln's Inn, but in 1613 issued "*Abuses Stript
and Whipt*," and was sent to Marshalsea prison. After his release attached
himself to the Puritans, though he acted quartermaster-general of a regi-
ment in the campaign of Charles I. against the Scottish covenanters, 1639.
He had the rank of major in a troop he raised for the Parliament. He was
taken prisoner by the Royalists in the civil war. On regaining his free-

dom he was made a justice of the peace, and Cromwell made him major-general of the horse and foot in Surrey, after which he was made curator of the statute office. He glutted himself with perquisites, which he had to restore in part after the Restoration. The Convention Parliament, by vote, ordered him to be imprisoned as author of "*Vox Vulgi*," of which he at first denied but afterwards confessed the authorship. He was kept in the Tower with considerable strictness, but managed to use his pen in prison. He died near, and was buried in Savoy church.

Epitome of Critical Opinions.

15. "Of six tragedies and four comedies, written by Otway. his tragedies of '*The Orphan*,' and '*Venice Preserved*,' still sustain his fame and popularity as the most pathetic and tear-drawing of our dramatists. Their licentiousness has necessarily banished his comedies from the stage."—*G. L. Craik*. "There is something much nearer [than in Nelson Lee's dramas] to a revival of the ancient strength of feeling, though alloyed by false sentiment and poetic poverty, in '*The Orphan*' and '*Venice Preserved*' of the unhappy Otway."—*W. Spalding*. "They have both a deep pathos, springing from the intense and unmerited distress of women; both, especially the latter, have a dramatic eloquence, rapid and flowing, with less of turgid extravagance than we find in Otway's contemporaries, and sometimes with very graceful poetry."—*Hallam*.

16. "John Philips's '*Splendid Shilling*' makes the fame of this poet; it is a lucky thought happily executed."—*W. Hazlitt*. "The poet of the English Vintage '*Cider*.'"—*Macaulay*. "Author of the mock-heroic poem of '*The Splendid Shilling*' (published in 1703), and also of a poem in two books, in serious blank verse, entitled '*Cider*,' which has the reputation of being a good practical treatise on the brewing of that drink." "What he aims at imitating or appropriating is not what is called the language of nature, but the swell and pomp of Milton."—*G. L. Craik*. "He displays skill in the management of his plots, but very little in the delineation of character."—*Dr. Denham*.

17. "Rochester as a wit is first-rate; but his fancy is keen and caustic, not light and pleasing, like Suckling's or Waller's. His verses cut and sparkle like diamonds."—*W. Hazlitt*. "Rochester, endowed by nature with considerable and varied genius, might have raised himself to a higher place than he holds."—*Hallam*. "There is immense strength and pregnancy of expression in some of the best of his compositions, careless and unfinished as they are."—*G. L. Craik*.

18. "Roscommon excelled chiefly as a translator; his Horace's list of Poetry is unique as a specimen of fidelity and felicity."—*W. Hazlitt*. "It was a strangely pregnant evidence, both of narrowness in thought and of dulness of ear to the higher tones of the lyre, that one of the most famous poems of the day should have been an '*Essay on Translated Verse*.' The author, Lord Roscommon, was honourably distinguished by the moral purity of his writings."—*Spalding*. "Roscommon, one of the best for harmony and correctness of language, has little vigour, but he never offends, and Pope has justly praised his *unspotted bays*."—*Hallam*.

19. "The writings of Sandys are simple, earnest, and devout; his travels are learned without pedantry, and circumstantial without being tedious."—*G. L. Craik*. "His travels are distinguished by erudition, sagacity, and a love of truth, and are written in a pleasant style."—*Kerr*. "He comes so near the sense of his author [Ovid] that nothing is lost;

no spirits evaporate in the decanting of it into English; and if there be any sediment it is left behind."—*Langbaine*.

20. "Shirley was deficient in imagination; he had a vigorous grasp of the elements of nature, but lacked the faculty of refining them for his purpose. An opulent fancy, uncontrolled by a superintending taste, frequently led him to overlay his lines with rich images, that pressed heavily upon them. His incidental lyrics are cumbrous; and his poems are generally wanting in grace and delicacy. But notwithstanding these deductions, his plays abound with passages of exquisite beauty and tenderness. . . . His diction is masculine, energetic, and exuberant."—*Dr. Denham*. "Shirley claims a place amongst the worthies of this period, not so much for any transcendent genius in himself, as that he was the last of a great race, all of whom spoke nearly the same language, and had a set of moral feelings and notions in common."—*C. Lamb*. "Shirley has no originality, no force in conceiving or delineating character, little of pathos, and less perhaps of wit."—*Hallam*.

21. "One of the most piquant and attractive of the minor poets. He has fancy, wit, humour, descriptive talent, the highest elegance, perfect ease, a familiar style, and a pleasing versification." "His genius was confined entirely to the light and agreeable."—*Hazlitt*. "Suckling, who is the author of a small collection of poems, as well as of four plays, has none of the pathos of Lovelace [author of "Lucrecia," &c., 1649] or Carew, but he equals them in fluency and natural grace of manner, and he has besides a sprightliness and buoyancy which is all his own." "An adherent to the French school of propriety and precision, some of his happiest effusions are remarkable for a cordiality and impetuosity of manner which has nothing foreign about it, but is altogether English."—*G. L. Craik*.

22. "Waller belonged to the same class as Suckling—the sportive, the sparkling, the polished, with fancy, wit, elegance of style, and easiness of versification at his command. Poetry was the plaything of his idle hours."—*Hazlitt*. "Waller's poetry is free from all mere verbiage and empty sound; if he rarely or never strikes a very powerful note, there is, at least, always something for the fancy or the understanding as well as for the ear in what he writes. He abounds also in ingenious thoughts, which he dresses to the best advantage, and exhibits with great transparency of style." "He had a decorative and illuminating, but not a transforming imagination."—*G. L. Craik*. "Waller has a more uniform elegance, a more sure facility and happiness of expression, and, above all, a greater exemption from glaring faults, such as pedantry, extravagance, conceit, quaintness, obscurity, ungrammatical and unmeaning constructions, than any of the Caroline era." "In his amorous poetry he has little passion or sensibility; but he is never free and petulant, never tedious, and never absurd."—*Hallam*. "A vain and ample though a witty man."—*Bishop Burnet*. "The general character of his poetry is elegance and gaiety. He is never pathetic, and very rarely sublime."—*Dr. S. Johnson*. "Waller may be said to have wrought with the finest gold, and to have brought *filigree* to perfection."—*Dr. E. Bell*.

23. "His unaffected diction, even now, has scarcely a stain of age upon it, but flows on, ever fresh and transparent, like a pebbled rill." "Some, at least, of his political pieces are very remarkable for their vigour and terseness."—*G. L. Craik*. "Withers, best known in his own time as a controversial writer on the side of the Puritans, wrote, principally in early life, poems which are amongst the most pleasing in our language, delicately fanciful, and always pure, both in taste and in morals."—*W. Spalding*. "A poet of comparatively little power."—*Hazlitt*.

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

754. In a work published by Messrs. Bemrose and Sons, London and Derby, entitled "English Statesmen," by T. E. Kebbel, M. A., "James F." will find ten sketches of men who have ruled the destinies of Europe since the peace of 1815. Among these occur the names of Russell and Derby, Gladstone and Disraeli. A sketch of Disraeli appears in the *Oak*, a magazine issued by Messrs. Houlston and Wright. "Debrett's House of Commons" is valuable for the biographical particulars it contains, not only of the great lights of the state, but the less and least. Almost every magazine has of late been engaged in treating of Gladstone, and some of them of Mr. Bright.—G. W. H.

758. With "S. W. Young's" explanation of Macbeth's question, "Which of you have done this?" (act iii., scene 4) I do not feel satisfied. I cannot, from the circumstances of the affair, very well understand how it can be supposed Macbeth imagines Banquo's ghost to be a "mere trick," or a "made-up apparition." What is intended by the question is very probably—"Which of you have done this (*murder*)?" There are several points which favour this view. (1) Macbeth knew that Banquo was murdered, and at once concluded that the appearance was Banquo's ghost:—

"The times have been
That, when the brains were out, the
man would die,
And there an end; but now they
rise again,
With twenty mortal *murders* on
their crowns,
And push us from our stools."
"Macbeth."

(2) Macbeth naturally supposes that the whole company can see the ghost, and that, from its bloody appearance, they must inevitably conclude he has been foully dealt with, and wishing to remove all suspicion from himself, and to throw it on some one else, asks, "Which of you have done *this*?" (3) Macbeth's after assertion to the ghost,—

"Thou canst not say I did it [*i.e.*,
the murder]; never shake

Thy gory locks at me."

The seat which the ghost occupies is for the occasion Macbeth's *appointed* seat. To Macbeth's words, "The table is full," Lenox replies, "Here's a place reserved, sir." And on Macbeth's turning to take the seat he finds it occupied by the ghost of murdered Banquo; hence he exclaims, "Which of you have done *this*?" But conscience does not permit him to use the too suggestive word which might imply a foregone knowledge. Besides, the horror is heightened by the use of a definite word in an indefinite sense.—T. H.

759. J. T. F. has asked a question which may give rise to statements inviting controversy. Marriage, in Scripture, is alleged to be not only a divine institution, but is represented as a civil contract. It seems to be designed by Providence to be right that one man and one woman should bear the definite relations of husband and wife from the natural equality in the number of the sexes, and from the similarity of nature otherwise than sexual, given to all human creatures. Marriage commends itself for its beneficiality in domestic comfort; the proper upbringing of children; the distribution of families under due restraint and government; the permanency of residence, and

the moral effect that produces; the encouragement of industry; and the progress of individuals and society. We can scarcely, therefore, suppose it could be without visible sanction and proper form. The commonness of the relationship of husband and wife is amply demonstrated in Scripture. In Ruth iv. we have something very like a public marriage ceremony; and allusions to marriage ceremonies are frequent in Scripture—as betrothal, “duty of marriage” (Exod. xxi. 10), preparation of bride for bridegroom, consent of relatives, witness, &c., all of which suppose or imply ceremonial; as do also the words “espousals,” “divorce,” “harlotry,” neither of which could exist unless marriage were ceremonial, and the rule of life and society.—S. O. M.

760. A notice of the late Rev. G. Croly, LL.D., bearing the signature of “Q. S.,” appeared in the *British Controversialist*, January, 1861, pp. 39—46. The biographical dictionaries contain brief notices of him, but we know of no life of the multifariously learned rector of St. Stephen's, Walbrook, nor do we know of any complete edition of his works. This, we should think, would be a rather difficult publication to float; for his works include prophetic interpretations, biography, criticism, sermons, speeches, dogmatic treatises in theology, satire, tragedies, comedies, tales, novels, history, &c., so that besides being voluminous they are heterogeneous. It seems a most unfair treatment of so distinguished a Conservative, that Dr. Croly should have been left almost memorialless by the periodicals of his own party.

762. F. G. will probably find enough said on the subject of his query in our forthcoming paper, “Auguste Comte: the Positive Philosophy—Critical.” Meanwhile we may note that in a note to the interesting “Personal Preface” pre-

fixed to the sixth volume of “The Course of Positive Philosophy” p. xxxvi, distinctly affirms, “I have never read, in any language, Vico, Kant, Herder, nor Hegel, &c. I know their various works only through certain indirect reports and some very insufficient extracts.” If F. G. wishes to pursue the subject farther, at present he may read with advantage the “History of the Positive Philosophy,” in chaps. iii.—vii. of M. E. Lettré's “Auguste Comte—the Positive Philosophy,” second edition, where the course of thought is traced through Turgot, Kant, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Bordin, to Comte. Dr. J. H. Bridges, of Bradford, one of the most distinguished of the British disciples of Comte, in his lectures on “France under Richelieu and Colbert,” delivered before the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh in 1866, says from Descartes “more than from any other man we can trace the two great intellectual movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—the critical philosophy (Kant's) and the positive philosophy (Comte's); the first, exposing the weakness of all such beliefs as from their nature are insusceptible either of proof or disproof, thus demarcated the knowable from the unknowable, and fixed the limits within which it is alone useful for the human intellect to exert itself; the second, building up within these limits a new structure of scientific conviction, formed a far securer basis than has ever existed before for the social and moral relations of man; opened a newer and wider sphere for his primeval instincts of love, of reverence, and of duty” (p. 173).—S. N.

764. Does our esteemed Bristolian friend, O. D., insinuate his accusation against the conductors of the *British Controversialist* speaking advisedly with their lips? There did appear in the second volume of this

serial a debate, consisting of four articles on either side, bearing the title, "Does the Divine Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit exist in the Person of our Lord Jesus Christ?" which seems to us to be a debating, not an ignoring of this question. It is not the custom with them to shirk any question which can be debated.—R. M. A.

SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Ought a secular oath, bearing the usual penalty of perjury, be adopted?

Has Ireland or Poland been worse governed?

Ought Newman rather than Manning to have been the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster?

Was the adoption of Christianity by the State fatal to its purity?

Would the suppression of the Pope as a temporal prince be justifiable?

Ought we have to an inconvertible currency?

Has there ever been "an actual apocalypse of truth by the will of God" to man?

Literary Notes.

"A LIFE of General Grant"—probably as a candidate's brief for the Presidency—is nearly ready, from the pen of A. D. Richardson, Connecticut.

James Teare, one of the earliest English advocates of total abstinence, has left an autobiographic sketch of his life and labours, a series of lectures on temperance, and a sum of £100 to found a prize essay fund on the fundamental principles of teetotalism.

James Henry Dixon, now resident in Florence, has in the press a "Selection of the Ballads of all Nations," to be called *The Redclyffe Ballad Book*.

Rev. Christopher Benson, Hulsean Lecturer, Golden Preacher at the Temple, &c., author of "Scripture Difficulties," "Tradition and Episcopacy," &c., died 28th March.

Ralph Waldo Emerson lectured in New York on "Eloquence," "The Man of the World," and "Relation of Intellect and Morals."

J. H. Friswell is engaged on an emended and extended edition of "Familiar Words"—a dictionary of quotations.

J. O. Hotten is to publish, from the pen of an Oxford Graduate, "Horse and Foot; or, Pilgrims to Parnassus," a satire on modern poets and poetry.

Edward Jesse (b. 1780), author of "Anecdotes of Dogs," editor of White's "Selborne," Walton's "Angler," &c., died 28th March.

M. Adolphe Franck (b. 1809), author of a "Sketch of the History of Logic" (1838), "Communism judged by History" (1849), &c., has in the press a second edition of the excellent "Dictionary of the Philosophic Sciences," which he conducted (1844—1852), which is, we understand, revised to the present time.

Professor H. Roessler, of Erlangen, has issued a critique on and introduction to "The Wealth of Nations," by Adam Smith; and at St. Petersburg Professor W. Besobrasoff has published a lecture "On the Influence of Economic Science on the Modern Life of Europe."

Dr. J. N. Sepp, a Romanist theologian, has issued a new edition of his "Jesus Christ: a Study of His Life and Doctrine in connection with the History of Humanity."

Two volumes of Marchioness de Boissy's (Guiccioli) "Life of Lord Byron," have been issued at Paris.

The late Rev. C. H. Townshend has appointed Charles Dickens to be his literary executor in the publication of his views on religious topics.

John Crawford, Oriental scholar and ethnologist, died 11th May, aged 85.

Lord Brougham, whose name is famous in almost every field of intellectual effort, died 8th May, in the ninetieth year of his age.

Viscount de Cormenin, publicist and jurisconsult, author of "Studies on Parliamentary Orators," &c., himself one of the most able of that tribe, died May 12th, aged 80.

The *Edinburgh Review* has for the subject of its opening paper, "Comte's Positive Philosophy;" and the *Quarterly* opens with a paper on "Lord Macaulay and his School."

Wm. Morris, author of "Jason," has in preparation a new poem in two parts—"Earthly Paradise."

"Lives of the English Cardinals" (from Brakespeare to Wolsey), by Folkestone Williams, is in the press.

"The Shakspeare Memorial Library," proposed in 1861 by George Dawson and the Shakspeare Club, has been inaugurated at Birmingham. It has already acquired by donation and purchase "a collection of Shaksperian literature such as has never been seen before." It is anticipated that it will shortly embrace every edition of Shakspeare's works, and all works, such as commentaries, biographies, criticisms, &c., bearing on the dramatist.

An edition of the "English Reform Act," 1867, with notes and an index, has been issued by R. Wilkinson.

It has been proposed to issue a "Birmingham Shakspeare." It would be better, in our opinion, to prepare a "Universal Shakspeare," and invite help from all the Shaksperians in the world to make it one,

like its subject, "not for an age, but for all time."

Professor Kingsley has given a course of four lectures at Cambridge supplementary to his course on "The Sixteenth Century." They treat of "Vesalius the Anatomist," "Rondeletius the Naturalist," "Paracelsus the Alchemist," and "Buchanan the Scholar."

An interesting correspondence between Lord Byron and the Armenian monks of St. Lazare, near Venice, has been recently discovered in that monastery. Lord Byron spent a considerable time at St. Lazare, and cherished a great affection for its monks, to whom he alludes in "Childe Harold."

Lovers of Milton will be happy to hear that Professor D. Masson has relinquished the editorial management of *Macmillan's Magazine*. Mr. Grove, the Palestine explorer, has taken the vacant seat.

A new series of the *Journal of Philology* under the care of the editor of the *Globe Shakspeare*, is announced.

"Cavalier and Puritan Song," by Professor H. Morley, is in the press.

At the sitting of the French Academy of Science, 18th May, M. J. B. Dumas, professor of physics, author of "Lessons on Chemical Philosophy," &c., delivered a eulogium upon the late Professor Faraday. His discourse was much applauded.

It is said that Tennyson has the Arthurian epic of which the "Morte d'Arthur" is a fragmentary chip, lying completed among his papers, but that he is so anxious regarding the absolute finish attainable in it, he will not yield to the many endeavours made to get him to publish it.

In competition for T. P. Cooke's prize of £100, nineteen dramas have been sent in.

Professor D. Schenkel, D.D., has commenced the issue in shilling parts, at Leipsic, of a Bible Lexicon.

V. P. Tchijoff has translated Hegel's "Philosophy of Nature" into Russian.

John Payne Collier has had printed "for private circulation" a volume of "Old Popular Songs" in *fac-simile* of type, woodcuts, &c. He recently delivered a lecture on "The Origin and Progress of Street Ballad Singing," for the benefit of the Mechanics' Institute, Maidenhead, illustrating his subject by extracts from this work.

Dr. Besley, translator of Aristotle's "Rhetoric," author of "The Principles of Christian Allegiance," &c., died April 20.

Thorold Rogers, formerly Professor of Political Economy, Oxford, is to edit an authorized edition of Mr. John Bright's speeches.

Dr. Hampden, Bishop of Hereford, author of Bampton Lectures on "The Scholastic Philosophy in its Relation to Christian Theology" (1832), "Philosophical Evidences of Christianity," "Lectures on Moral Philosophy," "Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle," reprinted from the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, the article on "Scholastic Philosophy" in the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*, sermons, &c., died 23rd April.

"Leibnitz as a Metaphysical and Ethical Philosopher," has been fixed on by Mrs. Blackwell's Trustees as the subject of the next £25 prize. The competition is unrestricted, and a note to the "Trustees," addressed University of Aberdeen, will, we believe, secure farther information.

Sir J. T. Coleridge has nearly ready a memoir of John Keble. A selection from the inedited and miscellaneous poems of the laureate of "The Christian Year" is in the press, as is also his translation of "St. Irenæus."

"Fugitive Poems on Scientific Subjects," selected by the late Dr. Daubeny, are to be issued shortly.

Professor Veitch's memoir of Sir William Hamilton is now actually in the press.

Professor Leonard Rabus, Erlangen, has just published vol. i. of a "Logic and Metaphysic, Historic and Systematic."

M. Louis Gustave Vapereau (b. 1819), editor of the "Dictionary of Contemporaries," has prepared for Messrs. Hachette and Co., with the aid of literary and learned men, a "Dictionary of Literature," containing articles on the history, criticism, and theory of literary questions in all literatures.

H. Ulrici has undertaken the editorship of a twelve-volumed re-issue of the German translation of Shakspeare's works by Schlegel and Tieck.

"A Poem," by George Eliot, is announced by Messrs. Blackwood as in the press. It is said to be founded on "a gipsy adventure."

The sum expended in publishing the *fac-simile* of "Domesday Book" has been £3,556, and it is expected that the receipts will more than cover the cost of its production.

That indefatigable old-book clergyman, the Rev. A. B. Grosart, now of Blackburn, having produced his "Fuller's Poems," and the annotated "List of Baxter's Works," now proposes to reprint, by his usual plan of private subscription, "The Complete Poems of Sir John Davies," "Giles Fletcher and Phineas Fletcher," and the "Divine Poems" of Thomas Washbourne.

Bishop Colenso has issued the first part of "The Pilgrim's Progress," translated into the Zulu language, and the second part is in progress.

"The Paston Letters" are to be issued by the Early English Text Society, under the care of H. B. Wheatley.

A *fac-simile* series of reprints of broadsides, ballads, &c., has been commenced.

A statue of W. C. Bryant, the poet, is to be placed in the Central Park, New York.

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THE
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AND
LITERARY MAGAZINE.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT."

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PREFACE.

THOUGHT is the great power of life. *Election* implies the exercise of discriminative thought, and a *vote* is the practical and definite registration of the decision of the judgment on the matter at issue. There can be no genuine choice without reflective consideration, and the careful weighing and balancing of all the qualities that tell in favour of and against the subject submitted to the deliberative action of the understanding and will.

"Wisdom, of what herself approves, makes choice,
Nor is led captive by the common voice."

To culture among men, a wise considerateness in estimating opinions, a careful deliberation in the weighing of arguments, and a cautious sifting of statements and inferences before accepting conclusions, are more than ever necessary, on account of the rapid and important changes which are taking place in social, political, religious, and intellectual life. Dogmatic thought is always fascinating to weak and facile minds, and those who are thankful for being spared the trouble of thinking for themselves. The intellect itself is too apt to take opinions in reliance on authority or prevalency, without rigorous investigation and calm but searching revision, and without inquiring how they can be co-ordinated and held together as a coherent system. But now, when crude and indigested thought, when casuistic speculations and doubtful opinions may seriously affect the nation's material and moral well-being, the need for practical education in controversy has become more than ever important.

Public reforms, though initiated by individual thinkers, are shown to be advantageous by general discussion, and are brought into consideration and prominence by the tentative efforts of controversialists to procure a hearing for them. Public grievances have little hope of being redressed unless debate tasks their advocates, and overcomes their defenders. Hence we affirm that critical controversy has an important office to perform in Society, and in the Church, on the Platform and through the Press. The essence of political and social influence is the formation of independent judgments, and these cannot be formed by those who devote themselves to the associations of a clique, the leaders of a school, the tenets of a sect, the opinions of a party, or the hobby of a favourite politician. He who contents himself with one view of a question, or the averments and statements of a specific organ for the diffusion and inculcation of any definite opinion, virtually closes his eyes, shuts his ears, and refuses to give reasonable heed to the means by which the whole truth on a question may become known to him. The larger proportion of newspapers and periodical publications exist for the purpose of promoting some given view, and appeal to the adherents of special opinions. Our serial endeavours to hold an independent place in letters as the organ of no party or creed, but of genuine critical thought, as applied to all the debateable questions which arise in the course of reflective thought and actual life.

This practical training of the mind in the art of placing the arguments in favour of, or opposed to, any opinion fairly before the mind side by side, so that their force, power, consistency, and accuracy, might be tested, *The British Controversialist* has been endeavouring to supply, for many years, with, we venture to say, happy results, not only to its readers but to the

public interests so far as our readers have been concerned in them. In its pages there have been discussed several of the old standing controversies in regard to which every age has endeavoured to gain some available settlement, and many of the new and stirring questions which have arisen in the present time, and forced themselves into prominence as the topics of prevailing interest. So far as regards these, its past volumes are a storehouse, and a treasury of reasoned opinion and argumentative inference, and we hope that the present volume is not less engrossing in the merit and matter of the controversial writing it contains, than those of its numerous predecessors—volumes for which the demand has, in some cases, exhausted five editions, and of which the sale continues active still, though years have passed since their first issue. To the contributors, by whom the matter has been furnished which imparts a large portion of its usefulness and worth to this volume, the Conductors tender their own thanks, and they believe they may assure them of the esteem of their readers.

The interest of public events, and the intense activity of political agitation having immediate ends in view, have, for a time, absorbed the attention felt in, and given to, theoretical discussions, but we presume that our controversial pages will be found to be fully impressed not only with the spirit of the times, but with the larger interest of a search for truth.

Of the other departments, a slight notice only is required. "The Reviewer" has narrowed his range, but extended his labours, and has supplied several abstracts of good works, which should be useful to the reader. "The Inquirer" continues to give efficient help to those in need of advice and in quest of information, and we are happy to notice its increasing value and suggestiveness. In "Our Collegiate Course" the student of "his own land's language" and literature, is provided with careful and elaborate facts, references, illustrations, and assistance in connection with the past, while in our "Literary Notes" the history of letters in the present time is sketched in outline. "The Essayist," with more than usual fulness, directs attention to life, literature, and men, and in the section entitled, "Toiling Upward," exemplary biography has received some praiseworthy additions. "The Societies' Section" notices some phases of associative thought and effort, and "The Topic" brings before our minds some of the more immediate questions which have animated thought from month to month.

In the leading papers the Conductors have had the aid of the same writer, who has from its earliest pages given so much of charm and novelty and worth to this serial. His exemplary fidelity to us, and his devotion to the interests and instruction of our readers, renew and increase our obligations to him. On the whole, we think that, on a fair comparison of the contents of the volume now laid before the reader with those which we have previously had the honour and pleasure of submitting to public judgment, as well as an impartial collation with its compeers, we may justly claim acceptance for this volume on its merits, and that we may venture to ask its readers and subscribers to encourage and promote the circulation of this magazine, as a serial helpful and useful to the student engaged in self-culture, interesting and valuable to the thoughtful inquirer, and worthy of the attentive perusal and study of all who delight in critical thought applied to the consideration and solution of the most important questions that can, or do, arise in art, science, philosophy, social life, politics, literature, and religion.

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

The Works of "Samuel Bailey, of Sheffield,"

"An able and zealous inquirer after truth."—*J. F. Ferrier.*

"One who, on any subject on which he thinks fit to write, is entitled to a respectful hearing."—*J. S. Mill.*

THE advocates of freedom in "the formation and publication of opinions" have, as Milton affirms, "light, truth, reason, and the practice and the learning of the best ages of the world" on their side. The right of free thought and fair discussion may in our day be regarded as theoretically conceded; and in some measure, as not only practically allowed, but absolutely provided for in the customs and laws (as now interpreted) of our country. Some thinkers have come to regard this right as a necessity to the well-being of our race and the development within man of all the powers tending to progress he possesses; and advocate its permission, assertion, and exercise on account of the benefits and advantages that must ultimately accrue from the thorough and fully argued consideration of every question. Others have risen to a higher form of thought regarding inquiry, debate, and investigation. They look on it not as a favour to be taken advantage of, as a necessity to be yielded to, or a right proper to be exercised, not even as a virtue to be displayed, but most truly as a duty to be performed. The duty of impartial inquiry is the novelty in the morality of our age. These advanced thinkers in "enforcing that neglected part of morality," insist on the constant exercise of "that earnestness and that sincerity, that strong love of truth, and that conscientious solicitude for the formation of just opinions, which are not the least virtues of men, but of which the cultivation is the more especial duty of all who call themselves philosophers," and of all those who would fulfil to their highest reach the duties incumbent on them as the worthy inheritors of the wisdom of past ages and the responsible preparers of the future of humanity.

In this Apostolate of dutiful free thought and impartiality of investigation probably no living man has exerted so large an amount of directly formative influence as "Samuel Bailey, of Sheffield," a thinker who, almost half a century ago, won the admiration of Brougham and Mackintosh, Bentham and James Mill; whose works have since stirred the minds of the leaders of men, and acted upon the thoughts of Molesworth and Grote, J. S. Mill and W. J.

Fox, of Alex. Bain and John Austin; whose philosophical writings have excited to controversy De Quincey and Macculloch, Ferrier and Fraser, Mill and Herbert Spencer; and whose cogent arguments on the duty of the free publication of opinions had, if we are not much mistaken, a considerable effect in determining the promoters of *The Westminster Review* to commence that important literary undertaking. As the advocate of intellectual liberty he has been a most successful continuator of the labours of a long line of master spirits, and yet has been so effectively characterized by originality that he may justly be spoken of as the initiator of the modern doctrine of mental freedom, in as much as he took up what appears to us *now* to be "an obvious and familiar truth, which, till his time, had been a barren truism, and showed that it teemed with consequences." "It often happens that an important principle is vaguely apprehended, and incidentally expressed, long before it is reduced to a definite form or fixed by regular proof; but while it floats in this state on the surface of men's understandings, it is only of casual and limited utility; it is sometimes forgotten and sometimes abandoned, seldom pursued to its consequences, and frequently denied in its modifications. It is only after it has been clearly established by an indisputable process of reasoning, explored in its bearings, and exhibited in all its force that it becomes of uniform and essential service; it is only then that it can be decisively appealed to both in controversy and in practice, and that it exerts the whole extent of its influence on private manners and public institutions." It is because Mr. Bailey has accomplished this vitalization of an old common-place that one of his early reviewers (whom *we guess* to be J. S. Mill) has given the following enthusiastic estimate of his first production:—

"If a man could be offered the paternity of any comparatively modern books he chose, he would not hazard much by deciding that next after the 'Wealth of Nations' he would request to be honoured with a relationship to the 'Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions.' It would have been a glorious thing to have been the father of the mathematics of grown gentlemen; to have saved nations from fraud, by inventing the science of detecting the pillage of the few upon the many, the 'practical men' protesting the while against its inferences, as defaulting purse-bearers protest against arithmetic. It would have been a splendid triumph to have set up the 'lever which will move the world,' and have originated the process of discovery which heads of houses are called on to prohibit, lest knowledge should become insupportable, and Oxford 'man have too much light.' But next to this, it would have been a pleasant and an honourable memory to have written a book so *totus torus atque rotundus*, so finished in its parts, and so perfect in their union, as the 'Essays on the Formation of Opinions.' Like one of the great statues of antiquity, it might have been broken into fragments, and each separated limb would have pointed to the existence of some interesting whole, of which the value might be surmised from the beauty of the specimen."—*Westminster Review*, Oct., 1829, p. 477.

It would be impossible to present in any brief space an outline of the progress of thought on the subject of free inquiry and the right

and duty of the honest and charitable utterance of its results from the first, the earliest, and the most complete, the all-embracing enunciation of the general doctrine, "Whatsoever ye would that others should do unto you, do ye even so unto them," by Him "who left on the memory of those who witnessed his life and conversation, such an impression of His moral character that (more than) eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to Him as the Almighty in person," to the fine exposition of the contents of the ancient aspiration (*περὶ παντός τὴν ἐλευθερίαν*), "above all things, liberty," which J. S. Mill has given in the essay from which this characterization of Jesus Christ is quoted. But it cannot fail to be profitable to recal a few of those names which, in modern times, have most fully maintained the perfect freedom of the soul of man in thought, and have affirmed with more or less distinctness man's right and duty, under proper responsibility for the welfare of society, to give utterance to his convictions with frank candour and honourable considerateness.

Not to speak of the Pauline adaptation of the royal law of love to matters of controversy, and indeed to all thought, "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind;" or Luther's fiery denunciation of any attempt "to assail by force the enemies of the truth," and his burly assertion of the sanctity of men's convictions before all men; passing over the strong words of the Swiss reformer, Zwingli, and the pithy sayings of that Hungarian reformer, Dudith, as well as the easy-going indifferentism of Montaigne, the witty appeals of Erasmus, and the effective sarcasms against tyranny over opinion expressed by Reuchlin, we may come at once to later times, and mention a few of those who in our own country have claimed the noble freedom of the mind. Jeremy Taylor's "Liberty of Prophesying," a discourse issued in 1647 to show "the unreasonableness of prescribing to other men's faith, and the iniquity of persecuting differing opinions," has been justly characterized as "the first distinct and avowed defence of Toleration which had been ventured on in England, perhaps in Christendom," for the treatise of Crellius, entitled, "*Vindiciæ pro Religionis Libertate*," 1636, is rather a pleading in favour of his own sect, the Socinians of Racow, than for universal immunity from suffering for opinion's sake. Milton, indeed, had in 1644 published his splendid and precious "*Areopagitica*" in order to deliver the press from the restraints with which it was encumbered, in opposition to the power claimed by the State "of determining what was true and what was false, what ought to be published, and what ought to be suppressed." "Many passages in this famous tract are admirably eloquent; an intense love of liberty and truth glows through it; [and] the majestic soul of Milton breathes [in it] such high thoughts as had not been uttered before;" but we know from his issue of a "Treatise on True Religion, Heresy, Schism, Toleration, and what best means may be used against the growth of Popery," 1678, that Milton had not attained to the expansive philosophic views on this subject which Jeremy Taylor advances in his discourse. We owe

to the early outcome of Milton's noble spirit some of the most admirable words in behalf of free discussion which have ever been uttered in "our English, the language of men ever famous and foremost in the achievements of liberty;" the glory of his language and the grandeur of his thoughts outglowing his prejudices, he expands thus, in oft-quoted words, the motto of this magazine: *Magna est veritas et prævalebunt* :—

"Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely, according to conscience, above all liberties." . . . "Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter? Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing." . . . "For who knows not that Truth is strong next to the Almighty; she needs no policies, no stratagems, no licensings to make her victorious—those are the shifts and the defences that Error uses against her power."

In Dr. John Owen's appendix to "A Vision of Free Mercy," the sermon which he preached before the Parliament in 1646, indulgence and toleration are learnedly and rationally considered, and a good plea for liberty of conscience in matters of religion is placed before the reader. Robert Barclay's "Apology for the people called, in scorn, Quakers," 1676, contains many passages of manly defence of free thought and pathetic deprecation of persecution and oppression for conscience' sake. Locke's "Letters on Toleration," 1689, carried the discussion of this question into politics, and is an exposition of the opinion, that "All the power of Civil Government relates only to men's civil interests, is confined to the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to come." This same principle was supported by Bishop Hoadley on scriptural grounds in that sermon preached before George I., in 1717, on the text (St. John xviii. 36), "My kingdom is not of this world," which excited the Bangorian Controversy, and resulted in a ponderous collection of pamphlets on the power and rights of the Civil Magistrate in matters ecclesiastical, and in the suppression of Convocation so far as relates to "the despatch of business." Induced probably by the interest of the question in his day, in consequence of a controversy between Hoadley and Atterbury—the former gaining the applause of the House of Commons, and the latter that of the Lower House of Convocation, for the parts they took in it—on the nature and extent of the obedience due to the civil power by ecclesiastics, Dr. Benj. Ibbot chose for the subject of the Boyle Lectures (1714-5), published in 1727, "The Right, Duty, Benefits, and Advantages of Private Judgment," a subject which he treated in a judicious, learned, and ingenious manner. Paley, in his "Moral Philosophy," 1785, maintained the moral obligation of toleration and the right of private judgment, founding his views much on the same principles as Locke. In Disraeli's "Curiosities of Literature," 1791-4, the author announced his intention of writing a History of Toleration, a work which, how-

ever, he did not accomplish; but in two sections of his "*Curiosities*"—those on *Political Religionism* and *Toleration*—some singular jottings on this matter may be found interesting to the inquiring reader. William Godwin, in his "*Inquiry concerning Political Justice*," 1793, gave a turn to the question, which made it civic instead of religious. Sydney Smith, in "*Peter Plymley's Letters*," 1807, in favour of Catholic Emancipation, applied the forces of wit and argument to the furtherance of Toleration. Percy Bysshe Shelley made some most musical, but most extravagant and rash demonstrations in favour of free thinking in his marvellous, though boyish poem, "*Queen Mab*," 1812, not to mention his hasty "*Defence of Atheism*," 1811.

The authors of all these works, however, had for their main aim some other object directly or indirectly in view in their discussions of the question, and used arguments for toleration as steps leading to farther and other objects. They did not treat this subject pure and simple, and for the most part spoke of free thought as a privilege to be conceded, a right to be permitted, and a sort of grace and favour to be given, rather than a sacred duty to be exercised, and a responsibility bindingly laid upon man as the possessor of intelligence and as a member of the social confederation in which his lot is cast. This is, as we conceive it, the chief element in Samuel Bailey's claim upon the gratitude of mankind. He has first of all proclaimed, propounded, and proved the *duty* of free inquiry as a moral obligation incumbent on men as individuals, as members of society, and as intelligent creatures; and has demonstrated the profound impolicy of inculcating views regarding investigative thought which causes men to hesitate to pursue reasonings to their ultimates, and—

" Grow pale,
Lest their own judgments should become too bright,
And their free thoughts be crimes, and earth have too much light."

It is on this account that we think that some idea of his writings ought to be laid before the readers of this serial, whose chief object is to excite and to train those who feel interested in its contents to the impartial and candid investigation of every question, and to the proper exercise of the faculties of discrimination and judgment with which they have been endowed, as an important part of self-culture, and an essential preparation for taking a right share of the duties of social life.

To the writer of this paper Samuel Bailey is almost as impersonal as a myth. He knows nothing of the life, habits, position, circumstances, doings, sufferings,—in short, the *biography* of the author. A few vague and indistinct hearsays have occasionally reached him in incidental conversations with philosophic friends; but of these no note has been taken, and only from his works have our ideas of him been formed. We know that he is averse to personal publicity, and that he considers that authors should be free from the constraint on life, which the intrusive anxiety of biographers and

critics impose on a thinker. We are unable, in this case, to supply that abstract of the events of a life which we have sometimes been privileged to communicate for the first time to the public, and we must depend for the interest of our paper on the notices of the works of the first modern advocate of the duty and the right of freedom in "the formation and publication of opinions."

Samuel Bailey, who is usually characterized as "of Sheffield"—perhaps at first employed to impart to his ideas a sort of stigma of provinciality, but now transformed into a kind of connotation of kindliness—was born in the metropolis of the steel manufacture, in 1791, was educated in the Grammar School of his native town, and, we have heard it said, that he attended some of the classes in Edinburgh University, especially those of Dr. Thomas Brown; if so, it is probable that he there acquired that loving reverence for the Scottish metaphysicians, Hume, Reid, Smith, Stewart, Brown, and we may add, James Mill, which is so remarkable in him as an English thinker and as a disciple of the philosophy of John Locke.

He has continued to reside in Sheffield, and there, as a banker, he was occupied during most of the years in which he was busied with the speculations which have won him influence as a thinker. He took an active part, we believe, in the establishment of the Mechanics' Library, 1828, and the Mechanics' Institution, 1832. He is a member of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Sheffield, and has frequently discoursed at its meetings. After the passing of the Reform Bill he offered himself as a candidate for the representation of Sheffield, but was outvoted. He is now, we understand, retired from business and enjoying learned leisure at Norbury, in the vicinity of the town of his nativity. All that we know of him besides is summed up in the dates of the appearance of his volumes and the additions they have made to human thought and the impetus they have given to human progress and enlightenment.

Early in 1821 his first work appeared. It is entitled, "Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions, and on other subjects;" it reached a second edition in 1826, which differed from the previous one only in "a few verbal alterations" and in the possession of an appendix, in which the author "attempted to extend, support, and elucidate some of the doctrines contained in the essays;" in ten years afterwards a cheap edition was issued, "to secure for the work a more extensive circulation and a wider influence." They were issued anonymously, as were most of his other works, till the name of the author had become so well known that anonymity would have been affectation. The work consists altogether of ten essays; of these, the two first are the most important, and occupy the larger half of the book. In the following paragraphs we shall endeavour to give an idea of the contents of these essays in brief:—

Essay I., On the formation of opinions, consists of eight sections, (i.), "On the terms belief, assent, and opinion," giving "their respective shades

of meaning. *Assent* appears to denote the state of the understanding in relation to propositions ; while *belief* has a more comprehensive acceptation, expressing the state of the mind in relation to any fact or circumstance, although that fact or circumstance may never have occurred to it in the form of a proposition, or, what is the same thing, may never have been reduced by it into words." "The term opinion is seldom, if ever, used in reference to subjects which are certain or demonstrable ;"—"the term in its ordinary sense denotes not the state of mind, but the subject of belief, the thing or the proposition believed." (ii.) "On the independence of belief on the will." "To ascribe to mere volition a change from doubt to conviction is asserting that a man without the slightest reason may, if he please, believe to-day what he doubted yesterday." He holds that "belief, doubt, and disbelief are involuntary states of the intellect," and that to affect "belief you must affect the subject of it by producing new arguments or considerations, [but he forgets that man is a spontaneously assimilative being, who is possessed of selfhood and exercises will, not as "mere volition" but as volition in regard to self and circumstance.] (iii.) "On the opinions of Locke and some other writers on this subject." Locke who says—"as knowledge is no more arbitrary than perception ; so I think assent is no more in our power than knowledge," and yet affirms that "assent, suspense, or dissent are often voluntary actions," ought perhaps to be put out of court. Reid says, "It is not in our power to judge as we will, the judgment remains in suspense until it is inclined on one side or another by reasons or arguments," [but Mr. Bailey ought to have told us besides that Reid asserted that man had "a power over the determinations of his own will," and also that certain operations of the mind—attention, deliberation, fixed purpose or resolution—are voluntary, (see "Active Powers," Essay II., ch. iii. 4 ;) and thus affords no valid authority.] Bacon, as Mr. Bailey observes, never made this "a matter of separate consideration, and only incidentally mentions it," and "his language cannot be expected to be uniformly consistent," and hence when he tells us that he says, "the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment over the will," . . . "and giveth law to the will itself," it would have been better had Mr. Bailey told us that he treated also of "those things which are within our own power, and work upon the mind and affect and govern the will and the appetite" (see "Advancement of Learning," Book VII., ch. iii.). (iv.) "On the circumstances which have led men to regard belief as voluntary." (a) "The intimate connection subsisting between belief and the expression or declaration of it, the latter of which is at all times an act of the will." "As we can refuse to express our agreement with a proposition, so, it has been assumed, we can refuse to believe it ; and as motives have power to induce a man to declare his assent, so, it has been taken for granted, they have the power of inducing him to yield his credence. (b) "The practice of confounding the consent of the understanding with that of the will or the feelings." (c) "Many people adopt an opinion according to their interest or their passions ; or, in other words, they undertake to assert some particular doctrine, and regard as adversaries all who oppose it." (d) "On many questions men are not able to form any definite decision, and yet from the necessity of professing some opinion, or joining some party, and from the habit of making assertions, and even arguing in favour of what they are thus pledged to support, they come to regard themselves as entertaining positive sentiments on points about which they are really in doubt." "The practice of adopting and maintaining opinions without

actual conviction must necessarily give them the appearance of depending on the will, and what is true of mere professions is naturally and easily transferred to opinions which have really possession of the understanding." (v. and vi.) "On the sources of differences of opinion." 1st, "Belief may, in some circumstances, be partially controlled by our voluntary actions." We may turn our attention from the arguments on one side, and direct all its keenness to those on the other, "and we may possibly by such means lessen our doubts about an opinion which we desire to think true." 2nd, "The external circumstances in which men are placed, as they vary in the case of every individual, must necessarily occasion different ideas to be presented to each mind, different associations to be established even amongst the same ideas, and of course different opinions to be formed." 3rd, "A great portion of the opinions of mankind are notoriously propagated by transmission from one generation to another." "Mere instillation is sufficient to make him believe any proposition, although he should be utterly ignorant of the foundation on which it rests, or the evidence by which it is supported." 4th, "Whatever occasions the same arguments to suggest different considerations, or combinations of thought to different minds, may be ranked among those sources of discrepancies in opinion which we are investigating," *e. g.*, the defects of language, suggestions originated by arguments, the nature of the ideas, associations, prejudices and opinions already in the mind, and "the influence possessed by the sensitive over the intellectual part of our nature." 5th, "There is indisputably an influence exerted by emotions and passions over the understanding." Whatever fixes the attention on some arguments more than others must affect our decisions; and so will all the ideas and considerations which these arguments suggest. "This attribute, of drawing and fixing the attention, belongs in a remarkable degree to all strong emotions." "Our good as well as our bad passions, our kind as well as our malevolent feelings, may equally operate as principles of suggestion," and "are of course equally liable to mislead the judgment;" hence they may "be expected to have considerable power in the consideration of questions which furnish various conflicting arguments, and in the case of men whose notions are loose and undefined, without the ties of logical dependence and consistent principle." (vii.) "On belief of opinions as objects of moral approbation and disapprobation, rewards and punishments." As "what is involuntary cannot involve any merit or demerit on the part of the agent," "it follows that those states of the understanding which we term belief, doubt, and disbelief, inasmuch as they are not voluntary, nor the result of any exertion of the will, imply neither merit nor demerit in him who is the subject of them;" "the nature of an opinion cannot make it (the state of the understanding) criminal," "because it is the necessary and involuntary consequence of the views presented to his understanding without the slightest interference of choice." "Our approbation and disapprobation, if they fall anywhere, should be directed to the conduct of men in their researches, to the use which they make of their opportunities of information, and to the partiality and impartiality visible in their actions;" and it follows that opinions "do not fall within the province of legislation; that they are not proper subjects of rewards and punishments;" [for this very reason, it might have been as well to add, "philosophers should diligently inquire into the powers and energy of custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friendship, praise, reproof, exhortation, reputation, laws, books, studies, &c., for these are the things which reign in

men's morals. By these agents the mind is formed and subdued, and of these ingredients remedies are prepared, which, so far as human means can reach, conduce to the preservation and recovery of the health of the mind." "Bacon's Advancement of Learning," Book VII., iii.] (vii.) "On the evil consequences of the common errors on this subject." 1st, It has drawn "mankind from an attention to moral conduct to lead them to regard the belief of certain tenets as far more deserving of approbation than a course of the most consistent virtue;" 2nd, Laden "the minds of the timid and conscientious with the imaginary guilt of holding opinions which they regarded with horror while they could not avoid them;" and 3rd, "Alarmed the inquirer into an abandonment of the pursuit of truth." "The same error has been one principal cause of requiring subscriptions, or other outward manifestations of assent to a long list of abstruse, complex, and often unintelligible doctrines in order to qualify the aspirant not only for ecclesiastical, but even for civil and military offices." Again, the natural consequence of imputing guilt to opinions was an endeavour to prevent and to punish them "by intimidation and persecution, pursued with eagerness and marked by cruelty."

"Men even of the best regulated minds and mildest dispositions, find it difficult to argue with uniform coolness and temper. A debate from a contest of arguments often becomes a contest of passions. We resent, not only the opposition to our doctrines, but the presumption of the opponent, and grow eager to chastise him. Love of truth, if we originally had it, is soon lost in the desire of avenging our mortified vanity; and the rancour of our feelings being exasperated by every detection of the weakness of our arguments, recourse is had to violence to overwhelm those whom we cannot confute." "When the emolument, power, pride, personal consequence or gratification of any one becomes identified with a doctrine or a system, he is impatient and resentful at the slightest doubt; because every doubt is of the nature of a personal attack and threatens danger to the object of its regard."

"If our opinions are not voluntary, but independent of the will, the contrary doctrine, with all its consequences, ought to be practically abandoned; they ought to be weeded from the sentiments, habits, and institutions of society, and to be extirpated from the human mind."

Essay II. On the publication of opinions, affirms in the introduction, that "utility is the test by which every institution, every law, and every course of conduct must be tried." "The only point is to establish their beneficial tendency." The author thus states his aim: "After endeavouring to establish the conclusion that the attainment of truth ought to be the sole object of all regulations affecting the publication of opinions, because error is injurious, we shall proceed to show that the extrication of mankind from error will be most readily and effectually accomplished by perfect freedom of discussion." In Section II. he descants "on the mischiefs of error and the advantages of truth," limiting his remarks to "those sciences which treat of the powers, conduct, character, and condition of intelligent beings,"—"theology, metaphysics, morals, and politics." "The object of all these sciences is to inquire what is most conducive to the happiness of mankind." "The nearer mankind approach to truth, the happier they will be, the better will they be able to avoid what is injurious, and adopt measures of positive utility. All errors must be deviations from the path of real good." "Every advance in true knowledge must have a tendency to exalt our sources of enjoyment." "Truth is the only sure and

stable basis of happiness." "The influence of delusions will always be detrimental to happiness, inasmuch as they have a tendency to withdraw men's attention from those subjects in which their welfare is really implicated, and lead to eccentric modes of action, incompatible with the regular and beneficial course of duty and discretion." "The same fallacious principles which deluded mankind on one occasion with perhaps little detriment, would carry them from the direct path of their real interest in affairs where such aberrations might be of vital importance." In Section III. we have a "continuation of the same subject," in which it is the author's object to test, by reference to experience, the deductions he has been led to make. He denies the accuracy of the common opinion that "truth and error can be of importance only to speculative men." "Knowledge of truth is essential to correctness of practice; and this is true not only of individuals but of communities." "Let him that is sceptical as to the vast importance of truth cast his eye down the long catalogue of crimes and cruelties which stain the annals of the past, and examine the melioration which has taken place in the practices of the world, and he will not again inquire into the nature of those advantages which follow the destruction of error." Section IV. "On freedom of discussion as the means of attaining truth," maintains that if "mankind can never err in their speculative views without endangering their real welfare, it follows as a necessary consequence, that the sole end of inquiry ought to be, not the support of any particular doctrine, but the attainment of truth." "The inquiry, how truth is to be attained, becomes, therefore, in the highest degree, interesting and important." "Since then we have no fixed standard by which we can in all cases try the validity of opinions," and as certain truth, "how are we to attain it, or by what mean escape from error? Although we have no absolute test of truth, yet we have faculties to discern it, and it is only by the unrestrained exercise of those faculties that we can hope to attain correct opinions. Our success in every subject will essentially depend on the completeness of the examination." "Hence the co-operation of various minds becomes indispensably requisite. The greater the number of inquirers, the greater the probability of a successful result." "By the comparison and collision of opinions, truth will be separated from error and emerge from obscurity." "The way then to obtain this result is to permit all to be said on a subject that can be said." "Where there is perfect freedom of examination there is the greatest probability which it is possible to have that the truth will be ultimately attained. To impose the least restraint is to diminish this probability." "Unrestrained freedom of inquiry is the only, or at least the best and readiest way of arriving at correction of opinions." On this ground Section V. enlarges, "On the assumptions involved in all restraints on the publication of opinions," which seem to the author to be (1st), that the prevalence of truth would be productive of injurious consequences; (2nd), that truth has been attained, or (3rd), that truth stands in need of the protection and assistance of power in its contest with error; the first has been shown to be wrong, the second cannot seriously be maintained, and regarding the third, it may be affirmed that if opinions are "true, then is there the highest probability that every fresh examination to which they may be subjected will terminate in placing them in a clearer light." Section VI. "On the free publication of opinions as affecting the people at large," asserts that all restraints thereon "would imply, on the part of those who imposed them, that they themselves could infallibly determine what was true and what was false,"—but this would have repressed truth

and assisted error; besides, governments "could not confine the minds of the people to those ideas which they chose to impart to them." "Under a system of restraint, therefore, it is probable that a multiplicity of errors would secretly exist; and as they would not be allowed to find public vent, they could not be refuted." "The surest way of contracting the empire of error is to increase the general power of discerning its character;" for "fallacies may be exposed, misstatements detected, absurdities ridiculed if opinions are promulgated, and cannot if they are restrained." Section VII. "On the ultimate inefficiency of restraints on the publication of opinions, and their bad effects in disturbing the natural course of improvement," affirms that "truth at the best makes but slow advances;" that the sooner doubt, difficulties, and objections are discovered and met the better; that there are charms in secrecy which may be given to errors which are sought to be repressed by force, but which would lose all interest if freely discussed. "Whether established opinions are false or true, it is alike the interest of the community that investigation should be unrestrained; in order that, if false, they may be discarded, and if true, rendered conspicuous to all. The only way of fully attaining the benefits of truth is to suffer opinions to maintain themselves against attack, or fall in the contest." Essay III. "On facts and inferences," hits a blot in common thought—the incorporation of our own inferences with the facts which suggest them, and draws attention to the distinction between the proof of facts and the establishing of inferences. Essay IV. offers remarks of value "On the influence of reason on the feelings," and the gradual effect of habitual thought and constant mental discipline in subduing and controlling the passions. Essay V. animadvertes "On inattention to the dependence of causes and effects in moral conduct," and on the frequency with which men "betray a negligence of consequences, a hope against experience, a defiance of probabilities, a vagueness of anticipation, which looks for results where no proper means have been employed to produce them." It inculcates this principle, that "we should expect from virtuous actions and qualities only their peculiar consequences; and in recommending them to others we should be careful to do it on just and proper grounds," and reminds us that "all the virtues and the vices have their respective good and evil consequences, which will be felt in proportion a each vice and virtue is exercised;" "that all our actions and all our qualities have some certain tendency, and may greatly affect our well-being that in everything we do, we may be possibly laying up a train of consequences which may terminate only with our existence." Essay VI. supplies acute thoughts and able illustrations "on some of the causes and consequences of individual character." Essay VII. "On the vicissitudes of life," enlarges on the truth that "time gradually elaborates apparent impossibilities into very natural and consistent events." In Essay VIII. "On the variety of intellectual pursuits," we have a contrast and a comparison between the sciences of mind and those of matter, of nature and of letters. Essay IX. "On practical and speculative ability," is weighted with thoughtful sayings—a specimen of which we quote. "Intellectual ability is, in fact, only an inert instrument; it is passion which is the moving power, and which brings it into operation: and a small measure of understanding may often do more, when urged on by strong passion or a determined will, than an infinitely larger portion with no vigour to set it in motion." Essay X. is full of wise and pertinent remarks, "on the instability of human feelings," and yields, among many other just thoughts,

this : "The folly of sacrificing settled purposes for transient humours cannot be kept too steadily in view. In a man of susceptible mind these moods of feeling often chase each other in rapid succession ; and if he is also a wise man, it will powerfully restrain their influence on his actions, to reflect that next month, or next week, or even to-morrow, he will experience nothing of the melancholy, or vexation, or ardour, or desire which predominates to-day. He should therefore make his considerate determination the fixed point, round which his passions and feelings and humours might play, with as little power to move it as the clouds possess on the steadfastness of Skiddaw." The notes contain many important observations and extensions of the views in the Essays.

The foregoing is a brief epitome of Mr. Samuel Bailey's earliest gift to English Letters and Philosophy, a work which drew instant attention and exerted great influence, stirring a number of young minds to the very depths of their being, and setting their energies a-glow for freedom of thought, the liberty of the press, and the emancipation of the oppressed in creed, person, or position. There was great excitement among the thoughtful ; and debating, self-improvement, and other associations, sprang up in great numbers in all the large centres of population. Sympathizing with this movement, and anxious to aid the progress of reflective study, Mr. Bailey, in 1823, issued his second work, "Questions on Political Economy, Politics, Morals, Metaphysics, Polite Literature, and other branches of knowledge for discussion in literary societies, and for private study, with remarks under each head, original and selected." This work was "intended for the use of those young men who, after performing the daily duties of their professions, met together for the purposes of intellectual improvement. Societies of this kind, it is believed, are now become numerous, and it was thought that a collection of subjects for conversation, accompanied by brief explanatory remarks and references to such books as are commonly to be found in libraries, might relieve them from the difficulty of supplying topics on the spur of the moment, or from the trouble of searching for them at an expense of time which individuals of this class have it seldom in their power to bestow." It aims at being "a collection of hints for the understanding or materials for thought." The book is true to its purpose. It contains eighty-three "subjects suitable for debate," arranged under the four following heads :—I. Questions in Politics and Political Economy (36) ; II. Questions relating to the Natural and Civil History of Mankind, and to the Progress of Society (10) ; III. Questions on Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy (15) ; IV. Miscellaneous Questions (22), principally of a social or literary kind. The references are pretty impartial, although in some cases not numerous, and the author sometimes indicates his own views in concise and precise paragraphs.

In 1825 he added an able contribution to the controversy on the main question of Political Economy in his "Critical Dissertation on the Nature, Measures, and Causes of *Value*, chiefly in reference

to the writings of Mr. Ricardo and his followers." "The groundwork of the subject," Mr. Bailey says, "has not been examined with that minuteness and closeness of attention which are due to its importance;" "and the neglect of this preliminary labour has created differences of opinion and perplexities of thought which otherwise could never have existed." Hence the difficulties the student finds in pursuing the study of political economy. "Words used without determinate ideas, terms introduced without proper explanations, definitions abandoned almost as soon as enunciated, principles assumed without first being examined, verbal instead of real simplification"—such are the obstacles which everywhere meet him. The treatise is "essentially critical, and even polemic;" for its author thinks it important "not only to explain and establish correct principles, but to expose the delusions which have formerly misled, to trace the process of error, to mark the particular point where inquiry departed from the right path, or where the unperceived fallacy which has vitiated a train of reasoning first insinuated itself into an argument." The controversy he wages is with the first men in the field: Malthus, James Mill, Ricardo, Macculloch, De Quincey, &c., for the talents of all of whom he had a profound respect. The work consists of eleven chapters, which, from considerations of space, we reluctantly forbear to analyse. It may not only aid our readers in the perusal of books on this subject, but also show the sharply defining character of Mr. Bailey's mind, to mention that he discovers in Mr. Ricardo's treatise on "The Principles of Political Economy" no fewer than *seven* distinct significations in which the term value is used, namely, Value in use, and in exchange; real, absolute, relative, nominal, and natural value; in consequence of which fact he recommends the student of political economy never to let the word "value" pass before him without putting the question, "Value in what?" or, "in relation to what?" His own view of the matter seems to be that "value" is the *comparative* "esteem in which any object is held." The opinions contained in this book were made the subjects of animadversion, which caused the author to issue, in 1826, a "Letter to a Political Economist, occasioned by an article in the *Westminster Review* on the subject of *Value*," in which the author maintains his views and sustains the argument against his opponent's criticisms. In 1829 a sequel to his former essays appeared after the labour of years had been expended on the contents, and assiduous revisal and deliberate reconsideration had been given to the matter. This work was intended to explain the aims which should be uppermost in "the conduct of men in the application of their means and faculties to the investigation of truth." Some of the critics who had pronounced a favourable opinion on his former essays regretted, "that while he had explained more or less to their satisfaction in what manner the mind is affected by the circumstances in which it is placed, and the inevitable determination of its views by the evidence presented to it," "he had indicated in

too cursory a way the duties of mankind in the collection and examination of that evidence, the effect of which, when once brought before the understanding, is so completely uncontrollable by the will," according to the author's theory. The work bears the title of "Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principle of Evidence and Expectation." These essays, the first edition of which was exhausted in about ten years after its publication, and of which the author declined to issue a second edition until he had given it "such a complete revision as other studies had prevented him for a season from bestowing upon it." These essays confirmed, sustained, and extended his reputation as a thinker, and in fact for a time took the lead in the mention of Mr. Bailey's efforts as a philosopher. It cannot be expected that we can supply a *résumé* of the contents of the work so extensive as we gave of the first offering he presented to fame. The following series of quotations must suffice:—

'TRUTH, by which term is implied accuracy of knowledge and of inference, is necessarily conducive to the happiness of the human race. This is an assertion scarcely requiring in the present day to be either enforced or illustrated. That mankind are deeply concerned, not only in clearly understanding the properties of the material world and of their own physical constitution, but in an accurate acquaintance with the operations of the human mind, the consequences of human actions, the results of political institutions, the relations in which they themselves stand to other beings, and their real position in the universe, is a proposition so undeniable when clearly expressed, as barely to escape the character of a truism. The transcendent importance of this fulness and accuracy of knowledge is attested by the sad tale of error and suffering presented to the eye in every page of history. What possible problem can mankind have to solve in their mutual intercourse but one? What is it but to make themselves conjointly as happy and, for that purpose, as noble-minded and virtuous as they can during the short term of their mortal existence? And how have they hitherto solved this problem? In what numerous ways have they not proved themselves totally blind to their real interests, perverted their capabilities, wasted their resources, exasperated the unavoidable evils of their condition, and inflicted gratuitous wretchedness on each other and on themselves? It is clear that men can have no interest in suffering, no taste for misery, no preference for unhappiness in itself; and wherever they are found in a regular and systematic career after it, they must be labouring under an impression that they are in pursuit of a different object. It is error therefore, it is ignorance, it is illusion, it is an incapacity on their part to see the real consequences of actions, the real issue of events, that gives rise to all those evils which desolate the world, except such as can be traced to irresistible impulse or to the physical circumstances of man's nature and condition. "Error is the universal cause of the misery of mankind," are the first words of a distinguished philosopher (Malebranche) in his treatise on the "Search after Truth," and they are scarcely too unmeasured.—Pp. 1-3.

"The prevalence of misery, as the consequence of error and ignorance, proclaims the paramount importance of accurate knowledge. To discover

truth is in reality to do good on a grand scale. The detection of an error, the dissipation of a doubt, the extirpation of a prejudice, the establishment of a fact, the deduction of a new inference, the development of a latent principle, may diffuse its beneficial consequences over every region of the world, and may be the means of lessening the misery or increasing the happiness of myriads of unborn generations. The great interests of the human race, then, demand that the way of discovery should be open, that there should be no obstructions to inquiry, that every possible facility and encouragement should be afforded to efforts addressed to the detection of error and to the attainment of truth; nay, that every human being, as far as he is capable, should actively assist in the pursuit; and yet one of the greatest discouragements to such efforts at present existing amongst mankind is the state of their own moral sentiments."—Pp. 4, 5.

"There is happily a growing disposition in the world, amongst the intelligent part of it at least, to prize truth of doctrine and veracity of statement; to look with disdain on all artifice, disingenuity, and disguise, both in speculation and practice; to regard the business of life no longer as an affair which demands unremitted intrigue and perpetual deceit; to consider the great interests of humanity as not requiring to be supported by ignorance, hypocrisy, and superstition; to believe that the suppression and concealment of facts and arguments can be of no service except to the few at the expense of the many; and that it is for the benefit of mankind, as well as essential to their progress in all which is virtuous and high-minded, that every important question should be freely and boldly examined. This state of feeling on the part of men of cultivated minds seems highly favourable to an impartial discussion of the conduct which we ought to observe, or, in other words, the moral sentiments we ought to cherish in relation to the pursuit of truth."—Pp. 14, 15.

"The duty of inquiry will be generally acknowledged to be obligatory upon every one in proportion to his capacity and opportunities in the following circumstances:—

"1. When any direct means are within his reach of obtaining additional or more accurate knowledge of the relation in which he stands, and the duty he owes to God.

"2. When the extent and accuracy of his knowledge on any subject must have an important and direct effect on his conduct in life, public or private, professional or unofficial, and consequently on the happiness of his fellow-creatures.

"3. When he takes upon himself the office of instructing others; a case included indeed in the preceding, but of such peculiar distinction from any other as to deserve a separate consideration.

"4. When he possesses opportunities and abilities for prosecuting historical, scientific, or philosophical investigations, so as to enlarge the bounds of human knowledge.

"These four cases appear to comprise all the great circumstances which can be considered by any class of moralists, as rendering it the duty of mankind to enter upon any regular and express inquiry; and they are all fruitful of important suggestions deserving the deep consideration, not only of the moralist and philosopher, but of every human being."—Pp. 19, 20.

These several points are thoroughly gone into, and the considerations which each suggests are brought into full view. The author

next seeks to obviate the objections and remove the prejudices inimical to the performance of the duty of inquiry arising from indolence, ignorance, misapprehension, fearfulness, or prejudgment. and affirms that "thinking can never be too free, provided it is just." He endeavours to drive out of the mind the idea that free inquiry is presumptuous, may lead to the incurring of guilt if we reach conclusions different from those which are held to be established, or that acquiescence in current opinions is evidence of a praiseworthy humility. "The duties of man in the process of inquiry" engage attention thereafter; first in relation to the state of our own mind, and second, in relation to the evidence. On the former of these topics these observations deserve quotation:—

"Here, then, is the precise and the only duty of the inquirer in relation to the state of his own mind—to examine closely what that state is with regard to the subject which he is called to investigate. This preliminary task is, no doubt, sufficiently difficult to all those who have not been accustomed to reflect on the phenomena of consciousness; and to them the duty may not appear very perspicuous or very determinate. It is, nevertheless, incumbent on them as far as their ability reaches; it is also part of that process of inquiry through which they must pass in order to attain the benefits of truth; and even to be aware that such a self-examination is requisite is a step in advance to their object.

"To men of thought, to philosophers, to those who profess to teach any subject, and especially to all who are avowedly engaged in the pursuit of truth for its own sake, such a close investigation into the state of their own minds is not more an imperative duty than one of the most beneficial and salutary tasks which they can undertake. Always to commence at this point will be found an immense advantage, not only in prosecuting the inquiry into which they are to enter, but in showing them how exceedingly few are the subjects on which even the most enlightened minds have any pretensions to being positive and dogmatical.

"What is the intellectual condition in which a man of even the most liberal education finds himself on attaining a mature age and being roused to independent reflection? He awakes in the midst of a chaos of heterogeneous opinions which have been determined to be what they are by a long series of causes, and have been received into his mind by unconscious adoption, or fixed by assiduous inculcation as objects of affection and reverence. He finds himself (to use the expressive language of Turgot) in a labyrinth, into which he has been conveyed blindfold. Upon the grounds of these opinions he has scarcely bestowed a thought, and yet has often probably contended for them with a warmth, a resentment at opposition, and positiveness of language which rational conviction shrinks from assuming. . . A dogmatical assertion of opinions will scarcely be the fault of one who constantly falls back on his own understanding, to ask whether he holds the positions he is maintaining from having mastered the evidence in their favour, or from their having been fixed in his belief without any evidence at all."—Pp. 74-76.

In regard to the state of the mind in relation to evidence, he remarks:—"The only legitimate end of inquiry is to arrive at the truth; and the most likely means of attaining that end is to pursue

it with adequate diligence and rigorous impartiality. This, then, is man's simple duty, to examine fully and fairly."

The next chapter deals with "the issue of inquiry," which Mr. Bailey contends is not a matter of duty, and must be followed by (as well as to) its natural consequences. Our "duties towards others in relation to the pursuit of truth" may be briefly designated as *moral influence* and *intellectual assistance*; "the one supplying motives to search for truth, the other means for succeeding in the pursuit." The "duties of governments in relation to the pursuit of truth" are considered as Inquirers, Encouragers of Inquiry, Promoters of Truth, Employers of Public Instructors, Employers of Force; and on each of these heads excellent observations are made. The whole work is remarkable for "the rigid consistency with which it aims to apply in every direction the great principles of morality connected with the pursuit of truth," and the thoroughness with which these principles are applied.

The second essay is in the form of a dialogue between A. and N. on the "progress of knowledge." It is ably conducted, and exhibits tact, ease, fluency, and wisdom. We had marked many passages for extract, but must forbear, and give only the following *soupons* :—

"There are among those impediments which doom the (human) species to a tardy progression—the dulness and inertness of the faculties to discover truth, the interests arrayed against its reception, the difficulty of sundering the established bonds of mental association. Besides, there is a puny sort of self-love in every department of knowledge, which desires the prevalence and stability of opinions because they are *its* opinions. It cannot find in its heart to fancy itself in error" (p. 200). "It would bind down all the great spirits which are yet to advance the happiness and elevate the dignity of man to its own blind dogmas and narrow sphere of vision, and permit no other intellectual movement in the world than an approximation to those opinions which itself has chanced to adopt" (p. 201). "Chemistry and the other physical sciences are incalculably inferior in their effects upon human happiness to those sciences which explore the nature of man and the tendencies of action, and which in the present day, notwithstanding the circumstances which force them in some degree on general reflection, are disgracefully neglected" (p. 203). "It is a common error to consider the achievements of a few great minds as indicative of the state of civilization to which the community at large has attained. Men of genius leave their contemporaries a century behind."—(p. 207).

Besides these two essays there appeared in the first edition one which was withdrawn in the second issue, because Mr. Bailey had neither the leisure nor the inclination to give it that deliberate revisal which he thought it required. It was entitled, "On the Fundamental Principle of Evidence and Expectation," or, in other words, our belief in or assumption of "the uniformity of causation;" our conviction that those causes which have been observed by us in the past to produce certain effects will produce similar effects on their recurrence at any future period. We do not expect anything

in the future which we have not experienced in the past, unless we see a change of antecedents, and thence our belief in the constancy and the selfsameness of causation does not depend on the *probability* of the future resembling the past, but on the *improbability* of the future being unlike the past. The law of expectation is therefore founded on the facts of experience. It does not assume that in the past we have exhausted all the possibilities of causation, but it assumes that it is in general safe to go upon the experience of the past as providing a fair gauge of the improbable. "An Essay on the General Principles of Physical Investigation" supplies one form of the exposition of this principle, but it does not seem yet to have appeared in the "improved and expanded form" which its author contemplated. It is not improbable that the reason for the withdrawal of this tract from the republication of the essays in 1844 was the appearance, in 1843, of John Stuart Mill's "System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, being a connected view of the *Principles of Evidence*, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation," in which the law of causation is most elaborately discussed. It is scarcely less probable, however, that this essay of Bailey's, appealing as it did to "that small number of intellectual men who have turned their thoughts to the consideration of the foundations of human knowledge," attracted the attention of Mr. Mill, and that "set of young men who were engaged in studying Logic, Political Economy, and Psychology, and discussed every question of these sciences with text-books before them in meetings held twice a week, and continued for several years" about the time of the first publication of Bailey's work—meetings to which, we know, Mr. Mill ascribes a great part of his own mental improvement. If, as there is some reason for believing, Mr. Mill was the writer of a critique on these essays in *The Westminster Review*, Oct., 1829—a notice mentioned with praise by Sir James Mackintosh—he felt convinced of Mr. Bailey's position, for that article closes by saying: "The world's experience goes to demonstrate that the height of human folly is to believe anything that is not proved, or anything, merely because it is not proved that it will not be. We must go by the experience of our half-hour, though it is but half-an-hour; and when it pleases Heaven to give us more we will go by that."

Taking earnest interest in the great political agitations of his times and in the intensely exciting debates to which the proposals for extending the power of the people by a reconstruction of the representative system gave rise, Mr. Bailey issued, in a pamphlet, "A Discussion of Parliamentary Reform," by a *Yorkshire Freeholder*, in 1831; and rejoicing in the achievement which progressive thought had accomplished in the passing of the Reform Bill, he sought to provide an intelligible "Theory of Representative Government," and to supply solutions of the more momentous of its practical problems for the information and guidance of those on whom the responsibilities of the franchise had been placed. This

work consists of an introduction on the general question of Government;—its necessity, forms, and claims, and six chapters on—(1.) The proper object and province of Government. (2.) The grounds of preference for a Representative Government. (3.) The Representative body. (4.) The Electoral body. (5.) Elections. (6.) The introduction of changes in Political Institutions; with two essays on Political Equality and on Rights. To a considerable extent the views of Mr. Bailey coincide with those entertained by James Mill, and one of the ablest portions of the book, in a controversial sense, consists of a critique of Macaulay's early, eloquent, and repented-of article on Mill's "Essay on Government," contributed to the "Encyclopædia Britannica," and republished in 1828 by the author. The article appeared in *The Edinburgh Review*, and attracted much attention, and is republished in Macaulay's miscellaneous writings. But this, and many other passages of great ability, we must only allude to, not quote, though we cannot prevail on ourselves to withhold the two following paragraphs of much interest regarding parliamentary representatives:—

"It becomes essentially requisite to place them in such a position that their own interest and the public good shall be identified. The simple expedient which meets this is to make the office of legislator dependent on the will of the people. If his power were irresponsible, if it were subject to no direct control, if the improper exercise of it were not followed by evil consequences to the possessor, it would be inevitably abused; the public good would be neglected, and his own habitually preferred; but by the simple expedient of rendering the continuance of his power dependent on his constituents, his interest is forced into coincidence with theirs. Any sinister advantage which he might derive from the power entrusted to him would cease with the loss of the office, and he would have no inducement to pursue an advantage of that kind, if by doing so he unavoidably subjected himself to dismissal. Such is the general theory of political representation. An individual, under the title of a representative, is delegated by the people to do that which they cannot do in their own persons, and he is determined in his acts to consult the public good by the power which they retain of dismissing him from office."—P. 71.

"Political science is perhaps that department of intellectual exertion which requires the greatest powers of mind and the intensest application. Its facts are multifarious and complicated, often anomalous and contradictory, and demanding the guidance of clear principles; its principles are many of them abstruse, and to be developed only by long and close processes of reasoning; and the application of these principles requires the sagacity of quick observation and long experience. The whole business calls for that familiarity of mind with the subject, which can be the result of nothing but habitual daily devotion to it.

"In making laws, too, not only is there a demand for powers of mind to cope with the disorder and complication of facts, and the abstruseness of reasoning, but there ought to be also a complete mastery of language, that nice and delicate instrument of thought and communication, by the clumsy handling of which so much confusion and uncertainty is yearly produced in legislative enactments. Every word in a law is of importance; every

sentence ought to exhibit that perfectness of expression which is to be looked for only from the skill and caution of undistracted minds. Well might Bentham observe, that the words of a law ought to be weighed like diamonds. Is this, then, a matter to be dealt with by an exhausted professional man in what should be his hours of recreation? Can such a one be competent to a task hard enough for the mind which comes to it every day with all its vigour fresh, all its perspicacity undimmed, its spirit of activity unworn, and its feelings of interest unabsorbed? Is the refuse of an individual's time and abilities what a people are to be content with, from a representative to whom they confide the determination of measures in which their prosperity is deeply implicated? Is this sufficient for governing the destinies of a great nation?"—Pp. 184—186.

"While the current of life flows on smoothly, the interest which each individual has in good government evidently makes little impression on his imagination: it consists, for the most part, of small fractions of benefits scarcely appreciable; of protection from evils, to which, as they are prevented from occurring, he is insensible; of advantages which, to a superficial view, accrue to him only under particular circumstances, such as redress of wrong when he has occasion to appeal to the law. Most people are therefore supine and indifferent as to the intellectual qualifications and conduct of their representatives. Their minds want awakening to the difficulty and importance of sound and accurate and systematic legislation. They may rest assured, that in our complicated state of society it is a business which requires as long and assiduous preparation as any profession which can be named, and as entire devotion to it, when its duties are once undertaken, as the calling of a lawyer or a physician, a merchant or an engineer. One chief reason why there are so many needless, blundering, crude, mischievous, and unintelligible enactments, is that men have not dedicated themselves to legislation as a separate study or profession, but have considered it to be a business which might be played with in their hours of leisure from pursuits requiring intense exertion."—Pp. 186, 187.

In 1837 two important questions received contributions from Mr. Bailey's pen; the one through a pamphlet entitled "*The Law of Primogeniture examined, by a Younger Brother*"; and the other in a treatise on "*Money and its Vicissitudes in Value, as they affect national industry and pecuniary contracts*"—both spoken highly of by competent authorities; but these the writer of this paper has not seen, nor has he been able to procure a copy of his subsequent pamphlet, "*A Defence of Joint-Stock Banks and Country Issues*," 1840; but this we guess was a contribution to that great fiscal debate after which, by the Bank Act of 1844, Mr. Ricardo's opinions were acted upon by the Parliament—an event which could scarcely be gratifying to Mr. Bailey, who doubted Ricardo's principles, and must have feared their practical results.

Mr. Bailey issued in 1842 "*A Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision, designed to show the unsoundness of that celebrated speculation*." Great care in expression and exceeding minuteness in criticism are shown in the work. The author contends that it is a decided case of the assumption of purely imaginative facts as real and incontrovertible premises, and affirms that the false step

in Berkeley's reasoning is taken in the second paragraph of the essay, by the introduction of the abstract term *distance* in a sense which prevents it from being used in regard to concrete experiences. He affirms that the phenomena of consciousness afford no proof of the Bishop's theory. It would lead us too far to analyse this book; for we would require to give an abstract of Berkeley's theory, that the remarks of the author might be felt in all their force. The merit of the work is vouched for by the fact that it immediately called such thinkers into debate against him as John S. Mill and J. F. Ferrier, the former in the *Westminster Review*, October, 1842, and the latter in *Blackwood's Magazine*, June, 1842. Though both complimented the critic on his admirable analytic powers and clear style, the author was not convinced by them of his error, and issued a reply, which elicited rejoinders, in a pamphlet entitled "A Letter to a Philosopher, in reply to some recent attempts to vindicate Berkeley's Theory of Vision," in 1843. These papers have all been republished.

The superintendence of republications of previous works occupied Mr. Bailey's literary efforts for some time after this, and he subsequently devoted several years to the elaboration of a scheme of thought on logic, which "differs as a whole, and, of course, in some of its details, from any theory hitherto promulgated." This, after due and diligent reflection, he completed in 1851, and published as "The Theory of Reasoning." So popular was this work, that in a year it had reached a second edition. The work is rather discursive, and to our mind not sufficiently formal for students. As an essay on logic, it is worthy of higher commendation than as *The Theory of Reasoning*. The chapters on "Contingent Reasoning" and on "Demonstrative Reasoning" are of great value; that on "The Relation between Reasoning and Language" is perhaps the most practically useful set of remarks which has been made by any modern writer on logic. His chapter on "The Relation of Observation, Experiment, and Induction to Reasoning, and to each other," supplements some of J. S. Mill's instructions. His acquaintance with scholastic logic is not so profound or extensive, as we think, to justify his recriminations; but we venture to say confidently that his "Suggestions for the examination of argumentative compositions" contain some of the best hints on the culture of logical criticism which any book on reasoning due to this century offers to the student (see pages 197—200). We regret they are too lengthy for extracting here, and that we must ask our readers to be contented with the following paragraph on the nature of Reasoning in his Theory:—

"In scrutinizing our own minds, several different operations are easily distinguishable, and have accordingly received particular appellations. When present objects are discerned through the senses, the act is usually named *perception*; when objects formerly perceived by us, or facts formerly known to us, are recalled, the mental event is denominated *recollection*, or mere *conception*; when objects or facts occur to the mind in a different

order or combination from that in which they were actually perceived, there is something more than conception, and it has been termed *imagination*; lastly, when facts perceived determine the mind to the belief of facts which it does not perceive, although here also conception is implied, the operation is evidently as distinct from the former three operations as they are from each other.—"P. 2. "The determination of the mind to the belief of something beyond its actual perception or knowledge, is obviously what is termed reasoning."—P. 3. "To be determined by facts to the belief of an unobserved event or object, past, present, or future, and to discern when two facts are presented to the mind, that one is implied in the other, are intellectual acts or operations plainly distinct. If there were no other circumstances by which to discriminate them, they would be broadly distinguished by this, that in the latter species of reasoning, every step being discerned to be necessarily true, the denial of the conclusion involves a contradiction, while in the former species it does not. The conviction in the one case, and the discernment in the other, have, nevertheless, this in common, that the fact expressed in the conclusion is not in either case evident of itself, but is arrived at through the medium of some other fact or facts."—P. 5. "The facts which determine the mind to the belief, or lead it to the discernment of other facts not immediately manifest, are usually spoken of under the designation of evidence or proofs, and when expressed in propositions preceding a conclusion under that of premises. To reason, is to go through proofs or evidence for or against any alleged fact. Frequently, the fact alleged or expressed in the conclusion is placed before the mind first, and the proof is adduced to substantiate it; but it also frequently happens, in the course of reflection, that a fact, or combination of facts, leads the mind to the belief or to the discernment of a fact before unknown, which is then seen in its logical place as the conclusion."—P. 6.

Mr. Bailey "has been occasionally called upon in his capacity of member of several literary and philosophical societies, and sometimes merely in that of a well-wisher, to contribute to their Transactions. When, in the course of some quarter of a century, these contributions had accumulated to a goodly pile, it occurred to him, on looking them over, that a selection from them would be well received by his friends, and might possibly be acceptable to a wider circle." This consideration led, in 1852, to the issue of his "Discourses on various Subjects," the matter of which was written at intervals, "not with any view to publication, but simply for the occasions on which they were read, and on subjects that happened at the time to interest the writer's mind;" but they have in this volume been diligently revised, and form a volume of much interest and variety, as may be seen from the following list of its contents—viz., 1. "On the Mutual Relations of the Sciences," written in 1823, before the advent of Comte's "Positive Philosophy" and its hierarchy of sciences; but, like it, exhibiting them as "a grand, continuous, and harmonious whole," which, on being comprehended, makes them the easier "to understand, to retain, and to apply," and presents a prospect of improvement "bounded only by the incapacity of our faculties to traverse its extent." 2. "On the Mammoth or Fossil

Elephant discovered at the mouth of the Lena," in the early part of this century, and delivered about 1826, after the author's return from a tour in the United States. 3. "On the Changes which have taken place in the English Language, especially during the last Three Centuries." As "of all the languages in the world none is more worthy of investigation than our own, which, as it at present exists, may be characterized as full, rich, vigorous, and expressive; and every Englishman with the slightest tincture of literature must feel interested in tracing the course by which it has reached its actual condition," so every endeavour to explain and illustrate the course and state of our native speech ought to receive attention; and it will be found that the observations made by Mr. Bailey are of much aptness, force, and critical merit. 4. "On the Science of Political Economy," an expository notice of the object, and a defence of the utility of that science. 5. "On the last Reformation of the Calendar in England," containing useful information to students of history and literary investigators. 6. "On the General Principles of Physical Investigation," maintains that science can do no "more than point out resemblances between phenomena, or trace the order in which they occur." 7. "On the Mechanical Causes of Thunder." 8. "On the Paradoxes of Vision," read in 1842, treats of phenomena lying on the border-territories of physics and psychology. 9. "On the Theory of Wit" (1846), is a pretty complete endeavour to explain and defend the use of this power—"to lighten and exhilarate the intervals of respite from strenuous exertion and profound thought." The volume is one of worth and excellence.

Of his "Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind," issued in three volumes in the years 1855, 1858, and 1863 respectively, we dare scarcely speak, as our reading of them was hurried; and we can only note the memory of the impressions made on us during the separated intervals of our perusal of them. Of the first volume we remember the skilful though somewhat petulant, as we thought, controversies against preceding metaphysicians, and the materializing tendency of the psychology advocated—his cutting down of all thought to the *experienced*, instead of allowing it the whole scope of the *possible*, or at least the *probable*. In the second volume we recommend as singularly worthy of perusal the critique of the theories of perception advanced by Berkeley, Reid, Brown, Kant, and Hamilton in his endeavour to maintain, against them, that perception is a simple, indivisible, ultimate experience of the mind, incapable of analysis—an opinion which, although also acutely maintained by Ferrier, we cannot accept as final; for were it so, metaphysics would be a closed record. Against the innate principles and *à priori* cognitions of Leibnitz and Kant he produces some able arguments; he exposes with much ability the personifications of metaphysicians; and in two letters on "The Causation of Voluntary Actions," he endeavours to prove the consistency of his views on the will with moral accountability; but his ideas

failed to convince us that human spontaneity and personality can be wholly enwrapped in and overcome by circumstance and surroundings. His appreciation of German philosophy seemed to us defective, not only in sympathy, but in comprehensiveness—especially as not perceiving that the object of German metaphysics is *living* thought. In the third volume his defence of psychology against Comte's assertion of its impossibility is able; his disquisition on identity is acute and well conducted; his letters on evidence, and on the laws of nature and preceptive laws, are clear and valuable, as are those on the direct perception and the inferential deduction of causation—particularly his remarks on statistical results and causative effectiveness. On language, his disquisitions are ingenious and varied; abound in apt illustrations and acute observations, with a marked controversial ability and wonderful lucidity of expression. With some of his views on the moral sentiments we cannot coincide, and his criterion of morals as that which most completely succeeds in producing happiness, though a good practical test, is not theoretically complete. His five fundamental facts from which moral phenomena result do not seem to us to be an exhaustive statement. To man's susceptibility to pleasure and pain—his liking for the former and dislike of the latter—his wish to reciprocate either himself—his expectation of reciprocation, and his sympathy with the giving of pleasure or pain, as an observer, we should surely add a personal element—a self with endowments and aims not only *conditioning*, but *necessitating* moral activity! These, however, are considerations which cannot easily be settled in sentences, however subtly conceived or astutely expressed. Despite of all drawbacks, these volumes are a substantial addition to human speculation and the reflective solution of the problems of being, requiring perusal from the thoughtful, and demanding it from those who would fully comprehend the mysteries of psychology and the concrete activities of the human kind.

Of another effort of Mr. Bailey's active mind, which, on consultation as occasion required, we found highly useful, and in many cases eminently satisfactory, we have not left ourselves space to speak adequately. In 1862, Mr. Bailey published the first volume of a work "On the Received Text of Shakspeare's Dramatic Writings, and their Improvement;" and in 1866 the second volume, about double in extent, was issued. Nearly two hundred phrases and passages are examined—especially those in the Perkins Collier folio,—to which he gives no authoritative place. His description of Shakspeare's text as his contemporaries left it, his dissertation on Shaksperian metaphors, and his critiques on Shakspeare criticism are able, discriminating, original, and excellent in scope and form. It would be impossible in a brief space even to indicate the value of the matter which Mr. Bailey has packed up in this profuse and profound study of the works of the many-sided Shakspeare; but we may state our conviction that students of Eliza-

bethan English and of the dramatist will alike derive pleasure, profit, and instruction from his pages. We are unable to refer in detail to the contents of the volumes by inspection, as our acquaintance with them has been confined to consultation in libraries; but we may at a future time draw attention to them in connection with some interesting questions on philology in a paper on "Shakspere's Phraseology and Grammatical Peculiarities."

"Samuel Bailey, of Sheffield," is a writer of independent mind and pure understanding, a clear expositor, and a consecutive thinker; an idiomatic and perspicuous style recommends his thoughts to popularity, though the thoroughness of his reasoning disquiets ordinary readers. He has not the power of condensed epigrammaticism, which packs the results of a whole speculation into a phrase—as light lives in the diamond—but he has the clear, pellucid flow of English undefiled, which all great masters use. This clearness is sometimes gained, it is true, by refusing to entertain thoughts that fling shadows, and from shunning the depths from which it is as difficult to bring forth light as it is to raise pearls from the far reaches of the Indian Ocean. His thoughts are always determinate, his words are all so aptly chosen that they express precisely and unmistakeably what he intends, and neither less nor more; and there is never any difficulty in seizing the scope and comprehending the aim of his logical thought clothed in the most transparent language. Much as we differ from him on several points, slightly indicated, and much as we admire his writings for their merits of thought and diction, we commend him more as a manly English thinker—neither afraid of thought, or truth, or true speech—and still more as the advocate of the right and duty of freedom of investigative thought, and liberty of impartial controversy in "the formation and publication of opinions," in "the pursuit of truth," and as the best possible means of securing the "progress of knowledge."

DISTRIBUTION OF PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION.—When the distribution of the English representation was originally made, the southern part of England was not only the most gentle and agreeable but the most rich and energetic. The ports of Devonshire were celebrated wherever the English Navy was known. What are now old and mouldering seaport towns were then active, victorious marts, eager with enterprise and sparkling with the intelligence of the day. England north of the Trent was in old times a less cultivated, a harsher, and less populous region. Naturally, therefore, the duty (the *charge* was the phrase of those times) was entrusted to the towns which were the most eminent for industry and for wealth. Parliamentary boroughs were placed in the south because it was adapted for Parliamentary boroughs; they were not placed in the north because it was not adapted. Centuries of change and industry have altered all this.

Religion.

IS RITUALISM CONSISTENT WITH, OR UNNECESSARY TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF TRUE CHRISTIANITY?

CONSISTENT.—REPLY.

EXTREME views are seldom defensible, and in debate the proper attitude to assume is that wherein the greatest amount of strength is gained, and that from which, with the greatest possible effect, defence may be made. It is the first duty of a wise discussionist to exercise discretion, and rather seem to prove too little than to endeavour to prove too much. It is a fault too common among controversialists to scatter about random assertions, to rush to extremes, and to expect that though the whole exaggerated nonsense spoken is not accepted, yet that the effect of much of it may remain. This is an excessively unwise method of procedure, for these outlying skirmishing strategies are sure to be detected, and repulse is almost sure to overtake them; and the conquest thus gained discredits the whole defence offered. Very few people count the intrinsic force or value of arguments, but conclude from the number of those disposed of, that victory rests with the ingenious demolisher of the outworks of an opponent's controversial position. It is, nevertheless, the fact that true controversy requires the adoption and the defence of a main position; and that so long as that is held impregnable, no matter how many twitterings of success may be raised upon small points, no real damage is done to a cause. But it is obvious that the natural fallacy of counting victorious attacks by number, tends to make many people fancy that great destruction, yea, even havoc, is being committed upon a controversial position; when there is, in truth, little effective work going on at all. Thus an injudicious debater will often seem to be defeated, while his main entrenchments of argument have never been touched, or if touched at all, have merely been grazed, not razed. Controversialists who are skilful in fence, get a quick eye for vulnerable points; and knowing that this fallacious method of miscalculation prevails, they "go in," in their attacks, for many not much. We think that if the attention of debaters were drawn to the essential matters in the discussion, and could be induced to keep their attention fixed upon them, to the exclusion of the mere accidents of phrase and small inadvertencies of allusion, controversy would gain in value and in power. To move right forward to the main stronghold of the opposition camp, to march to the Magdala of the antagonist Abyssinia, and to Napierize it, is the proper policy in controversial warfare. We have to regret that in

this debate on Ritualism our opponents have "fought shy" of the position we undertook to defend, and have invited us to take the field against them on quite a different issue. We have undertaken to man the garrison in behalf of Ritualism, and to keep it from effective assault. We set our lines of circumvallation round our citadel, and exactly define our position. They have gone into some outlying districts, which they affirm we ought to have defended and embraced in our programme, and having overrun these fields at "their own sweet will," they affirm that they have gained a victory over us, and have inflicted injuries from which we cannot recover, and which we cannot deny. This is not fair fight, nor is it honourable conquest. We have not been assailed, and therefore it is impossible that we can have been overcome. They have fought with shadows evoked "from their own consciousness," and they boast that they have encountered "wild beasts at Ephesus." Could anybody argue so totally beside the question as W. C. C. does, and yet deceive himself into the belief that he was engaged in controversy? "The Ritualism," he says (p. 109), "which forms the topic of interest in our day is that which has been plainly defined by S. S." Is it so? Well, we did not know that. We understood that the Ritualism to be debated about was that which is, may be, or has been thought to be consistent with and necessary to true Christianity. W. C. C. thinks that, having undertaken to prove *some* defined kinds (see p. 15) of Ritualism are consistent with and necessary to true Christianity, we are bound, to gratify him, to maintain that *all and any* kind of Ritualism is so, and to produce scriptural proof that in Christianity copes, chasubles, stoles, censers, changes of vestments, genuflexions, responsions, bowings towards the East, kneelings before the altar, specific forms of taking or administering the Sacraments, priestly gestures and the confessional, choristers and orchestral music, chantings and Latin prayers, singing boys and vergers, all the varieties of the hierarchy, and all the forms of worship adopted by the advocates of a picturesque or a grotesque worship, are essential to the service of the Deity and the salvation of man. This is to defend sacerdotalism, not Ritualism; to advocate, not decent and orderly forms of worship, but priestly aggressiveness in spiritual concerns! If it were asked, Is a currency essential to the existence of modern society? W. C. C. would surely scarcely require us, in maintaining the affirmative of that, to defend and uphold the Bank Charter Act of 1844; yet when affirming the necessity of Ritualism, he insists on our setting lance in rest in favour of "an assimilation of Laudism," whatever that may mean. When S. S. inserted the word "excessive" (p. 17) in his definition, he provided an easy victory for himself; for he had only to quote the old proverb, "All excess is wrong," and his opponent was necessarily silenced. If it had been said, Currency means an excessive supply of exchangeable wealth, he would have seen at once that nobody would argue that that was essential to modern society. So in a question regarding a religion which

expressly commands, "Let your moderation be known of all men," to ask any one to maintain the affirmative of the necessity of anything "wherein is excess" was asking a cheap conquest without toil of contest.

Of course, it is all plain sailing with S. S. in his definition. Ritualism is excessive, &c. ; all excess is wrong. Jesus did nothing wrong, and Christians are bound to follow the example of Jesus. But question its accuracy at the foundation. Did Jesus not demand attention to *forms* as the ground of benefits? "Go wash in the Pool of Siloam;" "Show thyself unto the priests;" "Stretch forth thine hand;" "Take up thy bed and walk." Did not Jesus lift up His eyes to heaven and pray? Are we not commanded "to fall upon our knees before the Lord our Maker"? and did not Jesus kneel down and pray in the Garden of Gethsemane? Did not He teach, "After this *manner* therefore pray ye"? Did not He institute baptism and the Lord's supper? and can these be performed decently and in order, after the example of the Lord Jesus Christ, without attention to forms, ceremonies, ritual? So with his other argument—apostolic and patristic Christianity was free from Ritualism. Christianity was then an aggressive religion; it was a species of dissent from the religions of Greece, Rome, and Alexandria, and hence was opposed to the law of these lands. In our country and in modern Europe generally, Christianity is *the* only religion, and holds the law in its favour. The two conditions of society and of Christianity are so dissimilar that no genuine comparison can be drawn. Within the conditions of Christianity its forms are pliable, as was shown by St. Paul in his remarks on "meats offered to idols," &c., and his distinction between the Jewish converts to Christianity and the gentile converts. S. S. must know that comparisons can only be justly drawn from cases which are nearly parallel.

The whole argument founded on the times of Charles II. is fallacious on many points; *e. g.*, before we could admit its soundness, we should require proof that "Charles II. and his counsellors" (p. 20) were trustworthy exponents of what was essential to true Christianity; a very huge preliminary we are afraid, and one not likely to be granted on any other question by S. S. Again, we should require to be assured that the circumstances of the times of Charles II. were such as to allow of a proper, distinct, well-considered and impartial view of the entire question. But surely, an argument based on the Christianity of Charles II., and the inviolate Christian purity of the Puritans, must be insecure somewhere. If we should carry out the spiritualistic argument of S. S. to its legitimate issue, we should have no public worship at all; and no proof, public and open, that men engaged in the service of God; for we cannot worship *in spirit* (p. 20), *i. e.*, without signs and forms, without failing in the command, "Let your light so shine before men that they may take knowledge of you that ye have been with Jesus." We do not affirm that worship is less "acceptable to God

in a room, a barn, or a hovel as in a cathedral" (p. 20); but we do say that the man who affects to worship God in a barn, while he dwells in a house filled with articles of luxury and taste, has not duly given to God the things that are God's—is giving "tithes of mint, anise, and cumin" only.

Ritualism, like charity, is comparative. The widow's mite was a praiseworthy donation to the temple offerings, but it did not and does not justify the wealthy in giving "their mite also," as the phrase goes. So in a state of existence in which ease, comfort, and splendour vie with each other in our houses, to erect barns especially for the worship of God is a mockery and a sin; and in an age when the civilities of life are cultured between man and man, to offer to God less cultured worship than we give to our merest acquaintances cannot be right. W. C. C. on this point is fallacious (p. 105); because he defines, or at least speaks of, etiquette as "the organized hypocrisy of fashionable life," and contrasts that with the heart-felt homage due to God. If "forms of intercourse" are "refuges of lies," then we must carefully abstain from them in the worship of God; but then the question recurs, How can we worship God exemplarily without forms? and if with forms, by those which indicate little or much homage and love? It is true that "God looketh upon the heart;" but if the heart be right, the outward life, with all the forms it observes, shall be in accordance with that pure heart; for out of the heart are the issues of life. In this way it is evident that if God sanctifies the heart, He sanctifies also the whole ritual by which that heart symbolizes its love to God.

R. F. G. affirms that, as "religion is a matter of faith and not of sight," its ritual ought only to be "spiritually discerned." That Godward is all right; He can see "the very thoughts and intents of the heart;" but manward, how stands it? The worth attached to anything is measurable by something that addresses the senses. We have forms of address, by letter and speech, to the various grades of men; and so natural is it to the human heart to make this distinction, that in all ages and in all countries prayer has assimilated to itself a form of phraseology which is quite different from the common forms of speech, and even the songs of praise we sing have by this conception taken to themselves a peculiar style, which has been appropriated as "sacred" to those songs of holiness and aspiration in which we strive to utter the desires of our souls, in some approximation to what we think may be the glorious language of heaven and of the adoring host around God's throne therein.

"Is it true that rites and ceremonies are found to increase as the substance of religion becomes clouded?" (p. 217). If so, how can Judaism have been a preparation for Christ? for it was made by God's own appointment much more ritualistic as the ages advanced towards the days of His coming, in whom the hopes of sinners are centred and concentrated. Is it not a fact that Jesus did not oppose

Ritualism, but only their outward use without their internal incitements—making them an appearance and a sham, not a reality and an absolute outcome of the earnest soul, and using the accidents of religion as a substitute for the realities thereof? Now, Christ “knew what was in man, and needed not that any man should testify of men;” and hence He was in a position not only to rebuke but to judge. R. F. G. cannot lay claim to any such omniscience, and when he calls Ritualism a hypocritical, self-indulgent form of worship, we must suggest the question, Who art thou that judgest? and the absolute fact, “To his own master each standeth or falleth.” This same reply may be given to W. C. C., when he says that “Ritualism raises up a partition between the soul and the Saviour” (p. 108). That such a statement is inaccurate may be proved most simply. One of the most notable of Ritualists was John Keble; yet who like him has lighted up “The Christian Year” with the very grace of Christianity—“the light that shineth more and more unto the perfect day.” Similarly the Rev. Orby Shipley has supplied devotion with the threefold cord of the hymns for the Christian life, in his *Lyra Messianica*, *Lyra Eucharistica*, and his *Lyra Mystica*.

The Christian activity of the *Ritualists*, as they are called derisively, with the self-complacent implication that those who call them so are the only true *Spiritualists*, proves that they are in earnest, and that their work is the result of a living, quickening influence; and they are thus brought before us as “serving the Lord out of a pure heart fervently.”

R. D. Robjent seems not to know the theory on which the great and splendid genius of the architects of our grand cathedrals worked. It appears to us that if he knew that, he would not be at all so shocked by “old carving of first-rate workmanship,” &c. (p. 346). If he will look attentively at our oldest and best structures of the ecclesiastical style, he will find that the theory is this: that all forms of beauty are attracted to the place of worship and come nearest to its centre, while all the hideous brood of vice and sin flee from the place and hold themselves aloof from the services. This is the reason why the sweet-angel faces beam on the worshipper, and why the most disgusting forms are seen making off from the holy enclosures; but yet arrested in the very act of seeking to escape, and frozen into stone by the supreme horror they feel of the sinfulness of their natures. This is the justification of the ugly forms and antic shapes that are often to be found sculptured on cathedrals, and carved on the furniture of old churches. “Riotous conduct in Ritualistic churches,” Ruddy says, “is the effect of Ritualism.” We may grant, for the nonce, that it is so. Just as theft is the effect of the institution of property, illegitimacy is the effect of the institution of marriage, sin is the effect of the law of God! “Where there is no law there is no transgression;” where there is no marriage there can be no bastardy, and where there is no property there can be no theft; but is it equally

true that where there is no Ritualism there is no rioting? Is it not nearer the fact that "riotous conduct in Ritualistic churches is the effect" of those anti-ritualistic superstitions which cause men to think they do God service by desecrating churches, and forgetting the sanctity of the Sabbath, rather than allow to others freedom to worship God according to their own consciences, and the exercise of that worship according to "to the rights of private judgment"? Did not the rioters show in their conduct that they were "neglecting the weightier matters of the law"—Sabbath observance, reverence for God's sanctuary, the love of the brethren, and the duty of letting each be "fully persuaded in his own mind." "Riotous conduct in Ritualistic churches is the effect," in our opinion, of anti-Ritualistic prejudices, of the persecuting spirit, and of the very mind of those who cried, "Crucify Him! crucify Him!"

This is an uncharitable judgment, and we may perhaps be better to withdraw it; but we must let it stand as an example and a warning of how prone we all are to give way to misapprehension, when we set ourselves to give judgments on the motives of the hearts of others. We plead guilty to being as little able to judge righteous judgment as W. C. C. and "Ruddy" are, when they, departing from the sound maxim of being "able to give a good reason for the faith that is *in them*," they (and we) endeavour to give a bad reason for the faith that is *in others*.

In truth, this question of Ritualism—on the one side as on the other—has its interests from the narrowness of our souls and the want of grace in our inmost hearts. Why should not the forms of worship be as varied as the songs of birds, each species having its own, but all, singly or blended, harmonious and the gift of God?—like the colours and the incense of flowers, all gracious to the spirit, and all indicative of the love of Our Father?—like the forms of life, all suited to the attainment of special ends, all right in their own place, all demonstrative of the Creator's goodness? Ritualism is an outward symbol of the inward state: if the heart be right, the Ritualism will be offensive to none; if the heart be wrong, ritual or no ritual, the worship offered is mockery, a sham, and a shame.

As the illustrious peasant-poet of the Scottish nation said,—

"The heart's aye the part aye
That makes us right or wrong."

This—this is the great matter! Let each of us seek the aid of the one only Spirit of grace to set our hearts right with God, and then all will be well. Whatever our difference of opinion on these Ritualisms of ours, may we never forget—or if we forget, may we instantly and earnestly repent of our forgetfulness—the true spiritualism of our calling in Christ Jesus; and let us—

"Pray to be blinded to the world's strong glare,
Pray to see brightly the clear heaven above;
For they are highest on their thrones of love,
Who most for God in this dark world will dare.

"Before us goes the strong Incarnate Word :

In Him the weak ones overcome the strong;—

Thus in His strength each cross is borne along,

Thus onward sweep the armies of the Lord."

It is cause of thankfulness that this topic has been so fully discussed. We believe, on our side, the matter stands thus:—Article 1 demonstrates the necessity of Ritualism; 2, its consistency with Christianity; 3, its preceptoral conformity with Scripture; 4, the philosophy of it; 5, its adaptation to its purpose. This offers a complete view of the whole matter; and our opponents, though arguing well from their point of view, have not effectively invaded the entrenchments we threw up. We are still encamped within our

LINES.

UNNECESSARY.—REPLY.

"To what end is the clogging religion by multiplication of ceremonies and formalities, but to amuse the people and maintain a blind reverence toward the interpreters of the dark mysteries couched in them; and by seeming to encourage an exterior show of piety (or form of godliness) to gain reputation and advantage, whereby they might oppress the interior virtue and reality of it, as the scribes and Pharisees did, although with less designs? Why is the veneration of images and relics, sprinklings of holy water, consecrations of baubles (with innumerable foppish knacks and trinkets) so cherished, but to keep the people in a slavish credulity and dotage—but to be led by them whither they please, by any sleeveless pretence, and in the meanwhile to pick various gains from them by such trade? What do all such things mean, but obscuring the native simplicity of Christianity, whereas it being represented intelligible to all men, would derogate from that high admiration which these men pretend to from their peculiar and profound wisdom? And why would men spend for these toys, if they understood they might be good Christians and get to heaven without them? What doth all that pomp of religion serve for, but for the ostentation of the dignity of those who administer it? It may be pretended for the honour of religion; but it really conduceth to the glory of the priesthood, who shine in those pageantries."—*Dr. Isaac Barrow.*

In our opening article we endeavoured to show that Ritualism is both unnecessary to and inconsistent with the advancement of true Christianity. We shall now notice, in the order of their appearance, the articles of our opponents. "Lines" says, "All religion is symbolical." Then there is in it no substance. According to this writer's statement, the whole of religion is a shadow; love is but a sign, not a reality—faith, repentance, and humility are but signs, not realities. But of what are love, faith, humility, and repentance symbolical? We believe that "Lines" himself would be puzzled to tell us. This writer further says: "Ritualism is undoubtedly necessary to Christianity. To be Christian at all, we must let it be seen and known of all that we have been with Jesus." In this sentence there is that which reads very much like the

putting of the effect in the place of the cause. Instead of its being necessary to be seen and known of all that we have been with Jesus to constitute us Christians, a man must first be constituted a Christian before it can be seen and known that he has been with Jesus. It is a man's being made a Christian which is the cause of its being seen that he has been with Jesus, the latter following as the effect of the former. Some Christians have been in unusually secluded situations—isolated from nearly all the rest of mankind—and thus not in a position for it to be seen and known of others that they had been with Jesus. On being afterwards brought amongst men, it has been seen that they had been with Jesus, but they were Christians before they were in a position for this to be seen. Thus the assertion of "Lines," that Ritualism is necessary to Christianity is disproved, and it is seen that true Christianity has existed in connection with the utter absence of Ritualism.

"Lines" tells us, "It was on the *form*, not the *fact* of worship that Cain was less favoured by and less acceptable to God than his brother Abel." Now it was not in its *form* merely that the worship of Abel differed from that of Cain. It was worship of a totally different nature. Abel's worship was offered in the faith of Christ, of which faith Cain was destitute, and in his approaches to God he had no regard to nor thought of Christ, in whom alone God can be acceptably worshipped. Surely the difference between the worship of a partaker of faith, and the worship of one destitute of faith, is more than a difference in *form*!

"Lines" quotes the injunction given to Christians to do all to the glory of God, and adduces the fact of greater elegance, luxury, and ceremonial being found in private dwellings than are found in the house of God, as evidence of a breach of that injunction. But what is it to do any act to the glory of God? Is it not to do it in that way of which He most approves? And as He himself tells us that He looks not on the outward appearance, and therefore regards not the external accompaniments of worship, it is evident that the simple, unadorned worship of the heart is more to His glory than that which is formal and ceremonious.

R. S. reminds us of the "splendour, costliness, and elaborateness" of the Old Testament worship. But what relevancy has this to the point under debate? Is not the Mosaic ceremonial abolished? If it be not, why take only a portion of it—its gorgeousness and elaborateness—and omit its burnt-offerings and its purifications? If it were designed as an exemplar for Christian worship under the New Testament dispensation, where are we informed that only a portion of it is so? But does any body of Christians at the present time believe that it was designed to be a pattern for our imitation now? No body of Christians now observes its various injunctions, but evidently believes itself to be warranted in passing them by. Then is not the frequent bringing forth into notice of the splendour of the Old Testament worship simply done with the view of giving a scriptural justification to

that which Ritualists themselves feel to be an innovation? And were not the robes of the Jewish priests, the ornaments of the tabernacle, and the magnificence of the temple appointed—not to show God's delight in splendid externals, but as types of spiritual things? R. S. entirely misses the sense of 2 Cor. iii. 9, which he quotes. The superior glory of the ministration of righteousness above the ministration of condemnation is not an exterior glory. The former ministration is that of the gospel, the latter that of the law. The former excels the latter in glory, in that it is a display of all the divine perfections; while the latter is a display of only a part of them, and that part of them is displayed more gloriously in the gospel than in the law.

With respect to R. S.'s assertion that nowhere throughout the Bible is there any intimation that anything but what is now called excessive ritual was practised; that no other kind of public worship was used by Christ and his apostles; that the Reformers never meant any other to be practised in the Church of England; and that the testimony from their words and acts in favour of Ritualism is as clear, strong, and decisive as any testimony can well be, we believe that our opening article is a sufficient refutation of it. The evidence adduced by us from the New Testament, and from history, no one of our opponents has attempted to controvert, which—to employ the language of W. C. C.—we believe “is quite conclusive of the question.”

“Clericus” makes repeated references to the Book of Common-prayer, in proof of that which he advances; but he must allow us to remind him that the Prayer-book is not the standard of appeal on this subject. The topic now discussed is a religious one; and all points in religion must be decided by the Bible, and by it alone. “Clericus” contends that some forms in worship are necessary. This is indeed true, and these forms may appropriately be termed Ritualism. Yet surely “Clericus” must be aware that it is the extravagance in Ritualism so greatly prevailing at the present time which has given rise to the debate in which we now take part, and that in the question here debated the term Ritualism signifies not only forms of worship, but those genuflexions, intonings, frequent changes of dress, incense-burnings, and outward trappings which have become so common in very recent times.

Through viewing Ritualism in the question debated as signifying any form of worship, “Clericus” represents our arguments as tending to introduce confusion into public worship. This is a misrepresentation of them, as our arguments are directed, not against all forms of worship, but against modern Ritualism.

Both Layman and C. K. mass religion together with poetry, statuary, painting, architecture, and the adornments of our homes and persons, and contend for the desirableness of form and sumptuousness in the one as well as in the others, thus instituting a miserable comparison between that which is earthly and that which is heavenly.

C. K. defends Ritualism as a protest against avariciousness in the support of the house of God. We cannot ourselves see any necessary connection between Ritualism and liberality, or between anti-Ritualism and illiberality, and we feel sure that the readers of the *British Controversialist* will with ease conceive of the possibility of manifesting, without Ritualism, much greater liberality in the support of the house and worship of God than has yet been generally manifested by either Ritualists or anti-Ritualists.

"Abracadabra" does not see how Christianity "can exist without a given ceremonial and settled rites." Does he intend to say that he cannot conceive it to be possible for God to make a Christian of one of the natives of New Zealand or of Patagonia, without that individual ever coming into contact either with any other Christian, with the written Scriptures, or with any kind of preaching? If he admits that God can do this, then he admits that Christianity can exist without a given ceremonial and settled rites.

"Abracadabra" writes, "I am astonished that S. S. should fancy that God can be indifferent to the manner in which He is worshipped, as he affirms." Now we did not affirm that God is indifferent to the *manner* in which He is worshipped. What we affirmed was that God regards not the posture or dress of the worshipper; this we still affirm, and such an affirmation is materially different from the assertion that God regards not the *manner* in which He is worshipped.

"Abracadabra" writes again, "We have no catechism drawn up in the Scriptures, nor have we any but one form of prayer given; and as we are not to use 'vain repetitions,' S. S. must be at a loss to pray according to a form sanctioned by Scripture, and therefore consistent with Christianity, if he is to be limited in things lawful to be done by the Scriptures alone." Precisely so. S. S. is at a loss to pray according to a form sanctioned by Scripture, or according to any form. He could not conscientiously employ a form of prayer, and believes that true prayer is not the repetition of the words of a form previously drawn up, but the outpouring of the heart. "Abracadabra" writes yet further, "The Holy Scriptures are full of ritualism; and so fully does the Deity recognise the necessity of ritual for man, that He lays down elaborate laws for it, that it may be a trustworthy 'schoolmaster' to bring the Jews to Christ." But the "schoolmaster" here spoken of by Paul is not the law of ceremonies, but the law of ten commandments, as may be seen from Gal. iii. 10—13, in each of which verses the law spoken of is evidently the same as that termed "our schoolmaster."

"Abracadabra" further speaks of Ezekiel and John having "introduced ritual into heaven as the very safeguard and glory of angelic worship." Now if this be not "ritualistic nonsense," to talk of ritual in heaven being the safeguard of angelic worship, we know not what is.

"Abracadabra" presumes that we consider marriage to be a re-

ligious ceremony. We beg to assure him that we do no such thing—that we view it simply as a civil contract. Were it a religious ceremony, it would be only for the observance of religious persons, and could not be rightly attended to by the irreligious. Instead of this being the case, it is “honourable in all,” and does not require the possession of religion to qualify persons to enter into it.

A few remarks of one of our own coadjutors lead us to think, and in so doing recollection brings forth further testimony in favour of the proposition we advocate, that Ritualism is unnecessary to the advancement of true Christianity. R. D. Robjant differs from ourselves in our belief that the attitude of the worshipper is unimportant; thinks us very wrong in considering that God regards not whether the worship be paid in a sitting, standing, or kneeling posture; does not believe that any one who is not suffering from bodily infirmity pays proper respect to God when lazily sitting in the act of prayer; and considers that a careless and indifferent position necessarily prevents due reverence and devotion.

In opposition to these opinions of R. D. Robjant we place Scripture testimony. When God had signified to David his pleasure to make him a house, and to establish his throne and kingdom for ever, David went and *sat* before the Lord and prayed unto him (2 Sam. vii. 18). Yet David felt at this time deep humility, great reverence of God, and a truly devotional spirit. He was far from being careless and indifferent. At other times we read in Scripture of godly persons engaging in worship in some other bodily attitude, thus plainly showing that the posture of the body in worship is a perfectly unimportant matter, and confirming us in the belief we before advocated, that—Ritualism is unnecessary to the advancement of true Christianity. S. S.

WOULD THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE IRISH CHURCH BE INJURIOUS OR BENEFICIAL TO PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY?

INJURIOUS.—I.

THE law of supply and demand is not all-pervading. It has limits beyond which it does not operate. It has full power only within the circle of *felt* wants. When a want is felt, there is a chance, varying according to the intensity of the feeling, that endeavours will be made to procure what is required; but when a want exists that is not felt, what can induce effort in regard to it? Clearly a sense of that want must be excited. The ignorant do not feel the want of knowledge, of the great sum of happiness they lose by their non-possession of knowledge; they can form no conception of the wonders unfolded and the glories which the earth puts on to the educated eye. As the blind man by positive deprivation cannot

know the beauty of the earth and sky, so the ignorant by a defect as positive walk blindfoldedly amid the grandeurs and the gratifications of information, science, and civilization. The religious consciousness is equally blighted and benumbed, equally incapable of recognising the nature of its own deficiency as the eye of the blind man or the mind of the ignorant. Hence it is just as much the duty of those who possess religious consciousness and culture to look to the providing of the means of opening the souls of those who are religiously blind to the light and glory of the love of God, as it is the duty of those who know to spread knowledge, and of those who see to remember the wants of the blind—nay, much more so, for these are mere earthly wants, while that is a defect which has an infinite reference and effect. It is not a fitting thing to introduce the law of supply and demand into these domains; for in these the worse and not the better is naturally chosen. Just as the ignorant patronise and popularize the lowest amusements—the lowest, if any, literature—the slightest, if any, education, so does the natural heart of man prefer the most sedative and the most deceptive theology, and the priesthood which offers vicarious prayers, and gives of the superfluity of the works of supererogation to make up the deficiencies of those who care for none of these things, yet hanker after the comfort of them. Hence the disendowment and disestablishment of the Irish Church is virtually the endowment and establishment of the Romanist credulity—is throwing into the hands of the Papists the entire sway of the Irish millions—millions who are peculiarly prone to gain anything whatever without the trouble of working for it, and, of course, most willing to attain unto salvation by any means rather than by those of repentance, faith, love, and new obedience, trust in Christ and the imitation of His work, will, and self-denial.

There is a political economy of capital, but not of Christianity; of gold, but not of God. Had the law of supply and demand held good in regard to truth, mercy, and righteousness, there would have been no need of the Great Heavenly Missionary who came to excite in the souls of men the love of God, which being felt in the heart, would operate savingly on the life of men and bring them to practise goodness as godliness.

The entire Jewish dispensation proves the necessity of having some established form of things—especially in religion—as a point of departure and comparison. The establishment of Christ's church as a confederation of believers shows the same thing, the need of a fixed and definite form of religious faith and practice as a condition to the keeping up of holy endeavour and enlightened worship. It is therefore right that there should be—with perfect freedom for religious men to combine as, and to think what, they like so far as the state is concerned—"a light set on an hill," a city of God to be seen afar off, a light set in a candlestick to give light around to form a mark for the eye to behold, a testimony for the worth and virtue of Christian ordinances. The Irish Church ought not to

be disestablished nor disendowed; it should be reformed, not destroyed. This is a fixed Protestant stronghold and place, and ought not to be surrendered; it is a witness Church, and to veil its standard would be, in fact, to confess that Protestantism was a failure and Catholicism of the Roman type that which alone could prosper in Ireland. The latter statement, as we have already said, may be true, but it is only a sign of the increased need of the Established Church in Ireland; for we have shown that in religion it is natural for the heart of man to choose the worse unless educated to apply his heart to the better. It is not right to withdraw a witness from the watchtower although it is right to make that witness as effective as possible; it is, therefore, reform in the Irish Church, not the disendowment and disestablishment of it, that is required.

But though political economy has no place in the main question in regard to religious establishments, in regard to an Established Church it has a place. The endowment of an Established Church forms a rent-charge on property, and in consequence of that rent-charge all property that changes hands and all property inherited has in it a certain fixed proportion that is not transferable, but exists as a permanent part of it unexchangeable and held in trust for the Church. To confiscate this and hand it over to the proprietary of the country is to rob the Church and to bribe those very parties to perpetrate that injustice who are sent to parliament to execute justice among men. In no case else would such a thing be suffered as that those parties who would benefit by the abolition of a thing should be the judges as to whether it would be better to abolish or amend it. Every injustice sanctioned by those who have the care of law and justice in their hands is a disadvantage to true religion; and the permission of the disendowment and disestablishment of the Irish Church would be such an injustice—an injustice of double-grained iniquity, because an injustice perpetrated through fear of those who adhere to Popery, the shabby injustice of cowardice, and an injustice perpetrated through the love of the lucre that would come into the pockets of those who determine the result,—the shabby injustice of avarice. To sanctify such crimes by the title of religious reformation cannot but be hurtful to Protestant Christianity.

The Irish Church is spoken of as the Church of the minority, and hence it is said that it must go to the wall; but such reasoning is absurd. Law is the agreement made among men to protect the minority from the tyranny of the majority. If similar reasoning were to be applied to other things where would we be? The knobstick who works while others are on strike is in the minority, therefore he must go to the wall, and the law of the majority may disendow him of life or disestablish him in the labour market by maiming or rattening. The capitalists are in the minority, and they must go to the wall, while communism will seek the complete disestablishment of that tyrant of labour and the entire disendowment of those who hold the chieftaincy of capital, and treat bankers

as bishops of the Irish Church, workowners as rectors, and proprietors like archbishops. The House of Lords is a minority, therefore disendow the Peerage and disestablish the holders of it. Such a spirit is alien to true Christianity, and anything which is done with the sanction of such a theory is in opposition to, and therefore injurious to, Protestant Christianity.

The union of Church and State may be a debateable question; indeed it was debated in the very first volume of this serial, but it has really nothing to do with the question before us, which is not one of theory but of practical effect. We shall not enter into that question at present, but shall content ourselves with what has been already said as a general principle in the opening of our article.

I must now point out briefly the "following elements of thought" which require to be taken into consideration:—1st. The disestablishment of the Irish Church would be the abandonment of a principle; and that every abandonment of principle implies that it is false and inimical, so that the same thing will be right in England, Scotland, and Wales as is hereby declared to be right in Ireland. 2nd. That the disestablishment of the Irish Church is equivalent to the endowment of Popery: (1) because it removes a rival; (2) because it gives an apparent victory to it; (3) because it releases property from burdens which would be given to that Church all the more readily, because it could be so easily represented that the release was due to those who asked its transfer; (4) because it would remove protection from Protestants and put down in many places the witnessing for Protestantism which the Irish Church involves; (5) because it would put all the temptations on the other side of the Protestants; it would menace them by the majority, enfeeble them by their being conquered, bribe them by the saving in money and peace of mind Popery would promise. 3rd. That the disestablishment of the Irish Church would widen the area of Popish influence and lessen the vigour of Protestant resistance. 4th. That the disestablishment of the Irish Church would affect the minds of the unthinking to believe that Protestantism was a failure and Popery the only eternal truth of Christ. On these grounds we maintain that the disestablishment of the Irish Church would be prejudicial to Protestant Christianity.

E. B. O. R.

BENEFICIAL.—I.

ENGLAND has again turned its attention to Ireland. The ebullitions of feeling which have been shown on several occasions recently seem to have reminded the English that the people across the Channel are not quite satisfied with their present condition. Foremost among the grievances of which that land complains is the "Church,"—a Church which, foreign to that country and to the religion of its people, has been by law established there and styled the Irish Church. It is now again proposed to disconnect that Church and the State, and in contemplating the measure

we naturally inquire, "How will Protestantism fare under the proposed change? Will it be injured or benefited?"

It is our opinion that the disestablishment and disendowment of the Irish Church would prove beneficial to Protestant Christianity, and that that Church itself would be the first to feel the salutary influence of the change. Many objections have been raised to its disestablishment. Several of those objections, could they be well known and clearly understood, would be found to have arisen simply from selfish and interested motives. Of course, such a remark does not and could not apply to many of the reasons which have been adduced in favour of its continuing as at present. It is urged by some that the poverty and destitution of the country necessitate an external support for religious ordinances. The Rev. A. T. Lee, LL.D., in a letter to Lord Dufferin, in reference to this plea, says,—“The existing endowment of any parish, if the Irish Church were disestablished, would last till the death of the present incumbent, and not a moment longer. After his death, who is to look after the spiritual wants of his parishioners? who is to occupy his pulpit on the following Sunday? Suddenly his parishioners, few and scattered, as is undoubtedly the case in many Irish parishes, would be left without a pastor and without the ability of providing one for themselves. In numberless cases the landlord would be utterly unable, and in many others, if able, would be unwilling to support a clergyman out of his own income; and in a short time, in a vast majority of cases, these scattered parishioners would lapse into open infidelity or be gathered into the fold of the Church of Rome.” But upon what grounds can the Rev. Dr. Lee support such an opinion? From the teachings of Christ and His apostles it seems evident that they never intended that the Church should be connected with any State; and that the original idea of the Church on this matter was, that it should be self-supporting; nay, able to support itself against the oppressions even of a mighty adverse state, as it was in the days of the early Christians. There is a power and a vitality in voluntarism that is little known till put to the test. Look at what voluntarism has done in England! Its innate principle calls forth some of the highest and noblest powers of our nature. No man knows what he is capable of doing till thrown entirely on his own resources. In reviewing the history of men of all ages and countries, and especially those holding prominent positions, it is instructive to notice the powers, the capabilities, and the talents which they possessed merely in a dormant condition till called into action by some crisis or some necessitous event; and if such a remark applies with any truth to man as man, with how much greater truth will it apply to man as a Christian, to one whose whole nature has been recreated and called into the exercise of its most exalted powers. Moreover, regenerated men will, from overflowing gratitude and unbounded love that delights in free-will offerings, do more for the prosperity of the Church than all the governments in Christendom; and besides, it

may be added, that such support of the gospel is in itself a means of grace. Had the Rev. Dr. Lee lived about two centuries ago, it is at least probable that he would have sighed with bitter lamentation over the future prospects of religion in England, when two thousand men resigned their position as evangelical clergy on a matter affecting their consciences. But compare the present position of the voluntary churches in our country with that church which receives its support from the governing power, and it will be found that the church established by law is the church of the minority. But even supposing that spectres of a decaying church should occasionally haunt our minds, the duty of Protestants remains untouched. Do what is right, and leave the results to a higher power than mortal men possess. Let the Irish Church be disestablished, and a spirit of independence and self-reliance will be infused into it; it will be roused to energetic action, a more healthy spirit will animate its constitution, and new blood will speedily be found circulating through its veins. If the principle of voluntarism and self-supporting churches be correct (and who is prepared to deny it), then the time will arrive when the Irish Church, disestablished and disendowed, shall rejoice in a liberty, a freedom, and a purity which it never knew when endeavouring to serve both God and mammon. Further, if Protestant Christianity possess in itself, with divine aid, a spirit, a power, and a majesty of truth, having its head and source in God, it will be found not only capable of supporting its honoured servants and messengers, but also capable of extending its influence over thousands of unborn souls. What shall be said if God has not been trusted enough? What if we have taken the management of the affairs of the Church into our pany hands, and reckoned that its prosperity depended upon no higher power? And it is possible for men to do even this.

Not alone would the Irish Church feel the results of the proposed measure; the rest of the Protestant interests in that land, small though they be, would likewise be benefited. The sense of injustice which they at present feel would be no longer known, and the Church could co-operate more gracefully with the other sects to promote the best interests of a common Protestantism and resist with a more powerful arm than hitherto the advancement of that institution called Roman Catholicism. The Romanists cannot receive any addition or strength in any manner from the proposed step. No true-hearted Protestant will leave the Church because it is freed from the patronage and control of the State; nay, rather will he feel himself bound to exert a greater power than ever for the maintenance and prosperity of that Church. And as for those nondescripts, of whom there are far too many, not only in Ireland but throughout the world, who know not why they attend one church in preference to another, there will still be no good reason why they should leave the Church and join the Romanists; but even should they do so, Protestantism will feel no loss and Roman Catholicism will know no gain.

In considering this and similar questions much depends upon one's individual religious education; and when men can cast aside the garment of sectarian culture and unburden their minds of all prejudice,—can shut their eyes to the present state of affairs and the present recognised constitution of everything in the world, and look upon questions in the pure, clear, undimmed light of a generous and unbiassed mind and a truly charitable conscience,—then will there be such a revolution and such a turning upside down of present arrangements and institutions as will shock our stereotyped notions and herald the commencement of a better era in the world's history,—a time that shall—

“Ring out the darkness of the land;
Ring in the Christ that is to be.”

H. SCOTT.

Literature.

ARE SENSATIONAL NOVELS SUPERIOR TO NOVELS WITH A PURPOSE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE novel, as a species of literature, has high and peculiar claims upon the consideration of all readers, not only because of the prevalence of them, and the charms they possess, but on account of the very large hold they take on thought, feeling, and fancy. Any one who knows in what remote suggestions moral acts arise, cannot but know, also, how slight are the elements which turn human purposes, and how subtle may be the interlude to the exercise of a passion which shall sway a life's best interests, and work blessedness or woe to many. This is the far down depth of thought over which the novel exercises almost unlimited influence, and among the associations which they occasion are those often which decide the will and fix the destiny. How strong is the energy, how wide is the sweep, of the sceptre of imagination! How slight are the catches upon reality attached to which fancy weaves her web of gossamer imperceptibility but of adamantine power! With what speed and effectiveness do the flashes of suggestion pass from faculty to faculty, impressing them, changing the current of their force, and bringing them over to the dominion and rule of some yearning and craving of our nature! To form some estimate of this, we have only to notice how much more intense and thrilling is the interest we feel in the fortunes and misfortunes of the heroes and heroines of fiction than we take in that of our kindred, our neighbours, the poor around us, or the feeling we manifest regarding the play and prevalence of passion around us in everyday life, and the working out of the *dénouements* of real existence.

We do not use this as an argument against the perusal of novels.

All argument against that is, we are afraid, useless. The fancy has a greed for exercise ; the imagination must work in some form or way, and the interplay of the passions must be gratified. We have withdrawn so much of the show and excitement of personal activity from our everyday life, that we hunger and thirst for the exercise of it, and so we build up our phantom castles, and bring upon the scene our lords and ladies bright, and disposing them, like the mimic tournaments of chess, we feel the glow of imaginary love, the heat of fancied heroism, the pulsations arising from scenic dangers, and the triumphs of the passions in the theatre of the imagination, which we dare not manifest an interest in in the common walks of life. There we enjoy the under-currents of passion hidden in common events, like the blood in the veins of a beauty in her ball-dress ; there we witness the play of passion, not clothed on with the grace of state procession, but as if its forces were made apparent, like the demonstrations of a professor of anatomy with a skeleton, and there sometimes we see the terrible secret of the heart as if we were present at a case of mental vivisection. Our civilized life will have its lapse into barbarism, and we cannot solidify the heart, or marble the passions, or arrest the currents of animal life, or deny ourselves the dear delight of what Professor Bain has most appropriately called plot-interest. Novel reading is the revenge of our repressed nature against civilization, formalism, and etiquette—its rebellion against the self-containedness of modern life.

In the scenery of the novel we catch something of the delight of the nomad ; we wander in new scenes and see fresh sights ; we pass to new cities, enter other country towns than those we know, and make our entrance good into palaces, churches, castles, mansions, monasteries, cottages, huts, slums, caves, and dens which we could not or dare not enter in our most adventurous moods. We see these things, too, in the vigorous light of a mind of power, under the influence of passion and incident ; they are not only described, but they are described under the impressions of emotion, and subdued to the designs of the author ; the varying lights of life fall on the scenery, and the state of the imaginary beholder's mind interfuses itself with the spectacle, and changes as swiftly as as the changes occur in the sky of an April day. We see the scenes, not as strangers with cold hearts, with none who interest themselves in us, none in whom we are interested ; but we see them with life in them—life with emotion palpitating under the surface, and passion posting on to its purposes.

In the characters of the novel we see much more than we do of our nearest and dearest friends. We see each other dressed for the busy stage of life, and acting our part therein, with our exteriors subdued to the fashion of the time ; with our manners and style of doing things put on, like our clothes, in the newest mode ; and with the very cast of our face moulded *to*, rather than *by*, our circumstances and positions. We cannot see into the hearts,

notice the inner workings of the minds, perceive the under-currents of feelings and interests, and watch the throbbings of emotion in our friends; but all this inner anatomy of character and conduct is performed in regard to the novelist's characters for us.

Is it not a fact, that in our inmost thoughts we can form a more vital idea of Falstaff, Hamlet, and Othello; of Dame Quickly, Ophelia, and Desdemona; of Jeanie Deans and Little Nell; of Amy Robsart and Mary Barton; of Mrs. Poyser and Mrs. Proudie; of Nicholas Nickleby and Philip; of Adam Bede and Mr. Micawber; of Rochester and the Laird of Ravenswood, than we can of our nearest neighbour. And is it not an exact statement of the reality of things that we much more frequently recal the sayings, doings, and surroundings of those creatures of the imagination than we do those of the earl in the vicinity, the millowner in the great house, the curate in the parsonage, the baker in the main shop, the doctor and his wife, the two old maids in the cottage at the corner, the widow in the grange, the ostler at the Lion's Arms, or the demure little dressmaker with whom the burly blacksmith is desirous of blowing up an amour? The influence of these characters upon our life and conduct is a great deal more powerful than we are apt to give them credit for. The favourite style of our favourite heroes and heroines almost unconsciously becomes ours; they affect our inclinations and associations; they provoke our likes and dislikes; they form our elements of comparison, and we judge realities by their nearer or more remote resemblance to our ideals; nay, we fret at the circumscription reality and sigh for freedom from the pressure of the actual, because we cannot, within its bounds, perform the heroisms, feel the emotions, and do the clever things which those permitted the whole range of the possible can accomplish or entertain.

The incidents of the novel, the intricacies of its construction, and the elements of the plot exert over us a charm in the mimic world in which they occur which we do not feel in regard to the thrilling plots of the great world of reality in which men and women live and love, sin and suffer, err and repent, hope and fear, do and endeavour, grow sick, decay, and die. We live in a world where all that is possible is probable, and yet we look on it as commonplace and used up. We see the whole interest of the plot brought to a focus, and we dislike the diffused interest of common life thereafter, just as some people, in their love for the confined selection of landscape visible in pictures, grow to think of Nature herself, the soul and source of the picturesque, as deficient in beauty, grandeur, and sublimity. This is the falsity of our impression, and is the result of our unthinking want of common sense. A novel, at its best, is but a modelled picture of life—a selection of incidents, one plot chosen out of many and a series of connected events, the outfall of a few causes and motives. Seeing this aggregated and intensified, we think that our life of a thousand coactive plots, of ten thousand

simultaneous motives and emotions, is too poor, too weak for us to pay heed to—quite undeserving of the keen and earnest thought which the contents of a three-volumer can excite. In all these facts we see the immense power of the novel over our minds, and get a sort of notion of the mighty influences they can exert over our thoughts and feelings—that is, over ourselves in their best part.

These things give emphasis and importance to the question which we are called upon to consider, which is—"Are sensational novels superior to novels with a purpose?"

Sensational novels are those which depend mainly on their plot-interest, the strength of their effects, and the intensity of their incidents; the suspense, the thrill, the rapture, and the mystery; the curiosity, the alternation of guess and surprise; the involutions of chance and change; the conduct of the story through a seemingly labyrinthine maze of contending complications and complieities to to a clear and marvellous upshot and issue, and which require us "to apprehend no farther than this world."

Novels with a purpose are those which have a background and a beyond of aim and intention which show a bit of causation as a specimen of the evolution of life from motive, and of incident from disposition, which suppose other and higher ingredients mingle with life than those which appeal to the senses and excite the curiosity and bewuzzle the intellect with gleams into the dark of fate or circumstance, as if it were all clueless and intertwisted. They have definite and decided views on the feelings, frenzies, longings, doubts, aspirations, desires, endeavours, and institutions which go to constitute life, and they are written to show existence as a determinable something which depends on the nature, disposition, theory of life, emotions, and motives, and which, therefore, may be misemployed or employed, may issue in infinitely important results or most lamentable consequences.

Novels with a purpose are superior to sensational ones, because, however inferior to them in art they may happen to be, they really give more correct notions of life, and impart a sense of the inadequacy of all merely temporal, personal, and selfish joys to produce the true and proper best ideal of existence. They put the facts of life before the mind with greater accuracy in their relations to causes and causation, and help to break down the absurd notion that love and marriage constitute the means and the end of all human interest.

"Love, of man's life, is but a thing apart that charms,
The novel makes it all-existence."

This is a false ideal of life, and very misleading. The phenomena of human life are woven upon warp of many colours, with woof of great variety. Life is not all sensation; much of it has interests, into which sensation enters very little. Nor do the circles of sensation include all the possibilities of humanity. It is well that this

should be known, and that principles should be inculcated capable of adding to the glory of humanity. It is not, surely, essential that life should be shown to be constantly in the grasp of the detective officer, that the hangman's noose should be every now and then casting an ominous shadow over human happiness; that crime should be exhibited as housed in splendour, and familiar with the chief persons in the "Court Guide," though closely allied to those whose arms are emblazoned in the "Newgate Calendar."

Dickens and Thackeray, Miss Evans and Miss Braddon, Charles Kingsley and W. H. Ainsworth, Mrs. Oliphant and Miss Thomas, Bunyan and Sterne, Miss Martineau and Miss Edwards, Mrs. Hall and Gerald Griffin, are names which may help the reader to adjudicate on the question. It would be easy to extend the list by contrasting "Sartor Resartus" with "The Woman in White;" the political novels of Disraeli with those of W. G. Reynolds; Miss Brontë with Mrs. Gore. But this is really needless; for, as we have already pointed out, the true grounds for a judgment are to be found in the power of the novel to influence the character and touch the imaginative and the moral nature of man. To touch that nature to high aims and to moral interests *i.e.*, the highest and noblest aim. To debase all human life and interest to the mere contact of corporeality, and to entice the reader into the whole of the details of the working and effects of "the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eye, and the pride of life" is surely a less honourable and less worthy application of talent than that which teaches that "the world passeth away, and the lust thereof; but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever." Hence we raise our voice in behalf of the novel with a purpose as that species of narrative which follows most closely and comes most nearly of human efforts to the parables of our Lord, who gave us example that we should follow His steps.

PHILOMATHES.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE novel bears the same relation to our prose literature that the epic or narrative poem does to poetry. In both the aim is, or should be, to give "a poetic representation of a course of events consistent with the highest laws of moral government, whether it delineate the general history of a people or narrate the fortunes of a chosen hero." As such there are canons of criticism common to both.

The first great point for observation is the idea intended to be developed. Is this great and deep, or is it small and trivial? If in a novel the theme or idea is important, it is the object of the author to seize and to represent in a mimic world of ideal characters and situations, the deepest peculiarities of the life of a time. Again, the novelist as the creator of his mimic world makes also the laws that govern it; he conducts the chain of events to its issue; he winds up all according to his own mature judgment. "We have therefore to observe how far his laws of moral government are in accordance with those that rule the real course of things; and so,

on the one hand, how deeply and with what accuracy he has studied life; and on the other, whether, after his study, he is a loyal member of the commonwealth, or a rebel, a cynic, a son of the wilderness. The measure of the value of any work of fiction, on the whole, is the worth of the speculation, the philosophy on which it rests, and which has entered into the conception of it." * Secondly, the portrayal of character is to be considered; it is, in fact, by this that a novelist is chiefly judged. The most valued part of a novelist's genius is his power in the imagination of character. In this is included the imagination of physiognomy and corporeal appearance, as well as the imagination of feelings, states of disposition, and modes of thought and speech. Lastly, the merit or otherwise of the extra-poetical contents of any novel is to be carefully attended to. A large portion of the interest of every work of fiction consists in the matter which it contains in addition to the pure fiction. If in a novel the writer can contrive, consistently with poetic method, or even sometimes by a slight strain upon that method, to give us valuable matter over and above the mere fiction or story, we ought to allow all that is so given to go to his credit. So also, on the other hand, if these speculations, philosophical disquisitions, or matter-of-fact enunciations, have a perverse or immoral tendency, it is our duty to censure severely the author, and to condemn his work as mischievous, no matter how beautiful may be his descriptions, how intricate and ingenious his plot, or how vigorous his delineation of character!

From the foregoing remarks it is easy to deduce that every novel properly so called, any work of fiction worthy of the name, must be a novel of purpose, and in consequence the title of this debate has several times appeared to me as a strange and incongruous one. It is, in fact, a misnomer, supposing all novels to be novels of purpose; and unless we depose the thrilling, sensational tales of the railway book-stall from the realm of novels proper, the question needs no discussion. However dispassionate may be the mind of the novelist, however determined he may be to regard the facts around him as so many objects to be observed, studied, represented, and nothing more, there will always be more or less of purpose blended with the representation. The very choice of such and such facts to be represented, to the exclusion of others, is a manifestation of purpose, of preference, of moral intention. Nearly every novel of note by any of our great writers during the last quarter of a century has been a novel of purpose. Most of Dickens's are so. In the preface of most of them we are informed what the distinct object is; the same may be said of Wilkie Collins, many of whose novels are considered highly sensational. Thus "No Name" gives us the author's views of the unnecessary hardship of the laws relative to illegitimate offspring in England. Kingsley's novels are all novels of purpose. No writer has occu-

pied more of the possible classes of prose fiction than Bulwer Lytton; none has greater versatility; and yet all his novels, from "My Novel" downwards, are more or less novels of purpose, written to show the state of society at one period or other of English history, the eddies, currents, and quicksands of a political, and the advantages or temptations of a philosophical life. A novel writer, if he or she look upon the gift that is in him or her in the light that Charlotte Brontë did, will not write merely to say something, but will refrain till he have something to say. The novel will be the medium of the enunciation of his thoughts to the world, and as a consequence we shall have a novel of purpose in which the hero and others will utter and attempt to confute the author's sentiments.

The circulating library and the railway book-stall have of late years, however, raised up a class of novels—if, indeed, they can be called novels—which certainly appear to be written—I beg pardon, made like the countryman's razors—for one purpose, viz., to sell. To the majority of these the name "sensational" has been given, in conformity to the thrilling nature of their contents, though some of these, as "Miriam," "Philip Paternoster," "Such Things Are," &c., are truly novels of purpose *plus* sensationalism.

What, then, is a sensational novel? This is no easy question to answer; and as I have before shown, it is difficult to draw the line between this and the novels of purpose. The imagination is not a faculty working apart; it is the whole mind thrown into the act of imagining; and the value of any act of imagination, therefore, or of all the acts of imagination of any particular mind, will depend on the total strength and total furnishing of the mind, doctrinal contents and all, that is thrown into this form of exercise. Every novelist is a thinker, whether he knows it or not; and no novelist will be found greater as a novelist than he was as a thinker. But again, what is a sensation novel? Are "Aurora Floyd" and "Lady Audley's Secret" sensational novels? and is "The Woman in White" a non-sensational one. A sensational novel I should define as one in which the characters act in an improbable or impossible manner, the event leading to a most illogical issue, and the conclusion or moral, if moral there be, utterly at variance with that sense of moral fitness and justice inherent in mankind; not that the supernatural or improbable should be excluded from the domain of prose fiction, but that in novels professing to be novels of real life, for such things to be, is bad and mischievous. Startling dialogue and thrilling incident seem to be the chief features of the sensational novel. It is a preaching to the nerves, not to the judgment. A sensation novel, as a matter of course, abounds in incident. Indeed, as a general rule, it consists of nothing else. Deep knowledge of human nature, graphic delineation of individual character, vivid representations of the aspect of nature or the workings of the soul—all the higher features of the creative art—would be a hindrance rather than a help to a work of this kind. The unchang-

ing principles of philosophy, "the thing of beauty that is a joy for ever," would be out of place in a work whose aim is to produce temporary excitement. The human actors in the piece are for the most part but so many lay figures on which to exhibit a drapery of incident. Each game is played with the same pieces, differing only in the moves. Excitement, and excitement alone, seems to be the end at which the writers of sensational novels aim—an aim which must at any rate be accomplished. Now, as excitement, even when harmless in kind, cannot be continually produced without becoming morbid in degree, all works of this class manifest themselves as belonging, to a greater or less extent, to the morbid phenomena of literature—indications of a wide-spread corruption, of which they are in part both the effect and the cause, called into existence to supply the cravings of a diseased appetite, and contributing themselves to foster the disease and to stimulate the want which they supply.

The novel proper has been shown to be nearly allied to the narrative poem. Is there no place in a detailed comparison for the sensation novel? Yes; the public are occasionally favoured by some poetaster with wild and frenzied outbursts of emotion, for which spasmodic seems the most appropriate name. The sensation novel, then, is a counterpart to the spasmodic poem. They have the same aim, but set about it in a different way. The one aims to convulse the soul of the reader for the pleasure of so doing; the other endeavours to do so by an utterance of the convulsive throes which have torn the soul of the poet. But the novelist is morally decidedly inferior to the poet. A writer, be he poet or novelist, has morally no right to publish his works merely for the sake of so doing; that is, has no right to address the public unless he has something to say to them worthy their attention.

The poet has, or honestly believes he has. He writes to satisfy the unconquerable yearnings of a soul moved by the divine afflatus strong within him. Can this be said of the sensation novelist? Surely not; no divine influence can be imagined as presiding over the birth of his work beyond the market law of demand and supply. "The public want novels, and novels must be made—so many yards of printed stuff, sensation pattern—to be ready by the beginning of the season."

Viewed in this light, one may well ask whether sensational novels, supposing such to continue to exist, should any longer be tolerated, I will not say by the reading public, but by the thinking class of the community, or thought worthy a place in the category of those many works of pure fiction by great masters, the products of the thoughts and imaginings of observant, intellectual men and women.

Test the sensation novel again by either of the canons of criticism stated in the former portion of this article. I need not ask if the idea be trivial, but rather if there be any idea at all. In the majority, forming of course the worst of the class, there seems to

be absolutely no purpose whatever, beyond the stringing together a number of startling and improbable incidents and incoherent dialogues, so as to cover a certain quantity of foolscap. Of knowledge of life what have we? What is the philosophy of life taught by the sensational novelist? The very element in which he or she works is human nature, yet what sort of psychology have we in these novels?—a psychology and a philosophy which would not hold good in a world of apes, to say nothing of men; impossible conformation of character; actions determined by motives that never could have determined the like chains of events, defying all laws of conceivable causation.

For character we are introduced to the deeply beautiful but intensely wicked woman, the she-fiend of the human creation, who works, as may be supposed, havoc and mischief wherever she goes. There may be such in the world, but it is not fair in a novel of real life, supposed to depict events belonging to our own time—(this is always the object of sensational novelists, many of their stories being written close upon some great criminal or civil *cause célèbre*)—it is not fair, I say, in these to give continually as they do such persons as specimens of “every-day” life, and tell us “Such Things Are.”

Of the moral teaching of the sensation novel I shall not speak further. Enough has, I trust, been written to show that all novels are or ought to be novels of purpose; that if the sensational novel is not so in the full meaning of the term, it must be decidedly inferior to the novel of purpose; while if it be a novel of purpose, it ought to carry its condemnation with it, in consequence of the sensationalism which is its leading characteristic. R. S.

Politics.

WAS THE ABYSSINIAN WAR JUSTIFIABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

IN opening a controversial campaign on this subject, a mere statement of the circumstances which led our Government to undertake the expedition will afford a sufficient bulwark to our proposition for our opponents to try their strength upon, without our seeking at present the aid of argumentative entrenchments or parallels. Merely acting as pioneer to prove the way, we must leave to the discretion of the main body that follows, and which will be better acquainted with the tactics and strength of the enemy, the mode of defence.

Briefly stated, the *casus belli* was this. About four years ago her Britannic Majesty had an accredited representative stationed at Massowah in the person of Consul Cameron. His was no new office; it had been established some years previously, as much out of courtesy to the requests of Theodore, the Negus or Emperor, as from any other object; and it had been held by Mr. Plowdon, whose life was sacrificed in the service of Theodore. The European population of Abyssinia seems to have consisted of a mere handful of German missionaries and a few artisans in the employ of the Negus, and the country having no intercourse with Europe generally, England and France were the only two European powers having representatives there. The fitful and violent temper of the Emperor appears to have been offended in the first instance by some action of the German missionaries, which he construed into disrespect to himself, and he in consequence had them seized and imprisoned. These captives, belonging to the professors of a Protestant faith, and there being no representative of their own country in Abyssinia, appealed to Major Cameron to endeavour to obtain their freedom. The British consul took up their case and used his influence to effect their liberation. This action Theodore resented as being opposed to his claims of absolute and supreme power over all those who dwelt, or traded, or held office in his territories, and the consul soon found himself bearing Messrs. Stern and Rosenthal company in their disgrace, captivity, and chains.

On these circumstances becoming known in England, the Government, looking upon the Negus as semi-barbarous and not really responsible to the laws of civilized nations, wrote conciliatory letters to him, asking for the release of the consul, and giving assurance of the friendly feelings of the English nation. These failing in their object, a special envoy, Mr. Rassam, was sent with presents to treat with the Ethiopian potentate. When Mr. Rassam and his colleagues first appeared in the royal camp they were received with the utmost consideration. Presents were made to Mr. Rassam, and the promise given that the original prisoners should be released and sent out of the country with all due honour. The captives were even brought up from Magdala, and apparently started on their homeward journey; but this proved to be a mere blind of the treacherous king to entangle new victims. Paying a farewell visit to Theodore, Mr. Rassam and his companions were seized and treated with great indignity, their uniforms being torn and their property confiscated. Mr. Flad was then released, and sent to England with a letter to the Queen, declaring that Mr. Rassam had been detained for the sake of his advice, and asking our Government to send out more hostages in the persons of civilians, who could teach the Abyssinians useful trades; and again were the wishes of Theodore complied with; but after having had such proof of his treachery, and his desire to get Englishmen into his power, orders were given that the mechanics were to be left at Massowah,

and not to enter Theodore's service until the release of the prisoners was actually effected. Mr. Flad was also instructed to warn Theodore that should he refuse this last request and keep the European captives any longer in the country against their will and as prisoners, he would bring down punishment upon his head. This message, by his own request, was repeated several times to the king, and his reply was, "If they wish to come and fight, let them come. By the power of God, I will meet them, and if I do not beat them, call me a woman." His obstinate spirit kept him to this resolve, and in our opinion, there was then nothing left to our country but to have recourse to the extreme measures of the arbitrement of arms to sustain our national honour. Every peaceful effort to obtain the liberation of our fellow-Christians and countrymen, imprisoned without a pretence of law or justice, had been tried. Her Majesty herself wrote Theodore a friendly complimentary letter, which he treated with disdain; special envoys were despatched to him, and he threw them into prison; presents were offered him, which he declined to accept; he schemed to obtain possession of more Englishmen, and challenged us to combat. England has always watched over the interest and fortune of her subjects abroad with a zealous care, which perhaps has only been equalled by ancient Rome; and this fact has in no small degree contributed to the safety, prosperity, and comfort of our countrymen in foreign lands. If, therefore, we had allowed a petty and barbarian prince, without fault on his part or legality on the part of the king, to imprison and torture an accredited representative of our Government, without attempting to vindicate our honour, a fatal shock would have been given to the belief in our power to afford protection to commerce, citizens, and partakers of our faith. The prestige of our name would have been injured in every land; and as Sir R. Rawlinson tersely puts it, "Prestige in politics is what credit is in finance, it enables us to achieve great results with small means."

F. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

Was the war-bud which appeared in the matter of Cain and Abel an offshoot of a branch of equity? Were the Alexandrine wars justifiable? Or the Roman wars occasioned by their invasion of Britain? The war against the French Republic and the Russian "balance of power" war are now looked upon as founded upon erroneous doctrines. In scanning the war-history of Time we find but few, alas! very few, which were justifiable. It is therefore necessary that we should thoroughly investigate the nature of a war before we enter its name upon the small list of rare "justifiable wars." In declaring a war to be needless and extravagant, we simply treat it as kindred wars have been dealt with by the thinkers of the world, and cast it among the numerous company of wars that they may bemoan, in their constant clamours against the clangings of the fatal blunders of obtuse statesmen.

And what is this Abyssinian war? It is a struggle between a powerful nation and one in a parturite state—something like what England was in those times when Egbert had vanquished the petty chiefs of the octarchy and joined their states in one kingdom. It is the response of a weak government to the cry of the army, "We have no work to do." The army was sick of sham fights, and their masters, the rulers of the land, gave them this little job of whipping the savage chief. It is the culmination of government by bugbears. Its advocates say that it is the just punishment of Theodore. In this article I shall endeavour to prove the fallacy of this defence.

The condition of the captives when released has been described by the Press correspondents, all of whom are unanimous in statements of their robust health, only one being sick, and he was not suffering on account of cruel treatment. A very little harshness would have produced ill-health in such an untoward climate. Theodore's treatment of native captives was in accordance with the *code d'honneur* which those captives abided by. No cruelty but to British subjects can be taken cognizance of by the British sovereign. Queen Victoria has no business to interfere with a king who abuses his valet or his subjects.

Indeed, not a few who saw the prisoners and their prison-warders thought that if a little pluck had been shown by the incarcerated they might have effected their own escape. How much more likely would a plenipotentiary have been to have obtained their release if he had been provided with an escort of 500 men, with power to treat in the name of the Majesty of Britain for the release of those who had been confined.

The Negus of Abyssinia was offended, yea, exasperated by his insulting negligence of the British Secretaries in not answering the note. He therefore incarcerated the representatives of the British Government. Now the question upon which this article turns is: "Was the British Sovereign justified in punishing Theodore for his conduct at the point of the bayonet?"

If our French ambassador were to be incarcerated because a letter from Louis Napoleon had been left unanswered, I think we in England would and should do our best to get him out, and that best would be—we should detain the French envoy in this country. In the matter of Theodore, a British envoy was sent to a king who had no envoy in Britain. The British Government in sending their ambassador (or rather "very extraordinary envoy") could foresee that it was within the range of possibility for this envoy to offend the Negus. According to the law of Abyssinia, any man who displeased the king deserved death. That was the law, and not a few lost their lives on account of this law. The British Government was thus possessed of so much of the nature of "Simple Simon" as to send a subject to a place where he might legally be imprisoned for the simple offence of displeasing his majesty the king. If any one who displeased the Emperor of France incurred culpability punishable by death, would any country be justified in sending an

ambassador to France while that law was in force, unless such government possessed security for the good treatment of their ambassador? And if the ambassador broke that law, would his country be justified in declaring war against the Emperor for keeping his laws? Would the Prussian Government be justified in attacking England for the execution of the Prussian subject, Müller, notwithstanding that Müller had broken the law of England? Müller broke the English law, and Cameron broke Abyssinian law by displeasing the king. We have nothing to do with the tyrannical nature of this law; it is sufficient for us to know that it was the law of the land. Abyssinian rulers have a perfect liberty to make the laws of their own country. British rulers should not grumble at those laws; they should take account of their own stupidity in becoming, in the persons of their representatives, subject thereto. Government well knew that there was not a Habeas Corpus Act in Abyssinia, or even a Habeas Vita Act, yet they deliberately sent their representatives to the land.

Diplomatically speaking, no law can be wrong; for law is the standard of right in every country.

The redress obtained from the Sultan of Aden, and the subsequent and unforeseen accident which led to the colonization of that peninsula, was a totally different matter; *then* the crew and passengers of a British vessel were maltreated, though that crew had not from free-will entered territory where the laws of the Sultan of Aden were enforced. In this case Government had elected to send men to Abyssinian territory. In the former case, any crew sailing into the Red Sea might have been dealt with by that Sultan, if such crew were wrecked; but in this there was not the least likelihood for supposing that Theodore intended punishing British subjects, unless they came into his clutches, a thing which they had just as much siness to do as to walk into a lion's den.

The British Government staked the freedom of their representative in order to gain a chance of the monopoly of the Abyssinian markets, which are frequented by gold and ivory dealers from the central country, and *they lost their stakes*. They did not possess the slightest trace of a reason for punishing the holder. Britain tried to obtain supremacy in the Red Sea by treaty with the Negus, and having failed, it gave vent to its spleen by taking up arms against that Negus.

R. F. G.

The Essayist.

SELFISHNESS.

PART II.—ITS MANIFESTATION IN SOCIETY.

CHAPTER I.—PUBLIC LIFE.

SOCIETY is the agglomeration of individual personalities into masses, which display in their unity specific universal characteristics, made up of the peculiarities of the mental types by which it has been constructed. The germs of communities are the same as the springs of ideas, the innate tendencies of the mind; which create first a crude conception of social life, from the unprepared materials of circumstance, which solidifies in its realization, and furnishes a foundation on which its next possessor builds, according to his power of origination, his own layer of institutions. The coincidence of their prevailing dispositions in men draws them together, and induces them to adhere to like outlines of conduct and choose the same insignia of their will force; imitating that which they inherit in its chief features, heightening some and depressing others; sometimes, but seldom, when the tide of progress has reached the high-water line, going back to the primary stages and beginning anew. It is the credence of habit which maintains the existing modes of social life—its arrangements for physical enjoyment and mental education; a belief dependent upon the training which the mind receives from the conditions to which it is wedded by the accident of birth, and from which it can only be unbound by the discovery of other circumstances than those by which it has been nurtured. The past which we inherit is “a grand system of mechanism,” originated, built up, and fitted together from the earliest incentives to action in man, by the vitality of expressed emotions, hardened into forms, which our hands can handle, which we can apply to feed our cravings for the creatorship of deeds. It is a concrete mass, “fashioned by art and man’s device,” coloured by passion, ignorance, and superstition, and propagated by prejudice; which comes to us as creeds, political institutions, manners, and customs, &c., calculated to promote the happiness of man, or the contrary.

As the man finds gratification in these and follows out their teachings, or feels antagonism in them to the desires of his soul, and follows them or opposes them on these grounds alone, he exhibits frailty of character—in short, selfishness; but if, on the other hand, his upholding or subversion arise from a conviction that he is promoting thereby the cause of truth and the happiness

of humanity, even if we discover wrong judgment in the conduct, taken in concert with the motive, the action "is devoid of blame, pure and unsullied. "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin," not honest conviction, and sin is selfishness.

We have said that selfishness may be of as many different kinds as there are possible combinations of the faculties, save perfect co-operation; and so all the polemics against the failings of human nature, against all manner of vices, are really so many assaults upon the subjects of the old despot *self*. It is impossible, therefore, for us, particularly in a short essay, even to name all these; and we can therefore do little more than point out in a general way the selfish action of the mind and its opposite, in the exhibition of vice or virtue, as applied to some subjects on which there appears to us to exist a great deal of misapprehension, or of lethargic ignorance, in the popular mind.

Out of social life springs, with its other growth, government, as the embodying executive for the perpetuation of the form of moral life, which has been adopted in the early conceptions of the intercourse between man and man. Assuming the authority first, through the force of superior age and experience, it laid hold of the wills of men in their nonage and prepared them for the reception of it, as pre-eminence of will-force or physical energy. "In its earliest form, probably kingship was voluntarily assumed and willingly submitted to," being induced by the felt want of a cunning or knowing mind and strong body to hold together and direct the energies of the community, when its tradition of interest was assailed by the aberrations of individual desires and conduct within its recognised circle of relationship, or the combined force of any other family-enclosed community without.

Thus states were formed, in which the relationships of right and obligation became fixed, being what is laid down by custom, that is, law, and independent of or different from those of other states. Hence we have two forms of virtue arising out of this political position—obedience to law, as embodied in the executive, and patriotism. Law constitutes itself "the guardian of civil society," and if it be "the deliberate expression of the highest conception of duty to which a nation has attained," its application by the individual who believes this as the rule of conduct towards his fellow-citizens, and his appeal to its arbitration, when will clashes with will, to discover the right and enforce it, may be regarded as the highest moral position which he can take. Hence in ancient Rome, religion was submissive and earnest faithfulness to the state, which exercised the relegated power of the gods; and, indeed, duty to man is duty to truth, to God. They are inseparable; to further the interests of the one is to bring him nearer to the other; but inasmuch as law, expressed by governing force, can only seize upon and coerce the body, that is the conduct, the will is and must be left free from any direct compulsion, only submitting really to the inner government of choice, the law of desire.

It is possible, then, to obey and exercise law, and still be afflicted with moral disease, arising from disordered loves, which is selfishness—sin against the order of divine perfection. There will be little difficulty in convincing most men that the enforcement of laws by tyrannical supremacy, simply for the maintenance of kingly state and vested might, is a self-seeking, darkened by the scorching fires of unmitigated ambition. Yet, to an Akbar or Charlemagne, it might appear that "despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually attaining that end," without their being chargeable with this narrow selfishness; inasmuch as it is the machinery of existing ideas, shaped in institutions, from which we cull thought and interpret duty. He might act imperfectly, as he was surrounded by false lights to misguide, and yet be actuated by the purest impulse, seeing as he did in his success the warrant for his presuming to think this to be the wisest and best course; but yet, in the very nature of things, must have often been led on by his position to assert his self beyond its due, even as the leader of Christendom or Islamism.

But the attainment of obedience in the individual or the mass, to the expressed will and embodied wisdom of the traditions of a community, is not always bringing the mind into subjection to the law of God, written on the fleshly tables of the heart. It may be either the exercise of compulsory scourges by blinded bigotry, arising from the ingrained colouring of social status, or moral discipline, in which the upholder of what is written has learned to see light; or it may be the vile assumption of the right to use the weapons of the state to avenge rankling wounds in the spleen-spliten souls of Mammon worshippers, because some one more daring and less scrupulous about the letter of the law has appropriated the diamond in the head of a toad, which the other had fed for himself.

If law is thus resorted to because for the time, from behind its bastions, you can deliver salvoes at your own will and pleasure against personal offenders, you make it a camp of selfishness, and disgrace the banner of duty under which you enroll yourself. Law, as the compiled verbalism of past action and thought, is only a fossil, and if reanimated by the vitalizing breath of to-day's public opinion, by modern ideas of statecraft and legislation, it rises from the water only as ephemeral life, which to-morrow will not recognise. It wants the ductileness of universality which God's law possesses, and must be regarded as a substitute, which, though it has eternal principles at core, being perennial as to its reproductiveness, yet, as a fruit, is time-limited, finite in kind, and dependent on the weather of the events under which it grew and ripened for its quality and flavour; and this weather is always the self-will of the dominant imperfections under which it budded, burst into fruit and fulness, and gathered into the storehouse of enactments.

Duty is the sole text of the warrantability of our dealing with a man, or the whole rest of society, according to law or not ; and by duty is meant the application of the whole of our acquired knowledge of the truth, not of one attribute only, but all, to direct us in our conduct, and an obedience to the whole code of this our morality, which men sometimes, ay, often forget, embraces the obligation of mercy as well as that of justice.

Thus there arises another consequence, which is that abrogation may be equally imperative with maintenance. If to-day the rule of yesterday has been abolished, and the coin of opinion that was current is no longer a legal tender, it should be fresh minted, and have to-day's effigy stamped on it ; so that, whoever chooses to enforce the acceptance of such effete cash because he is rich in it and dreads to lose by the innovation, or whoever will not do his part, though convinced of its rightness, to effect the reform, since he is content with what is, but leaves those who want a boon to fight for it while he stands neutral, really only letting resistance alone because he thinks their victory will not detract from his advantages ; both serve the same king self, and may be fairly set down as allies against right and justice. Conservatism of form is not confined either to the " noble blood " or wealth of any land, but there is a " bloated aristocracy " of indulgence and heedlessness, wherever there is deafness to the sufferings with which the adversity of the prevailing circumstances may be afflicting men, to whatever social grade the upholders and the victims of the evil belong, be it high or low. A man's foes may be those of his own household. Democracy is good will. It makes kings and the lowly born alike the ministers, the willing servants, of the needy ; it is the only true " leveller " where there is difference of capacity, and is at once the friend of man and of government.

Actions are energized ideas, and express them far more mightily than words, breaking down or piercing through where these rebound or glide harmlessly off ; hence, " example is better than precept." Now there has come down to us through the ages a word and a deed, which have been very mighty until now in allaying the savage murderousness of Christian nations. They read, " Resist not evil, but overcome evil with good," exemplified in the willing death of their speaker on Calvary, which has gone home to the hearts of men in a way that the terrors of the law could never have done, manifesting the speaker's sincerity and faith in the power of his own doctrine as a thousand years of verbal enunciation could not. The coercion of selfwill, exercised for the propagation of truth, hinders it in one way, even though it succeed, which frequently is not the case, in attaining the end in view ; because it attacks the whole man, and annihilates much that is good, before it can uproot the evil, instead, as example does, of launching its bolts solely and entirely against the vice it would destroy. If we want to win men into a love of truths, as we conceive them, we must practise them ; but if our uttered conviction

of the truth of the axiom of Christ be so veiled about with the verbiage of tradition, as to sophisticate us into a state in which we will not read it as He did, but still cling to the dirt-dimness with which human savagery has closed in the light of heaven, and reject the brightness which would disclose our own rags of custom and prejudice, we practise self-seeking. Sophistry is intellectual selfishness.

Benevolence, in common with all the other qualities of mind, is in itself general or universal in its operation, and alone would consist in an undefined feeling towards the whole cosmos in which it found itself. The other faculties localize, direct, and intensify (or the reverse) its nature; shape it into a thought or an action, making its existence as a practical virtue a fact, tangible and appreciable to every form of mind.

Patriotism, as it is exemplified by your Winkelrieds, your Alfreds, your Hampdens, is such localized good-will. A man is not deity, and if he loves men, to show his love he must act as the earth-born thing that he is, finitely; and thus, in taking some into his heart to nourish, he excludes others—that is, in the material benefits he confers; but the spirit of the act, embodied in its form, diffuses its beams directly wherever its knowledge penetrates, and indirectly through the universe. Patriotism does not exclude from the affection all other lands than the one which was favoured with our first glances; it simply broods over the interest of man, as represented in the happiness of our kindred people under institutions which we love, or strikes to obtain the boon to the uprooting of the tares of selfish oppression and injustice. It is not Gorgon-eyed, full of the lust of blood, but clear, open-browed, and with its aim fixed in heaven, whither it would lead men, and whence it came. Its counterfeits are born of the prince of this world—self. It has meant, ever since men associated themselves into communities, the resistance of force that would subvert the inherited happiness which belonged specially to any one of these agglomerates of appetite, sentiment, and intelligence; or the assault of the imposed rigidity of selfwill, that hindered social bliss for to-day and clouded the evening of to-morrow. Its leaven was and is put into the brayed corn of society by philanthropy, but self is the hand that kneads it into the mass, until it is altogether permeated by the wholesome influence; and self has nothing more that it can do. When in the far-off days of Europe's barbarism, one horde wilder than the other rolled its tide against the settled tracts of land, or the still nomadic tribes that carried their lives in their hands, the man who then stood out champion of his little world fought for its preservation from slavery or annihilation, and seeing but the foes of human well-being in the foes of his tribe, became a patriot when he drew his weapon against them; not else. And so, through all the changing institutions of the past until now, no man should be accredited with the possession of this virtue, who has not felt the baseness of slavery, the inhumanity of enthralling men,

the banefulness of foreign yokes, not to self alone, but to all who have come within the reach of his love.

"By oppression's woes and pains!
By your sons in servile chains!
We will drain our dearest veins,
But they shall be—shall be free!

"Lay the proud usurpers low!
Tyrants fall in every foe!
Liberty's in every blow!
Forward! let us do or die!"

The Alexandro-Napoleonic lust of aggrandizement, by the subjugation of all types of men of all modes of life, to the dictation of one narrow nursery, is the direst opposite of patriotism; but it has been the loadstone of all governments up to yesterday, scattering blood and ashes upon the fields to feed men withal, and calling itself glory, national honour, making treaties for the maintenance of its falsifications, which in themselves showed that the light was beginning to pierce the pall which it had so long hung over human thinking and striving, and would one day chase it from the heavens.

To-day we have a more liberal thought, though it seems narrower,—the idea of nationality which is coming up from the deep, which is the creation of the infused conceptions of the pioneers of truth on the rights of nations; and with its advent that old dull-head protection, with its double-barred shutters which excluded all other light but what was emitted by the lamp within, lest others should gaze on the beauty of their treasures, is fast passing away. It has ever been well for self that other self has connived at and abetted the opening of secret passages for the dissemination of those miserly national hoards, without their being dulled or mildewed by the blight of protection tariffs; or it would have fared, and has often done, with your richly poverty-stricken communities, as it did with that bishop on the Rhine—the rats, the very vermin of human nature, would have devoured all the manhood.

Selfishness always aims at impossibilities, forgets in its eager grasping that the goose is but reproductive, and must be fed, not slaughtered, if the fountain of its golden eggs is to continue its munificence. Saw-grinding Broadheadisms are protections of demons, not of humanity; and though in their principle of the protection of the weakness of individual labour against the might of concentrated capital, they have all the nature of patriotic institutions, yet if they endeavour to obtain higher wages than the general prices of merchandise warrant, at the same time restricting the payment of such wages to a *favoured* band, they become, instead of patriotisms, cruel tyrannies. They either drive away the fulcrum of enterprise to some other locality, or push their own

commodity out of the market, which is nearly the same thing ; else they compel an advance of prices in the articles produced by their consumers, and so bring about an abnormal state of high prices under which they have really no advantage as a whole body, and from which those who are shut out by their combination from a participation in their receipts, suffer a corresponding amount of misery. "Bloated aristocrats," where are you now, if not here? Are not both those pernicious systems embraced in these illogical societies—these unions for the conservation of rights? Yes, both that of entailed estates and that of pocket boroughs. An increase of happiness, a widening of the channels through which it flows, so that the highest ratio of it may be attainable by the greatest number, is the aim of all philanthropic effort, ostensibly or by implication, though confined in its action to the narrowest limits. To call yourself patriot, then, and shut either other classes, other townsmen, or other countrymen, Irish, French or German, out from your father's house, so long as there is "bread enough and to spare," is to go blundering in the way of blind infallibility, where you will *infallibly*, if you let this intellectual selfishness lead you, get into the ditch of mean, grovelling selfishness, in social and spiritual emotions, where you will struggle with the choking slime of your own perversity, until one of these rejected outsiders kindly drags you out.

It is altogether false reckoning that calculates on retaining good for its own, and shuts out the new thought and character of aliens, lest it should disinherit the children. What is strongest will prevail, and where there is substance to be had, will get it, either by the external might of physical destruction or removal, or by the internal, the mental potency of moulding it into new forms, and absorbing character in character.

Mankind can only arrive at manhood by the interchange of truths gathered from different climes under the various aspects and colourings which nationality and race give them ; not by petrifying all individuality in one imperfect mass, such as we have in India, China, or Japan, by putting them all under the drippings of one external government. Free intercourse of mind with mind is what we want, and truth must be eliminated ; but only by the destruction of the types of life as we have them to-day.

The races of the present in Europe are neither the Celts, Goths, nor Slavonians of the great migrations ; the friction of individualities has eradicated many idiosyncrasies, and the old type has been swallowed up in the new. It is a verity, a universal fact, applicable to all our relations with each other, that we are "wearing human lives." Labour costs life, thought uses it ; the very extension of the race into the future expends the vigour of the present. The offspring, whether mental or physical ratiocination, aspiration, or affection, verbal utterance, mechanical handiwork, or sentient being, exits by taking to itself so much of the genitor's vitality ; and so the whole material creation is in an incessant fer-

ment, ceasing in becoming and living in dying. The spiritual does not come under this law, as it is the underlying motive force of this formal world; so to impart knowledge does not lessen my own, the exercise of love diminish my affection, nor worship take away from my veneration; yet each and all of these exercises takes from me so much of my animal existence, whilst it builds and increases my mental structure, that is, my selfhood, by which I make the matter of my body my servant.

To spend and be spent for truth, practising the same love for our neighbour as ourself, in all our public aims and ends, of internal or foreign policy, of legislation or social institution, is to meet as a nation the requirements of that sublime appeal of the apostle John—"Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren;" and at the same time an escape from the suicidal thralldom, the darkness of ignorance, imposed by the god of this world—Self.

ALBERTI.

The Reviewer.

Notes Expository and Critical on certain British Theories of Morals. By SIMON S. LAURIE, M.A. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas.

IN the month of October, 1866, we had the pleasure of calling the attention of our readers to the merits of a work on "The Philosophy of Ethics," an analytical essay by the same author as the book now to be noticed. Of that work the present expository and critical notes may be regarded as a supplement. Indeed, its author states that the matter of it would have found a place in that treatise, had he not "found that an adequate treatment of the various representative writers on morals, involved too great a departure from the line of the argument within which he then wished to confine himself." His former contribution gained compactness and consistency of form by that abstinence, and this one acquires a new utility from its being disembarassed of the closely thought theory of its predecessor. The former has a value for its theoretical completeness; this has a practical worth as a handy and concise summary of the tenets of the chief thinkers of our native British school of thinkers. Its plan is not nearly so vast as Jouffray's *Critical Survey of Ethical Systems*, as contained in "The Introduction to Ethics;" nor is its detailed exposition so

thorough as Whewell's "Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England;" but it has special characteristics which give it importance as a contribution to ethical studies—it takes the type views of the great thinkers and analyses them succinctly—expressing the various views in the current moral language of our day, thus at once modernizing and interpreting the theories they held; and it criticises the various forms and foundations of their thoughts with a piercing keenness and a thoroughness of comprehension which all must admire who know the works noticed.

There can be no doubt that the names of Thomas Hobbes, Lord Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, Bishop Butler, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Professor Alex. Bain hold high rank among ethical expositors and thinkers; and these are the representatives chosen by Mr. Laurie. To get in brief compass, and in the very essence of their thoughts, a knowledge of the opinions of these men on moral questions must be a great boon to all thinkers, not only because economy of thought is of great importance in our age, but because it is a good thing to learn to catch up the salient and special points in any speculative doctrine; and when to these advantages are added the acute reflections of a well-informed mind on mistakes, omissions, errors, or fallacies, the good to be derived from such a work is greatly enhanced. We can safely say that this is a good, useful, painstaking, and trustworthy student's book—a book which will be valued as an introduction to the study of these great writers, but much more thought of as a judiciously selected aid to a revision of a course of ethical reading.

The book, however, has a higher purpose. It is a reconstructive work. The author feels that divergencies in moral science work much injury in crude minds and among rash men, and he desires to show how much essential consistency in regard to qualitative morality exists in the midst of all differences in regard to the foundations and forms of theories; and hence to lead men to see that morality is not, in reality, a mere set of conventionalisms selected by men for selfish interests and the working out of class aims, but a series of truths derived from the very nature of the human being and the social economy in which he is intended to exist.

In this book Mr. Laurie has condensed to the utmost, and has sacrificed everything to clearness and conciseness; hence it is difficult to find any quotation capable of adequately exemplifying the merits of the work. Perhaps the most acute and able portion of the treatise is to be found in that part which relates to the opinions on morals entertained by Professor A. Bain. But inasmuch as the Professor of Logic, &c., at Aberdeen has, since Mr. Laurie's work was published, issued a distinct "Compendium of Mental and Moral Science" a work of which (in conjunction with an excellent treatise on "English Composition and Rhetoric," long in our hands) we hope soon to have an opportunity of discussing the merits, we

do not feel justified in extracting from that portion of this work, we shall present our readers with a criticism on Benthamism, and a friendly observation or two on J. S. Mill.

"Pleasures, then, constituting the utilities, and pains the inutilities, of human life, it behoves man to seek the former and avoid the latter, if he would do *right*. What!—we feel constrained to ask, when reading such a simple summary of moral duty—can it be right to court the pleasures of malevolence and antipathy, or to indulge without stint in the pleasures of the senses, or of power, or of the closet, or of the trumpet? Into the multitude of pleasures and of pains of which man is susceptible, does no supreme power enter? 'Sum up,' says Bentham, 'the pleasures or utilities that flow from any act, and put them on one side of your moral ledger, and on the other make an equally careful summation of the pains or inutilities; strike the balance, and if it be on the side of pleasure it will give the *good* tendency of the act upon the whole, and thereby constitute it *right*; if on the side of pain, it will give the *bad* tendency of it on the whole, and thereby constitute it *wrong*. Right and wrong, virtue and vice, accordingly become questions of measure and quantity.' In perfect consistency with this doctrine Bentham holds that there can be no such thing as good or bad motives, inasmuch, we suppose, as every possible motive which can actuate a man must be a desire for some admitted utility which is in itself good."—P. 83.

"The exposition which we have endeavoured to give of utilitarianism, as advocated by Mr. Mill, brief though it has necessarily been, will suffice, at least, to suggest the relation of his doctrine to past and present theories; and if in our estimate of it we cannot admit that it possesses so consistent and thorough-going a character as the parent utilitarianism of Bentham, it is gratifying to find that its deficiencies in respect of logical precision and inner consistency are due to a deeper sensibility and a wider reach of thought than were characteristic of the older doctrine, and consequently, give good promise of an approach to that non-personal, subjective, sentimental eudæmonism, in which are to be found, we believe, the elements of the reconciliation of a strife which has lasted for more than two thousand years."—P. 127.

"Although we find in Mr. Mill such a departure from the strict letter of Benthamism as we should have expected from a man of wider intellectual and imaginative sympathies than the master, we confess that we do not perceive in him a deeper insight into the moral constitution of man, or a clearer apprehension of the scientific defects of the theory which he expounds. The philanthropic zeal which characterized the teacher belongs to this equally distinguished disciple; and this, while giving intensity, also gave narrowness to the moral vision. The thoughts and desires of both being fixed exclusively on measures tending to the amelioration of society, the equalization of felicities, and the relief of human misery, they take hold of ethical questions only in their relation to the polity of communities, and pay comparatively little attention to the ethics of the individual. Had they started with a more patient analysis of man's nature, and striven to read correctly the moral record written on his heart, they could not, it seems to us, have rested content with the meagre exposition which utilitarianism gives of the ends of human action, of the obligation to pursue those ends, and of the characteristics of moral energizing."—P. 100.

The Philosophy of Life and Death. By JOHN BROOKES. London: F. Pitman.

HAD this book been called *thoughts* on Life and on Death, it would perhaps have been more appropriate as a designation. Philosophy is generally understood to mean systematic reflectiveness; whereas this work is pretty discursive. Yet, withal, it is a book which may be read with pleasure and profit. Were we reviewing it as an exposition of a philosophy rather than as remarks on life and death, we might be tempted to say that his views of each were somewhat different from those held by the orthodox. The pages it contains, however, are well occupied. They are full of choice sentences and well-arranged expressions, often suggestive, always pertinent. We cannot suppose any reader to rise from the perusal without feeling himself, if not a wiser, yet a better man. If we think that the author's partiality for Swedenborg and Carlyle sometimes misleads him, we also think that he has profited from a wide range of reading, and that he has thoughtfully considered the subject with a clear purpose and an aim for good. We could wish that many would look on life and death in a different fashion from that in which they do; and if they could be induced to read this tract of Mr. Brookes', we feel sure they would. He treats of life as a serious responsibility, and of death as the arbiter of destiny.

The Topic.

ARE THE WORKING CLASSES REGARDLESS OF RELIGION?

AFFIRMATIVE.

THIS is a question that has agitated the clergy in such a way as to arouse them from their lethargy, and compel them to ask the question whether the "working classes" are, as a body, regardless of the teaching of Christianity or not. And if we take the answer as given through the conferences that have been held to consider the subject, I think we shall find that, as a body, they are regardless of religion; which state of things is not brought about by the spirit of Christianity being changed, but by the want of unity between the profession and the practice of those whose mission it is to preach the gospel of peace.

1868.

For in these days of progress, the people are beginning to distinguish between their friends and their enemies; they are ever on the watch to see who comes nearest to the standard of the "Great Teacher." And when such a one is found, if he unites with his profession of Christianity a desire to remove the burdens that help to press them down, such a man, bad as the world may be, will be appreciated, and the people will hear him gladly; for example teacheth more than precept. For so long as we find men among the clergy that can so far forget their position as teachers of all that is high, noble, and lofty of attainment, as to descend to stigmatise the class below them in the social scale as meretricious,

F

I for my part cannot understand how they can expect the people to listen with that love and admiration to men who have failed to learn the spirit of the great commandment, that says, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

It is not that the people have a dislike to the Church as a religious institution, that causes them to abstain from public worship; but rather from the action of the clergy on all matters that appertain to their individual interest. That is the cause of the dissatisfaction that exists between the clergy and the people.

Let the objects which arouse suspicion in the minds of the people be once removed, and then we shall find a warmer love spring up towards religion than has ever existed at any previous time; for there is a feeling of goodness existing in the human mind that compels it to look for something around in which it can centre its highest thoughts; and though the working classes may for the time being ignore religion, as taught through the lives and motives of some of its professors, it does not as a body reject the good that follows from a well-directed aim.—D. W. R.

It cannot be doubted that the working classes are regardless of religion. This is proved by the abundance of gin-shops, the frequency of drunkenness and of brawls, the revelations made in our police courts of the low state of morality, or rather immorality, in which they live, the records of the Registrar-General on illegitimacy, and the prevalence among them of the vices without the virtues of civilization. The low amusements they contrive to find delight in, the impure and infidel literature—if we dare pollute that word to name the letter-press they read—which they encourage, and the vile trade

customs which they impose upon each other, bear witness against them. The fines inflicted in workshops for honest working, the vicious conversation in which the working classes indulge toward apprentices, and the delight they take in introducing nasty ideas into the minds of those who are brought into contact with them in their early years, all tell against them. The extravagance and waste they exhibit in their holiday time, the effrontery with which they run into debt in tally-shops, the readiness with which they fall into pauperism, are so many evidences that cannot be gainsayed that "they care for none of these things," which make for "glory, honour, and immortality, eternal life." It is sad to turn from these positive proofs to the pews of our churches, and to find no contradiction there: to ask what steps they have taken to improve, and to be told none; and to know that, despite all the efforts of Christian men, they still continue in their old ways, give emphatic proof that they are regardless of religion.—M. C. S. R.

Empty churches, alleys full of drunkenness on Sunday, beerhouses crowded at every available hour of the holy day, lounging groups at corners and straggling wayfarers on the path, quarrelling and wife-beating, profane swearing and almost as profane song-singing on the Sabbath show too truly the regardlessness of the working classes for religion. Any one who passes in a Sabbath afternoon through the south-eastern district of London, and through the populous streets of Birmingham, Manchester, Newcastle, Hull, Liverpool, and Glasgow, will find evidence abundant in their progress of the affirmative.—W. H. M.

To no class should the divine religion of Jesus commend itself so readily as to the labouring commu-

nity. It alone justifies the poor against the rich, and throws around poverty the sacred shield of God. It alone glorifies in the Person of the Redeemer labour and the sweat of the brow in which men eat bread. It alone inculcates mercy, compassion, considerateness, and justice upon the rich, and abjures those who live regardless of the charities of life to remember the case of the poor and the needy, and to give the labourer the hire of which he is worthy. It shows us God as *the Divine Worker*, Jesus as the One who took on Him the form of a servant to work out our salvation; and all His apostles were working men. Yet nothing is more certain than that in working men's homes, and especially in workshops and fields, Christianity is contemned, derided, and jeered at. Seriously inclined men are the butt of their neighbours, and church-going working men are stigmatised as sneaks and hypocrites, scoffed at, and played tricks upon. It is well known that the Bible is the book most burlesqued and disregarded, and that all the ceremonies of religion are made the subjects of mockery in a very large proportion of the places where the working classes congregate. Then look at the unrestrained lives they lead in regard to home morals, drunkenness, dishonourable dealing with each other and their masters; above all, look at the God-regardless Sabbath days they spend, and it becomes impossible to do aught else than affirm the melancholy and cheerless fact that the working classes are almost wholly divorced from religion and religion's duties.—B. C. E.

It is indeed a most distressing thing for us to say, but being truth it is right that it should be said—the working classes are regardless of religion. We look to the many schemes of benevolence, humaniza-

tion, improvement, Christian effort, and enterprise, which have been suggested by the thoughtful and carried on by the enthusiastic for the advantage of the working classes, which have failed. They have transformed benefit and friendly societies into pothouse feeders; trades unions into beggar-my-neighbour tyrannies; strikes, from being protests against injustice, into practical seed-beds of conspiracy and murder, under the name of rattenning; and they consume as many finer in drink as would, if properly applied, provide an ample income for an accident fund for working men for the three kingdoms. They patronize dolly-shops and eschew savings banks; they avoid the mechanics' institute as if it bred pestilence, and they crowd the gaff, the singing saloon, the skittle alley and the rat-fight pits, the tap-room and the bar corner, as if they possessed all the charms of "Araby the blest," if not something better. They are almost the sole upholders of Secularism; they are the purchasers of the worthless garbage of the London press, and they are in the almost constant habit of using profane and vulgar not to say sinful language. Count the schemes tried for their advantage, which through their stubborn adherence to vice, indulgence, and sottishness have failed, and they will prove a host of witnesses that the working classes are regardless of religion.—B. K. S.

NEGATIVE.

I think the working classes generally are *not* regardless of religion. The fact is, there is far too much "respectable religion" in this age; great accommodation is afforded for the upper or middle classes, and little indeed for working men and women, or children. Until this state of things be altered, the working classes will not have a fair chance

to show clearly and unmistakably whether or not they are favourable to or regardless of religion. The cry that the Established Church is the "poor man's" church is, to an immense extent, simply untrue.—**R. D. ROBERT, Bristol.**

The working classes are not averse to Christianity; and they are, most certainly, not regardless of religion. But appearances are against them! Granted. Still, let us look the facts in the face. They have neither the power nor the temptation, neither the chance nor the inducement, to conceal the apparent irreligion of their lives. They do not, because they cannot, pay church seats or pews, as a regard to decency, character, and "what will the world say," makes many of the upper and middle classes do. If they are non-church-goers, they cannot hide the fact. Often circumstances prevent their appearance in church from causes beyond control—sickness at home, children to be taken care of, want of work, clothes, &c.; inability to pay church dues, &c. Again, many of their homes are unprotected, and they cannot be left safely. But the welcome they give to Bible reading-women, missionaries, tract distributors, clergymen, &c., as well as the readiness and eagerness with which they send their children to Sunday schools, the respect they pay to the teachers of these Sunday schools when they visit their pupils, and the sacrifices they are willing to make to become possessors of Bibles of their own, are all eloquent in their favour. The retentive memory which they show for gospel truth is also in their favour. But we would even go higher, and say of the working classes, as a whole, that while they make no concealment of their faults, they make no parade of their virtues, and all who know anything of them know that good deeds and kindly

acts abound among them; and that the charity of the poor to one another is unmistakably a sign of the religious spirit in the working classes.—**P. O.**

Onlookers see more of a game than the players, it is true; and many of the loud-speaking accusers of the working classes think that life is just such a game in which they have seen more than their neighbours. I am a plain working man, but I see a fallacy glaring through their speeches. They do not know the life they pretend to judge. Hence they are unlike the onlookers at a game. It is because they understand the moves and turns of the game that they can judge. One who understands whist only, cannot be quite sure of the rights and wrongs in a game of loo; and a man may be good at cricket without being up to skittles. So men looking from their middle-class life cannot comprehend a working man's life. They can bring their family round them at stated times and ceremoniously hold the worship on which they lay stress; and when they hear that prayer seldom hallows the hearths of the poor they forget that the breath of prayer can arise to God from an humble couch, or take wing from a heart that cannot speak its joy, or fly to heaven in the midway between home and work. Because working men often cannot go to the public assemblies of the church—men have made the distinctions of rank and dress so obvious in them—they need not be accused of being godless and profane. We know many humble working Bible inquirers, who cannot get to church, but hold their household readings of God's word; and, earnest as they are, they are numbered among the irreligious working classes, who absent themselves from church and ordinances. This is a mistake.—**N. S. D.**

As a class, they certainly are not. It is quite true that a great many of their number are utterly indifferent about religious matters, but proportionately these are not greater than in any other class of society; and it is only because they form the largest portion of the community, and because it is considered discreditable in the middle and upper classes not to belong to some church, while the working classes think nothing of it, that there seems to be more indifference amongst them. The facts that many of the congregations, both in town and country, are almost entirely composed of working people, and that many of the elders and other office-bearers, especially in country districts, are drawn from their ranks, strongly support the negative. Some of the most efficient city missionaries, and the best co-workers with territorial ministers in the evangelization of our home heathen, are drawn from them; and all this shows that, as a whole, they are not regardless of religion.—BETA.

The working classes, as a body, are not regardless of religion; on the contrary, great numbers of them take a great interest in it; hence they furnish the majority of those who become affected with what is termed religious revivalism, &c. The feelings of wonder and awe, with their natural tendency of leading into superstition, have a close connection with the religious sentiment, and are much more easily excited in those who have not received a liberal education than otherwise. The working classes, as a rule, do not receive a liberal education; hence we find among them a craving after and a willingness to believe in the supernatural: a state favourable to the development of the religious sentiment. The same cause greatly favours, indeed, produces credulity.

The credulity and excitableness of the working classes on religious

matters are manifest, as the Murphy riots will witness.

Relating further to this topic, I would divide the working classes into four sections. First, those that simply vegetate, and take no interest in anything of a spiritual nature at all. This is a small section. Second, the highly emotional and credulous, who accept their religious opinions passively, hold them strongly, and display them actively—as members of anti-Popish and other societies, tract distributors, street-preachers, and encouragers of public prayer meetings. This is a pretty large section. Third, tacit assenters to the form of doctrines and church government in which they have been brought up. This is a very numerous and timid class, who submit quietly to spiritual authority, and are strongly averse to change. Fourth, sceptics, who take a strong interest in religious matters, are very aggressive and fond of disputation, resist spiritual authority—although they generally follow pretty submissively some favourite author. The more intelligent, I find, affect Hume; the more vulgar, Paine, or some kindred writer. Taken collectively, these three last sections are very alert to any movement in the religious world; they, when the occasion demands it, display an active interest in such movements. I think no questions excepting those that may affect their immediate money interest excite them so freely as religious questions.—J. B.

A first glance at the working classes made us infer that they were regardless of religion; a closer examination, however, has led us to conclude that this disregard is more apparent than real. The immense numbers of the working classes place them in a decided majority when compared with other classes; their qualities, whether of good &

of evil, will be proportionably larger, but they will not attract the same attention. For religion and the virtues which accompany it are not always forward, they are oftener retired; but vice and its disregard of religion force themselves into publicity, and being in a ratio with the body to which they belong and other classes, we do not always take into account those whose "light," as Fichte called religion, is hidden in the sanctuary of their home, but stigmatise the whole body of the working classes as regardless of religion. Persons engaged in religious visitation tell us that they generally find the working classes the most truly pious body. "By their deeds ye shall know them." Well, keeping their position and numbers in view, we do not think

they ought to be called regardless of religion; for we boldly affirm that no community with such an increasing power has shown such a proportionate temperance. Our former arguments will account for many moral indiscretions. We cannot always, at a contemporary period, get a fair view of the religion and character of a class. We look to the past. History, we think, leans to our side. The minds of the working classes were open to receive the reformed doctrines, and upheld them; reformed religion gave them their mightiest support; and, as a social and political power, almost created them. In that respect they have not changed. We believe, in spite of many faults, that they are a religious body.—W. M. L.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

774. A Royal Commission was sent out to Jamaica to inquire into the disturbances in that island in 1865. Was their report published? If so, where can it be obtained, and at what price?—GEORGIUS.

775. Can any one inform me if there is a debating class in the south-eastern district of London? If so, what is the address and mode of admission?—GEORGIUS.

776. Will some reader or correspondent kindly inform me what is the general character and price (and where published) of the "Rejected Addresses" referred to by the Right Hon. James Moncrieff, in his speech before the Young Men's Christian Society of Glasgow? (See *British Controversialist* for Feb. 1867, p. 141.)—G. G. H.

777. What is the price, and

where published, of the work entitled "Bryologia Britannica"?—G. G. H.

778. Who was the editor and what is the nature of a work entitled "The Senator, or Clarendon's Parliamentary Chronicle"? being a record of the debates, &c., in the Houses of Parliament, commencing in the year 1790. Is this work of any particular value? if so, wherein consists its usefulness? I have searched several cyclopædias, I have looked into other books, and have put the same question to two other periodicals before I knew the *British Controversialist*, but have failed to obtain an answer. The editor of one of the periodicals simply said, "The works referred to are valuable, and are found in all good libraries."—M. B.

779. Is Cobbett's "Legacy to Parsons" truthful, and are its state-

ments borne out by the facts of history? I know a little of English history, but not enough to decide this question, nor have I the means of ascertaining within my reach.—M. B.

780. How many volumes, and what ones, of the English Cyclopædia will be ready by July, or during that month?—M. B.

781. Is a work entitled "Pious Annotations on the Bible," by J. Diodati, of any value?—M. B.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

765. It has been long ago objected to the "Paradise Lost" of Milton that in some of its gorgeous but pedantic pages, "God the Father argues like a school divine." One of the chief passages of Milton's poetry on which the charge of Arianism is founded is in "Paradise Regained" (150—167), which reads thus:—

"He now shall know I can produce
a *Man*,
f female seed, far mightier to
resist
All his solicitations, and at length
All his vast force, and drive him
back to hell;
Winning, by conquest, what the
first man lost,
By fallacy surprised. But first I
mean
To exercise Him in the wilderness;
There He shall first lay down the
rudiments
Of His great warfare, ere I send
Him forth
To conquer sin and death, the two
grand foes.
By humiliation and strong suffer-
ance
His weakness shall o'ercome Sa-
tan's strength,
And all the world and mass of
sinful flesh,
That all the angels and ethereal
Powers,
They now, and men hereafter, may
discern

From what consummate virtue I
have chose
This perfect Man, by merit called
My Son,
To earn salvation for the sons of
men."

In Channing's "Essay on Milton," O. D. will find Milton claimed as a Unitarian, along with Locke and Newton. J. H. Blunt, in his "Essay on Milton," admits the Arianism contained in Milton's "Treatise of Christian Doctrine," but charges him with inconsistency of thought. In 1862 a work was published by Hamilton, Adams, and Co., entitled "John Milton: a Vindication specially from the charge of Arianism," on the opposite side. If O. D. wishes to examine the question, let him get Bohn's edition of Milton's works, and study them.—R. M. A.

776. "The Rejected Addresses," by Horace and James Smith, stood and stand without a parallel in our literature. It is a thing *suigeneris*, and must have high merit; for often as its popularity has been attempted to be shaken by younger hands, and the adaptation of newer themes to similar management, it remains not only unsurpassed, but is literally a first without a second. Written for a temporary purpose in 1812, it still remains a staple production; and probably no better, or at least more truthful and striking epitome of the greater and smaller authors whose characteristic excellences, peculiarities, and defects it professes to imitate can anywhere be found than in its lively and ludicrous pages. Among its happiest things are the imitations of Crabbe and Coleridge, by James Smith; and of Scott and Byron by Horace. Exquisitely humorous as are the Monk Lewis, the Wordsworth, the Southey, and the Fitzgerald, they can be regarded merely as travesties, and are consequently far inferior to those mentioned in value.—D. M. Moir's "Poetical Literature." P. 195.—A. A. R.

Our Collegiate Course.

MILTON'S MINOR POEMS.

IL PENSEROSO. (1)

5

*Hence, vain, deluding Joys,
 The brood of Folly without father bred ! (2)
 How little you bested,
 Or fill the fixed mind with all your toys !
 Dwell in some idle brain,
 And fancies fond with gaudy shapes possess,
 As thick and numberless
 As the gay motes that people the sunbeams ; (8)
 Or likest hovering dreams,
 The fickle pensioners (4) of Morpheus' (5) train.*

10

Helps to paraphrasing.

Line 1. Avaunt, worthless, deceptive delights.	6. Imaginations doting; flaunting forms occupy.
2. Race ; nonsense ; begotten.	7. Plentiful ; incalculable.
3. Avail, or help those who trust in you.	8. Dancing particles ; throng ; rays of light.
4. Satisfy ; settled ; trifles.	9. Most similar to indistinctly moving night visions.
5. Take up your residence ; thoughtless.	10. Frequently changing dependents ; retinue.

(1) The Italian word is *pensieroso*, not *penseroso*, from *pensiero*, the proper signification of which is *thoughtful*, never *pensive*, the word for which is *pensoso*. In Florio's "World of Words" *pensieroso* is the spelling given; but *penseroso* appears with the meaning given in the poem, "sage," "staid," "sober," "musing," &c. Thomas Koightley quotes the following phrases from Ossian as illustrative of the gentle melancholy which this word implies :—"There is a joy in grief when peace dwells in the bosom of the sad," and "like the memory of joys that are past, pleasant and mournful to the soul."

(2) Observe the quaint antithetic paradox involved in *brood* and *bred*, a sort of hyperbolical *Synæciosis*, intended to heighten the idea of their uniparental generation.

(8) Chaucer says, "As thick as motes in the sunne beame;" "But," says Leigh Hunt, "see how by one word, *people*, a great poet improves what he borrows."

(4) In consequence of Henry VII.'s having established a band of military attendants under the name of *the King's Pensioners*, to wait on him on

But hail, thou goddess *sage and holy*,
 Hail, *divinest* Melancholy!
 Whose *saintly visage* is too bright
 To hit the sense of human sight,
 And therefore to our weaker view
 O'erlaid with black, *staid* Wisdom's hue;
 Black, (6) but such as in esteem
 Prince Memnon's (6) sister might besseem,

15

11. Welcome; wise and saintly.
12. Most heavenly.
13. Pure form; splendid.
14. Impress; perceptive power;
man's eye.

15. On that account; feeble eyesight.
16. Covered; sober; colour.
17. So excellent; worth.
18. Suit.

state occasions, for which they were allowed an annual consideration (*pension*, payment)—a band which Queen Elizabeth improved into a company of courtiers in immediate attendance on her sovereign person, this word came to mean state attendants; as in Shakspeare's "Midsummer Night's Dream," II., i., a fairy sings of Titania,—

"The cowslips tall her pensioners be;
 In their gold coats spots you see;
 These be rubies, *fairy favours*,
 In these freckles live their savours."

Milton was educated as a *pensioner* of Christ's College, Cambridge, but in this use the word denotes "one who pays for his commons,"—a paying student.

(5) *Morpheus*, Phobetor, and Phantasia are—according to Ovid—the children of the god Somnus; Morpheus assumes the likeness, gestures, manners, and voice of mankind; Phobetor the form of serpents, wild beasts, &c.; Phantasia that of rocks, rivers, and inanimate things. Morpheus is represented as a winged child asleep, holding a vase in one hand and poppies in the other; sometimes as a man dressed in a white garment thrown over a black one, in allusion to the gates of *ivory* and *horn* of the infernal regions, whence dreams are represented by Homer and Virgil as issuing, though Euripides assigns to them an earthly origin,—“Hail, reverend Earth, from whose productive womb sable-winged dreams derive their birth.”

(6) Memnon, king of the Ethiopians, was the son of Tithonus, the brother of Priam and Eos (Aurora, morning). Jove conferred immortality upon him. A colossal statue behind the temple of Thebes—which gave forth sounds as the early rays of the morning touched it—was called the statue of Memnon. Prince Memnon's sister seems to be a mere figure for a handsome, stately Ethiopian. Memnon was beautiful, but of his sisters we have no information in tradition or history. See Bacon's xiv., "Memnon," "Wisdom of the Ancients;" and J. E. Reade's "Memnon, a poem." This repetition, by anaphora, of the word Black used in the preceding line, heightens and emphasizes the darkness of the hue of Wisdom's robe.

Or that *starred* Ethiop (7) queen that *strove*
 To set her beauty's *praise above* 20
 The Sea-nymphs', (8) and their *powers offended* :
 Yet thou art *higher far descended* :
 Thee *bright-haired* Vesta, (9) *long of yore*,
 To *solitary* Saturn (10) *bore* ;
 His daughter she ; in Saturn's *reign*, 25
Such mixture was not held a stain : (11)
 Oft in *glimmering bowers* and *glades*
 He met her, and in *secret shades*

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| 19. Heaven-honoured ; endeavoured. | 24. Unmated ; brought forth. |
| 20. Boast ; character superior to that of. | 25. Time. |
| 21. Divinities enraged. | 26. Similar intermarriage ; considered ; fault. |
| 22. Nobler in lineage. | 27. Dimly lighted, sheltered recesses ; forest walks. |
| 23. Glowing-locked ; in the olden time. | 28. Hidden nooks. |

(7) Cassiope, wife of Cepheus, king of Ethiopia, and mother of Andromeda, whose beauty, she affirmed, surpassed that of Juno and the Nereides. At this Neptune was offended, and sent a sea-monster to devour her. Perseus saved her and took her to wife. Perseus and Andromeda, Cepheus and Cassiope, were after their death placed among the constellations by Minerva.

(8) The Sea-nymphs consisted of the *Oceanides*, or female divinities of the ocean, daughters of Oceanus and the *Nereides*, daughters of Nereus, goddesses of the Mediterranean.

(9) Vesta, the goddess of fire, and consequently of the hearth, home, and state. She was the daughter of Saturn and Ops (plenty and fertility). To her service the *vestal virgins* were dedicated, whose duty it was to keep the sacred fire in her temple continually burning, and to be themselves chaste and pure like the goddess they served. Here Vesta is put figuratively for the fire and light of genius, which should be kept stainless and handed down from age to age, with perpetual renovation and brilliancy.

(10) Saturnus, or Chronus, a hybrid mythical god, the introducer of civilization and order ; hence his reign was "the golden age," of which the poets sung, and in commemoration of which the *Saturnalia* were instituted ; and Italy was called *Saturnia*, the land of order and beneficence. *Saturnalia* has become a synonym for wild self-abandonment to dissipation, of which the carnival may be a modern type. *Saturnine* means dull, heavy, phlegmatic, gloomy, and deep-thoughted,—from this circumstance probably,—that lead in the old chemistry was called Saturn. The connective suggestion of Saturn with "black, staid Wisdom's hue" may perhaps have arisen in Milton's mind from the black colour used in blazoning the arms of foreign princes being called in heraldry *Saturn*.

(11) "Though loath to venture to find a fault in such a perfect work of so great a poet, we must say that the origin assigned to Melancholy, however philosophically just it may be, has always grated on our feelings. The species of incest here described is such as no ideas of a Golden Age, or any particular state of society can make accord with our moral instincts, and

Of woody Ida's (12) inmost grove,
 Whilst yet there was no fear of Jove. (13) 30
 Come, pensive Nun, devout and pure,
 Sober, steadfast, and demure,
 All in robe of darkest grain,
 Flowing with majestick train,
 And sable stole (14) of cyprus lawn, (15) 35
 Over thy decent shoulders drawn.
 Come, but keep thy wonted state,
 With even step, and musing gait;

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| 29. Tree-crowned; farthest wood lands.
30. At a time when; cause of anxiety.
31. Advance, thoughtful vestal; serious and chaste.
32. Solemn, trustworthy; modest.
33. Garment; blackest hue. | 34. Hanging in loose and waving folds; queenly skirt.
35. Black-fringed tunic (or vesture); fine linen.
36. Across; handsome and becoming; gathered.
37. Retain; usual demeanour.
38. Equal or steady pace; thoughtful carriage. |
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we must confess we wish the poet had assigned her different parents. Possibly Milton's mind was influenced by the chorus respecting the Golden Age in Tasso's 'Aminta,' where the morality is certainly not of the finest."—*Thomas Keightley's "Life, Opinions, and Writings of Milton,"* p. 274.

(12) A mountain nearly in the centre of the island of Crete, surrounded by the Idæan forest. In a cave in Mount Ida, Jove was brought up by the Corybantes, and fed upon the milk of the goat Amalthea.

(13) Jove was the son of Saturn, whom he released from the imprisonment in which he was held by the Titans. Saturn was afraid that Jove would fulfil a prophecy uttered by an oracle, that he would be dethroned by one of his sons, and plotted the destruction of his deliverer. Jove discovered his intention, and drove him from his throne, whereupon the dominions of the father were divided among his three sons.

(14) "*Stola*, a loose tunic, to the bottom of which a border or flounce, called *Instita*, was sewed, the whole reaching down so low as to conceal the ankles and part of the feet. . . . The *Stola*, with the *Instita* attached, was the characteristic dress of the Roman matron. . . . The *Stola* was gathered and confined at the waist by a girdle, and frequently ornamented at the throat by a coloured border. Several ancient monuments show the *Stola* with alceves. The *Palla* was a shawl, so large as to envelop the whole figure, thrown over the *Stola* when a lady went abroad."—*Wm. Ramsay's "Roman Antiquities,"* p. 456.

(15) Cyprus, south of Asia Minor, in the Levant. It was famous for linen of a thin transparent texture, sometimes on this account called cypress, as in "Twelfth Night," III., i.,—

"A cypress, not a bosom,
 Hideth my heart."

See also Shakspeare's "Winter's Tale," Act IV., sc. iv., where Antolycus enters, singing,—

"Lawn as white as driven snow,
 Cyprus black as e'er was crow."

And looks commercing with the *skies*,
 Thy *rapt soul* sitting in thine eyes : 40
There, held in holy passion still,
Forget thyself to marble, till
With a sad, leaden, downward cast
Thou fix them on the earth as fast :
 And join with thee *calm Peace and Quiet*, 45
Spare Fast, that oft with gods doth *diet*, (16)
 And *hears* the Muses in a *ring*
Aye, round about Jove's altar sing :
 And *add* to these *retired Leisure*,
 That in *trim gardens* takes his *pleasure* : 50
 But *first*, and *chiefest*, with thee *bring*,
 Him that *yon[d]* soars on golden *wing*,
Guiding the fiery-wheeled *throne*, (17)
 The cherub *Contemplation*; (18)
 And the *mute Silence* *hist along*, 55
 Less *Philomel* (19) will *deign* a song.

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| 39. Eyes holding communion;
heavens. | 47. Listens; choir. |
| 40. Delightful spirit taking pos-
session. | 48. For ever close to; special place
of sacrifice rejoice. |
| 41. In that posture, entranced with
sacred emotion for some time. | 49. Join; recluse. |
| 42. Become absorbed into a statue's
fixedness, thereafter. | 50. Nicely arranged; finds; gratifi-
cation. |
| 43. Careworn, heavy, earth-turned
gaze. | 51. Especially; above all; lead along. |
| 44. Set; ground; quickly (or firmly). | 52. Far off flies; pinion. |
| 45. Associate; gentle. | 53. Drawing; kingly seat. |
| 46. Abstinent; partake of a meal. | 55. Speechless; call (or invite) to
come. |
| | 56. Kindly favour with. |

(16) "Abstinence in diet was one of Milton's favourite virtues, which he practised invariably through life, and availed himself of every opportunity to recommend in his writings."—*Dr. Symmons*.

(17) An allusion to the vision of the wheels in Ezek. i., iii., x., &c. Also "Paradise Lost," lines 749—759; especially—

"As with stars, their bodies all
 And wings were set with eyes, with eyes the wheels
 Of beryl, careering fires between."

(18) "Learnedly called Cherub, not Seraph; because the cherubs were the angels of knowledge, the seraphs of love. In the celestial hierarchy, by a noble sentiment, the seraphs rank higher than the cherubs."—*Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy,"* p. 261.

(19) The Nightingale. See Notes to "Sonnet on the Nightingale," *British Controversialist*, Jan., 1867, p. 71.

The Societies' Section.

WORKMEN'S CLUB AND INSTITUTE UNION.

THE sixth annual meeting of this Union opened the 8th June, in the lower room, Exeter Hall. The Earl of Carnarvon occupied the chair; and on the platform were Lord Lyttelton, the Earl of Lichfield, the Hon. A. Herbert, the Rev. H. Solly, the Hon. Dudley Fortescue, M.P., Mr. Hodgson Pratt, Mr. Ernest Noel, Edward Hall, F.S.A., Mr. S. Smiles, &c.

The report read by Mr. Hodgson Pratt showed the following results:—

The number of working men's clubs and institutes of the existence of which the council are at present aware is 312. According to returns received from 85 clubs, the average number of members amounts to 128 to each club. Of the 85 clubs sending returns, 54 report themselves as self-supporting, or very nearly so; and of these 40 are entirely self-supporting. In these 85 clubs sending returns, there have been 103 educational classes in operation during the past winter. Twenty-eight clubs report that provident societies of various kinds have either been formed by their members, or hold meetings at the club. Nearly all state that they have had various lectures and entertainments during the six winter months, amounting to 239 lectures and 548 entertainments for the 85 clubs.

The noble chairman addressed the meeting in a lengthy and eloquent speech, in the course of which he said that one of the great benefits resulting from working men's clubs and unions was, that they stood out the alternative, so to speak, the rivals of the public-house

and public-house influence. In that respect they met the cases of two classes. They met the case, in the first instance, of those who go to public-houses and spend their time and money there, with very little profit to their families; and in the second instance, they provided for a class with which they could all sympathize, namely, those who did not go to the public-house, who from conscientious reasons stayed away, and yet had no homes to go to, or homes possessing little comfort or accommodation. The introduction of spirituous liquors and chance games into working men's clubs, he thought, should be left to be determined by the good sense of the managing committees and the members themselves, who felt more than anybody else that the credit and success of these institutions were at stake in the matter. He thought it would be a great misfortune if party politics were allowed to give a complexion to those clubs. Nevertheless the value of the clubs could not be too highly advocated and supported. They were the means of bringing before the working man first-class literature, which undoubtedly was a great advantage to the working man. And again, the cultivation of music had been added to country clubs with equal advantage. Drawing, too, was, in his opinion, one of the most useful branches of education, as was also technical education, which he held to be highly important, and every working man should receive what was termed a technical education. After other remarks, the noble chairman said he

heartily believed there never was a time when there was less opposition of class against class. We were too few to do without each other; and if society would form a great collective body, the nation might still be what it was in former times, but without that co-operation of classes we should be scattered, and pass away as a third-rate nation.

Lord Lyttelton moved the adoption of the report in a few appropriate remarks, observing that the work of the society was such as to exercise an important influence on the social condition of the working classes.

The Earl of Lichfield seconded the motion.

Mr. Solly spoke in support of the resolution, which was carried unanimously.

A second resolution, to the effect "that working men's clubs afford an opportunity to members of all classes uniting in common work, and of becoming better acquainted with each other," was moved by Mr. Fortescue, M.P., seconded by Mr. Howell, and carried.

Sir George Young then moved the next resolution, as follows:—"That places of resort, free from the objectionable features of the public-house, are essential to the moral and intellectual welfare of the people."

This was also adopted, and some routine business closed the proceedings.

Next day a conference took place in the room of the Society of Arts. The Earl of Lichfield occupied the chair, and there were present, amongst an audience of about seventy of the principal officers of the various clubs, the Hon. A. Herbert, Mr. Howell, the Rev. H. Solly, Mr. H. Pratt, and others. The questions discussed and generally enlightened by the experience of different localities, embraced such

as the admission of visitors and strangers to the respective clubs, the best mode of making clubs self-supporting, and especially the question of refreshments, and of allowing the consumption of spirits or beer. Reference being made on this point to the Paris cafés, one speaker observed that during the whole time he was in the French capital, he never got a decent meal of meat. He recounted the nick-nacks given in place of butcher's meat; and he could not at all see the philosophy of spending the whole blessed day in sitting out in the street sipping what appeared to be coloured water. It was urged on the one hand by advocates of teetotalism that ale and spirits should be excluded altogether, and on the other that limitation in these respects should be left to self-respect, decency, and responsible management. Mr. Howell could not understand the applying of rules on this point to working men's clubs different from those that are applied in the middle and upper classes of life. Men in England would have drink and tobacco, and that being so, whether would it be better that they should be surrounded by good and noble influences, or that they should take those things in places where there is every temptation to debauchery? The discussion was continued by Mr. Solly, Mr. Hodgson Pratt, Mr. Connolly, and others.

SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Is religion an instinct or a revelation?

Would international banking be advantageous?

Is military Cæsarism suitable for our age and times?

Is the priesthood of woman possible and desirable?

Is frivolity on the increase in modern society?

Is the average morality of modern life fixed at a lower level than that of olden times?

Does universalism lead to materialism?

Is a general disarmament of the nations possible in the present state of Europe?

Is the church the horseleech of nations?

Was Burke well treated by the Whigs?

Is the finance of trades unions consistent with their principles?

Was Sir C. Barry or A. W. Pugin the art-architect of Westminster Palace?

Is the history of British India honourable to the governing state?

Have the results of the Tractarian movement been satisfactory?

Does the relation of the Colonial church and the public law afford guarantees for the proper management of endowments and the maintenance of the faith?

Is the sacerdotal doctrine of the Lord's Supper scriptural?

Is nutrition the basis of the treatment of disease?

Ought religious associations to be based on identity of belief or of purpose?

Is it possible to eliminate doubt from theology?

Have the Protestant equalled the Catholic martyrdoms in England in number, cruelty, and unjustifiability?

Does Russell or Mill propose the better remedy for Irish discontent?

Are religious more divided than political opinions?

Must religious worship be either symbolical or mystical?

Are men more interested in perusing the history of religious error than of religious truth?

Does Carlyle or Macaulay supply the most trustworthy representation of George Fox?

Is Quakerism on the decline?

Literary Notes.

It has been calculated that out of the seventy-nine new serial publications which have appeared in London since the commencement of the present year, only seven are now in existence.

On dit, a new epic poem has been submitted to one of the great publishing firms by a poet who is as yet unknown to fame. The work is said by competent critics to surpass any similar production of the last quarter of a century.

Mrs. Riddell (*K. G. Trafford*) is bringing out, as an experiment in novel literature, a two shilling edition of "George Geith" in 8vo., with paper wrappers, printed uniformly with the shilling magazines.

Mr. Samuel Morley has become

the proprietor of the *Daily News*, which is now a "penny daily," with its old staff retained and strengthened.

The "Letters and Life of Francis Bacon," vols. iii and iv., containing memoir matter from 1601 to 1613; and a correct copy of his private memorandum book, and many other contributions to a knowledge of the Verulamian sage, are nearly ready.

A volume of sacred poems, translated by Catherine Winkworth, from the German of Karl Gebok, and called "Palm Leaves," is in the press.

Dr. Ginsburg is engaged on a re-scension of the text of the Hebrew Scriptures.

Sir James Brooke, formerly Rajah

of Sarawak and Governor of Labuan, whose "Private Correspondence" was published as a reply to his enemies in 1853, died 11th June, aged sixty-five.

Wm. Lloyd Garrison has in hand a "History of the Anti-Slavery Movement."

Messrs. Routledge seem to have accomplished the project of J. O. Halliwell in the centenary year, 1864,—the issue of a shilling edition of the Works of Shakspeare. It follows the text of Charles Knight.

Mr. Rigg, for twenty years editor of the *Watchman*, died 12th June.

The Japanese Dickens, Kioyte Bakin by name, has written one story in 106 volumes, which was thirty-eight years going through the press!

A 4to. edition of Shakspeare's "Much Ado about Nothing" was sold in May for £235.

A half-crown edition of H. F. Cary's translation of Dante has been issued. At the same price, too, S. Johnson's "Lives of the Poets," with an introductory notice by Colonel F. Cunningham, son of Allan Cunningham, has been published.

The committee of the United Kingdom Band of Hope Union are offering prizes of £100 and £50 for the best and second best *temperance tales*, especially bearing on the Band of Hope movement. Conditions obtained from the secretaries, 5, Red Lion Square, London, W.C.

Ritualistic Anglo-Catholicism is about to add to its repertory a translation of the "Spiritual Exercises" of St. Ignatius (Loyola, canonised 1662); a "Manual for the Invocation of Saints, and Prayers for the Dead" in a new edition of a book, entitled "The Daily Sacrifice."

Lord Clermont is editing the

works of Sir John Fortescue, and writing a history of the family of the Fortescues, of which the author of the "Discourse on Monarchy" was an illustrious progenitor.

A colossal statue of Luther was inaugurated at Worms 24th to 27th June. Its pediment is surrounded by figures of John Wickliffe, Peter Waldo, John Huss, and Savonarola, the precursors of the Reformation.

The Oxford University prizes have been awarded; that for English Verse on "The Catacombs" to J. A. Stewart, Lincoln College; Latin verse on "Marathon" to J. W. Standbridge, New College; and the Latin Essay to E. L. Hincks, Fellow of Corpus Christi.

A German translation of Dante by Philalèthes,—i. e., John, King of Saxony, has just appeared.

An edition of "The Talmud" has been issued at Warsaw in twelve vols.

Of the Pagan Anglo-Saxon heroic poem, "Beowulf," a new edition has been issued at Paderborn, by M. Heyne.

Dom. Bouquet and the Institute of France are issuing the "Collection of the Historians of the Gauls and of France," in 23 vols. at 2 guineas per vol.

Messrs. Warne & Co. have projected a series of cheap but handsome reprints, to be called "The Chandos Series."—No. I. *Shakspeare*.

The authoress of "Aunt Margaret's Mirror," "Mabel's Progress," and, who is to run the new novel through *St. Paul's*, is a daughter of Charles Dickens.

The "Nicholas" of *Fans* is J. W. Prowse.

"The Old Curiosity Shop" is to be printed in raised characters for the use of the blind at the expense of the author.

Auguste Comte.

THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY—CRITICAL.

"SPECULATIVE philosophy, which to the superficial appears a thing so remote from the business of life and the outward interests of men, is in reality the thing on earth which most influences them, and in the long run overbears every other influence save those which it must itself obey."* "Religious belief, philosophy, science, the fine arts, the industrial arts, commerce, navigation, government, all are in close mutual dependence on one another, insomuch that when any considerable change takes place in one we may know that a parallel change in all the others has preceded or will follow it."† The wisdom which depends on long chains of reasoning, which contains a systematic exposition of truths which grow out of one another, which offers a comprehensive survey of the whole of a subject at one view, and which exhibits all these in a reasoned and a reasonable form—explaining how from the acceptance of some truth, which is thoroughly incorporated with the very being and nature of thought all the integral parts in interdependent connection, develop themselves as from a common centre and seed, must hold intimate connection with life, and influence as well as be influenced by the totality of experienceable existence available to man in any age. Hence the ever-recurring importance of taking a critical estimate of the various philosophies which have prevailed within the potent nations of the earth; and hence especially the need of endeavouring to gain an accurate acquaintance with the main line and current of reflection, and of forming an intelligent opinion regarding the merits and defects of those systems of thought which attain dominion over the minds of men, secure the approval of thinkers, and operate upon the practical social life of a period. The Positive Philosophy is without doubt one of the most notable achievements of architectonic thought accomplished in our century. Comte is as true a successor and continuator of Kant in one sense and form of development as Hegel is in another, and, as we think, a higher and a nobler one. Mighty encyclopædic minds they both possessed, and both manifested the classifying, evolving, and philosophizing faculties in wonderful power, activity, and thoroughness. As Kant through Fichte lives in Hegel, so Kant

* J. S. Mill's "Dissertations and Discussions," vol. i., "Bentham," p. 330.

† J. S. Mill's "Auguste Comte and Positivism," p. 87.

through Condorcet animates Comte, and the systems of both of these great co-ordinators and expositors articulate themselves to the illustrious Critic of human reason. Hegel's affiliation is to Kant's metaphysic of mental nature; Comte's is to Kant's metaphysic of corporeal nature; but both alike take their architectonic foundation and plan from the strangely subtle investigator of the nature and forms of thought whose life was spent in Königsberg.

Of the two elements which are found manifesting themselves in human consciousness—thought and nature—"the one," as Kant beautifully expresses it, "departs from the place I occupy in the outer world of sense, expands beyond the limits of imagination, that connection of my being, with worlds rising above worlds and systems blending into systems, and protends it also to the illimitable times of their periodic movement, to their commencement and continuance; the other departs from my invisible self, from my personality, and represents me in a world truly infinite indeed, but whose infinity is to be fathomed only by the intellect, with which also my connection, unlike the fortuitous relation I stand in with regard to the world of sense, I am compelled to recognise as necessary and universal." Hegel chose for his task the substantiation, the explicit interpretation, the evolutionary development of the knowledge which is to be sought in and gained from the soul itself, *i. e.*, the idea in and by itself as logic; the idea out of itself as nature; the idea in its return into itself as philosophy. Comte took as his task the exposition of the mighty outward, man-involving universe, "the irresistible economy of nature, which cannot be amended till it is first studied and obeyed." The former consequently produced a philosophy of selfhood, progressing to moral freedom and religious life; the latter became involved in speculations which require the subjection of the intellect in matters of faith and reason to the behests of the senses and the interests of this world.

I cannot but think that Comte misconceived the problem of philosophy, and misunderstood its elements. The elements of philosophy are conceptions. The mind can only see nature envisaged in its conceptions. Our conceptions of things are obtained by observing their various aspects and qualities, by uniting things into one whole in which apparent contradictions are harmonized, and in which what is lasting is distinguished from what is changing. A criticism of conceptions actual and possible is one of the earliest efforts of a true philosophy. This it does that it may take them all into account after they have been well weighed, bring their various aspects together, compare, assort and arrange them one with another that their results may be found. Philosophy is not long in discovering that conceptions contain opposite and opposing characteristics, but it does not therefore deny them as conceptions, or brand them as fictions, because they seem to contradict each other. It endeavours to reconcile opposites and contradictories, and to find a whole evolution of thought in which these shall harmonize themselves, and truth shall be seen to be

contained in these very opposites, while it is superior to all these contradictions which seem irreconcilable to ordinary thought. M. Comte does not accept all conception as the province of philosophy, as Hegel does; he dismisses all conceptions which cannot legitimate their relation to realities, and thus cuts away the larger half and the higher and more mysterious of the elements of philosophy—those which have the most intense human interest.

“The man who first declared that he was not a σοφός, or possessor [of true wisdom], but a φιλόσοφος, or seeker of truth, at once announced the true end of human speculation, and embodied it in a significant name. Under the same conviction Plato defines man, “the hunter of truth,” for science is a chase, and in a chase the pursuit is always of greater value than the game:—

“Our hopes, like towering falcons, aim
At objects in an airy height;
But all the pleasure of the game
Is afar off to view the flight.”

“The intellect,” says Aristotle, in one passage, “is perfected, not by knowledge, but by activity;” and in another, “The arts and sciences are powers, but every power exists only for the sake of action; the end of philosophy, therefore, is not knowledge, but the energy conversant about knowledge.” Descending to the schoolmen,—“The intellect,” says Aquinas, “commences in operation, and in operation it ends;” and Scotus even declares that a man’s knowledge is measured by the amount of his mental activity. The profoundest thinkers of modern times have emphatically testified to the same great principle. “If,” says Malebranche, “I held truth captive in my hand, I should open my hand and let it fly, in order that I might again pursue and capture it.” “Did the Almighty,” says Lessing, “holding in his right hand *truth* and in his left *search after truth*, deign to tender me the one I might prefer, in all humility, but without hesitation I should request *search after truth*.” “Truth,” says Von Muller, “is the property of God; the pursuit of truth is what belongs to man;” and Jean Paul Richter, [affirms] “It is not the goal but the course which makes us happy.”*

M. Comte looked on philosophy not as an endeavour after, but as the attainment of, certainty. Hence he expunged, as he thought, from philosophy all the conceptions which contain or imply uncertainty, and strove to complete a cycle of thought in which demonstration would supplant faith, and science would be all in all. All conceptions of phenomena capable of being made the objects of science as being the known subjects of immutable law he admitted into his scheme, while all that lay beyond and all that led the thoughts above physical nature and the classifications and co-ordinations possible within it, he dismisses as unfit objects of human contemplation or regard. Hence he sought to reduce philosophy

* Sir W. Hamilton’s “Lectures on Metaphysics,” vol. i., pp. 11—13.

to dogma, and to convert the search for wisdom into contentedness with the things of time and sense and pleasure, and even in this he proceeded empirically, for he supplies no criterion for distinguishing fictitious from real conceptions. With the affectation of humility, M. Comte, in the pride of his intellect, dethroned all the supernatural, and cast religious responsibility away from the human heart and from the regulations of society. Of such a state of mind we cannot resist thinking that "it is a pride of intellect to be brought down—vain and presumptuous, which, building itself on its growing strength and the acquirements of farther ingenuity, aspiring to the planets of night, and settling their laws of motion, grows in consciousness of strength almost absolute and independent of God. Full of the doctrine of our nature's infinite perfectibility, it goes up to the heavens, but cannot see God, being hoodwinked to upward views. Pluming itself on success in subordinate inquiries, it aspires to deduce the beginning of all things from natural causes, and believing that 'the thing that has been is the thing that shall be,' invests with an independent existence this material universe, as if there were no higher control, and not that Power whose slightest wish could at once trammel the sun and the sun-pursuing stars."*

Such a style of thought is not only profane—for that the positivist may fairly regard as an accusation arising from prejudice—but it is unphilosophical. It is not a search for wisdom, but for certainty; it is not an investigation of the whole issue and results of conception; it is not a criticism of human nature in all its relations and interest. It is the usurpation of a pretender who proffers security at the cost of freedom, and who relaxes the reins of pleasure while he tightens all the restraints he holds against a revolution in favour of higher things. It is Napoleonism in thought.

I shall not condescend to take a cheap and clap-trap commonplace exception to positivism as a popular panacea for all social evils, by detailing the terms of scorn in which M. Comte speaks of the theory of the sovereignty of the people, of the doctrine of equality which has been such a favourite matter of declamation for French patriots, and of the right of the people to freedom of thought. All these absurd transitional notions have fatal anarchical tendencies; the first "condemns indefinitely all superiors to an arbitrary dependence on their inferiors, by a sort of transference to the people of the much reprobated right divine of kings;" the second "tends to prevent every just reorganization, since its destructive activity is blindly directed against the basis of every new social classification and arrangement;" the third is "a principle which opposes a grave obstacle to the reorganization of society." "Under it, a spirit of unbridled criticism tends to destroy all kinds of authority, temporal and spiritual." Dogmas are for the people; "there is no freedom of conscience in science; demonstration makes faith as unnecessary as it is impossible." "The positive criticism is not controversial."

* "Religious Characteristics," by Thomas Aird, p. 85.

It is employed in order to gain "an exact estimate of the imperfections of the economy of nature, and of the limits within which it varies, so as to indicate and define the boundaries of human intervention." It is not employed upon opinions but on existences. These are themes on which one might enlarge in ridicule and in expostulation; yet on the positive view of life and nature they possess much justification apart from the prejudices of those who live in the unpositive world.

But there are grave errors which it would be unwise in us to leave unnoticed, though pressure of space will not allow of extended consideration. M. Comte misunderstands, misrepresents, and condemns Political Economy. "Any one acquainted with the writings of political economists need only read his few pages of animadversions on them* to learn how extremely superficial M. Comte can be." This is the testimony of the most unexceptionable witness, J. S. Mill, who states farther in the same connection, that "on the whole question he has but one remark of value, and that he misapplies." Any plan for the furtherment and improvement of human welfare which ignores the labours and the demonstrations of political economists, but without disproof of their scientific inductions and the deductions regarding sociology based on them, ought to meet with doubt; for if the sociology proposed is superior it must have grounds on which its acceptance depends, and these must be potently superior to those previously held by; and if it is less worth than that which we have we are bound to adhere to what we know and have experience of. While positivism claims the credit of proffering a perfect sociology, it contemns all previous achievements in regard to the knowledge of human welfare—a knowledge which proves that the best path in all measures of political importance is that of the least resistance conformable with righteousness and good sense.

It would be equally wrong to take exception to M. Comte's philosophy, on the ground of the serious cerebral disturbance to which he was subjected, and to flout at or scout it as the vague vision of a madman. No sign of mental malady is visible in the "Course of Positive Philosophy;" the work gains massiveness and power as it proceeds, and even the style moves with a dignity and freshness which the first lectures do not possess. But while we do not accept this as at all a tenable objection, we hold it to be quite as untenable as a defence. Comtists cannot take the early part of their master's speculations as those of a sage, and condemn his subsequent developments as those of a zany. The whole was produced after his madness, and if, after acquiring the completeness of a philosopher owing to his intercourse with Madame de Vaux, he produced some fantastic notions and acted on some strange ideas, it must be held, like the vision of Pharaoh, that "the dream is one, and the interpretation is one." His, in fact, was the usual fate of all thinkers. His circling thought returned to its starting-point again—returned.

* "Cours de Philosophie Positive," vol. iv., pp. 193 to 205.

but with a difference. He set out in detestation of myths, especially the myths of Christianity, and he found, after taking the circuit of science, that he could not transcend the region of myths; but instead of consenting to and examining those from amidst which he started at first, he endeavoured to replace them with a brand new set, and to depose Christianity (in its Romanist form) and Christ, by the substitution for them of the religion of Positivism and Comte.

On the originality of the Comtean philosophy of the sciences and of history, one word may be enough. He expressly denies direct knowledge of Vico, Kant, Herder, and Hegel; and though a gratuitous denial, according to a common French proverb, may not reckon for much, yet we see no special reason for disbelieving his pleading. But the thought of Europe in the early years of this century was surcharged with the ideas of these men. Jouffroy, Laromiguiere, Cousin, Guizot, and in fact all the *doctrinaires* were influenced by the Italian and German thinkers. Vico's splendid generalizations of history had superseded Volney's, and Hegel's "Logic in History" had quickened the thoughts of the era of the Restoration. The essential elements of suggestion were possibly within his reach, and indeed could scarcely fail to have affected him. It was one of M. Comte's great errors to aspire too much after credit for originality, and this led him ostensibly and ostentatiously to avoid all reading subsequently to the time of his preparation for his "Course." In this he did injury to himself, his system, and the world of thought, for he cut himself off from the sources by which his mind could be filled, the means of testing and correcting his views, and the opportunity of bringing his scheme up to the furthest mark of scholarship and reflection. Condorcet for history, and Condillac for the logical development of thought, seem to us, with his St. Simonian connection, to afford the prime elements of a theory such as Positivism exhibits.

We must note, if only in a sentence, what may be called the metaphysical fallacy of Positivism. M. Comte uses the word metaphysical as if it were synonymous with causal, *within* the range of nature, while theological represents opinions regarding causation arising *beyond* nature. But theological properly signifies explanatory to faith, while metaphysical means explanatory to reason. It is asserted that the human spirit cannot rest in phenomena, and that it imperatively craves for some law as regulating and declaring cause. Comte declares that Cause is incognoscible, and hence that all investigations of *cause* should cease, and inquiries regarding *invariabilities* take their place. We should study the methods, not the aims of nature, and consent to dwell in a causeless or cause-deserted universe, accepting the sensible as all, and looking upon the reasonable as impossible to be known. Facts and functions are to be held as all: reasons and ends lie beyond our reach. But metaphysic affirms that it possesses entrance into a region of facts, and that its investigations regarding the functions of thought have had beneficial results, not only in producing a large body of truths,

but in inducing immense activity of speculative thought, and it objects that to fix the limits of thought within the boundary of physics, absolutely implies that an outlying region of metaphysic encircles humanity, and requires man's regards.

No more valuable proof of the benefit of metaphysical thought could be adduced than Comte's own classification of the sciences. That elaborate induction from history as manifested thought in a great measure coincides with that derived from metaphysics in its inductions from mind manifesting thought. *Mathematics*, as lying wholly within the ideal region, and as being fully within the power of the conceptive mind, was early wrought into a comprehensive and valuable system of truths. It had no interruptions to its progress from without. The observative sciences which constitute *physics*, forming the mind's interpretation of nature to itself, necessarily pass through many stages of advancement depending on accuracy of observation and correctness of inference, that is, on the progress of the culture of the mind. Knowledge begins *with* but not *in* experience, and knowledge explains experience; it does not merely arrange it. The more thoroughly external nature was explored, the more completely was man compelled to see how life separated him from the sweeping panorama of appearances in the midst of which he dwelt, and *biology* became an object of research. The dependence of life's higher pleasures, purposes, and pursuits upon those who surround and act upon man causes the social order to be thought of and studied, whence *sociology* arises; and from the inquiries which are necessitated by it, the thought of co-ordinate rights and duties—*morals*—gets developed into a system. But all through this course of research, metaphysical, *i. e.* reason-seeking thought was man's guide in regard to what to inquire after, and logic put the investigation into form. That was the course of thought concerning objects under the stir of experience, and in interpretation of phenomena as manifesting themselves in the region of nature. There was, however, a counterpart process going on in the region of mind, the progress and evolution of thought and knowledge, and this logical necessity resulted in the chronological succession of the Comtean evolution. The fact that the earlier science was that of simple ideas variously combined ought to have convinced M. Comte that science had a supra-sensual origin, and that he could not eliminate metaphysics either from the soul or the history of man; and the patent truth that the experimental sciences arose when it was found that work with its conceptions, as it might the mind, could not by mere logical process get farther, ought to have shown him that it was not to the enforcement of physical nature, but to the persistent perseverance of thought that science owed its progress. Thus logic and metaphysics would both legitimate themselves as the parents and the promoters of science. The sciences were not evolved in the Comtean order by the irresistible forces of nature overcoming the metaphysical in the mind, but by the forth-going of the mind in its determined effort to subdue nature to and by reason.

Logic legitimates itself as rightly worthy of the investigative criticism of positivism as perhaps the most wonderful of the phenomena of intellectual life. It has a history, a literature, and a place of its own; it has realized itself unmistakably among the phenomena of existence, and not a small part of mental training has been placed under the culture which logic supplies. Logic asserts itself as an indispensability in science and in law, in the exposition of thought, and in the composition of theories. Logic is, in fact, intrinsic in all thought, although it may not assert any extrinsic place or patent office. Knowledge cannot be attained by us except under conditions, and a knowledge of these conditions constitutes logic as the science of the laws of thinking. The actuality of logic as a component part of all investigative inquiry, as a known fact in human history, and a large element in the culture of the race, seems to us to give it a claim to consideration in any philosophy, especially of a philosophy claiming to be positive, for one of our most forcible and expressive synonyms for positive is, logical. When we look into the positive philosophy, we find this science of sciences and legislatress of method set aside; it is neither explained nor comprehended; it is ignored or condemned when it is not maligned or misunderstood.

"What is known of a subject only becomes a science when it is made a connected body of truth in which (1) the relation between the general principles and the details is definitely made out; and (2) each particular truth can be recognised as a case of the operation of wider laws." Each science, therefore, must have not only its own subject matter but its own constructive canons, its mode of combining the ideas of things so as to produce the results of a progressive upbuilding, and to conduce to its formative growth and formal exposition. Logic supplies the intellectual scaffolding of the structure. As M. Littré remarks, "Logic is the science of the *forms* of thought. In all knowledge there are two things—object and subject; the former of which provides the matter for reasoning to exert itself upon, the latter of which supplies the form of reasoning. In a word, logic is the study of the intellectual conditions to which knowledge is subject; knowledge never shows itself as a result except when some objective reality is combined with the subjective order. The mental process of knowing is not arbitrary; it is no less fixed than the process of being an object of knowledge; both have their laws. Logic can without difficulty perform its functions on nonentities. That was seen under the reign of the scholastic syllogism. It received only pure figures, and it gave back only pure figures; but the mental conditions of knowledge were not the less faithfully observed; they failed only in objective reality. In its turn, this objective reality is not, at the moment of its evolution, in a state which permits it to enter within the function and the play of logic: it is this successive entrance under the logical organon, more and more perfected and powerful, which constitutes the progress of science. Now this proves unmistakably

the distinction between a special science, which is particular, and logic, which is general."* Logic is an organon or instrument, and its results, when operating on any matter of thought, constitute a co-ordinated and coherent body of doctrine on that subject. Logic, as the theory of method, is architectonic. It builds up the materials of experience into science, and converts the various aggregates of science into a philosophy, *i.e.*, a system of reasoned thought in which the actions, re agencies, and interchanges of things are presented to the mind in a determinate order. "The philosophy of a science thus comes to mean the science itself, considered, not as to its results, the truths which it ascertains, but as to the processes by which the mind attains them, the marks by which it recognises them, and the co-ordinating and methodizing of them with a view to the greatest clearness of conception and the fullest and readiest availability for use—in one word, the logic of the science."†

M. Comte neither provides (nor allows of) a logic of science—still less a science of logic. A logic of science would demand a thorough consideration and systematization of (1) the powers employed in investigation, *i.e.*, a psychology of the intellect; (2) the methods of investigation, *i.e.*, a philosophy of discovery; and along with this a perfect yet practical set of (1) tests of evidence; (2) forms of reasoning showing the applicability of proof. "As regards deduction, he neither recognises the syllogistic system of Aristotle and his successors (the *insufficiency* of which is as evident as its *utility* is real), nor proposes any other in lieu of it; and of induction he has no canons whatever. He does not seem to admit the possibility of any general criterion by which to decide whether any given inductive influence is correct or not. . . . This indispensable part of positive philosophy he not only left to be supplied by others, but did all that depended on him to discourage them from attempting it."‡ So great was M. Comte's incapacity "to conceive an inductive logic," that though he recognised the ability of the "System of Logic," composed by his greatest disciple, J. S. Mills, yet that able writer is compelled in honesty to confess that "he cannot discover that he was indebted to it for a single idea, or that it influenced, in the smallest particular, the course of his subsequent speculations."

Positivism, as we have seen on good authority, has no place for the most positive of all our sources of information—consciousness, or self-observation. There is no direct evidence of the activity of the senses, of the existence or possibility of pleasure, of one's own existence even, except in or through consciousness. The senses constitute a veil through which the mind looks upon the outward world, and on which, as on a screen, the appearances of things display themselves; Science transforms the veil into a transparency through which the realities become known, and Sense and

* "Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive," par E. Littré, p. 566.

† "Auguste Comte and Positivism," by J. S. Mill, p. 53. ‡ *Ibid*, pp. 56, 57.

Science are brought into oneness by consciousness. Consciousness is the very inner core of perceptibility; upon it sensations impinge, and through or to it the senses communicate the facts as they seem to them of phenomena; yet positivism eliminates from philosophy all that sphere of the spiritual which acts on and is acted on by the phenomena of matter, except as a mere branch of physiology, and instead of a philosophy of consciousness—"in lieu of the direct mental observation which he repudiates" as a means of studying "the moral and intellectual functions of humanity"—gives us phrenology! a so-called science, which John Stuart Mill, at once the patron and the disciple of Alexander Bain, assures us "the later course of physiological observation and speculation has not tended to confirm but to discredit."* Consciousness is the inner side, as it were, of mind, and sensation is only the outer collector and gatherer of information for the consciousness to exert itself upon. Sensation is the agent of consciousness. We feel, perceive, distinguish, abstract, generalize, make inductions of and deductions from, or, in other words, reason about sensations as communicated to us by their representative ideas; but we neither reason in nor with sensations. The human consciousness is a fair field for investigative research. Its contents may be noted, its peculiarities registered, its activities analyzed, and its operations experimented upon; but positivism avoids the necessity for that by ignoring its existence as a phenomenon of life, such a phenomenon too as constitutes a final and irresistible evidence, as when we say, I am *conscious* that I saw a flash of lightning, &c. Not only, therefore, has M. Comte, as J. S. Mill affirms, "done nothing for the constitution of the positive method of mental science," but he has absolutely set it out of and beyond the bounds of legitimate inquiry, as an investigation into a metaphysical entity. Nor is this a small matter in itself, as abridging the range of the activities of man, cutting off from him the best source of self-knowledge, and causing a vacancy in the hierarchy of the science, but it is a great evil in its results. "This mistake is not," says J. S. Mill, "a mere *hiatus* in M. Comte's system, but the parent of serious errors in his attempt to create a social science"—as indeed it could not fail to be, if for no other reason than this, that an imperfect science of human nature could not supply a perfect guide to the activities of human nature, inasmuch as "the universal laws of human nature are part of the *data* of sociology."

Matter makes itself known to our conscious experience as that which consists of particles or masses which do not move unless they are moved, nor stop unless they are stopped; as a something which acquires or has acquired the power of pressure and of making a stand. It acts or ceases to act, not according to volitions of its own, but by the impressment on it of volitions issuing from a being capable of will. It does not form part of the conscious

* J. S. Mill's "Auguste Comte and Positivism," p. 65.

energy, nor does it harmonize and identify itself therewith. It exists as the antithesis of the determining agent, as standing out of and opposed to it, as requiring the force of effort, less or more, to move it to the purposes of the consciousness or to cause it to cease from impressing and affecting it. Hence consciousness affirms a distinction between itself and matter, and asserts its existence as non-identical with its own. Consciousness affirms itself to be an *Ego* with power—power to receive impressions from matter, and to turn these to its purposes; and power to affect matter so as to overcome, in some measure, its opposition, and to subdue it to the purposes and intents of the self-possessed *Ego*. Of this *Ego* each is directly conscious; and “whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe,” so that in this conscious *me* which psychology demonstrates, we have the grand synthetic point in which philosophy and science meet, and from which we can command a view of knowledge as a whole.

Here we have a region of phenomena which is practically constant and always before us, while the phenomena themselves are evanescent and fluctuating, or “constant only in inconstancy.” As the astronomer has before him the outspread vault of heaven, as a mighty panorama of appearances in constant change, yet changing constancy, and requires by patient observation, tact, skill, and nicety of perception to catch the moment and the point which divulges the secret of the sky, so the psychologist has before him the constant on-sweep and current of momentary perception, amid which he requires, with delicate and undistracted quickness of mental vision, to seize the happy moment when a given thought touches upon the outer line of consciousness, and to follow its course persistently till it orbs into fulness in the centre, and fades again into the cluster of similarities out of which it had been singled for observation, so that it may tell of the realities that lie beyond, and yet affect “that permanent possibility of sensations” which men call Consciousness. To note and register all the phenomena of mind; to trace their advent, culmination, and departure; to learn the antecedent which introduced, and the consequent which succeeded each, and so to determine the laws of their successions and associations; to analyse their composition that we may see their essential character, and to observe the order of development, the power, and the value of the different faculties which consciousness reveals as put in our possession, are some of the duties which psychology may perform by the observation and interpretation of the phenomena of consciousness.

M. Comte “rejects totally, as an invalid process, psychological observation properly so-called, or in other words, internal consciousness, at least as regards our intellectual operations. He gives no place in his series to the science of psychology, and always speaks of it with contempt. The study of mental phenomena, or, as he expresses it, of moral and intellectual functions, has a place in his scheme, under the head of biology, but only as a branch of physiology.

Our knowledge of the human mind must, he thinks, be acquired by observing other people. How we are to observe other people's mental operations, or how interpret the signs of them without having learned what the signs mean, by knowledge of ourselves, he does not state. But it is clear to him that we can learn very little about the feelings, and nothing at all about the intellect, by self-observation. Our intelligence can observe all other things, but not itself: we cannot observe ourselves observing, or observe ourselves reasoning; and if we could, attention to this reflex operation would annihilate its object by stopping the process observed." * This is "a grave aberration," and we are glad to state it in the very words of one of M. Comte's earliest disciples—constant friends, and warm though independent admirers—rather than in our own terms, which would have required substantiating proof. This enables us to abbreviate our remarks, and to enter upon the discussion of the question at once. Those who wish to verify the fact for themselves will find a statement briefly in Comte's "*Cours de Philosophie Positive*," Vol. i. Lect. i.; especially in p. 34—37; at greater length in "*Politique Positive*," Vol. i., Fundamental Introduction, ch. i., p. 401—454, and in "*Synthese Subjective*."

Positivism inculcates the concentration of all the powers of man upon the common welfare; "but the only possible welfare it acknowledges is that of time and worldliness." It places before our souls "the immutable necessity of the external world," "the unchangeable order of the world,"—"an order in which we can produce no radical change," and teaches us that "what we have to do is so to dispose of our life as to submit to those resistless fatalities in the best way we can." "The universe is not to be studied for its own sake, but for the sake of man, or rather of humanity." "The discipline of social feeling will check any foolish indulgence of the spirit of curiosity." "It encourages our efforts everywhere, except where they are manifestly useless." "The one great object of life, personal or social, is to become more perfect in every way; in our external condition first, but also, and more especially, in our own nature." The problem of Positivism is this: "to reorganize human life irrespectively of God or sovereign; recognizing the obligation of no motive, whether public or private, other than social feeling, aided in due measure by positive science and the practical energy of man,"—in short, positivism encloses man within the irresistible circle of phenomena, acknowledges nothing in man or beyond him other than phenomena, and so makes this life of ours a spasm in the eternal flux of events—a coming out of darkness at a given period and a return to the same at an uncertain interval, with no aim in that interval but the largest possible amount of that joy which suits us best, and beyond it no hope. Sense, the advocate of the present, is to be lord over all; and reason, faith, hope, &c.—as mere metaphysical and theological figments—are to be put away as childish things. To shut out

* J. S. Mill's "*Auguste Comte and Positivism*," p. 63.

these, Positivism would make a second and double film on the worldly eye, as if its lust did not enough veil all but the sense-seen from its perceptions already; as if man did not already grow down sufficiently to sense and self, and mammon and debasement; and was not already too apt to lose all upward and forward reaching tendencies of life in the hurry of daily avocations, interests, and enjoyments. Self-justification is prone to arise in the soul regarding all this; labour is the appointment of life; the cares and constitution of business press on the heart; the wants of time require that provision should be made for them; and even when business does not irk, thought is tiresome, reflection tedious, ideas of higher duties unengaging; and an endeavour to be prescient of a future beyond this life is unattractive, if not unprofitable. "Thus man is carried onwards; surrounded by the world and deep in its occupations; the thought of death [and all that lies beyond that bourne], if it darken sometimes on his spirit, abides but a short while, a dead letter of indifference"—so inclined and predisposed is man to carnalize his being, to engage and entrench himself within the limits and cravings of physical nature.

I think that in this Positivism offers to hoodwink men. Men wish to be deceived, and Positivism is willing to oblige them. I cannot believe that it is well or wise in men to say, "Our conclusions are come to upon very obvious considerations; we trust to our senses, we trust to daily experience, we trust to the mode of thinking that rises naturally in man, and will be quite sufficient for him if he only lops off all the excrescences of speculation and reflection." This is paltering with the soul and truth. Men never trust their senses, if they can avoid it at all. Take all science as a proof of man's suspicion of the evidence of the senses, and of his desire to see further than they can reach; for science is sense interpreted. "Is there any department of thought in which man is safer by confining himself to that which is clearly brought before his senses? I answer without hesitation, No. Certainly not the physical sciences. A readiness to decide that any given view is contrary to the evidence of our senses has not been found a security against error even in those sciences . . . From the whole domain of material science, 'the off-hand evidence of the senses' is banished absolutely and definitively. In electricity, in magnetism, in astronomy, in mechanics, nothing deserves the name of a principle, a discovery, an element of the science, which comes within the reign of the senses. . . . It is a universal truth in regard to science, that it lies beyond the sphere of the senses."*

Who trusts to daily experience and does not seek to gain generalized maxims and legitimate inductions of which daily experience is only a part and thought much? Do we not want experience to correct and direct experience, and hence endeavour to pack up experience into axioms, maxims, proverbs, saws and sayings—all being more or less experience with something superadded?—

* A. J. Scott's "Discourses," *Socialism*, pp. 171—173.

Is *all* we see a dream?
 Does this brief glimpse of time and space
 Exhaust the aims, fulfil the scheme
 Intended for the human race?

Do we not all feel that there is a region of thought which transcends experience, and outlying its whole domain in which lie the secrets of poetry, the questions of philosophy, the mysteries of religion, and out of which there *glimt* on us intimations of immortality, hope, futurity, and God in the clear "light which never was on land or sea"? Whence come our political economy, our philosophy of government, our æsthetics, our theories of art, our elements of criticism, our metaphysics, and all the theologies of the earth? From experience merely, or from experience incorporated with thought as a potent factor? Why, our ways to wealth, and our arts of money-making even are not the issues of our trusting to daily experience, but are expressly got up to teach us to distrust our daily experience, and to direct our conduct by something transcending daily experience, by a judgment formed after a certain intentional arrangement of the observed facts had been gone through, which revealed a meaning in the whole which was not visible in each.

Who ever "trusts to the mode of reasoning that rises naturally in man"? Why have we accumulated tests of proof, elaborated principles of evidence, drawn up theories of induction, and produced treatises on logic if it is so? It is true that M. Comte derided logic. He whose chief glory rests on his method, proves his method to have been an empirical one by supplying no science of his method, and by treating the idea of studying logic as chimerical. In this he was consistent; for logic, however realistic the foundations on which we rest it may be, implies a power of reasoning, laws of reasoning, results of reasoning, all of which transcend sense and lead to science; and yet while consistent on that ground, he was inconsistent in another, for he constructed a logic of the sciences while denying, *ab origine*, a place in his system to logic. To attain to truth we need clear, distinct, and connected thinking; logic instructs and guides us in thinking well; but in doing so it assumes thought as thought, and as applicable to experience, while Positivism regards thought as the concrete deposit of experience. That system asserts a law of classification or arrangement, and fixes the order in which our conceptions pass by a law of filiation. These laws and this order imply a logic, but we have no Comtean logic given. We have a *subjective synthesis* suggested, but we have no demonstration of it given; and yet "demonstration," according to Positivism, "is now the only possible basis of permanent belief." All this shows that the positivist does not trust to "the modes of reasoning that arise naturally in man." Had positivism originated in modes of reasoning arising naturally in man, there would have been little glory in the discovery and small claim to commemoration on M. Comte's part. But M. Comte saw

laws in phenomena which were not attainable through trust in the senses alone, and hence he is himself a proof that the modes of reasoning that arise naturally in man are not and cannot be quite sufficient for him. The sedulous care, too, which M. Comte inculcates as the duty of the spiritual power in regard to education, involves a confession of distrust of the modes of reasoning that arise naturally in man; for if men spontaneously reasoned on positivist principles, an education in these principles would be less imperative in proportion to the naturalness of man's tendencies towards positive reasoning.

But we object chiefly to the conditional clause "if he only lops off all the excrescences of speculation and reflection." This clause shows that there are grounds of trust taken by men other than sense, experience, and natural reason, or wherefore counsel that they should be shunned, lopped off? But it condemns them, without proof given, as excrescences, while many, at least, believe that they are the natural fruit of thought; that they develope and contain the highest results of intelligence. But we object still further that positivism assumes and asks us to admit as a preliminary to the investigation a postulate which closes up the possibilities of full and fair inquiry. It calls upon us to lay aside speculation and reflection, and to admit that phenomena is all we know. "We are required to stake the whole point (of positivism or intellectualism) upon an issue, the granting of which is to yield up all for which we are contending." It is as if we were invited to give the question the fullest, freest, and most impartial criticism in all its elements and bearings within the Comtean circle but not beyond it, while far beyond that lie the proofs and tests, the territories of thought of which we wish to produce and furnish evidence. While we do not grant that,—

"Within that circle none dare walk but he,"

we claim that no *petitio principii* should be presented. M. Comte accepts facts—so do we; but M. Comte will admit no facts except sensible phenomena, while we claim speculation and reflection as most patent and undeniable facts—as facts by his own admission, for they are phenomena so troublesome that he desires them to be cast out as aliens and trampled under foot, as the wild grapes of metaphysic or theology. We contend that speculation is a fact resulting in facts. We take positivism itself as one of the fruits of speculation, and if we are to lop that off positivism becomes self-destructive. We affirm that reflection is a fact resulting in facts. We take the laws of classification and filiation as results of reflection on the facts of nature, history, and man; and if these are to be lopped off, where is the positivism of Positivism? Can we have anything positive if there is nothing else than a constant flux of phenomena—an onflow only of seeming?

We claim for speculation and reflection a place in science. Their phenomena require acknowledgment and elucidation, and these

necessitate a culture of metaphysic, theology, and morals. Speculation cannot be restrained by any decree of positivism, for there is a law in the life of man which compels speculative thought, and Positivism is as powerless to check the outgoings thereof as the gossamer of autumn would be to arrest the course of the forth-faring sun. Reflection is one of the most certain facts in the phenomenalism of thought; Positivism must grant it as a fact and explain its contents. Denial is not disproof, and reflection asserts its own existence in opposition to all denial. Now, reflection "is never employed except upon the mind and its contents. We cannot be said to reflect upon any external object except in so far as that object has been previously perceived and its image has become part of the furniture of the mind." Hence it not only transcends experience but it transcends sense. If we reclaim speculation and reflection from the limbo of absurdities or nonentities, in consequence of their phenomenal actuality and psychical veracity, we necessitate a psychology, a metaphysic, a morality, and a theology on which reflection and speculation are known for ages to have been engaged; and we are entitled to deny to positivism the claim it makes of being *the* complete philosophy of all phenomena, the perfect and organic whole of thought in which all existence and existents are explained as integrants, co-ordinated by demonstration and fitted for spontaneousness.

Positivism takes for granted that the entire circle of debate-ability has been and must be abandoned. The "outlying agencies" of moral sanctions, theological doctrines, metaphysical deductions, are all cast out of the circle of things to be investigated, and we are quietly assured that they are not,—because they are not patent to sensible experience. Yet if we ask to what sensible experience the law of evolution is patent, we receive no answer but that it is a fact; and if we enquire to what sensible experience the law of classification reveals itself, we get the same reply. Laws are not phenomena; they are inferences from phenomena, and in fact phenomena themselves are inferences from conscious experience. Laws are not experiences, they are seen in experiences, eliminated from experiences, and are regarded as imposed on experiences; they, therefore, imply something other and beyond experience. G. H. Lewes represents Positivism as "the organization of the sciences into a philosophy." But a philosophy is a reasoned arrangement of truth, wherein the *why* of antecedence and consequence is ostensibly or really given; while "the true positive spirit consists in substituting the study of the invariable laws of phenomena, for that of the so-called causes, whether proximate or primary; in a word, in studying the *how* instead of the *why*." That is, to admit that positivism is a natural history of sensible experiences and their sequences, but at the same time to abnegate the character of a philosophy.

Positivism professes to provide unexceptionably for the highest well-being of humanity. This it proposes to do by circumscribing

the beliefs, aspirations, enjoyments, efforts, thoughts, scientific investigations even, as well as hopes, within the limits of the positive, the knowable and the attainable. But this, we apprehend, is a mistake at the outset; for it assumes, without proof given (may we not say without the possibility of sufficient evidence being produced?) that the attainable, the knowable, the positive, are already not only determinable, but determined. If we admit that positivism has explored every region of the possible, and brought thence the truth of things for us; that it has tested every effort capable of being made by mankind, both in the present and in all coming time, and has discovered "the bounds that it cannot pass;" that it has investigated the entire range of space, time, thought, invention, and discovery, endeavour, desire, despair, enjoyment and sorrow, over which the powers of humanity can reach, we may also submit to the restraints it imposes, and encircle ourselves with the effortless fate which we have accepted in faith, as a faith, but in that very faith we have disproved this Positivism to which we devote ourselves; for we have not only accepted mythless Positivism as our myth, but by the very supposition made a new experiment regarding the attainable, after all experiment, we do not say experience, has been exhausted.

Phenomenology is not philosophy. An object or fact, *as it is perceived by us*, is a phenomenon. Philosophy endeavours to translate appearance into reality: that is, to discover what the thing is *in itself*. Neither science nor philosophy contents itself with what is brought before or into contact with the senses. The truths of science lie beyond the sphere of the senses; its principles and laws recede farther and farther from the region of sensation, as each science is developed, until discoveries can be made by mathematical calculations, which quite transcend the possibilities of sight. Inference is the act and art of drawing the unseen truth from things seen. Phenomena are *effects* only, "they are not our learning they are our ignorance." Knowledge only begins when we pass beyond the phenomena of nature, or of mind, and endeavour to learn what they mean and necessitate. "To remain within the region of sense, is to remain in ignorance. I know not how otherwise to define it. To remain within the region of sense is to remain within that region where impressions are made that ought to stimulate and rouse the faculties, that look for an answer far beyond the region of sense."*

Comteism proclaims that "we know nothing except phenomena," but it immediately, though silently, subsumes the addition "and all that they imply," by averring that "the laws of phenomena are all we know respecting them." Are then phenomena laws? Or are laws not rather the results which science deduces from phenomena?

It is quite true, we admit it sorrowfully, that we are such slaves

* A. J. Scott's "Discourses," p. 175.

to the sensational philosophy, that we not unfrequently call a person of superior intelligence a *sensible* man. But while we employ this term we abjure its implication, in reality, by the fact that scientific discovery is a continuous process of transforming the sensible into the transcendental, and compelling the most potent impressions of the senses to confess themselves to be erroneous, misleading, and untrue. Even now the transcendental idea of *force* has become the key-word of science; but force is *supra*-phenomenal. It is an intellectual conception, not a sensible experience—in its scientific sense; and yet the most realistic of the sciences, mechanics, astronomy, and even chemistry, are interpreted by it,—and light, heat, magnetism, electricity, &c., have it as the very core of their secret. If we can believe our senses only, and if we must restrain ourselves within the circle of phenomenal experience, we must banish science and make sense supreme. Abstraction must be discarded and generalization be blotted from the list of allowable forms of thought. Induction must give place to enumeration and apprehension; while inference, deduction, and prevision must be cast into the limbo of human follies, as the lumber of the soul. If we live in a world of phenomena, of mere appearances, and must content ourselves with our lot, what need can there be for attempting to reach reality?—and how is Positivism possible if phenomena is all, and neither law nor truth is found in or beyond them?

Has not science ever affirmed that invisibilities are the great realities? Who has seen motion, or anatomized gravitation? Who has caught elective affinity in its course from chemical atom to atom, and compelled it to undergo the scrutiny of the senses? In what subtle network of sensation has force been caught, and been manifested not in its effects but in itself? Who has materialized it?—and to what sense does it immediately reveal itself? What *phenomena* are described in these modern words of science, “the correlative and reciprocal convertibility of all forces”? And what is its minimum of visibility or of perceptible sensibility? We know that oxygen and hydrogen combine to form water, is the *power* which holds them in combination a phenomenal element, or is it merely an imagination? If the former, why is it not producible when analysis is made? if the latter, how does the composition of water come about, exist, consist, and persist, until some other power or influence is brought into play to effect its decomposition? There is evidently here an unseen element which is a reality, an element which manifests itself in phenomena, but not *as* a phenomenal entity, an element perceived not by the senses but by the intellect,—an element, therefore, which transcends phenomena, and yet is scientific,—an element which *posits* itself beyond the range of Positivism, which limits itself to the perceptible by sense, and abjures all supra-sensational elements as myths and metaphysical nonsense.

Is *invariability* of antecedence and consequence *all* that *cause* implies? If so, how does it happen that there is any difficulty in singling out the causative agent? and what distinguishes causal invariability from casual invariability? is there no *means* of influence—

no wedlock-like union of forces and co-efficients? When we have noted and recorded all the phenomena of antecedence and consequence, do we think we have attained to a scientific comprehension of things, that their philosophy is evident? Are we contented to accept a statement of fact, as a sufficient explanation of cause? If so, all science must be the history of revolution—not evolution—and it may excite expectancy but cannot supply prevision; for we cannot foresee an invariability of sequence or antecedence, which is not established, which is not yet, if sense-experience is all we can know. If causative invariability exists in things, it must exist because of a power in things to enter into this relationship of causative effectiveness, and if it does not exist in things but in our own thoughts, habits, customs, associations, &c, how is the prevision of science to be accounted for? Is cause a projection from our mind upon nature? or is it an injection from nature into our mind? or is it a compound term in which mind and matter are alike factors? Whichever of these significations is accepted, it is still an unquestionable fact that men do seek causes in nature, and that causes are not envisaged to experience.

J. S. Mill points out that "M. Comte fails to perceive the real distinction between the laws of succession and co-existence, which thinkers of a different school call laws of phenomena, and those of what they call the action of causes, the former exemplified by the succession of day and night—the latter by the earth's rotation which produces it. The succession of day and night is as much an invariable sequence, as the alternate exposure of opposite sides of the earth to the sun. Yet day and night are not the causes of one another;—why? because their sequence, though invariable in our experience, is not unconditionally so; these facts only succeed each other, provided that the presence and absence of the sun succeed each other, and if this alternation were to cease, we might have either day or night unfollowed by each other. There are thus two kinds of uniformities of succession—the one unconditional, the other conditional on the first laws of causation, and other successions dependent on these laws. All ultimate laws are laws of causation."* "Causation," says Prof. A. Bain, "is the name for the total productive forces of the world, and, as these are comparatively few in number, but wide in their distribution, and often disguised in their operation, the ingenuity of man has long been exercised in detecting the hidden similarities," which reveal them to the mind as causative forces. M. Comte must be, therefore, in error when he asserts that "the laws of phenomena are all we know respecting them; their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are unknown to and inscrutable by us."

"It is good," says Lord Bacon, "to commit the beginnings of all great actions to Argus with his hundred eyes, and the ends to Briareus with his hundred arms;" but Comte avers "that the first social need of Western Europe is community in belief, and in habits of life; and this must be based upon a uniform system of

* J. S. Mill's "Auguste Comte and Positivism," p. 58.

education controlled and applied by a spiritual power that shall be accepted by all," and that "everything points to the necessity of establishing a spiritual power, as the sole means of directing this extension and systematic reform of opinion and of life, with the requisite consistency and largeness of view," and this educatory dictatorship will exert "an influence over the whole course of practical life, whether public or private." Nations professing the same faith, and sharing in the same education, will naturally accept the same intellectual and moral directors." So that all human life shall be systematically trained to a true unity of effort, aim, design, and duty. We by no means consider this abandonment of individuality, this abnegation of self, this cloistrality of life, an advisable thing; and we are suspicious of a priesthood regulative of thought. We believe that the noblest life is consistent with the fullest liberty,—nay, that the fullest liberty is necessary to the noblest life. We speak from no prejudice against socialistic or communistic schemes, but from a distinctly thought-out set of principles, on which we base our opposition to the sociology of Comte.

"It is," says Gibbon, sarcastically, "the first care of a reformer to prevent any future reformation."* Thus the benefactor of his race almost unconsciously becomes its tyrant. Knowing that by earnest, honest, and fearless exertion of his powers he has attained to what he conceives to be truth, under the desire of banishing error, he seeks to stereotype for ever his thoughts upon human life, circumstance, and thought. He elaborates his scheme into formulæ and regulations, prescribes modes, legislates for observances, and, not content with dissemination, insists on perpetuation. From this vice of reformers, Comte was not free. He could not endure hesitant discipleship, nor be contented with an independent adhesion. One by one, as his disciples suggested, however mildly their dissent from any element of his system, however full their assent may have been to his general principles and their implications he cast them off. Thus the Positivist Chief cast aside J. S. Mill because he assumed the right of holding views opposed to him. So he threw off the learned and able, the faithful and enthusiastic, Emile Littré; so did he excommunicate Célestin de Blignières, because they would not give to the entire details of his scheme "that unqualified acceptance," which alone, it would seem, could find favour with M. Comte; and so he treated "every other person who, having gone with him a certain length, refused to follow him to the end."

* "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," chap. 44.

(To be continued.)

Note to Article on "The Works of Samuel Bailey, of Sheffield."

Our attention has been called to the fact that the article in the *Westminster Review*, October, 1829, quoted on p. 2, appears in the authenticated edition of "Exercises, Political and others" (1843), by Lieutenant-Colonel (now General) T. Perronet Thompson, vol. I., p. 152; and hence the guess made regarding its authorship is proved to be an incorrect attribution of the opinion of that ardent politician to our foremost political thinker.

Religion.

WOULD THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE IRISH CHURCH BE INJURIOUS OR BENEFICIAL TO PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY?

INJURIOUS.—II.

“THAT the Church of Ireland should cease to exist,” though determined and resolved upon by a majority of the House of Commons, we think would be inexpedient and impolitic, unwise and unjust, disadvantageous to the cause of Protestant Christianity, and to the progress of peace, order, and religion in Ireland and elsewhere.

In every Government of Europe some connection subsists between the clergy and the Government; and the State possesses some guarantee of the fidelity, honesty, and patriotism of that large body of men who more than all others come into close contact with the spirits of their citizens and influence their practical life. Thus there is a power of control in their hands over the acts and teachings of the clergy, which in some form or another seems to be essential to the welfare of society. Over the Church of Ireland such a control is maintained, and so long as a Church in Ireland exists, there is a certain influence and power in behalf of good government, true piety, and sound instruction exerted in each parish throughout the land. But the priests of the papacy owe and acknowledge no allegiance to the Crown, are not bound by any fealty to the institutions of the country. They are on the contrary bound by the most solemn obligations and the most pressing interests to an absorbing foreign tyranny to a state spiritual (so-called) which claims rule over soul and body, time and eternity.

These clergy are entirely free from obligations to the Crown and to the State, and are entirely bound to the Roman Pontificate. They confess no allegiance to, they profess no love for the reigning dynasty; and they are opposed distinctly to the terms of the tenure of the British throne. They are hence essentially, at the very least and lowest, unfavourable to the Crown as a Protestant one, to the present dynasty as a Protestant one, to the present constitutions of the realm, which is a Protestant one, and to the present Church of the three kingdoms because it is a Protestant one. They are therefore opposed to the conditions of things which

exist among us as a Protestant state, and are bound by their faith, their hierarchal connection, and their personal as well as ecclesiastical interests to be promoters of agitation against things as they are, to be agents in favour of papal domination, and to be averse to the honest and impartial pursuit of truth, investigation, and controversy. In all these regards they find themselves checkmated by the Established and endowed Church in Ireland. So long as the Irish Church is upheld there is a guarantee for order and a witness for another state of things in each parish. Protestantism and the State are represented, and the interests of two—order and toleration—are provided for by the legal establishment of a Protestant clergyman, over whose person, property, and position, the State throws its protecting shield in each parish.

Should the Irish Church be disestablished and endowed, the risks to which Protestant pastors are exposed—indeed all Protestants—would be immensely increased. The Protestant people abandoned by the State, would find themselves exposed to greater difficulties (i.) in maintaining their faith in the face of a majority who were led to believe that the overthrow of that Church was a triumph of theirs; (ii.) in supporting a Protestant clergyman to minister to their spiritual necessities—nay, in getting one to support in the midst of a population so prone to exercise violence for religion's sake; and (iii.) in preserving their persons, property, and place in opposition to the priests and people of those clergy who could only obtain full mastery over their catechumens when they destroyed all individual thinking, and all independency of action within the circuit of their respective parishes. Thus far the interests of religious toleration and of true Protestantism could not fail to suffer; for we know that intolerance in Roman Catholics is religion, is duty: because the employment of any means to bring one within the fold of the Church is better than that he should remain beyond the pale of salvation. We say, then, that the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church in Ireland would be most disastrous in its effects on Protestantism as the religious belief of many, and still more of Protestantism as an integral element in the State.

It is well known that Roman Catholicism erects the priest into an overseer, in many instances a tyrant of life. That this priesthood hold in control, through the confessional, the whole bulk of their communion. It thus forms a secret society of a far more formidable kind than any organization of conspirators—fenian or others—can form. The Church is a confederation having definite and determined aims, one of which is the supremacy of priests over persons. Protestantism is a divided empire; its sectarianism, if it has many objectionable features, otherwise is favourable to inquiry and certainty of criticism of one party by the other. Hence Catholicism, when it attains supremacy and shuts out criticism, is a terrible enemy to progress and improvement. Should the Irish Church be disestablished, the power of the priest

would be increased, the freedom of the people would be lessened; but beyond all, the sense of a watchful public opinion would be withdrawn, and the full evils of the secrecy in which Rome delights would become inevitable. Protestantism as a constant protest against priesthood is essentially necessary to keep alive a sense of responsibility to public opinion in the priesthood and the people. The downfall of the Church would be almost a death-warrant to public opinion in Ireland. That lost, Protestantism would lose much, and all that it lost the priesthood would gain.

It ought to be remembered that this is a political, not a religious movement. The Fenians did not ask the abolition of the Church, but the deposition of the landlord. The landlords are unwilling to go overboard, and they propose that the clergy should be self-sacrificing enough to walk the plank for their salvation. The thing is got up as a decoy, and though it were accomplished to-morrow would not still the political discontent of Ireland, it would only whet the edge of that turbulency which grows with what it feeds on. The overwhelming of a church, the uprooting of parochial life, depriving of the means of the ordinances of religion so many people in order that the proprietors of the land should enrich themselves, and throw the poor peasantry, bound hand and foot, into the power of the papal priesthood,—can in no way advantage true Protestant Christianity. Indeed, nothing in the shape of dishonesty can.

By the abolition of the Church, if any funds are set free the poor will not be benefitted; either the landlord will get it as his due, or the priest will call for it, as relieved from the pressure of another priest just that it might be transferred to him. In that way it can accomplish no possible good; but it will do this injury, it will silence Protestant church bells, abolish Protestant sabbaths, close Protestant parsonages, and put the Protestant people who used to be ministered to in holy things, at the bare mercy of a Romanist priesthood in regard to the right of worship and the consolations of religion.

The Irish Church is neither a tyranny nor a menace; it is absolutely required as a protection to those who wish to worship God with the freedom which Protestantism gives, and those do very much mistake the matter who think that the withdrawal of the Protestant pastor from a parish will work no woe. It will leave the parish with a thinker the less in it, a thinker interested in the defence of protestant thought; a thinker capable of detecting, denouncing, and defeating the tyranny of the Romish priest, while himself restrained from the exercise of tyranny by the clever eye of the priest at home; it will strike with the terrors of parochial persecution those who venture to love and pursue Protestant worship, and it will magnify the priesthood of an alien faith.

These are a few reasons against the disendowment, and disestablishment of the Irish Church, as set up in the midst of a people of dissimilar creed. These are not arguments for the retention of abuses, or

the maintenance of a superfluity, or a monopoly, They refer to the principle of free discussion and free thought, as opposed to a tyrant church and a domineering priesthood, who seek to stifle personal intellectual life; and who are agitating for this abolition as the only means available to them to crush Protestantism out of Ireland, and secure passive submission to the Pope and his priests.

L. H. E.

BENEFICIAL.—II.

THE Irish Church is at present a subject of great interest, and this question is one of the most important relating to it, for if it can be shown that the disestablishment of the Irish Church *would* be beneficial to Protestant Christianity, then one of the chief arguments for the maintainance of that monument of injustice and bad policy will be defeated. I shall endeavour to prove, simply and solely, that the disestablishment of the Irish Church *would* be *beneficial* to Protestant Christianity; and this from many reasons.

The first that I will give is,—that if the Irish Church were disestablished it would possess a larger amount of freedom than it now does, and consequently, would prosper more than at present. A free church has many advantages that a state church has not: it can decide its own doctrines, make any reform that is necessary or advisable, choose its own pastors, and rule itself in every detail; whilst a state church is obliged to leave all important matters to be decided by government.

Now if the Irish Church were separated from the State, it would enjoy all these advantages and reap much benefit from them. How much easier and better it is for a church to decide all matters relative to its own government, to remove evils and effect improvements, than for a government to do it; the ponderous engines of State power are hard to move and slow to produce any effect. Nor has a government that interest in the church that its members have; and therefore it is not so able, so quick, nor so willing to make reforms as the members of the Church itself, who are acquainted with its affairs and believe in its doctrines. To be able to choose its own clergymen is a great advantage which the Irish Church would possess if separated from the State, for they, when chosen by the churches themselves, are far more likely to be fit to fill their sacred office than if chosen by the State; and if from any reason they prove unsuitable, how much quicker and easier a church can remove them than the State; and, in fact, if the Irish Church were separated from the State it would be able to rule itself entirely, and this would prove of great benefit to it; for how can we expect a government, the members of which often do not believe in it, to rule a church so well as its own members, who, of course, understand and believe in its principles, and are most anxious for its welfare. Hence we see that if separated from the State the Irish Church would prosper more for the freedom that it would enjoy.

Another reason why the disestablishment of the Irish Church

would be beneficial to Protestant Christianity is, that where the maintainance of any church depends entirely on its individual members for support there is far more personal zeal and energy, which all must admit tends greatly to the well being of any church, than when it is supported by the State, and this necessarily so, for the members of the former knowing the imperative necessity for such individual zeal and effort, if they would have their church continue to prosper, or even to exist, are naturally more energetic than the latter, who know that their church is supported by the State, and will thus be maintained whether they put forth any effort or not, and are therefore contented to leave everything to the control of the State. So in Ireland, the Church is supported by the State, and therefore does not put forth its own strength, but leaves its maintainance entirely to the government, and, consequently, there is not such activity in the Church as there would be if it supported itself; the effect of disestablishment would be that most of those who now belong to the Church from policy or pecuniary motives would leave it, many useless incumbrances would be got rid of, and those who remained would be real, earnest, working Christians, anxious for the welfare of the Protestant Church, and they would all undoubtedly rally round it and uphold it, and thus the Church, thrown on its own resources, would necessarily work for its own support, a spirit of activity and zeal would pervade it, its members would be stirred up to personal efforts on its behalf, and it would do far more good than it now does, and be much more beneficial to Protestant Christianity. Facts too prove that where the Protestant Church is left to its own resources, and is neither supported nor controlled by the State, it invariably prospers. Take the United States as an example of this. As is well known, that "nation, as such, makes no profession, and provides no funds for the establishment of religion," but "in no part of the world is religion more universally embraced or more liberally supported; and a survey of the religious statistics of the last census shows a large proportion of the population as church members; while the buildings consecrated to worship, although not so costly and magnificent as those of the Old World, are fully as numerous in proportion to population. Though unaided by forced taxation, churches have sprung up as if by magic, not only in the cities, towns, and villages, but in the very wilderness." * According to statistics in 1862, there are 50,000 Protestant churches in America, which is about equal to one for every 550 persons. This is all the result of voluntary effort, not one church receives support from the government, and yet we see Christianity prospers, proving that State support is not, as some would have us believe, essential to the prosperity of religion.

Of course, if the Irish Church were disestablished, all grants to other religious bodies would also be withdrawn; the annual allow-

* *Vide* "Bacon's Descriptive Handbook of America," page 268.

ance to Maynooth College would cease, and this would be another advantage which would result from the separation of the Church from the State in Ireland. At present the government, which professes to be endeavouring to convert Roman Catholics to Protestantism, is at the same time supporting Roman Catholicism; like a general trying to starve out a garrison, but at the same time sending in provisions to enable it to hold out against him. What can be a greater anomaly than this? which is one of the results of endeavouring to maintain the State Church in Ireland; but yet until that Church is disestablished it must continue, or at least it would be very unadvisable if not impossible to withdraw it. Those who oppose the disestablishment of the Irish State Church, because they consider it would be injurious to Protestant Christianity, that Roman Catholicism would immediately get the ascendant, and that the Protestant Church in Ireland could hardly exist were it not connected with the State, appear to me to be using one of the worst arguments that they could, for they either imply that there are many who at present belong to the Irish Protestant Church simply because it is a State Church, and that as soon as State support is withdrawn they will immediately desert it; or else, that Roman Catholicism possesses such extraordinary attractions, that if only placed on an equal footing with Protestantism, it would immediately convert the minority of the people who are now Protestants and make them Roman Catholics. If the former is the case, if many do belong to the Protestant Church only because it is a State Church, that is an argument for the withdrawal rather than for the continuation of State support; those who belong to that Church from such motives are no real benefit to it; they cannot be true Protestants, and the Church would flourish better without them; if the latter is the case, if all the people would become Roman Catholics were it not that the Church was supported by the State, then by all means withdraw State support; a Church that does not possess sufficient merit of its own to commend it to the hearts of the people surely is not worthy of the support of the State; but where is the faith in their own religion of the professed supporters of Protestantism who think that it is not more than a match for any such error as Roman Catholicism, without such artificial support as that derived from the State? Cannot the Protestant Church exist without being a State Church? Surely it possesses sufficient intrinsic worth entirely apart from State support to enable it to fight with Roman Catholicism on even ground without fear for the result. Those who really believe in the Protestant faith have no reason to fear such a result as this; all true Protestants will remain so, whether the Church is separated from the State or not, and the Church will certainly not be weakened by its disestablishment. Even members of the Episcopalian Church admit this. An eminent divine, the Bishop of Ripon, has expressed his opinion that Protestantism would not be injured by the separation; indeed, he has given an excellent reason for the disestablishment of the Irish

Church. At a meeting of the Society for promoting Irish Church Missions on the 20th of April, 1868, this prelate said:—"Let them (that is, the Liberal party) violate the Act of Union, let them call upon the Queen to violate her coronation oath, and let the Church be dis-endowed and disestablished, and if this were done she would attract to herself the sympathy of the Church of England, and by such an agency as this Society—which would become more than ever necessary—the truth of God would be more and more diffused through the length and breadth of the land, and many valuable souls would be brought to know the truth."

Undoubtedly the Protestant State Church in Ireland was intended to convert the Roman Catholics; for some centuries it has professedly been endeavouring to fulfil that intention, but we all know that it has failed to accomplish it, nor will it ever do so whilst it continues to be connected with the State; in fact, instead of aiding the cause of Christianity in Ireland the State Church has hindered and does hinder the progress of Protestantism; for not only has it failed to convert the Roman Catholics, but it has made them more intensely Romanist than ever; they look upon the Protestant State Church as a great injustice and as an insult; they see those who belong to it more favoured than themselves, and they know that it has been the cause of most of the unhappy disturbances in their country: is it surprising, then, that they dislike the Protestant Church? The very position of that Church is a hindrance to its prosperity; forced upon a people, nine-tenths of which are very averse to it, but yet are to a certain extent made to support it; viewed by them as a badge of conquest and tyranny, how can it prosper in its present position? The people dislike it from the very fact that it is connected with the State; but remove State support, place it on an equality with other religious creeds (by "levelling downwards" and not upwards, as some would have it), and then the Roman Catholics must cease to regard it as an injustice; it can no longer be the cause of bloodshed and disturbance, as everyone knows it has been in times past; then the animosity to Protestantism which at present exists will in a great measure be removed, and thus the Irish Protestant Church will have a far better prospect of success than it now has amongst the vast bulk of the population.

Let, then, the Irish Church be disestablished, and when all hindrances to its prosperity are removed, when it is placed on an equality with all other religious creeds, unfettered by State control, perfectly free as to its own government, no longer disliked by the Roman Catholics on account of its connection with the State, and stirred up to a spirit of activity by its own situation, it will be far more vigorous than it ever has been, will be in a far better position for doing good, will receive much more sympathy and support from external sources, and will, in short, prosper all the more for its separation from the State; and thus the disestablishment of the Irish Church would be beneficial to Protestant Christianity.

GEORGIUS.

CAN THE GOSPELS BE HARMONIZED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

WE may, I think, congratulate ourselves on the subject of the present controversy. All must admit that if regarded only from a literary point of view it is one of peculiar interest, and we should all equally rejoice in the fact that it is a subject which can be discussed with deliberation, and without inducing a single spark of acrimony.

Let us, in the first place, endeavour to ascertain what the Gospels purport to be as a whole.

They contain and record the history of the birth, life, actions, death, resurrection, ascension, and doctrines of Jesus Christ; or, in other words, are a revelation of the grace of God to fallen man, through a mediator, including the character and teachings of that mediator with the whole scheme of salvation as made plain by Christ.

It will be seen that the Gospels may be regarded as a whole from two points of view—viz., as a narration of facts, and as an annunciation of doctrines.

To prove that they harmonize, it will not be at all necessary to show that each Gospel relates the same facts and announces the same doctrines, but it will be sufficient to point out that where the same event is narrated in each, it is identical in substance, and that where the same doctrine is announced its teaching is the same.

It cannot be expected that four authors writing independently of each other, at different times and in different places, and possibly although from the same motive yet with different objects, notwithstanding their having the same topic for a theme, could perform their work in the same words, or in the same order or manner. Indeed were the coincidences of the Gospels so exact, it would go far to cast a suspicion on their genuineness.

Here, then, the question presents itself, What is meant by the harmonizing of the Gospels? And to this I venture to reply that it signifies the setting forth of their agreement with themselves, and the just adaptation of each to the other in such a manner as to form a consistent whole.

It will, therefore, be advisable at the outset to ascertain what is the nature and character of each Gospel, as, of course, if of two Gospels, the nature and character of each be different, although each be true, it cannot be presumed that they will coincide, *e.g.*, without alleging that it is so, let us suppose for the moment, that the Gospel of Matthew is a narration of facts, while that according to John contains simply the sermons of Christ, it could not of course be contended that these two should assimilate with each other.

The Gospel of Matthew announces itself as "The Book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham." It contains a history of the life of Christ, recounts some of His sermons, many of His miracles and sermons, announces His doctrines, and concludes also with His condemnation, death, and resurrection. But it is to be remarked that it gives no account of His early life, commencing as Matthew's gospel does with His baptism by John.

The Gospel of Luke seems in many respects to be the most complete of all. The writer's own preface to it is a remarkable one (the italics are my own). "Forasmuch as many have taken in hand to set forth in order a declaration of those things which are most surely believed among us, even as they delivered them unto us, *which from the beginning were eyewitnesses* and ministers of the word; it seemed good to me also, *having had perfect understanding of all things from the very first*, to write unto thee in order most excellent Theophilus, that thou mightest know the certainty of those things wherein thou hast been instructed."

This Gospel contains a history of the birth of John and the birth of Christ, of the preaching of John and the preaching of Christ, the genealogy of Christ, His doctrines, miracles, and parables, and like the preceding books, concludes with an account of His death and resurrection.

In the Introduction of his Exposition of the Gospel of John, Dr. Gill says,—“Clement calls this Gospel of John *a spiritual Gospel*, as indeed it is; consisting of the spiritual discourses of our Lord, on various occasions, both at the beginning and in the course of His ministry, and especially a little before His sufferings and death; and the same writer observes, that John, the last of the evangelists, considering that in the other Gospels were declared the same things relating to the body of Christ—that is, to Him as He was after the flesh; and His genealogy and birth as man; to what was done to Him or by Him in His infancy to His baptism, temptation, journeys, &c., at the request of His familiar friends and moved by the spirit of God, composed this Gospel. Moreover, it is observed by some, that the other three evangelists only recorded what was done by Christ, in one year after John the Baptist was cast into prison, as appears from Matt. iv. 12, Mark i. 14, Luke iii. 20, wherefore John, at the entreaty of his friends, put these things into his Gospel, which were done or said by Christ, before John was cast into prison.”

I have already intimated that the Gospels harmonise in two ways—viz., (1) in the facts which each relates; (2) in the doctrines which each preaches, and I now proceed to point out in the first place the harmony of facts which exists between them.

Taking up the Gospel of Matthew, we find that that book commences with declaring the genealogy of Christ, or rather with tracing the line of descent of Joseph, the husband of Mary, the mother of Christ; but as this book is the only one which gives the paternal genealogy of Christ, and there cannot, therefore, be any dispute on

the point, I pass on to endeavour to delineate the harmony which exists on other points.

Let us, in the first place see the account which Matthew gives of the birth of the Saviour. Commencing at the 18th verse of the first chapter of that Gospel, we find the following words:—

“Now the birth of Jesus Christ was on this wise: When as His mother Mary was espoused to Joseph, before they came together, she was found with child of the Holy Ghost.

“Then Joseph her husband, being a just man, and not willing to make her a publick example, was minded to put her away privily.

“But while he thought on these things, behold, the angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a dream, saying, Joseph, thou son of David, fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife; for that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost.

“And she shall bring forth a son, and thou shalt call His name Jesus: for He shall save His people from their sins.”

Mark has no account of the birth of Christ, as his history commences from a later date; but in the 1st chapter of Luke and in 26th verse, we have the following:—

“And in the sixth month the angel Gabriel was sent from God unto a city of Galilee, named Nazareth, to a virgin espoused to a man whose name was Joseph, of the house of David; and the virgin's name was Mary.

“And the angel came in unto her, and said, Hail, thou that art highly favored, the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among women.

“And, behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a son, and shalt call his name Jesus.”

John gives no description of the birth of Christ, but the reader can trace the perfect analogy which exists between the descriptions given by Matthew and Luke, the virgin's name, her husband's name, his descent from the royal house, and the name by which the child was to be called.

Matthew details as well the birth of John the Baptist, and in recounting his mission, he says,—

“In those days came John the Baptist, preaching in the wilderness of Judæa, and saying” (and to the effect and aim of his preaching and office, as related by each evangelist, let me call particular attention), “Repent ye: ‘for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.’

“For this is He that was spoken of by the prophet Esaias, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make His paths straight.

But when he (John) “saw many of the Pharisees and Sadducees come to his baptism, he said unto them, O generation of vipers, who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?

“Bring forth fruits meet for repentance: and think not to say

within yourselves, we have Abraham to our father ; for I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham. And now also the ax is laid unto the root of the trees : therefore, every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire.

" I indeed baptize you with water unto repentance : but He that cometh after me is mightier than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to bear ; He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire : whose fan is in His hand, and He will thoroughly purge His floor, and gather His wheat into the garner, but He will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire.

" Then cometh Jesus from Galilee to Jordan unto John to be baptized of him.

" But John forbad Him saying, I have need to be baptized of thee, and comest thou to me ?

" And Jesus answering, said unto him, Suffer it to be so now, for thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness, then he suffered Him.

" And Jesus, when He was baptized, went up straightway out of the water : and lo, the heavens were opened unto Him, and He saw the spirit of God descending like a dove, and lighting upon Him : and lo, a voice from heaven saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased."

After giving this account of the baptism of Christ by John, Matthew then proceeds to narrate the forty days temptation of Christ in the wilderness.

The exactitude with which Mark harmonizes with Matthew on this point is surprising. He says :

" As it is written in the prophets, Behold I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee.

" The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make His paths straight. John did baptize in the wilderness, and preach the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins.

" And there went out unto him all the land of Judæa, and they of Jerusalem, and were all baptized of him in the river of Jordan, confessing their sins. . . .

" And (John) preached saying, ' There cometh one mightier than I after me, the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to stoop down and unloose.' I indeed have baptized you with water, but He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost.

" And it came to pass in those days, that Jesus came from Nazareth of Galilee, and was baptized of John in Jordan.

" And straightway coming up out of the water, He saw the heavens opened, and the Spirit like a dove descending upon Him : and there came a voice from heaven saying, Thou art my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased."

And Mark then goes on to relate the temptation. Luke relates the same facts in a somewhat different manner, but their substance

is the same, and for the reader's satisfaction I quote portions of his account.

"The word of God came unto John the son of Zacharias in the wilderness.

"And he came into all the country about Jordan preaching the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins; as it is written in the book of the words of Esaias the prophet, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make His paths straight.

"Every valley shall be filled, and every mountain and hill shall be brought low, and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough ways shall be made smooth; and all flesh shall see the salvation of God. . . .

"And as the people were in expectation, and all men mused in their hearts of John, whether he were the Christ or not; John answered, saying unto them all, I indeed baptize you with water, 'but one mightier than I cometh, the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to unloose': He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire: whose fan is in His hand, and He will thoroughly purge His floor, and will gather the wheat into His garner, but the chaff He will burn with fire unquenchable. . . .

"Now when all the people were baptized, it came to pass that Jesus also being baptised, and praying, 'the heaven was opened, and the Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape like a dove upon Him, and a voice came from heaven, which said, Thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased.'"

Luke then likewise narrates the temptation of Christ in the wilderness.

John's Gospel assimilates in every particular. This evangelist says:

"He (John the Baptist) said (this was in reply to the interrogation of the multitude) I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Make straight the way of the Lord, as said the prophet Esaias. And they which were sent were of the Pharisees. And they asked him, and said unto him, Why baptizest thou then, if thou be not that Christ, nor Elias, neither that prophet?

"John answered them, saying, I baptize with water, 'but there standeth one among you, whom ye know not, he it is who coming after me is preferred before me, whose shoe's latchet I am not worthy to unloose.' . . .

"And John bare record, saying, 'I saw the Spirit descending from heaven like a dove, and it abode upon him.' And I knew Him not: but He that sent me to baptize with water, the same said unto me, Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining on Him, the same is He which baptizeth with the Holy Ghost."

It would occupy too much time and space to go through the many miracles and parables of Christ to indicate which evangelists narrate the same. A few must therefore suffice.

The first I notice is the cleansing of the leper. Of this miracle

Matthew says, "And, behold, there came a leper, and worshipped Him, 'Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean. And Jesus put forth His hand and touched him, saying, I will : be thou clean. And immediately his leprosy was cleansed.'

"And Jesus saith unto him, See thou tell no man ; but go thy way, shew thyself to the priest, and offer the gift that Moses commanded, for a testimony unto them."

Mark says, "And there came a leper to Him, beseeching Him, and kneeling down to Him, and saying unto Him, 'If thou wilt, thou canst make me clean.'

"And Jesus, moved with compassion, 'put forth His hand and touched him, and saith unto him, I will : be thou clean.'

"And as soon as He had spoken, 'immediately the leprosy departed from him, and he was cleansed.'

"And He straitly charged him, and forthwith sent him away, and saith unto him, See thou say nothing to any man : but go thy way, shew thyself to the priest, and offer for thy cleansing those things which Moses commanded, for a testimony unto them."

Luke describes the same miracle thus : "And it came to pass, when he was in a certain city, behold a man full of leprosy : who seeing Jesus, fell on his face, and besought Him, saying, 'Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean.'

"And He put forth His hand, and touched him, saying, I will : be thou clean. And immediately the leprosy departed from him."

"And He charged him to tell no man : but go and shew thyself to the priest, and offer for thy cleansing, according as Moses commanded, for a testimony unto them."

Here, then, are three out of the four evangelists who relate this miracle in almost identical language, and certainly to the same effect.

In this instance the language of each writer has itself been given, and it may be taken, that in other instances where, for want of space, the language has not been quoted, a reference to the Gospels themselves will make it obvious that the substance of each event related is the same.

I may here mention a miracle which all the evangelists relate, viz., the feeding of the five thousand people.

From amongst His almost innumerable miracles Matthew, Mark and Luke have each recorded that He miraculously healed Peter's mother-in-law, that He cast out devils, that He stilled the tempest, that He healed a man sick of the palsy, that He restored Jairus's daughter to health, that He healed the withered hand, that He cured a woman of a bloody issue, that He gave to the blind sight, to the deaf hearing, to the dumb speech, to the impotent strength, and to the insane reason. Each of these three evangelists also recounts His transfiguration.

Although John does not relate all the miracles described by the other evangelists, which from the character of his book, as above noticed, is scarcely to be expected, and which does not in any way

destroy the harmony of all the four, yet he relates numerous others, which his co-evangelists appear to have omitted; for instance, the raising of Lazarus, the turning of the water into wine at the marriage feast, the walking on the sea, and the miraculous draught of fishes made by the disciples under the directions of Christ after His resurrection.

Matthew and Mark also record that besides feeding the 5,000, Christ on a similar occasion miraculously fed 4,000 in the same manner: Matthew and Luke also narrate His healing the centurion's servant, which fact the other evangelists appear to have omitted.

Matthew and Mark also detail His healing of, as Matthew calls her, the Canaanitish, or, as Mark calls her, the Syrophenician woman's daughter, which the others do not notice.

Mark and Luke also relate that He cast out of one man, not simply a devil, but a legion of devils, and at the man's request bade them depart into a herd of swine, which they did.

Luke also relates that He raised a widow's son from the dead, and tells of a miraculous draught of fishes taken by His disciples at His command before His death. John gives us the healing of a nobleman's son, which his co-evangelists do not relate. But why need this branch of the subject be pursued further? What if the four evangelists did not record the same miracle in any one instance? Would this in any respect destroy the harmony of the gospels? I answer No, because, as will be seen from the few facts above referred to, it is indisputable that the entire four gospels harmonize in these respects, viz., that Christ worked miracles, that thousands flocked after Him, that He gave life to the dead, that He cured the diseased, that He fed thousands plentifully from food which, under ordinary circumstances, and in the hands of any except Himself, would have been insufficient for half-a-dozen; in fact, that His control over life and death, time and nature, was complete.

But there are some other facts as to which the harmony is still more striking. I refer now to those facts connected with the condemnation, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ.

As this is the material and essential part of every system of Christian theology, in whatever other points theologians may differ, it is necessarily a point of vital consequence, and to this I beg the reader's attention.

The four accounts vary in very few particulars; but these I will point out before showing those in which they all agree.

After narrating the darkness which overspread Jerusalem, and the rending of the temple which took place at the crucifixion, Matthew goes on to say that the bodies of dead prophets and others came forth from their graves, and appeared to various persons; and states that the centurion (I presume) in charge of the crucifixion was constrained to confess that Jesus was the "Son of God," or, as one evangelist says, "a righteous man."

The darkness, rending of the temple, and confession of the cen-

tution, Matthew, Mark, and Luke all concur in; but John does not mention either. Matthew, however, is the only evangelist who records the temporary rising of the dead bodies.

Nor does any but Matthew narrate the fact that after the burial of Christ the chief priests and Pharisees, recollecting the prophecy of the murdered Saviour, that after three days He would rise again, obtained Pilate's permission to set a watch on His sepulchre, which they did, and also sealed.

This, of course, makes the harmony of the other three accounts more perfect, as it gives a reason for the circumstance in which all appear to concur—that the sepulchre was guarded.

Luke appears to have omitted the circumstance of the crown of thorns, which the other three evangelists relate; and John omits to mention that the chiefs of the Jews conspired to destroy Christ under any circumstances, with which conspiracy Matthew, Mark, and Luke all commence—as it is natural that they should—their histories of their great Leader's death and resurrection.

But now, after having indicated these few unimportant variations, let me draw notice to those circumstances in which all coincide, which I find to be these, viz.,—That Judas agreed to sell his Master for money; the agony of Christ in the garden of Gethsemane—or, as John terms it, a garden—where He was betrayed into his enemies' hands by the traitor, and whence He was taken before Caiaphas the high priest (in whose palace Peter denied Him), and accused; from Caiaphas He was taken to Pilate, who remonstrated with His tormentors, but does not seem to have had a sufficient sense of justice to have acted with rectitude; here Pilate, at the urgency of the Jews, released to them Barabbas, and delivered over Christ to be crucified (although, as he himself admitted, he could not find that He had committed anything worthy of death), and the crucifixion was perpetrated with every aggravation of insult and degradation; then His clothes were parted, and after His death, Joseph of Arimathea begged and obtained the body from Pilate, and buried it in his own new sepulchre.

In Matthew xxviii. we have the following:—

“In the end of the Sabbath, as it began to dawn toward the first day of the week, came Mary Magdalen and the other Mary to see the sepulchre.

“And, behold, there was a great earthquake: for the angel of the Lord descended from heaven, and came and rolled back the stone from the door, and sat upon it.

“His countenance was like lightning, and his raiment white as snow: and for fear of him the keepers did shake, and became as dead men.

“And the angel answered and said unto the women, Fear not ye: for I know that ye seek Jesus, which was crucified.

“He is not here: for He is risen, as He said. Come and see the place where the Lord lay.

“And go quickly, and tell His disciples that He is risen from

the dead; and, behold. He goeth before you into Galilee; there shall ye see Him: lo, I have told you.

"And they departed quickly from the sepulchre with fear and great joy; and did run to bring His disciples word.

"And as they went to tell his disciples, behold, Jesus met them; saying, All hail. And they came and held Him by the feet and worshipped Him.

"Then said Jesus unto them, Be not afraid: go tell my brethren that they go into Galilee, and there shall they see me. . . .

"Then the eleven disciples went away into Galilee, into a mountain where Jesus had appointed them.

"And when they saw Him they worshipped Him, but some doubted.

"And Jesus came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto Me in heaven and in earth.

"Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world."

From 16th Mark I extract the following:—

"And very early in the morning the first day of the week they" (the two Marys) "came unto the sepulchre at the rising of the sun.

"And they said among themselves, Who shall roll us away the stone from the door of the sepulchre? And when they looked, they saw that the stone was rolled away: for it was very great.

"And entering into the sepulchre they saw a young man sitting on the right side, clothed in a long white garment; and they were affrighted. And he saith unto them, Be not affrighted: ye seek Jesus of Nazareth, which was crucified: He is risen; He is not here: behold the place where they laid Him.

"But go your way, tell His disciples and Peter that He goeth before you into Galilee: there shall ye see Him as He said unto you.

"And they went out quickly, and fled from the sepulchre; for they trembled and were amazed: neither said they anything to any man; for they were afraid.

"Now when Jesus was risen early the first day of the week, He appeared first to Mary Magdalene, out of whom He had cast seven devils. And she went and told them that had been with Him as they mourned and wept. And they when they had heard that He was alive, and had been seen of her, believed not.

"After that He appeared in another form unto two of them, as they walked, and went into the country. And they went and told it to the residue: neither believed they them.

"Afterward he appeared unto the eleven as they sat at meat, and upbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they believed not them which had seen Him after He was risen.

"And He said unto them, Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. . . .

"So then, after the Lord had spoken unto them, He was received up into heaven, and sat on the right hand of God."

On reference to the 24th Luke, the reader will find these words:—

"Now upon the first day of the week, very early in the morning, they came unto the sepulchre, bringing the spices which they had prepared, and certain others with them.

"And they found the stone rolled away from the sepulchre. And they entered in and found not the body of the Lord Jesus.

"And it came to pass, as they were much perplexed thereabout, behold, two men stood by them in shining garments; and, as they were afraid and bowed down their faces to the earth, they said unto them, Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here, but is risen: remember how he spake unto you when he was yet in Galilee, saying, the Son of man must be delivered into the hands of sinful men, and be crucified, and the third day rise again,

"And they remembered His words, and returned from the sepulchre, and told all these things unto the eleven, and to all the rest.

"And their words seemed to them as idle tales, and they believed not.

"And it came to pass, that, while they (the disciples) communed together and reasoned, Jesus himself drew near, and went with them. But their eyes were holden that they should not know Him.

"Then He said unto them" (this is after a conversation on the all-engrossing subject, which for the sake of space I refrain from quoting), "O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken; and beginning at Moses and all the prophets He expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning Himself.

"And it came to pass, as he sat at meat with them, he took bread, and blessed it, and brake and gave to them. And their eyes were opened, and they knew Him, and He vanished out of their sight.

"And as they thus spake, Jesus himself stood in the midst of them" (this is on a subsequent occasion at Jerusalem), "and saith unto them, Peace be unto you. But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they had seen a spirit.

"And He said unto them, Why are ye troubled? And why do thoughts arise in your hearts? Behold My hands and My feet, that it is I Myself: handle Me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see Me have. And when He had thus spoken, He showed them His hands and his feet, and while they yet believed not for joy, and wondered, He said unto them, Have ye here any meat? And they gave him a piece of a boiled fish and of an honeycomb; and He took it and did eat before them.

"And He led them out as far as to Bethany, and He lifted up His hands and blessed them.

"And it came to pass, while He blessed them He was parted from them, and carried up into heaven. And they worshipped Him, and returned to Jerusalem with great joy: and were continually in the temple praising and blessing God."

As John's account of these events, although extremely interesting, is rather detailed, and as I have already quoted so much, I can only venture to refer to his history of them which will be found in his 20th chapter, verses 1 to 21 both inclusive, and 24 to 30 both inclusive.

John describes a further appearance of Christ to his disciples which is not narrated specifically by the other evangelists, although some of the circumstances which they detail would seem to have taken place at this further appearance, the particulars of which, for the sake of space, I do not quote.

John, however, states this last appearance of Christ to have been "the third time that Jesus shewed himself to His disciples, after that He was raised from the dead."

This evangelist also concludes his book with a very significant verse, which appears to me to admit that he was aware that he had not recounted some of the events which the other writers had noticed, and not only so but that he also well knew that they had not narrated circumstances which he had, and that each differed from the other in some slight particulars, for he says: "And there are also many other things which Jesus did, the which if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not hold the books that should be written."

With this verse in the face of him, one can less than ever make a variation between the evangelists of the kind pointed out, a ground for the assertion that there is a want of harmony in their books. Bishop Sherlock, in his celebrated work, called "The trial of the Witnesses of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ," sets forth in an admirable manner the harmony which exists not only between the evangelists, but also between the other witnesses of that miraculous event, and I cannot do better than quote him on that subject.

Of course, the whole point of proving that there is no harmony in the four accounts of the resurrection is to cast discredit on the fact of the resurrection, with the intention of trying to prove that it did not take place.

The following remarks from the work already mentioned are therefore well to the point.

"But let us see what the council and senate of the children of Israel thought of this matter, in the most solemn and serious deliberation they ever had about it (Acts v.). Not long after the resurrection the apostles were taken; the high priest thought the matter of that weight that he summoned the council and senate of the children of Israel. The apostles are brought before them, and make their defence. Part of their defence is in these words:—'The God of your fathers raised up Jesus whom ye slew and hanged on a

tree.' The defence was indeed a heavy charge on the senate; and in the warmth of their anger their first resolution was to slay them all. But Gamaliel, one of the council, stood up and told them that the matter deserved more consideration. He recounted to them the history of several impostors who had perished, and concluded with respect to the case of the apostles then before them, 'If this work be of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God ye cannot overthrow it, lest haply ye be found to fight against God.' The council agreed to this advice, and after some ill-treatment the apostles were discharged. I ask now, and let any man of common sense answer, could Gamaliel possibly have given this advice, and supposed that the hand of God might be with the apostles, if he had known that there was a cheat discovered in the resurrection of Jesus? Could the whole senate have followed this advice, had they believed the discovery of the cheat? Was there not among them one man wise enough to say, How can you suppose God to have anything to do in this affair, when the resurrection of Jesus, on which all depends, was a notorious cheat, and manifestly proved to be so?"

I now come to the last point, viz., the doctrinal harmony of the gospels. It is, if possible, more important to show this doctrinal harmony than the circumstantial one which I have endeavoured to point out.

By a doctrinal harmony, I mean, not that each evangelist propounds the same doctrines, as that is not to be in the least looked for, but that the doctrines enunciated by Christ as reiterated by the four evangelists, constitute one harmonious system of Christian theology.

It must, we presume, be borne in mind that Christ's mission was one of redemption and salvation, and it will therefore, of course, be readily understood that the doctrines to which I now refer are those bearing on the subject of spiritual salvation.

It is, we presume, admitted, that when Christ came into the world, man had fallen from his first estate, and was, as he is at the present time, literally saturated with sin, in consequence of this fall.

But it having been predetermined, in the councils of the Supreme, that the whole of man should not be lost for the crime of one, it was resolved that a portion of humanity should be saved, but the Almighty being also Alljust, this salvation could only be effected by the fallen expiating their sin, and destroying its consequences; and this expiation, in order to allow His merciful intentions to be carried out, man being himself impotent to fulfil it, the Creator permitted to be performed by a substitute, and as only an Almighty substitute could perform an Almighty work, and there was only one Almighty Being, consisting, however, of three persons, although indestructible, He suffered one of those three persons, viz., His own Son, that is to say, a part of His own triune self, to assume human form that He might suffer the human consequences of human sin, in order that that portion of the human race whom He had predestined

to redemption might, through being purged of their sin, be saved from its consequences, and entitled to that destiny.

The doctrines which Christ Himself announced and which His apostles under His authority taught, are the means and the only means by the application of which the redeemed portion of mankind can receive the advantage of His mission and work.

And the first of these doctrines is necessarily regeneration.

I say *necessarily* because man, having, as it is laid down by the Christian creed, been *born* in sin, it is obvious that while sinful he can never inherit a state which necessitates sinlessness, and that he can never be sinless unless he be born so. Here, then, applies with full force the doctrine announced by Christ, "Ye must be born again."

This is taught in positive terms by Christ Himself, in His conversation with Nicodemus, which is related in 3rd John, where Christ says, "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God."

On a perusal of the Evangelists it will be found that they all concur in the necessity for this new and spiritual birth.

But the question raised by Nicodemus may be raised by others, viz., How can a man be born again? And the answer given by each of the four gospels is the same, viz., that it must be by faith.

Each gospel plainly announces (although not perhaps in those identical words) the same doctrine as that taught by Paul and Silas, who, when asked, "Sirs, what must I do to be saved?" said, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved."

This is, in fact, the great doctrine of justification by faith, the beauty and completeness of which enraptured and emboldened Luther.

To show that I am not writing without my text, when I say that the Evangelists concur in this doctrine, I quote passages from two of them, where it is taught in express terms. In Mark xvi. and 16th verse we have "He that *believeth* and is baptized *shall be saved*; but he that *believeth not* shall be damned." And in John, chap vi. and 47th verse, we have "Verily, verily, I say unto you He that *believeth* on me hath *everlasting life*."

It may here be said, then, has every man a faith in Christ, and is he consequently saved? To this I would say, Certainly not; the gospels teach that a faith in Christ does not mean simply a belief that Christ once existed, but it denotes a vital belief in His works and doctrines, and a willingness to suffer even death rather than give up this faith.

The gospels all teach likewise that it is not in any one's power to possess this faith, that it is only given to a portion of the human race, that only those receive that gift and are spiritually benefited by the teachings and work of Christ, who were predestined to enjoy that benefit; and that only those inherit eternal life who were elected to that possession before they themselves were in existence,

or as John the Divine expresses it, "whose names were written in the Lamb's book of life before the foundation of the world."

Should it be doubted that the gospels harmonize in the teaching of these, which are their principal, doctrines, I shall take the opportunity in my reply of bringing forth the proof of my affirmative, which is abundant.

I much regret that the want of time and space has prevented my following a similar plan to that adopted by Eusebius in his canons, which consist of ten tables, "Of these, the first, which contains four columns, exhibits all the passages which are common to the four gospels; the second, third, and fourth contain three columns, and show the passages which occur in any three of the gospels; the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth are in two columns, and show the passages which occur in any two of the gospels; and the tenth contains the passages which are found only in one of the gospel narratives."

This work of Eusebius is in itself a pretty conclusive answer to the question now under discussion.

H. K.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"It is good for us at times to be shaken out of the dull routine of traditional teaching, and be taught to see that all is not so positive and certain in these matters as some have asserted;—should be taught to inquire, and read and think for ourselves as reasoning men, and not submit ourselves blindly to the yoke of authority."—*Bishop Colenso*.

THE earliest attempt at forming a *Diatessaron* was made by the heretic Tatian, and dates from about the close of the second century. This system of bringing the contents of the Four Evangelists at one view before the mind, is far more effective in bringing out the discrepancies than the coincidences of them, and hence from that unlucky time when the disciple and friend of Justin, the martyr, attempted this form of apology the manufacture of harmonies has gone on with greater or less activity—each new endeavour only making it more apparent that a harmony is impossible. *Synopses Evangelicæ*, begun by a heretic, have led to innumerable efforts at reconciliation, which end only in making the want of concilience more palpable and apparent, more perplexing and bewildering. Not content with the Ten Canons, elaborate and exhaustive as they are, of Eusebius and Jerome, which served the church pretty well up till the era of the Reformation, every year or so produces a new offer to reconcile the irreconcilable. If such productions were as useful as they are numerous, people might not seriously complain of them, but when they act as stumbling-blocks to the faithful, and as weapons of offence to the faithless, it is almost time we were asking the question now put before us for debate—Can the Gospels be Harmonized? i. e., be shown to be literally and fully coincident in their facts, mutually illustrative in their contents, and, where not

identical, yet complementary or supplementary, confirmative not contradictory?

We contend, as a matter of fact, that they are not—the explanation which this fact may be able to receive we do not endeavour here to elucidate, for that would not only lead away from the main question, but would be apt to raise side discussions which it would be better to avoid. That it is a fact we hope to be able to prove, and that it is a fact capable of explanation we do believe. Neither our belief, however, nor our explanation is, in reality, comprehended in the question before us. We shall, making “the Gospels their own witnesses,” prove the fact, and we shall leave our opponents to try their best to disprove our averment after they have seen the terms of our statement. But we shall argue now altogether irrespective of the possibility of an explanation the one inquiry, can the Gospels be fully harmonized or exhibited in such a form as to show that they are very congruous and consistent, capable of complete and easy re-arrangement in such order as to exhibit coherency and unity in their contents?

In order to set about our task in an orderly way we shall first consider—Who are the Evangelists? and What are the Gospels? Thereafter we shall proceed to show that they cannot be harmonized—1st, in their purpose; 2nd, in their spirit; 3rd, in their incidents; 4th, in their chronology; 5th, in their portraiture of the Lord Jesus Christ as the appointed and anointed Saviour of men.

And *first*—Who are the Evangelists, and What are the Gospels?

The four gospels have four nominal authors;—for tradition has not ventured to say definitely that they are the genuine productions of those whose names they bear, but contents itself with affirming that these works from which we now acquire our knowledge of Jesus Christ are, “according to” the authors whose names are affixed to them. St. Matthew, the proto-Evangelist, was the son of Alphaeus; his brother James the son of Alphaeus was the son of Mary, the wife of Cleophas, sister of the mother of Jesus, and hence Matthew, otherwise called Levi, was a near relative of the Messiah. He was a Galilean by birth, by religion a Jew, and by occupation a *portiter* or inferior collector of customs, a publicanus, at or near the town of Capernaum on the sea of Galilee. He was early converted, and called to be an apostle, was one of the intimate associates of Christ, and is supposed to have drawn up his narrative of the Life of Jesus about the year 41 A.D., in the Syro-Chaldaic dialect prevalent in Judea at that time. The Gospel we have is a translation of this work done into Greek, shortly after its first production, some affirm under Matthew’s own supervision for behoof of the Gentile converts—the original being used by the Jews. John, surnamed Mark, was a convert from Judaism introduced to St. Paul by Barnabas or Joses, as he is also called, who had been a fellow-pupil under Gamaliel with Saul at Tarsus, and the son of Mary into whose house Peter was welcomed after his escape from

the prison. Mark was converted by St. Peter, and always held him in high esteem. He accompanied Barnabas and Paul on their travels for some time, but forsook the connection much to the displeasure of Paul. He attached himself closely to St. Peter, and went as his secretary with him to Rome, where it is said, he composed his Gospel under the instruction of Peter. He introduced the Gospel into Egypt and founded the church at Alexandria. St. Luke was a freedman descended from heathen ancestors and a medical practitioner (as was common among the Roman freedmen). He was a native of Antioch, the capital of Syria, and was the attached friend and faithful follower of the Apostle Paul, whose companion and medical adviser he was in his missionary journeys, and whom he accompanied to Rome. He seems to have been a Pauline convert, and to have been thoroughly subdued by his fellow-freedman's ability and enthusiasm. He does not write as an independent person, but as a compiler either of oral narrative or tradition—his informants professing to have been eye-witnesses of what they relate. It was probably at the instigation of Paul that he made his compilation, and that it was intended to be used as a compendium of the Pauline instructions to his converts. St. John was the youngest of the apostles, his father was a fisherman in good circumstances at Bethsaida on the Sea of Galilee. He was "the disciple whom Jesus loved," and on whom Jesus conferred the honour of ministering to the requirements of His mother. In consequence of this charge, he had many opportunities of hearing things regarding Jesus which none of the other Evangelists had knowledge of; and he was less active in the furtherance of the new religion than Peter or Paul, though he was an acknowledged leader of the early church in its convocations at Jerusalem. He composed his Gospel in his old age, after his return from Patmos to Ephesus, about 97 or 98 A.D. The gospels with which we are concerned in this debate are clearly those contained in the canonical scriptures; and it would be quite unfair to complicate this discussion by bringing in the Apocryphal gospels, and asking our opponents to harmonize these with the records of Jesus which the four Evangelists have presented, if not preserved, to the Church of the Saviour—the Hebrew Evangel of St. Matthew in its translated form, the Petrine gospel of St. Mark, the Pauline compilation of St. Luke, and the good news of the Messianic St. John, the seer and the privileged disciple of our Lord. Two witnesses chosen from the apostolate (Matthew and John), and two selected from the immediate converts and disciples of these servants of Jesus Christ (Mark and Luke), contemporaries, companions, and fellow-labourers of the chiefs of the Christian faith subsequent to the Pentecostal Establishment of the Faith and Discipleship of the Early Church. We accept the gospels as they stand, and we free our opponents from the need of proving the authorship or the genuineness of the Evangelical quaternion by allowing the reading "according to" to stand for what it is worth in the record, and at least as bearing that though

the gospels preserved and transmitted to us may not be those "of" their accredited writers, they are substantially "according to" what they wrote and contain "a declaration of those things which are most surely believed," and wherein the early Christians had been "instructed."

We propose to pass on now to prove that:—

1. *The Gospels cannot be harmonized in purpose.* The gospel according to St. Matthew—by repute the production of one of the despised publicans who received the favour of Jesus much to the discomfiture of the Scribes and Pharisees—is the most pharisaical of the gospels. Its main intent and chief characteristic is to display Jesus as the Messiah of the Jews. Matthew's object is to judaize Christ, to make him out to be the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Hebrew seers and the hopes of the Hebrew nation. A Jew of the Jews himself, he speaks with all the sectarianism which Judaism in his day displayed in the holy city of which he was a resident, and he sees little in Jesus besides the hope and expectation of the Hebrews, the proof that the faith of his race was not in vain. Mark, though he, like Matthew, was a resident in Jerusalem, and had been in that great metropolis of Judaism during much of the lifetime of Christ, is quite the disciple of St. Peter, and takes colour from him and his objects in opposition to Paul with whom he had a difference on one of the conjoint missionary tours the apostles undertook. So much is this the case that the early writers on Christianity—Papias, Iræneus, and Tertullian—call him "Peter's interpreter," and affirm that its contents were derived from the information and recollections of the most impulsive and prominent of the apostles. Mark's gospel is a brief handbook, chiefly anecdotal, and is more concerned with the acts than the sayings of the Petrine as contrasted with the Pauline Christ. His gospel is much less Messianic than that of Matthew, whom he abridges and explains in accordance with Peter's theories.

"The gospel according to St. Luke" is avowedly a compilation, a *compte rendu* of the "Life of Jesus," drawn from the evidences of eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses. It is most probable that the early preachers of the gospel used a narrative of the sayings and doings of Jesus as the means of "convincing and converting sinners;" and St. Luke evidently takes his report from some such sources; and follows the lead thus given to his thoughts, using the circumstances so as to excite feelings of awe, reverence, and love for the Saviour. It is an eclectic performance, brought into unity by the practical purpose of making men better through the love of Jesus. It is the work of one who writes from intellectual and moral appreciation, and reconstructs what he has heard to suit his chief end. This purpose is that of bringing men to the practice of righteousness by the inculcation of certain dogmas based on certain narratives—the narratives drawn from the common reports of the churches, the dogmas being those suggested and defended by St. Paul. The gospel of John is Messianic, but it is not the Jewish

Messiah like that of Matthew's, whose dignity he asserts, and whose instructions he professes to reproduce. It is a Messiah of philosophic generation, an abstract idea is put for the Messiah of the laws and the prophets, and the notion of the God-man is advanced from an inference from prophecy into a distinct realization in life. John idealizes the character of Christ as at once God and man, as much as Matthew restricts Him to a Jewish nature and to the working out of a given destiny.

These purposes cannot be harmonized. The Judaism of the Messiah of Matthew is realistic and human, while that of John is idealistic and transcendental; that of Mark is a doer of good and a worker of mighty works; and that of Luke is a teacher of good, whose works are the evidence of his greatness, and his authority to teach. This fourfold series of purposes is irreconcilable, and therefore the gospels in which they are exhibited are not able to be harmonized; and this leads us next to show—

2. *That the gospels cannot be harmonized in their spirit.* The gospel of Matthew is an Israelitic Evangel. It is narrow and Jewish. But it is somewhat epical and grand. It affords a complete view of the Lord in one aspect, and from one restricted point of view. It has in it many echoes of the Psalms and the prophets. It has a great many exquisite episodes, and is constructed with skill to exhibit Jesus as the King of the Jews as well as the Saviour of men, and to prove that He thought of the Jew first, and then of the Gentile. The spirit is distinctly Hebraistic. But Mark is under the dominion of a Roman conception. He has seen and felt the grandeur of order and the might of massed force. He has been touched by the impulsive spirit of Peter, and subdued by the potency of the empire of the world. He has heard the terse and striking language of the master people, and he has compressed the force and might of the gospel into terse and precise form that it may act on the Gentile mind, and make them feel the might and majesty of the Messiah as one of the forces of morals, and as holding a special patronage towards Peter.

St. Luke, again, is free from Judaistic prejudices, and takes up the "Life of Jesus" as a benefit to the world, and as affording, in some sort, a solution to questions which had acquired prominence in the Greek schools of morality. He has the artistic disposition of the events and thoughts so as to make the one set off the other, which distinguished the Greek mind, and make them the very patterns of orderly and systematic ideas. With a clear flow of narrative and a piercing spirit into the necessities of things for his purpose he exhibits Jesus as the universal benefactor and Saviour whose descent is traceable from the Father of all men, as well as from the God of Heaven. St. John is Spiritualistic. It is full of the theoretic matter of Christianity. It is colloquial and yet it has all the effect of dramatic evolution, and is intended to show the development of the Messianic idea as the One Sacrificer and Saviour. It has more of the mysticism of the Christian faith than any of

the synoptic gospels and a grander beauty of moral teaching than even Luke presents to us. But the spirit of the gospel is quite different from the glorification of the Jews as the race from whom Messiah sprung, at which Matthew aimed; from the life-picture of the active Saviour, Mark endeavoured to portray, or from the narrative for the encouragement of personal piety which Luke attempted. St. John wishes to beget love by sympathy, and to induce to love by a portrait in which love is the chief feature. As their purpose and spirit differed we see that they must have selected from the traditions, experiences, &c., while they record those things which best suited their purpose, and narrated them in regard to their own object, and hence we reasonably conclude—

3. *That the gospels cannot be harmonized in their incidents.* For example, St. Matthew gives the genealogy of Joseph, the reputed father of Jesus, Mary's husband, which has nothing at all to do with the life of Jesus, who was not at all descended from Joseph, nor man by ordinary descent. This genealogy is given, though altogether beside the question, in accordance with the Hebraistic character of the first gospel. The genealogy of Jesus given by Luke traces his maternal relationship not to a distinctly Jewish source, but up to the original of the race—Adam, to give point to the Pauline contrast between the first man—Adam, the bringer of death, and the last man, Adam, as a quickening spirit and the bringer of life. St. Mark quotes the sayings of Jesus in Syro-Chaldaic, and Luke never; Matthew only once. The call of Matthew is given in three different ways (see Mat. ix. 9—17; Mark ii. 13—22; Luke v. 27—39). It is difficult to see how the cleansing of the temple (Matt. xxi. 12; and John ii. 13—16) can be considered as a narrative of one event, equally difficult to think of how they can be read as of two; so with the Passover supper at which "The Communion" was instituted, the accounts of the synoptic gospels and of St. John are irreconcilable—so much so that interpreters have thought *two* suppers (not *one*) have been spoken of by them. The extent to which our remarks have already extended warn us not to attempt an exhaustion at once of this portion of the question and of the patience of the reader. These incidents are of so much importance that they may well be used as tests of the assertion made that the gospels cannot be harmonized in their incidents, while they, to a certain extent, go to prove the point to be insisted upon now—namely,

4. *The gospels cannot be harmonized in their chronology.* It is quite sufficient at this time for the proof of what has been stated above to note that the time of the ministry of Christ is a subject of dispute among students of Scripture themselves. The common opinion is that His mission occupied three years or a little more, but Canon Browne, following an idea held by the early fathers of the church, crowds all the events of the ministry of the Saviour into a single year, while Bishop Ellicott, following German authorities, says that about two years is all that the ministry of Christ could

have occupied. Where such discrepancies of opinion are possible among professed students of the Scriptures it may be safely asserted that the chronology of the gospels is incapable of being harmonized. This great general difficulty is one which cannot be got over, and until it is got over it is of little importance to notice any slight anachronism in incident and circumstance. We proceed, therefore, to point—

5. *The gospels are unable to be harmonized in regard to their portraiture of Jesus Christ.* The Christ of Matthew is splenetic against the Pharisees, and his speech is vituperative, scornful, satirical, and daring. The Christ of John is meek and lowly, suffused with love, and gentle in act and speech. The Christ of Mark is active, restless, peregrinatory, and constantly moving and working; the Christ of Luke, didactic and sermonizing, continually on the watch to put in a word of advice, and to supply counsel and direction. There is in the first gospel a haughty majesty and dignity in the bearing, demeanour, and speech of the Lord; in the fourth He is docile and lamb-like, all-enduring and quiet. The denunciative predominates in Matthew; in John the more common form is that of gracious invitation; in Mark we have most bustle; in Luke more hortation. The countenance of the Christ of the early Evangel is austere and Oriental; that of the latest is beaming and inviting; the intermediate ones do not help us to shade off the character so as to bring the two extremes into one entire whole. With points of resemblance they intermingle points of contrast, and suggest characteristics out of keeping with the Christ of either of the two others.

We have made the above objections without any design of impugning the credibility of the gospels, as to historic value or of denying the reality of the life of Christ or the glory of His mission. We believe that the overstraining of the idea of inspiration is a great hindrance to the acceptance of the Rule of Life which Christianity supplies by many; and we believe that it is quite as impossible to harmonize history and life, nature, and science as it is to harmonize the gospels. This is a world of doubt, difficulty, conflict, and probation, and we must content ourselves with it, and make the best of it, in it and beyond it, but our opponents will probably charitably say that this is another instance of Christ's enduring "the contradiction of sinners against Himself" when we affirm that the gospels cannot be harmonized. R. N.

Literature.

ARE SENSATIONAL NOVELS SUPERIOR TO NOVELS WITH A PURPOSE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

EVERY novel has a purpose, and it ought to be a clear and distinct one. That purpose should be to give a plot a full, proper, and artistic development harmonized in time, scenery, characters, &c., with the probabilities of life in such a way as to excite interest and sustain the strain on curiosity, which supplies the excitement of the mind in its passage from surprise to surprise. That is what a sensational novel does. It places before us given objects in whom our interests are awakened; it exhibits a certain crossing of the lines of possibility which multiply the chances of the characters employed attaining to, or being driven towards, ends in opposition to those which seem to us for the best in the excited state of our engrossed thoughts. This play of chances among, and interfering with the results of will—this making of advances to and relapses from the consummation of an end suggested to us as desirable, so as to heighten the anxieties and intensify the engrossment that we may be carried on steadily through all the entanglements of plot and counterplots, episode and description, till the decisive termination—has been reached, and the novelist gratifies the keen, huntsmanlike feeling which has been excited in the mind by showing the end attained in spite of the obstacles and interventions which have been or have come into the course of events. This is the purpose of a novel, but it is quite different from being a novel of purpose. This excites emotion; that endeavours to excite thought.

The novel of purpose selects a thesis which is to be suggested, impressed, or proved to the mind; and this is its main end—the conviction of the understanding. It projects a plot involving some singular disclosures, some interesting series of events, and some engaging discovery or issue which encloses within itself the suggestion, proof, or impressiveness the given thesis requires. It awakens interest, excites desire for an end or consummation of a special sort; and the excitements of suspense ought only to chafe the mind into greater expectancy and earnestness of wish that the event may turn out as has been suggested to the emotions. It moves along the course of the plot, interweaving in the progress of the tale the necessary excitants to sympathy with the purpose involved, and with the several steps and issues that tend to bring

the consummation nearer. When the end has been gained, and the clearing-up has come, there is left behind, not the excitement of the tale merely, but the positive knowledge, conviction, or truth which it was the aim of the story to fix in the mind. It is quite easily seen that this requires an equal mastery over the emotions and the intellect in the author, as well as an equal activity of each in the reader. The novel reader indulges in his pleasure for the pleasure, not for the profit; and he is not likely, therefore, to give equal heed to the profit intended as the plot involved; and in the author it must be more difficult to hold both steeds and drive than to manage one only. Hence, sensational novels are superior to novels of purpose, because they are specially adapted to their one end—pleasure. We read a story for its interest, not for its purpose. When we desire to gain an idea of how political economy affects life, we do not read Miss Martineau's "Illustrations of Political Economy," clever though they are. The didactic element continually impedes the plot-interest, and hence it is that most novel readers become skilful in the art of skipping. A novel to be good may be instructive, but it must not be didactic; precisely in the measure of its didactiveness, is illusion—the charm of the novel—destroyed. Sermons in novels are as much out of place as novels in sermons—a little of the illustrative caught from the novel may heighten the relish of the preacher's address, and a little of the sombre shadow from the sermon may heighten the brilliancy of the narrative parts; but they have separate aims, and follow different laws in their formation.

Besides all this, a novel with a purpose is from its very nature a breach of the conditions of art. In ordinary life we never see or know the purpose which animates the characters which surround us; nor do we find all the parties concerned working towards the teaching of some grand lesson. The purposes of men are concealed and held free from question, and any representation of life which gives effect to a purpose violates one of the first principles of novel literature likeness to a section of life. The novel is the prose epic of human nature, and the epic is not a treatise on philosophy or morals. The novel exhibits human passion in action as a game of chance and skill; but the author of a novel with a purpose throws with loaded dice, and evidently plays a rehearsed game of chess, all the moves of which have been pre-calculated and marked off, set in their order, and shifted in their courses with a fixed design—a design altogether apart from the game, and having an interest quite distinct from it. If we wish truly to teach, we must accept the conditions of teaching; and we ought not to beguile ourselves into the acquisition of knowledge as a pastime instead of a principle. Teacher and taught ought alike to face each other as such; and it is especially unbecoming in the teacher to pretend to be what he is not. When Mitford made the "History of Greece" the vehicle for advocating toryism, and Macaulay gave the "Lyre of History" a screw in favour of whiggery, we heard it objected

that history was not a partisan, and the authors were censured accordingly. When Charles Kingsley takes to preaching Christian socialism in "Alton Locke," instead of in sermons, which might or might not attract the notice of convocation—or when Mrs. Gaskell protests against strikes in "Mary Barton; a Tale of Manchester Life,"—have we not an equal right to complain that we are being allured and enticed into a debate having a foregone conclusion, and in which all the elements have been pre-arranged for prejudicing the case? If so, the novel with a purpose is condemnable, not commendable.

A novel of purpose requires a restriction of plot and character much greater than that demanded by the sensational novel. In the former, *result* is the chief end; in the latter, effect and *event*. In the former the plot must *grow* out of the purpose and result in the establishment of the principle; in the latter the plot must *proceed* in accordance with the natural order of events; the latter may include the element of accident, but the former cannot. The presence of accident interferes with purpose, for we cannot be brought to believe that accident is intentional. It is obvious, therefore, that, so far as the novel is a story, it has a wider range of plot than can be introduced when we make it a story and something else. This something else, however good in its own place, is always in the way when it is not wanted, and makes itself felt as an annoyance. This interferes with coherence; and the demand made upon the mind of the writer to sustain, and the reader to remember at once the plot and the argument, is such as to occasion a decided failure in novels of purpose,—as indeed is the case with everything which attempts to do two things with one agent. The need for dexterity of application as well as for excellence of narration complicates the labour and injures the efficiency of the agent. It is then as certain, as that divided effort fails in effectiveness, that novels of purpose are inferior to sensational novels.

The choice of probable incidents, and the range of properly individualized characters are far wider in sensational novels than in those of purpose, because these characters and incidents, which may conjoin to the production of an event, it may be quite impossible to bring together under the pressure of a purpose, and in furtherance of the same design. It may be noticed, also, that the novelist does not necessarily require to be an advocate, and that it is a far more difficult task to wind two balls of logic together than to roll one—the logic of events with all their inexorability, and the logic of advocacy with its endless adaptations to a given end. The skilful evolution of a plot may be within the scope of a writer, while the skilful conducting of an argument may not lie within the limits of his capacity. The incidence of argument, too, must follow the incidents of the story, and the interest of the tale must be subdued to the proposed advocacy. The preservation of this coincidence of plot and purpose puts difficulties in the way of author and reader. Now, the communication of purpose ought to

be direct and immediate; it ought to be imparted fairly and honestly. To insinuate a good purpose through the intervention of fiction is obtaining, or at least endeavouring to obtain, persuasion under false pretences. As a principle of art, unity of aim is essential to a great work—to tell a story as a means of conviction violates that principle by introducing duality of aims.

The judgment on a novel with a purpose is taken on a wrong issue—on its polemic, not its poetic merits—so that works which, as portraiture of human life, have no claims to consideration, are as polemical tracts applauded to the stars. Take the series of novels written by the prize-takers of the Scottish Temperance League—all of which have been largely lauded as able tales, excellent novels, &c., while often displaying an ignorance of even the elementary principles of human nature in the wonder realms of emotion and will. Look at the tales issued by the Anti-Corn-Law League, too; they tell the same story. We may also point to the battle of the novels carried on between the high church and the low church as proofs that novels of purpose are in themselves violations of art, if not of truth. Very notable in regard to this argument is the case of what may be called the *Whately*, as contrasted with the *Waverley* novels. The latter grand series were composed as stories—they are sensational novels in their best sense, that is to say, they are tales told to be perused for the interest felt in their plots, and for their verisimilitude; the former course, though produced with much care and consideration, produced no sensation at all. It was the same with Mrs. Stowe's *Uncle Tom*; the purpose gave it a run, but the mighty magic has gone out of it, and it has become almost as dull as *Dred*, and quite as unexciting as her "*Sunny Memories of Foreign Lands*."

It cannot have escaped the notice of any one who has seen any one addicted to novel reading, that the plot was all in all; nor can anyone have read novels much himself without remembering how frequently he sighed over the long-drawn descriptions, and the dissertations which occupied pages, to his great discomfort, and how he got to knowing, by the compact type, and the non-appearance of the names of the interesting characters, to omit the "padding," and get to the gist of the adventure again. No one can have "taken stock" of a circulating library in which novels abound, without knowing that there are long passages in many of those which have no thumb-marks, and have undergone little trouble in having their contents extracted, while other parts are bethumbed to the very point of being outworn. No one can fail to observe how carefully critics refrain from telling the plot of a good novel. Well, all these observations converge to the proof of the same fact—that it is for their sensational elements novels are read, that the novel reader is intolerant of anything else, and eagerly avoids it, and hence that the novels of sensation are as superior to novels of purpose, as things which accomplish their due aims duly are superior to those which, even if they accomplish their end at

all, do so under continual protest and irritation of those in whom the effect is wrought. Because we are eager to know life, we seek sensational novels and avoid didactic ones. C. H. S.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE—II.

"Fictions may be divided, and again cross-divided, into many different genera, according to the principles on which the different classifications are founded. They may be divided, for instance, as to their form, into narrative and dramatic; as to the emotions which they propose to excite, into serious, comic, and satirical; as to the instrument which they employ, into verse and prose; as to subjects which they paint, into elevated and familiar; as to their matter, into allegorical, historical, and purely invented; as to their premises, or the state of things which they pre-suppose, into supernatural and real; and lastly, as to their peculiar merits, into those whose principal aim is excellence in plot, in characters, or in scenery."* Another arrangement has been proposed by one of the practisers of the art of story-telling, which deserves quotation and attention:—"It is when we compare works of imagination in writing with works of imagination on the canvas, that we can best form a critical idea of the different schools which exist in each; for common both to the author and the painter are those styles which we call the familiar, the picturesque, and the intellectual. By recurring to this comparison, we can, without much difficulty, classify works of fiction in their proper order, and estimate the rank they should severally hold."†

Having given the critic and the artist's classification, let us now look at the philosopher's:—"From the exceeding variety of the prose fiction, it is difficult to design well marked types. The religious allegory of Bunyan is a distinct kind. Other species are the pastoral novel (Sidney's *Arcadia*), the sentimental novel (Richardson, &c.), the satirical novel (Swift), the comic and also satirical (Fielding, Smollett, Thackeray), the historical novel (Scott, Bulwer). But each writer of fiction usually embodies all the kinds of interest suited to their genius, with slight reference to a type. There is a real difference made in choosing the subject from the present or from the past; the one tends to imitation and reality, the other to identity. Also the presence of a didactic purpose gives a character to the novel. The supernatural is rare in the prose fiction, and when attempted is considered a doubtful experiment."‡ Had we been composing a *critique* on novels, we might have compared and contrasted these various classifications; as it is, we do not require to do so. We have reproduced them to show how many varieties of novel may be enumerated in order that it may be seen how difficult it is to debate the question under its present heading, in consequence of the possibility of cross-divisions, unless the line of demarcation drawn for us be accepted by the contro-

* N. W. Senior's "Essays on Fiction," p. 189.

† Lord Lytton, in the preface to "The Last of the Barons."

‡ A. Bain's "English Composition and Rhetoric," p. 233.

versialists. All schools of fiction are, however, to be regarded by us as capable of being ultimately reduced to the two great classes given us as the subject of debate now—(1) Sensational novels; (2) Novels with a purpose, or plot novels and preachment novels.

The plot novel is honest. It recognizes the fact that fiction is the nutriment and delight of the imagination: that life is the main element of interest in fiction, and that life manifests itself in event; that the intricacies and complexities of plot, passion, and circumstance form the great attractions of life, and therefore of all representations of life—dramatic, epic, or novelistic. The recognition of this fact in fiction is the ground of the delight which the perusal of it brings. It is well known that the circumstances, surroundings, and pressing everyday incidents in which men find themselves are sometimes in accord with their aims, in concord with their powers, or in discord with their desires and ambitions; that sometimes by passive endurance they may abide their time and seize the circumstances in their evolution which favour and reward their patience by giving them the success they seek; and that sometimes by active energy and working skilfulness they may link on the success of their individual schemes with the great whole of the circumstances in operation around them. In this interplay of passive suffering and active endeavour, and in the effectiveness or ineffectiveness thereof in the production of a desirable event lie the chief recommendation of the novel as an excitant and as a work of art.

The novel with a purpose is dishonest. It proposes the evolution of thought through the evolution of plot, and it proffers a demonstration of some truth or opinion through the imagination. But it is not the duty of the imagination to discern truth; nor is it possible for it to attempt such a task without great injury at once to itself and to truth. Because: Firstly, imagination is concerned only with likenesses and similarities, with appearances and representations; it is not called upon nor is it able to give judgment upon realities, especially on the reality of a course of thought being a demonstration; and secondly, such a course degrades truth to a level with mere analogy and imaginative vraisemblance, and so causes a misapprehension of what truth is. Even when it does not propose to prove, but only to illustrate the truth of an opinion, it is dishonest, inasmuch as it comes in the disguise of a novel when it ought to present itself as a treatise; while there always underlies it the fallacy that imagination is fictile, that it can work as it listeth in the production of its events, while reality is textile and must possess a certain coherence with all that goes before, surrounds, and comes after. We can make excellent designs, but they must be adapted to the material, the appliances, and the uses before they can be woven into fabrics of value. A novel of purpose is such a design; but it leaves unsolved the chief difficulty as to how this thought, opinion, or practice is to be inwrought into the human life we must lead.

The novel of events, otherwise called the sensational novel, is capable of the unity and harmony of high art; the didactic novel, i.e., the novel of purpose, is incapable of such unity and harmony. It has not a single aim, it has not the processes of the plot only to attend to, but the processes of the argument or the persuasion to work out and arrange. These, however capable of being evolved properly as separate elements, demand a complex evolution when they are conjoined, and involve additional difficulty in the production, as well as additional intricacy in the form of the novel. It therefore sins against the first great principle of art, simplicity; and it cannot bring into co-existence and harmony the elements of plot from so wide a range or from so vast a field. The novel of sensation is bounded altogether by the possible, and beyond that it must not step—unless by agreement of imagination, as in the romance, where imaginary beings may be introduced; but it is advisable for it also to submit to the farther limitation of the probable, and if it does so, it is lawful for it to do whatsoever seemeth unto it good. The novel of purpose, however, by the very necessities of the case, cuts up the probable into sub-sections, and must limit itself within one or other of these sub-sections—that, namely, in which the special idea might work its effects; thus a sectarian novel, a radical novel, a conservative novel, a novel on political economy, and a novel dealing with the reform of the marriage laws, &c., all necessitate a more restricted plot than those merely of event.

The novel of purpose, from its very nature, can never get hold of the minds of those whom it is desirable to affect by it—namely, those who doubt the opinion which it endeavours to substantiate. A novel is confessedly ideal and imaginary; it may be founded on facts, but it does not narrate facts in the order of causation and occurrence—in the order of real life. On this account it is always open to an objector to say that the aggregate of circumstances and effects is planned and pre-ordained according to the will of the author, and not according to the real disposition of things in actual life. There is thus always an outlet given from under the pressure of the purpose; and an appeal is always open to the imagination to provide an opposite set of conditions which would result in teaching a different lesson; for the lessons of social life are not so single and solitary as the novel of purpose must represent them to be. Once more, the harmony of things and the harmony of truth must both be exhibited in the novel of purpose as clearly tending to the same end; and the novel of purpose must therefore fit in the plot to suit the theory of life which each one must accept, as well as to fit the particular purpose in view; for if the purpose conflicts with any general theory, it has all that to contend against in gaining acceptability to the mind. We cannot hesitate, then, to believe that sensational novels are superior to novels of purpose, because the former fulfil one end more thoroughly and with less liability to exception or exceptionality than the latter.

A. A. R.

Toiling Upward.

ALEXANDER SMITH, POET, ESSAYIST, AND
JOURNALIST.

"And tho' that he was worthy, he was wise,
And of his port as meke as is a mayde;
He never yet no vilanie ne sayde
In alle his lif, unto no manere wight,—
He was a veray parfit gentil knight."

Chaucer's Prologue to "Canterbury Tales."

"**LAST LEAVES**" are words of mournful sound in whatsoever manner they are uttered. The signification is suggestive of the regret of the past, the pressing pathos of the present, and the sadness of bereavement. *Last* is so near a companion in sound and thought to lost, and then "of joys departed, never to return, how bitter the remembrance." *Leaves* that were full of life, that glinted their little day in the sunshine, shone in beauty to the eye, and made music with the breeze, that were the signs of vigour and health, and held nestled among them the fruits of the tree of a life! *Last Leaves* speak of decay and death, of function finished, and of mingling with the earth-mould; *Last Leaves* express the heartache of the living for the lost and the dead. Such were the impressions which flitted, in a sort of dreamy, semi-consciousness, while we held in our hand, yet unopened, the book which suggested them and the present article—for it spoke of one on whom December had fallen while it was yet May.

In a handsome volume of upwards of 450 pages, under the title of "*Last Leaves*," published by W. P. Nimmo, and edited by Patrick Procter Alexander, we have a reissue of the latest productions—essays, sketches, criticisms, and poems—of Alexander Smith. It is a work which possesses much interest, and which ought to be perused with thoughtful care by all those who feel an interest in the lives of those who think, by all those to whom the progress of mind is matter of reflection, and by all those who know the mighty enchantment which resides in well-written biography and in the writings which have been produced with the tremble of early death in the hand and brain of the penman who had even then scarcely taken a step beyond the midway journey of human life, and who felt at once "the age of the gods" in his spirit and the age of exhaustion in his brain. A short, toil-filled, honour-attaining life was that of Alexander Smith from the New year's-eve on which he was born to the Twelfth night's-eve on which he underwent "transference," not "cessation."

Alexander Smith was born in a small thatched house near the foot of Douglas-street, Kilmarnock, one of the largest towns in the county of Ayr. 31st December, 1829. Kilmarnock is noted in Scottish literary history for having given forth from its press the first edition of Burns' *Poems*. He was the eldest child of his parents, Peter Smith and Helen Murray, the former of whom was a native of Old Rome, a village in the neighbourhood of Kilmarnock, and was at the time of his son's birth a pattern drawer in one of the calico-printing establishments for which Kilmarnock is now more famous than for its "cowls" and its "wabsters." The young couple had settled in Douglas-street at the preceding Whitsunday term. Kilmarnock was a place of great stir about the time of the passing of the Reform Bill, but shortly after that it suffered a shock of dulness in trade, which caused the Smiths to seek elsewhere the means of providing for themselves and their growing youngsters. This they found in 1834, in Paisley (the *Greysley* of his "Alfred Hagart's Household"), a town redolent of poetic memories and influences—of Alexander Wilson and Robert Tannahill, John Wilson (Christopher North), &c., and there in a short time after their removal, Alexander took his place in school, where "the dominie, in rusty black—who twenty years ago had given up all hope of a kirk—was busy teaching, setting copies, hearing complaints, punishing culprits, and ruling as best he could his murmuring kingdom, began to initiate him into "the world of words." In the course of time, by the combined aid of monitor and master, he acquired a fair ability to read, write, and cipher, and was even tempted to attempt Latin and mathematics. Another removal to Kilmarnock occasioned the interruption of his school-days, and brought him into the days of toil. He was employed in Bailie Geddes' print work as a *putter-on* or assistant to the block-printer in his operations; but this stroke of work lasted only for a short time, and they got back to Paisley again, where he entered the pattern-drawing shop in which his father was engaged, as an apprentice, and where, with the dream of a Scottish kirk pulpit in the distance, he took to learning in the evening classes, which supplied in Paisley so much of the educational necessities of those who were early yoked to the loom, seated at the desk, put behind the counter, or otherwise set to labour when little, if at all entered into their teens. Fluctuations abound in the calico-printing districts, and in the shawl trade of Paisley similar uncertainty reigns, and it is an object of just desire in a working life to get into a district where from the variety of occupations going on in it, any stagnation in trade may fall more lightly, because there may be compensating activity in other branches. By the removal of the family to Glasgow, Alexander was brought within physical eyesight of the university; but a failure in his health, which had previously affected him, again put the power of severe study beyond his reach, and he was compelled to fix down his aims, as it appeared to follow the indications of fate, and content himself to be a designer of patterns for muslin

and lace, the employment procured for him in Queen-street, Glasgow. It was a difficult task to kill down the higher ambitions of his spirit, and though the pulpit faded into the dim inane, the love of books and of bookish interests remained with him. He would be about seventeen or so when he became a member of the Addisonian Literary Improvement and Debating Society, and felt the tremor and delight of companionship in the consideration of books and men, and in the development of thought and skill. He was a quiet and earnest listener, and seldom spoke, though when he did, he usually achieved some felicitous expression which indicated power and acuteness, and he not unfrequently endeavoured to be waggish, with no great success unless in the quieter sorts of sarcasm. Probably about this time he was misled by an intimacy formed with a young gentleman who purveyed local sayings and jests for a newspaper of some repute in the city called the *Citizen*, and edited by Mr. James Hedderwick, author of "*Lays of Middle Age*," and one of the most accomplished literary men in the city, the great friend and patron of the literary aspirants of the West of Scotland; but in wit, except of a very serious kind, Smith did not, at this time, if he ever did, excel.

One of his Addisonian essays is specially memorable to all who heard it, as displaying great epic talent in conception, although somewhat perhaps inflated in style and thin in the substrate of thought it contained. The subject was "History," and the essay opened with a descriptive sketch of Rome, principally suggested by Byron's "*Childe Harold*," it might be, in which the essayist figured himself to be a wanderer who had set his foot, I think, on the ruins of the Palace of the Cæsars while the full moon was shining on temple, dome, pillar, and monument. There an "aged crone" was seated, leaning, seemingly asleep, on the top of his staff. The young enthusiast's soliloquising eloquence disturbed the old man's quiet, and he addressed the youth, whose head was uncovered in homage to the past. With more attention than youth commonly pays to age, he deferentially listened, and without any astonishment expressed, heard "the grey-haired hunter of the ruins" tell that he remembered when those mighty piles were built, when the city was founded, and how events proceeded till some prisoners from the land of Palestine brought tidings of a strange and wondrous One who had but shortly died, and in whose name they spoke of glories greater than Cæsar's, and a King of kings. Then followed the tale of the persecutions, of the conquest of Christianity in Rome, of the spread through the nations of the power of the monarch of the triple crown, of the pomp and magnificence of Rome, and of the crash of eloquence with which on one All Hallows' Eve the firm base of the Roman Empire was shivered by the voice of a Bible-reading monk. It was old Father Time, the world's historian, with whom he had an interview.

This hint of the imaginative splendour that was in him not a little astonished some of his clerkly friends and counting-house comrades,

and not long afterwards it was whispered about that Alexander Smith had then been actually figuring in "the poet's corner" of *The Citizen* for a while. The Rev. John Macfarlane (now of Clapham), under whose ministry Smith sat, took notice of him, but narrow circumstances formed an unconquerable bar to the aim not even then finally relinquished of proceeding through a university course. The literary *cacoethes* still irritated his fingers, handling the pencil for bread without much liking for it, but as a staver-off of direr things, and yearning to purl down the songs that made their way into his brain. He became an omnivorous reader, a haunter of book-stalls, and one of the rare men who endeavoured to form opinions for themselves on books and subjects. He heard George Gilfillan with admiration, and Isaac Taylor on the Hebrew poets with the curious awe of a neophyte; while Professor J. P. Nichol's splendid prose poems on astronomy fascinated him. *Hogg's Instructor*, *The Eclectic*, and *The Critic* were then in high vogue, and of all three the Rev. George Gilfillan was a leading contributor. He had soared into a fame as a literary critic, second only to that of Hazlitt, and "Young Glasgow" in its debating and other society was pre-eminently Gilfillanized. Smith, with his yearning for a lettered life, appealed to George Gilfillan for an honest opinion of the likelihoods of anything being in him which the world would care to hear. We are glad to be able to give George Gilfillan's own account of this step and its results.

"One day in the spring of 1851 some poetry was handed me in from Glasgow, along with a short note signed 'Alexander Smith.' The handwriting was unformed and straggling, and there was nothing at first sight to distinguish the MS. from the masses I was continually receiving. I threw it aside for, I dare say, two months, when, taking it up accidentally, I began to read, and was so fascinated that I could not forbear reading the whole. My first impressions, however, were peculiar, for I remember asking myself repeatedly, 'Can this be the author's own? have I not surely read something like this before?' And when I wrote him I expressed some such feeling of surprise, along with warm approbation. His reply, which, unfortunately, I have lost, was long, minute, interesting, and gave me such an impression of the sincerity of the youth (he was then, he told me, only twenty-two) that I thought if a plagiarist at all, he was so unconsciously. I wrote him again, and made him promise to send me more of his compositions. In the autumn he forwarded me two additional poems, since incorporated in the 'Life Drama,' 'The Garden and the Child,' and 'The Page and the Lady,' which I thought first-rate, and much superior to the former, which were fragmentary, while the latter not only approximated to wholes, but possessed dramatic and storied interest. Writing shortly after an article in the *Eclectic Review* on 'Recent Poets,' I introduced the name of Smith, and quoted some of his scattered beauties. This produced considerable effect, as was proved by the fact, of which Smith himself informed me, of an intelligent and accomplished Englishman—whose name I could give—who travelled all the way to Glasgow for the sole purpose of finding the poet out.

"In October, 1851, I called on him in Glasgow, bringing with me the two

poems referred to, and offering, if he chose, to show them to my friend the late Professor Nichol. This I did. The Professor highly approved of them, invited Smith to his house, and became a steadfast friend. During the winter, Smith was still sending me poetry; and in the early spring of 1853 I wrote a paper or two in the *London Critic*, under the title, 'A New Poet in Glasgow,' in which I did not merely print short extracts, or 'italicise' beauties, but quoted entire poems, such as the two above-mentioned and a third, greatly admired at the time, entitled 'The Old Manor House,' which also may now be found in the 'Life Drama.' This was a turning point in his history. A gentleman in Glasgow—Mr. Daniel Lawson—procuring for himself copies of my paper in the *Critic*, circulated them widely in that city. The Glasgow journals, headed by the *Citizen*—where, by the way, a short poem by Smith had appeared some years before—began to sound his praises. The London literary coteries heard of his name, and some of their number were highly pleased with the extracts they read in the *Critic*. Mr. David Bogue, the London publisher—since dead—wrote Smith, offering him £100 for the MS. of his poem when completed. Encouraged by this generous offer, he spent the rest of 1852 in finishing the work. It appeared in 1853. He sent me a copy, along with a note, of which I remember the words, 'But for you, no poem of mine would ever have seen the light.'"

The poet's fame "jumped into summer all at once." The critics were all but unanimous in his favour, and the bright sensuous glow of many of the passages dazzled and delighted many of those who had grown tired of the maudlin sentimentality of the verse of the day, and felt the realism, not the reality of the poetry. At first its repetitions and its echoes did not so much strike as the glow and the glare of the diction, the hectic flush, and the throbbing pulse, but on calmer reperusal, the juvenility and the imitativeness, as was to be expected, made themselves felt. All demurrers aside, however, as was said in this serial at the time, "that Mr. Smith is potentially a poet" his "work will amply prove;" "the true poetic instinct dwells within him," and the book possesses "beauties which should recommend it to every young man desirous of encouraging youthful genius." The justice of our review—thought by some at the time a little too restrained in its praises—was afterwards acknowledged by the poet, and the advice given in it was pursued. It would be agreeable to quote from it, but its beauties are now well known, but we may adduce one passage to show how the influences of youthful interests transmute themselves into poetry in after days. Those who have looked from the hills of Dundonald and taken in the sea view there, may say with him—

"I stood afar upon the grassy hills,—
I saw the country with its golden slopes,
And woods and streams run down to meet the sea;
I saw the basking ocean skimmed with light;
I saw the surf upon the distant sands
Silent and white as snow. Above my head
A lark was singing 'neath a sunny cloud,
Around the playing winds."

"Of 'The Life Drama,' it is said, ten thousand have been sold at home and thirty thousand abroad, bringing a fame beyond the bliss of dreams, and something much more substantial. For the copy-right of the book the poet received from Mr. Bogue £100 a sum which was afterwards supplemented according to the success of the work, as it ran through successive editions, to what precise extent I have forgotten, if ever I knew. £100! It is a small sum; but to a young gentleman whose breeches pocket thrills with it for the first time, it seems a considerable bit of money, with more good prospective spending in it than £1000 a year or two after. One's first £100 is somewhat like one's first love, and is consecrated for ever in memory in connection with a good deal of folly and rapture. Of Smith's raptures with his first £100 nobody could possibly know anything; for the reason that, except on paper to the public, he never indicated rapture, or even the germ of a capacity for it. His folly, so far as I know of it, amounted to this, that—a thing from the first preordained and inevitable—he cut decisively the pattern-designing concern, in which, to say sooth, his forte did not greatly lie, as surmising that literature, in one or the other form of it, was marked out for him as his proper career; and farther, as second item, that his time being thus at his own disposal, and the necessary funds in hand, he considered a trip to London might be allowable, taking the lake or Wordsworth country on the way." ("Last Leaves," pp. 51—53.)

On this tour Smith was accompanied by Professor John Nichol, son of the author of "The Architecture of the Heavens." They passed through the lake district of Cumberland, with all its literary memories, and visited Miss Martineau; they wished to pass thence to the Bronte country (Haworth), but found a visit would be unsuitable. At Forest House, Nottingham, they called on Philip James Bailey, for whom Smith entertained a high respect, as indeed he might, for *Festus* had stirred in him the poetic unrest out of which "The Life Drama" took issue. In London they visited, among others, Mr. G. H. Lewes, who had given the young poet hearty encouragement in *The Leader*, and defended him against the depreciations of *The Athenæum*; Mr. James Lowe, editor of *The Critic*, in which the genius of Smith got its earliest outlet; Mr. Herbert Spencer, the philosopher; Mr. Helps, and many others of those who shape the world's thoughts in serial, periodical, and book. They saw something of the book world and the sights of the metropolis, and felt the thrill of the life of London.

On his return to Glasgow, Smith was invited to visit the Duke of Argyll at Inverary Castle, and in some of the autumn weeks enjoyed the hospitality of the author of "The Reign of Law;" and then, having like Burns "dinnered with a lord," he returned to Glasgow to look for a career. He had gathered around him many friends of literary aspirations and ability, notably Patrick Procter Alexander, A.M., editor of these "Last Leaves," author of "Criticism on Mill, and Carlyle, &c., and Hugh MacDonald, one of the

sweetest minor Scottish poets of this age, of whom Alexander Smith wrote a notice in *Macmillan's Magazine*, and whose biography he was to have written; James Hedderwick, whom we have already mentioned as the singer of "The Lays of Middle Age"—

"Fair time of calm resolve—of sober thought

Quiet half-way hostlery on life's long road ;"

The ingenious and eloquent J. P. Nichol and his gifted son; M. Provan, the main establisher of the Glasgow Athenæum, a literary institute which promised well; Professor Lushington, the laureate's brother-in-law, in whose house he had met Mr. Ruskin, &c., &c. For a little while before his fame dawned he had endeavoured to slide into letters as the editor of *The Scottish Athenæum*, a paper projected by Robert Buchanan, and supported by his son Robert Buchanan, author of *London Lyrics*, &c., but that had failed after a very short life, as almost every literary adventure in Glasgow has for the last half-century—from its disbelief in local genius and its taste for trading in imports. Motherwell, Mackay, Weir, Atkinson, Carrick, Bennett, and many others had striven to keep up a local serial; but Paisley and Dumfries could sustain a magazine when the Cottonopolis of Scotland could not support one. Again, another attempt was made in another form to "float" another serial, as a means of gathering the Glasgow circle of readers to the aid of the youthful climber of Parnassus. Luckily, an incident occurred elsewhere which rendered the risk of another failure unnecessary. We refer to the election of Alexander Smith to the Secretaryship of the University of Edinburgh early in 1854.

"For any little place of this kind," says P. P. Alexander, the competitors in these days are numerous; even in regard of literature, more than one of those pitted against him had very considerable claims; and the contest was somewhat of a keen one." Mr. James Hedderwick enlisted in his favour the powerful aid of Robert Chambers. Sydney Dobell, author of "The Roman," "Balder," &c., personally canvassed the electors in his favour, Dr. John Macfarlane stirred for him the influence of Mr. W. H. Macfarlane, famous as a lithographer, and a considerable amount of pressure in his behalf was brought to bear on Duncan MacLaren, then Lord Provost of the city of Edinburgh. He was well furnished with arguments in favour of the poetic candidate—the neglect of Burns and the atonement Scotland owed for that great error of the past forming one of his most effective topics. Smith was chosen to fill the vacancy, and Edinburgh gained a poet while Glasgow lost one who was able to shed over the "tragic hearts of towns" the consecration of poetic light—as it has lost David Gray and Robert Buchanan since. On 18th February, 1854, his Glasgow friends entertained him at a dinner in the Tontine Hotel, for the purpose of "expressing the high esteem in which Mr. Smith was deservedly held in the literary world as a poet, and in private life as a man."

In Edinburgh Smith was welcomed heartily, although in that same year there issued from the press of Messrs. Blackwood, and from

the pen of Professor W. E. Aytoun, a broad, vigorous, slashing, satirical work, in ridicule of Gilfillan, Bailey, Dobell, Massey, and Smith, entitled "Firmilian; a Spasmodic Tragedy," by T. Percy Jones. It was a hard stroke, but Smith bore it bravely; Aytoun came afterwards to know Smith better, and was anxious to help, and indeed did help him by an introduction to *Blackwood's Magazine* in the best and most friendly way. Of this affair in literature and its effects Smith subsequently wrote thus:—

"Ten years ago the readers of the magazines and critical reviews could hardly fail to encounter unfavourable strictures on what was called the 'Spasmodic School of Poetry.' The three or four writers supposed to constitute that 'school' were, at the period referred to, passing through the fires of exhortation, reproof, and parody. The nickname was the invention of a brilliant poet and wit, recently gone to his rest; and it had a nickname's best prosperity—it stuck. That this said nickname had, in some rough obvious manner, hit off the salient characteristics and defects of the 'school' was evident from the favour with which it was received. The quaint brain of Professor Aytoun shaped the happy phrase; and immediately thereafter the three or four writers were everywhere recognised as 'spasmodists.' . . . Nothing tells like a nickname which catches the popular ear, and which is called out at every street corner. The nickname 'spasmodic school' grew popular, and in a short time it became the critical stock-in-trade of provincial newspapers, just as if they had been its sole inventors, and had taken out a patent for its exclusive use. For a while no one of the writers could air himself in public in a volume of verse, however staid and hum-drum, without the cry of 'spasmodist' being raised, here, there, and everywhere, so loudly that he was glad to retreat again into his shell. All this is a matter of ten years ago. For seven years past the magazine reader has heard nothing of the 'spasmodic school,'—it is the lost pleiad of the critical firmament. Oblivion distributeth her poppies with an equal hand. 'Firmilian,' too, has been forgotten in these years. The nicknamed and the nicknamer sleep in the same forgetfulness of reviews—like foemen in one grave." (*Last Leaves*, pp. 171-2).

The paper from which the foregoing extract is made is on Sydney Dobell, and it contains a modest defence and a wise criticism. Sydney Dobell and Smith, on the breaking out of the Crimean war, entered into a sort of literary partnership, and published a volume of "Sonnets on the War," which, though not precisely sonnets in the technical sense, but ideas or emotions expressed in fourteen lined stanzas, met with some appreciation, and showed at least that they had not been laughed out of countenance.

Edinburgh is a city in which letters and sociality combine readily, and the several *sets* of those who devote themselves less or more to literature and art are highly clubbable. It has been so from old time, when Carlyle, and Home, and Hume, and Smith, and Blair, held literary evenings; that tradition has been continued in the *Noctes Ambrosianæ*; and the due effects of that tradition are felt in that city to this day; so that nowhere else, probably, is any "lion" likely to be fêted to the same extent as in Edinburgh, if he gets fairly introduced into the proper circles. Of this for a while Smith

had enough, and more than enough. He loved better, however, the social converse and criticism, the frank and genial friendship which he met at "The Raleigh Club," of which he was the secretary, and among the members, of which he was the prime spirit, and the chief favourite, though by no means either the loudest, the most talkative, the wittiest, or the wisest—only the heartiest.

About this time, Smith began to feel that prose was not a paying commodity, and that, like other luxuries, it can only be indulged in at great cost. As the salary accruing from his secretaryship was only £150, and as Edinburgh is not a place remarkable for the economy with which life is conducted, he cast about for some means of making literature pay. This was only to be done by writing prose, and to the production of prose he devoted himself. He became a contributor to *The London Review*, *The Morning Star*, *The Glasgow Citizen*, *The Edinburgh Evening Courant* (under the editorship of James Hannay, who paid a kindly tribute to Smith's memory in *Cassell's Magazine*), *The Caledonian Mercury*, &c., among newspaper; to *The West of Scotland Magazine*, *The Museum*, *The Quiver*, *The Argosy*, *MacMillan*, *Blackwood*, *The North British Review*, and *Good Words*, he became, as time went on, a frequent contributor and an acceptable one; and besides all this he composed some articles for the latest edition of "The Encyclopædia Britannica," many memoirs for "Mackenzie's Biographical Dictionary," and a great number of papers for "Chamber's Encyclopædia." But he would not altogether abandon poetry. "He was one—

That could not help it—for it was his nature
To blossom into song, as 'tis a tree's
To leaf itself in April."

So, though toiling through the long hours at the necessity of prose, and making for himself a quaint and quiet style, he still stole delightful moments to be given to the muses, and in 1857 he produced his "City Poems," for which MacMillan gave £200. This work was severely handled in *The Athenæum*, and the charges of wholesale plagiarism, which had been made against him in the same literary organ, were reiterated and reaffirmed. Mr. Lewes defended him in *The Leader*, and Mr. Shirley Brooks, in a smart paper in *Punch*, spoke up for the accused; and in "Last Leaves," Mr. Alexander makes a very able reply for the defence, not only in the text of his memoir but in an *appendix* on the point.

In this same year Smith married "Miss Flora MacDonald from Skye, eldest daughter of Mr. MacDonald of Ord, and nearly akin by blood to the historic heroine of that name." This marriage was a most happy one. After having settled in his own homestead he resolved on a retrieval of his poetic fame, and, having fixed upon a subject in English History suitable for poetical purposes, devoted himself for four years to the production of his most carefully elaborated poem, "Edwin of Deira." This work had the

misfortune to be preceded by the Laureate's "Idylls of the King," and the odious comparison by which the charges of plagiarism and imitativeness are usually sustained were again producible with even greater force than before. It is well known to Smith's intimates that the work was planned, and a very considerable amount of it produced; that, in point of fact, its form and character were shaped, and much of the material of it in actual being prior to the issue of Tennyson's sweet, melodious song. The talent and the genius in Smith's "Edwin" is much greater than in any of his other productions, though as it was composed under severe self-restraint against anything like spasmodism, it does not seize and possess one so much. But it is a nobler instance of self-control than can easily be found in the annals of poesy—it is seldom the *forte* of poets to bridle in their Pegasus, and to subordinate its flights by principle and intent. The net pecuniary result of this four years' labour was—£15 5s. 3d., for the volume was issued on the half-profit system.

"From this time forward Smith's "Biography" resolves itself pretty much into this—the appearance of his books before the public; the emergence in his pleasant home at Wardie of a series of little baby faces, dearly welcomed, as the reader may suppose. Daily, with dreadful regularity, he paced his way up to college; despatched what might chance to be his work there; and, with a regularity perhaps a little less positively dreadful, paced his meditative way home again. In the evening what literary work might be on hand would be gone in upon, subject always, as hinted to interruptions of the social good-fellow or fiend, who, dropping idly in to kill his own evening, might now and then kill the poet's. In August he had a clear month of holiday, and almost always he passed it in Skye with his wife's relations, the whole household making joyous migration thither. His love for the misty island was intense. Its grand scenery profoundly impressed his imagination. The primitive modes of life, and the lingering of the old patriarchal relations—nearly everywhere else now as good as extinct—were matter to him of unfailing interest and amusement."—(*"Last Leaves,"* p. ix.)

It must be borne in mind that Smith was not professionally a literary man, and that he had not all his time and thoughts to devote to his productions. The daily round of daily duty had, as was right, the first claim and that had always to be done, done like the work of men who had nothing else to do than to acquit themselves of their wage-work, and then do what they listed. All those precious—as well as many merely time-serving and pot-boiling—productions were the result of the use of the leisure which other men devote to personal enjoyment, recruitment, &c., they are the winnings of the world from the life-hours as distinguished from the work-hours of the man—and, alas! in his case as in so many, they brought the death hour nearer by exhausting the recuperative energies of the frame and the brain. Little does the world know of the terrible toil with which its greedy pleasure is purveyed for, and by how many deaths the daily press, the weekly periodical, the

monthly magazine, the quarterly review, and the pamphlet or volume, which serves its time and is forgotten, is sustained. By its insatiability for news, amusement, and instruction, at high pressure and for the production of intellectual essences, the public puts a premium on death and fancies it pays for the headaches, the heart-aches, the cares and harassments of authorship, with the pennies it spends and by the praise it—occasionally—gives. There is no possible money-estimate of the life consumed in the service of literature, and there is no sorrow commensurate to the occasion of the daily-dying death which many men pass through in the, often vain, effort to arouse in spirit, inform, and benefit the people of this country, sometimes underpaid, often unthanked, and not unfrequently subjected to ridicule and disparagement.

In 1863 a collected edition of *Essays*, contributed to various periodicals, strung together by a thread of narrative—after the manner of Thomas Aird's "Old Bachelor," and "Helps' Friends in Council," was published by Mr. Strahan under the title of "Dreamthorpe." In 1865 he published his "Summer in Skye," the misty island of his wife's birth, and of the hours spent by him in the holiday-tide, which he regarded as "the Sabbath of the year." It is a hybrid-book—greatly in consequence of the publisher's desire that it should extend to two volumes, which it originally did—containing a curious combination of poetry, essay, character, sketching, and guide-book description, not very adequately moulded into artistic unity or grace, but full of fine expressions, subtle thinking, quaint turns, and evidences of a skilful pen, an acute eye, and a full mind. In the same year he prepared for Macmillan an edition of the poems of Burns, with a memoir, notes, and a glossary. The glossary has been got up with great care and labour; the notes are concise, discriminating, and judiciously selected; and the memoir is quiet, sagacious, collected, and pellucid; and it forms a strange contrast—this biography by one of the spasmodic school—with another memoir of the same great poet now publishing by a clergyman in Scotland, who surely must be the chief of some sort of rhapsodic school. The latter is flurried and hurried, inflated and extravagant, flushed with the colour of a spring night's sky, but as barren almost as an east wind. The former is plain, sensible, quietly flowing, suffused with the genial glow of sympathy, and free from bounce, pretence, counter-accusation, or sophistic apology, that sneaking egotistical thing which Burns abhorred.

"Alfred Hagart's Household" was planned in 1864, as a relief and a change and an endeavour to break into "fresh fields and pastures new." As a first effort in fiction it was highly successful, and it would have been more so had the original plan been steadfastly adhered to. But the publisher, finding the story a taking one, pressed for its extension, and hence there arose a need for racking the brain for incident and packing, which troubled the author, and broke the fine Idyllic simplicity of the tale. In

Hawkshead, Glasgow found itself vividly reproduced, and felt its Charlotte-street ennobled by the residence of Miss Macquarrie. Even the Paisley and Johnstone canal, an almost stagnant thing, became vital under the touch of the poet's finger; and, as Greysley, the centre of the shawl manufacture was pleased to find itself immortalized in fiction, as its environs had been immortalized in poetry; Spiggleton may be a disputable point between Neilston and Barrhead; even Kilmarnock having lent touches to it but Skye, is again the scene of glory in its pages, and out of the family experiences of the author not a little of the incidents have been chosen. With a dash of the autobiographic it acquires a realism which might have led to higher things hereafter. But the toil of brain which so many labours, all requiring writing up to a day, demanded, was too much for him. He had often felt, and once said—

“Before *me* runs a road of *toil*,
With my grave cut across.”

That which was poetry became prophecy, he begun to feel himself to be a “near neighbour unto death;” and his life seemed to him truly to be invested with—

“The marble pallor of a western sky.”

In his last volume of poems he has one addressed to Blaavin, a hill in Skye, very tender and sweet, in it the following foreboding lines occur:—

“O sweet is the spring wind, Blaavin,
When it loosens your torrents' flow,
When with one little touch of a sunny hand
It unclasps your cloak of snow,
O sweet is the spring wind, Blaavin,
And sweet it was to me—
For before the bell of the snowdrop
Or the pink of the apple tree—
Long before your first spring torrent
Came down with a flash and a whirl,
In the breast of its happy mother
There nestled my little girl.
O Blaavin, rocky Blaavin,
It was with the strangest start
That I felt, at the little querulous cry,
The new pulse awake in my heart;
A pulse that will live and beat, Blaavin,
Till, standing around my bed,
While the chirrup of birds is heard out in the dawn,
The watchers whisper, He's dead!
O another heart is mine, Blaavin,
Sin' this time seven year,
For life is brighter by a charm,
Death darker by a fear.”

The whisper has passed through his house at Wardie, and England has a poet the fewer. A dawn with the chirrup, let us hope, not of the bird but of the angel has dawned on him, and the black portal is passed.

Overwork told on him, the brain would not steady itself to the task, "copy" became irksome, and "proof" a trouble. The stroke of illness which embarrassed him in 1865 had touched him to the quick.

In 1866 he continued his secretarial labours, and wrote in several magazines, newspapers, &c., and did his quantity of hackwork much as usual, only with a deepening solemnity in his writings. His father-in-law was ailing, and he went for his August "out" of the neighbourhood of Dingwall, but even in the far recesses of the north the printer's devil found his way to him, and kept dunning for copy and impatient for proof. He returned to town and the duty, neither rested nor refreshed, no re-invigoration had entered into his mind, a low, jaded, half-alive feeling possessed him. On the 20th November, he was unable for duty, and his friend, the editor of "Last Leaves," kindly undertook the fulfilment of the routine work. Gastric fever and diphtheria had caught him, and he struggled in their toils, the latter was overcome but the former intensified its grip. The fever assumed a typhoid complexion, and despite the best efforts of the most skilful of the physicians of Edinburgh—amidst alternate glimpses of hope—he was taken firmly by the hand of death. With the dawning light of January 5th, 1867, he passed away from the day of effort and the impotence of life, to the place where death teaches things deeper than all lore. He was laid in his grave in Warriston cemetery, and over his remains there rises now a Runic cross, containing a medallion likeness in bronze, with the inscription, "Alexander Smith, poet and essayist." His "toil" is ended, and his fame is garnered; but the lesson of his life, when will it be learned and when attended to?

A word may be permitted to us regarding a book which has suggested and furnished this outline of a life of toil. It is emphatically a good book. It preserves to us in a handy substantial form some of Smith's best productions—his Essays on Scottish Ballads, on Dreams and Dreaming, Winter, Literary Work, Essayists, Old and New; his Critiques on the Minister Painter, Thomson of Duddingston, and Sydney Dobell; his description of the installation of Carlyle as Lord Rector of the Edinburgh University; as well as a Spring Chanson, and an unfinished companion-poem to "Glasgow" on "Edinburgh,"—a subject which has capacities exceeding almost any that is yet unsung. These and other matters fill 334 pages. But to these there is prefixed a memoir of Smith, occupying 132 pages, written with delicious grace for the most part and with genuine simplicity. It is not quite so characteristic as we might have expected from one who had studied Carlyle so thoroughly; for surely Smith was as capable of portraiture of the analytic and pertinent sort as John Sterling, but withal it is an

excellent sketch and full of interest. We might except to his cynicism as a little too *brusque* and somewhat laid on, and with regard to Smith's religious opinions more might have been said. Though he was not a philosopher he was sincere, though not a bigot he was impressed with a sense of holy service, and though not punctillious as to days and seasons he had a spirit of faith in him to which Mr. Alexander has scarcely done justice. We are glad to have this mournful gift, and we hope it may be long before the "Last Leaves" of Smith's wreath of fame shall wither in the memories of men.

The Topic.

OUGHT WE HAVE A CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS IN THE INTERESTS OF PUBLIC MORALITY?

AFFIRMATIVE.

NOTWITHSTANDING the floods of pure literature which are poured so plenteously over our land, there is such a love for the filthy and vile polluted streams of sensualism and infidelity, the records of crime and the novel of rascality, that something should be done to stop the flow of pestiferous trash along the low levels of life, where there is no restraining educatory principles active to save from the terrible evils of indulgence in this criminal kind of reading, and this trading in the debasement of humanity,—I go in for a moral censorship of the press.—F.M.W.

There are in all great towns evil spirits that delight in degrading and demoralizing others. These fiends in human shape and those demons of cleverness have let out the floods of their depravity into literature, and are catering for the perdition, social and personal, temporal and eternal, of those who take to the reading of their pernicious and abominable penny sheets. Two boys have just been brought to the bar for the commission of a crime

suggested by these sheets, another is a fugitive from the law from the same cause, and not a few have been enticed to try the fortune of Claude Duval, Jack Shepherd, and the Boy Assassin, by the perusal of these disgraceful productions of degraded men. Let the punishment fall on the tempters.—D.J.K.

We have already a censorship of the press in the interests of public morality—*partially*. This is an admission by British legislators of the advisability of such a censorship, and a ground on which to build a plea for its extension. We have a censorship reaching to obscene prints and writings. This is so far good, but goes not far enough. The fact acknowledged by criminals, in various instances of late, that crimes have been suggested to them by a class of writings now abounding in England, giving eminency, glory, and attractiveness to crimes and criminals of past times, sufficiently shows that we require a censorship of the press to prevent the publication of all such writings. Liberty is a possession the value of which cannot be expressed; but as our laws do not allow to any the

liberty of injuring the persons or property of others, so neither should they allow to any the liberty of contaminating the minds of youth to the extent of injuring public morality, and thus inflicting a hurt on the whole of society. If it be right to suppress public nuisances because they are detrimental to the health of the body, surely it is proper to suppress public nuisances which are injurious to the health of the mind and morals. We are alive to the necessity of *physically* sanitary laws. Let us not be less alive to the urgent need of sanitary laws *morally*. S. S.

We have already a censorship of the theatre, and we have a licensing court for theatres, music-halls, public-houses, &c., and we have sanitary laws giving extensive power to put down and prohibit nuisances. But the pollution of literature is a more dangerous and dreadful pollution than any other form of poisoning the springs of life. The mind, soul, progress, and prospects of men are ruined by the immoral publications of the day. Women, too, are made the subjects of their degrading influences, and boys are incited to crime and sin by these poisonous flysheets which the low press of the metropolis sends forth. Why should we not have a mental sanitation act?—some power given by law to restrain the vicious, the vile, and the profligate from making victims and seducing spirits? I say that human law ought to be employed to that end. S. T.

NEGATIVE.

Truth and righteousness are not a monopoly attainable by censors. To establish such a sham precaution would be only to deceive ourselves by a false belief in our safety. See how much that is censurable is passed by the dramatic censor, and how those who go trusting to the

purged purity of the stage find grossnesses and abominations permitted. We trust too much to coercive measures and too little to the wise vigilance of discipline and training. A well-guided mind will not enjoy the swine-husks of letters. Let us redouble diligence in Sunday school and in church, in mission and reformatory, in education and in prayer, and we shall establish a censorship in every soul against the progress of impurity.—BRINDON.

No censorship of the press could be established which would not put a screw in the hands of the Government to destroy or at least to impede freedom of discussion. Therefore, no !—B.R.

The long contention for the freedom of the press through which this country has passed in bygone years was too stern and too hardly won to incline us to resign any right attained thereby. The Government have in their hands all sorts of laws, repressive of immorality, of aiding, inciting to, or abetting crime to require any other engine of suppression. Let it so use the laws in existence as to show their incompetence to effect the object of preventing the sale of moral nuisances and criminal incitements, and we may then consider the question. Meantime, I propose 'the previous question.'—C.C.

The press proper in this country has of late been one of the greatest preservers of the good morals of the community, and at the present day, by its moral tone, has shown itself to be without the slightest need of a censorship being exercised over it. Although a law, I believe, is at present in existence for its supervision, there is no necessity for it, and its powers are, therefore, never exercised. Free thought on social and political topics ought not to be interfered with by the legislature; and any attempt to interfere with

this right ought to be resisted. We could not, I fear, have a censorship of the press in the hands of the Government without the right, I contend for being encroached upon,—at any rate, the experiment would be dangerous. The good influence which the press has exercised without any real censorship, is the best argument that there is no need of a censorship. The state to which the French press has been reduced through its supervision by the legislature is to be deplored; and such a result, if a censorship were adopted, is to be feared in this country. I am aware that a certain class of publications has a bad influence especially upon the young. But I do not think that for the sake of these

trumpery publications, a censorship should be adopted over the whole of the press.—J. L. EVANS.

For the very small injurious effects produced by a few broad sheets and fly-pamphlets, are we to imperil the long results of freedom's battle on behalf of thought? Certainly, no. A boy here and there may be tempted to Jack Shepherdisms, or a girl to become a Jane Shore. A man may be made a Secularist by a sceptical tract, and a positivist by a pamphlet, but surely we are not to be asked to resign our use for the abuse of a few. Are we to have a literary permissive bill agitation commenced now as an aid to freedom and holiness?—W.M.S.

Our Collegiate Course.

MILTON'S MINOR POEMS.

IL PENSEROSO.

In her *sweetest, saddest plight*,
Smoothing the rugged brow of night.
 While Cynthia (20) checks her dragon yoke,
 Gently o'er the accustom'd oak :
 Sweet bird, that shuns't the noise of folly,
 Most musical, most melancholy ! (21)

60

Helps to paraphrasing.

Line 57. Most delicious ; most grief-
 fraught state.

58. Softening ; ruffled forehead.

59. Reins in ; team.

60. Mildly ; usual.

61. Avoideest ; sound ; riot.

62. Harmonious ; sad.

(20) Cynthia, Diana, Artemis, the Moon. Diana was born on Mount Cynthus, in the island of Delos. In ancient representations her chariot is drawn by dragons.

(21) The Rev. F. W. Faber, in "The Cheerwell Water Lily," says,—

"I heard the raptured nightingale
 Tell from yon elmy grove his tale

Thee, chauntress, oft the woods among,
 I woo to hear thy even-song ; (22)
 And, missing thee, I walk unseen
 On the dry, smooth-shaven green,
 To behold the wandering moon,
 Riding near her highest noon,
 Like one that had been led astray
 Through the heaven's wide pathless way ; (23)
 And oft, as if her head she bow'd,
 Stooping through a fleecy cloud.
 Oft, on a plat of rising ground,
 I hear the far-off Curfew (24) sound,

65

70

63. Songstress ; groves.

64. Anxiously desire ; listen to.

65. Failing ; stroll ; unobserved.

66. Level-cut grass.

67. See ; constantly moving.

68. Taking an upward course ; mid-
night position.

69. Out of the proper path.

70. Skies abroad ; unmapped ;
stretch.

71. Lowered.

72. Humbly bending ; thin-white.

73. Knoll ; upland.

74. Distant ; peal.

Of jealousy and love,
 In thronging notes that seemed to fall,
 As faultless and as musical
 As angels strains above :
 So sweet, they cast on all things round
 A spell of melody profound ;
 They charmed the river in its flowing,
 They stayed the night wind in its blowing,
 They lulled the lily to her rest,
 Upon the Cherwell's heaving breast !"

See Notes to "Sonnet on the Nightingale," *B. C.*, June, 1867, pp. 71-4.

(22) "Be the day weary, be the day long,
 At last it ringeth to evensong."—

Stephen Hume's "Pastime of Pleasure."

(23) "This calls to mind a beautiful passage about the moon in Spenser's
 'Epithalamium' :—

'Who is the same that at my window peeps ?
 Or who is that fair face that shines so bright ?
 Is it not Cynthia, she that never sleeps,
 But walks about high heaven all the night ?'"

Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy," p. 202.

(24) The introduction of the Curfew (*Couvre-feu*, cover fire), bell is ascribed to William the Conqueror. Its object was to warn the people to arrange their fires for safety and retire to rest. It was rung at sunset in summer, and about eight in winter ; hence in Gray's "Elegy" it is said,—

"The Curfew tolls the knell of parting day."

Over some wide-water'd shore, 75
 Swinging slow with sullen roar :
 Or if the air will not permit,
 Some still removed place will fit,
 Where glowing embers through the room
 Teach light to counterfeit a gloom ; 80
 Far from all resort of mirth,
 Save the cricket on the hearth, (25)
 Or the belman's drowsy charm, (26)
 To bless the doors from nightly harm.
 Or let my lamp, at midnight hour, 85
 Be seen (27) in some high lonely tower,

75. Across ; coast.

76. Surging ; dull.

77. State of the weather ; suit.

78. Quiet retired.

79. Red-hot half-burnt faggots ;
apartment.

80. Cause ; imitate ; darkness.

81. Apart ; common place of enter-
tainment.

82. Except ; beside ; fire-place.

83. Sleepy song.

84. Injury.

85. Permit ; student's light. "

86. Noticed ; lofty solitary eminence

(25) It is surely not uninteresting to note that to this line Charles Dickens' owes, if not the suggestion, at least the title of his exquisite and tender story, "The Cricket on the Hearth, a Fairy Tale for Christmas," issued in 1845, more than two centuries after the production of the phrase.

(26) The Bellman was the recognized term in Milton's time for what we would now call a night watchman. He carried a hand-bell with him, and his duty was to go about all night, and he, as Stow says, "at every lane's end, and at the ward's end, gave warning of fire and candle, and to help the poor and pray for the dead." It was customary for the bellman to call the hours, and to utter some rhymes, catches or snatches of hymns, and hence the origin of the phrase "Bellman's Verses." Robert Herrick shows us how this was done, in a little poem invocatory of a blessing on his friends, after the manner of "the bellman's drowsy charm."

"From noise of scare-fires rest ye free
 From murders *benedicite* ;
 From all mischances that may fright
 Your pleasing slumbers in the night ;
 Mercy secure ye all, and keep
 The goblin from ye while ye sleep.
 Past one o'clock, and almost two,
 My masters all, Good bye to you !"

In 1830, Sir R. Peel's Police Act established a new system, and the guardians of the night ceased to be persons who—

"Disturbed your rest to tell you what's o'clock."

(27) The picturesque of this *Be seen* has been much admired. Its good nature seems to deserve no less approbation. The light is [to be] seen afar by the traveller, giving him a sense of home comfort, and perhaps helping to guide his way."—*Leigh Hunt's "Imagination and Fancy,"* p. 262.

Where I may oft out-watch the Bear, (28)
 With thrice great Hermes, (29) or unsphere
 The spirit of Plato, (30) to unfold
 What worlds or what vast regions hold 90
 The *immortal mind* that hath *forsook*
 Her *mansion* in this *fleshly nook* :
 And of those demons (31) that are *found*
 In fire, air, *flood*, or under *ground*,

87. Sit up beyond the setting time of.
 88. Bring from the upper skies.
 89. Mind ; inform me.
 90. Planets ; mighty spaces for the
 habitation of.

91. Everliving soul ; departed fr m.
 92. Home ; earthly comer.
 93. Supposed to reside.
 94. Water ; earth.

(28) Ursa Major a constellation known as "the plough," "the waggon" "Charles Wain," &c. The phrase is a metaphor, meaning "Study till morning is advancing."

(29) *Hermes Trismegistus*, a supposed Egyptian philosopher, priest, legislator, &c., who is said to have flourished about 1580 or 2,000 B.C. Hermes is the Greek name for the Roman *Mercury*, and the Egyptian *Thoth*, the former the inventor of the lyre, patron of Athletics, teacher of eloquence, herald of the gods, &c., and the latter the scribe of the gods, inventor of speech and letters, sciences and arts, &c., and is most probably the deity who gave name to the first month of the Egyptian year. Lactantius says he was the founder of Hermopolis, and was, for his great knowledge, called Trismegistus, or thrice great. The *Hermetic* philosophy—the mysticism of science is represented as originating with him. See "Hermès Trismegiste," a complete translation, preceded by a study on the Origin of the Hermetic Books, by Louis Menard, Paris, 1866. Also "Notes and Queries," May 30th, 1868, pp. 503-4.

(30) It is probable that besides the general reference to the works of the great philosophical dialogist there is a special allusion to "the speculations of the *Phædo*," where the greatest intellectual power of the ancient world is seen to go 'sounding on its dim and perilous way,' taking a chart of the depths of Death, and striving to find it a strait and not a shoreless sea."—*W. D. Geddes' "Phædo of Plato," Introduction*, p. 80—speculations, which give such emphasis to the remark of Coleridge, 'Across the Night of Paganism,' Philosophy flitted on like the lantern fly of the tropics, a light to itself and an ornament—but, alas! no more than an ornament—of the surrounding darkness. Christianity reversed this order.—"*Aids to Reflection*," vol i., p. 146.

(31) "The Demon," says Plato, in "*The Banquet*," is a middle intelligence between God and man and the uniting link, which completes the chain of being. They dwell in the air, float along the sky, hover among the stars, and delight to visit the earth. They can foresee the future, and can, in some cases, alter its issue. Every mortal, at birth, receives a particular *demon*, who remains with him as a "guide, philosopher, and friend" till life terminates, and he then bears the freed soul to the place of purgation or of punishment. The later Platonists mingled Zoroastrianism with their idea of demons, and gave greater prominence and definiteness to this doctrine of

Whose power hath a true consent 95
 With *planet*, or with *element*.
Sometime let *gorgeous* Tragedy
 In scepter'd pall (32) come *sweeping* by,
Presenting Thebes, (33) or Pelop's line (34)
 Or the *tale* of Troy (35) *divine*; 100

95. Influence; sympathy.

96. Wandering star; first form.

97. Occasionally; splendid.

98. Marching past in state.

99. Showing; descendants.

100. Story; Godlike.

devils (Genii); among the scholastics a mixture of Judaic and Platonic notions were Christianized and incorporated not only with metaphysics but with the beliefs of the early church, and hence arose the legends on which Goethe founded his Faust, and many of the other superstitious notions regarding witchcraft, fairies, hobgoblins, &c., which have held, if they do not hold, such power over the human fancy.

(32) *Palla*, a loose mantle or cloak, like the *Peplum* of the Greeks, thrown over the stole to form the upper garment. It was worn by matrons. Sceptred pall is here put by Catachresis for "robed in a pall and bearing a sceptre, as a sign of the sovereign sway she wields over men's minds."

(33) "The seven chiefs against Thebes" of Æschylus, a tragedy of fate glowing with warlike passion, and pathetic lamentations on the perversities of destiny and the calamities of life.

(34) This phrase would include the Agamemnon of Æschylus, the Electra of Sophocles, the Iphigenia, and the Orestes of Euripides, &c.

(35) Perhaps this refers to the "Trojan captives" of Euripides, and the line of suggestion may have started thence from the Cassandra of the Greek playwright to the Cassandra of Shakspeare, in the drama of "Troilus and Cressida," for the main elements of which play the modern writer was indebted to Chaucer, and this supplies the transition to the succeeding lines.

The Societies' Section.

OWENS COLLEGE EVENING CLASSES.

ON the evening of 8th June, at the Town-hall, the Rev. F. D. Maurice, M.A., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge, and Principal of the Working Men's College, London, distributed the prizes and certificates of honour to the successful competitors in the annual examinations in

connection with the evening classes at Owens College. Mr. W. H. Houldsworth occupied the chair. There was a large attendance.

The chairman said he was sure he need not say that the trustees of Owens College had been particularly happy in the selection they had made in the gentleman who was to

distribute the prizes. Professor Maurice united things new and things old. He is the representative of one of the ancient universities to which they all looked as the model which Owens College was to follow, and the representative of a modern class of institutions, which had for their object the promotion and extension of high academic education amongst all classes of the community. That was the combination which Owens College wished and aimed at. At the same time the trustees felt that they would not be doing their duty if they did not adapt the college to the circumstances around them; and they had, therefore, endeavoured to depart occasionally from the rigid rule which the model of the ancient universities presented. The evening classes, which were instituted immediately after the foundation of the college, was one of these departures, and it was one which, as everybody knew, had been most beneficial.

Principal Greenwood then read a report on the state and progress of the classes during the year, of which the following is an abstract:—The total number of students last session was 280. For this session it had been 324. The whole number of students in the evening classes in the session now closing had been greater than the number in any former year. Of the larger groups into which the classes fell, those which had undergone a corresponding increase were the classical classes, in about the same proportion as the total number, and in a yet higher ratio the classes for the study of the sciences of experiment and observation, and the modern language classes. In October next two scholarship examinations will be held for admission to which evening students are qualified—the Shuttleworth Scholarship for Political Economy, of the value of £50 per annum, for

two years; and the Shakspeare Scholarship for English Language and Literature, of the value of £40, for two years. The report concluded by a hearty acknowledgment of the public obligations to Mr. Whitworth for his most munificent foundation of thirty scholarships in aid of what has lately been called technical education; noticing also the new professorships of engineering at Owens College and at Edinburgh University as steps in the same direction. Mr. Whitworth having wisely postponed for one year the competition for the scholarships themselves, offering in the interval sixty exhibitions of £25, designed to prepare candidates for that competition, eight of these exhibitions are placed at the disposal of Owens College."

The Rev. Prof. Maurice, having distributed the prizes, said he considered that a very great honour had been laid upon him by the trustees of Owens College, in asking him to distribute those prizes to the students who had earned them. He believed his chief claim to be there that night was that he might in some sense put in a claim to be a fellow student with them, inasmuch as he had learned almost more from the first principal of Owens College than they might have learned from him. He did not mean to say he was in a formal sense a pupil of his, for he believed their ages did not very much differ, and they did not know each other until they were both full-grown men. They knew their education went on long after that. They were all under education through their whole lives, and it would have made a much greater difference than he could well express in his education if he had not had the benefit of the lessons of the first principal of Owens College on various most deep subjects—if he had not been able to listen, in private intercourse and in

public discourses, to his most remarkable depth of thought—those thoughts would never merely travel round a subject, but would penetrate into the very heart of it, and that wonderfully clear, precise, and profound language in which those thoughts were expressed. That was some right perhaps to appear among them that evening; and he would also claim this further right, that there was to him a great charm in the very word “college,” and a great delight to think that young men, such as had come before them that evening, might be able to claim their place in relation to a college. It was a very good thing indeed to belong to those evening classes, and he rejoiced that they should belong to them, and that they should have all the benefits of the instruction which those classes could confer upon them. But it was also an exceedingly great benefit that they should feel themselves in relation to a society—a body which was called a college; that they might feel themselves not merely a set of loose learners, picking up information here and there, but that they felt that they were connected with a body of men united together in a fellowship for the purpose of learning and teaching. He did feel that that was a very great advantage indeed, a special advantage in the midst of such a great city as Manchester. They were benefits for which he trusted he should never be ungrateful, for he had experienced them in former days, and he thought he felt them more now than ever he did before. There were great advantages in these colleges, which were cut off in some way from the common business of the world, where they were reminded continually by quiet seclusion of the advantage of study whether they chose to avail themselves of it or not; but he also thought there was

a very great advantage in having a college set down in the midst of all the traffic and business of the world. Let them look upon the business of such a city as Manchester, and see all the wonderful processes that are going on, so calm, so regular, so constant, which could produce no results if they were not calm and regular and constant, and they might be reminded by these what was required of them in order to acquire the knowledge they were seeking. Their studies must be as even, as steady, as those of the mechanical operations which they saw going on around them. More wonderful operations by far were those operations within their own hearts, those processes of thought and feeling, than all the mechanical operations in the world; but still they had to pursue the same orderly mode of proceeding under the same care and discipline, that they might not fall into disorder, for then no results would come from their efforts. There was something further to be received from what they saw around them in Manchester. The results which were produced by this grand and vast machinery seemed hardly commensurate with the wonderful thought and the labour spent upon the production of them, and whether the results they would have from their thoughts would be satisfactory or not, the prizes they had received would be of value to them hereafter—would remind them of days passed here, of friendships formed; they would be a blessing, because they could show them to mothers and sisters, and it would give them delight. Still these prizes, let them be as precious as they can, let books be as valuable as they may, were nothing to compare with those thoughts which had been called forth in the production of them. The thoughts and energies which had been called forth in learning

were worth all the prizes they could receive. They were stimulants to them to go on and do more, but they could never be rewards for what they had been doing. These rewards must be found elsewhere. They must look for rewards elsewhere than in any advantages that might accrue from them—the grandest the world could reckon upon. These were the lessons which they might derive from all they saw about them; and then they might also teach a lesson to all those who were engaged in similar work. They were sometimes told that the study of words was nothing to the study of things. Well, if words were mere idle dead things, dead utterances from our lips, they were nothing to the study of things; but he told them the words they uttered were the expression of living thought and of living mind, and these were worth more than all things, because men were worth more than things; therefore, though he would have them study things, and with all possible diligence, he told them they were not wasting their time in the study of words. All the studies in which they had been engaged, and for which prizes had been given them, were of unspeakable value. They should not set one against another; they should not say that this is more valuable than that; let them try to believe that whatever they were enabled to learn they might turn to profit, to the cultivation of something that was in them—to something that God had given them to cultivate. Understand that whatever results might come to one kind of study more than another there was something more than results. There was the bringing out of that which was within them; there was the education of the human being; there was the raising him above the mere animal; they were learning in their colleges and classes

that they might be really and truly human beings. One great blessing which he was sure their first and present principals and all their professors had at heart was that Owens College should be the means of bringing classes together, to combine them together in one, and make them feel they were not sent into the world to contend one against another. The chairman, in his opening remarks, had said that the establishment of evening classes in connection with Owens College was a departure from the system adopted at the old universities; but he did not think that its expansion and enlargement for the benefit of another class was in the slightest degree a departure from the system pursued at the old universities; he believed it was only a development of such institutions, and only showed forth what the universities were really intended to be. They were meant to be institutions for the cultivation of humanity; they were meant to be institutions for teaching us that man was above all distinctions and differences of class; and so they were but developing the principle in the old universities when they brought out those new classes, when they brought forward those new colleges, and anyone who had received any benefit from the old universities ought to hail the appearance of every new college and class with the most intense delight as an expression of that benefit which he had derived from the old. He believed and was sure they were doing what was in the most perfect harmony with the intention of the noble founder of Owens College and of all those founders of colleges who existed in the generations of old; they were increasing their work and carrying it forward; and he believed that a true college and a true evening class might be the means of binding the past, present, and future

of our own lives, and might also express the past, present, and future of the nation to which we all belonged.

On the motion of Mr. John Robinson, seconded by Mr. Oliver Heywood, a vote of thanks was passed to the rev. professor for his interesting address, and the proceedings terminated.

The Forthcoming International Working Men's Congress. — The council of the International Working Men's Association has issued an address to the trades' unionists of Great Britain and Ireland, showing the position of the association, and protesting against the charge of having provoked strikes. Having alluded to the desirability of working men throwing aside their national antipathies to make common cause with each other in their struggle with capital, the address continues: — "The continental workmen work longer hours for less money than the British do. If this country is yet producing cheaper than others, it is owing to a higher development of her machinery. The distance in the race between the British and the continental manufacturer for the prices in the markets of the world is rapidly diminishing; the British is ahead, but only just ahead. The ever-ready cry of the British capitalist that wages must be reduced because the continental workmen work longer hours for less money than the British can only be

effectually met by endeavouring to approximate the hours of labour and the rate of wages throughout Europe. This is one of the missions of the International Workmen's Association, and its annual congress is one of the most efficient means, to accomplish it. At those gatherings the spokesmen of the working classes of different countries meet each other face to face. The exchange of ideas brought about in the private conversations outside the regular meetings has as great, if not a greater, influence than the regular debates. It is there where everybody says what he has to say, and makes inquiries as to what people think of kindred topics elsewhere." It is asserted that the formation of trades' unions after the British model in France and Switzerland was the immediate result of private conversations which took place in London in 1865. The congress is to assemble at Brussels on the first Monday of September next. Amongst the questions that will be submitted for deliberation are the following:—1. Reduction of the hours of labour. 2. The influence of machinery in the hands of capitalists. 3. Property in land (proposed by the Belgian section). 4. The education of the working class. 5. The establishment of credit institutions to promote and facilitate the social emancipation of the working class. 6. The best means to establish co-operative production.

Literary Notes.

THE Earl of Oxford, having lately picked up at Rome the MS. diary of the secretary of Henry Stuart, Cardinal of York, has had it translated into English with a view to its publication.

The Oxford prize essays have been published. The two English ones are on The Genius of Spenser, and The Effects of the Renaissance on England.

Three, shilling-editions of Shak-

spere's works are in the market:—Routledge's, Warne's, and Dicks'.

Marco Polo's Travels are to be re-issued, edited by Col. Yule.

Warton's "History of English Poetry," is to be re-published under eminent editorship with, we believe, dissertations and continuations.

Prof. Matteucci, the Electro-physiologist, is dead.

George Grote, D.C.L., LL.D., &c., historian of Greece, and expositor of Plato, has been elected Chancellor of the University of London, in succession to the late Lord Brougham.

Lucrezia Borgia, who has been the heroine of opera, novel, and drama, is about to be brought before us in the light of historical research. Mr. William Gilbert, author of "Dr. Austin's Guests," has in preparation a sketch of her life and court.

Samuel Lover, novelist, poet, artist, musician, critic, &c., died 6th July, aged 70.

It is announced in the *Athenæum* that certain portions of Peter Cunningham's "Extracts from the Accounts of the Revels at Court," published in the "The Shakspeare Society" series are spurious. These are the Shakspeare references in pp. 203—205 and 210-11 of that work: "This is the worst bit of Shakspeare news we have had to report for many a day." Would it not be well to have a commission of Shakspeareans appointed to examine all documents and books professing to give original notices of the dramatist?

George Whetstone's "Rock of Regard" has been reprinted in J. P. Collier's series of reprints.

Dr. Robert Vaughan, author of "Revolutions in England," &c., projector, and until lately, editor of the *British Quarterly Review*, died 19th June.

Milton's "Poems both English

and Latin," containing, *inter alia*, Comus, Lycidas, L'Allegro, Il Penseroso, &c., was published in 1645. In a copy of this edition, now in the King's Library at the British Museum, Prof. Henry Morley has discovered an unpublished poem, entitled "An Epitaph," in Milton's script, signed J. M., and dated October, 1647. A copy of the poem appeared in the *Times* of 16th July, and has been extracted into many newspapers, and quite a controversy has arisen as to its Miltonicity.

Sir Rowland Hill is writing a History of the Post Office.

Several original autograph MSS. of novels and poems, by Sir Walter Scott, as well as accompanying and connected letters were sold by auction and realised £1,073.

The whole works of William Browne—the friend of Ben Jonson, Selden, Drayton, Waller, Wither, Davies, &c., author of "Britannia's Pastorals," "The Shepherd's Pipe," "The Inner Temple Masque," &c.—have been collected and edited by W. C. Hazlitt, with a biography and "new facts."

"Recollections of a Busy Life," by Horace Greely, the journalist, are about to supersede the life by James Parton issued about a dozen years ago.

"The Exiles," by Victor Hugo, is ready for publication.

Robert Browning's long-talked-of new poem is on an Italian subject, and will, it is said, be one of the longest poems in the language.

E. S. Dallas, author of "The Gay Science," "Poetics," &c., has edited, in a revised and abridged form, S. Richardson's novel, "Clarissa;" he has also translated from the German of Fritz Muller "Facts and Arguments for Darwin."

M. E. Littré's French Dictionary has reached the letter "N."

A member of the Philologist

Society of London has translated "An English Grammar," from the German of Prof. Maetzner, of Berlin, in 3 vols.

"A Series of Essays on the Church Questions of the Day," under the title of "Principles at Stake," is in preparation by various anti-ritualists, to be edited by Geo. H. Sumner, M.A.

A distinct work on "The Talmud," by the author of the article in the *Quarterly Review*, Emanuel Deutsche, is promised.

Mrs. Mary Somerville's work, "On Molecular and Microscopic Science," is in the press.

A third series of "Meditations on Christianity," in its relation to the state of society, and of the progress of the human mind, by M. Guizot, is nearly ready.

The translations from the ancient and modern poets, which were prefixed to the sixth and are to be found in the seventh edition of the version of the "Iliad," by Edward, Earl of Derby, have been published in a separate form.

Robert Browning's "Poems," in 6 vols., have now been re-issued.

Joseph Stirling Coyne, dramatic author, &c., died 18th July.

Reports are afloat that Napoleon III. is employed on a "Memoir of Charlemagne."

Of the "Correspondence of Napoleon I.," Vol. XXIV. is out.

Dr. Braidwood, of Birkenhead, has gained the £300 Sir Astley Cooper (triennial) prize for an essay on *Pyæmia*, or blood-poisoning.

Robert Sullivan, LL.D., author of many of the school books used by the Irish National Board of

Education—*e.g.*, "Geography Generalized," "Dictionary of Derivations"—is dead.

M. Viennet, born November 18th, 1777, author of "Essays on Poetry and Eloquence," a sort of French Walter Savage Landor, is dead. He was the oldest member of the "French Academy."

Mr. Adams, late American Minister to the Court of Britain, is engaged on the preparation of an edition of the works of his father, John Quincy Adams, sixth President of America, and son of the second President, whose works Mr. Adams edited.

A "Ballad Society" is about to be established for the publication of that vast literature of the pre-writing and printing period which passed from generation to generation in rhymed story.

Hints are thrown out that we may shortly expect, from his consular retreat at Barcelona, a new sea-novel from James Hannay, author of "Singleton Fontenoy," &c.

"A Pure and Useful Literature Society" is in process of establishment in Russia, with head-quarters at St. Petersburg and Moscow, and branches in different central localities.

Father Fischer is employed on an edition of the documents relating to Maximilian's Mexican expedition.

The seventh edition of J. S. Mill's "System of Logic" has just been issued.

An expurgated (?) edition of the Holy Bible, for children, is in preparation by Messrs. Cassell, Petter, and Co.

The Philosophy of Politics.

THE STATE; ITS NATURE, RIGHTS, AND OBLIGATIONS.

THERE is, probably, no subject upon which, in our day, more has been thought, spoken, and written than upon politics. Whenever a topic has been thus made a sort of popular possession, there is a tendency in society to forget its primary principles, and to look at all the questions which arise regarding them, not from the scientific but from the practical point of view. This makes a recurrence to first principles at once a necessity and an annoyance. It is absolutely requisite that men should be brought back to the true signification of civil life ; but it is equally inevitable that men who feel the pressure of reality upon them, should imagine that time wasted on speculation can only retard or interfere with the attainment of the practical results from which immediate advantages are to arise. "Yet," as Coleridge has said, "it would not be difficult, by an unbroken chain of historical facts, to demonstrate that the most important changes in the commercial relations of the world had their origin in the closets or the lonely walks of uninterested theorists ;—that the mighty epochs of commerce that have changed the face of nations—nay the most important of those discoveries and improvements in the mechanic arts, which have numerically increased our population beyond what the wisest statesmen of Elizabeth's reign deemed possible, and again doubled this population virtually ;—the most important, I say, of those inventions, that in their results

‘ ————— best uphold

War by her two main nerves—iron and gold,’

had their origin, not in the cabinets of statesmen or in the practical insight of men of business, but in the closets of uninterested theorists, in the visions of recluse genius."

Thus modern legislation has been for many years little more than the adoption and enforcement of the opinions of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, &c., closet speculatists ; almost all modern improvement in the arts, and consequently in commerce, is the working out of the ideas of James Watt, George Stephenson, and Robert Napier ; not a few of the fortunes in many lands are due to the thoughts of Arkwright, Dalton, and Faraday ; and had not Davy experimented, Herschel studied, and Murchison thought, how much of modern history would have been otherwise written than it is ? All great principles are seminal, they produce and reproduce ; they are the roots and radical firstlings of fresh progress ! To see how, from the phenomena presented to experience, the spirit of man unlooses science from the intricacies of facts, and finds experience harmonized by certain principles which

possess at once acceptable evidence and perceptible fruitfulness, is to philosophize ; and hence it is to philosophy as an ultimate, that we owe the possibility of improving the practical arts and conveniences of life. We affirm that the greatest, though we admit at the same time that it is the least felt, want of our times is that of a thoroughly reasoned-out and true philosophy of life ; of personal life in a trustworthy psychology, of social life in a sufficient ethic, and of civic life in an acceptable and unexceptionable politic, that is, a science of the state, of statesmanship, of citizenship, and of sovereignty.

Few questions are effectively inworked with the popular mind until they are largely written about ; but it is not an uncommon thing for those who have heard the first truths of a science laid down in definite sentences, fitted to become catchwords and watchwords, to contract careless and precipitate habits of drawing conclusions, thus using words as coin instead of counters. It is this propensity of the mind to accept and maintain propositions instead of truths, and to juggle and conjure with terms that makes it of so much importance in the great history of nations to revert to the seed-principle of thought. "It is with nations as with individuals. In tranquil moods and peaceable times we are quite *practical*. Facts only, and cool common sense are then in fashion. But let the winds of passion swell, and straightway men begin to generalize ; to connect by remotest analogies, to express the most universal positions of reason in the most glowing figures of fancy ; in short, to feel particular truths and mere facts too poor, cold, and incommensurate with their feelings." . . . "This seems a paradox only to the unthinking, and it is a fact that none but the unread in history will deny—that in periods of popular tumult and innovation the more abstract a notion is, the more readily has it been found to combine, the closer has appeared its affinity, with the feelings of a people and with all their immediate impulses to action." Hence it is that "the knowledge of the speculative principles of men in general between the age of twenty and thirty is the one great source of political prophecy." The preceding quotations from "The Statesman's Manual," by S. T. Coleridge, show the all-prevailing power of philosophy in politics, and the efficacy of the influences exerted by those who ponder upon, reflect about, and settle the principles of truth in regard to

"What makes a nation happy and keeps it so."

Closet-statesmen are not unfrequently sneered at on the platform, and twitted on the floor of the houses of parliament : but those who are most prone to this despicable custom would find it difficult to lay their fingers upon a good act of parliament which was not suggested by, advocated for, and touched into the very quick of life by these very self-same *doctrinaires*,—men who meditate in loneliness, unthanked, upon the good of men, and, "sagacious of the quarry from afar," both point and prompt to measures for the common weal.

"The men of deeds are foolish to despise
 The men of books—for books are still the spells
 Of the earth's sorcery . . . *Words* father actions,
 And are the fruitful yet mysterious soil
 Whence *things* bud forth, grow ripe, and burst to harvest,—
 Ev'n when they rot away, 'tis words receive
 The germs they leave us, and so reproduce
 Life out of death—in everlasting cycle!"

Some of our readers may be inclined to turn from these pages because we have inscribed upon their fore-front "The Philosophy of Politics," and may perhaps lean to the supposition that, for the present time, a series of papers on practical politics would have been more suitable and more valuable; if such an one has favoured the writer by reading thus far, he may perhaps now see that philosophy is the very kernel of practice, and supplies the productive element of reform, order, and progress. If men are to be made qualified for the proper exercise of political power, they must be taught to foresee distant consequences, and to comprehend wide ones; they must learn to distinguish the constant from the accidental sequences of civil affairs; they must become familiar with those considerations and peculiarities which show that propositions are true and applicable; they must comprehend the various elements that enter into the complicated questions of politics; and they must get their minds imbued with principles in their pure and simple state, as well as be habituated to apply them properly to the cases which arise in real life, by seeing how they operate in and affect hypothetical cases. Thus alone can men be so disciplined as to be set on their guard against the surrender of the mind to the near, the pressing, and the present, and to be able to look—from the point of view afforded by the present—backward upon the past for causes, and forward to the future for results, with few mismeasurements of the former and few misconceptions of the latter. These things are not seen with the eyes nor heard with the hearing of the ears; they become known only through meditation, reasoning, foresight, and forethought—through the processes of the understanding exerted upon the experiences of public life. Men who are called, by their position as citizens, to act with, upon, and by means of others, ought of all men to be able to comprehend the true relations which subsist between individual, social, and civic life; and that they may know their proper part in the State, should have a fixed and referable idea of "the State: its nature, rights, and obligations."

The State is that single and permanent unity of many and variable subjects, which watches, controls, and arranges the voluntary powers of the individuals composing it, at any given time, to transfuse into them the idea of responsible duty, to direct and realize life to that end, and to regulate, inspire, and apply the sum of the voluntary powers of the total aggregate of its citizens, as a mutually associated whole, to the maintenance and manifestation of

orderly progress. It is not a congregation of individuals as individuals, but of individuals in living though ever-changing relations towards each other in such a way as to constitute them into a whole—in such a way that each is liable to the whole in the sense of having obligations to perform, and that the whole is liable to each, in that each possesses certain rights so long as he continues to perform, or to be willing to perform, the obligations laid on him in the manner required of him. It is a unity in community connected by participation in the advantages accruing to all by the co-aidency of each, and to each by the combined influence of all. The State, as the word implies, is something fixed, settled, *static*, and conditioned; though the individuals composing it are subject to constant change—not only in themselves as to power, ability, worth, energy, character, &c., but in reality by birth and death—yet it remains permanent and staid or steady, amid the fluctuations possible among its elements, an equilibrium of forces in which power and resistance are so balanced that relative rest is attained or attainable.

This equipoise of power and resistance of rights and obligations of individual freedom of action, combined with individual restraint from action, gives the State a oneness which no mere concourse, congress, or collection of individuals could possess; for it imparts coherency, manageableness, and permanency to the consociated groups of citizens whose possessions, privileges, and conditions are established in and made stable along with and through the State as a consolidated polity under the supreme ideas of reciprocal duty and responsibility. This constitutes it into an organic whole, notwithstanding the various modifying circumstances operating upon and within its elements; this makes it a living activity visibly present in consciousness as a power and a tie even where there is no insight into or perception of the reason why the arrangements among which we find ourselves have been so planned and ordered around us. Citizenship demands the submission of all our voluntary powers to a superintendence which shall thoroughly penetrate them and make them the instruments and agents of civilized life—a life in which the state of the citizens is made the care of the State; but it demands as well that that superintendence shall act in a stated or statutory manner for the preservation of the State, as the safeguard of the state of the citizens, and as the conservator alike of the rights and obligations of every member relatively to each other, however different each may be in status, privilege, civic duty, or office, from the other, by the subjection of all citizens to law.

The State includes or comprehends within it individuals who have personal qualities, functions, attributes, and duties—social aggregates which have ethical relations, claims, duties, and influences; with these civic regulations and political laws take nothing to do, except in so far as they are voluntary and may be employed to the advantage or disadvantage of each other or all. The State

is the conservative unity of men so related that they may interfere with each other, which determines the boundary line between equitable and inequitable interference, and constitutes a safeguard against inequitable interference of such a sort as would, if permitted, alter and change the state of things desired by those who are consociated within its plans; and therefore the enforcer of all the equitable activities upon which the preservation of the state of man as a citizen depends. It substitutes thoughtfulness for passion, and a consideration of the interests of the whole for the self-interest of each, control for impulse, duty for desire. The State is a combination of men into a common wealth, wherein the forces—mental and physical—are by culture organically evolved in a sound and fitting way to ensure the greatest possible amount of happiness with the least possible sacrifice of freedom; and to secure, in fact, the maximum of activity with the minimum of hindrance, the most orderly progression of individuals with the least legal repression of their personal liberty, social inclinations, and intellectual activities.

The State is a standard institution, a series of collective arrangements for the stability, security, and harmony of human existence; it is embodied civilization. Within it arise and flourish the industrial arts in their agricultural, manufacturing, commercial, and transmissive developments; the healing arts in their surgical, medical, pharmaceutical, and sanitary subdivisions; the training arts in their athletic, technical, intellectual, and æsthetic manifestations; the social arts for the culture and use of language, oral and written; the gratification of the emotions, desires, and feelings; the regulation of the forms and methods of co-operation and behaviour, and for the promotion of associative life in all its modes and varieties; the political arts in their family, municipal, electoral, and governmental relations; the legislative arrangements for the protection and encouragement of all equitable efforts and co-operations; ethical customs or the conduct proper to the various relations of life between person and person; religious worship, or the method of showing reverence to the Supreme Being in whom the faith of a people is centred; scientific thought, or researches into the nature of man's environments; the reproductive as distinguished from the industrial arts, as literature, sculpture, painting, &c.; activities of life as regards amusements, personal relations, health, benevolence, associated existence, &c.; and all these arts and activities are regulated for social ends by the conservative agency of society—the State—or constituted community.

In this attempt to get at an idea of the state, we have endeavoured to keep apart from it any reference to the *form* or *constitution* of government, or any implication that the governors, the active directors of civic life, the practical operators in state-craft, are the state; and our aim has been to define the state as a consciously organized unity of human beings, animated by a common

purpose, working for a common end, having a common will, and forming a commonwealth.

It might be proper to consider here whether society is founded on force, convention, or equity, according to the theories respectively of Hobbes and Spinoza, of Locke and Rousseau, and of Aristotle, Cicero, Kant, and Godwin; but we do not think the discussion of the question could be profitable in regard to the present inquiry. In our day, at least, states exist as political entities, and we require to accept them as we find them, and work gradually for their amendment and reform, while we are effective citizens of them. Hence it seems to be of little importance, except as a curious theoretical question, in what manner states originated. There seems to be a constraining force in our nature, which causes or occasions a desire for social life; and there are so many possibilities of change in human affairs, that not only our love of social intercourse but our sense of individual weakness compels us to accept of citizenship as a benefit, and to acquiesce in the arrangements which surround us.

The state, though fixed and permanent in its essential form, contains within itself dynamic activities, all of which co-operate to ends implied in order and progress—individual powers, interests, aims, efforts, and hopes, which in mutually respecting consensuousness, ought to operate freely in kinetic effectiveness for the production of personal and social happiness within the sphere of the state. Only over a small margin of personal activity should the state exert its restrictive constraint; and though it may exercise a wider jurisdiction in regard to the social affections and relations, this should be managed as far as possible by customs rather than laws, by common habits than by legislative regulation. The greater the power of the state over its members, the less the amount of free individual development possible to each subject, and the more confined the social delights over which the activities of man may range. The tyranny of a state consists, not in its form of government, but in the extent to which its legislation infringes or trenches upon the personal and social activities of its subjects, under whatever form, that is not essential to the preservation of the state and the progress of man. If the freedom of man, in thought, act, and enjoyment, is unnecessarily interfered with or invaded by a monarch or a multitude, the act is tyrannous; and hence the safeguard of human freedom is ultimately dependent on the possession by the members of any state of a true conception of the nature of a state, and the extent to which the provinces of government and legislation should be permitted or invited to encroach on or control individual life.

Within the state, individuals are dynamic; they are the possessors of powers to be exerted for the welfare of the person and for the happiness of social life, but to be co-exerted for the promotion of the civic unity in which they dwell. The freest exercise of each power possessed by individuals, in so far as that exercise is possible

without detriment to the exercise of similar powers by others, as it permits the greatest possible safe development of humanity, imparts the largest amount of latent power to the state, which allows it and gives it the vital energy by which its state is held and its position kept. But states, while static by themselves, are dynamic among themselves, and exert influences among, regarding, and upon each other. Thus there arises a series of duties and rights exigible not only between state and subject reciprocally, but also among states in regard to one another. Not only must we have efficient authority in a state, resulting in controlled action, but we must have sufficient guarantees that the state is capable of self-sustaining existence, in regard to and in comparison with other states. Hence there emerges for consideration the rights and obligations of states among themselves, as well as the rights they claim over their members and the obligations they are under to them. As the rights of subjects can only be properly provided for and protected when states are stable and coexist in harmony, we shall proceed to consider first the rights of sovereign polities, or states, among themselves, and the obligations these imply.

The state, as a state, has the right to integrity of territory and existence. Every state depends for its existence and permanency on the integrity of its condition. To exist it must be conditioned, and to be fixed these conditions must have an available centre of force. The territory of a state is essential to the subsistence of its people, and for the carrying on of the processes by which it is enriched or supported. To interfere with its territory, therefore, is to do something tending to injure or destroy its existence, which of course would cause it to cease to be a state, put it out of the category of standing and constituted forms of corporate aggregation.

Each state, as a state, has the right to autonomy or self-government. If it is subjected to restraint or constraint from without, it ceases to be a state, and becomes a subject province or part of a supreme state, either by confederation, conquest, treaty, or permitted migration. It is not a state but a constituent; it wants independence and power. It is subject to the dynamic force of something external to itself, and does not cohere round its own specific centre, and work for the perfecting of its own ends. It cannot rule itself, and hence it cannot ensure its own existence and secure the integrity of its territory. The right to make laws for itself within itself, and uncontrolled by an enforcement from without, either suggestive, aggressive, or coercive, seems implied in independence, and independence appears to be essential to the very signification of a state as a form of effectiveness of political life.

The rights of self-preservation and of self-control include within them the right of self-defence, i.e., as a state, the right of making resistive war. Since a state must preserve itself as a distinct and independent polity, it must resent all endeavours to lessen its

vitality, endanger its sovereignty, or harm those who repose their faith in it and contribute to its power and compactedness. In regard to war, the state must be sovereign; it must attain, maintain, and retain its position, its stated place, and static influence. In so far as it fails to do so, it fails in its specific purpose, it loses the power of preserving order and of effecting progress; the very fundamental and paramount aim of state life being to hold together and unify those who form the constituents of a polity. Treaty and the sword, international law, or diplomacy, are the means by which the integrity of states is preserved; but diplomacy, the law of nations, and the observance of treaties, are all agencies for the securing and procuring of the autonomy of states. Failing these, the arbitrement of force is alone available, and war is the only resource against invasion of rights, absorption, or destruction. In so far, therefore, as war is the ultimate argument in favour of the *status quo*, it is legitimate in a state to provide for the defence of its territory and subjects, and to call forth the energies of its people for the protection of their persons, their homes, their rights, their altars, their laws, and their chosen or accepted form of constitutional polity, government, or well-being.

The obligations of states are correlative with the rights they advance, demand, and enjoy; though they may be all summed up in the one great thorough-going obligation of non-intervention. If we would respect the territory, existence, and self-government of other states, permitting to them as states the same privileges and advantages as we would secure for ourselves, we must admit that the intervention of one state with the internal affairs and management of another is altogether indefensible, if not absolutely reprehensible—that is, in so far as they are the state's own desire and wish, the united totality of the polity agreeing according to their own forms in regard to these affairs and internal concerns. Should the governing power—whatever its form may be—set itself in opposition to the state, as a total entity, and labour for the accomplishment of ends out of harmony with the aims and intents of the corporate body, so serving itself from the state, and carrying on life, law, and finance as a thing apart from the citizenship and independently of it, it ceases to be a portion of the state and becomes a tyranny, and it may legitimately become a matter for consideration how far any other state may interfere in repressing rebellion against such a tyranny, or in aiding any insurrection, by which there is a fair prospect of bringing in a government in harmony with the intents and aims of the people—the government, in our view of the matter, being very different, in these circumstances, from the official representatives and agents of the State. A State over-ruled is not autonomous when the will of the people is knowingly and defiantly resisted by the Government in office, though a State may be thoroughly and practically over-ruled by a Government quite legitimately, so long as the unforced will of the people submits to

what is done, and has the power, when conviction is brought home to it, that reform, or change, or security is requisite, of bringing the operations of the Government into harmony with the changes in civil life, which the changes of time or of thought have made advisable in the State.

Before any State has claims upon another for intervention, tyranny must have become felt, must have been resisted by all the means at command in the State itself, within the limits of law, and must be proved to be beyond the sympathy of the citizens by tangible and overt acts. Each State being the judge for itself of the amount of enforced obedience it is prepared to submit to as legitimate, and what it shall regard as tyrannous and unendurable. No State has the right to define liberty or right for another. No State is justified in interfering with the ongoings of another government, the results of which are entirely confined within the national territory, and whose incidence comes wholly on the people subject to it, however oppressive, to them, the forms of it may seem, and however tyrannous the results may really be. Each State is an individual political entity, and can only be so while it is independent of interference from without in regard to its internal arrangements and affairs. When, however, the homogeneity of a State is disturbed, when the government assumes self-action in opposition to the main body of the citizens, and when these citizens see that all internal efforts are unavailing otherwise, to bring the government to act for the corporate good, they are justified, after all due legal efforts have been made and been found unavailing, to call in the aid of other States to dismiss or reform the government, which by its ill-advised course threatens the integrity of the State, of which it forms only the official and the efficient part. Intervention must be invited by and not be imposed upon a people, and then it ought to be cautiously given for well defined purposes, and only for the rehabilitation of the State as a homogeneous totality, having a marked place among the polities of the earth.

Non-intervention is implied in the autonomy of self-existence of States, the integrity of territory, and the political self-hood of States. It classes among illegal acts—in regard to the jurisprudence of nations—co-intrigues among governments; coercion of people by foreign armies; the excitement of war for the purposes of aggression or for the enforcement of privileges, treaties, or rights against the will of the people against whom war is threatened; the stirring up of strifes between States and their governments; or the menacing of any one nation, by direct or indirect means, with the disfavour of other nations unless it subdues its policy to that of others; in short, the exercise of any constraint upon the self-ruling energy of other States. Each State has the right to be, and to be what it chooses, so long as its right to be so is held, exercised, and maintained in due respect of the same right in others, and all treaty rights, international arrangements, &c., are entered into with the reservation of these the natural rights of States.

Whenever the continuance of these confederate engagements, infringe on or threaten to destroy the selfness of the State, the resumption of the *status quo* on due explanation, and on proper intimation and observance of forms, is not a cause of war. The etiquette of nations does not require self-sacrifice, although it declares self-denial to be advisable. Non-intervention is the safeguard of the personality or autonomy of States.

As a corollary of this duty of non-intervention comes the guarantee of safety for the life and property of the servants of States while engaged in the conduct of official duties, for reciprocal interests, and for the arrangement of any mutual duty, purpose, treaty, or formal engagement, or formal negotiation. Officials belonging to one government, properly authorized to conduct and complete business with another, take all the rights of existence and integrity which belong to the government, and must have a cordon of inviolability thrown over them, in order that the interrelations of governments may be properly conducted and efficiently carried through—they are the States representatively present.

The duty of non-intervention is implied in the right of self-defence, which negatives any submission to outward influences which are intended or are likely to result in any diminution of the powers, position, wealth, or happiness of a State, without the utmost resistance possible in the circumstances. Non-intervention does not, however, imply abstinence from mediation in circumstances of peril, or of armed mediation when States have come into collision. Self-defence may make armed mediation necessary, if an unjust success gained against another State would make it probable that similar endeavours might be directed against the State of which we form a part; or if any scheme of aggrandisement appeared certain to result in the overturning of those principles of international rights and laws, on which the stability of States depends. When the conditions of States are undergoing transitions the duty of mediation between one State and another is unquestionable—friendly mediation if possible, armed mediation if that is necessary; for non-intervention does not at all mean neutrality. Neutrality may arise from selfishness or indifference, and may produce all the ill-consequences of intervention or inimicality, without giving a plea for retaliation; but non-intervention is the announcement of a principle—the principle of live and let live, of allowing the development of every State to the utmost within itself, so long and so far as it does not trespass upon the rights of other states.

Non-intervention is a negative duty, but in the course of time, and by the interlacement of events, it soon develops into the positive duty of reciprocity—of doing unto other States as we desire should be done to our own, and of endeavouring to secure the order and progress of man in his endeavours after wealth and civilization. The independence and solidarity of States then becomes a justifiable ideal for the statesman to aim at, and to direct

his aims for the success of. Looking on these as the chief interests of nations, a statesman should respect the integrity of States, and use such influences as he legitimately may to increase the love of freedom, order, progress, and civilization in the various States of the earth. This he will not attempt by interference in the self-hood of States, but by permitting them to taste of the advantages of these results of good government by giving them a share in the advancement made by arts, industries, and commerce, and so by encouraging among States the giving and receiving of the highest inducements possible, to orderly progress—a positive reciprocity of rights, treaties, and privileges: not an enforced reciprocity, but one which has become the growth of conviction. The duty of reciprocity is the great duty of the future. It is rather a duty than a right—it cannot be enforced though it may be induced. Non-intervention is a reciprocity of abstinence; but a reciprocity of benefits, advantages and privileges has in it a wealth of influence and joy of which nations, as yet, have little idea.

We have hitherto been regarding States as States, *i.e.*, as congeries of persons of different classes, positions, personal interests and relations combined into a static unity, having within it members or subjects, and official agents or a government, regarded as one whole; and we have been considering their interrelations one with another, or the means by which they may maintain their static integrity and yet exert themselves consentaneously in the dynamic progress of civilization, for the furtherance of which social life seems to have been instituted. We must now turn our attention to the internal life of States, and endeavour to attain to a just idea of the relations subsisting between the citizens, or members of the commonwealth, and the representatives, rulers, or official conductors of the civil polity of the State.

The State is a commonwealth and its whole people form a community. There must, therefore, be common objects to be aimed at and common duties to be performed by its several constituent parts, and a certain portion at least of their inclinations, labours, interests, sacrifices, &c., must be directed to a common end and be wielded by a common power. Only so is the unity of a community able to be felt, known, and appreciated. Hence, in some form or other, each State must have a concentrated representation of its static force—a fixed centre of action and dependence; in short, a government of some given or accepted form.

As the existence of a State in the midst of States implies political action, there must be some recognized and admitted representative to act for it as a State; and there must be some senatorial order, however rude, to keep the representative and those represented in communion. These form the governing power. It is the duty of the government to foresee what is best for the State as a whole in its internal arrangements and in its external relations; to design the means by which the order and progress of the people may be best maintained and advanced; and to execute, on behalf of all,

whatever is required to uphold and benefit the State. The government wields the power of the State, and ought in doing so to perform the will of the citizens, in accordance with their ideas, which government ought to realize in acts and facts. The legislative functions of government are to spread justice down through all ranks and conditions of men, so as to keep the balance as fair as possible under the given polity between man and man, rank and rank, and class and individual, so as to check all static disturbance, and to restrain from the commission of anything subversive of order as well as to constrain to the observance of all that is essential to order and progress. Government is the custodier of the power to enforce justice, repress wrong, assert right, and preserve the State. Yet this power must be so wielded as to maintain the integrity of the State as a community; it must be part of it, not apart from it, if the State is a unity.

"This implies three conditions. The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing to accept; or, at least, not so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment. They must be able and willing to do what is necessary to keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what it requires of them to enable it to fulfil its purposes. The word "do" must be understood as including forbearances as well as acts. They must be capable of fulfilling the conditions of action, and the conditions of self-restraint, which are necessary either for keeping the established polity in existence, or for enabling it to achieve the ends, its conduciveness to which forms its recommendation."*

The form of relationship which binds the whole State into one generally goes by the name of the constitution—that by which the rights and privileges of the members of the State are settled and established, conserved and maintained. This constitution may be written or unwritten, may have been formally agreed on or have been the slow growth of circumstance and custom, but it constitutes that by which the State is bound and kept together in such a way that the subjects and the governors know and recognize their respective rights, duties, privileges, and responsibilities. The government plan what is requisite to conserve the State and make it progressively prosperous, and the people, having the same desire for the conservation and prosperity of the State, supply the means and submit to the requirements which in the opinion of the government that stable success demands. But if the people, as a combination of individuals, believes that the government is acting in opposition to the vital interests of the State, they must insist on the performance by the government of the duty undertaken, viz., the maintaining of the State in its integrity, and the working out of those ends and aims on which the body of the citizens have agreed, or to which they may agree, while the government may constitutionally repress all endeavours made within it to alter or abrogate, upset or disunite

* J. S. Mill's "Representative Government," library edition, p. 5.

the static unity of the commonwealth. This they do by exercising authority, and by holding well balanced counsel between individual love of liberty and the political necessity of order.

This consideration leads to a need for determining on some principle the respective rights and duties of governments and citizens.

The prime duty of the government is to conserve the State as a State, and it should plan, pass, administer, and realize the laws or arrangements it makes in such a manner as best to ensure the permanency of the commonwealth as an aggregate with given aims, conditioned in a given manner, and comprised or compressed within a given territory, affording certain means of defence, development, progress, and stability. This implies the provision and efficiency of national defence, so that intrusion on the rights of its citizens, or the perpetration of injustice or violence by any external power may be effectually averted, prevented, or repaired. It must make the State substantial by its thoroughly potent fence, bulwark, and border.

The next important duty of a government is to maintain and preserve the static equilibrium of class and class, and man with man, by upholding the law, which is the highest expression of justice attained at the time by any State. The State is organized by law, and unless the observance of the law is impartially enforced disorganization must ensue. In proportion as the laws of a State are unequal, or administered without impartiality, that State is in an unsafe condition, for there is always danger that those who are neglected, oppressed, or used unjustly may rebel, and so operate for the destruction of the government if not of the State.

A proper government is bound to administer justice in accordance with the law, and ought, as far as possible, to bring the law into harmony with equity. That any State may be fully vital, and all its constituent members may do their respective parts in the conservation and progress of the State, Government must observe the claims of justice, and not only induce, but, where need arises, enforce obedience to the law in all personal matters. If it maintains justice by law, and preserves the rights of persons and classes, sedition will be unjustifiable. Sedition is, engaging in, or planning, projecting, and proceeding to carry out any general movement for procuring and furthering discord, dissension, disunion, tumult, or insurrection in contravention of the laws of the State and in opposition to the government. Its object is to disrupt the State, and therefore to infringe its integrity as a political unity.*

* "The history of forcible attempts to improve governments is not cheering. Looking back upon the course of revolutionary movements, and upon the character of their consequences, the practical conclusion which I draw is, that it is the part of wisdom and prudence to acquiesce in any form of government which is tolerably well administered, and affords tolerable security for person and property. I would not, indeed, yield to apathetic despair, or acquiesce in the persuasion that a merely tolerable government

It is competent to a government to discourage and punish any such offence, especially if the law supplies a just and proper course of procedure, by agitation, for the attainment of reform and the carrying out of those measures which are deemed necessary by the members of the State to fit the constitution of society to the times. When a citizen ceases to be law-abiding, he is an enemy of the State, and is an alien to the social polity which has been established in it, and having failed in his fealty, is adjudged a felon and put under the restraints provided by the law. Sedition is one of the gravest of felonies, because it tends to subvert the government and the law, and to destroy the State. Sometimes it rises into treason—that is, acting in such a manner as to aid and abet the enemies of the government in an express endeavour to overturn or destroy its essential constitution, and especially to compass or bring about the injury of the chief officers by whom the State is managed, by the aid of an enemy of the State. When sedition arises from dissatisfaction with the government, it is called political; when it originates in differences of faith, it is called religious; each of these may remain merely resistive or nonconforming, or may be of such a sort as to lift weapons against and engage in open strife with the government, so becoming armed sedition. Sedition may proceed by plot, conspiracy, or rebellion, and in its earlier stages is hidden, not overt. But as the governors of the State act for and represent the State, any act of sedition, though nominally undertaken against the rulers, is in reality taken against the State as a whole, of which the government is only the representative part; and so long as the State upholds the government, or the government as a general fact, acts in accordance with the mind of the State as usually manifested within that polity, sedition is a crime involving the integrity of the State. From this right of repressing felony and sedition—that is, of enforcing law as the best means of preventing the dissolution of the State—the government acquires the right to impose oaths of fidelity or other precautionary safeguards, and possesses the right of punishment, extending, as the case may be, from simple deprivation of State privileges to the extreme penalty of capital punishment.

The duties of a government in preserving the State from the infringement of its integrity by other States, and in maintaining justice between class and class, and man and man—as well as pro-

is incapable of improvement. I would form an individual model, suited to the character, disposition, wants, and circumstances of the country, and I would make all exertions, whether by action or writing, within the limits of the existing law, for ameliorating its existing condition, and bringing it nearer to the model selected for imitation; but I should consider the problem of the best form of government as purely ideal, and as unconnected with practice, and should abstain from taking a ticket in the lottery of revolution, unless there was a well-founded expectation that it would come out a prize.”—“*A Dialogue on the Best Form of Government*,” by Sir George Cornwall Lewis.

meting peace, order, tranquillity, progress within the territories committed to its trust—confers the right of receiving financial supplies for the carrying on of all the affairs requisite to these ends, and thence arises the right of taxation and the levying of compulsory contributions for the proper conduct of governmental arrangements; the right of appointing officers and conferring honours, rewards, distinctions, privileges, &c., in so far as all these harmonize with the mind of the State as incorporated in the customs, legislation, and common principles of the country and times.

In repayment of the performance of these duties to it by the members of the commonwealth, the government takes upon it certain implied obligations. The laws of the State must be administered by it with truth, honesty, justice, and humanity. It must observe the course of events and the current of opinion, and it must keep the State in its right and proper place in reference to these by faithful observance of treaties, pure and rational diplomacy, and attention to all international interests as regards all other States. But Government must also administer wisely and well the finances of the country for the accomplishment of the ends, aims, and safety of the State; put the laws faithfully and thoroughly in operation, and do all the requirements of the internal regulations of the State efficiently, and with upright dealing in regard to all citizens.

When these things are done the Government has claims upon the citizens to stand by it and up for it. The citizen is bound to yield obedience to the laws, customs, observances, and common purposes of the State; must be industrious, honest, self-supporting if possible, and orderly; should conform to the requirements, and act in accordance with the regulations instituted by the Government for the facilitating of administrative purposes; and ought to contribute willingly to the common fund by which the commonwealth is maintained and promoted. The citizens should by assent, sympathy, and, where it is required, by joint-action, uphold the Government whenever it is engaged in the execution of any duty in or on behalf of the State. All that is done on behalf of the Government is virtually done in obedience to the law which is the will and the highest moral wisdom of the State, and it is therefore done to the State itself. That the acts of the State may be as wise as possible, citizens should endeavour to attain the highest education available to them, and in their several places and relations, as far as possible, comprehend the duties and requirements of the times; that by discussion, explanation, and proof, the questions which arise regarding Government may be wisely and warily considered, and the convictions required to bring the State up to the highest mark of political efficiency it can attain, may be so spread amongst the community that they may act in unity to bring it into legal force.

Such, as it seems to us, are a few of the general principles which flow from the conception of the State, as an integral part of civi-

lized life,—as containing within itself the static elements of order, and the dynamic elements of progress, to be worked through the kinetic power of will—in the individual as desire, and in the State as law. We have endeavoured to evolve all our present reflections on these points from the conception of the State, and without any intended reference to any individual State or nation. We have yet to consider what a government is as a conception, and what form of government is best suited to different states, in different conditions of intellectual, religious, and industrial life. We have yet to endeavour to define what is citizenship, and what are the rights and duties it implies in relation to the individual. We have yet to discuss civic freedom in its relations to personal liberty, in thought, word, and act. All these, though in some vague way touched upon in the preceding pages, have had no specific expansion from any point, except as regards the implications of the idea of a State. It is important that we should not confound the conception of a State with that of the Government. The State is the entire body of the people in all their classes and ranks, in all their differences of personal, social, and civic position, and duly considered as a totality, as a community of men acting together as a commonwealth, a State is that which has been so elegantly and eloquently defined by Sir William Jones in the following imitation of Alcæus :—

What constitutes a State ?
 Not high-raised battlement or laboured mound,
 Thick wall or moated gate ;
 Not cities proud with spires and turrets crowned ;
 Not bays and broad-armed ports,
 Where, laughing at the storm, rich navies ride ;
 Not starred and spangled courts,
 Where low-browed baseness wafts perfume to pride.

No : men, high-minded men,
 With powers as far above dull brutes endued
 In forest, brake, or den,
 As beasts excol cold rocks and brambles rude ;
 Men who their duties know,
 But know their rights, and knowing, dare maintain,
 Prevent the long-aimed blow,
 And crush the tyrant while they rend the chain.

These constitute a state,
 And sovereign Law, that State's collected will,
 O'er thrones and globes elate,
 Sits Empress, crowning good, repressing ill ;
 Smit by her sacred frown,
 The fiend Rebellion, like a vapour sinks,
 And e'en the all-dazzling Crown
 Hides his faint rays, and at her bidding shrinks.

Auguste Comte.

THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.—CRITICAL.

(Continued from page 100.)

INSTEAD of giving heed to independent criticism and impartial considerateness, Comte surrendered himself to flatterers, closed his eyes against reviews which were not favourable to his entire speculation, and delighted himself in the companionship of those who to an intelligent man are the most to be dreaded—those namely, whom no difficulty stops, and no absurdity startles, who receive and absorb but do not assimilate, far less develope. His love of personal ascendancy outgrew all bounds, and he claimed homage as the price of friendship and a preliminary to toleration. He aspired to be the intellectual high priest of the universe and the regenerator and saviour of modern civilization; and ever “as his thoughts grew more extravagant, his self-confidence grew more outrageous. The height it ultimately attained must be seen in his writings to be believed.” As J. S. Mill truly says, the “self-conceit of M. Comte is colossal.” A loftier and mightier domination than that of imperialism, a vaster reach of sway than even the papacy dare claim, he arrogates. He was to be the legislator of humanity for all time coming, and beyond the bounds which he set for the development or investigations of mankind there was to be no going. The dreams of M. Comte were to be the limits of human aspiration, endeavour, outlook, and aim; after him a Chinese civilization of stationary life was alone possible for the occident and its inhabitants.

As an additional proof of the foregoing accusations against positivism, we may call attention to the fact that “it is,” according to J. S. Mill, “one of M. Comte’s mistakes that he never allows of open questions;” “M. Comte’s system makes no room for them.” “The *fons errorum* in M. Comte’s later speculations is this inordinate demand for unity and systematization” which rendered necessary the revival of “the Catholic idea of a spiritual power,” “liberty and spontaneity on the part of individuals form no part of the scheme.” “Every particular of conduct, public or private, is to be open to the public eye, and to be kept by the power of opinion, in the course which the spiritual corporation shall judge most right.” “The general idea is, while regulating [life] as little as possible by law to make the pressure of [an organized public] opinion, directed by the spiritual power so heavy on every individual, from the humblest to the most powerful, as to render legal obligation in as many cases as possible needless.” We object to this first, that open questions are essential to the exercise of free

and independent thought and the development of individuality and originality; second, that systematic life *ab extra*, is weakening and unsatisfactory; third, spontaneous thought is life, while life, according to received dogma, is intellectual death; and fourth, that "the engines of moral repression," if organized against individuality and freedom by a spiritual power under the name of public opinion, would constitute an unendurable as well as highly disadvantageous despotism.*

We are advocates for the culture of the richest, fullest, largest, ripest development of individual life. We dissent from the opinion that it is a moral, intellectual, or a religious duty to reduce the enjoyments and activities of life to a minimum. The moralization of humanity requires no such asceticism. Man is in duty bound, as the being he is, to cultivate, employ, and enjoy every faculty and power of thought and sense to the utmost in consistency with the great law of innocent existence,—“Do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you.” Man's nature is made for growth, and is not created for liminary circumscriptions of the systematizing order. Individual selfhood is the incumbent attainment—not a little, smooth, polished, mechanical, dainty, nice, finical sample of man as issued from the positivist manufactory. The birthright of man is personality; his duty is sociality, under a sense of personal responsibility, and progressive perfection of nature in all the contents of self under the consciousness of individual responsibility. Every law of nature is a law of happiness and life, in so far as it is obeyed with thoroughness, and no one of the great ordinances of the universe ever works to the destruction and misery of man, unless when its requirements are neglected. Within the limits of obedience to the laws of life in its entirety, the fullest happiness is attainable. We accept the restraints of nature, not the constraints of M. Comte.

It is not from regulated thought and the results of discipline exercised over the mind by a supreme and superincumbent spiritual power that originality and genius can arise. It is in human tendencies to variation that the best hopes of progress and improvement have their surest foundation. But M. Comte decrees that “all exercise of thought should be abstained from which has not some beneficial tendency, some actual utility to mankind. He would expurge from science all curious speculations, and bind down the soul to think only of the accessible and the useful, and his greatest anxiety seems to be lest people should reason, and seek to know more than enough.” Hence he advocates the propriety of stifling, as much as possible, the “examining and questioning spirit.” Nay, he even went the length of selecting from the whole range of occidental literature a hundred and fifty volumes which, in his opinion, constituted a sufficient “positivist library” (thirty in poetry, including the novel, thirty in science, sixty in history, and thirty in general

* For the proof of which see J. S. Mill “On Liberty.”

knowledge, including the Bible, the Koran, and the works of M. Comte); "and," we now use the words of J. S. Mill, "actually proposes a systematic holocaust of books in general—it would almost seem of all books except these." This Mr. Mill rightly stigmatizes as a "crime," even in suggestion, and holds that it "merits real indignation." But the expurgation proposed does not cease with books, the life-issues of the human soul; M. Comte regards it as desirable to decree that "all species of animals and plants which are useless to man should be systematically extirpated." These things seem too dreadful to be conceived; a general order from the spiritual power of the future to blot from the multitudinous heavens of thought all the stars of light except 150, for which no substitutes can be had, to which no additions can be made, without leave asked and granted by the papacy of mind! a systematic confiscation of the rights of inquiry and criticism, unless prejudged by the priests of humanity to be probably productive of useful results! an irresistible command issuing from the sacerdotal hierarchy to eradicate all plants and exterminate all animals which in their wisdom they declare to be of no use in the universe, and against which they do not even require to bring a proved charge of noxiousness or inefficiency for good! When we reflect on the worlds of thought and enjoyment we should lose by the blaze of libraries and the prohibition of free authorship; when we think of the institution, not of a censorship of the press only, but of a censorship of thought and effort; when we think of the priesthood passing a vote of censure on nature, and commanding the destruction of her creatures—we use the language of materialism here purposely, to avoid begging the question of the being of a God—we are lost in amazement at the hardihood of the suggestions, and "can only be thankful that amidst all which the past rulers of mankind have to answer for, they never came up to the measure of the great regenerator of humanity; mankind have not yet been under the rule of one who assumes that he knows all that is to be known, and that when he has put himself at the head of humanity the book of human knowledge may be closed for ever."

Who can know the value of a book before it is written; and after it is written who can declare its uselessness and worthlessness to minds of any state and in any condition, so as to decree infallibly that it is better to execute capital punishment upon it at once and for ever. "Who can affirm positively of any speculations, guided by right scientific methods, on subjects really accessible to the human faculties, that they are incapable of any use? Nobody knows what knowledge will prove to be of use, and what is destined to be useless." Nobody knows what links the apparently useless may possess to enable us to pass from the known to the unknown, and how much depends on the trial by humanity of every possible avenue for the outgoing of thought. Naturalists already lament the extinction of species by the unintentional accidents of circumstance, as leaving *hiatus* in the classification and scientific order of

organic beings; how would their mourning have been increased had there been an adjudicative destruction of all plants and animals whose uses were not then known, or whose seemingly noxious qualities had alone at that time been observed? and had the wisecracks of the spiritual powers of the past done with many creatures as was done to "the birds of Killingworth," as related in Longfellow's "Tales of a Wayside Inn"? For who can "presume to assert that the smallest weed may not, as knowledge advances, be found to have some property serviceable to man?" "The united power of the whole human race cannot reproduce a species once eradicated." "What is once done in the extirpation of races can never be repaired." All the mind of humanity could not reproduce a book, if once totally destroyed, and the progress of centuries might be interrupted by the condemnation of a thought. No, no; a spiritual papacy regulating, reorganizing, systematizing the very roots of life, the very germs of genius, drilling the human race what it is to think, write, work at and avoid we shall, at least for centuries to come, refuse to give a resting-place on earth to, even in Franche Comté, and shall relegate to the far future, and to the region of *chateaux d'Espagne*! Such an exaggeration of the systematizing functions of the ruling powers, such a life-pervading discipline of despotism, such a subjugation of all the rights, privileges, endowments—nay, we shall say duties of humanity, is an impossible if not an inconceivable tyranny in our age and circumstances. And yet this is the system of which the author asserts that "positivism is now the only consistent advocate of free speech and free inquiry." To our thinking even truth itself, given in and as dogma, would destroy the independence of those who received it as such, would interfere with the proper performance of the duty of free inquiry, to engage in which every intelligent creature is morally bound, and would destroy the capacity of original thinking, as well as check adventurous thought. To organize public opinion under any spiritual power would, we think, be disastrous to the general commonweal. "The great sources of intellectual power and progress to a people are its strong and original thinkers, be they found where they may. Government cannot and does not extend the bounds of knowledge; cannot make experiments in the laboratory, explore the laws of animal or vegetable nature, or establish the principles of criticism, morals, and religion. The energy which is to carry forward a people belongs chiefly to private individuals, who devote themselves to lonely thought, who worship truth, who originate the views demanded by their age, who help us to throw off the yoke of established prejudices, who improve on old modes of education or invent better. . . . Government is not the spring of the wealth of nations, but their own sagacity, industry, enterprise, and force of character. To leave a people to themselves is generally the best service their rulers can render. . . . Political power is a weak engine compared with *individual* intelligence, virtue, and effort; and we are the more anxious to enforce this

truth because, through an extravagant estimate of government, men are apt to expect from it what they must do for themselves, and to throw upon it the blame which belongs to their own feebleness and improvidence. *The great hope of society is individual character.* . . . The great lesson for men to learn is that their happiness is in their own hands; that it is to be wrought out by their own faithfulness to God and conscience; that no outward institutions can supply the place of inward principle, of moral energy, whilst this can go far to supply the place of almost every outward aid."*

Comte affiliates his positive philosophy to the traditions of France. Charlemagne, Charles V., Henry IV., Louis XIV., and Napoleon I. endeavoured to revive in spirit or in form an Occidental Empire, in which the entire West, bound together by force of arms or by the power of modern diplomacy, would carry into the life of Europe again, the mighty unity and majesty of ancient Rome, the sense of the universality of citizenship and interest, and of the stretch of sway and government from the Euxine to the Atlantic, if not beyond it. It was not so much an anti-national as an unnational movement, an attempt to integrate into a single state-system the variousness and the dissimilarities of the races which people the West. But the verdict of history has as yet gone against such a scheme. The results of the efforts of these mighty monarchs have perished, sometimes along with, sometimes before themselves; and neither the compulsion of armed forces nor the speciousness of a uniform administrative system has sufficed to induce the different nations of the occident to coalesce or combine into a federation, of which France should hold the reins of empire. Europe continues to be an assemblage of independent monarchies and states, affording opportunities for variety of life, favourable to good government, to the progress of true liberty, to the pursuit of knowledge, to individuality of character, and to the development of genius, unrestrained by conventional forms and the vast overshadowing influence of a might co-extensive with the space of occidental Europe.

The various endeavours recorded in history to found an empire of the west, produced entanglements beyond parallel. It seems to have been a struggle after an ideal which had opposed to it the configurations of the continent, and the characteristics of race. In the alternations of success and defeat, which accompanied each attempt to re-invigorate the traditions of Rome, or of Constantinople, recollections were aroused and passions excited, which developed patriotism, and fixed upon that tradition the stigma of tyranny,—the shifting and discordant scenes of warfare which arose,—the complications of intrigue and diplomacy which became necessary, the ebb and flow of events which it caused, the uncertainties and the tergiversations it occasioned all the while that the disruptive tendencies were too strong to be overcome, are

* Channing's Works, "Essay on Napoleon," vol. i., p. 87.

among the most singular and woful of historical phenomena. The discrepant materials accumulated round the coast of Europe, seem to be unweldable, to withstand aggregation, even to hate amalgamation. There does not seem to be any bond, spiritual, moral, or intellectual, which could unite and unify the inhabitants of the Mediterranean with those of the Baltic, and still less with those that dwell within the sweep of the Atlantic, into one mass, moved by the same desires, and animated by the same aspirations, obedient to the same code, and submissive to the same rule. To incorporate these into one organic state, to establish occidentality—it would seem to be essential to uproot or distort the feeling of nationality, and however compound that feeling may be under analysis, history affirms that it is one of the most potent at once of the aggregative and of the disruptive political forces.

Positivism would legitimate a Cæsarism of capital and a Papacy of science; would result in an enslavement of industry and the confiscation of the rights of human thought. The supremacy of the temporal power would produce the former, the directorship of the spiritual power would ensure the latter. Under either, as things have been, the greatest glory of man, individuality, has declined, under both combined, special Self-hood would be impossible. They would "eliminate from the language of politics the word right," and they would also eliminate from the practices of men the just privileges which right confers. It would secure the apotheosis of power and not of duty. Comte would make the state in its twofold form all, and the people merely organized particles thereof, filling a designed place, fulfilling a destined purpose. Cæsarism would mechanize humanity; with the strong left hand of temporal power it would threaten and check all independence of political action, and with the cunning right hand of spiritual authority it would repress and withstand all freedom of mental manifestation. It would double despotism, then crown, enthrone, and worship it as liberty. Statecraft would creep into all the actualities of life, and the freedom of *choosing* one's own career—of being, in short, one self—would be impossible. The conservative organizations of the state would issue in regulations, which would make barracks of home, and of every act of life, an opportunity for the interference of a police—temporal or spiritual.

Positivism asserts that "no important step in the progress of humanity can now be taken without totally abandoning the theological principle." It aims, therefore, to convince us of the necessity of dismissing all the theological chimeras, which have hitherto fettered or frightened humanity, and it especially calls upon us to allow ourselves to be hampered no longer with the false idea of a Providence and a God, with all their consequents of prayer, praise, homage, sense of eternal law, personal responsibility, and future judgment. It offers to free us alike from the love and the vindictiveness of God, and it ejects the fear, by the denial of futurity; but it proffers instead the certainty of individual annihila-

tion, and the chance of an ideal commemorative immortality. "The principle of theology is to explain everything by supernatural *wills*;" but we ought to lay aside all inaccessible researches on the ground of their utter inutility, "and especially this childish superstitious notion of learning to comprehend what is the will of God, as if even we could attain to a knowledge of it we could change, by prayer or otherwise, the inexorable must under which our lives are placed by the operation of the inevitabilities of existence. This is to seek for truth in a region beyond human reach, while it is our plain and simple duty to take a full view of that which unfolds itself to our eyes, or is placed within our grasp."

"Theology and physical science are radically incompatible." "Their conceptions are of a character completely opposed to each other." "The idea of supernatural directive agency" has no reality, no utility—it is an effete metaphysical manufacture, an unjustifiable myth, less substantial than the shadow of moonshine.

We object to this proposed elimination of God from the universe—either of thought or of nature, and to this materialization of man. We do not, although we fairly might, as a great historical phenomenon, plead as an offset to this scheme, the revelation of God in the Bible, in Christ Jesus, and in the church. We prefer to meet philosophy with philosophy. We say how wondrous is life, how glorious and complicated is nature,—how marvellous is thought!—if these are caused, how infinite in resource and power is their originator; if uncaused, how mighty and marvellous is chance, and how inexplicable is circumstance. The mystery of phenomena—the mystification of man—becomes ten thousandfold increased if all that we are and see and know are but the endless successions of the mazy effluxes of seeming—we cannot call it *existence*, for we are bound to deny any *ENS* out of which it *stands*—can we even call them *phenomena* seeing that *the things shown* have no one who shows them, and by whom the *shown* becomes the *known*? If I am a foam bell on the tide of circumstance, what a curious conflux of results and energies my poor human life is—to be of nought, and for nought, and worth nought!

I cannot eliminate from the necessities of thought the conception of origination and purpose and end, of aim and duty and responsible life. I find my whole being a theological enigma, but M. Comte would transform it into a metaphysical paradox, and fill me with an unbelievable belief. I am told of course to put aside as the foolish nonsense of a bygone time the mysteries and myths of metaphysical theology. Nature, and not the supra-natural, is, I am given to understand, all that I can know. But I find a *beyond* encircling me everywhere, and *that* I wish to comprehend. M. Comte, with positive compass, draws around me a circumference to the border of which my inquiries may extend, *beyond* which I must not attempt to penetrate. I reply, the more widely you stretch the circumference of the permissible the vaster becomes that *beyond* which I wish to learn about; for I cannot but think that if I am

influenced at all by that which lies beyond me, influences may play around me thence which it is important I should know. Nor can I be satisfied by testimony that such a thorough search throughout infinity has been made that satisfactory proof is definitely attained that a Supreme Disposer, an eternal and heart-searching One does not exist and affect me. I know that the influences of stars, lying billions of miles out in the space-distances affect this planet, and all that is in it and on it, and I am anxious to know if there are influences operative on mind from that beyond as well!

I am told that in regard to the attainment of theological truth "the difficulty is impossibility." That may be; but the difficulty of impossibility besets me again in the attempt to restrain the out-yearning of the soul for *Theos*—the One Immutable, the Thought-seen, the Originator and the Sustainer. Are these colours, forms, sounds, scents, forces, &c., only and all, and is there no vitality beyond them? The difficulty increases the importance; all that is valuable to man is gained in opposition to difficulties. Amid difficulties demanding the sweat of his face man earns his daily bread; by labour against difficulties commodities become commercial affairs; in the face of difficulty all mechanical, political, and scientific improvement has been made; and by the undauntedness with which he defies and overcomes difficulties the nobility of human genius is measured. Shall difficulties appal in this matter my living soul, when all history, science, and life inform me that the more intense the difficulty of an achievement the more glory, blessing, and power result to mankind? I believe that the very entertainment of the conception of theology—in its twofold aspect of a need for life and a creed for thought, as a science and as a religion—is not only a witness to the grandeur of the human soul, but a prophecy of the possibility of its attainment. My life lifts me above the phenomena which surround, inveigle, and allure me, which would enmesh me in their snares, and chain me down in servility to them instead of rising to be their master. I am quite prepared, therefore, to recognise as phenomena of thought, history, and life, theology, religion, and morals; to investigate their claims, and welcome those to my life which seem to me to substantiate their claim; and the more so as I know that the devout soul tabernacled in this frame of clay is prone to cry, "Who by searching can find God out? who can find Him out unto perfection?" am I willing to accept as possible and probable a revelation of the Most High. We get the light of science from afar, and we search in the career of comets and the march of stars for guidance in thought and act. We live by the light which centuries ago left unknown suns, and we apply forces for the furtherance of every day desires which come to us in the plenitude of their might from regions of unmarked influence in the immensities of space. These operate in and for the body; these affect the body, and through the body they affect the soul-tenant who dwells in and animates it. Why may there not be effluences of spiritual force given in vision, prophecy, and voice, even in abso-

lute appearance among men, in order that our race may be taught of God? M. Comte counsels the neglect of all these as guides and advisers, and the recognition of them all as fictions of imagination, and then, acknowledging their force and fitness to the soul, asks us to engage in make-believe and sham, by instituting the religion of humanity. God *may* be—in the manner in which poor human thought envisages Him to itself—a myth; but humanity is one, one the process of manufacture of which we know, one the falsity of which we comprehend, an idol of our own choosing and making! Hence, even on the lowest terms I would prefer to worship God rather than Humanity, for we cannot, with our knowledge of humanity, form a high ideal, whilst in regard to God the loftiest ideal we can attain is confessedly not even a shadow of the resplendent majesty of Deity. The higher the ideal placed before man for worship, communion, and obedience, the more potent is it to raise him from debasement and lift him to newness of life. When to the mere philosophy of the question we add the terrible penal sanctions which for the neglect of this—as of all other revelations of law and duty—await us, we cannot hesitate to cast off the positive religion of humanity as a burlesque, a travestie, and a caricature of that which ought to reign effectively in the soul for good. For a criticism as to the details we have not now space. They are essentially theatrical, processional, and objective; as permanent and potent, pervading and purifying forces we have no faith in them. In religion, if in anything, truth, earnestness, and faith are requisite. The arms and discipline it furnishes must be for use in the two great battles to be fought by us—life and death. In it every gain is only the centre of another circle of effectiveness. Life's day of battle must find us at our post in earnest not in sham, and when death approaches we must endure and fight and conquer, advance the standard, and extend the kingdom of life. Thus it is, as an old Christian gladiator said, that "tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope; and hope maketh not ashamed, for the love of God hath been shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit that is given unto us."

Such are a few of the reflective criticisms which have arisen in our minds during the perusal of the works of M. Comte and the Positivists. It is quite probable that they may not commend themselves to the readers of our previous papers, because I have given no indications in them of such opposition in reserve. I have only to say that I have endeavoured to sketch the biography of M. Comte as that of one whose life demands much admiration in many ways, especially for uprightness, consistency, and moral and intellectual elevation, remarkable in his circumstances, and have endeavoured to turn the favourable side of his character most prominently into view. In the abstract of his philosophy, politics, and religion I have assumed the place of an impartial reporter, whose duty it is to give a fair outline of what he reports, however his own opinions may incline. I have striven to make no points, to provide

no cues, to exaggerate no fault, and to conceal no merit, and I believe I may claim the credit of furnishing a clear and honest digest of the Comtean system, such as even a positivist would not appeal against. In this paper I have assumed the office of critic, and have given, I hope, reasoned, and reasonable objections to positivism as a complete philosophy, a perfect sociology, and an acceptable religion. If I have done so, I have fulfilled my task and my intent, which was to supply a trustworthy epitome of the life and labours of Auguste Comte, to provide a concise account of his speculations, and to cast the light of critical thought upon it, that in the testing thus given to it our readers might see whether it was or was not "The Positive Philosophy."

CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE.—The lay mind of the country, let enthusiastic sceptics say what they will, has not learned to look upon the historical facts with which the Christian religion is bound up, as Cicero and Cæsar looked upon the tattle of the augurs; but it is, I think, absolutely certain that the lay mind of England will accept those truths respecting the physical world upon which scientific authorities are agreed, and those conclusions respecting the documents in which the Christian religion is embodied on which scholars are unanimous. It is absolutely certain, also, that these scientific truths and philological conclusions differ in important points from the conceptions entertained regarding them by the divines and scholars who drew up the confessions of the various Protestant churches. Englishmen feel themselves bound, not merely by their national character for integrity, frankness, and courage, but by their Protestantism itself, to face every statement which is true, and to face it with a welcoming smile. That clearing process which has been applied to all our knowledge must be applied to our religion. It must divest itself of every tag of superstition; and it will, we may pretty confidently infer, be in the future less ecclesiastical and less dogmatic than it has been in the past. But there is no reason to apprehend that we are passing into the Chinese phase of civilization, or that the grandeur which envelops human affairs when heaven's light falls upon them is to be no more seen in England. Christianity, the most spiritual of religions, presents no parallel to the religions of classic antiquity: it affords scope to all that is noble, great, beautiful in man; it is the religion of conscience and of the affections; its harmony with what is divine in humanity is so profound, that the circumstance has been taken advantage of to represent it as a mere elaboration of natural religion. The deliberate testimony of the wisest of the moderns, Goethe, was given to the effect that man cannot recede from the point to which he has attained in Christianity. That a religion which, in its body of spiritual truth, offers a comprehensive and benign response to all that is deepest in human nature, under what theory soever man is viewed, should be undermined by the discovery of new facts relating either to the formation of the world or man's place in the animal creation, is out of the question; and the historical evidence touching the fundamental facts of the Christian revelation stands at this moment on a basis which scholars taking rank with any in Europe hold to be impregnable.—PETER BAYNE.

Literature.

ARE SENSATIONAL NOVELS SUPERIOR TO NOVELS WITH A PURPOSE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"That sort of poetry or romance which is of a didactic or merely moral character never can possess individuality—will be as characteristic of one country as another, and will fail therefore to excite a very strong enthusiasm in any."—*W. Gilmore Simms.*

"THE art of the novelist enables him to conform his writings more nearly to the form and aspect of events as they really happen than can ever be the case with the dramatist and poet,—and this very conformity to nature is a source of vast freedom and flexibility. His laws are not only less arbitrary than those of other artists, but his privileges combine, in turn, those of all the rest. He may contend with the painter in the delineation of moral and natural life,—may draw the portrait and colour the landscape as tributary to the general *vraisemblance*, which is his aim. He may vie with the poet in the utterance of superior sentiment and glowing illustration and description; with the dramatist in his dialogue and exciting action; with the historian and philosopher in his detail and analysis of events and character. Shall we doubt the legitimacy, or marvel at the progress of an art which, while asserting these high powers, not only of its own, but in common with other arts—conforms in its delineations more decidedly than any other, to the various aspects of man and nature and society?"

"This species of composition as it combines some of the qualities of almost every species of imaginative art, whether prose or verse, painting or statuary, so is it susceptible of far more various employment than any. More pliant in the hands of the master, it is more universal in its appreciation of the desires of the multitude. It enters more readily into the general sense, and to a certain extent has superseded, and must continue to supersede, in some degree, the uses of all others. To its influence may be ascribed, in part, the decline of the drama in popular estimation, and it is scarcely possible that, whilst its sway continues, there will be any return to the elaborate works in poetry, which distinguished periods of less diversified forms of literature." It delights "in the erection of noble fabrics and lovely forms, to which the fire of genius imparts soul, and which the smile of taste informs with beauty; and which, thus endowed and constituted, are so many temples of mind—so many shrines of purity, where the big, blind, struggling heart of the multitude may rush in its vacancy and be made to

feel; in its blindness, and be made to see; in its fear, and find countenance; in its weakness, and be rendered strong; in the humility of its conscious baseness, and be lifted up into gradual excellence and hope."

These observations on the place and power of the novel, we have culled from a celebrated American critic whose works have been thought worthy of collective publication—the "Views and Reviews" of W. Gilmore Simms; they seem to us to show the importance of the debate in which we are now engaged by establishing a true place in literature for the novel.

It has been very common in all ages to decry the imagination and all its products. Poetry, the drama, and the novel have all been subjected to the prevailing modern test—of what use is it? and what of good, solid good, does it produce? Some critics prove to their own satisfaction that the novel is a garish, flaunting, showy weed which takes and gains the nourishment which flowers and fruits or history and science ought to get; but if there is any truth in the law of supply and demand—and our opponents will find it hard to upset and overturn the settled maxims of political economy—novels have a use, for they are bought and read. Some other more fastidious critics cry out against the novel, as being in a state of irremediable corruption and inevitable decline, and nothing can invigorate their faith in it as an important and pleasurable agency in the promotion of good ends in our constantly progressing civilization. We are convinced, however, that it supplies a want, and falls in with a tendency of the constitution of our nature, and we are all the more persuaded that this is the case, from the modifications which we see it undergoing to bring it into accordance with the intelligence and the characteristics of each succeeding age. That circumstance shows its vitality, and proves that it has an indestructibility in it which cannot be put down by priestly anathemas, critics frownings, or, worse than all, by incompetent attempts to work it away from its proper form.

Our opinion of the novel is that it is an exercise of the constructive intellect in the author, and that it is a gratification of the faculties of curiosity and anticipation in the reader. The reader is like an onlooker at a game of chance or skill, he feels the alternations of hope and fear, curiosity as to how all will end, who will win and who will lose, and with what sort of odds the side he espouses will be victorious or the reverse; as each move is made or cast is thrown the chances vary and the changes possible become fewer, though more pressing and real, more exciting and more exacting in their claims on interest; and as in the progress of the affair the character develops and the difficulties increase with the uncertainties which these changes in the personages import into the conduct and upshot of the whole, there are excitements redoubled on excitements of plot, passion, character, aim, surrounding circumstances, &c. Just as a game of chess is a game pure and simple, though of course we may attach betting to it, the proceeds

of which are to go for a church-restoration bazaar, a benevolent fund, or a volunteer corps excursion; just as a game of cricket is a game with its own laws and course, although people may tag on to it a different element, and seek to widen the excitement of the game thereby; just as a swimming match is a trial of skill, and affords in itself a proper excitement, although people may add a little to the interest of the concern by calling it international, or any other superadded thing, so a novel ought to be a novel—pure and simple, though many try to make it something else.

History is philosophy teaching by example, and biography is a record possessed of a living interest, and both are bound to have a purpose beyond narration, because reality is given to us to learn from and by. But when we give history and biography their highest commendation, after vouching for or taking for granted their truth, we say—they are as *interesting* as a novel. This shows that the chief claim of a novel to attention is its *interest*. A novel is, in fact, a story of any kind possessing as its aim the awakening of curiosity and the sustaining of interest. A sensational novel is one in which no end is held in view—although many laws, such as probability, consistency, &c., have place in it—except the production and continuance of interest. It is therefore the only true and consistent novel. A novel with a purpose is a novel either “scribbled o’er” with a copy-line text, through its printed text, or one with a postscript appended to it—a novel and something else, in fact, and that something else a thing which is contradictory of the very first principle out of which the novel springs, the love of knowing all the possible results and intricacies of life, the anxiety to multiply and unravel experiences, the attempt to fill up the measure of our human capacities by imaginary, if not real exercise. This we take to be proved by the fact that novels always interest most which are most opposite to one’s own position, state, profession, circumstances; for in that we find the elements of interest freshened, and the eagerness for the fulness of life gratified. We have, then, in the facts of human experiences an evidence that cannot deceive that novels are read for their interest, that is, for the activity and keenness of the emotions and feelings they excite, the stir in fact that they make within us—their sensationalism.

It is a very easy thing to call a certain class of novels—the Whole Art of Bigamy made Plain, the Adultery Simplified, the Murder Popularized School of Fiction, and so gain a conquest by an *equivogue*. But though some novels certainly do make rather too much of the Newgate Calendar and the processes of crime, it is not because they do so that they are named sensational. These elements are adopted as the basis of such works, because they possess in themselves a spurious interest, and the authors do not possess the skill to work out the play of the passions to true and new issues, and preserve the human interest essential to novels. It is because sensationalism is in reality the essential characteristic of a novel that the less competent authors deal in such themes; it is not

because such themes constitute their plot that they are called sensational. Every true novel is sensational, must be sensational to be a member of the class, and the higher the sensational power the better the novel.

Everything is best which holds itself bound to its own specific characteristics. We have comic grammars and comic histories; we have oratorios with lively airs, and operas with staid and psalm-like melodies, but we feel that these things are misplaced, and that they mar and injure the consistency and harmony of feeling every work of art should possess—just as we would feel that a statue of Othello in white marble would be a shock to the ideal we have formed of him. We have even comic sermons and novelistic sermons—ay, even sensational sermons—just as we have sermonic novels, or novels with a purpose. But as few would contend for the superiority of sermons well spiced with Joe Millerisms to sermons properly suited to their purpose, so we think if people were to think properly about what they affirm, they would not say that a novel which preached was improved by the sermonic introduction—unless they suppose that, like soot in the laudanum sold by druggists, it makes poison less deadly, and less likely to be taken.

This last illustration leads us to our last observation. The novel of purpose is often used as a mere excuse for the conscience in a course of reading which it cannot justify to itself, considering the prejudices of the mind over which it should exert control. Many people believe that the reading of novels is in itself sinful, but adopting the evil maxim that the end justifies, and even sanctifies the means, they read the novel that they may learn its lesson, and so commit a known violation of duty knowingly in order that they may learn a lesson regarding the importance of doing duty and keeping firmly in the right way. The novel of purpose makes this self-deception possible, and subsequently palatable. If the sensational novel alone existed, such persons would probably abstain as rigorously from their perusal as they do from playing-cards or frequenting horse-races; but the novel of purpose breaks down the walls of partition in their minds between right and wrong with as little real justification as if a game of cards were played with innocence, because the cards had got texts of Scripture round their edges, or as if attendance at horse-races were justified to the conscience by the statement that all winnings would be given for the establishment of a home mission among the home heathen, and for the establishment of a tract-distribution fund against indulgence in profane and foolish amusements. Intellectually and morally, it seems to us that sensational novels are superior to novels of purpose, and I am led by critics to believe that in point of literary skill they always excel their rivals.

F. W. J.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE propriety of novel reading in general is by no means universally acknowledged. There are some people who can find no

pleasure in reading such works ; just as there are many who do not care about plays, because they can never divest their minds of the idea that they are only acted, so there are many who do not read novels because they can never get rid of the idea that the story is not true, and that it is drawn mainly or altogether from the imagination of the author, and who prefer a single chapter of history to a whole volume of fiction. There are also many who disapprove of novels in general from the unquestionably injurious tendency of many of them, the bad morality they inculcate, the false views of life they give, and the enervating effect they are apt to have upon the mind in unfitting it for severer studies, and who on these grounds never read such works themselves, and take every opportunity of dissuading others from doing so. Among the latter there are many whom we cannot but esteem, and who we know are thoroughly conscientious in their objections. Nevertheless we cannot agree with them, and we justify our position by a variety of arguments, holding that the mere fact of there being injurious novels does not warrant us in eschewing good ones. Now the ground on which I chiefly rely is this, that the arguments by which novel reading may be justified are applicable only to novels with a purpose, and that consequently these are superior to sensational novels.

Novel reading may be justified because it affords a relaxation to the mind. Man is not a machine, and his Creator never intended that he should spend his whole time in one unvarying round of business engagements. In such a case the mind becomes worn out, and like a spring too heavily pressed upon, or a bow too often bent, it loses its elasticity and becomes prematurely dull and feeble. Nor will mere idleness afford this necessary invigoration. The mind recovers itself far better if engaged in a new direction and in a lighter way ; and reading a good novel is as good a way as any other to effect this purpose. It is certainly not the only way ; for studies in the arts and sciences, such as drawing, painting, music, botany, mineralogy, and many others, such as amateur bookbinding—which the writer of this paper made his evening amusement for some years—all supply suitable recreation to the mind. But many, from natural tastes and other circumstances, cannot avail themselves of such means, and to them our light literature affords recreation at once. A business man coming home at night, wearied with thoughts of bills and discounts and fluctuations in the markets, can hardly be expected to sit down to a volume of political economy or ethical philosophy ; and so, instead of lounging in a sleepy fashion on the sofa, or going out to the theatre or the billiard-room, or into society, he dips into one of the Waverley novels, or the last of George Eliot's or Anthony Trollope's ; he goes back to business next morning all the better for it. But this presupposes that the novel is a good one, and that it has a healthy tendency. And here we have no hesitation in saying that the novel with a purpose will effect this object far better than a sensational one. The latter, instead of soothing the mind, will only excite and disturb it, and

fill it with imaginary fears. Novel reading no doubt is very often abused, by being indulged in to excess ; but while excessive reading of good novels may lead to what may be called intellectual dissipation, excessive reading of sensational novels can only lead to a diseased imagination. The "Woman in White" may be quoted as a thoroughly sensational novel, and one of the best of its kind ; but it cannot be said to be fitted to afford refreshment to the mind, for its effect is to make its readers afraid of going out in the dark and in constant terror of meeting ghosts. Sensational novels, as a rule, are made up of thrilling incidents, improbable adventures, startling dangers, and endless difficulties, arising out of horrible and often immoral crimes. The readers of such works have often been described as "feeding on horrors," and it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that their food cannot prove nutritious, that their digestion will be none of the best, and that their appetite for solid and better food will be sadly impaired. How different is the case with some novel having a good purpose in view ! Take one of Sir Walter Scott's, for instance ; say the "Heart of Mid-Lothian." Who has risen from its perusal without feeling both pleased and refreshed, and every way the better for it ? delighted, not only with the author's powers, but with the noble devotion of a sister's love.

The reading of novels may also be justified by the medium which they afford for conveying important truths and as an educative power. The influence which works of fiction exercise may be said to be all but illimitable, from the vast numbers who read them. Novels are published in greater numbers, oftener read at public libraries and book-clubs, and more extensively circulated through all classes of the community, than any other kind of literature ; and this makes their power for good and evil so much the greater. Some of our great novelists count their readers by thousands and tens of thousands. All these are brought more or less under their influence, and they have the power of giving some bent to the thoughts and colour to the feelings of all who read their works. If they have lofty aims and noble aspirations, and can breathe these into the characters depicted on their pages, their readers will insensibly try to follow in their path, and set a lofty ideal before their mind's eye as the goal which they strive to reach. They picture before us what is great and noble in man ; show us the springs of such an one's excellence, and how he attained to eminence ; and having honour, virtue, and integrity presented to us in an attractive guise, we instinctively desire that such attributes should characterize ourselves ; while from the author's exhibitions of wickedness, cowardliness, and immorality we instinctively shrink back, and abhor alike such men and their deeds.

We think that novels as a great educative agency are not understood as they should be. People will read them, however much they may be abused and condemned ; and thus they form one of the most accessible and powerful vehicles of public instruction we possess. Dr. Newman, Mr. Kingsley, Mr. Conybeare, and Lord

Brougham, it is said, have all written novels with this purpose in view, and have thereby expressed their deepest and most earnest convictions. Such novels as these are surely superior to sensational ones. By novels with a purpose we do not understand those prim, old-fashioned story-books about Charles and his Mamma, which have about a page of didactic matter at the end of each chapter, headed "Moral;" but the class represented by such works as the one which George Macdonald is now publishing, "The Seaboard Parish;" it is as interesting a story as could be wished, and this interest is excited by the most legitimate means, and not by the claptrap machinery resorted to by the sensational novelists. There is a fine vein of philosophic thought running through the whole, which sets the reader thinking for himself. There are many passages in it so beautiful that one can hardly help reading them a second time for mere enjoyment; and altogether it is such a book that we feel that its perusal has increased our ideas and enlarged our views, warmed our hearts and widened our sympathies, and we wish there were many more like it.

Novels may be further allowed because of the illustrations they afford us of national life and manners. For a long time historians seem to have thought it beneath the dignity of history to describe the less important details of every-day life. But although they might have given us more of these details than they have done, it is from other sources, such as novels and poetry, that we can expect a full account of them. We have not a Boswell in every generation to photograph for us the daily life of his hero, but novel writers in some measure supply his place. We need not look for such information regarding society a hundred years ago in the histories of Hume or Robertson, but we find it in the pages of such novelists as Richardson and Fielding. Historians have to do with those great events that mark the progress of the world and fix the destiny of nations; but novelists take us behind the scenes, and give us those views of life which historians pass over in silence. The novelist describes to us the life of his hero, or of a family, besides the subordinate characters; and in doing so tells us something of their houses, furniture, and dresses; their intrigues, love affairs, and common conversation; he takes us to their public gatherings, convivial parties, and religious services, and shows us the condition of the commerce and husbandry, education and literature of the period.

The novels of Fenimore Cooper may be classed among novels of purpose, and in them he describes American life, and especially among the Red Indians, who apparently will soon be enrolled among the nations of the past, and whose deeds will be read only in the records of history. There he shows us the interior of a wigwam and the drudgery of the squaws. He takes us with the hunter as he follows the chase over the boundless prairies, and with the warrior as he pursues the trail of his enemy through the pathless forest, armed with his deadly tomahawk and scalping-knife. He ushers us into the council, when the war-hatchet is buried, and

the chiefs solemnly smoke the calumet of peace; and with him we listen to the untutored eloquence and passionate earnestness of these children of the woods. He takes us with one who has fallen into the hands of a hostile tribe, and we see him die with unmoved countenance and unflinching nerve, although tortured to the utmost by a fiendish malignity.

So is it with Marryat's novels. They introduce us to a seafaring life, and open up to us the hard-hips and adventures of our sailors, their rollicking fun, their discipline on board, and revelry and madcap follies on shore. He recounts to us some of the pleasant and often improbable yarns which old sailors are so fond of spinning.

But these descriptions are to be found only in novels with a purpose. They form materials inadequate for the sensational writer's object. A reader whose mind is suffused with sensational fiction or spasmodic poetry would take little interest in them; and the writer who ministers to his taste must find more exciting material, hurrying on from one exciting adventure to another, till his reader's feelings are wrought up to their highest pitch, and the story reaches its climax at the end of the third volume. If we had none but sensational novels, we could get but few illustrations of national life, and this contributes to demonstrate their inferiority.

Sensational novels are further inferior from their own nature. It is this sensationalism that prompts the publication and finds readers of the "Police News" and kindred publications. Here the public are treated to the most spicy news that can be found, and that is intensified by ill-drawn, flaming wood-cuts of murders and accidents of all kinds; now a young woman stabbing her rival, or some boys hacking a woman with axes and mallets; or some shocking case of starvation and cruelty, and so on *ad nauseam*. These are the materials with which the sensational writer deals, and he heightens the effect and colours the details from his own imagination. Such tales as "Dick Turpin," "Jack Sheppard," "The Robber of the Rhine," all belong to this class; and the mischief they have done is incredible. How many have been seen at police courts whose minds have been led away, and who have been so excited by the perusal of such works as to become thieves and footpads, and pests to society! These stories published in low-class periodicals are all sensational ones, and to their effect is traceable a great deal of crime and immorality; for they represent these in an attractive guise, and carry off the former successful in every conflict with justice, and make the latter not so bad after all. The same thing goes on in the higher classes, through such books as "East Lynne," Miss Braddon's, and many of Bulwer Lytton's earlier works, where sin is glossed over, and crime never meets that reprobation which it merits, but where the worse is made the better of the two.

That novels with a purpose are superior is demonstrated by the good they have accomplished. Think of the abuses which Dickens'

unsparing criticism and ridicule tended to abolish. His pictures of Mr. Squeers and Dotheboy's Hall undoubtedly assisted to improve the character of our public schools; so with the workhouses and many social abuses. We have heard of a tradesman being called liar and rogue, and remaining unmoved; he was called a Dombey, and he trembled with dismay. The publication of "Valentine Vox" has improved the character of our private lunatic asylums, and of our lunacy laws. What an influence has Mrs. Stowe exerted by the publication of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," in the extinction of that most iniquitous of all systems—the slave trade! Its abolition in our colonies was brought about by the overwhelming force of public opinion; and in the same way this novel of Mrs. Stowe's has assisted in the same noble work, by directing kindly attention to the slaves, awakening sympathy on their behalf, and preparing the minds of the American people to demand their freedom.

I have thus shown that the chief grounds on which novel-reading may be justified or recommended are applicable only to novels with a purpose, and that therefore they are superior to sensational ones; that the latter are inferior from their nature, and the former superior from the good they have accomplished; and if I have proved these, I have proved the negative side of the question under debate.

R. D., JUN.

TWELVE CANONS OF ART AND LITERATURE.—1. The source of Art is the love of the beautiful; its aim is the excitement of the imagination. 2. The source of literature is the love of the true; its aim is the instruction of the intellect. 3. Paintings and sculptures intended to instruct the intellect by the record of facts are not works of art, but of literature. 4. Writings intended to excite the imagination by the description of the beautiful in nature or in human life are not works of literature, but of art. 5. Art is false to its origin when that which it creates is unbeautiful; it fails in its purpose when it leaves the imagination unexcited. 6. Literature is false to its origin when it panders to error; it fails in its purpose when it leaves the intellect unfed. 7. As the purpose of art is the excitement of the imagination, the perfection of the expression (whereby the imagination is affected) is of more importance in art than the thing expressed. 8. As the purpose of literature is the instruction of the intellect, the thing expressed (whereby the intellect is instructed) is of more importance in literature than the perfection of the expression. 9. A work may be a work of art if the expression be good, even if the thing expressed be insignificant. it is not a work of art if the attempt at expression fail, even if the thought which is sought to be expressed be noble. 10. A work may be a work of literature if the thought be good, even if the expression be poor; it is not a work of literature if the thought be worthless, even if the expression be good. 11. The secondary merit of art is the choice of a subject; the secondary merit of literature is the polish of style. 12. To estimate a work of art primarily according to our intellectual or affectional interest in its subject, or to estimate a work of literature primarily according to our æsthetic pleasure in the style, is in either case the criticism of ignorance.—*Frances Power Cobbe, in the Spectator.*

Politics.

WAS THE ABYSSINIAN WAR JUSTIFIABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THERE never surely could have been a war so nobly entered upon, so honourably engaged in, so pure in purpose, and so specific in plan, as the war which we recently waged against the Emperor of Abyssinia. It was a pure war of moral purpose. It was a war in behalf of civilization, of principle, and of true policy. It may be justified on the broadest moral theory. Its great moral effect was to show that the petty tyrants of the countries in which savage customs and despotic passionate potentates preside, cannot be permitted to set at nought the privileges and rights of the citizens of civilized nations, to despise the monarchies of the West, and to break through the restraints of right. A savage of indomitable will, great personal conceit, much courage, and a great deal of ambition, but altogether destitute of self-control, or of prudence and humanity, provoked the hostility of our nation by his cruelties to his own nation, but still more for the tyrannous oppression of subjects of our empire, and missionaries of the Cross to which we look for salvation. It was ours to show that in no part of the world, however far from the civilization in which he was bred, could a citizen of our nation, without an act of self-renunciation, be disrobed of his rights and of the protection of the might of armies which civilization possesses as her safeguards. We did so in a most justifiable style.

The painful slavery to which Theodore had doomed his captives, the deceitful manner in which he involved them in his toils, the insolence of his tone, the breach of international rights of which he was guilty, especially in regard to the envoy of the British Sovereign (for the persons of envoys have in all ages and places been held sacred), put the imperial ruler of Abyssinia beyond the pale of civilized diplomacy. There was no method of treating with him, no intercourse could be kept up, because no dependence could be placed on his temper and his sense of justice. Negotiations can only take place when those who are to negotiate have their personal safety guaranteed, but for any legation to have gone to make a diplomatic treaty with King Theodore would have been to have walked into a tiger's den to gain rest and peace.

Nothing but the discharge of the wrath of nations; nothing but a striking, decisive, absolute shaking of the very power in which he trusted; nothing but an exhibition of such force as was irresistible, could effectively show that Civilization protected the humblest of her children against tyranny and wrong; that she

would not consent to the harming of a hair of the head of one of her own without rebuke, punishment, and condign reprisal. In this way alone was civilization able to make her explorers and missionaries, her agents and servants respected. One good lesson of such sort given in the East would be invaluable as a warning, and our Government was fully justified in regard to the causes, and success has justified the manner. The hero of Magdala, with all the spirit of the peerless Napiers, went to his duty with energy and determination, forethought and skill, and he conquered the barbarian. The calculated coolness, the unflinching calmness, the unwavering determination in which the whole was done, upon the clear principle that civilization must maintain its supremacy, and to do so must teach barbarous nations that no member of the confederacy of civilization could be injured intentionally, without a call being made for instantaneous satisfaction—a satisfaction which would be substantial in its results, as a preventative of barbarian outrages hereafter—now, this justifies the Abyssinian War in every particular, and makes it one of the most holy wars of any age.

The majestic forbearance exercised towards the fallen, the absence of any selfish end or aim, the high moral dignity with which the war was conducted, is a further justification. There is on record no war where the mere administration of punishment has been so strictly adhered to, and where the conquerors, disdaining any other object, did what they were sent to do in a minimum of time and with a minimum of evil.

If war can ever be justified, it must be used as a chastiser, and be conducted with this supreme regard to right and purpose. It ought not in our days to be the unleashing of the hell hounds of cruelty and slaughter, rapine and rage, ravine and beastliness. It ought to be a great moral agent moving amidst all its destructiveness to beneficent ends. The Abyssinian Expedition almost glorifies war by showing how the stern dignity of assured strength can bring the might of its force against the strongholds of wrong, without carrying distress, devastation, disorder, and despair along its path. The self-restraint of the army, the pure, noble dutifulness of the commander, the calm assertion of a principle which was kept in view, the unity of object aimed at, and the careful abstinence from any injury not necessary for the accomplishment of the main purpose, mark this war off in our historic annals as a new leaf in the military art. It was a conscientious war conscientiously conducted. It was a war of civilization against barbarian outrage, and it very properly kept free from outrage, and maintained the dignity and purity, the propriety and the self-regard of civilization. There can be little doubt that the high moral nature of Lord Stanley clearly marked the civilizing effect of such an exhibition of restrained force, and that he planned the expedition on justifiable principles, and in a justifiable manner.

Our Abyssinian Expedition has had the effect of displacing a tyrant, whose cruelties were great, and whose savage bravery

might have created imitators of his example: it has given proof to Africa and Asia that the watchfulness of Europe follows those who undertake enterprises of great pith and moment, and will suffer no injury to befall the humblest of its servants; it has released the captives who were suffering painful duration; it has given an opportunity to Abyssinia to place itself under the control of some chief who is powerful enough to protect and rule with wisdom, to be moderate and honest enough to prohibit plunder; it has shown that a high principle of honour may be imported into war, and that self-control is not beyond the reach of armies, but that the virtue of valour may be combined with the valour of virtue; it has proved that rigid self-denial can be exercised under the greatest temptations, and that a noble country when it has executed its purpose can leave even a hostile land without making any breach in the chances of after tranquillity. And above all it has made plain to Europe that we have no empty pride in extending our sway over barbarous tribes. In many of these regards people may compare our Abyssinian War with the recent conquest of Algiers by our near neighbours and allies.

In a nation whose trade extends so far as ours, whose commerce is continually leading daring men to make journeys into strange lands, and whose missionaries enter into any territory where an opportunity offers of urging men to accept the Faith of Christ, nothing is more urgently required than that all who hold themselves ready to do service to the country, should know that the shield of their country's arms is round them wheresoever they go, and that so long as they labour for good they need not fear. In lands where the wildness of manners tempts to the ill-usage of those who venture, seemingly unprotected, into the territories of new tribes, it is well that it should be known that there is an eye tracking the path of the lonely wayfarer, and that if aught evil betide him, strict inquisition will be made regarding the cause and the circumstances. It is, too, highly advantageous that the country should be pledged to actual carefulness concerning those who take on themselves the extreme risks of such journeys. No one who thinks of these things with considerateness will fail to see that they supply due reasons for affirming that "the Abyssinian War was justifiable," and its conduct a glory to the nation.

H. D.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE—II.

OUGHT we really to call this Abyssinian affair a war? Is it not making rather too much of this raid so to name it? In a doubtful cause we ran perilous risks, and hazarded all the horrors without any possibility of attaining to any of the honours of war. It was an expeditionary force of some ten thousand men sent out by one of the greatest centres of European civilization against a petty sovereign of savages, who, though brave himself, and the leader of brave men, was quite unfit to cope with our armies, gallant as his

untrained heroes may have been. We indeed ran the risk of a long, wearisome, and exhausting campaign, extended by stratagems, and made dangerous by the unknown geographical region into which our army was led, but we had no equivalent of honour to hope for, because it could never redound to the glory of Britain that it chose to consider such a kinglet as an enemy and to recognize such men as foes. The policy was decidedly contemptible which induced the British Government to condescend to set its troops into the field against a foe so insignificant for a cause so worthless, while we were crouching to America, and trying to stave off the Alabama claims and the Fenian invasion of Canada, and did not venture to take the field against the invaders of Denmark, or set our faces against the encroachments of Russia upon Asia.

A great nation, such as ours is, cannot afford to embroil itself in petty squabbles; and let us deck this expedition with whatever high-sounding name we like, it was little better than a squabble in its origin and course, though it culminated into tragedy in the end by the death of the emperor and his six thousand men. The nation never heartily took up the squabble, and they not only looked with aversion on the proposed engagement, but paid for it with reluctance. This is clearly manifest, from the fact that a large proportion of the expense has been thrown on India, and this merely as a bribe to the British taxpayer to allow the Government to go on. It is not the custom of the British to huckster about the payment of warlike outfits, however costly, when they have the cause at heart for which they fight. This is considerable evidence in itself that it was unjustifiable; it created no enthusiasm, aroused no commotion of spirit, and was permitted only on sufferance, because the Government seemed in want of something to do for their army and for their own prestige. There was something in the whole affair shabby and ignoble, and in any question of British policy that is enough to stamp it with the stigma of being unjustifiable. However satisfactory its close may have been to the people—for "all's well that ends well"—it does not seem ever to have caught the public mind as even the Crimean War did, mistaken though it was.

It is not necessary to grudge his honours and rewards to the hero of Magdala; to deny the courage and excellence of the British troops; or to criticise the campaign at all in order to consider this question and give a reply in regard to the question, "Was the Abyssinian War justifiable?" It is the duty of a general to execute the commands of the Government he serves, and he is not at liberty to form an opinion upon the general policy which originates the orders he receives, and "it is the duty," as has been said of old time, "of soldiers to obey their general." Whenever, then, a general performs with success and credit the service which has been allotted to him, he deserves the fitting rewards which Government has in its power to bestow; and wherever soldiers carry out with earnest attention and unflinching

courage the duties imposed on them by their leaders, they deserve the praises due to excellence, bravery, and endurance. There need be no retraction of the thanks voted to the army, no abrogation of the honours achieved, even although we should succeed, as we hope to do, in proving that "the Abyssinian war was unjustifiable." It is not on the officials in the war that censure falls, but on the Government; and we firmly believe that the moral convictions of the nation were more thoroughly outraged by this war than by any we have undertaken during the present century. It was not an equal war, but a bullying one; it was a war in which all the chances were on one side, and hence one which was not a glorious arbitrament of arms. We all know that when an unequal strife is engaged in, the one on whose side the advantage lies is always regarded as acting unjustly in forcing on the fight. The Abyssinian War was a clear case of the oppressive use of force against a foe which we knew was no match for us, and contrasts most forcibly with the cunning evasion by which we shrunk from contending in arms with Prussia in behalf of Denmark, where a foeman worthy of our steel was offered, and a cause worthy of our defence was open to our valour.

Mr. Rassam and Consul Cameron may be very good men, but they seem not to have been particularly fitted for the offices of envoys and representatives of her Britannic majesty in Theodore's territory. Even though they had been, however, all that they should be, it seems pretty generally admitted that if they were entitled to Theodore's protection and courtesy, King Theodore was also entitled to courtesy, and the observance of an etiquette well enough known. The obstinacy or folly with which the neglect to send presents and letters to Theodore, in accordance with the customs observed in the East, gives emphatic grounds for thinking this war unjustifiable, for it is never wise to cover our own faults by forcible asseverations of our own rightness, and to maintain an error in diplomacy to be justifiable by the might of arms, is unjustifiable.

It is a maxim in politics as well as in mechanics that economy of force ought always to be arrived at. Now we have expended in this war a large amount of money—upwards of half a million for each captive—and yet we have added nothing to the prestige of British arms. Our fight has been against barbarians in civil condition, especially in war-training and equipment, and though it was successful in obtaining the release of the captives, it has been successful in nothing else. It has not taught the Abyssinians the evil of their ways; it has not impressed Europe with a sense of our power; it has not elevated the moral sentiment of nations; it has merely enabled a Tory Government to write their name among those who have achieved success in war, and enabled them to boast of the prowess of British arms as a reason for extending the taxation levied for the payment of the army. The Abyssinian War is in our eyes a costly electioneering dodge, a ground for a hustings'

cry, an expensive advertisement of the Conservative party. Had we used half the money to ransom the prisoners, we would have been much better off; they would have been equally safe, Europe would have seen more heroism in it than in our war, and Abyssinia would have been preserved from the condition of anarchy into which it has been thrown by our destruction of the reigning power, and our opening up of the pathways of ambition to many claimants of kingly dignity.

The Abyssinian War is unjustifiable because it has introduced disorganization in that nation, and made it a prey to anarchy, confusion, and revolution, and so begun in that country a series of events and complications such as may lead to European interventions in the East, resulting in collisions in the West. It is easy to be imagined that if any new sovereign ascends the Abyssinian throne, he must be in a great measure the creature and tool of England, to whom he owes his opportunity of elevation. Whether the sovereign of Godjam or of Shoa, or one of the chiefs of the Gallas makes himself master of the crown and sceptre, or Theodore's main enemy, Wagshum Gobazye, continues his ambitious schemes to success. English influence and power will be felt, and a knowledge of the share England had in the creation of the present vacancy cannot fail to make the future king ready to make submissions to this country. But in the meantime we have exposed the unoffending natives to all the horrors of a civil war and contentions for supremacy and a crown—a condition in which we had no right to leave the country, a condition which ought to have been foreseen by us as possible, and as furnishing a great reproof to us for proposing to unhead the State and destroy its vitality. This criminal apathy of ours, by increasing the probability of foreign intervention, makes our engagement in the war all the less justifiable.

We had written thus far, when the papers in the July number, pp. 51—54, came into our hands, and we could not control our wonder that F. S. should have closed his article with a quotation which seems to us to go hard against his whole argument. If "prestige" is so all-important, as Sir R. Rawlinson says, and F. S. agrees that it is, ought those who had the charge of "Britain's prestige in politics" not to have halted before they risked a war on such a trivial basis, with such doubtful right, and with such a rude and unequal enemy. War is the last argument of kings, and the ultimate arbiter between states; but surely things had not come to such a pass with Britain that war was our only means of ransoming our envoy and releasing the captives whom Theodore kept in such bondage, as at least permitted them to send pretty long and strong letters to Britain about his cruelty and his savagery. To cast the prestige of Britain upon the hazard of such a die was unjustifiable; for climate, the unknown country, or the strategy of war might have led to the defeat of our forces had Theodore been a cunning coward instead of a strong, brave man, with the courage of his opinions on him—personally a much nobler

foe than we could have expected, one who showed fight and feared no fate.

I think F. S. makes a very bad excuse for the British Government. His account might have been condensed into this single sentence—The Governments of Great Britain did all they could to humbug the Emperor of Abyssinia, and when he would not submit to be befooled they sent an army against him. I do not think this is justifiable in any Government, but it certainly is very far from an honourable course in the policy of our country.

F. S. sees in the war a means of propagating a belief in our power throughout the East. Fortunately it is not our power to chastise that the East requires to learn. Unfortunately, it is trust in our honesty they want. They want to feel that they are sure of honourable and upright treatment, and this our present war must lead them to doubt and disbelieve. Had we been true to ourselves and our traditions, had we been fully alive to the problem of the East, we should have hesitated to add the Abyssinian War to the other reasons which the East has for doubting British fair dealing.

I do not think that R. F. G. is right in commencing to urge as a negative that all war is unjustifiable; for that precludes the raising of the special question upon which we are engaged, which assumes that it may have been justifiable, but that it admits of debate.

M. T.

DIVINE PLAN CONCERNING GENIUS.—To regard the appearance of men of genius as mere chance, or dependent on material causes alone, will be impossible to any one who views man's history, not as a vast chaos, but as the scheme of an intelligent superintending Power. There remains, then, only this alternative; to refer the appearance of every single individual to a special act of divine will and creative energy; or to recognise in the whole succession of such individuals, one great act of the same will, expressed in an eternal, inviolable law. Each supposition has much on its side; the former seems, at first, more honourable to God, as well as to men of genius, who thus appear to derive their being more directly from an act of free will on His part; the other corresponds more to the general course of Providence, and suggests more clearly the idea of a great spiritual choir, extending in harmonious succession through the whole history of human progress. If, however, we examine more closely, we shall find that the two sides of the dilemma are not contra fictions, but different views of one great truth. Free will and necessity are, when used of God, two ways of expressing the same idea. Looking, according to our imperfect conceptions, at each separate manifestation of the divine will, we may truly say, that by a special exercise of creative power, the heaven-born gift of genius has been bestowed on the world at such a period and among such a people. But we must guard well against representing to our minds the divine will as a series of unconnected resolutions; it is, on the contrary, an all-embracing plan, eternal, unchanging: and thus the idea of a law, by which the periodical appearance of men of genius is regulated and fore-appointed, and the progressive intellectual development of the human race secured, harmonizes fully with what our previous conceptions would lead us to expect.—ALLMAN.

Religion.

WOULD THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE IRISH CHURCH BE INJURIOUS OR BENEFICIAL TO PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY?

BENEFICIAL.—III.

THE *odium theologicum* having been largely imported into the discussion of this question, by the raising of a "No Popery" cry on the part of our opponents, we beg leave to state first of all that we are no friend to Popery. We are sincerely attached to the fundamental doctrines of Protestantism, and highly venerate those noble men who inaugurated the great Reformation. We would strive with all our might to check the progress of Romanism; we hate its doctrines and practices with a perfect hatred, and we should greatly rejoice to see Protestantism everywhere taking the place of Popery. But we must remember that the Apostle Paul has said that "the weapons of our warfare are not carnal" (2 Corinthians x. 4). To oppose the spread of Romanism by legislative restrictions is to make use of carnal weapons, which we ought not to do, but should rather fight against our spiritual enemies by means of that "sword of the spirit, which is the Word of God" (Ephesians vi. 17). It is true that the Papacy aims at temporal authority, and the power to take away the lives of its opponents, but it can only exercise this authority and this power where it has acquired spiritual ascendancy over the minds of the people, and therefore to prevent this spiritual ascendancy will be to thwart all its ambitious designs. We have made these prefatory remarks to show that we do not advocate this side of the discussion from any leaning towards Romanism; and now we will proceed to the more immediate subject of debate.

We support the Disestablishment of the Irish Church both as an act of justice, and also as an act of policy, believing that the maintenance of the Irish Church would be both unjust and inexpedient, and that which is unjust cannot possibly be beneficial to the cause of Christianity. Christianity may for a time appear to derive benefit from unjust measures, but the end will prove that these unjust measures were, in reality, prejudicial to the cause they were intended to support. Inflexible justice is one of the fundamental principles of Protestant Christianity; it teaches us to "do right, come what may." Whatever is unjust in principle must necessarily in practice be injurious to the cause of true Christianity. Therefore,

if we can prove to the satisfaction of our readers that the Irish Church is unjust in principle, all of them who are genuine Protestants must admit that the Disestablishment of the Irish Church would be beneficial to Protestant Christianity; they must admit the truth of our conclusion unless they can overthrow the premises from which that conclusion is deduced.

It is not consonant with justice that the religion of the few and of the rich should be specially favoured by Government, whilst that favour is withheld from the religion of the many and of the poor in a conquered country, against the will of a vast majority of the nation. A Protestant State cannot consistently establish or endow the Roman Catholic religion in any part of its dominions, but there would be no inconsistency in its refusing to establish or endow Protestantism where the greater part of the people are opposed to the Protestant religion. In some of our colonies there is no religion whatever established or endowed by the State, and in some of our colonial dependencies, where there has been an established church, that church is now being disestablished. If it is right, if it is safe, for these colonies to be without an established church, why would it be wrong, why would it be dangerous to disestablish the Irish Church? It is universally acknowledged that it would be unjust to establish Episcopacy in Scotland, because the majority of the people are attached to Presbyterianism; how then can it be just to establish Episcopal Protestantism in Ireland? We maintain that in this case justice demands religious equality, and we think that equality should be obtained, not by "levelling up," not by the endowment of other churches, but by the disestablishment and disendowment of the Established Church, and the withdrawal of the *Regium Donum* and Maynooth grant. What right have we to compel the poor Roman Catholics of Ireland, who form a large majority of the people, to pay towards the maintenance of the church of the rich minority, whilst they have at the same time to support their own church without aid? Ireland may reasonably complain of England as acting unjustly towards her. The sons of Erin may with justice say to England, "Centuries ago your armies came across the water to us, and through our internal dissensions gained a footing in this our native land. Then your religion was the same as ours, but if your religion had then been opposed to ours, as it is now, the united force of religious enthusiasm would have hurled you from our shores. Afterwards, you renounced your religion, you deserted the standard of the Pope, you became Protestants, and then you demanded that we should turn Protestants too. Because we refused to do so, you took our churches from us, you took our endowments from us against our will, and you put down all opposition to these arbitrary measures at the point of the sword. You put fresh ministers into our churches to teach your religion, made us pay towards their support, and left us to maintain our ministers without any aid from the State." His story would prove this complaint to be a correct statement of

facts, and every unbiassed mind must acknowledge the injustice of such a line of conduct. We have, until recent times, been ruling Ireland with a rod of iron. Of late years our statesmen have governed Ireland in a more wise, generous, equitable, and tolerant spirit; and now it remains for us to do justice to our sister isle, in removing the great monument of our national injustice, by Disestablishing and Disendowing the Episcopal Church in Ireland.

We also defend the Disestablishment of the Irish Church as an act of policy. If we admit that the Established Church in Ireland is an act of injustice, we must also admit that it is an unwise act, for that which is unjust can never be politic or wise. Injustice may for a short period seem to be wisdom, but it will in future times most surely prove to have been the height of folly. The Established Church in Ireland has proved a constant source of irritation among the people. This was plainly shown about thirty years ago, when there was a general rising of the people in opposition to the payment of tithes, and those who were dependent upon these tithes were reduced to a state of extreme destitution. It was not merely a repugnance to give money for religious purposes, on the part of the Irish Roman Catholics, for they could and did voluntarily support the ministers of their own religion, but it was a violent outburst of feeling—an habitual line of thought suddenly vitalized and transformed into united action, the result of a long-felt repugnance of the majority to pay towards the support of the religion of the rich minority, and a hatred to those who oppressed them in matters of religion as well as of state. The Established Church in Ireland has widened the breach and increased the hostile feeling between the native Irish peasants and their English lords. Protestant Episcopalianism in Ireland being placed upon a footing that causes such irritation and hostility, the influence of that form of Protestantism is thereby greatly diminished. Prejudice against the English people and their favoured religion binds many of the Irish peasants to Romanism, who are not bound to it by any conscientious belief. If we wish Protestantism to spread amongst the Roman Catholics of the lower classes in Ireland, we must proceed, not by means of coercion and restriction, but by endeavouring to draw and win by conciliatory measures and the power of moral persuasion. The Established Church in Ireland has been spoken of as a strong bulwark to defend Protestantism from the encroachments of Romanism, and E. B. O. R. calls the Irish Church “a fixed Protestant stronghold,” and those who use this argument say, that to disestablish the Irish Church would be to increase the power of Popery. But when the Established Church of England and Ireland contains men who say, “I am no Protestant,” and who assert that “the Reformation was an act of Divine vengeance, not of Divine grace,” that Luther, Zwingli, and Melancthon were villains that stood on a lower level than Robespierre, Danton, and Marat, and that the martyrs of Queen Mary’s reign were base traitors, deservedly put to death, who were dunces as well as liars,

discouraging learning as well as morality, how can we look upon that church as a defence against the encroachments of Popery?

E. B. O. R. says that "the disendowment and disestablishment of the Irish Church is virtually the endowment and establishment of the Romanist creolulity—is throwing into the hands of the Papists the entire sway of the Irish millions." We have seen similar arguments adduced by bishops and other dignitaries of the Episcopal Church, but what a strange argument to proceed from Episcopalians. We could understand such an assertion coming from a certain class of Dissenters, but how short-sighted must be those churchmen who make use of such an argument. It implies that the disendowment and disestablishment of the Irish Church would destroy its power, and that its chief strength lies in its endowments and establishment, not in the truthfulness of its doctrines, or the moral influence of its ministers. But many Dissenters, and all Episcopalians who have any real faith in their form of religion, hope better things than this of the Episcopal Church in Ireland. If it were disendowed and disestablished its influence would not be destroyed, but increased. Many of her ministers, who now have a secret leaning to Popery, not having so great a personal interest in remaining within her pale, would probably appear in their true colours, and go over to the Church of Rome; thus her ranks would be more purified and united. Again, if the Irish Church were disestablished and disendowed, the hostility and jealousy which exists on the part of the Roman Catholic peasantry towards the English Protestants, would be lessened; thus one great barrier to the progress of Protestantism in Ireland would be removed, and therefore for this, amongst other reasons, the act of disestablishment would be beneficial to Protestant Christianity.

The next argument brought forward by E. B. O. R. is, that "the entire Jewish dispensation proves the necessity of having some established form of things—especially in religion—as a point of departure and comparison." We cannot see that it proves any such thing, because the circumstances that surround us are so different from those by which the Jews of old were affected. Judaism was framed and enforced by its divine author to point the eye of faith to Him that should come, and to His vicarious work, and also to keep the Jews from union and amalgamation with the heathen around them. When, however, Jesus came and established a new dispensation, He sent forth ministers to preach the gospel, but He did not found any established system in any way comparable to the Jewish economy of o'd, or the established churches of the present day. He did not establish gradations of rank amongst the ministers of the gospel, neither did He give one minister authority over other ministers. If such a system had been necessary for the welfare of Christianity, He would have exerted His almighty power, and would have established such a system; and the fact that He did not establish such a system

proves that such an established order of things is not necessary for the welfare and advancement of Christianity.

E. B. O. R. remarks that, "Every injustice sanctioned by those who have the care of law and justice in their hands is a disadvantage to true religion." Just so : and it is because we believe the Established Church of Ireland to be an injustice to the Irish people, that we believe its maintenance would be a disadvantage to Protestant Christianity. Our opponent insinuates that if the Irish Church should be disestablished and disendowed, the act would be "perpetrated through fear of those who adhere to Popery," and "through love of the lucre that would come into the pockets of those who determine the result." These are serious charges to bring against our legislators, and such unworthy motives ought not to be rashly imputed to them. Our opponent adduces no evidence in support of these insinuations ; they are perfectly gratuitous inuendos. Perhaps in his reply E. B. O. R. will kindly give us the evidence upon which he founds the assertion that the disestablishment and disendowment of the Irish Church would be "the shabby injustice of cowardice,"—"the shabby injustice of avarice." E. B. O. R. then says, that "to sanctify such crimes by the title of religious reformation cannot but be hurtful to Protestant Christianity." If it would be a crime for the legislature to take possession of the revenues of a church established by the same legislature, it must have been a crime equally great for the Reformers of the sixteenth century to seize upon the Roman Catholic churches and their endowments, and appropriate them to the use of Protestant clergymen. And here those who speak of the disestablishment and disendowment of the Irish Church as an act of injustice, are landed upon the horns of a dilemma. The Reformers of the sixteenth century either had a right or they had no right to seize upon the churches and revenues of the Roman Catholic Church. If they had a right to do so, then we have an equal right to disestablish the Irish Church, and to take possession of her endowments ; and if they had no right to do so, then we should be perfectly justified in taking from the Episcopal Church in Ireland that which she has wrongfully gained.

E. B. O. R.'s next argument is as follows : "The Irish Church is spoken of as the Church of the minority, and hence it is said that it must go to the wall : but such reasoning is absurd. Law is the agreement made among men to protect the minority from the tyranny of the majority. If similar reasoning were to be applied to other things, where should we be ?" If this argument be intended to have any force in the present debate, it must mean that, *because* episcopacy is in Ireland the religion of the minority, *therefore* that religion must be favoured by law in Ireland, *because* law is to protect the minority from the tyranny of the majority. "But such reasoning is absurd." On the same ground the Roman Catholic Church ought to be favoured by law in England, because in England Romanism is the religion of the minority, and in

Scotland Episcopalianism ought to be specially favoured by law, because in Scotland Episcopalianism is the religion of the minority, in order that Episcopalians there might be protected from the tyranny of the majority. Oh, Mr. E. B. O. R., we must repeat to you your own words—"If similar reasoning were to be applied to other things, where would we be?" We do not say that the Episcopal Church in Ireland "must go to the wall" because it is the religion of the minority, we merely say that it ought to stand or fall upon its own merits, and that under the circumstances in which it is placed, it ought not to receive a special support from the state.

E. B. O. R. then proceeds to "point out briefly" four "elements of thought," which he says "require to be taken into consideration;" we will therefore at once briefly consider these "elements of thought." The first is as follows: "The disestablishment of the Irish Church would be the abandonment of a principle; and that every abandonment of a principle implies that it is false and inimical, so that the same thing will be right in England, Scotland, and Wales as is hereby declared to be right in Ireland." To this we reply, Whatever may be the personal feeling of some who take our side in this great debate, yet it does not necessarily follow that, because it is right to disestablish the Irish Church, it must be right to disestablish the churches established by law in England, Scotland, or Wales; for the position of the Established Church in Ireland is very different from the position of the churches established in England, Scotland, and Wales. They are not parallel cases, therefore we cannot correctly reason thus from the one to the other. The second is, "That the disestablishment of the Irish Church is equivalent to the endowment of Popery." This we simply deny *in toto*, and at once proceed to examine the five reasons given in support of this assertion. The first of these reasons is, "Because it removes a rival." But the disestablishment of the Irish Church will not remove a rival to Popery; it will merely alter the position of that rival. Surely the episcopal ministers of Ireland will not desert their congregations *en masse* when the church is deprived of its endowments. Were they to do so, it would indeed show most disreputably that they merely entered the church for "the loaves and fishes." The second reason given is, "Because it gives an apparent victory to it." It would be a Popish victory in appearance only, and not in reality. The disestablishment of the Irish Church could not be considered as a victory of the Romanists over the Protestants, because it would be gained by a large section of Protestants striving to do an act of justice to the Irish people. The third of these reasons is, "Because it releases property from burdens which would be given to that church all the more readily, because it could so easily be represented that the release was due to those who asked its transfer." In reply to this we would say, that if the owners of property in Ireland choose to give of their substance towards the maintenance of the Roman Catholic

churches, we have no right to prevent them from doing so; we have no right to say to them, You shall not give to your church, you must give your money to our church. The fourth reason which E. B. O. R. gives in support of his assertion is "Because it would remove protection from Protestants, and put down in many places the witnessing for Protestantism which the Irish Church involves." This would not be the case; for if the Irish Church were disestablished, Protestants would then be protected by the law just as much as they are now; and all who are now sincere in witnessing for Protestantism would then still continue to be witnesses for Protestantism. The fifth and last of these reasons is "Because it would put all the temptations on the other side of the Protestants." To this we reply that hitherto the temptations which E. B. O. R. mentions have been on the side of the Romanists, but these temptations do not appear to have had much influence in drawing them over to Protestantism; why, then, should we imagine that, supposing these temptations transferred to the side of the Protestants, they would draw over Protestants to Romanism? If these temptations have not drawn Roman Catholics from their Romanism, surely they would not draw Protestants from their Protestantism. The disestablishment of the Irish Church would not be equivalent to the endowment of Popery, because the endowment of Popery would give it a direct sanction and assistance from the State; but by the mere disestablishment of the Irish Church, Popery would not receive any direct sanction or pecuniary aid from the State.

The third of these "elements of thought" is "that the disestablishment of the Irish Church would widen the area of Popish influence, and lessen the vigour of Protestant resistance." On the other hand we believe, for reasons given before, which we need not here repeat, that the disestablishment of the Irish Church would not widen the area of Popish influence, and that it would increase the vigour of Protestant resistance and aggressiveness. The fourth and last of these "elements of thought" is "that the disestablishment of the Irish Church would affect the minds of the unthinking to believe that Protestantism was a failure and Popery the only eternal truth of Christ." We do not think that this effect would be produced, but supposing that the disestablishment of one Protestant church should produce this effect, how much greater an effect ought to be produced in the opposite direction by considering the many instances which the sixteenth century affords of Roman Catholic churches being disestablished and supplanted by Protestantism.

In conclusion we would ask, Do the Episcopalians of Ireland sincerely wish to do battle with Popery? Then let them not fear the disestablishment and disendowment of the Irish Church. They will, in the circumstances that surround them, be better able to fight in a state of autonomy when freed from the chains and shackles thrown around them, and when liberated from the effects

of that prejudice which has been produced by their close and special alliance with the State. Let them carry on the warfare honestly, bravely, never fearing the result of the contest, for "*magna est veritas, et prevalebit.*"

SAMUEL.

INJURIOUS.—III.

By the terms of the question the debate on this important subject is confined within precise and narrow limits. With the expediency, necessity, or justifiability of disestablishment, or disendowment, we have nothing to do, nor need we inquire whether this is the time, or Mr. Gladstone be the man, to inaugurate such a change. It may be the clock has gone wrong, and the "coming man" is still to come, but this is no concern of ours. We are, as in geometrical problems, to suppose that the thing required is done, that disestablishment is *un fait accompli*, and then, following up the synthesis of our problem, note the consequences on each hand naturally flowing out of our assumption, that we may through them discern the steps by which an analytical solution of the problem is to be obtained. It is not means, however, so much as results with which we have to do. The consideration of this fact, and the restriction of the compass of the debate, will, I imagine, exert a powerful effect upon the minds of those who take part in it, in determining the choice of sides. Many who, like myself, consider the disestablishment of the Irish Church an unjust, cruel, and unnecessary proceeding, will yet have faith enough in the Church of the future to believe that that Church, the Church of the truth, the witness and preserver of Protestant faith, founded upon the Rock of TRUTH, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail, will survive all opposition and persecution, and, phoenix-like, arise from what men believed its death and destruction, with renewed beauty and power and an extended term of existence. To this view I confess myself to have been at first much inclined, and, so far as the final accomplishment is concerned, am fully persuaded of the truth of it now; but looking at what is likely to take place in the interim, at the immediate results, and not the final issue, I am constrained to declare that the disestablishment of the Irish Church will be injurious, most injurious to the cause of Protestant Christianity.

My reasons for so thinking I now proceed to lay before my readers, desiring only that they will give them that thorough and impartial attention which the gravity of the subject demands.

1. *There is no Necessity for Disestablishment.*—This in the teeth of suspensory bills and royal commissions. Anomalies and abuses may, yea, do exist in the Irish Church, but with these mountains are made of mole-hills, and no need has been shown for disestablishment. In fact, the different reasons made use of by the supporters of this movement show that there is no inherent grievance in the mereexistence of the Established Church in Ireland, but that it is brought forward as a political bugbear, and its anni-

hilation proclaimed to be the sovereign nostrum for restoring tranquillity and contentment to the sister isle.

By some we are told that there is a crisis in Ireland. Admit that there is, or rather was. Fenianism is at the root of this crisis, as all allow. What has the Church to do with Fenianism, or Fenianism with the Church? Nothing, absolutely nothing. Fenianism aims at nothing less than the repeal of the Union, and, as its leaders are pleased to term it, the "independence of Ireland." In these momentous issues the church is a mere trifle, and to suppose that by destroying it you would render Fenianism powerless is vainly to imagine that Cerberus will be appeased with a sop.

The extensive emigration, the vexed educational and Irish Reform question, elements of the crisis, are all traced by these men to the Irish Church establishment, whereas it is well known that all the agitators want is the land; but the landlords, having no inclination to be made Jonahs of, get up the cry of the Irish Church as a decoy-duck, and then quietly invite the clergy to walk the plank. In their crusade against the Church her enemies have overreached themselves by making her the parent of so many abuses, that it is readily seen their opposition to the Church is founded on factional prejudice, not on reason.

But, further, the Irish Church is accomplishing the work for which it was established in Ireland. A deal too much has been made of this object. Some consider it a missionary church established to convert all the Roman Catholics in the island, and, because it has not done this, argue that it has failed in its purpose. The Church in Ireland was established with no such ultimate aim. It was to be a witness for what the English Government believed to be the true faith in the midst of the darkness, error, and superstition prevalent in a severed portion of her Majesty's dominions. So long as its light burns with undiminished lustre it is fulfilling its work, and its candlestick should in no wise be removed. To do so must certainly be most injurious to Protestant Christianity. That it is doing so, its opponents, Mr. Gladstone included, will not venture to deny. As he himself has said, "the Irish clergy are a body of zealous and Christian ministers, who give themselves to their functions in a manner not inferior to those of any Christian church." It is acknowledged by Romanists themselves that the principles of the Reformation are taught with undiminished vigour and boldness from the pulpits of the Established Church in Ireland. In numbers it has, compared with Roman Catholicism, increased greatly during the last two centuries, and it embraces the wealth and intelligence of the country.

In the mission work it has been anything but a failure, as the organs of the Papacy acknowledge with lamentation and woe. According to the Earl of Malmesbury, the Bishops of Clontarf and Cashel complain bitterly of the numbers of Roman Catholic youths who made shipwreck of their faith in passing through their academical course at Trinity College, Dublin. And an

Irish clergyman declares that Sunday after Sunday, Roman Catholics had come up to the altar after the Nicene Creed, each accompanied by two Protestants, and requested that they might be admitted to communion in the Irish Church. This minister had received on an average four each Sunday, and this in the face of serious apprehensions of ill-usage on the part of the converts.

In no single particular has the Church been a failure, and therefore there is no just reason for disestablishing and disendowing it. To close this paragraph in the words of Mr. Gladstone himself, "We defend the Established Church in Ireland, not because it is the Church of the nation, but because it is the Church of the truth."

Any further remarks would, supposing the first proposition fairly established, be uncalled for, yet I cannot resist adding a few more reasons.

2. Any unnecessary interference with settled customs and institutions is in itself injurious. The staunchest Liberal, or most advanced Radical, will scarcely attempt to confute this; and if there is no necessity for disestablishment, it follows that any attempts in that direction are injurious. The Church has, through the piety of individuals, acquired considerable property in the country, and, despite of all the tall talk about injustice of tithe charges, which, according to Sir G. C. Lewis, never belonged either to landlord or tenant, and of which four-fifths at least is paid by Protestants, the Church, like any other corporation, has a right to be protected in that property; certainly as long as she fulfils the purpose for which it was bestowed, and to wrench it from her for so-called Irish purposes, simply because others envy her it who have it not themselves, is at once most impolitic and most unjust.

3. The disestablishment of the Irish Church would be injurious to Protestant Christianity, inasmuch as it would unnecessarily place in jeopardy the loyalty and good-will of a large and influential section of her Majesty's subjects. There can be no doubt that if ever the disestablishment of the United Church of England and Ireland, as by law established, be carried by any future law, mortal offence will be given to the whole Protestant population of the north of Ireland, which, though numerically in the minority, is, so far as wealth and intelligence is concerned, greatly in the majority. And they will be justly offended. Not only will they see the property for which they have taxed themselves and their children taken from them, and applied to purposes totally different from their intention, but they will see themselves deprived of the spiritual privileges which they of themselves had provided for themselves; and find, if they wish to retain or re-establish them, that they will be mulcted in a sum certainly not less than they at first voluntarily bestowed. Christianity is a religion inculcating good-will toward men, and anything tending to mar this must be injurious to its progress.

4. The disestablishment of the Irish Church means the ascendancy of the Papacy. The Romish party and their coadjutors

enlarge much upon the odious ascendancy of the Establishment; but it is almost a certainty that there will be an ascendancy, and if Protestantism in Ireland is deprived of it there is little doubt that Romanism will obtain it. The primate of Ireland truly said, "As the Church of Ireland sank or receded another powerful church would advance, that did not acknowledge the supremacy of the Queen, but that of a foreign potentate, which at one time was thought dangerous to the liberties of the people of this country. If they crushed the Irish Church, and with it the supremacy of the Crown, they would have to submit to a foreign ruler and a foreign church. They would not get rid of the Irish difficulty by destroying the Irish Church, but, on the contrary, their difficulties would just begin." We hear now of disaffection and resentment; but rest assured if we inflict this deep and glaring injustice upon the Protestant population of Ireland, they will nourish in their breasts a resentment which, although it may not break out into disturbance, you will feel at every moment when the country is in a critical condition. They have paid willingly to the Protestant clergymen the tithes to which he has from time immemorial been entitled. They seek no change. But the whole of the tithes are to be taken away; it may be to construct a canal or to build a lighthouse, and then they will have to burden their property again for the support of their religion; and this will not only produce discontent, but be equivalent to advancing the Church of Rome. For it is manifest that in many of the many poor districts in Ireland, and where naturally a minister is most needed, the people when the tithes are confiscated will be unable to burden themselves to make up the stipend, the minister will be withdrawn, the Romish priest will find no opposition to his sway, and the poor people must either submit to his ministrations or go without spiritual consolation. Absenteeism is one of the grievances of Ireland, and by disestablishing the Irish Church the evil would be increased, and the one gentleman of education, refinement, and influence in every parish would be removed, and the country would gradually but surely sink into the degradation and ignorance so favourable to the pretensions and ascendancy of the error and superstition of the Papacy. But, lastly,—

The disestablishment of the Irish Church would afford a fatal precedent for dealing with other corporate property. In fact, there would be no security for private property of any kind. The title of the Church to her property is indefeasible. We hear a great deal about respect for vested rights; we know pretty well what it means. Patronage is one vested right, and this would be done away. Many a clergyman has endowed his own church or greatly improved it, and this too would be taken from him.

For the above reasons, however imperfectly expressed, I believe the disestablishment of the Irish Church would be fatal not only to Protestant Christianity, but to the cause of justice itself.

R. S.

The Essayist.

SELFISHNESS.

PART II.—ITS MANIFESTATION IN SOCIETY.

CHAPTER II.—PRIVATE LIFE.

THE whole of human endeavour, of all the striving, and longing, and anxiety which brings men into the turmoil and ferment of our hives of industry and commerce,—planning, plotting, devising,—or draws him within the tender influences of love and friendship, may be expressed in one word as a search for happiness. Being implies impulse, and selfhood gives it locality, direction, and relation. We have nothing at the outset in the possession of our life but consciousness; a simple revelation of existence, which speedily by the discovery of something outside of this our existence, *finds out* that we have a self, as distinct and apparently independent of this other self, which we are not. As soon as the mind then awakes to a sense of the existence of a universe without, it appropriates, draws into itself its first perception, and from thenceforward we exercise—

“Senses, which inherit earth and heaven,
Enjoy the various treasures nature yields,
Give scent to flowers and harmony to groves,
Their glorious hues to gold and gold’s bright aire;
Take in at once the landscape of the world
At a small inlet, which a grain might close,
And half create the wondrous world we see.”

Following up, or coeval with, the assimilation of these soul-lacking beauties of the “world of sense,” is the enlightening of ourself to the existence of affections, which attach to some special manifestation of the almighty Limner’s skill. These emotions are of the heart, and start up from oblivion, as it were, before the view of ourself which drinks them up, draws them into it, having them to enjoy all the while that it is taking them in and making them its own; but this process over, the selfhood stands in inane loneliness, and must either exercise its creative function in again making the same sensations reappear outside of it, where it can behold them, which we call remembering them, or must extract fresh ones from new objects. In any case it is the appropriation which yields the delight, whilst the compulsion of receiving what it would not is pain. Thus the whole activity of life may be expressed in one attribute, acquisitiveness. But this is at once the greatest blessing and curse of humanity:—

"The heaven of each is but what each desires,
And soul or sense, whate'er the object be,
Man would be man through all eternity."

And so misdirected it would swallow up the whole world in one or two sensations, leaving the rest to annihilation. Being, however, not the governor, but only a factor of the universe, a man must submit for the continuance of his delights, first to the law of his own nature, and secondly, to the power of that which is without him, circumstance. We may not eat of "the tree of life" after we have eaten of the tree of "the knowledge of good and evil," because this latter eating implies that we must have tasted evil, or we could not have distinguished between it and good; thus there is a condition attaching to the perpetuity of the delights which we cherish in ourselves, that is, goodness.

Selfishness assimilates the transitory states of circumstance, encrusting itself with broken glass, being fascinated by the show of brilliancy in the fragments, heedless of the harmony of the light which manifested the beauty, and ignoring the dependence of this beauty upon the light, it takes of the form of the hour, as the whole life of the principles of truth, as if appropriating a self-existent entity, not accepting it in its true sense, as an expression, but as a reality. But the soul of man is insatiable, having a constant craving for novelty, and building itself up into a garner of thought and feeling from the world around; sensations often repeated become indifferent, and although they form the nucleus which sustains the life, they must stretch out beyond themselves for something to excite joy and chase the dulness of monotony. It is consistent with an immortal destiny that it should be so; but, at the same time, it is possible so to overstep the meaning of this characteristic in pandering to some of the faculties at the cost of others, that these pampered ones shall at length be able to discover nothing on which to feed even in the circle of earth, but have destroyed the capacity of their overstrained organization for extracting delight, such as they would fain have, from the "stale, flat, and unprofitable" experiences which are like in kind to what has gone before. This is because of the composite nature of our souls, and the interdependence of its parts for vigour and strength; whence it follows that for one to climb away and seek to scale heaven alone, is to involve itself in mortifying, if not everlasting defeat. We are men, not single attributes, therefore goodness means "self-denial," and "self-denial" is moderation, the mutual restraining of integral parts, and, as well, their stimulating of each other to orderly exertion. In the brute the affections rule the creature, being compelled "to do the will of strong necessity" by the quantitative relative force implied in the term species; in man they are under the control of conscience, which in its exercise towards men may be concentrated into the single attribute called charity. Without it we are nothing but passion and prejudice; with it all the powers

become "holiness to the Lord." Affection is the sanctified gift of heaven, but unless it has the guidance of the celestial qualities of the conscience, even when restrained and directed by the intellect, it breaks away from the precepts of truth, and, Ulysses-like, enjoys prudentially the charms of the Circe, the careful slave of the demons who assume such god-like semblances. Men think that they are under an irksome rule when chastity is imposed upon them, and to-day Paris teems with thousands of the votaries of the fatal goddess, who deem that she is the potent all-governing deity of earth, and with careful economy of vitality commit "little imprudences," whilst avoiding dangerous excess only "lest magic bind (them) cold and impotent" for further enjoyment. Such is the interpretation which the worshippers who kneel towards the shrine put upon the word happiness; that which should be the aim of marriage even is forgotten, or rather perverted into a decorous search for gaiety, into systematized intellectually controlled indulgence, in which the attention to an offspring, instead of furnishing a new source of enjoyment, would stand rather in the way of the *fêtes* of tasteful iniquity. And so the round of natural progressive change, which in orderly attention to even the animal conditions of our being affords, as a consequence of the observance of its law, ever-varying delights, does not afford it here; instead of this pleasure growing out of duty, out of the fulfilment of obligation, it is forced in the hotbed of household neglect, and is at once the most fascinating and deadly specimen of the serpent of selfishness.

It does not rank as a moral state, with all its beauty, one whit above the beastly passion which kills all intellect with its rashness, and leaves its owner a grovelling hag. A higher authority than that of the "wanton gods" of the *Odyssey* says, "He that findeth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life for My sake shall find it;" and so he or she who pursues "pleasure so as to blunt the moral susceptibilities, and to create a sensitiveness of the nervous system or the æsthetic faculty, which unfits for the actual business of life," even by ministering to the fastidiousness of taste, even without breaking married faith, and cannot fulfil the functions of a parent, because it would debar from the enjoyment of the glitter of art, is surely such a self-seeker.

Unless a man can look "upon the travail of his soul" and be "satisfied," feel satisfied that what his immediate action has produced accords with the plan of nature, be willing not only to bear the results, but look for them as the reward of his labour, and look to them as new objects on which, in truth, his affection may be fixed, he has sought his own life, wronged his fellows, and disobeyed his God, by listening to the voice of this charmer and being unjust to the other loves of his heart; and this injustice we have defined as selfishness.

Wholeness is what we need, singleness of eye. And this we may attain by schooling each faculty to follow the true vocation of its power, in doing which it will be the exponent of the entire mental

frame of man, and will bring again its own with legitimate usury to the Giver of all good gifts. It is not the pursuit of pleasure in itself which is selfish, but the degradation of the orderly conditions of its attainment to the level of unruly appetite.

The object of marriage is primarily "the procreation of children," and all the various arrangements which the union of the sexes and their co-operation in the labour of life imply, are calculated to educate these children for the part of good or bad citizens in this world, and according to their highest purposes, as expressed in Jeremy Taylor's beautiful interpretation of life's enigma, should train them for heaven.

All relationships, then, into which man and woman enter with each other should have this threefold character, and develop in the contemporaneous generations, first, the corporeal part of our being, with its attendant social affections, as the necessary condition of our participation in the plan of material creation, and of our contributing to the fulfilment of the design expressed in it, thence by suggestion to engender thought, and above all to foster virtue and unite its practiser to God.

Now of the evils which our conduct or circumstances bring upon ourselves, it has been decided by moralists, philosophers and theologians, that those which assail and insinuate themselves into the conscience are alone worthy of the name of evils; then rank the sufferings of the intellect and affections *per se*, whilst bodily pain and decrepitude ranks last. Hence in our action, whenever we *must* make choice between one kind of loss and another, we should rather enter into the life of intellect and affection, than keep the body intact, and choose rather to lose knowledge, father, and mother, than spiritual excellence. If, however, the exhibition of affection means simply a wasting of physical power, it is a wrong done first to the bodily temple, and through it to the higher mental faculties, so that we have no right to entail pain upon ourselves, unless with the prospect of alleviating it in others, or when the present mental gain promises to exceed the amount of the good held out to healthy effort by the future, which good the injury sustained by the body in the first instance shall prevent us from acquiring.

Our body is the instrument of life's work. Thus to attain the highest we may give it all, and all at once, but to interfere hurtfully with the functional activity of its organs is to take away some of our power of becoming mentally more than we are, and we ought then to consider and "number our days, that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom." Health is the complete subserviency of the human frame, in all its organic processes, to the individuality of each of ourselves, whilst disease alienates the result of the chemical processes which take place apparently within us, from this individuality to some inferior one, which we have to subjugate to our will before we can use it. Hence he who brings on the disease of organs, which supply the mind with nourishment without an equiva-

lent mental return, robs the mind, robs himself, and, although superficially it may appear otherwise, is at bottom the prey of one of the aberrations of his loves, which constitute selfishness.

To apply these thoughts to the training of children, who—

“ — Open the eastern windows
That look towards the sun,
Where thoughts are singing swallows,
And the brooks of morning run ; ”—

for—

“ What the leaves are to the forest,
With light and air for food,
Ere their sweetly tender juices
Have hardened into wood,
“ That to the world are children ;
Through them it feels the glow
Of a brighter and sunnier climate
Than reaches the trunks below ; ”—

how often do we see erring fathers and mothers witlessly infuse the germs of blighting self-indulgence into these leaves, through which they themselves, through purity of the outgiven live and by the restraint of true fatherhood on self and child, should inhale the air of heaven, or by over-sternness, ivy-like, with the dark sombreness of unjust severity quench the smiles of gladness and love !

True parental love will discern that it is not charity to seek to win joyousness for the offspring by ministering to its carnality, but by educating defects by the coercion of pure incentives, rewards or punishments, and checking the growth of weeds in body and mind.

We are not speaking now of what is called neglect, but of a spirit, which running in the opposite direction, is blind to the fact that the dread of seeing one's own offspring in pain or danger, when such exercise of the patience and courage would conduce to the child's moral advancement, is simply anxiety about the loss which we do or should sustain in being bereft of a source of delight to us.

Children must be exercised in virtue, even though it cost life or limb, and the parent who shrinks from the sacrifice loves self, and not the child.

There is a strange *improvidence* in the parent who, by overstraining of the physical powers in *providing* dainties for body and soul, which undermine the health of both in the child, make it timid and dependent, or self-indulgent and unwarily prodigal, and thus increase the need of the parental guardianship's being continued to it in the future, if it is to be kept from the suffering which was so much dreaded, and yet the overworking of the protector's frame inevitably ends in premature incapacity for further effort on the child's account or in total removal. And it means that if I would have my children happy I must restrain myself so as to be able to teach them moderation, that is, self-denial.

This is equally applicable to the other extreme, the terrorism of the sword of justice, which never rewards but always punishes, which governs by strong self-will. It springs from a cable of firmness and the sense of justice to violate their own selves, by being unjust to the claims of hopeful, trusting mercy, and to all the pleadings of virtue and affection. Punctilious veracity is falsehood, because it can only distinguish between white and scarlet, and discerns nothing of the other hues into which light divides itself. "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," seems very much like equity, and so it is; indeed, the Judge of all flesh exacts it, but neither the offended parent nor fellow-man can ask it and enforce it, without doing it *rather* to have right done to himself than to the offender or God, and hence does it from selfishness. It is quantity without quality, for in doing too much of one kind as finite agents, we must banish from the composition elements and colours requisite for the production of a faithful image of truth. The wrong-doer suffers a loss equal to the amount of his crime in his life, his eternal interest, whilst the wronged, if he do not re-alias, loses only in temporal things, so that the punishment of exacting a tooth or an eye from the evil-doer by us is so much extra penalty over and above the punishment inflicted by the eternal law of God, and so cannot be administered as a desert, but if given must be as a deterrent or restraint against the committing of faults, and as such should be balanced by incentives to well doing, viz., rewards.

To carry, then, this vocation of married life on with the best results for mankind demands the consideration of adaptability in the contracting parties, physical, social, mental, and moral. Three plans or customs are, we may say, at present in vogue for meeting the first requisite characteristic of marriage, which are sanctioned by the communities in which they obtain as virtuous, and which modify the conditions and value of the contract, as a social basis and as a political and religious institution. The first is polygamy; then comes our *beau-idéal*, monogamy; and the third has been called panagamy, and rests on the basis of "affinity." The first meets the inequality which sometimes exists between the vital force of man and woman, to the avoidance of wrong to the *weaker vessel*; but presumes that male vitality is always in excess of female. The last aims at avoiding mismatches, on the principle of natural "selection." Our system of pairing exhibits, when not marred by other considerations, the result at which men starting with either of the preceding notions before them would arrive, if they considered them in relation to the perfection of character; and points to self-restraint as a necessary condition of success in the development of family happiness, which means health of body and mind, in parent and child, as its very initial. If it is sin to yield to appetite before the blessing of a priest has been pronounced upon the intercourse, this same blessing is certainly made of non-effect if it end in nothing but the same unhallowed indulgence; which indulgence leaves the result out of the question, heeding not whether the

offspring are weakly or not, indeed, losing sight of them altogether, and regarding only passion. This is a form of selfishness which is strangely insidious; men running away with the notion that if they have once bound themselves at the altar, their licence is unbounded, and thence are led into conduct which lessens the capacity for the work of life; perverting the affection, which should have expressed itself in tenderness to childhood's necessities, into a cruel mockery of the children through suicidal waste.

We who scoff at harems and "free lovers," although our system has so many apparent advantages of a moral kind, may do well to cull a hint or two on its practice from their over-coloured pictures, which shall advantage us much. We know the meaning of sexual intercourse, and hence should not enter into marriage in its full sense without the aim and prospect of rearing useful "citizens of the world," through our own corporeal and mental strength, aided by the institutional appliances at our command. No man has a right to generate paupers, and so in some of the Continental states, as Würtemberg, it is made criminal for a man who cannot earn the wages of a "day-labourer" to marry. On the other hand, "it is the duty of most men to marry," and over-repression of the promptings of instinct has wrought agony as poignant in the souls of the great celebrities of monkish times as the remorse pangs of those other noted ones of the same mode of life who yielded to temptation.

The right course is the moderate one; for in the first extreme it is selfishness who is so ruefully importunate, whilst in the other it is still he who makes those horrid mocking grimaces under his cowl. But there are numberless varieties of this same disorder, which show themselves, amongst others, in "unequal matches;" for, indeed, unless a man feels convinced that in his choice of "a helpmeet," he is doing that which is best for his own welfare, for the advantage of his kind, and the interests of truth, selfishness is at the root of his conduct. Affection is the very first requisite; because temperament and character both protest against politic unions, undertaken from ambition or the thirst for gold, and it is only—

"When the heart goes before, like a lamp, and illumines the pathway,
Many things are made clear, that else lie hidden in darkness;"

whence they would fret the soul, and estrange will from will. Such falsehoods are the intermarriage of royal houses, the blue-blood theory of nobility, the consanguine unions of Rothschilds. But, on the other hand, there is not much benevolence mingled in a passion which persuades its object to plunge into the "rude stream" of pinching necessity or obloquy, just for its gratification. It is of the same category as the converse instances; and so are the beastly unions of boors without intellect, and, indeed, so is the avoidance of the marriage bond, when in body and mind young people are yoked together, knit soul unto soul by the concord of sympathetic tastes and aims; because loss of rank or wealth, or a

stern battle with difficulty stands before them. "Two are better than one," because they have a good reward for their labour; "for if they fall, the one will lift up his fellow"—that is, if love is not lost, a warm attachment to truth, as well as to the personal attractions of each other, inspires the soul of each with a concordant striving after the spiritual growth of the other; quells the rebellion of fiery-eyed desires into a co-operative educative energy, and a mutual restraint in fealty to the central self, which exalts this personality in proportion to its completeness so much above the savagery of selfishness, and nearer to the full stature of a man.

In such a union, trials of patience "are more precious than gold or silver," and "though for a time grievous," yield a fruit of satisfaction to the soul, which clears the vision, and enlightens it to the discovery of sweets of pleasure in the vineyard of life, which are ignored by the poet of time, when he recites for the sordid-souled the gilded joys of indulgence. Hence, in the search for happiness amidst the delights of conjugal love, he that sings for immortal beings discovers in the self-denial which labours for another's weal, not for *earth* only, but for *heaven*, an ideal of happiness that is nearer to the beatitude which men shall attain, "where sorrow and sighing shall flee away,"—

"A bliss beyond all that (earth's) minstrel has told:
When two, that are linkened by one heavenly tie,
With heart never changing and brow never cold,
Love on through all ills, and love on till they die.
One hour of a passion so sacred is worth
Whole ages of heartless and wandering bliss;
And oh! if there be an Elysium on earth, it is this—it is this!"

The attainment of pleasure in its largest sense is the aim both of the selfish and self-denying amongst us; but the difference lies in this—that the first are inconsiderately indulgent to favourite inclinations without considering their results; whilst the others, being "wise unto salvation," although prompted in the first instance only by a more far-sighted self-love, educate themselves from "obedience" up to "goodness;" from practising charity through the fear of God into longing after and striving for the dissemination of good things, through "love of Him who first loved us."

And so we have endeavoured to point out how, in the search for happiness in the chief relations of life of the sexes to each other, there are constant exhibitions of selfishness in forms not generally called by this name, but which are equally dependent on this same principle of favouritism with what are commonly considered obvious cases, and which have been left unnoticed in the category of human failings used to illustrate this part of the subject.

There is, however, another wide domain in which men act and move, next in extent to that of marriage, and which we may embrace in the term friendship, between the highest form of which and the furthest remove from it—that is, enmity—are countless

exhibitions of love and selfishness; and it is principally to the mistakes about the identity of these two that we would turn for the further application of our idea of the character and manifestation of selfishness.

Here, as well as in all other fields, charity (in which we summed up the action of conscience with regard to men) begins at home; for we are bound to focus our love, and therefore select special objects for its exercise, holding different degrees of nearness to its outflow. But do I choose my friend for his or my own sake? Here are the two antitheses: "Greater love hath no man than this, that he lay down his life for his friend;" but "whoso hateth his brother without a cause is a murderer;"—love and selfishness.

In the highest degrees of its manifestation, friendship means a complete sympathy or absorption, one by the other, of the two wills of the friends, and implies that nothing would be withheld, not even the yielding of life by either, if the other demanded it. But there must subsist a complete confidence, that, as in the case of Caius Blossius and Tiberius Gracchus cited by Montaigne, the heart of the friend is devoid of offence towards man and God; else, if I will not be selfish, I must openly yet wisely withstand, in short, become the foe of my friend in that wherein he is wrong. This is hating a brother with cause, and is no murder; whilst if I made war in common with him against the world, we should be two murderers, not one.

But friendship, to be anything more than mere good-will, always demands a certain amount of community in thought and feeling, as there can be no close association between men who have not affinity for each other, but a natural repulsion is the consequence of their contact. This, however, is no proof positive of the goodness or badness of either, and may indeed arise simply from temperament; thus in neither instance is it selfishness to indulge the feeling to the limit of good-will; but if the strong attraction to one, or the antipathy to the other type of humanity overtop and stifle charity, making the heart dead to the need of that which is not liked, it becomes a malady of mind, and this is selfishness.

The grand test of the rightness of our amity or animosity to particular individuals or sections of our kind is that when the feeling is sifted to the bottom, although this idea be absent from our consciousness, it shows as its foundation a desire for the well-being of mankind, as a whole implied in the mode of our dealing, in the same way as we pointed out in the action of patriotism; and that our energy is directed not against men, as our competitors for the good things of earth, but as the representatives of falsehood and evil.

Hence every man who is faithful to truth, however great his tact in assailing or undermining error, has personal foes; indeed, the man who does not make even temporary enemies, is without courage to do right, and must have stooped to the adulation of the meanest of men, that he might not lose their approbation: he must

have sacrificed, when his desires and convictions in general have been opposed to it, all their worth for the sake of the ruling passion of his soul, for the love of praise even when proceeding from fools. This is crying Peace where there is no peace, instead of overcoming the opposition to the extension of God's kingdom in the rebellious disposition, which he leaves in full possession of a heart, for which perchance he cherishes good-will and affection. It signifies, too, that if I have a faulty friend, I dread more the loss of his ministrations to my pleasure than I care for his happiness; and though I should fade away from the earth with sorrow if death snatched him from my side, I should only exhibit the intensity of a selfishness which fed on his presence.

There is a wide difference between giving one's life for his friend, to save him from pangs and pain, and throwing up the life as worthless, because it finds no object to satisfy its greed amongst the sons of men. We must really give like for like, and give not only when we receive, but wherever there is need; so that if a man would take away the coat, he needs the cloak also, and we must not resist the evil, but overcome it with good. Men who are, physically speaking, murderers, are the most selfish creatures on earth; but it is not simply the destructive propensity being too strong, which brings them to strike at the life of their brother, but because their good-will, their benevolence, is too feeble to guide it. "It is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill, but because their consciences are weak." The need is in the conscience, and charity alone can remedy the effect, fill up the void, and make a man out of the half-demon. It may be necessary for self-protection to exercise the restraint of energy on those whose energy is rampant; but to crush it out by opposition alone demands the exertion of a still greater brute force, and leaves the man, or rather, tamed beast, incapable of harm, but just as impotent for good as before. Correction is not in punishment, but in example; in training the mind to love good, not to be afraid of the penalty of doing wrong. The scaffold and the gospel in the same land are, in this conjunction, the strongest evidences of a deep-rooted, not self-interest, but selfishness, which will not interpret duty to the degraded slaves of passion, according to the "self-denial" of a soul striving after perfection, but according to the "self-assertion" of wantonness, and the prejudiced injustice of what society loves and hates. This is the moral atmosphere that sustains the opinions of the individual in his home, and from which his education in it transfuses his life with its taint: and he withholds his cloak from the desperate wretch who has taken his coat, striving to crush selfishness by selfishness.

We fear the loss of life more than the loss of purity; whereas physical life is but the opportunity for spiritual activity; and so we slaughter the manslayer, not because he has robbed some one of the capacity for attaining to goodness—for we do this without compunction to the criminal, but because of our deficient humanity.

Cowardice is always more cruel than courage, and, where it can, kills outright anything that threatens or might threaten the taking of its property or its life, instead of seeking to subdue it to the amenities of right and truth. Not that there is not present in the mind of some persons, the feeling that in ridding society of such a one in this capital manner, they are working out the purification of the soul of mankind; because they see in the retribution justice, and in the example a wholesome lesson for all their fellows, which guards them from the worst of crimes; and they, because of the character of our training, must be exempted from the imputation of selfishness in this respect, but they only.

There is yet in that sort of intermediate state in friendliness, beyond which men do not frequently pass in their attraction to others, much display of motive both in its continuance and its abrogation, which when tested to the bottom oftentimes discovers a larger admixture of self-love than belongs to disinterestedness. It shows itself in many ways, which bear various names, but which are all alike but forms of this same great evil, and wear the livery of selfishness.

Where the tie that knits man to man is close, the reciprocity of feeling is perhaps chiefly exhibited in the mutual interchange of the stores of the friend's inner self; and in a less degree people often like others either because they are good listeners, or contrariwise, because they ask no revelation of hoarded secrets. But to talk that which pleases only the speaker, or to extract pleasure from the exercise of volubility, when the topic of discourse does not indemnify the listener by the mental improvement for present endured tedium; or for the mouth to noise all things abroad, whether they are good for men to know or not, yet blight the little sweets of a day, or the fruits of long striven after happiness, in those of whom or against whom they are said even when uttering only the *bald truth*, is really perpetrating a wrong to others and ourselves; so very often done with an unthinking want of purpose, which arises from pre-occupation with our own pet desires.

We cannot urge too strongly that bald truth—that is, an absolute and unconditional assertion referring to matters in which opinion is our guide—is falsehood, since it has always only one side and implies more than is spoken. It represents in its statement (when adverse) the violation of some such opinion, which is powerful as a criterion of right in the minds of the speaker and hearer, and, tacitly decides that a man who has acted contrary to this standard, even at some remote time, feels obnoxiously towards right, and since the conduct is a fact, is worthy of reprobation; whereas the defamer, though convinced that he has no malicious intention, deserves censure for deficient charity. For, however verbally correct he may be, he is but seeking a morbid self-gratification: he likes uttering his dislikes, and that is the reason why his conscience is blinded by the sophism of truth, to approve of his giving free flow to the Meribah of his soul. This applies to action

as well as words, which are but synonyms the one of the other, and to the converse relation of men—to reticence; for there is the same principle at bottom, when a man will not open his heart for the gain of others, nor to release them from the agony of doubt, as when he will not curb his babblings to spare others a pang.

Another ingredient, perhaps the most palpable, which oftentimes intensifies or subdues these immoderate exhibitions of talkativeness, or secretiveness, is the love of approbation. It sometimes induces a display of assiduity in ministrations ostensibly for the happiness of their object, whilst the soul of him who serves is really engrossed with the idea of earning laurels for open-heartedness and profusion. If a man is offended, and becomes simply indifferent to thus showing his friendliness, or being more vindictive, grows rancorous when he wins no praise, self is before others in his purpose, whatever his profession be; and it is like the case of him who, through fear of losing men's good opinion, or of incurring blame, or of being subjected to ridicule, refrains from needful action; indeed, whenever it quells rather than directs the other sensibilities, the love of men's esteem infringes the law of love and enters the service of selfishness. It is legitimate only when sought for such qualities and actions as are aids to the furtherance of truth; not that men who have no conception of the meaning of the phrase, cannot seek it rightly, or that those who have must with each action have this notion before their mental vision; but "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh," and the heart that is a law unto itself, of itself seeks such a course as would, if compared with the law of the commandments, coincide with it.

Dignity, self-respect, is another keeper of human hearts, whose true office is to make charity magnanimous; to elevate the view beyond the mean and sordid impulses of the subordinate faculties, which when unrestrained lower humanity to brutishness; to teach us to see in humanity a higher and nobler destiny than enslavement to circumstance. But when it grasps at a throne above humankind, leading one man in his ambition to ask of his fellows homage beyond what he asks for God, over-estimating the stewardship to which he has been called, whether it be the headship of a nation or only a position in a class or family, it renders him foolishly eager for all the little tokens of respect from those who come in contact with him, until he forgets all about humanity in the contemplation of the importance of this man—himself. But if a man either acts thus, or stands aloof from ministering to the wants of his kind, amongst the meanest and most degraded, because he thinks it would lower him to perform such menial offices, his dignity has grown into egotism, and he seeks his happiness in pandering to a pride which inscribes selfishness on his front. It is the same when his friendly feeling is quenched by offence offered to this lofty assumption of right; but, indeed, so contradictory is the action of faculties when they become selfish,

that pride not unfrequently allies itself with destructiveness, and instead of elevating him above it, moves him to mimic the blood-thirsty cruelty of the most untamable beasts of prey. Perversion of use is a statement of selfishness. Forgetfulness will sometimes irritate pride as well as wilfulness, and the proud man, though wrong in heart, is not seldom right in judgment when condemning it. For this letting of things which contribute to the happiness of those to whom we should be linked by affection, be covered from contemplation by other objects when the attention should be fixed on them, is a sign that these other objects, which shut those out, find most favour with the desires; hence, if they are not directly or indirectly equally important to the happiness of the persons for whom those first kind offices were intended, or minister to some who have a greater need, then forgetfulness becomes evidence of self-absorption, which is selfishness, since it grasps at particular prizes, and thereby excludes others just as fair from the favour of the soul.

These are some of the modes in which men give expression to the promptings of erratic desires in their endeavour after happiness; which, when placed side by side, all alike disclose the same effigy of selfishness impressed upon them, in that, when reduced to their fundamental character, they are of the same kind, although engraved with divers mottoes and cunning devices, and called by different names, which sometimes, ay, often, blind the possessor to their quality, and conceal their relationship from him.

And the reason why men spend this coin instead of true metal, we have endeavoured to show, lies in their greed after to-day's goods, and their inability or aversion to saving. No to the demands of the appetite, which every uncontrolled faculty puts forth in seeking enjoyment; in shirking the pain of such contradiction, and choosing rather to strive for the fading dress that is ever passing away, than after the reward of perfection, "the power of an endless life." But the end! If men prefer giving the life for the member, rather than yielding up the member for the life, and persist in their preference, they not only eventually defeat themselves, but paralyze the capacity of the man for enjoyment evermore.

*"Life is the energy of love,
Divine or human, exercised in pain,
In strife, and tribulation, and ordained,
If so approved and sanctified, to pass
Through shades and silent rest to endless joy!"*

ALAN.

The Reviewer.

English Reprints: John Selden. Table Talk. 1689. Edited by EDWARD ARBER. London: A. Murray and Son.

WE extend a hearty welcome to this little volume, both as one of a series which we admire, and also for its own merits. As one of a series, it is a praiseworthy attempt by Mr. Arber to facilitate a closer acquaintance on the part of students of English literature with some of those older English writers, the names of whose works have become common on the tongue rather than their contents treasured in the heart and familiar as household words. Already the series has included some valuable reprints of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and more are in store. For the small outlay of sixpence or a shilling per month our libraries may be enriched with as carefully edited and in reality a more valuable series of reprints than is furnished for the higher subscriptions to many of the learned societies. This is an invaluable boon, as it enables the student to note the tidal marks of his language, and to familiarise himself with the idioms and peculiarities of each successive age. We need hardly speak of the advantages of such a familiarity, not only on the part of those who aspire to impress the thought of their day or to lead as writers and teachers in this branch of polite learning, but even to those who desire only an intenser enjoyment of writers of later day. To the student of olden literature and dialects, expressions often very commonplace have a far deeper meaning than they convey to ordinary readers.

But greater than any outside claim is the intrinsic merit of this volume. It is the garnered store of the crumbs that fell, so to speak, from the intellectual table of a richly furnished mind—a mind stored with deep and varied learning, well balanced and trained by experience and observation. The present generation has almost forgotten the name of John Selden. Amidst the galaxy of great men that crept from under the cloud of tyranny in the times of the Stuarts, the quiet, unpretending jurist who lived in the uppermost story in Paper Buildings (Inner Temple) has been lost sight of in the brilliancy of the heat that surrounded him. Perhaps it is that we are too much lost in an admiration of action (of which the period certainly furnishes no stint) to notice the subtler power, the man of thought; there are so many great warriors in the field, so many glorious statesmen in the senate, that we have not time to seek the scholar in his closet. Or perhaps it may be because no great pen has paid tribute to his worth; to no Carlyle has he been a Cromwell, to no Macaulay a Milton or a Hampden, to no Foster an Eliot; and yet Grotius, a contemporary, styled him "the glory

of the English nation." Truly he was no small light in the assembly of which he was a member.

In his youth he vowed himself to liberty in all his pursuits, and adopted for his motto *περί παντός τὴν ἐλευθερίαν* (above everything liberty), which he inscribed on most of his books and manuscripts, and his after life was attuned to the same aspiration. Once only do we find him recreant to his liege, when, like the Florentine philosopher, he bent his mind in submission to power, and confessed before the High Commission Court his error in publishing his "History of Tithes." But the true man deserted him but for a moment, and the "It moves for all that" of Galileo was not more contemptuous than Selden's repudiation of his act. It was chiefly as an authority on all matters respecting the rights and privileges of Parliament that he exercised an influence in the country. When a question of prerogative arose he was consulted by both Houses of Parliament, and his opinion was always the basis of the confident perseverance of the popular party in maintaining any endangered privilege. He drafted the remonstrance made in the House of Commons on 18th December, 1621, when the King had declared their privileges were "rather a toleration than an inheritance;" he assisted in drawing up the articles of impeachment against the obnoxious Buckingham; he demonstrated to the House the inability of the King to impose loans by virtue of his prerogative; he was active in preparing and establishing the petition of rights in 1628, and he was in his place at the commencement of the sitting of the Long Parliament. In 1639 the King made overtures of the Great Seal to him; in 1646 Parliament voted him £5,000 for what he had suffered in the cause: but he steadily refused both, for "his mind was as great as his learning, full of generosity, and harbouring nothing that seemed base." He did not sympathize with the extreme views of many of his associates, and he was pained to see the conflict which was inevitable. After the commencement of the civil war he appeared seldom in Parliament, and took very little interest in political affairs, but this was mainly owing to ill-health. In 1654 he died.

The works published by Selden during his lifetime are not of sufficient general interest to keep his name alive with the public. His first task, written at twenty-two, was a work on early history and antiquities. He is best known now as the author of the "History of Tithes" and his "Mare Clausum," both legal works of reference. But the present little volume is one that might fairly aspire to keep his memory green, although it is a posthumous work, and one which he unwittingly wrote in the memory of a friend, to be thence reproduced long after his death. It shows us the chatty friend conversing with congenial spirits on topics of common interest. He has crept out from his black-letter books, and they have left no trace upon him except richer resources of illustration. This table-talk is, as the editor says in the introduction, "the spontaneous incidental outpourings of an overflowing mind." There are

many pithy sayings on the subjects which were often uppermost in his mind—the *jus divinum* in its various shapes ; but his views on books, philosophy, truth, reason, &c., will be most interesting to our readers. Writers in the present day, even *British Controversialists*, would do well to take heed to his warning:—

“In answering a book, 'tis best to be short ; otherwise he that I write against will suspect I intend to weary him, not to satisfy him. Besides, in being long I shall give my adversary a huge advantage, somewhere or other he will pick a hole.”

We are afraid there is a deep truth in these words:—

“In giving reasons men commonly do with us as the woman does with her child ; when she goes to market about her business she tells it she goes to buy it a cake or some plums. They give us such reasons as they think we shall be caught withal, but never let us know the truth.”

Here is a sample of his love of liberty of thought:—

“'Tis a vain thing to talk of an heretick, for a man in his heart can think no otherwise than he does think.”

Again,—

“The Aristotelians say all truth is contained in Aristotle in one place or another. Galileo makes Simplicius say so, but shows the absurdity of that speech by answering, all truth is contained in a lesser compass ; viz., in the Alphabet. Aristotle is not blamed for mistaking sometimes, but Aristotelians for maintaining those mistakes. They should acknowledge the good they have in him, and leave him when he is in the wrong.”

“Religion is like the fashion, one man wears his doublet slashed, another lac'd, another plain ; but every man has a doublet ; so every man has his religion. We differ about trimming.”

There is a vein of quiet humour running through his sayings ; witness the following:—

“In buying books or other commodities 'tis not always the best way to bid half so much as the seller asks : witness the country fellow that went to buy two groat shillings, they askt him three shillings, and he bid them eighteen pence.”

“Why have we none possest with devils in England ? The old answer is, the Protestants the devil hath already, and the Papists are so holy he dares not meddle with them.”

“In a troubled state save as much for your own as you can. A dog had been at market to buy a shoulder of mutton ; coming home he met two dogs by the way that quarrell'd with him ; he laid down his shoulder of mutton and fell to fighting with one of them ; in the meantime the other dog fell to eating his mutton. He seeing that left the dog he was fighting with and fell upon him that was eating ; then the other dog fell to eat. When he perceived there was no remedy, but which of them soever he fought withal, his mutton was in danger, he thought he would have as much of it as he could, and thereupon gave over fighting and fell to eating.”

One or two more extracts, and we conclude.

“Say what you will against tradition, we know the signification of words by nothing but by tradition. You will say the Scripture was written by the Holy Spirit, but do you understand that language 'twas writ in

it? No. Then for example take these words,—*In principio erat verbum*. How do you know those words signify *In the beginning was the Word*, but by tradition, because somebody has told you?"

"'Tis a wrong way to proportion other men's pleasure to ourselves; 'tis like a child's using a little bird (O poor bird, thou shalt sleep with me), so lays it in his bosom and stifles it with his hot breath. The bird had rather be in the cold air: and yet too 'tis the most pleasing flattery to like what other men like."

"When men comfort themselves with philosophy, 'tis not because they have got two or three sentences, but because they have digested those sentences and made them their own."

"We have no fortune-tellers and wise men when nobody cares for them."

"'Tis not seasonable to call a man traitor that has an army at his back. One with an army is a gallant man."

"We cannot tell what is a judgment of God, 'tis presumption to take upon us to know. . . . Commonly we say a judgment falls upon a man for something in them we cannot abide."

Our extracts have scarcely done justice to the mass; but it is so difficult a task selecting from such variety, and we can only hope to have stimulated interest, and we point to the fountain for satisfaction.

The Topic.

‘OUGHT WORKING MEN TO BE RETURNED TO PARLIAMENT?

AFFIRMATIVE.

Those who feel and know what is wanted are those best able to enforce the sort of legislation required, and to defeat that which wars against the interests of the community. Hence I reckon that it would be advisable to introduce working men into the House of Commons.—A. J. M.

Hitherto all classes have had representatives, except clergy and working men. Ought we not in justice to give both of these a trial, and see if they could possibly legislate in a worse manner for the best interests of the country than those who have had it all their own way? As I believe things could not be worse done than they have been, I

am sure it would be an advantage to infuse new blood and fresh brains into Parliament.—J. A.

When we look upon the records of success, and see how many of our best men have risen from the ranks, we cannot but see a good reason for opening the field to men of energy and intelligence belonging to the working classes. They would keenly scrutinize the financial bearing of the taxes, watch the incidence of bills relating to property, look after the proper settlement of the relations of capital and labour, master and servant, and prevent the young gentlemen of the peerage class from dipping their fingers so deeply as they are said to do into the Treasury boxes. They would make legislation real, not a sham.—H. G.

Looking at the ignorance lately shown by legislators on the questions most important to the working classes, I am decidedly of opinion that they should have a few representatives from their own class, and possessing the necessary ability and character in Parliament to represent their interests. I do not, however, think that every trade should have its especial representative, for this would be impracticable; but looking at the vast importance of the working class element in this country, I think it should have a man to represent it thoroughly conversant with all its wants. Even Mr. Gladstone himself, when put to the test, was found to be ignorant of the fundamental laws of the most important trades unions which he was condemning. As an instance in favour of the affirmative side, I do not think that in a place like Sheffield—where there is an immense preponderance of working men—the operatives would be doing an injustice to the other electors by electing such an intelligent and conciliative man as Mr. Mundella, of Nottingham, to represent their interests in Parliament. He invariably looks to the best interest of the working men, being always opposed to strikes when the matters in dispute can be settled by arbitration. By his general intelligence and thorough knowledge of the great social and political questions most affecting the working classes, he would command the respect of even the House of Commons. If a few such men (I admit the number should be very limited) were returned to Parliament, legislation beneficial to labour, and not unfair to the employer, would follow, and many questions which now agitate workmen, and produce the feeling that they are being unfairly dealt with by the Legislature,

would be set at rest.—J. LLOYD EVANS.

Most undoubtedly they ought. Many of the working men are more intelligent and possess more common sense than some of those who belong to the higher classes. Working men have a way of their own in giving expression to their views. I should be glad if some of them, therefore, found their way to the new Parliament. England will be none the worse, but I believe all the better.—R. D. ROBERT, *Bristol*.

NEGATIVE.

Class Legislation, against which working men complain, ought not to be patronized by themselves. If you make a working man a legislator to-day, on that very day you destroy the qualification for the possession of which he was elected. A working man would be unlikely to feel himself comfortable in a house where even Mill and Fawcett find it difficult to get speaking in without sneers and chaff. Working men would be sadly exposed to temptations, to which other men would not be to the same extent, to accept, say permanent office in some odd quarter which would shelve him; or to yield to the blandishments of the civilities, &c., of the artful dodgers of party. Working men could not represent any entire constituency, nor could they hold the position in life which they would be required to do even though they were paid members, which if they were would destroy their independence. A working man representative would be a delegate to not a member of the House of Commons, and would have all the odium of a paid advocate cast on him in the House. Let working men rise above such low views, and give their votes and countenance to men of principle, who know alike political rights and

duties, and honestly uphold and claim both—good true men, who possess the confidence alike of thinkers and workers, and who have the place and influence as well as the character of gentlemen.—L. M.

Working men ought not to be sent to Parliament, because it would put them in a false position. The moment of their election would be the moment when they would cease to be working men, and when they would be political speculators. Nothing could be worse for any working man himself, nothing worse for any constituency, than to send a working man as a working man to the House of Commons. He would be exposed to many temptations, and they would show that they desired to perpetuate the very evil parliamentary reform is given to prevent—class legislation.—B. C. H.

Many working men are intelligent politicians, and can make good speeches, but few working men are carefully trained to estimate evidence and to observe the incidence of contending evidence; fewer still are practised in the cunning of forensic eloquence, and in the detection of all the sophistry which advocates employ. Few of them have the power of looking clearly at all sides of a question, and so of forming impartial conclusions about them; and for these reasons few working men are qualified for being statesmen. Nor even if they had these qualifications would it be advisable to send them to the legislative halls of this country, for there they would be treated with contempt by the landowners and the manufacturing class, and they would either require to impede public business by irrelevant

discussions, or sink into mere ciphers if they did not succumb to the temptations Governments wield for gaining votes. Not yet are working men qualified for Parliament.—W. H.

No worse proposal on behalf of working men themselves could have been made than to send working men candidates to the hustings, and to endeavour to get them into the Parliament. It would be a sad day for a working man when, leaving his natural place in society, he aspired to be made a member of the Commons while he still remained a working man. He has a far better sphere in his own circle for moving men than he could have in St. Stephen's, where he would be out of place and harmony with the whole place and company. We want as law-makers men of thought, culture, leisure, wide observation, and independence. We do not want demagogues or men of straw.—G. N.

Legislation is the highest task in civil life. It is the safeguard of society and of happiness. We have hitherto very foolishly believed that any sort of fellow would do for the House of Commons. But we must alter this. We must regard legislation as a great and holy duty, and endeavour to find men who comprehend the importance of just, intelligent, and moral principles of legislation. We must seek the best men. At present the best men cannot be had among working men; for if they were the best, they could not remain working men, but would have risen. On this account I think working men unsuitable for legislators.—A. B. M.

Our Collegiate Course.

MILTON'S MINOR POEMS.

IL PENSEROSO.

Or <i>what</i> (though <i>rare</i>) of <i>later age</i>	101
<i>Ennobled</i> hath the <i>buskined stage</i> . (36)	
But, O <i>sad Virgin</i> , that thy <i>power</i>	
Might <i>raise Musæus</i> (37) from his <i>bower</i> !	
Or <i>bid</i> the <i>soul</i> of <i>Orpheus</i> (38) <i>sing</i>	105
Such <i>notes</i> , as <i>warbled to the string</i> ,	
<i>Drew</i> iron tears down <i>Pluto's</i> (38) <i>cheek</i> ,	
And <i>made Hell grant</i> what love did <i>seek</i> !	
Or <i>call up</i> him that left <i>half told</i> (39)	
The <i>story</i> of <i>Cambuscan bold</i> ,	110

Helps to paraphrasing.

Line 101. Anything that ; seldom ; modern times.	106. Delicious sounds ; accompanied by the harp.
102. Glorified ; Tragic drama.	107. Brought ; countenance.
103. Downcast maiden ; height.	108. Caused ; to yield ; long for.
104. Could recal ; Elysian abode.	109. Reanimate ; unfinished.
105. Compel ; spirit.	110. Tale ; brave.

(36) The word "ennobled" must point chiefly to him who monuments himself in the spirit of his readers, and—

"So sepulchred, in such pomp doth lie,
That kings for such a tomb would wish to die."

Though besides the works which Shakspeare prepared for "the buskined stage," there is evidence in Milton's works that he had read Jonson, Massinger, Ford, Beaumont and Fletcher, &c.

(37) Musæus is generally represented as being the son of Orpheus ; Virgil ranks him high among the poets. He is said to have sung the war of the Titans, and to have composed hymns. No authentic relics of his genius are left to us, and hence, as he was a religious and philosophic poet, this sigh-like aspiration.

(38) See notes on Orpheus and Pluto, in *British Controversialist*, June, 1868, pp. 464-5.

(39) *Chaucer*, in his unfinished "The Squire's Tale." "But why," Leigh Hunt asks, "did Milton turn *Cambuscan*, that is, *Cambus*, the Khan into *Cambuscan*. The accent in *Chaucer* is never thrown on the middle syllable." What became of *Cambuscan's* sons, *Camballo* and *Algarsif*, and who gained his daughter, *Canace*, in marriage." *Chaucer* says, "aftere well I speke," and the tale is incomplete. *Spenser* essays to finish it, "Fairy Queen," book iv.

Of Camball, and of Algarsife,
 And who had Canace to wife,
 That owned the virtuous ring and glass;
 And of the wondrous horse of brass,
 On which the Tartar king did ride: 116
 And if aught *else great bards* (40) *beside*
 In *sage* and *solemn tunes* have sung,
 Of turneys, and of trophies hung,
 Of *forests*, and *enchancements drear*, (41)
 Where more is *meant* than *meets the ear*. 120
Thus, Night, oft see me in thy pale *career*,
 Till *civil-suited morn* (42) *appear*;
 Not tricked and frounced (43) *as she was wont*
 With the Attic boy (44) to *hunt*,

116. Besides; mighty poets; other-
 wise.

117. Wise; stately rhymes.

119. Wood; magic fearful.

120. Intended; is expressed.

121. In this manner; course.

122. Becomingly dressed; is seen.

123. When; accustomed.

124. Engage in the chase.

(40) The great bards here meant are Ariosto, author of "Orlando Furioso," the epic of Knight Errantry; Tasso, in whose "Jerusalem Delivered," the enchanted forest forms a main element, and Spenser's marvellous Queen, so fertile in enchantments of all sorts, so cunningly allegorized, that in every passage of it, more even than in the preceding poems, "more is meant than meets the ear." Here it seems proper to note the distinction between *rapt*, i. e., carried away, exalted, entranced, and *wrapt*, i. e., folded up, enrolled, enveloped, self-contained. *Rapt* is only used in the participle form but *wrap* is a complete verb.

(41) "It is," as Thomas Keightley has observed, "rather remarkable that" [in a Puritan writer like Milton, we are left to think] "the Scriptures do not form a part of the studies of the serious man." Was this because he intended to complete a Trilogy by adding a poem on the Holy Man?—or because the theme was too sacred to be ventured on in such a measure? or does it rather imply that the whole man is suffused with grace, and that in this poem therefore "more is meant than meets the ear?"

(42) *Morn* is here used as a personification, and is equal to *Eos* or *Aurora*, whom the poets feign to have been in love with *Cephalus*.

(43) *Tricked*, from Gr. *Triches*, hairs, and hence trim, adorned, dressed, so as to captivate, from which sense the more degenerate meaning *deceives* comes; *Frounced* (from Spanish *Fruñir*, to plait or gather into folded frizzled, curled, having the hair plaited or twisted about the forehead (Latin *frons*, the brow).

(44) *The Attic boy* is *Cephalus*, son of *Deion* and *Diomede*, and husband of *Procris* or *Procnis* (Ovid's "Met.," b. vii.), who was jealous of *Eos*, and ultimately fell a victim to her jealousy, for one day, while having concealed herself behind a bush, she was watching her husband, *Cephalus*, fancying that the rustling she made was caused by some beast of the chase, discharged an arrow, her own gift, which struck her to the heart.

But <i>kercheft</i> in a comely cloud,	125
Or ushered with a shower still,	
When the gust hath blown his fill,	
Ending on the rustling leaves,	
With minute drops from off the eaves.	
And, when the sun begins to fling	130
His flaring beams, me, goddess, bring	
To arched walks of twilight groves,	
And shadows brown, that Sylvan (45) loves,	
Of pine, or monumental oak,	
Where the rude axe, with heaved stroke,	135
Was never heard the nymphs (46) to daunt,	
Or fright them from their hallowed haunt,	
There in close covert by some brook,	
Where no profaner eye may look,	
Hide me from day's garish eye,	140
While the bee with honeyed thigh,	
That at her flowery work doth sing,	
And the waters murmuring,	
With such consort as they keep,	
Entice the dewy-feathered sleep ; (47)	145

125. Enwrap ; pleasant.

126. Introduced ; gentle rain.

127. Breeze ; blustered enough.

128. Closing ; whispering foliage.

129. Very small ; overhanging parts of the roof.

130. Diffuse over the earth.

131. Intensely bright rays ; lead.

132. Embowered pathways ; shaded woods.]

133. Darksome ; delights in.

134. Long-lived.

135. Harsh hatchet ; uplifted.

136. Frighten.

137. Chase ; sacred lurking-places.

138. Cozy shelter ; babbling streamlet.

139. Regardless ; cast its vision.

140. Conceal ; dazzling.

141. Pollen-carrying hind legs.

142. Labour among plants ; hum.

143. Soothing monotonous noise.

144. Harmony ; produce.

145. Allure ; having its plumage touched with the morning damp.

(45) A rural deity among the Romans, who presided over gardens, flocks, and forests, sometimes confounded with *Pan* and *Faunus*. "The unseen genius of the wood," line 154.

(46) Creatures of "slight and semi-mortal texture," in which the Greeks personified the picturesque. "Mythological figures which peopled earth, sea, and sky to every Greek imagination, and which are, in fact, the sentiment of the picturesque elevated into the dignity of a person. Of those gods that represent our modern sentimental and descriptive poetry, the nymphs or maidens, in their various troops of sea-nymphs, nymphs of the fountain and meadow, nymphs of the mountain, the forest, and the sparry cave, are typical examples."—*Prof. J. S. Blackie's "Homer and the Iliad,"* vol. iv., p. 195.

(47) Compare with this Virgil's "Eclogue," I., 52—57 :—

And let some *strange, mysterious dream* (48)
Wave at (49) his wings in *airy stream*
Of lively portraiture displayed,
Softly on my eyelids laid.
And, as *I wake*, sweet music *breathe* 150
Above, about, or underneath,
Sent by some spirit to mortals good,
Or the unseen genius of the wood.
But let my *due* feet never *fail*
To walk the *studious cloisters' pale*, (50) 155

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|---|--|
| 146. Singular, wondrous panorama
of the imagination.
147. Depend from ; procession light
and fleet as a breeze.
148. Seemingly animated vision
shown.
149. Gently ; extended.
150. Rouse to conscious life ; distil.
151. Aloft ; around ; below. | 152. Ordered to come ; mankind
gracious.
153. Invisible guardian ; sylvan
scene.
154. Accustomed and boundenly
responsible ; neglect.
155. Traverse ; thought-compelling ;
quadrangles. |
|---|--|

"Fortunate Senex, hic inter flumina nota
Et fontes sacros, frigus captabis opacum!
Hinc tibi, quæ semper vicino ab limite sepes
Hyblæis apibus florem depasta salicti,
Sæpe levi somnum suadebit inire susurro."

"Lucky old man! here amid familiar streams and hallowed fountains you shall enjoy the cool shade! On one side you have the same hedge still, that with its willow blossoms, fed on by Hyblæan bees, shall often tempt you to sleep with gentle humming."

(48) "Whatever is mysterious as to its cause, and beyond the power of man, appears as supernatural; and what more so than dreams? The thoughts in dreams, too, arise out of the past and present circumstances of the dreamer, and therefore are not altogether without connection with his future destiny, as most other omens are." This involuntary poetry of the mind, whether as sleep-fancies or reverie, has always been a favourite allusion of the poets as a figure of speech; but in modern times and among European nations dreams are seldom heeded except by the very ignorant or superstitious; and as "idle as a dream" has become a proverb. See Chambers' "Encyclopædia," article Dreaming, and a paper on "Dreams and Dreaming, in Alexander Smith's "Last Leaves."

(49) Some difficulty has been made of this word "at," we think unnecessarily, and the construction of the passage has given rise to several communications in "Notes and Queries," Jan. 18th, Feb. 22nd, 1868. If there is any difficulty the construction may be resolved thus:—"And let some strange mysterious dream wave at his [sleep's] wings, [and let it (the dream) be] laid (displayed in a lively stream of portraiture) softly on my eyelids."

(50) An allusion to St. Paul's School and Christ's College. Pale does

And love the *high-embower'd roof*,
 With *antique pillars massy proof*,
 And *storied windows richly dight*,
 Casting a *dim religious light* ;
 There let the *pealing organ blow*, 160
 To the *full-voiced quire* below,
 In *service high*, and *anthems clear*,
 As may with *sweetness*, through mine ear,
 Dissolve me into *ecstasies*,
 And bring all heaven before mine eyes. 165
 And may at last my *weary age*
 Find out the *peaceful hermitage*,
 The hairy *gown* and *mossy cell*,
 Where I may sit and *rightly spell*, (51)
 Of every *star* that heaven doth *show*, 170
 And every *herb* that *sips* the dew ;
 Till old experience (52) do *attain*
 To something like *prophetic strain*.
 These *pleasures*, Melancholy, *give*,
 And I with thee will *choose to live*. 175

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| 156. Vaulted ceiling. | 164. Excite my soul ; rapture. |
| 157. Age-touched columns' bulky
might. | 165. Vision forth. |
| 158. Painted glass panes gorgeously
illuminated. | 166. Time-laden life. |
| 159. Shedding ; small quantity of ;
suggestive of pious thoughts. | 167. Gain ; quiet retirement. |
| 160. Resounding ; produce its har-
monies. | 168. Tunic ; seclusion. |
| 161. Completely arranged singers. | 169. Properly discover the secrets. |
| 162. Devotional intonation ; sacred
songs. | 170. Orb ; present to view. |
| 163. Melody. | 171. Plant ; absorbs. |
| | 172. Arrive at. |
| | 173. Truth-telling song. |
| | 174. Delights ; supply. |
| | 175. Decide ; pass the time of my
earthly sojourn. |

not mean enclosure, but is used by metonymy to indicate the effects of study on the person ; storied signifies *pictured* ; the entire passage shows how Milton's spirit was subdued by the beautiful in architecture, painting, and music, and with what sternness of principle in after days he repressed the yearnings of taste at the behest of his convictions on matters of faith.

(51) Study with the painstaking sense of difficulties present, and knowledge attainable hereafter, as the result of the efforts made.

(52) Verified experience yields science, and science transforms vision into prevision, and enables men to find—

"The future from the causes which arise
 In each event."

First, as an *adjective*, implies "in preference to any one else ;" as an *adverb*, "in the forefront of those who follow."

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

782. Who invented the phrase "The inexorable logic of facts"?—**RAWDON.**

783. I find it stated in the "Memoir of Shakspeare" prefixed to "The Chandos Classics" shilling Shakspeare, that Richard Field, the printer of "Venus and Adonis" and "Lucrece," was a Stratford man, and probably an old acquaintance of their author. Is this an ascertained fact or only a conjecture? Is the writer of this memoir a known Shaksperian?—**AVONIAN.**

784. Who was Chester, the author of "Love's Martyr; or, Rosalin's Complaint," 1601, in which Shakspeare's lines to "The Phoenix and the Turtle" first appeared?—**AVONIAN.**

785. The Rev. J. Pycroft, in his "Course of English Reading," suggests that an improved commonplace-book, on the plan of Locke, be used, with a view to profiting by one's reading. Will some student describe the commonplace-book specified, and show me its use by an example? If any one would give me directions how to read with the greatest advantage, I should be greatly obliged. I want to know how to classify the knowledge I acquire in reading, so that it may be readily available. In short, I want to know how to read systematically.—**G. A.**

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

772. We believe that the Rev. Frederick Arnold, B.A., who, when curate of St. Mary's de Crypt, Gloucester, published in 1840 a volume of "Sermons," and is author of "The Public Life of Lord Macaulay," is the nephew of Thomas Arnold, the historian of Rome, and cousin of Matthew Arnold, the poet and critic of culture, and of W. D.

Arnold, author of "Oxford; or, Fellowship in the East."—**R. M. A.**

775. There is a debating class in connection with the Bermondsey Literary and Mechanics' Institute in Bermondsey Street. There are various others in connection with the chapels in the south-eastern district, and I am led to believe that there are district meetings of the Young Men's Christian Association in which discussions are carried on.—**R. M. A.**

In reply to the question of "Georgius," I would just say that there is a debating class connected with a working man's institution in Bermondsey Street. Having left the neighbourhood some time, and having had no opportunity of attending its meetings when living close by, I am unable to give fuller information, but the institution is open every evening, when, I am sure, the secretary would be happy to give "Georgius" every information. I believe debates are carried on every Saturday evening.—**SAMUEL.**

776. The early editions of "The Rejected Addresses" were published for John Miller, London, and John Ballantyne, Edinburgh, at 4s. 6d. in boards. They were subsequently issued by "the modern Towns," "the Avon of publishers," John Murray, with portraits, bound in cloth, price 5s. The price has since, we believe, been reduced to 2s. 6d.; but we have an idea that Messrs. Routledge have recently published a reprint at 1s.

777. "*Bryologia Britannica*," containing the mosses of Great Britain and Ireland arranged and described, by W. Wilson, 8vo. with sixty-one plates, £2 2s., or coloured, £4 4s.; published by Messrs. Longman & Co., London.—**R. R.**

The Societies' Section.

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.—At a recent sitting, M. J. Coste, the celebrated French Naturalist, author of "Comparative Embryogeny," &c., read a paper, in which he objected to an opinion expressed by M. Claude Bernard, the famous Physiologist and Biologist, author of "Researches upon Animal Heat," &c., to the effect that those sciences which had no other means of experiment but that of observation could not explain any of the phenomena of life, nor consequently effect any conquest over living nature; a duty which, in M. Bernard's opinion, exclusively pertained to experimental science. M. Coste quoted several instances in which observation alone had been sufficient to reveal some of the secrets of nature. M. Claude Bernard replied that M. Coste, in his remarks had been quoting experiments, which he called observations, and conversely; but that he could not deny there were sciences of mere *observation*, such as astronomy, geology, zoology, and botany, and others purely *experimental*, such as chemistry, physiology and physics. —M. Daubree, the geologist to whom we owe the idea of industrial geological research, thought geology was becoming an experimental science, and quoted Sir James Hall's labours in this respect. —M. Chevreul, the chemist who has devoted so much study to the discovery of the chemistry of colour, organic analysis, &c., joined in the discussion, affirming that sciences of observations would soon

be converted into experimental ones, that being merely a question of time.—*Galignani.*

The Working Men's Club and Institute Union have taken steps to obtain copies of important parliamentary papers, as they appear, in order to form a permanent parliamentary library, and to place them at the service of the institutions which it is their object to aid and establish. They particularly desire that artisans who are members of clubs in London should have access to these important papers. By the assistance of some members of both houses of parliament they have already collected documents of this kind, and on every Monday evening their offices will be open from eight to ten, p.m., when the members of any London club who is not in arrear with his subscription may, under certain conditions, borrow any paper or refer to it at the office. Clubs in the country subscribing five shillings a year to the circulating library of the society will be entitled to borrow copies of these publications, as well as thirty volumes of general literature every three months. To form a library of such works as are not generally accessible to working men, and to circulate them to clubs throughout the country, at a mere nominal charge, is an undertaking which the council are very anxious to carry out. Persons may thus do great good by supplying this library with copies of important works on politics, history, &c.

Literary Notes.

IN compliance with urgent representations from many intending competitors, the committee of the United Kingdom Band of Hope Union (Offices, 5, Red Lion Square, Holborn, London, W.C.), who are offering £100 and £50 for the two best Temperance tales, have resolved that the time for the delivery of MSS. shall be extended to May 1st, 1869.

An unpublished work by Hugo Grotius—of whom a biographic sketch appeared in the *British Controversialist*, July and August, 1861—has just been discovered. This work is on "The Right of Plunder," and was written 1604-5. The great treatise on "Peace and War" is an enlargement of this one, and the "*Mare Liberum*" of 1609 constitutes one of its chapters. It is to be published by Nijhoff, and edited by Dr. G. Hamaker, and is now *in the press*.

"The King and the Commons: a Selection of Cavalier and Puritan Poems," edited by Professor Henry Morley, forms a volume of "The Bayard Series," and contains a facsimile of the new poem attributed to Milton, about which so much discussion has taken place.

The Rev. J. O. M. Bellet has issued "The Poet's Corner," a manual of poetry, with biographical sketches.

M. Amédée Rolland, French dramatist, is dead.

Lord Lytton is rewriting his play, "The Sea Rover." Mr. Disraeli's early tragedy, "Alarcos," is on the boards, and Earl Russell's "Don Carlos" is spoken of.

A new series of "The Wellington Despatches" is in course of publication.

"Lord Liverpool's Life" (1770—1827) and his Administration have been engaging the attention of Professor Yonge.

Edward Edwards is preparing a new "Life of Sir Walter Raleigh," after original researches.

F. D. Maurice is to publish his "Lectures on Conscience," delivered by him as Professor of Casuistry at Cambridge.

After a quarter of a century's study of "The Life of Anthony Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury," W. Dougal Christie is about to issue the results.

The editor of the *Saturday Review*, John D. Cooke, died 11th August.

J. S. Blackie, Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh, is engaged on an exposition of early Greek philosophy in a series of "Dramatic Sketches of Hellenic Thinkers—Thales, Empedocles, Anaxagoras," &c.

A series of two-shilling volumes, containing the essentials of a technical education, has been projected by Cassell, Petter, and Co.

"The Letters of the Duchess of Parma" are to be issued under the editorship of her brother, the Count de Chambord.

The Very Rev. Dr. William Goode, Dean of Ripon, author of many Anti-tractarian treatises, and in defence of the doctrines, of the evangelical party, *e.g.*, "Tract XC. historically refuted," 1845; "The Doctrine of Infant Baptism," 1849, against Mr. Gorham—died 13th inst., aged 68.

"Impressions of America," by Newman Hall, are to appear in an improved issue of *Broadway*, a London magazine bearing an ill-omened title.

Modern Metaphysicians.

ALEXANDER BAIN, M.A., PROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN
THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN.

PROFESSOR "ALEXANDER BAIN has stepped beyond all his predecessors [in philosophical research], and has produced an exposition of the mind of the school of Locke and Hartley equally remarkable in what it has successfully done, and in what it has wisely refrained from—an exposition which deserves to take rank as the foremost of its class, and as marking the most advanced point which *à posteriori* psychology has reached." These are the terms in which J. S. Mill expresses his opinion of the results of this notable thinker's endeavour to systematize all that can be known of sense and intellect, emotion and will, through the scientific study of the mind. When we note that this is said by the logician of the philosophical school to which Professor Bain adheres, and in the days when speculations in mental science excite the labours of Samuel Bailey, Charles Bray, Herbert Spencer, G. H. Lewes, W. E. H. Lecky, &c., on one side; while the opposing ranks are led by writers like J. H. Stirling, Dr. M'Cosh, J. D. Morell, E. V. Neale, Dr. MacVicar, H. L. Mansel, &c., we gain a gauge for estimating the value of the praise accorded to the Aberdeen expositor of mental and moral science. We have long held the opinion that Alexander Bain possessed one of the most acute intellects of our time, and that his knowledge swept over an almost encyclopædic range; and his most recent book fully sustains our impression, and proves the correctness of that opinion.

Of the living philosophical thinkers, with whose writings we are acquainted, we know none whose mind is more thorough and systematic, whose style is so clear, whose grasp of thought is more tenacious, or whose fertility of illustration is so copious and varied. In all that he undertakes he shows that he has first been careful to know what has been previously done; to search out what yet remains to be accomplished, and to fix in his own intellect the precise line and course he is qualified to pursue in regard to the furtherance of the matter in hand. Hence his aim is well defined; his plan receives a completeness and unity, and his efforts possess a oneness which impart such consistency to the entire speculation as is seldom observable in the works of other thinkers, however formally logical they may seem to be. This constant presidency

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of self-conscious power, of well-balanced effort and effect, and of distinct coincidence of capacity and purpose, gives settledness and sense of satisfaction, and, perhaps, tends not a little to the prevailing influences which Professor Bain wields over the minds of his readers.

No difference of opinion can blind us to the fact that he is one of the foremost influences in British thought, that he possesses and exerts a strong power over the philosophic culture and training of our day, and that his effectiveness originates in a distinct individuality, which may be notably characterised as genius combined with that active energy, which is usually designated talent. There is in him an essential vitality of personal being which marks him out as a thinker, capable of subduing others to his purposes and aims. He is one of the glories of British intellectual effort, and his name shall hereafter occupy a high place, not only among thinkers, but among those who have distinguished themselves by "Toiling Upward." In William Anderson's "Self-made Men" we read, "Alexander Bain was a weaver boy in Aberdeen. By his own merits he raised himself to a commanding position in the scientific world. His two elaborate works, viz., 'The Senses and the Intellect,' published in 1855, and 'The Emotions and the Will,' published in 1859, have been pronounced, on the highest authority, to be 'among the most important contributions which have been furnished to mental science during the present generation.' He is now appointed to the new chair of logic in the university of his native city" (p. 299). This passage indicates a highly distinguished and honourable career, and bears out our opinion that he is one of the master-thinkers of our time and nation.

A few brief notes of his career are all that have come into our possession. He was born in Aberdeen, of humble parentage, in 1818, and by an indomitable energy contrived not only to work at the daily round of his necessary labour, but to acquire, while not neglecting that severe constraint of toil, a good and thorough education; by which, having gained a bursary or exhibition, and entered Marischal College, Aberdeen, he was able to pass with honour through the Scottish University curriculum of Arts, 1836—1840, and to win for himself, after examination, the degree of M.A. From 1841 to 1844 he assisted the Professor of Morals in his college, and during the session 1844-5 he taught the Natural Philosophy class; and he lectured on the same subject during 1845-6 in the Andersonian University of Glasgow. Meanwhile, so early as 1840 he had become a contributor to the *Westminster Review*, and had commended himself, by the proof of ability which his papers gave, to the promoters of the Metropolitan Sanitary Commission, and to this commission he was appointed secretary, 1847. When the Board of Health was established in 1848, he was transferred to a similar office under that body, with Lord Carlisle, Lord Ashley (now Shaftesbury), Mr. Edwin Chadwick, and Dr. Southwood Smith as his chiefs. This office he resigned in

1850. He was next engaged in preparing treatises in natural philosophy for the *Educational Course* issued by Messrs. W. and R. Chambers, Edinburgh, and articles, *e. g.*, "The Human Mind," "Logic," "Language," "Rhetoric," &c., for *Chambers' Information for the People*. He prepared for the same publishers an edition of the "Moral Philosophy of Paley, with Dissertations and Notes," in 1852, and a considerable number of "Papers for the People," *e. g.*, "Education of the Citizen," "The Myth." In 1855 he brought out his great philosophical work, "The Senses and the Intellect;" in 1857 he was appointed Examiner in Logic and Moral Philosophy in London University, which had then at its head another annotator of Paley—Lord Brougham. He was for several years Examiner in Logic and Mental Science at the Indian Civil Service competitions. In 1859 "The Emotions and the Will" appeared as the complement of the Psychology commenced in "The Senses and the Intellect." Both works have been revised, enlarged, and republished with many additions, and great improvements, not only in their several parts, but in their general theory. In 1860 he received from the Crown the appointment of Professor of Logic and of English Literature in the University of Aberdeen, then formed out of the union of two colleges—Marischal's and King's. In 1861 "The Study of Character, including an Estimate of Phrenology," appeared, being in large measure a republication of papers contributed to *Fraser's Magazine*. We may here interject the remark that we hope Professor Bain will add to the obligations under which he has already placed letters and science by the re-issue of some of those papers, especially those on questions relating to political economy, with which he has enriched the *Westminster Review*. "An English Grammar" for the use of students appeared in 1863—a manual of English composition and rhetoric—to which a supplementary tract of "Illustrative Extracts" has been issued, was prepared for his classes in 1866; and we have now received from his indefatigable pen "Mental and Moral Science; a Compendium of Psychology and Ethics." We ought not to omit a notice of the fact that he has contributed during the eight years of its issue, 1860—1868, a very large number of articles to Chambers' "Encyclopædia; a Dictionary of Universal Knowledge for the People." Most of the articles on psychological questions, the philosophy of politics, the elements of morals, logic, &c., are, we believe, from his pen; and many articles of curious lore and strange speculation have also been attributed to him, we know not with what accuracy.

These are a few of the external incidents of Alexander Bain's half century of life; but who can tell the inner efforts and the personal labours by which so much of sterling worth has been accomplished, the long hours of study, thought, and productiveness incorporated in these strong-minded and fresh, systematic, and full treatises and text-books? These would constitute the true life of this thinker—as indeed they constitute the true life of all men of

whom it is far more important to know what they did than what they became, and what they were rather than what they seemed. The events of a thinker's biography are the advents of fresh ideas, and the incidents are the workings by which the materials are gained, and the labours by which these are recombined into new views and original additions to the knowledge of the race. Evidence enough have we in the known events and works of Professor Bain to see that he is no ordinary man; but when we contemplate these events and works as merely the outgrowths of his intellectual and moral nature, we form a higher ideal of the personality whence they proceed, and of which they are the issues.

In former issues of this serial his great and sterling books, "The Senses and the Intellect," "The Emotions and the Will," and "The Study of Character" (*British Controversialist*, July, 1862, pp. 49—53) have been noticed; "An English Grammar" was also the topic of criticism;* while, though by a different pen, the general principles of "The Psychology of Professor Bain" were made the subject of animadversion.† We intend in the following pages to take a somewhat more extended survey of his psychological system, making an endeavour to give a fair though brief epitome of his tenets and teaching. But in order that, in connection with the above-noted papers, our notes of Alexander Bain's writings may be somewhat complete, we shall notice in a few words a very excellent volume of his which we have had in our hands for a long time, which we have studied with much care, and have found to be worthy of high commendation for its intrinsic merit, its accuracy and originality. It is true that our own opinions on the topic, and our definition and treatment of the subject have been very different from the learned professor's, but we have no hesitation in saying that, used as he intends the book to be used by his students, with diligent application and thoughtful care, it cannot fail to make good English students. The book to which we refer is entitled "English Composition and Rhetoric," a supplement to his "Grammar," which is itself supplemented with "Illustrative Extracts" most judiciously selected, and in some cases admirably analysed. As may be seen from the following abstract, Professor Bain's rhetoric is taken from the objective, not the subjective point:—

"Rhetoric discusses the means whereby language, spoken or written, may be rendered effective. There are three principal ends in speaking: to inform, to persuade, to please. They correspond to the three departments of the human mind,—the understanding, the will, and the feelings. The means being to some extent different for each, they are considered under separate heads. But as there are various matters pertaining to all modes of address, it is convenient to divide the entire subject into the two following parts:

"Part First, which relates to style generally, embraces the following topics:—I. *The figures of speech*, and the consideration of the number and

* *British Controversialist*, January, 1864, pp. 61, 62.

† *British Controversialist*, October, 1867, pp. 292—297.

the *order of words*. II. The explanation of the various *attributes or qualities of style*. III. The *sentence* and the *paragraph*.

"Part Second treats of the different kinds of composition. Those that have for their object to inform the UNDERSTANDING fall under three heads—*Description, narration, and exposition*. The means of influencing the WILL are given under one head—*persuasion*. The employing of language to excite pleasurable FEELINGS coincides with the most characteristic function of *poetry*.

"The will can be moved only through the understanding or through the feelings. Hence there are at bottom but two rhetorical ends."

The book then proceeds to consider "style in general" and "the figures of speech," which, according to the author's philosophy, are classified as those founded on similarity, contiguity, and contrast. To this there follow observations on the number and order of words, and clear and admirable instructions regarding "the qualities of style"—simplicity, clearness, strength, feeling or pathos, the ludicrous, humour and wit, melody, harmony of sound and sense, taste, elegance, polish, and refinement. On the sentence and the paragraph several most excellent, original, and valuable instructions are given. "The kinds of composition" are next treated of under the heads description, narrative, exposition, persuasion, and poetry. Besides some clear and pertinent remarks, definitions and observations on poetry in general, we have the species of poetry classified and defined, with special departments allotted to the explanation of lyric, epic, and dramatic poetry, and their varieties and combinations. Versification receives attentive and careful consideration under the heads metre, alliteration, rhyme, kinds of verse; and the work is closed with a selection of "Extracts Analyzed," in which the principles of the book are at once illustrated, applied, and tested. It will be seen from what we have said that this treatise on composition and rhetoric is full and informing, and we can safely say that for practical purposes it will be found highly valuable, although we think that a little more of the subjective philosophy of rhetoric might have improved the tractate as a whole—especially as a book for students.

Being fully persuaded that the thinking of Professor Bain has elicited results and effected developments in philosophical speculation of great importance, not only to the disciples of the Hobbesian psychology, to which his theory is affiliated, but also to mental science as a whole, we had employed considerable time and thought in the endeavour to bring into brief compass a synopsis of his views on "The Senses and the Intellect," "The Emotions and the Will," &c. This, from the complexity, the copiousness, and the originality of the contents of these volumes, we have found it exceedingly difficult to do, with even the best intentions and endeavours. The author of these able treatises has recently not only helped us out of this difficulty, but has also added to his claims on notice, by the production of a university text-book of high individual merit, extraordinary compression and comprehen-

sion, fulness of thought, completeness of speculative purpose, profound and extensive information—a boon to students and a benefit to science. It is not only a condensation of his system of mental philosophy, but it is such a linking together of his whole thoughts on the subject, that to us it seems to possess a higher value than the original tomes, inasmuch as it is more compact and yet as thorough, more closely concatenated and yet as logical—giving, in fact, at one view a complete system of *a posteriori* philosophy.

This treatise, which bears the title, “Mental and Moral Science; a Compendium of Psychology and Ethics,” contains, 1st, a systematic exposition of MIND; 2nd, a history of the leading QUESTIONS in mental philosophy; and 3rd, a copious dissertation on ETHICS. The exposition of MIND occupies nearly half the work, and is, for the most part, an abridgment of the author’s two previous volumes on the subject. He has singled out and put in conspicuous type the leading positions; and has given a sufficient number of examples to make them understood. It is not to be expected that the full effect of the larger exposition can be produced in the shorter; still there may be an occasional advantage in the more succinct presentation of complicated doctrines.

As regards controverted QUESTIONS, he has entered fully into the history of opinion, so as to present the different views, both formerly and at present, entertained on each. Nominalism and realism, the origin of knowledge in the mind, external perceptions, beauty, and free-will, are the chief subjects thus treated. The dissertation on ETHICS is divided into two parts. Part first—the theory of ethics—gives an account of the questions or points brought into discussion; and handles at length the two of greatest prominence, the ethical standard and the moral faculty. Part second—the ethical systems—is a full detail of all the systems, ancient and modern, by conjoined abstract and summary. With few exceptions, an abstract is made of each author’s exposition of his own theory, the fulness being measured by its relative importance; while for better comparing and remembering the several theories, they are summarized at the end on a uniform plan. It is not solely with the view of furnishing a complete manual of mental and moral philosophy that he has included in the same volume a system of psychology and an exhaustive dissertation on ethics. The connection of the two subjects is of the most intimate kind; all the leading ethical controversies involve a reference to the mind, and can be settled only by a more thorough understanding of mental processes.

In the foregoing description we have done little more than adapt the author’s preface, but we have done so because it most concisely and honestly indicates the nature and course of the work—except that it makes no mention of an excellent analytical table of contents of upwards of thirty pages which is prefixed to the work, which is highly useful for reference and for revisionary purposes. To this, had there been added a full index, the book would have had all the material appliances that a student’s book should b

furnished with—would have been mechanically perfect in suitability for learning and teaching.

At the same time, it is legitimate enough to remark that occasionally the analysis oversteps the limit of synoptic abbreviation, and imports opinions not advanced or maintained in the body of the work. We may note, in proof, although it may seem hypercritical, that “concomitance of mind and a material organism,” as it stands in the *contents*, differs in its philosophical implications from the “concomitance *between*” which we meet in the book; the phrase “all acquirements *suppose* physical vigour” suggests quite another idea than that in the text, in which the word *demand* is employed; in the contents we find the words, “*supposed* faculty of self-consciousness,” where the text affords no ground for regarding self-consciousness as supposititious; “the influence of the will indirect” gives an idea somewhat different from “the indirect influence of the will,” and similarly other passages appear to convey the sense in a more positive form than the work warrants, which in a book to be used by students is a defect. We note this all the more, because we know no writer who perceives better the incidence of language than Professor Bain, or who in general more cautiously weighs the expressions in which he utters his thoughts qualitatively, quantitatively, and allusively. Indeed, that is one of the chief charms of his writings; his style is more pellucid than that of Hobbes, less materialistic than David Hartley’s, and more concordant in associative effect than J. S. Mill’s.

It would be quite impossible to present any adequate idea of the excellency of this book, as a summary, yet systematic exposition of the philosophy of the mind as comprehended and advocated by Professor Bain, without extensive extracts, and even these could exhibit no exhaustive analysis. We are compelled, therefore, to fall back upon our usual plan, and to present to the reader only “*summa fastigia rerum*.”

The book opens with an introduction in two chapters, (1) giving a definition and divisions of mind, and (2) treating of “the nervous system and its functions.” Book I. concerns itself with “movement, sense, and intellect,” and contains four chapters, (1) on “movement and the muscular feelings,” (2) on “sensation,” (3) “the appetites,” and (4) “the instincts.” Book II. devotes itself exclusively to “the intellect.” After a few preliminary remarks, there follow seven chapters given to the consideration of (1) “retentiveness—law of contiguity,” (2) “agreement—law of similarity,” (3) “compound association,” (4) “constructive association,” (5) “abstraction—the abstract idea,” (6) “the origin of knowledge,” (7) “external perception.” The whole discussion is marked, as we have said, by fulness, completeness, and thoroughness; by logicity of thought and correctness of expression. The main positions are stated in large type, and thereafter explained, illustrated, or discussed, as may be most requisite, in observations printed in small type. From the first 160 pages we have culled the following

extracts, which may indicate to the intelligent reader, in some remote way, the method and the matter of this thoughtful and thoughtworthy treatise :—

"HUMAN knowledge, experience, or consciousness falls under two great departments ; popularly they are called matter and mind ; philosophers, farther, employ the terms external world and internal world, not-self or non-ego, and self or ego ; but the names object and subject are to be preferred.

"The department of the object, or object-world, is exactly circumscribed by one property, extension. The world of subject, experience, is devoid of this property.

"But as object—experience is also in a sense mental, the only account of mind strictly admissible in scientific psychology consists in specifying three properties or functions—feeling, will and volition, and thought or intellect, through which all our experience, as well objective as subjective, is built up.

"FEELING includes all our pleasures and pains, and certain modes of excitement, or of consciousness, simply, that are neutral or indifferent as regards pleasure and pain. The two leading divisions of the feelings are commonly given as sensations and emotions.

"WILL or VOLITION comprises all the actions of human beings in so far as impelled or guided by feelings. Actions not prompted by feelings are not voluntary.

"THOUGHT, INTELLECT, Intelligence, or Cognition, includes the powers known as perception, memory, conception, abstraction, reason, judgment, and imagination. It is analyzed, as will be seen, into three functions, called discrimination or consciousness of difference, similarity or consciousness of agreement, and retentiveness or memory.

"The mind can seldom operate exclusively in any one of these three modes. A feeling is apt to be accompanied more or less by will and by thought. Feeling and volition each involve certain primary elements, and also secondary or complex elements, due to the operation of the intellect upon the primary. The arrangement adopted in this book is as follows :—

"First. Feeling and Volition in the germ, together with the full detail of sensation, which contains a department of feeling, and exemplifies one of the intellectual functions—discrimination. The convenient title is MOVEMENT, SENSE, and INSTINCT.

"Secondly. The INTELLECT.

"Thirdly. The EMOTIONS, completing the department of feeling.

"Fourthly. The WILL.

"Although subject and object (mind and matter) are the most widely-opposed facts of our experience, yet there is in nature a concomitance or connection between mind and a definite material organism for every individual.

"Each mind is known, by direct or immediate knowledge, only to itself. Other minds are known to us solely through the material organism.

"The physical organs related to the mental processes are :—I. The brain and nerves ; II. The organs of movement, or the muscles ; III. The organs of sense ; IV. The viscera, including the alimentary canal, the lungs, the heart, &c. The greatest intimacy of relationship is with the brain and nerves.

"The brain is the principal, although not the sole organ of mind, and its leading functions are mental. The nervous system as a whole, is composed, of a *central mass*, or lump, and a system of branching or ramifying threads, designated the *nerves*. The general function of the nerves is to transmit influence from one part of the system to another.

"The muscular feelings agree with the sensations of the senses in being primary sources of feeling and of knowledge localised in a peculiar set of organs; their characteristic difference is summed up in the consciousness of active energy. For the most part our movements are stimulated through our senses, but movements arise without the stimulation of sensible objects, through some energy of the nerve-centres themselves, or some stimulus purely internal. This may be called the spontaneous activity of the system. There are three classes of muscular feelings:—1. Feelings connected with the *organic condition of the muscles*, as those arising from hurts, wounds, diseases, fatigue, rest, nutriment. 2. Feelings connected with *muscular action*, including all the pleasures and pains of *exercise*. These are states peculiar to muscular activity. 3. The *discriminative sensibility of muscle*, or the consciousness that arises during the varying tension of the moving organs.

"A *sensation* is defined as the mental impression, feeling, or conscious state resulting from the action of external things on some part of the body, called on that account sensitive. The sensations are classified according to their bodily organs; hence the division into five senses. The common enumeration of the five senses is defective. The omission is best supplied by constituting a group of organic sensations, or sensations of organic life. 1. Organic muscular feelings. 2. Organic sensations of nerve. 3. Organic feelings of the circulation and nutrition. 4. Feelings of respiration. 5. Feelings of heat and cold. 6. Sensations of the alimentary canal: these are relish and repletion, hunger, nausea, and the pains of deranged digestion.

"The appetites are a select class of sensations; they may be defined as *the uneasy feelings produced by the recurring wants or necessities of the organic system*. THE INSTINCTS. Instinct is defined as untaught ability. It is the name given to what is done prior to experience or education. In all the three regions of mind—feeling, volition, and intellect—there is of necessity a certain primordial structure, the foundation of all our powers. The following subjects are exhaustive of the department: 1. The reflex actions. 2. The combined and harmonious movements. 3. The primitive manifestations of feeling. 4. The germs of volition.

"States of pleasure are concomitant with an increase, and states of pain with an abatement, of some or all of the vital functions. Our voluntary power, as appearing in mature life, is a bundle of acquisitions." "One of the foundations of voluntary power is given in the spontaneity of muscular action." "Another foundation of voluntary power is to be sought for in the great law of self-conservation." "When the same movement coincides more than once with a state of pleasure, the retentive power of the mind begins an association between the two."

"The functions of intellect, intelligence, or thought are known by such names as memory, judgment, abstraction, reason, imagination. The primary attributes of intellect are (1) Consciousness of *difference*; (2) Consciousness of *agreement*; and (3) *Retentiveness*." "With few exceptions, the facts of retentiveness may be comprehended under the principle called the law of contiguity, or contiguous adhesion." "Actions, sensations and

states of feeling occurring together or in such close succession tend to grow together or cohere, in such a way, that when any of them is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea."

"There are certain conditions that govern the pace of acquisition generally. These are—(1) Repetition or continuance; (2) Concentration of mind; and (3) The natural adhesiveness of the individual constitution." "The circumstances favouring the adhesion of movements in particular may be supposed to be—(1) Muscular vigour; (2) The active temperament; and (3) Muscular delicacy." "The growth of associations among ideal movements must be supposed to follow the law of associations among the corresponding actual movements." "Throughout all the senses the associating process connects sensations that happen frequently together," so that they become "self-sustaining." "By means of contiguous association, states of pleasure and pain can, to some extent, persist, or be reproduced, without the original stimulus."

"The special emotions, by being directed habitually on the same object, become affections."

"In volition there is involved a process of contiguous association between specific actions and states of feeling. This is the third element in the growth of the will as already described; spontaneity and self-conservation being the other two elements."

"The phenomena of the world may be divided into the co-existing and the successive, although, so far as the mind is concerned, the generic fact is succession." Whether of cycle, of evolution, or of cause and effect. "Whether for self-preservation and bodily comfort, for industry or for sport and recreation, we have to be educated into a number of bodily aptitudes. In mechanical acquirements the conditions are—(1) The endowments of the active organs; (2) the delicacy of the sense concerned; and (3) the special interest." In the conduct of mechanical training, regard is to be had to the vigour and freshness of the system, and the exercises must be continued long enough to bring the energies into full play."

Under the heading "Constructive Associations" we have many able and original remarks, reducing to something like scientific exactness the observations which have been made regarding the alliances possible among the capacities, faculties, feelings, of which man is the possessor. The sections on mechanical and verbal constructiveness tempt to extract more strongly than those on the processes of constructiveness in the sensations and the emotions. These and the matters relating to "Concreting the Abstract," and the "Realizing of Representation or Description," must give place, in importance, to the following excellent observations which we quote on "Constructiveness in Science:—"

"The chief scientific processes are these four:—Observation, definition, induction, deduction. The first is the source of the individual facts, and depends on the senses; the three last relate to the generalities, and are all dependent on the intellectual force of similarity.

1. *Classification, Abstraction, Generalization of Notions or Concepts, General Names, DEFINITION.*—These designations all refer to the one operation of identifying a number of things on one point or property,

which property is finally embodied in language by the process called definition. The start is given by an identifying operation, a perception of likeness or community in many things otherwise diverse."

"The bodies identified and brought together on this common ground make a *class*, as distinguished from a mere confused aggregate. The mind, reflecting on the things so classified, attends to their similarity, and endeavours to leave out of view the points of dissimilarity; this is the long-disputed process of *abstraction*; the common attribute or attributes is called the *abstract idea*, the notion, or the *concept*. When a name is applied to the things compared, because of their agreement or community, it is a *general name*; and when we are further desirous of settling, by the help of language, the precise nature and limits of the common attribute, the result is a *definition*.

"II. *Conjoined Properties generalized, General Affirmations, Propositions, Judgments, Laws of Nature, INDUCTION.* In abstraction, a *single* isolated property, or a collection of properties treated as a unity, is identified and generalized; under Induction, a conjunction, union, or concurrence of two distinct properties is identified. A proposition contains two notions, bound together by a copula. 'Heat' is the name of one general property or notion; 'expansio' is the name of a second notion. The proposition, 'heat expands bodies,' is a proposition uniting the two properties in an inductive generality, or a law of nature. Here, too, the prime requisite is the identifying stroke of similarity." "All the difficulties and the facilities connected with the working of similarity may be found attending these inductive generalizations. There is one noticeable circumstance special to the case. That two things or two properties affect us together excites no attention at first; we are so familiar with such unions that we take little notice of the fact. It is, however, a point of some importance to know whether two things occurring together do so merely by accident, or by virtue of some fixed attachment keeping them always together; for, in the first case, the coincidence is of no moment, while in the last case, it is something that we may count on and anticipate in the future. Now, the real problem of inductive generalization consists in eliminating the regular and constant concurrences from the casual and inconstant. It is the identifying stroke of similarity that is the means of rousing us to the constant concurrences; these repeat themselves while other things come and go, and the repetition is the prompting to suspect an alliance and not merely a coincidence. The favouring conditions of mind for scientific induction are the conditions, positive and negative, of the scientific intellect on the whole. General power of similarity being supposed, the special circumstances are susceptibility to symbols and forms; the previous familiarity with the subject matter; the scientific interest; and the absence of the purely sensuous and concrete regards. Such are unquestionably the intellectual features of the greatest scientific geniuses—the men whose lives are a series of discoveries."

"III. *DEDUCTION, Deductive Inference, Ratiocination, Application or Extension of Inductions, Syllogism.* When an inductive generality has been established, the application of it to new cases is called Deduction." "Deduction also is a process of identification by the force of similarity. The new case must resemble the old, otherwise there can be no legitimate application of the law." "The deductive process appears under two aspects: a principle may be given, and its application to facts sought for; or a fact may be given, and its principle sought for. In both, the discovery is made

by the force of similarity." "Reasoning by *analogy*. This is a mode of reasoning that bears upon its name the process of similarity; the fact, however, being that in it the similarity is imperfect, and the conclusion so much the less cogent." "The name Reason is used in a narrow sense, corresponding to Deduction, and also in a wider sense, comprising both Deduction and Induction. To express the scientific faculty in its fulness, the process called abstraction would have to be taken along with reason in a wider sense. What is variously termed, by Hamilton, the Elaborative or Discursive Faculty, Comparison: the Faculty of Relations, Thought (in a peculiar narrow sense), includes the aggregate of processes now described as entering into the operations of science. It has just been seen that the working of similarity renders an adequate account of the principal feature in all these operations, although, to complete the explanation, there still remains a circumstance to be brought forward, under the head of the Constructive Operations of the Intellect."

To those passages which occur in Book I., chap. 2, we subjoin, as supplementary, three extracts from chap. 4.

"The Abstractions, Inductions, Deductions, and experimental discoveries of science, already included under similarity, also involve constructiveness. To begin with Abstraction. We may represent a form by an outline diagram, as in Euclid. But this, as giving a definite size, colour, and material, is not an abstraction. The most perfect type of the abstract idea is the verbal definition, which is a construction of language adopted to exclude whatever does not belong to the generalized attribute." "So the definitions of science generally are, on the part of the first framers, exercises of original construction, proceeding tentatively till a form of words is arrived at, conformable to all the individuals to be included in the generality. Induction presents no new peculiarity. All inductions have at last to be shaped and tied down by precise language, expressing neither more nor less than is common to the facts comprehended in each." "These involve, in the first instance, discoveries of similarity. The deductive sciences are made up of a vast machinery, exemplifying, in a remarkable degree, the creative or constructive, as opposed to the merely reproductive processes of the mind. Nature does not provide cubic equations, chemical formulae, or syllogistic schemes. These are built up, by slow degrees, out of elementary symbols, and the constructions are governed and checked by the ends to be served. The discoveries of experimental science are a more palpable and obvious case of constructiveness, being mostly material operations."

The foregoing quotations give a very summary, and, indeed, superficial idea of Professor Bain's systematic exposition of the powers and functions of the intellect. The three succeeding chapters involve controversial matter, dealing as they do with Nominalism and Realism, Experience and Intuition; and the Theory of Vision, the Perception of the Material World, Theories of the Material World, &c. On the latter topic, we have a pretty exhaustive, historical, and critical summary of the opinions of the most distinguished thinkers; among others, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Hamilton Ferrier, Mansel, Bailey, J. S. Mill, &c.; but not those of Dr. MacVicar, Dr. MacCosh, Dr. Calderwood, R. S. Wyld, R. Lowndes, E. V. Neale; nor of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, &c.

Book III., on "The Emotions," consists of thirteen chapters, remarkable for their width of induction, their careful elaboration, their acute generalizations, and their excellent classification. The method of exposition is also worthy of note; in all cases we have notice taken of the physical as well as of the mental manifestations of the Emotions. On the nature, characters, interpretation, estimation, and development of the Emotion many original and interesting remarks are made, and in the chapter on "The Emotions and their classification" there seems to us to be given a very exhaustive and thorough synopsis of the entire emotional range of humanity, on a principle which is at once novel and logical. As we shall not be able to extract at any length from the careful pages in which the "Æsthetic Emotions" are treated, it may be as well for us to state here that the scientific view of the emotions connected with the beautiful, the sublime, the picturesque, and the ludicrous is followed up by a review of "Theories of the Beautiful," which, so far as English thought is concerned, is full and fair; though we miss from it the names of Schimmelpenninck, Symington, Dr. Mac Vicar, Prof. J. S. Blackie, Hazlitt, Haydon, D. R. Hay, &c.; Baumgarten, Kant, Krug, Schelling, Hegel, Schiller, and Goethe, &c., might have been noted among German thinkers; and many modern French authors—Cousin, Jouffroy, H. Taine, &c., perhaps deserve remark; though wise reasons for limiting the lists most probably operated on the author's mind.

From this important section on the emotions, extending to upwards of 100 pages, we select the following heads of thought:—

"The two great divisions of the feelings are sensations (with muscular feelings) and emotions."

"Positively, feeling comprehends pleasures and pains, and states of excitement that are neither. Negatively, it is opposed to volition and intellect."

"Feeling has a twofold aspect—physical and mental. The PHYSICAL aspect involves all the organs recognised as connected with mental operations—the brain, muscles, senses, and secreting organs." "The characters of feeling are—(1) those of feeling proper (emotional); (2) those referring to the will (volitional); (3) those bearing upon thought (intellectual); and (4) certain mixed properties, including forethought, desire, and belief."

"On the MENTAL side we recognise *quality* (pleasure, pain, indifference); *Degree*, in the two modes of intensity and quantity, and *speciality*." "The will is moved by the feelings: pleasure, causing pursuit; pain, avoidance." "A feeling viewed with reference to any one of the three properties—discrimination, agreement, retentiveness—assumes an intellectual aspect, and is on the eve of becoming a state of intellect proper."

"The consideration of feeling, under the intellectual attribute of retentiveness or ideal permanence, brings into view the nature of forethought and prudence." "It is the property of every feeling to occupy the mind—to fix the attention upon the cause or object of the feeling, and to exclude other objects;" hence the state of desire. "For a knowledge of the feelings of others we must trust to external signs, interpreted by our own consciousness. The signs are—(1) the expression; (2) the conduct; and (3)

the indications of the course of the thoughts." "An outburst of feeling passes through the stages of rise, culmination, and subsidence."

"THE emotions, as compared with the sensations, are secondary, derived, or compound feelings." "Sensations and their ideas may coalesce to form new feelings or emotions. First. The simplest case is a plurality of sensations, whether of the same sense or of different sense, in MUTUAL HARMONY or in MUTUAL CONFLICT." "Secondly. There may be, as a consequence of the law of contiguity, a transfer of feelings to things that do not originally excite them. Thirdly. There may be a coalescence of separate feelings into one aggregate or whole, as in property, beauty, justice, and the moral sentiment." "We cannot, in classifying the emotions, comply with the rules of logical division. The nature of the case admits of but one method—to proceed from the simpler to the more complex."

"Emotions of relativity are novelty, wonder, liberty." "The emotion of terror originates in the apprehension of coming evil." "Tenderness is a pleasurable emotion, variously stimulated, whose effect is to draw human beings into mutual embrace." "It is the nature of the emotion to vent itself mainly on human beings."

"The term 'self' is not used here in any of its wide acceptations, but is a brief title for comprehending two allied groups of feelings—the one expressed by the names self-gratulation, self-complacency, self-esteem, pride; the other, by love of approbation, vanity, desire of fame or glory." "The feeling experienced when we behold in ourselves the qualities that, seen in others, call forth admiration, reverence, love, or esteem," is called self-gratulation, or self-esteem. "The feeling of being approved, admired, praised by others, is a heightened form of self-gratulation, due to the workings of sympathy." "The varieties of disapprobation represent the painful side of the susceptibility to opinion." "Self-complacency and the love of admiration are motives to personal excellence and public spirit."

"THE Emotion of POWER is distinct from both the pleasure of exercise and the satisfaction of gaining our ends. It is due to a sense of superior might or energy, on a comparative trial." "The pains of impotence are in all respects the opposite of the pleasurable sentiment of power."

"THE Irascible Emotion, or Anger, arising in pain, is marked by pleasure derived from the infliction of pain." "The objects of the feeling are persons, the authors of pain or injury." "The PHYSICAL manifestations of anger, over and above the embodiment of the antecedent pain, are—(1) general excitement; (2) an outburst of activity; (3) deranged organic functions; (4) a characteristic expression and attitude of the body; and (5) in the completed act of revenge, a burst of exultation." "On the MENTAL side anger contains an impulse knowingly to inflict suffering upon another sentient being, and a positive gratification in the fact of suffering inflicted." "In the ultimate analysis of anger we seem to trace these ingredients—(1) In a state of frenzied excitement, some effect is sought to give vent to the activity; (2) The sight of *bodily infliction and suffering* seems to be a mode of sensuous and sensual pleasure; (3) The pleasure of *power* is pandered to; (4) There is a satisfaction in preventing farther pain to ourselves, by inducing fear of us, or of consequences, in any one manifesting harmful purposes." "The infliction of punishment by law, although gratifying to the sympathetic resentment of the community, is understood to be designed principally for the prevention of injury."

"Emotions of action" are pursuit and plot-interest. "Chance or

uncertainty, within limits, contributes to the engrossment of pursuit," as also do contests. "The occupations of industry," "The sympathetic relationships," "The search after knowledge," &c. "The literature of plot or story is the express cultivation of the attitude of suspense."

"The operations of intellect may be attended with various forms of pleasure and pain; for instance, "The pleasure attending strokes of similarity in diversity may be described generally as an agreeable or exhilarating surprise." "New identities in science, whether classifications, inductions, or deductions, increase the number of facts comprehended by one intellectual effort." "Great discoveries of practice, besides contributing to knowledge, give the elation consequent on the enlargement of human power."

"Sympathy is to enter into the feelings of another, and act them out, as if they were our own." "Sympathy supposes (1) one's own remembered experience of pleasure and pain; and (2) a connection in the mind between the outward signs or expression of the various feelings and the feelings themselves." "Sympathy is a species of involuntary imitation, or assumption, of the displays of feeling enacted in our presence, which is followed by the rise of the feelings themselves." "The climax, or completion of sympathy, is the determination to act for another person exactly as for self."

"The fact that Feeling or Emotion persists after the original stimulus is withdrawn, and is revived by purely mental forces," constitutes Ideal Emotion. "Of mental agencies in the support of ideal emotion, two may be signalized—(1) The presence of some kindred emotion; and (2) the Intellectual forces." "Ideal Emotion is more or less connected with Desire." "The *Æsthetic Emotions*, indicated by the names Beauty, Sublimity, the Ludicrous, are a class of pleasurable feelings, sought to be gratified by the compositions of Fine Art." "The productions of Fine Art appear to be distinguished by these characteristics—(1) They have *pleasure for their immediate end*; (2) they have no disagreeable accompaniments; (3) their enjoyment is *not restricted to one or a few persons*."

Brief and disjunct as these selected sentences are, they can scarcely fail to be suggestive of a wealth of philosophical thought contained between and underlying them; and must be held to prove that as a moral speculatist, Professor Bain approaches his subject with rare powers, and on a well-defined system; while the matter his thoughts bring before us is often fresh, and always adequately stated. We presume that the reader will prefer criticism and remarks on this subject from the pen of J. S. Mill to any that we can supply, and we quote therefore an able passage from the writings of that distinguished leader of the school of *à posteriori* thought:

"Mr. Bain's classification of the emotions is different from, and more comprehensive than any other which we have met with. He begins with 'the feelings connected with the free vent of emotion in general, and with the opposite case of restrained or obstructed outburst,' the feelings, in short, of liberty and restraint in the utterance of emotion; which he regards as themselves emotions, and entitled on account of their superior generality to be placed at the head of the catalogue. He next proceeds to one of the simplest as well as most universal of our emotions—Wonder.

The third on his list is Terror. The fourth is 'the extensive group of feelings implied under the title of the Tender Affections.' The consideration of these feelings is by most writers blended with that of Sympathy, which is carefully distinguished from them by our author, and treated separately, not as an emotion, but as the capacity of taking on the emotions, or mental states generally, of others. A character may possess tenderness without being at all sympathetic, as is the case with many selfish sentimentalists; and the converse, though not equally common, is equally in human nature. From these he passes to a group which he designates by the title, Emotions of Self, including Self-esteem, or Self-complacency, in its various forms of Conceit, Pride, Vanity, &c., which he regards as cases of the emotions of tenderness directed towards self, and has largely illustrated this view of them. The sixth class is the emotions connected with Power. The seventh is the Irascible Emotions. The eighth is a group not hitherto brought forward into sufficient prominence—the emotions connected with Action. 'Besides the pleasures and pains of Exercise, and the gratification of succeeding in an end, with the opposite mortification of missing what is laboured for, there is in the attitude of *pursuit*, a peculiar state of mind, so far agreeable in itself, that factitious occupations are instituted to bring it into play. When I use the term *plot-interest*, the character of the situation alluded to will be suggested with tolerable distinctness.' This grouping together of the emotions of hunting, of games, of intrigue of all sorts, and of novel-reading, with those of an active career in life, seems to us equally original and philosophical. The ninth class consists of the emotions caused by the operations of the Intellect. The tenth is the group of feelings connected with the Beautiful. Eleventh and last comes the Moral Sense.

"Of these the four first are regarded by Mr. Bain as original elements of our nature, having their root in the constitution of the nervous system, and not explicable psychologically. The remaining seven he considers as generated by association from these four, with the aid of certain combinations of circumstances." *

As we have already intimated, it is our aim in this paper rather to be expository than critical; to convey in some brief form an idea of the important contributions to philosophical thought which Professor Bain has made, rather than, at present, to engage in any extended or minute criticism of the doctrinal elements they contain. Our own point of view ought now to be pretty well known to our readers, and they will not think that quotation implies assent. The analysis of the Will, given in Book IV., is the closest and clearest which has yet been made of that important function of man, in English letters. The clearness of the anatomy of the Intellect shown in it is beyond praise, and the general accuracy of the induction upon the elements of Volition is almost unexceptionable. Yet we resile from it as, in our opinion, incomplete; "we start, for *Life* is wanting there." Man, as a living Self, may be analyzed, but not anatomized; as a Vital Centre of Force, he must be more than that moved thing which the psychological school re-

* J. S. Mill's "Dissertations and Discussions," vol. iii., "Bain's Psychology," p. 183.

present him to be. The Will is undoubtedly a *plexus* and *nexus* of many influences; but man to be man must be Self-motived; for Individuality characterizes manhood, and ever, as the worth of manhood grows, the individuality of man shows itself more. This distinguishes the man of genius from the herd of men; of circumstantiated, not substantiated beings. Nevertheless, we do not hesitate to affirm that, in his researches on The Will, Professor Bain has carried analysis triumphantly into regions of latent Volitionary influence which have hitherto baffled speculation, and that he has added to the domain of philosophy in this department much inductive truth. We proceed to quote:—

“The Primitive Elements of the Will have been stated to be—(1) the Spontaneity of Movement; and (2) the Link between Action and Feeling, grounded in self-conservation. In the maturing or growth of the Will there is an extensive series of Acquisitions, under the law of Retentiveness or Contiguity.” “Spontaneity expresses the fact that the active organs may pass into movement apart from the stimulus of sensation ‘in’ a certain condition of the nervous centres and the muscles, connected with natural vigour, nourishment, and rest.” “As Spontaneity is not necessarily preceded by Feeling, there must be some medium for uniting it with our feelings. The requisite Link is believed to be given under the Law of Self-conservation.”

“The elements of voluntary power being assumed as—(1) Spontaneity; and (2) Self-conservation; we have to exemplify the connection of these into the matured will, by a process of education.” “The process of acquirement may be described generally as follows:—At the outset, there happens a coincidence, purely accidental, between a pleasure and a movement (of Spontaneity) that maintains and increases it, or between a pain and a movement that alleviates or removes it; by the link of Self-conservation, the movement bringing pleasure, or removing pain, is sustained and augmented. Should this happen repeatedly, an adhesive growth takes place, through which the feeling can afterwards command the movement.” “The second step in the growth of the Will is the uniting of movements with intermediate ends.” “Movements that have become allied with definite sensations are thereby brought out and made ready for new alliances.” “Volition is enlarged, and made *general*, by various acquirements; and first, the Word of Command.” “Another instrumentality for extending Volition is Imitation.” “A farther extension of the voluntary acquirements leads to the power of Acting upon the Wish to move.” “Voluntary power is consummated by the association of movements with the idea of the effect to be produced.”

“As our voluntary actions consist in putting forth muscular power, the control of Feeling and of Thought is through the muscles.” “The physical accompaniments of a feeling are—(1) diffused nerve currents; (2) organic changes; and (3) muscular movements. The intervention of the will being restricted to movements, the voluntary control of the feelings hinges on the muscular accompaniments.” “Command of the Thoughts is due to the control of Attention.” “This part of voluntary control has its stages of growth, like the rest, and enters as an all-important element into our intellectual or thinking aptitudes.” “The command of the Thoughts is

an adjunct in the control of the Feelings." "The reciprocal case—the power of the Feelings to command the Thoughts—is partly of the nature of Will, partly independent of the will." "From the nature or definition of Will, pure and proper, the Motives or Ends of action are our Pleasures and Pains." "The elementary pleasures and pains incite us to action, when only in prospect; which implies an ideal persistence approaching to the power of actuality." "We direct our labours to many things that, though only of the nature of Means, attain by association all the force of our ultimate ends of pursuit. Such are Money, Bodily Strength, Knowledge, Formalities, and Virtues." "The Motives to the Will are swayed and biased by the persistence of Ideas." "When two pleasures concur, the result is a greater pleasure; when a pleasure concurs with a pain, the greater will neutralize the less, leaving a surplus." "The natural Spontaneity of the system (which is a power through life) may come into conflict with the proper Motives to the Will."

"In the prolonged weighing of motives, termed DELIBERATION, the suspense is a voluntary act, prompted by the remembered pains of acting too quickly." "When the action suggested by a motive, or a concurrence of motives, cannot immediately commence, the intervening attitude is called RESOLUTION." "If with a strong motive there is weakness or insufficiency of the active organs, we have the peculiar consciousness, named EFFORT."

"DESIRE is the state of mind where there is a motive to act—some pleasure or pain, actual or ideal—without the ability. It is thus another of the states of interval or suspense, between motive and execution." "In Desire, there is the presence of some motive, a pleasure or a pain, and a state of conflict, in itself painful." "There are various modes of escape from the conflict, and unrest, of Desire. The first is forced quiescence; to which are given the familiar names—endurance, resignation, fortitude, patience, contentment." "A second outlet for Desire is ideal or imaginary action." "The provocatives of Desire are, in the first place, the actual wants or deficiencies of the system, and secondly, the experience of pleasure." "As all our pleasures and pains have the volitional property, that is, incite to action, so they all give birth to desire; from which circumstance, some feelings carry the fact of Desire in their names. Such are Avarice, Ambition, Curiosity." "Desire is incorrectly represented as a constant and necessary prelude of volition." "The mental state termed Belief, while involving the Intellect and the Feeling, is, in its essential import, related to Activity or the Will." "The relation of Belief to Activity is expressed by saying, that *what we believe we act upon*." "Belief is a growth or development of the Will, under the pursuit of intermediate ends." "The mental foundations of Belief are to be sought—(1) in our Activity; (2) in the Intellectual Associations of our Experience; and (3) in the Feelings." "Belief is opposed, not by Disbelief, but by Doubt."

"The Moral Habits are the acquirements relating to feelings and volitions." "The Moral Acquirements come under the general conditions of Retentiveness." "The conditions special to the Moral Acquirements are, first, an Initiative; and, secondly, a Gradual Exposure in cases of conflict." "Culture applied to the Special Emotions may embrace—(1) the Emotions susceptible on the whole; and (2) the Emotions singly." "The voluntary control of the Intellectual trains may pass into Habit." "Human Pursuit, as a whole, is divided, for important practical reasons, into two

great departments. The first embraces the highest and most comprehensive regard to Self; and is designated PRUDENCE, SELF-LOVE—the search after happiness. It is opposed or thwarted mainly by the urgency of present good or evil, and by fixed ideas." "Happiness is made up of the total of our pleasures, diminished by the total of our pains; and the endeavour after it resolves itself into seeking the one and avoiding the other." "The second department of pursuit comprises the regard to others, and is named DUTY. It is warred against not only by the forces inimical to Prudence, but also occasionally by Prudence itself." "The (foregoing) exposition of the Will has proceeded on the Uniformity of Sequence between motive and action." "The perplexity of the question of Free-will is mainly owing to the inaptness of the terms to express the facts." "On the doctrine of the uniform sequence of motive and action, meanings can be assigned to the several terms—Choice, Deliberation, Self-Determination, Moral Agency, Responsibility." "The whole series of phrases connected with Will, Freedom, Choice, Deliberation, Self-Determination, Power to act if we will, are contrived to foster in us a feeling of artificial importance and dignity, by assimilating the too humble sequence of motive and act to the illustrious functions of the Judge, the Sovereign, the Umpire."

It is quite obvious that in this exposition of the Will, the Necessarian point of view is essentially taken; although from the stress laid on Spontaneity, which is the special improvement wrought in the psychological school by Professor Bain, this is to some extent obviated. To this conception of Will, as determination without self-determination, we cannot assent. We believe, as we think, on the evidence of Consciousness, that besides the intellectual act of decision on motives, and the effective act by which Will is accomplished, there is a moral act of determination among emotions or inclinations, an impulse and issue from Selfhood involved in the operation of the Will. To decide on what is intellectually correct is an act which differs in its elements from that which determines on what is morally right, or what may be advisable or expedient. Hence the words, "Ought," springing from an inward sense of duty, and "Should," arising from the outward pressure of duty, differ entirely from "Will," which imports the personality of the speaker between the motive and the duty. The most stubborn of all arguments for the existence of Will as a self-determining agent is its involution in all languages, in the verb "Will" of a personalizing idea, *acting* as distinguished from a personality *acted upon*, as is suggested by "Shall." This indicates that man believes himself to be a Self-force, an original centre of Volitional energy, a point of appulse and impulse, whence issue regulative forces into the circumstances of life, thought, intent, and activity.

The History of the Discussion on Free-Will and Necessity is fairly analytical, and yet we miss some of the more prominent names connected with this question, *e. g.*, MacCosh, Neale, Lowndes, Wm. Cairns, Mansel, Ferrier and Bray; Spencer,

Combe, Arnott, Buckle, Lewis, &c., to mention now only British thinkers.

On the settlement of the Will depends the whole future of Ethics; and as we find the decision our author comes to on this point unsatisfactory, we cannot quite agree with him in what follows. This part of the book is carefully written, contains much acute thought, and is an advance on any system of Necessarian Ethics yet produced, as the reader may infer from the following:—

“ETHICS, or Morality, is a department of practice, and, as with other practical departments, is defined by its End.” “The Ethical End is a certain portion of the welfare of human beings living together in society, realised through rules of conduct duly enforced.” “The rules of Ethics, termed also Law, Laws, the Moral Law, are of two kinds:—The first are rules imposed under a penalty for neglect or violation. The penalty is termed *Punishment*; the imposing party is named Government or Authority; and the rules so imposed and enforced are called Laws proper, Morality proper, Obligatory Morality, Duty. The second are rules whose only external support is *Rewards*, constituting Optional Morality, Merit, Virtue, or Nobleness.” “Morality, in its essential parts, is ‘Eternal and Immutable;’ in other parts it varies with Custom.” “The Ethical End that men are tending to, and may ultimately adopt without reservation, is human Welfare, Happiness, or Being and Well-Being combined, that is, Utility.” “Any other standard that may be set up in competition with Utility must ultimately ground itself on the very same appeal to the opinions and the practice of mankind.”

The chief question in the Psychology of Ethics is whether the Moral Faculty or Conscience be a simple or a complex fact of the mind.

In favour of the simple and intuitive character of the Moral Sentiment it is argued:—

1st. That our judgments of right and wrong are immediate and instantaneous.

2nd. It is a faculty or power belonging to all mankind.

3rd. Moral Sentiment is said to be radically different in its nature from any other fact or phenomenon of the mind—(a) as irresolvable or unanalyzable; (b) possessing supremacy and right; (c) being unique in its action.

In reply, and in support of the view that the Moral Faculty is complex and derived, the following considerations are urged:—

1st. The immediateness of a judgment is no proof of its being innate; long practice or familiarity has the same effect.

2nd. The alleged similarity of men's moral judgments in all countries and times holds only to a limited degree.

3rd. Moral right and wrong is not so much a simple indivisible property as an extensive code of regulations which cannot be understood without a certain maturity of the intelligence.

4th. Intuition is incapable of settling the debated questions of practical morality.

5th. It is practicable to analyse or resolve the Moral Faculty, and in so doing to explain both its peculiar property and the similarity of moral judgments so far as existing among men.

"It may be proved, by such evidence as the case admits of, that the peculiarity of the Moral Sentiment, or Conscience, is identified with our education under government or Authority."

This is but a meagre outline of the heads of thought to be found in Part I. of this treatise; in Part II. there is much to interest the controversialist. It consists of nearly a hundred closely printed pages of analyses of the chief Ethical Systems of Ancient, Scholastic, and Modern times. The Socratic and Platonic morals are better explained by Maurice and Ferrier, but we have seen no abstract of Aristotle's Ethics which in an equal space is so complete and intelligible. Of Benthamism, a concise outline appears, and is valuable for its arrangement and plainness. A large number of authors have their main principles epitomized, and it would be a very excellent exercise for a student to compare and contrast the analyses of Bain in this text-book, and of Laurie in his "Notes on Moral Theories." This series of trustworthy abridgments of theories of Ethics is exceedingly valuable, and cannot fail to be useful, not only as a compendious view of moral speculation, but as the essence of a library of works on Ethical philosophy.

In an Appendix, we have an almost equally valuable abstract of the "History of Nominalism and Realism," of opinions upon "The Origin of Knowledge—Experience and Intuition." In eleven pages, "On Happiness," we have the quintessence of volumes, and in "Classifications of the Mind," we have an exhibition of many fine examples of Methodology; and we have in an abbreviated form observations on "The Meaning of Certain Terms," which are servicable, interesting, and improving.

On the whole, we do not know any work on Philosophy which within the same compass includes so much original disquisition and well-arranged, fully-developed thought, combined with so large a quantity of information, digested and abridged to the utmost of intelligibility, and yet so livingly incorporated with the whole circle of the author's own speculations, and so admirably co-ordinated with and subordinated to the aims of the teacher. It is in many respects a model book for students—exhaustive of the subject, and yet suggestive of much connected matter; full in its treatment of the entire whole of the topics required to constitute complete knowledge, and yet allowing ample margin for illustrative and supplementary thought; encyclopædic in its characteristics, and yet systematic and orderly in its developments; adapted to textual study, and yet affording gratification to the whole mind in its perusal, so far as arrangement, method, style, and matter go when taken in the mass. It is the book of a master in

Psychology—a book which emulates the productions of the great ages of authorship, and which cannot fail to inscribe the name of Professor A. Bain on a lofty place in the column devoted in the Temple of Fame to the Interpreters of Mind—a book which justifies for its author a foremost place among British thinkers and European philosophers.

We say this although we feel that the Philosophy which the learned Professor advocates is, in its ultimate, Material and Worldly—the very Metaphysics of Positivism; for we speak of the power, the force, the merit, the might of the book as an intellectual effort issued for a given purpose, and animated by an endeavour to accomplish a predetermined end. We have no right to object to the book that the author does not accept the philosophy which we believe to be most consonant with the experiences of consciousness and the observative experiments possible in metaphysics. We have rather to be thankful that the school of thought to which the author adheres has had its opinions so excellently formulated and so ably maintained, because it shows to how high a reach speculation must rise before it can cope in argument with a cogent and harmonized compendium of Psychology and Ethics such as that before us. The appearance of this book compels us to regret the early loss of Ferrier, while we rejoice at the advent of Stirling. We believe that it will cost Mansel or Calderwood a good deal of reflective thought to produce a work of equal merit on the opposite side. Shall Veitch come to the rescue? Is Flint engaged in scouring his armour? Will Fraser supply us with a groundwork of metaphysic, powerful enough to found an Ethical System upon? Or, though we are losing Mac Cosh as a British citizen, shall we yet see him at the head of a School capable of eclipsing Mill and vanquishing Bain?

“**APOLLEON** another name for Apollo, requires only an N prefixed to become the name of the hero; *ne* or *nai* being a particle of affirmation, establishes Ne-apolean as the genuine Apollo. Bonaparte also happily designates the sun. Night is the bad or evil part of the twenty-four hours, the day ruled by the sun is the good or *bona pars*. Here fact and allegory are within a hair's breadth of each another. Again, Apollo was born in an isle of the Mediterranean; so was Napoleon. Apollo's mother was Letona or Leto, this last name being the obsolete form of Lætor, I make rejoice. Napoleon's mother was joy itself, Letitia. Apollo had two wives—the moon and the earth—so had Napoleon. Apollo released Hellas from the terrible Python; Napoleon crushed the terrible hydra of revolution in France. Napoleon's twelve marshals are personifications of the twelve signs of the zodiac, and his four stationary officers are the four seasons or the four cardinal points.”

Religion.

WOULD THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE IRISH CHURCH BE INJURIOUS OR BENEFICIAL TO PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY?

BENEFICIAL.—IV.

IRELAND has been, and is, grossly misgoverned ; no one will deny this, and that the so-called Irish Church is one of her greatest evils is, I think, equally indisputable. The question as to whether disestablishing the Church in Ireland will be beneficial to that community is not, to my mind, the point at issue. The question is, whether that Church has a right to be there (of course I mean on its present standing as a State Church), and if once the fact is established—that it has no such right, then justice to ourselves as Englishmen, and to the Irish people, demands its immediate abolition. Scott truly remarks, “ Do what is right, and leave the result to a higher power than mortal man possesses.” How can the argument, that disestablishing the Irish Church is virtually establishing the Church of Rome, be upheld for a minute? Is the Church so weak that the clergy fear her *self-supporting power* when separated from the State? It would seem so, if we are to judge from the foolish agitations which they get up on the subject. I do not believe in what is called “ the apostolic succession,” but I do most firmly believe that the Church (and by the Church I mean the principles of the Church) will stand and flourish, whether separated from or joined to the State. We have not now, and we never had, any right to establish a church in Ireland, the principles and doctrines of that church being contrary to the belief of the majority of the people.

It is brought forward as an argument, by the supporters of the State Church in Ireland, that when a man buys land in Ireland, whatever may be the religious body to which he belongs, he buys it knowing that it is subject to a certain tithe. Granted ; but is that any argument in favour of the creation of that tithe in the first instance? I say, decidedly *not*, and for this reason : if you find any *existing evil*, you will not venture to defend that evil on the grounds of its *existence only* ; no, you will probe the matter to the quick, and if you find it *radically wrong*, you will, if you have any sense of justice, sweep it away entirely. Just so with the Irish Church. It is radically wrong ; it is the source of numberless evils ; it is the very spirit of oppression and injustice itself ; and therefore

sweep it away as a State Church, and permit it to occupy in Ireland the position it ought to hold there—namely, that of a *missionary church*.

And now to deal with some of the “elements of thought” suggested by E. B. O. R. In the first place, he says, “the disestablishment of the Irish Church would be the abandonment of a principle, and that every abandonment of principle implies that it is false and inimical, so that the same thing will be right in England, Scotland, and Wales, as is hereby declared to be right in Ireland.” Now I will own that this “element of thought” appears to me very easily disposed of, for this reason: by disestablishing the Irish Church we do not establish the fact that the *principle* of the Church (*quâ* Church) is wrong, but that its establishment in the country in question is *an injustice*, and ought therefore to be remedied. Let us take an instance. Supposing that a man is owner of a large manufactory, and that he has established certain rules and regulations in that manufactory; he buys another, and introduces the same rules amongst his new workpeople; after a fair trial, however, he finds that they work unjustly and hardly upon his workmen, and he therefore abolishes them—not thereby implying that they are wrong *in substance*, but that in the instance above mentioned they worked unjustly, and ought therefore to be done away with. I have previously mentioned the next “element of thought,” and need only say that it seems strange to me that the clergy and their supporters should be so frightened at the disestablishment of the Church, when they will tell you in almost the same breath that *the church* cannot and will not fail. The arguments brought forward in support of this proposition appear to me to need no answers; they are foolish. Can any one suppose that the *disestablishment* of one Church is *necessarily* the establishment and triumph of some other particular Church? Are there only *two* churches in Ireland—English and Romish? No, the disestablishment of the State Church in Ireland will be indeed a triumph; not to one particular religious sect alone, but to every honest and thinking man who wishes to see justice fairly administered in Ireland.

The third “element of thought,” states that “the disestablishment of the Irish Church would widen the area of Popish influence, and lessen the influence of Protestant resistance. Now, if we grant that it widens the field for Popish operations on the one hand, yet I think, on the other hand, that it equally enlarges the powers and opportunities of the Church. Unfettered by the State, the Church will spread her branches into all quarters of the Irish kingdom, will render Ireland more truly Protestant than any State Church will ever make her. Speaking of the good which the Established Church in Ireland has accomplished, makes me think of a speech made by Lord Macaulay, in the House of Commons, on the 28th of April, 1845, in which he truly says, “Two hundred and eighty-five years has this Church been at work. What could have been done for it in the way of authority, privileges, endowments

which has not been done? Did any other set of bishops and priests in the world ever receive so much for doing so little? Nay, did any other set of bishops and priests in the world ever receive half as much for doing twice as much? And what have we to show for all this lavish expenditure? What but the most zealous Roman Catholic population on the face of the earth? Where you were one hundred years ago, there you are still; not victorious over the domain of the old faith, but painfully, and with dubious success, defending your own frontier, your own English pale. Sometimes a deserter leaves you; sometimes a deserter steals over to you. Whether your gains or losses of this sort be the greater I do not know, nor is it worth while to inquire. On the great solid mass of the Roman Catholic population you have made no impression whatever. There they are, ten to one against the members of your Established Church." Further on, he very nobly states that "the fuller our convictions are that our doctrines are right, the fuller, if we are rational men, must be our conviction that our tactics have been wrong, and that we have been encumbering the cause which we meant to aid." All this is equally true now as it was then. Has the Irish Church, I ask, done any real practical good between 1845, when Macaulay gave utterance to these startling words, and the present time? I distinctly state that she has *not*. She has simply existed as a perpetual disgrace to England, and a shamefully unjust institution in Ireland.

"A church exists to be loved, to be revered, to be heard with docility, to reign in the understandings and hearts of men. A Church which is abhorred is useless, or worse than useless; and to quarter a hostile Church on a conquered people, as you would quarter a soldiery, is, therefore, the most absurd of mistakes. This mistake our ancestors committed. They posted a Church in Ireland, just as they posted garrisons in Ireland. The garrisons did their work. They were disliked, but that mattered not. They had their forts and their arms, and they kept down the aboriginal race, but the Church did not do its work; for to that work the love and confidence of the people were essential."* How true is this! How can a church work good in a nation unless that nation loves and reverences that church? Fatal, indeed, was the error of our ancestors in establishing the Protestant Church in Ireland; and do not let us, who have seen the evils which have arisen from their mistake, give our support to bear up the rotten fabric of an oppressive State Church, which, for three hundred and eight years, has been productive of no good, but of unnumbered evils to Ireland.

And now we come to the fourth, and last "element of thought," namely, "that the disestablishment of the Irish Church would affect the minds of the *unthinking* to believe that Protestantism was a failure, and Popery the only eternal truth of Christ." He must indeed be an "*unthinking* man" who for one moment would be

* Lord Macaulay's speech in the House of Commons," April 23, 1854.

affected in this manner by the disestablishment of the Irish Church. And I must say, that if a man is so utterly careless on the subject of religion that he will change his belief simply because the church to which he belongs is separated from the State, in that case I think his religion is indeed vain, and that such a person is rather a discredit than anything else to the church to which he belongs.

It is often said that the Queen can never assent to the disestablishment of the Irish Church without committing an actual moral sin, by violating, as they state, her coronation oath. In order to answer this argument fully, it will be necessary to trace the origin of, and inquire into, the uses of coronation oaths in general. The origin of a sovereign taking some oath to his people, on his coronation or election, is one springing purely from nature, and an innate sense of self-preservation. When a body of people choose a leader or governor, they naturally bind him by some conditions before placing the chief power in his hands; and in a "coronation oath," as prescribed by Parliament, are embodied all those conditions in the case of an English sovereign. It must never, however, be lost sight of that the people to be governed frame that oath themselves, and, therefore, surely they can permit the sovereign to depart from that oath, if they think that by so doing any real good will be obtained. The coronation oath is, in fact, an "Act of Parliament," and, as such, may be repealed altogether, or altered as the exigencies of the country may require. Can any one doubt, then, that the abolition of an institution so plainly repugnant to all ideas of justice can fail to be productive of benefit to Protestant Christianity? I say it must be beneficial; it must work well in the end, and at any rate it deserves a trial, for no one can say that the present Established Church in Ireland has ever worked any substantial good throughout the many years that it has existed there.

I heartily agree with Mr. Gladstone, when, in speaking of the Irish Church, he says,* "You cannot amend it in one respect or direction without offending in some other respect or direction, and making the case worse than it was before. The reason is that there is no basis for that Church. It is wholly disabled and disqualified for performing the purposes for which it exists, and consequently I spoke in literal truth, and not in mere sarcasm, when I said, *You must not take away its abuses, because if you take them away there will be nothing left.*" E. B. G.

BENEFICIAL.—V.

It must have been no slight reason, indeed, that caused Lord Macaulay to say, in one of his great speeches in Parliament, that "of all the institutions now existing in the civilized world, the established Church of Ireland seems the most absurd." The grievances of the people of that country, of which this Church is one of the most prominent, have distracted public attention for years, and formed the anxious study of our statesmen for many

* Speech at St. Helen's, August 5, 1868.

generations. It has been the cause of bitter animosities ; and the consideration of its position has been the origin of some of the keenest controversies that our political history has known. Year after year the question has been taken up in Parliament, as the annual grant to Maynooth has been proposed. The excitement has become greater as these grants have been augmented, or the demands of the Romanists become more numerous and urgent, until now the matter presents such an aspect, and has reached such a climax, that something must be done for its settlement, or we must be content to see that country still more disaffected than it yet is, and still more the scenes of disorder and rebellion. It is a question that can no longer be delayed ; and we believe the plan proposed by Mr. Gladstone, so far as it goes, to be the only one that will effect a just settlement and secure permanent peace ; and we hail with delight the response that his appeal to the country has already received ; and we have the utmost confidence that the matured plans which his statesmanship and abilities will bring forward, and his eloquence and indefatigable energies support, will have the effect of clearing away the clouds that presently obscure Ireland's political horizon, and of ushering in a bright morning and an unclouded day of sunshine and prosperity such as its people have never yet known.

It is often argued, in connection with this subject, that if the Church of Ireland be disestablished, the established Churches of England and Scotland must, as a necessary consequence, share the same fate. But there is no such logical necessity, for the circumstances of the three Churches are so different that the one cannot form a precedent for the other. The Church of Ireland has ever been peculiar. It stands on a platform exclusively its own, and it must stand or fall upon its own merits. It has been justly said, that of all ecclesiastical establishments, it is the only one in which a small minority is exclusively protected and endowed. In some countries none of the religions are in connection with the State ; and in others all are supported and fostered alike. In England the Established Church is the church of the majority ; and not only do the bulk of the people belong to its communion, but also the wealthy and influential amongst them. In Scotland, again, the case is somewhat different. It is disputed whether it now contains the majority ; but certain it is, that when it was first established it was the church of the people, and it contained the majority at least up to the Free Church Disruption, in 1843 ; and although there are now so many Dissenters, they are not in antagonism to the Established Church as they are in Ireland, for they hold substantially the same doctrines, and differ only about matters of church government, such as patronage and the power of the civil magistrate. It is possible, that if the voluntary principle continues to make such rapid progress as it has done lately, the time may come when these churches will also be disestablished ; but in the meantime there is nothing in the present state of affairs to render it necessary, as in

the case of Ireland. There is, therefore, no abandonment of principle in the matter; and it does not imply that the principle of establishments is false and inimical, for the attendant circumstances are so materially different, that what is right in the one case may be perfectly wrong in the other.

It is no wonder, indeed, that the Irish people entertain a strong feeling of dislike to the Established Church. They cannot rid themselves of the idea that it is a badge of conquest. They cannot forget that they have been ruled by the English, and ruled with a rod of iron. Once and again they have tried to throw off the yoke, but their attempts were always put down by the sword; their people were slain, and their property destroyed; and by a series of penal statutes and vexatious enactments their conquerors trampled upon them more than ever, and kept them almost in a state of slavery. As was to be expected in such circumstances, their race never mingled with the English; and at the time of the Reformation they clung tenaciously to their ancient faith, and this made the breach wider than ever. They cannot help feeling that the princely revenues which support the English Church belonged originally to their own; and they deeply feel the injustice of being compelled to pay for a church which does not minister to them, and which they believe teaches nothing but heresy. It is thus a matter of simple justice to the Irish people, and this of itself will benefit Protestant Christianity.

It will further be benefitted by the removal of the reproach which the present state of matters entails upon it. We all declaim loudly against the persecutions of the Roman Catholics, and they in turn, in defending themselves, accuse us of being as intolerant as they, and as a proof of their assertion they point to the manner in which Ireland has been treated by us. Is it not a reproach that we keep up a large ecclesiastical establishment, consisting of bishops, archbishops, deans, and between two and three thousand clergymen, in a country where the Protestants number less than one-tenth of the population, and less than many an English diocese? There are churches and ministers in nearly 400 parishes which have no Protestant population at all, and upwards of 500 more where the congregation numbers only twenty or thirty, and even that small number is eked out by children and servants. There are very many non-resident clergy who leave the work to curates, some of whom have as many as fifteen parishes under their care, and a county between some of them. It affords a capital opportunity, which is readily taken advantage of, for providing the younger sons of the English gentry with sinecures, giving them a good income, and nothing to do for it. Are not these things a reproach, and can such anomalies as these be done away with too soon?

It is admitted by both parties in the State that justice must now be done; and evidently the only two ways of doing that is by disestablishing the Protestant Church or endowing the Catholic one. The former is undoubtedly the better way, because in the latter

the Government and people of Great Britain would be encouraging and supporting what they believe to be error—at the same time teaching truth and taking means to destroy it. It is maintained that the disendowment of the Church is virtually an endowment of popery. No doubt it will give an apparent triumph to it; but we maintain that that will be only temporary, and that in the long run the victory will be on the side of Protestantism. The Papists, very likely, will rejoice at seeing the church which they hate in an untenable position, and which its best friends can no longer defend. But it is only removing the ruinous outposts which no longer guard the citadel, and enabling them to concentrate their forces, and engage them with better effect. It will not remove a rival out of the Papists' way, but it will remove the obstacles which obstruct that rival's path; and they will find their progress hindered and their difficulties increased far more than they at present anticipate.

The disestablishment of the Irish Church will be further beneficial to Protestantism by the impetus which it will give to evangelical truth in that land, and the reforms which it will necessarily bring about in the Church itself. No doubt many improvements in the Church have been made since its worst days, so that it is no longer a blot on our common Christianity, as it once was. Still it has altogether failed as a missionary church. It has been established for three hundred years, and yet, with all the prestige which wealth and power can give, it has made no appreciable progress; and, indeed, it has had great difficulty in keeping its own. Surely that is long enough to give it a fair trial, and it is now high time a better plan were tried. Some efforts were made, about twenty years ago, by the "Society for Irish Church Missions to the Roman Catholics" to bring about a reformation in Ireland; and one of its members, the Rev. Robert Bickersteth, in giving an account of its operations about three years after its institution, spoke of it as full of high promise, and that even then it had given earnest of the most beneficial results. Their operations were begun in Galway, and quickly spread through the neighbouring counties; and so successful were they that he said their schoolrooms were crowded with children thirsting for knowledge, the people throwing off the yoke in which the priests had bound them, and in one union of parishes, where there were previously only five hundred Protestants, there were then between five and six thousand. At that time the *Times* newspaper spoke of their success as an acknowledged fact; and the Romanist journals and the priests themselves spoke of the movement with indignation and alarm. We do not know what the society has done since then, or whether it is still in existence; but their success, so far as it went, shows what can be done towards the evangelization of Ireland, and makes it evident that if the ministers of the Established Church would make it really what it is understood to be—a missionary church, throwing themselves energetically, perseveringly, and self-sacrificingly into their work—they would have no reason to complain of want of

success; their schools would be crowded, and their churches filled, and they themselves would find a ready entrance into the hearts and homes of the people.

Our idea of a true parish church is that in which every one can hear the gospel preached in all its fulness, without money and without price; one in which the minister will make it his business to look after the spiritual interests of all who are not otherwise attended to; who will sympathize with them and comfort them in their afflictions, and point them to the Saviour as they draw near unto death. This ideal is found realized far oftener among voluntaries and dissenting ministers than among those of the established church; and we need not be surprised that it has not been realized by those of the Irish Church, when there are so many pluralists among them, and when the large stipends have induced so many to enter it as a mere profession. Many, no doubt, have entered it in a spirit of true devotion to their work, but becoming discouraged at the hindrances have abandoned all missionary work, and confined themselves to the handful of people who regularly wait on their ministry. The Catholic priests have come nearer this ideal than the Protestants, for, Macaulay tells us, when the latter were luxuriating in comfort and ease, the former were to be found in the miserable dwellings of the peasantry, instructing the young, consoling the miserable, and holding up the crucifix before the eyes of the dying. It is no wonder then that they have endeared themselves to the heart of the people, and that they are looked upon as the best of friends. It may be thought that established churches alone are able to carry on mission work, and that if it were left to voluntary churches, the work would be neglected. But the contrary is the case. The history of the Free Church of Scotland supplies an illustration. The outlying districts and islands in the north of Scotland were greatly neglected by the Established Church, but now that the Free Church has taken these up there are almost none without the means of grace, and the great bulk of the people there belong to her communion. So will it be, we are confident, in Ireland when the church is disestablished. Her ministers need not fear depending upon the free-will offerings of the people for their temporal support. The voluntary principle has an expansive energy and a living power which will fully meet their need. It has been tried everywhere, and it has nowhere been found wanting.

We have great hope for Ireland now. We believe the day is coming, is at hand, when the brightest prognostications of her friends will be realized; when that land will be the home of learning and the nursery of the arts and sciences, as it was in days gone by; when her people shall be happy and prosperous, and united to Great Britain by the ties of a common brotherhood. She has long been overshadowed with the darkness of Popery; her people have long been in that ignorance and subjection to the priests which is one of the tenets of Rome; but now, we trust, the disestablishment of the church will be "the beginning of days"

unto her; for it will prepare the way for its becoming the church of the people, and give unto them that liberty with which Christ hath made his people free, and more widely and more abundantly disseminate those blessings which ever follow in the wake of Protestant Christianity.

R. D., JUN.

INJURIOUS.—IV.

I AM about to plead, as I believe, on behalf of those who have been too little thought of in the discussion of the question regarding the propriety of the disestablishment of the Irish Church. I want to say a few words in favour of the adherents of the Protestant Episcopalian Church of Ireland—the Church minority of the faithful and true members of the Church, whose property and prosperity are about to be interfered with, and whose interest in the Church is to be cast aside as not worth a thought. The existing interests of the congregations connected with the communion of the Church of England are not, it seems, to be considered at all in the proposals of the party in favour of disestablishment. It has been proposed, we know, that all existing interests be conserved, but the only interests mentioned are those of the clergy, not those of the congregations. It seems to me unreasonable that the compacts of centuries should be broken off by governments in the way proposed in this case; and I am of opinion that it cannot but be injurious to Protestant Christianity to proceed as is proposed with the disestablishment of the Irish Church, because it will be an exhibition of a gross breach of faith on the part of a great Protestant power under the actuating influence of political expediency, and this breach of contract will be between those who have been the most loyal and faithful subjects of the Crown of Ireland for the purpose of propitiating the seditious and the rebellious, and for the currying of favour with the priesthood of a faith and connection altogether different from that which the British people is desirous of seeing in the ascendant, namely, the Roman Catholics. It is quite evident that to a government which could be so unjust as to break its most solemn engagements, as the upholders of the self-same Church elsewhere, the congregations of the Irish Church would have no need to be thankful, and would have little inducement to be submissive—so that their Protestant loyalty would receive a check; while they would have a perfect right to look upon the professed Protestantism of Britain as a matter of expediency, not of principle. To give just cause for such a feeling would not be beneficial to Protestant Christianity among its adherents. But it would not be less injurious in its effects on the Papists; for they who, despite political expediency, had held on to their views of religious truth, could not fail to be impressed with the idea that those who for political expediency disestablished the Protestant Church had but a low opinion of the worth of that Protestantism which they thus laid aside so easily. Protestant faith would thus, we see, be weakened, while Papistical bigotry would

be increased and emboldened, and we know that neither of these things could benefit Protestant Christianity.

Hitherto the Church has been spread over all the parishes of Ireland, and Ireland is for the most part an agricultural or pastoral land, having few manufactures, and, therefore, few large centres of population. Hence there are few places where a fair chance is given to the adequate support of gospel ordinances, after the Protestant model, from the independent resources of the people. In all rural districts the population is sparse, and in general poor. In many of the parishes the Roman Catholics have the numerical majority, and on this account, to throw the burden of the support of the clergy and of ordinances on the common people suddenly would constitute a great hardship. Those adherents of the Church have hitherto believed that they had national guarantees for the maintaining of their faith and of their worship. When the nation, by an act of repudiation, denies the responsibility to uphold the clergy, and confiscates the property to which they are entitled, it is scarcely possible that they should feel otherwise than that they have been illused and abandoned for party purposes; exposed to their enemies undefended, and called to witness for Protestantism, notwithstanding the national declension from its duty and engagements. This style of treatment is highly likely to alienate the love of these churchmen from the Government which betrayed them, and that not through the need for following out a general principle, but from the desire to make a political experiment. In such circumstances they can scarcely be expected to look so favourably on the Protestant faith as they formerly did; their attachment to it must be weakened, and their feeling of community with England cannot fail to be affected.

But besides all this, we must remember that these poor people are to be called upon to take up the responsibilities which the nation declares are too heavy for it to bear, and to provide for themselves the means for ordinances and the payment of a ministry. In many cases, where parishes have few adherents of the Church, this will be impossible, and these must either lapse into worshiplessness or betake themselves to the Romanist services. The clergy cannot subsist without income, and only where an income is provided can they labour; and in all the small parishes the Church must leave its flock as sheep having no shepherd. The sum drawn by the clergy of Ireland from the tithe of Ireland is only a tenth part of the yield of that tithe. The clergy get £400,000, and the landowners retain the balance of the £4,000,000 it yields. To call upon the adherents of the Church to make up at once about a half a million for church purposes, in addition to what they have formerly paid, must act prejudicially upon the poor, and test to the utmost their attachment to the Protestantism of their fathers and of their country, and can scarcely fail to affect, for evil, Protestant Christianity.

Here, then, is a patent and pressing prejudicial action. But it

is aggravated by the fact that it must be in those parishes which are poorest that the supplies of ministerial ordinances must be withdrawn; and those in which the adherents of the Church are in a minority, that they must be left undefended and unencouraged. In these places, where it will be impossible to raise a sufficient stipend, the people must be left without any efficient spiritual instruction or supervision. In many places, those who have hitherto had these, being left destitute, will be compelled to live together without being married, will require to live with their children unbaptised, and with the communion unpartaken—or they must go over to Catholicism. If they do the former, demoralization must shortly set in, and that will be no advantage to Protestant Christianity; if they do the latter, few will argue that that can be beneficial which strengthens the cause of the enemies of free thought and of Bible examination.

Again, remember the persecuting spirit and the adroit Jesuitism of the Papal clergy and their supporters, and feel what must be the condition of a Protestant minority in a parish where they have the mastery, and can apply the screw both to soul and body, and it will be plain at once that it is not our duty to leave in unprotected defencelessness the Protestantism which we have hitherto upheld and nourished.

Once more, a voluntary church must be an attractive church; must make itself popular by doing what pleases the people and preaching what is palatable. In this way the Irish Church, even in that part which retains its Protestantism, will be exposed to a double danger—an increase in Ritualism, in imitation of and in competition with Rome, and an increase in heretical preaching, so that the people may hear what they like. "Pulpit Cowardice" will get a great impetus; when to preach faithfully and truly the doctrines of the Church may expose the clergyman to loss of status and living. Many churches will remain faithful, many clergy will continue to preach zealously the unspeakable riches of Christ; but the disestablishment of the Church will put a temptation before many congregations and many clergy, which may tend to lead astray, by making it compulsory that a clergyman should study and adapt himself to the opinions of his audience, instead of drawing his views directly from the Bible and the Church Articles.

I have said all, I think, I intended to say; but I have had my attention called to a series of propositions which some of my readers may not have seen, and which, as, I think, they support my argument, I quote below in a note.* My hope is that our nation will do nothing permanently injurious to true Protestant Christianity.

C. S.

* The Irish Church did not rob the Papists, as the Jesuits falsely assert. The true Church in Ireland existed before the errors of Popery existed. This same Church, in process of time, acquired property, but contracted Popish error.

This same Church, retaining the property it had acquired, rejected at the Reformation the Popish errors it had contracted.

This same Church still exists, and "the gates of hell" have not prevailed "against it."

It is false for Papists to say that this same Church at the Reformation robbed the Papists of their property. This same Church then only rejected the popish errors it had contracted, but retained the property it had acquired—

Just as a man whose coat has got covered with dust cannot be said to rob any one when, retaining his own coat, he brushes off the dust; or,

Just as a stately oak, overgrown with ivy, is still the same oak, though the ivy which had grown round it, and which threatens its existence, is removed by the axe of the forester.

The Papists hate the Church of Ireland, because it teaches the truth—therefore they seek its destruction.

Let all true Protestants resist all attempts to appropriate any portion of the property or revenue of the Church of Ireland to other than Church of Ireland purposes.

If some stipends are too large, and if some stipends are too small, let the revenues be redistributed to the effect of reducing the too large, and increasing the too small, stipends.

If some ministers have too much work, and if some ministers have too little, reduce the work of those who have too much, and increase the work of those who have too little.

REFORM, BUT DON'T DESTROY, THE IRISH CHURCH.

INJURIOUS.—V.

A FRIEND of mine, when I told him I was going to write this article, affirmed, somewhat Milesianly, that I intended to defend the indefensible. If I thought the cause was indefensible, I would certainly not seek to defend it; for that would only indicate the stubbornness of folly. But I never like to desert the cause which seems to be falling merely because its hours appear to be numbered; and I am not so convinced of the honesty and intelligence of Parliament as to suppose that all that they do is right, and nothing is reprehensible that they propose. I am well aware that for many years the House of Commons has been a destructive house, and has delighted itself in unfixing a great many principles, and acting on the merest expediency; and, therefore, I may be advocating the losing side. Still, I hope to be able to show that something may be said in arrest of the foregone conclusion of the House of Commons, and in deprecation of the singular and sudden joy of Dissent at the prospect of Disestablishment. I am desirous of asking the Nonconformists of my opponents, if they have ever thought of the disestablishment of the Church of their abhorrence, as tantamount to the establishment of that Church which they ought most to desire to see put down—the Papal antichrist.

H. Scott says (p. 41), "The Romanists cannot receive any addition or strength, in any manner, from the proposed step." To this statement I demur. If you reduce the strength, means, and

status of your opponent, you advance and improve your own position in that proportion. If two armies are in the field, and, by a dexterous movement, one of the opposing generals manages to cut off eighty thousand men from appearing against him in the field, he strengthens himself to that extent. In a lawsuit we know the crippling effect of heavy losses. Now, by this "proposed step," Protestant Christianity would lose nearly half-a-million of money, and to that extent it would be weakened; but besides this it would be more materially enfeebled by the changes which would ensue. Every disadvantage thus brought upon the Irish Church would be equivalent to an advantage gained by the Papal Church, and hence we think H. Scott's argument for the harmlessness of the disestablishment of the Irish Church quite wrong. "Voluntaryism," of which H. Scott thinks so much, and of which he speaks in terms of high praise (p. 40), is a different thing in England than in Ireland. Nothing of that sort seems to prosper in Ireland, for the people, as a mass, have not learned to trust to their own energy and independent activity. On this account we doubt the likelihood of prosperous voluntaryism in Ireland. It must be recollected that the Papal Church is not a voluntary Church. For the same reason, what Georgius states in regard to a "free Church" (p. 104) does not hold here. Ireland is not naturally a land suitable for freedom. The Celtic race in France, Wales, the highlands of Scotland, and in Ireland, require the hand of a master. The feudal element has power over them. Self-government does not seem to them freedom. The analogies drawn from the prosperity of free Churches in England and America do not hold when applied to Ireland. The whole tendency of Catholicism is to lessen the power of self control, and hence the whole example and force of the Papist priesthood and their adherents is opposed to this freedom of intellect and action. The idea of the Protestant State Church being looked upon by the Irish as a great injustice and as an insult (p. 107) is, with all due deference to Georgius, in our opinion a mistake. It is not regarded as "a badge of ascendancy," nor is it a cause of disaffection. "The disaffection in Ireland is attributed to the existence of the Established Protestant Church, and it is said that if that Church is disestablished, disaffection will be at once allayed. What is the latest form of disaffection which we have seen in Ireland? It is Fenianism. Those deluded men who delight in the name of Fenians do not want to overthrow the Protestant Church. They have declared hundreds of times that if that Church were overthrown to-morrow—the whole thing, its buildings, manses, glebes, and all swept into the sea—they would not be satisfied. What they want is Ireland for the Irish; what they aim at is a disruption of the united empire. The wound of Ireland is, that whereas the great majority of the population are Catholics, such a large proportion of soil in reality belongs to Protestants, and the Protestants form such a large proportion of the classes who, by superior wealth and superior advantages, are raised in

social station higher than the rest." But this is the politics of the question, into which, as into a quagmire, Georgius has led us; and we are bound to adhere to the religious aspect in this debate. We shall address an observation or two to that point.

"We purpose," said Mr. Gladstone, in his speech at Romsey, "to apply religious equality to Ireland, to remove the State Church that now exists there, and carefully to avoid, and, if necessary, to resist the erection of any other State Church in its place." Each of the three assertions in this short sentence is fallacious. It is impossible "to apply religious equality to Ireland." The Romanists of Ireland know well that that which they shout out for as "religious equality" is really religious supremacy. They ask the Government to grant what they call "religious equality," but they proffer no guarantee to Government that they will apply, or supply, or comply with "religious equality." They cannot do so; they constitute a State Church, and a State Church of the worst description, for they are the Church of a foreign State. Mr. Gladstone proposes to abolish the State Church of our own nation, but he makes and he asks no provision for the abolition of the Romish State Church, which yields homage to, and works the will of a foreign potentate. How is religious equality to be applied in this case? The Romish Church is a State Church, and when the Establishment is laid low, and Dissent prides itself on its conquest over the Establishment, it will find that an Establishment holding its power from Rome is over all, and that the "religious equality" promised is farther off than ever: for the Romish Church is pledged by doctrine, laws, and history against religious equality to those beyond her fold and pale.

Mr. Gladstone, in the second place, proposes "to remove the State Church which now exists there," but he has forgotten, or ignores the fact, that there are two State Churches which exist there, and one of these only he purposes to disestablish and disendow. The Established Church of England in Ireland is one State Church, which has both religious and political aims and duties, obligations, and rights. But the Church of Rome, established in Ireland, is a State Church, owning supreme allegiance to an alien power, and spurning any other State obligations at all. Those who protest against any union, under any circumstances, between Church and State, should look to this, and if they insist upon abolishing the connection between the Irish Church and the British State, they ought to be prepared with some manageable scheme for securing the disconnection of the Catholic Church from the Roman State, and the Imperial power which overrides all crowns and sovereignties, laws and liberties. Unless Nonconformists and their allies are prepared with this, they are only agitating for the downfall of one State Church, which we can manage and hold in, in order that the real supremacy may go into the hands of those who form a State Church which we cannot control, who have another master—the Pope, and other aims—the universal dominion of

Romanism over the faith of men. The removal of both the State Churches which exist there is the only way to apply religious equality to Ireland—if one is to go, so must the other.

In some vague sense, but still a fallacious one, Mr. Gladstone seems to promise that this shall be the case. "We purpose," says he, "carefully to avoid, and if necessary, to resist, the erection of any other State Church in its place." But we can neither "avoid" nor "resist" the erection of this "other State Church," for there it is. The Roman Church, deriving its vitality, creed, laws, powers, priesthood, chiefs, &c. from Rome, exists a real, though not a nominal State Church, and proves the reality of its State connection by being a tributary Church—paying absolute taxation to the head of the Roman Church, the Pope. It is plain that we cannot "avoid" an accomplished fact; it is still more palpable that we cannot "avoid" the very thing under the force of which we are acting, and the mainspring of the agitation in which we are engaged—for the Church, the Roman Church is there. Well, then, how is this Church to be "resisted"? Are we prepared to enter on a crusade of persecution and penal laws, and to repeal all our concessions regarding Catholic emancipation? I trow not. But how else are we to "resist" the Roman Catholic Church? By lowering our standards, sheathing our weapons, destroying our bulwarks, dismantling our fortresses, dismissing our troops—are we to hurl defiance at the Roman cohorts and "resist" the onset of the papal legions? A most fallacious process this, I fear, of endeavouring "carefully to avoid, and if necessary, to resist the erection of any other State Church" in the place of that which we are about to overthrow.

Do "the public interests of Ireland require" that the management of its millions should be unreservedly put into the hands of a papal priesthood who own no allegiance to the Crown, and no fealty to the State, who are the emissaries of a triple-tiaraed sovereign, by whose singular sovereignty over "the keys" they can be absolved from law, obedience, or helpfulness, and by whom they may be commanded to engage in both covert and overt measures for subverting the rights and the liberties of Britain, and for opposing the principles of its government. If they do not, why this agitation for the removal of one State Church—our own—and for the establishment of the State Church of Rome in Ireland. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that if we abolish the Episcopal Church in Ireland, we leave the Romish priesthood masters of the field, in comparison to what they have been, and that we virtually endow them with all that we subtract from the disestablished Church. That Church which has been a centre of civilization and the mainstay of loyalty in Ireland, and which is doing its work better now than it has ever done, we propose to abolish, in order that we may afford free course to the progress of that Church which has been the torture of ministers and the fomentor of seditions—of that Church which has certainly not attempted to appease

the discontents of Ireland. In doing so, we, as I believe, sacrifice not the Irish Church only, but the interests of the empire. Although it may not be a popular doctrine in our day, that it is the duty of the State to support and promote the truth, we cannot have so far departed from the right path of thought as to assert that we ought to give free course to what is believed by the country generally to be error, and that it is our duty to destroy any of those means by which the progress of error is restrained and the cause of truth is upheld. Yet, if we go on to disestablish the Irish Church, what are we doing but stripping away from our Government the sanctions of religion, teaching that the property of the Church may be secularized, and thus throwing before the people an example of our contempt for religion, and our carelessness of its requirements, when political exigences seem to demand the downfall of the Protestant Church, as a bribe to the Roman Catholic hierarchy, to destroy Fenianism, and to maintain the Union. Is it not an absurd proceeding to take the Roman Catholic priesthood into our confidence, and to yield to them the desire of their hearts without any guarantee that they will do what we are about to speculate on their doing. If the priests have been disloyal hitherto, what plan have we fallen on to make them loyal? We encourage their disloyalty by concession, and we yield to them all our safeguards against them, while yet we leave them to be aliens in fealty as in faith, pledged to a foreign potentate and to an erroneous creed. Can our eyes be open when we propose such things?

G. D.

CAN THE GOSPELS BE HARMONIZED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

VARIOUS theories regarding the inspiration of Holy Writ have at different times found favour in the eyes of theologians and of religious philosophers. At one time the theory of literal inspiration was firmly held, and the Scriptures were looked upon as the direct revelation, the *ipsissima verba* of the Holy Spirit; the writers of the sacred narrative being accounted mere machines, not merely moved or influenced by the Holy Ghost, but compelled to pen every sentence at His dictation. Of the supporters of this theory, of the last century, the numbers are now very few. Mr. Burgon may be taken as the leading representative. At the present day there are two leading ideas on this topic; one, that espoused by Archbishop Thomson and those who are deemed orthodox theologians, which looks upon the sacred penmen as verily and indeed moved by the Holy Ghost, but as they were not placed above human infirmities, weaknesses, and passions, and did not scruple to use human materials, so the inspirations were moulded by their own feelings, and each deliverance of the heavenly message, while

retaining the substance of the divine revelation, bears unmistakable evidence of each writer's idiosyncrasy. The other view, of which Dean Stanley is the most powerful exponent, not only regards the Scripture authors as men of like passions with ourselves, but denies that the divine afflatus within them was anything more than what we call the development of genius; Isaiah was a man in advance of his age, in the same way as Wickliffe and Luther, and each inspired alike, Watt, Stephenson, and all great inventors, in this sense, are inspired.

It will be necessary to bear the above sketch in mind, as only in consequence of this diversity of ideas as to the nature and extent of inspiration could the question which heads this article have found a place in the world of religious thought; and, according as writers hold to one or other of the ideas here laid down, do they contend for or against a possible harmony of the gospels.

The reasons which induce a belief in the affirmative of this question shall now be briefly stated, premising, however, that harmony does not mean identity; and that omissions do not constitute discrepancies. There is no need to show, were it possible to do so, that every fact related by one evangelist is likewise recorded by the others; all that is required is to show that in any narrative common to all there is no absolute discrepancy, and that those peculiar to each do not run counter to what is narrated or enunciated by the others. I may state that I have been led to my present position by a careful and candid perusal of the objections to a gospel harmony, urged in the best and most modern works treating on this subject. Though many in number, they appear to me so deficient in weight, that I am at a loss to conceive how any one can seriously entertain them. For, even admitting that one or two appear at the present day unanswerable, still, the points of agreement are so many, and so striking, as quite to overpower any discrepancy, which is only such from our lacking the key to its solution.

Many of these objections I shall notice and reply to in the course of this article, which will aim to prove—

1. *That the Gospels are harmonious in purpose.*—The general purpose of each gospel is the same. St. Luke and St. John state the purport of their respective gospels. With the former it was that Theophilus might know the certainty of those things wherein he had been instructed (i. 4). With the latter, the things that were written were written, "That we might believe that Jesus is the Christ, and that believing we might have life through His name" (xx. 31). Matthew and Mark do not state their object in so many set words, but it must be evident to every diligent reader that the general purport of all four is the same—viz., to set forth the object of the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus, and that a belief in Him as an All-merciful and All-sufficient Saviour was necessary to the salvation of man. In Matthew we are exhorted to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness (vi. 33), to do the will of our heavenly Father if we wish to

enter heaven (vii. 21), to come unto Jesus if we labour and are heavy laden, and we shall find rest to our souls (xi. 28). Jesus receiving as a verity the statement of Peter, that he is the Christ, the Son of the living God (xii. 16). Compare with Mark viii. 30; Luke ix. 21; while the gospel of St. John is written in proof of this last particular. On all these leading points the gospels are harmonious, while on others, such as a judgment to come, and a future state of rewards and punishments, they are not less so. Though there be a unity of purpose in the gospel narratives, there is not, however, a unity of treatment. Nor is this to be expected. Each wrote for a different class of hearers, and each, therefore, sets forward most prominently those incidents which would have the most weight with his readers, and so accomplish the purpose which he and all the evangelists had in view, viz., persuading men to be reconciled to God, and to believe in Jesus as the Son of God.

Matthew, writing to convince the Jews, refers in every incident narrated to some old prophecy, and thus to the Jews sets forward Jesus as the Messiah, long ago foretold, and the long-expected deliverance of the race.

Mark, writing to both Jews and Gentiles, uses Jewish prophecies, though sparingly, and alludes to Jewish customs, always adding an explanation for his Gentile readers. Luke, writing especially to and for Gentiles, unfolds Jesus, not as the Saviour of the Jew only, but also of the Gentile. To this end he traces the genealogy of Jesus, not to Abraham the Father of the faithful, but to Adam the Son of God. He relates, also, miracles, discourses, and parables calculated to show the Gentiles that they are not excluded from the mercies of God, but that if they believe on the Lord Jesus Christ they shall be saved. Thus he relates Christ's discourse at Nazareth (iv. 23—28), the mercy shown to that dog of a Syrophenician woman, the parables of the great supper (xiv.), and of the prodigal son (xv). John, writing when heresies infested the church, avails himself of materials very different from those employed by the other writers. Only such miracles are noticed as had an immediate influence on the life and fortunes of him who wrought them; the turning of water into wine, healing the man born blind, and the raising of Lazarus, on the working of which the rulers took immediate action against Jesus, and the main argument of the gospel is based upon the discourses. But—

2. *The Gospels are harmonious in their narration of fact.* This is the crucial point of the whole debate, and the base on which all objections are made to rest, so that it will require careful examination. I shall take in order the objections raised in a modern pamphlet on the subject, called "The Zulus and the men of Science," to show the weakness of the props which, even in this enlightened age, can be found to bolster up their cause.

(1.) The three gospels, Matthew xxvii. 31—33; Mark xv. 20—23; Luke xxiii. 26, represent Simon as bearing the cross of Jesus to the place of crucifixion; while St. John relates (xix. 17), that Jesus

bore it himself. That the three harmonize is not denied. Is the fourth account irreconcilable? I think not. Neither excludes the other. It was usual, as we know, for criminals to bear their cross, and so did Jesus, as John says, and as the others also assume, for had he not gone out "bearing his cross" some one would have been appointed at the Prætorium to bear it, and there would have been no need to lay hold of and compel any one to do so, the mere act of doing this sufficiently proving that Jesus had borne the cross till he was exhausted.

(2.) Matthew xxvii. 34. The drink is vinegar mingled with gall. In Mark xv. 23, wine mingled with myrrh. In the one case he tasted it and would not drink, in the second he received it not. On this I will only remark that Griesbach gives in the former case *οἶνον* for *ὄξος* as an equally good reading, and the latter part of the difficulty about tasting and receiving needs no comment.

(3.) The witnesses of the crucifixion (Matthew xxvii. 55—56, Mark xv. 40) mention those present as looking on afar off (Luke xxiii. 49). All his acquaintance stood afar off, including Mary Magdalene, whom John (xix. 25—27) represents as standing with the Virgin and Mary, the wife of Cleophas, beside the cross. No precise note of time is given as to when these events took place, and it is in imagining that all four evangelists narrate the aspect of affairs at one particular moment, that the difficulty has arisen, and here one account does not exclude the other. The women would doubtless stand at first afar off, but, attracted by love, would draw nearer by-and-by. Let any one observe a crowd for three hours, at intervals of ten or twenty minutes, and note how many people will be in the same place at the expiration of the period as they were at the beginning. Some will have elbowed their way to the front, others will be thrown into the rear.

The same explanation, viz., that the time is undefined, will meet the case of the thieves, both of whom Matthew and Mark mention as reviling. Luke only one. It is almost certain that the other one would not become penitent till he felt himself *in extremis mortis*, and so at one part of the day both would revile. The omission by St. John of the railing being no proof against the harmony.

Want of space prevents my analyzing the accounts of the resurrection and appearances of Jesus. This, as a most important part of the subject, would require a detailed examination extending beyond the limits of an article; and all I can now do on the point is to refer the reader to Gresswell's, or any other harmony of the gospels, for a solution of the difficulty.

To the ascension it is objected that St. Luke's last chapter reads as one continued whole, and, including the account of the ascension (50—51), narrates the events of the day following the resurrection, not of a period forty days after, which Luke (Acts i. 3), states as the period during which Jesus showed himself to his disciples. The same objector generously and ingeniously offers to help us out

of the difficulty by supposing there were two ascensions, one at the beginning of the forty days, the other at its close. I see no need for the supposition. The closing verses of the gospels of Mark and Luke are evidently very abruptly inserted, and there is as clearly an interval of time implied by St. Luke between the occurrences mentioned in verses 49 and 50, as there undoubtedly is one between verses 18 and 19 of the last chapter in St. Mark's gospel. During this interval the events of the forty days took place, many of which are recorded by St. John, and by him alone.

Other objections, greater or smaller, will doubtless be urged and conclusively met in the course of this debate by succeeding writers, and I shall not allude to them now. I would, in concluding this article, reiterate what I said at its commencement, viz., that every one should note the very many instances in which the accounts of four independent witnesses agree, before they make too much of those in which they differ. In fact, it is doubtful, as the Bishop of London said in his speech at Edinburgh, whether the Gospel harmonists have not contributed to the state of things they desire to remedy. "The four gospels agree essentially, however they may differ in those minute details which mark the different circumstances and characters of the human authors, through whom the Divine Spirit breathes. But it has too often been the custom of theologians not to rest content with this essential unity. Pursued by a supposed difficulty in recognizing the one Divine voice thus speaking in a variety of notes, they have sought unwisely to reduce its utterances to a monotone. Incapable of appreciating that accumulating force of testimony which, in all valid historical documents, grows to a certainty through the marks of independence shown by diversity in minute points, in the midst of essential unity they have at times set themselves to work that they might torture every sentence and word of the independent witnesses into an unnatural agreement. But be this as it may, and let the tide of controversy swell, the mountain of objection rise as high as it may, we have, despite all this, revealed in the gospels enough to make man wise unto salvation. Let us see to it that we neglect not so great salvation in vain endeavours to reconcile all discrepancies.

R. S.

NEGATIVE—II.

THE following interesting passage we quote from an article in the *Athenæum* (Aug. 15, p. 206):—"The idea that free inquiry, which founded the long series of free churches, began only after the apostles had been withdrawn from the world is one of the commonest of errors. Free inquiry began with the apostles and (among the) disciples themselves; *and it met with no censure from Him of whom inquiry was made.* It opened boldly with the reply of Thomas to these words of Jesus: "Whither I go ye know, and the way ye know." Namely, Lord, we know *not* whither Thou goest, and how can we know the way? Philip spoke with equally respectful free-

dom when he said, "Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us." And there was a whole church of free inquirers when the disciples gathered together in their earnestness and asked of each other, "What is this that He saith, *a little while*? We cannot tell what He saith!" It is worthy of observation, and should be beneficial as an example, that none of these bold inquirers were censured. They were answered and enlightened. Even to Thomas, who was called Didymus (the meditator, the sceptic, the doubter, or man of double thought), Jesus did not refuse what He regarded as affording irrefragable proof of a risen Redeemer, such evidence as made him at once recognize and acknowledge Jesus as "my Lord and my God." It is a fact, then, that Christianity permits and encourages free inquiry into facts, doctrines, and instructions, and does not contemn or scorn the meditative man.

Accepting the freedom to inquiry thus granted, we have been called upon to consider the question, "Can the four gospels be harmonized?" This is a debate the engaging on the negative side of which is sure to be misconstrued by opponents into an advocacy of infidelity. We shall not condescend to defend ourselves from that charge. We point to the example of the apostles as free inquirers, and we point to our Lord's treatment of them, and say to our detractors, "Go and do likewise."

There can be no doubt that the four gospels have made a unique impression on the intellect of the world. They have given the conception of Christ, and we see no more cause for dubiety regarding Him and His work, because of a want of harmony in minute facts and so-called historical events, than for doubting the existence of Socrates because Xenophon and Plato disagree in many of their statements concerning him. We think that there is a clear and probably an all-sufficient reason for the want of harmony in the four gospels in the very need in man's soul for zealous free inquiry. Had they all said the same thing men's minds would have been quiescent, and they would not have felt any inclination to follow the bidding of Jesus—"Search the Scriptures."

The Rev. Edward Greswell affirms that "the Gospel of St. John is altogether independent of the rest, and relates almost entirely to scenes and occasions in our Saviour's ministry, to which there is *nothing correspondent* in them." The difference of the Gospels is admitted by Mimpriess, and a reason is supplied which is intended to be an argument for their essential harmony. "God has seen meet to give us, in the four evangelists, an exemplification of what we may frequently see in Christian society; the different members of which are expected to act in harmony, not by their all possessing the very same characteristics, or by their all performing the very same office, but by their combining their various powers for mutual assistance in testifying of their one Lord and Head, under whom they are, as it were, different members of the same body. Thus it is with Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John." That so many professed harmonies of the gospel exist, and that of all of them no

one has been held to be satisfactory is pretty good evidence that considerable disparities and incongruities exist. Our business is to establish the fact, that they do not harmonize; we have nothing to do with the reason for the fact, or to furnish any explanation of the fact. We may be sure that if it is a fact there is a good reason for its being so.

The want of harmony between the synoptic gospels and that of St. John is very marked. We may especially note the following:—St. Matthew represents the institution of baptism as having occurred after the resurrection of Jesus, and almost immediately preceding his ascension; in this St. Mark concurs, though St. Luke omits this event in his narrative; but St. John represents baptism to have been carried on in opposition to John, and in a sort of rivalry with him, saying, "When therefore the Lord knew that the Pharisees had heard how Jesus made and baptized more disciples than John—though Jesus himself baptized not but his disciples—he left Judea and went again into Galilee" (St. John iv. 1-2). It seems to be impossible to harmonize the implied habitual practice of baptism by the disciples of Jesus during his own ministry with the express institution of the ordinance as related by St. Matthew. The beautiful dramatic episode at the Well of Sychar, contained in the chapter of which these verses form the commencement, is not in keeping with the strictly Judaic Messiahship attributed by the other evangelists to the early years especially of the Lord's ministry. The narratives of the cleansing of the temple seem to be irreconcilable, not only in circumstances but in chronology. They cannot be those of separate events, and yet it is impossible to read them into any sort of consecutive story, and maintain the consistency of the gospels. The records given by St. John of the occurrences during the early visits of Jesus to Jerusalem are not consonant with the narratives of the other evangelists, and there are many other discrepancies in the accounts of the Lord's sayings and doings.

One of the most important of these is contained in the narrative of the baptism of Jesus. St. John represents the Baptist as saying, before the immersion of the Lord, "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the world," and St. Matthew represents the Baptist—who was the cousin of Jesus—as not knowing him as the Messiah until after the immersion, when the Holy Ghost descended upon Jesus like a dove. Again, the long discourse in Matthew v. —vii., commonly known as the "Sermon on the Mount," is delivered shortly after the temptation; but St. Luke represents a great part of it as being delivered after the choosing of the twelve. Matthew (viii. 28—31) brings *two* demoniacs on the scene; Mark (v. 2—12) and Luke (viii. 27—32) mention only *one*. Matthew makes Jesus commission the twelve apostles to "heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, cast out devils," &c. (x. 8), while we know that no such power or authority was either conferred on or exercised by the apostles till after the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost (see Mark xvi. 17; Luke xxiv. 49). Luke (xiii. 34) speaks of "How often" he had

been in Jerusalem, and would have gathered its people to safety, but the evangelists do not give us notices of his having been frequently in Jerusalem. Even the inscription reported to have been put by Pilate over the head of Jesus on the cross is differently stated by each of the gospel writers, as may easily be seen by comparing Mat. xxvii. 37; Mark xv. 36; Luke xxiii. 38; John xix. 19.

There is distinct record in the four gospels of thirty-seven miracles wrought by Jesus Christ during his ministry, besides the general references which are made to his wonder-working power. Of these miracles only *one*—that of the feeding of the five thousand near Bethsaida—is recorded by all the four evangelists. The walking on the water is not recorded by St. Luke, though it is given by Matthew, Mark, and John. The cleansing of the leper takes place in St. Matthew's gospel after the sermon on the mount, and "at the foot of the mountain of the Beatitudes," while St. Luke and St. Mark represent it as taking place "in a certain city." Out of twenty miracles recorded by Matthew, five are not mentioned by any other evangelist; of seventeen narrated by Mark, ten are not noted by the fellow-biographers of Jesus; of nineteen related by Luke, eight are not to be found recorded in the other gospels; and of eight miracles of which John gives an account, Matthew, Mark, and Luke omit all mention. Twenty-eight miracles altogether are reported on by the three first evangelists. Thus, out of a total of thirty-seven miracles, twenty-one are recorded only on the authority of *one* evangelist. Matthew and Luke speak of mighty works done in Chorazin; yet neither they nor the other two relate any one; a curse against Bethsaida was pronounced for its disbelief of the mighty works done in it at the time of the sending forth of the apostles, yet we only read of one—the cure of a blind man there—and this is recorded as having occurred after the giving of the mission to the apostles.

In Rev. H. Grenville's "Chronological Synopsis of the Four Gospels," we find 650 incidents, events, &c. noticed; of these, 304 are quoted as given by Matthew; 272, by Mark; 316, by Luke; 192, by John; but of these there are only 18 simultaneously related by the whole, and even these are told with minor variations. This is surely a very singular want of coincidence among writers bearing witness upon the same subject!

Several items in the gospels require great elucidation, *e.g.*, the relation between the Baptist and the Messiah; the calling of the apostles; the desertion of their Lord by these same apostles; the scenery and the duration of the Lord's public ministry; the accounts given of the Messianic Mission of Christ; the interpretations given of the Old Testament; and the opinions of Jesus (1) as a religious teacher, and (2) as a political personage. We commend some of the assertors of harmony to try their hands at these things, and not to deal in general assertions or beggings of the question. The question relates to a fact not to an opinion, and if our opponents devote themselves to that they will confer a favour on those who cannot see this harmony in discord.

O. P. Q.

The Essayist.

ARTHUR H. HALLAM AND "IN MEMORIAM."

THE deepest chords in the human soul respond only to the strong stern touch of sorrow. That is the great teacher—destroying for a time the mechanical routine and the merely conventional and surface beliefs of life, showing the insufficiency of all earthly things to give enduring satisfaction, and bringing us where sophisms and commonplaces can deceive no longer—face to face with the vast mysteries of Being, Eternity, and God.

With the sense of bitter, and arbitrary, and undeserved bereavement, grave questionings of the state and ordering of the universe—felt to be far otherwise at present than just, benevolent, and wise—spring up in the suffering heart, which craves an answer of peace, but often seems to seek for it in vain.

Then, if in the weary suffering of loneliness and doubt, it listens to the inward whisper or the outward voice which bids it look above, and conveys the assurance of the Divine Spirit that in His light it shall see light, all becomes well; grief is not destroyed but chastened, and the sad sense of separation mellows into a tender hope of reunion and immortality in a higher and purer sphere. Love is felt to grow unceasingly more precious, but the sting of death is taken away—the curse is transmuted into a blessing—even the deep, overshadowing darkness of evil is seen not to be unpierced by the care and wisdom of the all-present and eternal One.

The susceptible emotional nature of the poet will in all ages have realized most keenly the bitterness of loss, and pondered most deeply the great problems which sorrow forces upon the mind. The lays are many in which mourning affection has set forth its pain, uttered its perplexities and fears, and expressed the faith in which it finally reposed. But in all, the soul passes at once to the hope which brightens its otherwise gloomy and forbidding sky. There are no phases in the grief—no degrees in the consolation.

"In Memoriam" stands alone in the portrayal of the stages of feeling, of the growing wisdom and gain of loss. Other poems may be as beautiful, and reach an equal height of thought, but the long-sustained swell of grief and its ever-varying modulations are wanting; and to this bereaved ones turn with increasing preference, for here they find full sympathy; all the flow and ebb of their own emotions set to sweetest music from the experience of a brother soul. The mourner comes to know that sorrow is itself precious—that little by little it teaches him lessons of deepest truth and priceless import, such as he could scarcely otherwise attain;

and hence he cherishes a real love and worship of sorrow, he lingers upon its variations, and clings to even its trivial fancies; he prizes whatever helps him to keep it fresh and living, or finds it, as "In Memoriam" does, tender, and graceful, and complete expression.

The full details of the lofty and sacred friendship, whose interruption by the hand of death resulted in so deep a grief, but whose fruit was one of the greatest (as it is the tenderest and truest) of the sacred poems in our literature, can of course be known only when the life of Alfred Tennyson himself is written. What we may learn of the particulars of the two lives in their connection with each other is as yet but meagre; though of late, by the publication of Arthur Hallam's remains, we have been placed in a better position for estimating, in part at least, the genius and character of him to whom "In Memoriam" will ever be the noblest monument.

Alfred Tennyson was the elder by a few weeks or months. He was born in 1810, his father being a clergyman in Lincolnshire. Arthur Henry Hallam was the son of Henry Hallam, the constitutional historian, who afterwards had the painful task of editing his son's collected remains in prose and verse, and writing the touching memoir by which they are introduced. He was born in Bedford-place, London, on the 1st day of February, 1811.

At a very early age his parents noticed strong indications of future power and nobleness of character, manifested in a ready insight and quick intelligence, a rapidity of progress, a singular grace and sweetness of disposition, and a firm, unvarying adherence to truth and modesty remarkable as appearing in a child. Even his first years were marked by unusual thoughtfulness, and delight in books of a kind generally found interesting and intelligible only by adults.

At seven years of age he had acquired the rudiments of Latin, and could read French with ease. During a tour with his parents in Germany and Switzerland the former was forgotten, but he attained great readiness in speaking the latter language. Within a year of his return home he was able to understand many of the Latin Authors. His mind now developed with rapidity, and dramatic poetry became a favourite subject of attention. He wrote several tragedies in prose and verse, bearing, on the testimony of his father, strong marks of precocious talent.

At nine he was placed under the care of the Rev. W. Carmalt, at Putney, where he remained for two summers. After another continental journey, which occupied several months, he entered Eton School, as a pupil of the Rev. E. C. Hawtrey, and continued there for four years and a-half, or until he had passed his sixteenth birthday.

English poetry generally, but the early dramatists in particular—Shakspeare occupying the highest place in his regard—continued to receive his special interest and study. Of modern poets, Byron was at first sole favourite, but he afterwards learned to estimate far more highly the works of Shelley and of Wordsworth.

A debating society existed amongst the elder scholars, to the membership of which, when about fifteen, he was admitted. Topics of speculative and practical metaphysics were often discussed, and doubtless confirmed an already powerful bias towards the investigation of moral and political philosophy. He seems to have gained an unusual readiness in the utterance of his thoughts ; and probably the exercise of free extemporaneous speaking contributed in no small measure to form the clear and flowing style which is characteristic of all his compositions. The strenuous discipline of argumentative conflict would also act, with a keen longing for essential truth and native intellectual power, to produce the energy of insight, the steadfast resolve to gain the heart of every subject, manifest abundantly in his essays. He likewise wrote several contributions, in prose and verse, to the *Eton Miscellany*.

His father states that his scholarship, though good, was not of the highest class, particularly when compared with his attainments in other respects, especially in the modern tongues. His mind turned very strongly to subjects exercising other faculties than those which the study of languages require.

On leaving Eton, he again visited the continent, in company with his parents, and spent eight months in Italy, during which time he gained a complete mastery over the harmonious language of that country. Under the guidance of a tutor he studied its versification, and succeeded so thoroughly in entering into this that some of his sonnets drew the emphatic declaration from Mr. Panizzi : " They are much superior to what foreigners *have* written, but to what I thought it *possible for them to write*." His age was then between sixteen and seventeen.

His attention was not, however, given to languages and poetry alone. He became an enthusiastic student of the works of the ancient painters preserved in the great continental picture galleries. His ardour was not a mere delight in the technicalities of criticism, but a sympathetic and impassioned entrance into the thought and ideal which the artist strove to express through the medium of form and colouring.

An English sonnet, written about this time, upon the picture of the three Fates, at Florence—usually ascribed to Michael Angelo—will illustrate this, and also exemplify the high level of philosophic and solemn meditation which had become habitual to him :

"None but a Tuscan hand could fix ye here
 In rigidness of sober colouring.
 Pale are ye, mighty Triad, not with fear
 But the most awful knowledge, that the spring
 Is in you of all birth, and act, and sense.
 I sorrow to behold ye : pain is blent
 With your aloof and loveless permanence,
 And your high princedom seems a punishment.

The cunning limner could not personate
 Your blind control, save in th' aspect of grief;
 So does the thought repugn of sovran fate.
 Let him gaze here who trusts not in the love
 Toward which all being solemnly doth move:
 More this grand sadness tells, than forms of fairest life."

To the same period belongs a sonnet addressed to "Malek,"—doubtless one of his first companions, probably of somewhat superior age, but of kindred tastes and aspirations. Its closing lines are:

"Yet deem not thou thy friend of early days
 So lost to high emprise: trust me his soul
 Sleeps not the dreamless sleep which thou art fearing.
 No! still on lights the love of noble praise,
 His pilgrim bark, like a clear star appearing
 And oh, how bright that beam, where storm-waves roll!"

Let it be borne in mind that these are the utterances of a youth who had not long completed his seventeenth year.

Arthur returned to England in June, 1828, and entered Trinity College, Cambridge, in the following October, under the tutorship of the late Dr. (then the Rev. William) Whewell. It was here he met with the future laureate, who entered the same college shortly afterwards, and a friendship began which soon ripened into that gentle but manly affection which will henceforth rank with the love of Jonathan and David. Tennyson says:

"The path by which we twain did go,
 Which led by tracts that pleased us well,
 Thro' four sweet years arose and fell,
 From flower to flower, from snow to snow."

"And we with singing cheer'd the way,
 And, crown'd with all the season lent,
 From April on to April went,
 And glad at heart from May to May."

His health during the first spring at Cambridge was not good. The disordered circulation and flow of blood to the brain, which afterwards proved fatal, had already partially appeared, and now often laid him aside from study. As the season advanced, the symptoms passed away, to return slightly in the following year, after which they seem to have been overcome.

The subject announced for the University Prize Poem of 1829 was "Timbuctoo." That city, lying far in the interior of Africa, had just been brought into prominent notice by the visit and subsequent murder of Major Laing, and the vague accounts of other travellers. It became invested with a mysterious and romantic character, as a place scarcely ever seen by European eyes, though

it had been for centuries a place of considerable trade, a seat of empire, and the centre of some degree of barbarian civilization.

Arthur Hallam entered into the competition for the prize with a poem which singularly illustrates the philosophic light in which he could not help viewing even the most common-place of themes. "Timbuctoo,"—which his father, in speaking of this poem, terms a mere nest of savages—suggested by its remoteness and half-legendary character, the thought of the lost Atlantis, a continent feigned by poets as the true home of the departed golden age. The theme is thus lifted into the region of the ideal, and there is no longer an incongruity in clothing it with powerful and sublime conceptions. It opens :

"There was a land, which, far from human sight,
Old Ocean compassed with his numerous waves,
In the lone West. Tenacious of her right
Imagination decked those unknown caves,
And vacant forests, and clear peaks of ice,
With a transcendent beauty; that which saves
From the world's blight our primal sympathies;
Still in man's heart, as some familiar shrine,
Feeding the tremulous lamp of love that never dies.

Sages, and all who owned the might sublime
To impress their thought upon the face of things,
And teach a nation's spirit how to climb,
Spoke of long lost Atlantis, when the springs
Of clear Ilissus or the Tusculan bower,
Were welcoming the pure rest which Wisdom brings
To her elect, the marvellous calm of power."

This favourite figure of romancists is reasonably held to have originated in some early and otherwise forgotten knowledge of America, and Arthur here speaks of it as leading back to that knowledge by inspiring Columbus with the faith of an undiscovered land. His discouragements, but enduring confidence are presented, and then the rewarding triumph of success and accomplished certainty.

"Last came the joy, when that phantasmal scene
Lay in full glory round his outward sense;
And who had scorned before, in hatred keen,
Refused their baseness now: for no pretence
Could wean their souls from awe; they dared not doubt
That with them walked on earth, a spirit intense."

But greed of gold and lust of power defiled and desolated the new land, and destroyed for ever the images of liberty and beauty which had taken refuge there.

"Lo! there hath passed away a glory of youth
From this our world; and all is common now,
And sense doth tyrannize o'er love and ruth."

Is hope dead, then? Not quite; there is yet one place where nobleness and love of wisdom may dwell in purity and peace.

"Beyond the clime of Tripoly, and beyond
Bahr Abiad, where the lone peaks, unconform
To other hills, and with fair foliage crowned,
Hold converse with the the Moon, a City stands
Which yet no mortal guest hath ever found.
*Around it stretch away the level sands
Into the silence: pausing in his course,
The ostrich kens it from his subject lands."*

The last three lines form a vivid word-picture, singularly in harmony with Tennyson's own perfect delineations in later days.

"Thy palaces and pleasure-domes to me
Are matter of strange thought: for sure thou art,
A splendour in the wild: * * *
* * * * *

And who are they of blisses manifold,
That dwell within thee? Spirits of delight,
It may be spirits whose pure thoughts enfold,
In eminence of Being, all the light
That interpenetrates this mighty all,
And doth endure in its own beauty's right."

The following is avowedly inspired by personal recollections of Samuel Taylor Coleridge.

* * * * *
"Methought I saw a face whose every line
Wore the pale cast of Thought; a good, old man,
Most eloquent, who spake of things divine.
Around him youths were gathered, who did scan
His countenance so grand and mild; and drank
The sweet sad tones of Wisdom, which outran
The life-blood, coursing to the heart, and sank
Inward from thought to thought, till they abode
'Mid Being's dim foundations, rank by rank,
With those transcendent truths, arrayed by God
In linked armour for untiring fight,
Whose victory is, where time hath never trod."

He concludes by speaking of these as existing alone in the imagination and affections, but claims that to be the sphere of man's highest and divinest life, in which shapes of perfect truth and harmony can for ever be his companions, assimilating his nature to their own, and delivering him from the thralldom of merely outward and unspiritual facts.

Alfred Tennyson carried off the prize, though it has been said that this was owing to a misconception of the purpose of one of the examiners, in putting his poem aside for the special notice of his fellow-judges as somewhat of a curiosity. It is interesting to com-

pare it with Arthur's production, and thus to attempt an estimate of the relative characters and powers of the two friends. In Tennyson's production the poet says :

"I stood upon the mountain which o'erlooks
The narrow seas, whose rapid interval
Parts Afric from green Europe."

As with his competitor, he recurs to olden legends of islands and continents of the blest, and finds in them a witness to the grandeur of the soul which has power thus to form to itself glorious ideals transcending all experience and reality. He asks :

"Wide Afric, doth thy sun
Lighten, thy hills unfold a city as fair
As those which starr'd the light o' the elder world?
Or is the rumour of thy Timbuctoo
A dream as frail as those of ancient time?"

An angelic visitant appears, and quickens his senses into a supernatural power and distinctness, so that he can even discern :

"The moon's white cities, and the opal width
Of her small glowing lakes, her silver heights,
Unvisited with dew of fragrant clouds,
And the unsounded, undescended depth
Of her black hollows."

From his lofty stand-point he obtains the sight of Timbuctoo—unvisited and hitherto unseen, but clothed in imagination with all the attributes and splendours of romance.

"Methought I saw
A wilderness of spires, and crystal pile
Of rampart upon rampart, dome on dome,
Illimitable range of battlement
On battlement, and the imperial height
Of canopy o'er canopied."

He is overpowered with the view, and faints under the influence of strong emotion, but the celestial being by his side raises him up and speaks of itself as the spirit of the great vine of fable, which, like the tree Igdrasil, extends wherever life is, fast rooted in truth itself, and addresses him thus :

"Child of man
Sees't thou yon river whose translucent wave
Forth issuing from the darkness, windeth through
The argent streets o' the city, imaging
The soft inversion of her tremulous domes,
Her gardens frequent with the stately palm,
Her pagods hung with music of sweet bells,
Her obelisks of ranged chrysolite,
Minarets and towers? Lo! how he passeth by
And gulphs himself in sands, as not enduring

To carry through the world those waves, which bore
 The reflex of my city in their depths.
 Oh, city! oh, latest throne! when I was raised
 To be a mystery of loveliness
 Unto all eyes, the time is well-nigh come
 When I must render up this glorious home
 To keen discovery: soon yon brilliant towers
 Shall darken with the waving of her wand;
 Darken, and shrink, and shiver into tents,
 Black specks amid a waste of dreamy sand
 Low-built, mud-wall'd, barbarian settlements,
 How changed from this fair city.

Thus far the Spirit:

Then parted heavenward on the wing; and I
 Was left alone on Calpe, and the moon
 Had fallen from the night, and all was dark."

It is noticeable that the prominent characteristics of Tennyson's future greatness, before traceable in "Poems by Two Brothers," are already fully manifested here. While Hallam's chief power is in *thought*, Tennyson's strength is as plainly to be found in vividness of artistic conception and presentation. High, essential, ideal Truth is the aim and hope of one; actual concrete Beauty, as seen in the transfused sympathetic light of feeling, is the *present* enjoyment of the other. Both start from a high, intellectual level; one keeps it, on strong wing ranging, like a mighty eagle, above the earth, surveying and delighting in its vast prospects and boundless diversities of sublimity and grace; but the other, of yet nobler temper, urged by the great longing at his heart, rises, in bolder and more vigorous flight, towards the sum and sun of all things—"kindling his undazzled eye at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance."

Arthur's poem appears to shew signs of greater care in its composition: it is more finished, more harmonious in diction, more perfect and complete in conception and development. It takes altogether a higher tone, and is animated by a more earnest purpose. But, except in the three remarkable lines before noticed, he does not pause in his urgent course to pourtray material surroundings, as his friend has done with such marvellous beauty and delicacy—in this, but more particularly in later works—that his words seem like a garment of transparency and richness, in tone and meaning exactly fitting to the sense, and setting forth in distinctness and reality the objects of the poet's vision.

The two pieces will always retain an interest above their theme, from the circumstances under which they were written, and the characters and touching friendship of their genius-gifted authors.

Oswestry.

W.

Toiling Upward.

JOHN PRINGLE NICHOL, LL.D.,

Late Professor of Practical Astronomy in the University of Glasgow.

LIFE is personal being. Amid the surroundings, natural, industrial, social, and intellectual, into which a man is born, he is called to be a distinct individual complex one, with a place to keep or take, with a work to do, an influence to exert, a development to make, and a lesson to leave. Our thoughts, acts, endurances, and effects constitute our biography, and this we are continually writing as day succeeds day, and that succession brings with it constantly the opportunity of doing an effective act or the temptation to allow some act to pass undone, while each opportunity or temptation as it is acted on or contemned works out its own consequence in ourselves and upon others. These consequences give a sacredness to all thought and action; for they are incalculable at the hour and moment of their possible initiation, though they are all there in the single knot of the instant which calls upon us to think or do the one fitting thing that duty requires, as surely as the stem, branches, leaves, and fruit-bearing seed lie in the root which we plant or neglect. The act or the neglect is one, but the consequences are many. The noblest life is that whence the greatest possible number of the best possible consequences issue, and that as a general rule will be found to be the life which does the instant's duty wisely at the instant, and is thus prepared for the whole soul's devotion to the doing of whatever comes next. Life "containeth an endless power of semination," and is intended to be productive, hence also it is designed to be thoughtfully active, and that it may be so man is placed in circumstances and amid consequences to perform duties.

In examining into the worth of a life, as a lesson, it is the first duty of the investigator to see that the life is one from which consequences have resulted in such a way that they seem to be due to the initiation of the person whose biography is under consideration, and especially that these consequences should be visibly connected, as cause and effect, with duty done or duty left undone. A life, therefore, in which there are many instances of that unobservable connection between an act and its consequences, "which erring men call chance," does not afford a lesson's light unless we can eliminate from its elements the accidental from the real in causation, and show that change and chance in life are as clearly the results of originated effects as are the phenomena which occur among "Heaven's jewelry of stars." In all their arranged

splendour there is to the multitude little else visible but chance and change ; but to the eye of the astronomical observer, order and regularity, recurrence and plan are all seen to be coactive with law throughout the stellar universe. The biography, of which we have it in our mind to offer a brief sketch, was spent for the most part in the observance and exposition of "the ordinances of Heaven," but it was as well one filled with purpose and effective in consequences—a productive life in its influences, in its activities, and in its consequences ; and our desire is that the effectiveness and productiveness, and the influence of this life may widen into farther circles, and operate to ends, of which neither far-sight nor foresight can see the completion, in quickening and heightening the aims of men while "toiling upward."

John Pringle Nichol was born in the town of Brechin, in the county of Forfar, in 1804. He was the eldest of a large family, children of a bookseller in a respectable condition of life. He received his education under George Alexander, rector of Brechin Academy, who, though the lad was intended by his parents to be trained for commercial pursuits, saw so much talent in him that he advised the adoption rather of a literary or professional career. With this counsel his own wishes coincided, and he studied with such assiduity as to be early qualified to enter upon a university course. He became a student at King's College, Aberdeen, and while there, distinguished himself highly, not only in classics, but also in mathematics and physics, in the two latter of which he carried away, we believe, the highest honours. So reputable was his collegiate life that when scarcely seventeen years of age he was offered and accepted the office of teacher in the Parochial School of Dun, in the Presbytery of Brechin, in which he taught for two years. He returned to the University for some time, and while yet but shortly advanced beyond his teens was elected head-master of the Burgh School of Hawick, a town on a slope near the Teviot, of much activity and stir. Under the stimulus of the radicalism of his time, he quitted teaching to become editor of a liberal newspaper—established 1822—*The Fife Herald*, and published in Cupar, the capital of the county of Fife. On a vacancy occurring in the rectorship of Montrose Academy, Nichol became an applicant, and was appointed at once to be the chief teacher in that beautiful burgh and seaport of Forfarshire, which lay but about seven miles along the banks of the Esk from his native town. Here he took a high position as an intellectual force, not only in the peninsular county town where his residence was fixed, but among the intellectual men of his day. While in Montrose, he concluded his studies for the ministry of the Scottish Church, was licensed to preach, and for some time consented to occupy the pulpits of various clergymen in the neighbourhood of Montrose as a licentiate of the church. But he did not greatly long for the leisure and pleasure of a rural manse. He had found another vocation ; he had been led to the study of astronomy, and he had been fascinated by the mighty.

force and on sweep of the phenomena of the sidereal heavens. He saw the full interest of the vastness in which the transit of the stars occurs, and felt the true mystery of the infinitudes through which, in a multiplicity of intricate yet clearly defined and uncolliding paths, the orbs of heaven held on in their way; he was charmed with the sublimity of the night-sky, magnificent in its suggestions of immense eras and intense power, and he was enraptured with the grandeur of the themes which the far-reaching, the swift-changing yet stable, the profound and co-operating phenomena of heaven's concave vault revealed, and placed within the scope of elucidatory thought. The slow-evolving and majestic, the orderly and beautiful coexistences and sequences of the Cosmos fixed themselves before his intellectual vision, as having in them the very essence of philosophic interest, not only in the wondrous reality of the phenomena they disclosed, but in the glorious ideality of the forces they presupposed.

Nichol, under the strong influence of the zeal of his soul to attain some clue to the secrets of material space and force, studied with the sedulous earnestness of an enthusiast, and gave his days to thought upon, and his nights to observations of the firmamental visibilities of matter, so suggestive by their order, harmony, organization and progression, of the mental invisibilities of mind—law, plan, purpose, and sustaining vitality. There came to him—in the course of these investigations into the abysses of space and the recesses of time the questions of proto-genesis, of genetic evolution, of progress and of order, and of the high unity which is prior to development in matter—thoughts, through the influence of which the contemplatist is transformed into a worshipper. Man, the universe, and their Author were the connected problems whose relations he sought most eagerly to solve, and, professional astronomer as he afterwards became, he never lost sight of those sublime considerations which arise in the thoughtful spirit while reflecting on the dynamical possibilities of the system of the sky.

In 1831 Rector Nicol married, and in 1832 his eldest son, John Nichol (now Professor of the English Language and Literature in the University of Glasgow, a scholar and a man of letters), was born. Shortly afterwards the effect of his intense personal labours, combined with the exhaustion produced by hard work in the academy, and the heavy responsibilities involved in the care of a number of boarders, began to tell on his constitution, and he was warned that a cessation of those pressing and oppressive toils had become requisite. He therefore resigned his rectorship, and became for a time a contributor to various reviews and magazines, a lecturer on astronomy, and a general worker in literature. Having toiled with great zeal and earnestness in favour of reform, he felt much interest in the progress and prosperity of parliamentary independence, and gave a judicious and trustworthy support to the ministry of Lord Melbourne, especially during the difficult crisis of 1834, and again, when King William IV., anxious to restrain the degene-

easy of reform into revolution, took advantage of Lord Althorpe's advancement to the House of Lords to transfer the supreme direction of affairs to Sir Robert Peel, Nichol gave his literary aid to show the nation how indispensable it was to hold on in its liberal course and to keep the statesmen of progress in power. When, in 1836, a vacancy occurred, by the demise of James Couper, D.D., in the Chair of Practical Astronomy in the University of Glasgow, Lord Melbourne had no hesitation in advising the Crown to confer the dignity and emoluments of professor on the young lecturer, whose talents as an expositor of astronomy were well attested, and whose influence had been cast so thoroughly in favour of the policy of his Cabinet.

The new observatory, raised by the combined efforts of the University of Glasgow, the city, and the Government, stands at the north-west of the city, on a hill immediately adjoining the Botanic Gardens, about 180 feet above the sea level. Although the Treasury had the plans and specifications made and arranged, the estimates taken, and the instruments, machinery, &c. contracted for at their own will, it was a long labour for the Professor to superintend the progress of the establishment, and to get the Bavarian workmen whom the Government employed to do what was fitting in the way he desired; the work was at last accomplished, and the learned and enthusiastic Professor, housed at last, began to use those keen "eyes that keep watch and ward over spaces that make us dizzy to remember, that register the promises of comets, and that disentangle the labyrinths of worlds."

Here Professor Nichol made his astronomical observations, pursued his studies, gave expositions of the nature of the instruments and methods employed in investigations regarding the phenomena of astronomy and the kindred sciences, while in the college he delivered annually a short course of lectures, generally on the most recent speculations and discoveries in the department of knowledge under his charge. Besides this he was very frequently engaged in delivering lectures to the various literary and scientific institutions in the chief towns in Scotland—a duty which he accomplished in a manner rarely to be matched.' It was an experience surely never to be forgotten to listen to one of Professor Nichol's expositions of astronomical speculations! To profound and accurate knowledge he united clear conceptiveness, an apt power of illustration, a ready hand for black-board diagrams, and he was an unhesitant worker with figures and symbols. He employed a phraseology of great copiousness with much grace and clearness, inspirited all that he said with the verve of a poet while lifting the mind to scientific ideas. His tall, erect, handsome frame, his intellectual countenance—wherein there shone a pair of eyes lustrous as if with the living light of stars, and over which there hung brown locks profuse and pliant, getting when we knew them first their earliest turn rather than tinge of grey—bespoke favour, and his resonant, subtly-modulated voice crept into the very chambers of the brain and left its echoes

there. The gorgeous prose-poetry of his descriptions, the quiet business-like explanations of figures and illustrations, the pith of his phrases, the profundity of the gaze into space he gave, the sense of intellectual strength to breast the sea of ceaseless phenomena rolling evermore around our planet, like a lithe swimmer in his energy, and the grand outbursts of eloquence in which his perorations abounded, formed a combination of excellencies in lecturing which can seldom have been equalled. The very air of the halls became surcharged one would have thought with the fine ether of an intellectual world, the magic light of space-careering stars seemed to gleam in on one, the very thrill of the heavenly harmony quivered into the pulses, and the sense of limitation appeared to fade away out of consciousness, so that one became a part of all that is yet strangely differentiated by personal being from the massed but uncrowded orbs whose processes and progresses we behold in the vast stellar organizations of the sky. He may, indeed, in the presence of the immensity of distance and the expanses of time on which his thoughts were fixed, have made a too free use of the expressions infinite, eternal, inconceivable, incommunicable; but these indicated how truly he felt that all popular conceptions must falter before the presentation of truths in which figures were employed, which to the unskilled mind were practically suggestive only of vastnesses, infinitudes, and immensities, of which no mental integration was possible, and they had the effect of exciting the spirit to stir, and tumult, and admiration.

"As a popularizing astronomer," De Quincey affirms, "he has done more for the benefit of his great science than all the rest of Europe combined." Dr. Nichol's works, and his oral lectures upon astronomy, are to be considered as the *fundus* of the popular knowledge on the science of astronomy now working in his generation. More important it is, and more in reconciliation with the tenor of ordinary studies, to notice the philosophic spirit in which Dr. Nichol's works are framed, and the lofty character of that enthusiasm which sustains his intellectual advances. In reading astronomical works there arises (from old experience of that which is most faulty) a wish either for the naked severities of science, with a total abstinence from *all* display of enthusiasm, or else, if the cravings of human sensibility are to be met and gratified, that it shall be by an enthusiasm unaffected and grand as its subject. Of that kind is the enthusiasm of Dr. Nichol.* His enthusiasm was vital and contagious. His frank, genial, and generous personal character aided the heart to go out in its voyages with him into the illimitable territories of astronomical conquest with confidence and delight, and his sympathy with all that was fresh, noble, intellectual, and effortful caused him to be the joy of those who were about to engage in the explorations of thought, in which difficulties are to be met, and in which encouragement is rare.

* De Quincey's Works; Author's Edition. Vol. III., p. 192.

Our own confidence in and admiration of him had in it something almost filial, and the kindly aid in study and advice in letters which he gave, endear him to our memory. His house was one of those to which all aspiration was welcome, and one from which no one departed unhelped in and unhelpful of the results of his researches. Himself possessed of a widely cultured eclectic nature, he could see truth on many sides, and admit that it might be where he could not see it at the time; he could admire many forms of intellectual eminence and effort, and interest himself in them. To men of genius, of whatever stamp, his heart was kindly, and his home was opened readily for their reception; his love for those who had in them the promise or prophecy of anything good or great was unstinted, and at his table, company, such as no merchant prince in Glasgow could collect, would spontaneously gather. In the splendid library hall, which held so conspicuous a place in the *ménage* of the observatory, what exchanges of the wealth of thought and warmth of heart have been made! and how radiantly among his guests did Professor Nichol move, with a word, an idea, a reference of apt and fitting pertinence to each regarding each subject of conversation or consideration. He was not only a living library himself, but he had vital relations with all that was in his library; his books were the beloved of his soul, and their treasures were wholly in his power.

In 1837 Professor Nichol issued his first book, "The Architecture of the Heavens," a book which has won a high reputation and great popularity as "a beautiful exposition of the sublime observations of Sir William Herschel and others respecting the objects beyond the range of the solar system, and of the hypothesis of the nebular cosmogony." The phrase, from which the book took its felicitous and poetical title, occurs in a note to an article on "The State of Discovery and Speculation concerning the Nebular Hypothesis," which the Professor furnished to *The London and Westminster Review*, July 1836, page 391, written probably before the title of this book had been determined on. In nine years no fewer than seven editions of this fascinating book were exhausted. In the mean time he had produced, in 1844, his ingenious and eloquent "Contemplations on the Solar System," and was preparing to follow it by his "Thoughts on Some Important Points in the System of the World," an equally able and powerful disquisition, which appeared in 1847. In 1848 his "Contemplations on the Solar System" was issued, in a revised and enlarged form, bearing the title of "The Stellar Universe." In the same year he published "The Planet Neptune: a History and an Exposition," of that triumph of mathematical logic with which the names of John Couch Adams and Urbain J. J. Le Verrier are united. "The Planetary System" appeared in 1850. All these works have been popular, and have gone through many editions; while besides these substantive productions Professor Nichol has written for the popular serials a large amount of miscellaneous matter, lectures, essays, literary papers,

&c., which would, if collected, fill a series of volumes as numerous as those we have just catalogued.

Nor is this all or nearly all. Having had "the experience of many years spent in various connections with the work of education," he felt a keen interest in all that concerned the progress of that great question, and was especially an advocate for freedom of education. About 1846 the paramountcy of the question of education began to be maintained. In order to show his sympathy with that movement, and to do his part in pushing on the work of progress in the course of public affairs, he translated a work on "The Education of the People; a practical treatise on the means of extending its sphere and improving its character," by J. William, Inspector of the Academy of Strasbourg, "a useful work of the first order," according to the adjudication of the French Academy. To this translation the editor prefixed a long, important, and thoughtful introductory essay of eighty pages, in which he sets forth his views on the aim, organization, and method of conducting a great and adequate national system of training; on the obstacles to such a scheme, and on the social bearing and value of a right education of the citizen. This is a very able and comprehensive essay, and from it we venture to say the advocates of education who are yet discussing the question might learn much; as a sort of earnest of this we shall reproduce a passage or two from the author's introduction:—

"If it is the aim of education to draw out man into freedom, and to establish between him and the universe a solid and practical harmony, then it must direct its efforts from the time that the young mind rises above subservience to mere instinct. First, towards the culture of the MORAL sentiments, or the nourishment of a sense of right and duty, and of the love of the good, the just, and the honourable. Secondly, to INTELLECTUAL education, properly so called, or the awakening or deepening of a love of truth, to the explanation of the wonders of external nature, of the laws of the great order which combines them into a system still more wondrous; and through which man becomes part of that system—drawing from it enjoyment and strength. Thirdly, to ÆSTHETIC education, the culture, viz., of taste, of a love of the decorous, of the beautiful and the sublime; and lastly, to RELIGIOUS education, by which the idea of the infinite is unfolded, the fear and love of the eternal nourished, and faith in Providence upheld even under darkest misfortunes. It seems to me that to lay down the foregoing comprehensive task, as the first and essential aim of education, is simply asserting that man is man; it is merely an appeal to our universal experience whether these four classes of our dispositions are not all indispensable to the completeness of our personality; and whether they do not circumscribe that large portion of the activities of humanity which is independent of special circumstance or condition—that invaluable portion which constitutes a man's worth and true culture, and which needs only that some special instruction and some special skill be added to it, to insure that the rational being act with usefulness and honour, whatever his peculiar place amid the mechanism of the world and society."

"The object so closely involving our interests and responsibilities is manifestly that grand fundamental education which takes cognizance of man

simply as man. The fact we have to consider is merely the plain one—that the educable young within these realms amount to a certain number ; and the consequent demand of true policy is, that we use all possible means, so that, as these minds grow up, they may increase in strength and freedom, and be aided and not repressed by surrounding circumstances in their efforts to unfold their innate virtue and riches. When framing a system of national education, then, we may be assured that we have fallen into some erroneous view of what we ought to accomplish, if we find ourselves encumbered at the outset by references to social conditions, or that our efforts are being deprived of their essential universality by consideration of arbitrary distinctions ; just because no conceivable condition or arrangement of society ought for one moment to affect our desire that every man be moral and religious, his intellect trained to the contemplation of truth, and familiarized with the order and the beauties of the universe. The practices of life will determine regarding the occupation of the individual's time ; but—be that occupation what it may—those sentiments and powers ought to have been developed in infancy and cultured during youth, so that his duties be performed, and all circumstances used and enjoyed, as befits a rational and aspiring being ; and, indeed, it is a matter for great rejoicing that the order of the world itself, irrespective of man's will, or at least of his specific plans, contains provision for this essential education, which the neglect or ignorance of society have failed hitherto to render of non-effect. With the idea of what this universal education ought to be in one's mind, accompanied by a glance alike at the inadequate numbers, and the wretched character of the majority of our popular schools, one cannot avoid recognizing—in the mere fact of the existence of order and of progress, however slow—the presence of conservative energies in human societies that live and act without the aid of statesmanship, and are unconnected almost with any direct and conscious purpose. It would seem as if the advance of civilization may in so far be wrought out, apart from reflection, and solely by those *instincts* belonging to man's loftier nature, which, whatever the power of *circumstance*, are capable in so far of realizing an order of their own. The common life of the masses of society manifests, indeed, throughout its entire constitution the power and upward tendency of these instincts ; for wherever we discern moderation, trustful endeavour, and the civic virtues, we ought to recognize a freedom won—hitherto unaided—from the sternest necessity ; so that while performing a paramount duty, we are yet, in our efforts to upraise these masses, only working along with the natural course of the world, and hastening the realization of an end prepared for by all the arrangements of providence. The elevation of man is the most visible among the purposes of the existing scheme of things ; to speak in the language of philosophy, it is the world's most determinate *final clause* ; in seeking to advance by education, we therefore act in harmony with manifold resistless agencies ; nor, if the task be understood aright, is it possible but that we must prevail.”

To the “Comprehensive Dictionary of Biography” Professor Nichol furnished concise but most admirable and suggestive synopses of the doctrines of the founders of the great schools of mental science, as well as many notices of men distinguished in mathematics and physics. He wrote a great number of sketches for “The Imperial Dictionary of Universal Biography” in a neat, brief, condensed, and brilliantly-rapid style. We have little hesi-

tation in saying, that were due collection and arrangement made of the memoirs furnished to these two repositories of biography, a very useful, interesting, and stimulating handbook of the history of mental science could be constructed, for which students would be thankful, and by which thinkers would be edified. His latest work was a "Comprehensive Dictionary of the Physical Sciences," a book which is altogether without parallel for the amount, excellence, accuracy, and skilled writing accumulated within the same space; the width of knowledge, the freshness of view, the vigour of condensed expression, the method and the variety of the work are not less wonderful than the versatility of gift and the multiplicity of acquirement it exhibits. The hard toil to which he had been subjected during so many years told most prejudicially upon the life functions, and not only tried but strained them. He was ordered to rest and reinvigorate himself, and he took a tour through the United States as a brain-rest. There he was received with the utmost enthusiasm, and on invitation of some of the most eminent of the *savans* of America, he lectured to dense and delighted audiences with such extempore fluency and such grace of speech that he was for the time of his sojourn an irresistible attraction to the lecture-room and the conversazione. On his return he cast an account of "The Men, Manners, Constitution, and Life of the United States" into the form of a series of lectures, which were delivered with much gratification to the frequenters of the best literary institutes in Scotland and England. He contributed to some of the newspapers letters from the States, in which the facts of American politics were carefully explained, and many singular forecastings of the future were given, which were read with eager curiosity at the time, but may now, perhaps, be forgotten—so much of the results of meditative minds are now given to these ephemeral sheets, that endure but to-day, and are mislaid or forgotten to-morrow, by all but a few who take a special interest in their writer or in their contents. He never grudged to supply information to any who sought his aid; as a special instance of this we may mention the notes he furnished to Miss Martineau's translated condensation of "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte," 1853; and he never hesitated to communicate to the public, through the newspapers, any matter of importance in philosophy, science, or politics, on which it seemed that information would be acceptable, so free and generous was he of the knowledge he possessed.

Those who possessed the pleasure of being among his intimates best knew how incessantly active were the activities of his mind and pen, and how various were the stores of his intellect. Besides being a thoroughly well-informed astronomer and a physicist of almost universal acquirements, he was a metaphysician of singular acuteness of speculative thought, and of high critical sagacity, while in politics he was a thinker of profound reach and extensive information. Generous, impulsive, unsuspicious, and magnanimous,

he was an eloquent advocate on the platform of the progress of man and all that tends to hasten and secure it; a promoter of free discussion in regard to all truth, and an earnest opponent of those who claim the right to impose their opinions on others as dogmatic beliefs. In anything that seemed to promise national political regeneration he took a deep interest, and all social questions had his good offices employed for their solution. He was a firm advocate for nationality, and looked on the Polish partition as an unjustifiable iniquity, the Hungarian oppressions as blunders in policy and crimes against social order, and the Roman tyranny over Italy, and resistance to its national unity, as a treasonous mis-demeanour calling for the most condign vengeance; and he sympathized with those who desired to see justice but not favouritism extended to Ireland.

The revision of his books for new editions, and especially the preparation of an improved issue of his "Dictionary of the Physical Sciences," called back the old enemy from whose attacks he had previously suffered—disease of the heart. He had gone to Rothesay to undergo for the third time the restorative processes of the water-cure, but this time they failed of their expected results. A few weeks before his death we saw him hopeful of recovery, full of vital interest in philosophy and politics, friendly and judicious in counsel, and kindly in the interests he expressed for the success of certain investigations described to him as in progress, and then—we saw the unlooked-for announcement of his demise, 19th September, 1859.

We have been not a little surprised that no formal biography of this distinguished astronomer, philosopher, and man of letters has been issued, and that in the encyclopedias of our time his name is ignored. He did not merit such neglect. He was a man of most admirable powers and of the rarest intellectual capacity. Measured by the best standards he was a man of mark; but as an instance of toiling upward his life seems to us to be of singular worth, for it shows a moderate ambition crowned with such success as the aspirant most desired, and exhibits possibilities of imitation and emulation. An earnest and successful explorer and discoverer in the field of science; an able and instructive writer; a lucid and eloquent lecturer, and a graceful orator. Dr. Nicol's name and works, especially in connection with astronomy, were known and admired, not only over our own land, but by thousands in Europe and America, who had derived from his writings alike instruction and delight. Without special advantage or encouragement in his early years, he was indebted for his position in the world of science and letters solely to his own ability, merit, and perseverance. Knowing well the value of help, he was always helpful, and not a few of those whose lives have mainly consisted in the steady prosecution of the task of "toiling upwards" owe encouragement and loving aid to Professor John Pringle Nicol—in whose noble spirit science and philosophy alike found a welcome and a home,

The Reviewer.

Emanuel Swedenborg: His Life and Writings. By WILLIAM WHITE. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co.

THESE two handsome volumes of biography form a good and goodly addition to the library of memoirs which has of late enriched English literature. There is a perennial interest in man regarding men; and to know how the mystery of life has been pursued before it passed away into the mystery of death excites the most refined curiosity of the soul. The reading of one of the completed life-epics of Deity, represented in reality and faithfully reported by one competently informed, is like a glimpse into the inner circles of divine intent and human endeavour, and supplies one form in which life has been transacted. Therein we see the interweaving of event and intent, of circumstance and purpose, of history and personality, of the endowments of nature, the donations of the past, and the acquisitions of the individual combining themselves to a new product, and man positing a fresh fact in the development of the ages. The biographer who can show the threads of purpose crossing the threads of circumstance and gradually forming the new pattern in "the roaring loom of Time" has done a great work for humanity, inasmuch as he has shown that small and slight and ephemeral as life and personal force are they are capable of a wondrous unity and productivity; and proved that man has a personal life to effect. Mr. White has entered upon his task with proper views of the biographer's difficulties, duties, and dangers, and he has produced a work of great merit, research, and interest.

This is a biography composed after the best models. It is for the great Swedish mystic what Foster's "Goldsmith" is for the sagest writer and most arrant fool of the Johnsonian period, and what Masson's "Milton" promised to be, but is very long of fulfilling. Smiles' "Stephensons," Muirhead's "Watt," Lawrence's "Fielding," Chambers' "Burns," Stanley's "Arnold," and Lewes' "Goethe," form some of the more striking of the class of memoirs of which White's "Swedenborg" is a worthy compeer. Here we have an honest and thorough piece of work turned out with talent and effectiveness. The incidents of the life are related with all their surroundings, and with connecting mention of contemporary occurrences as suggestive of the state and time in which the events recorded took place. The book, we believe, is a most reliable one. Honest we have heard Swedenborgians declare to a fault, because it does not conceal or palliate the errors of thought, conduct, or character of the hero. And it is no mean or unimportant life of

which he narrates the events. Whether regarded as the life of a thinker, whose strange mysticism has affected the world, or as an individual who had passed through great vicissitudes of experience, or as a theological speculator who could enunciate a new theory of things divine amidst the diverse and divergent theories previously afloat, or as an enigma in psychology and an abnormal instance of spiritual powers or possession, Swedenborg is alike a singular person and character.

"Swedenborg's name has grown familiar in English literature, but with few definite ideas attached to it." With this book before us, such a reproach, in regard to the present age, ought to be improbable, if not impossible. This biography of one of the mysteries and marvels of the human race, is formed on the best models, executed with diligence and skill, with thoroughness of industrious research and excellence of literary workmanship, and it is informed besides by a spirit of a high order and an imaginative reproductiveness of much vigour and vividness. It is a trustworthy and honest piece of labour, full of the fine flavour and the exquisite essence of reflective and analytic thought; and it brings Swedenborg—the man, the sage, the seer, and the spiritualistic theologian—livingly as well as lovingly before us, by a rare union of fidelity of portraiture with the admiration which a man must have who devotes his days and his nights to the comprehension and just appreciation of a biography so replete with difficulty, and with so few of the charms of adventure and stir which give a glow and an enchantment to the heroes of the vulgar. Yet few lives can raise so many thoughts regarding man, his mission, his powers, and his destiny, as that of this marvellous dispartite, yet unique man, who became notable among men as an active and earnest worker in the common business of life, as an eager cultivator of the most material of the sciences and a student of the philosophy of human nature, and then, almost with the suddenness of a miracle, became an interpreter of scripture, a seer of visions, and, in his own thought at least, an inspired and God-possessed being.

Swedenborg is, of course, much more frequently talked about than understood. His works are voluminous, and they have not hitherto been sublimated by analysis into a quintessence, though now they have been put through the crucible of a thinker's brain, and Mr. White affords us a condensed but complete view of his philosophy and theology. In this "that divine common sense which," as Mr. White remarks, "is the pre-eminent distinction of his genius" is vividly displayed. "He is not without foibles, but is wise exceedingly, versed in much strange knowledge, and familiar with the intricacies of the heart." "His writings," to quote the words of Dr. Forbes Winslow, "constitute a splendid monument of the extraordinary intellectual powers, the untiring assiduity, and the lofty religious fervour of the man. As a philosopher he will always occupy a conspicuous and honourable position in the history of modern philosophy, and as a theologian he gave birth to

one of the most remarkable developments of Christianity in recent times." Of the results of these inquiries and insights into thought and religion the reader of this book is made the possessor by a skilful process of analysis ably conducted; and by careful exposition, accompanied by a judicious appreciation and intelligent criticism, he is enabled to see the very biography of Swedenborg's speculations.

Mr. White thinks that to regard Swedenborg "simply as a Ghost Seer is to make a prodigious mistake," and affirms that "Swedenborg's true glory consists in a new definition of the relations between the Creator and the creature, and that his other world experiences are altogether subsidiary to the illustration of these relations. He demonstrates the absolute inutility (for philosophic purposes) of the mere knowledge of an objective spiritual world. Its phenomena teach just as much and just as little as the phenomena of the natural world; for *there* roam atheists who prove there is no God, and Sadducees who argue they have never died. All this however has been obscured by his vulgar reputation as a ghost seer, and his merit as the author of a profound and original philosophy is almost unknown." The author then proceeds to explain the nature of his undertaking thus:—"To try and remove somewhat of this inveterate ignorance concerning Swedenborg seemed not an unworthy task; and a biography in connection with a review of each of his books appeared to me to be a good way of effecting my purpose. In short, I resolved to compile a Swedenborg cyclopædia in which no anecdote, nor any important principle should be omitted. Thus all other ends have been surrendered to the production of complete information. Swedenborg has, as far as possible, been left to tell his own story and to reveal the heart of his own books." "As a critic of Swedenborg my difficulties have not been slight. With a few exceptions he has undergone no criticism. He has been cursed without reserve, and he has been blessed without reserve, but he has been rarely [rarely been?] appreciated. I have therefore had to form many judgments which I feel sure would be modified had I enjoyed the discussion of liberal and enlightened minds."

This estimate is honest and honestly accomplished. The life may be read, for its singular contrasts and incidents, with all the interest of a novel, in addition to which we will add the interest of finding truth stranger than fiction, the historic reminiscences and memoranda which give the setting to the portrait of one who was born in the year of England's revolution, who was a favourite with Charles XII., who lived in the times of Frederick the Great and Voltaire, Dr. Johnson and John Wesley, Kant and Franklin, and died in 1772, when two other revolutions were dawning on the horizon, give additional zest to this production; while the great value of it consists in its being a mind-life as well as a register of events. The state of science in the eighteenth century is told in connection with Swedenborg's scientific period, the metaphysics of the eighteenth century is animadverted on in relation to Sweden-

borg's philosophical period, and the theology of the eighteenth century is alluded to in its bearing upon the theosophic aspirations of Swedenborg; and the social state of not a few of the chief cities of Europe during the same period is brought under review. Anecdotes abound in it; and by quotation and allusion a fine flavour of literature is imparted to the whole production. There are, too, not a few interesting notes concerning living characters in their relation to the Swedish theosopher which give links of connection between the age-fellow of Pope—whose birth was contemporaneous with Dryden's reverses and with the death of Bunyan—and our own times, when Tennyson sings, Maurice theosophizes, Carlyle radiates thought, and the philosophy of Mill and Bain is opposed by that of Stirling, Macvicar and Mansell.

Here is a slight glimpse into Swedenborg's early metaphysics:—

"The means to a true philosophy are three—experience, reason, geometry.

"Experience, he thinks, is the only way to wisdom. It is impossible to receive knowledge directly from the soul. Knowledge is attained solely through the senses; but, whilst knowledge or experience is thus procured, we must be careful not to confound knowledge with reason or wisdom.

"In knowledge or experience are found the mere materials with which reason builds; yet without knowledge it would be impossible for reason either to grow or exist. Daily we see much knowledge without reason; the learned man with a gorged memory, taken by a shallow world for the wise man, or the man of reason, and crowned with the laurels of genius.

"To knowledge or experience must then be added reason. Reason is that fine faculty of the soul by which knowledge is ruled, analyzed, classified, and reduced to laws and analogies. Reason, from facts or things known, elicits a second, a third, or a fourth truth hitherto unknown. Reason is the mark of the true philosopher; and reason, to attain her ends, must invoke the aid of all the sciences, but chiefly geometry.

"Under the empire of geometry are the three kingdoms—the mineral, the vegetable, the animal; and, if it be permitted to call it a fourth, the elemental.

"The method of nature is everywhere the same; what is true of the least is true of the greatest; the force that shapes a dewdrop forms a world; the mechanism of the trunk of an elephant and of a fly is the same. The philosopher must not be deluded by size and supposed difference. There is the same ratio between 1,000,000 and 5,000,000 as there is between .0,000,001 and .0,000,005. This truth is of inestimable value, because by analogies drawn from the seen we can advance to the unseen, and speak of the unseen as if it lay under the eye.

"Nature is only a word which expresses the motive forces proceeding from the infinite. Nature is nothing without the world, and the world without nature; but the infinite is still infinite independently of the world: while on the other hand no conception can be formed of the world independently of the infinite. They therefore are mere children, and have not reached the first threshold of true philosophy, who ascribe to nature the origin of all things, and exclude the infinite, or who confound nature and the infinite together, when yet the world or nature is only an effect, a causate, or thing caused, the infinite being its efficient or cause."

"Nature, he conceives, originated in a point, which he defines as the simplest existence, the geometrical point, the point of Zeno. This point is the beginning of geometry, and geometry is the law and essential attribute of every substance in the world.

"The point is produced immediately from the infinite. It is the medium between the infinite and the finite, and partakes of the nature of both. . . . The point is pure and total motion; it is the commencement and the potency of all motion and production. . . . Motion as derived from the point ever flows from a centre to a circumference, and around the circumference back to the centre, and is thus an everlasting spiral. In speaking in this fashion, he speaks of the point as manifested in nature. As from the point all the motion, force, and being of nature commence and are derived, so every atom, and consequently every aggregation of atoms, carries in its heart a perpetual tendency to vortical motion.

"Out of the congress and coacervation of such points of force the first finite is produced. . . . The first finite thus perfectly resembles the world, although it is so small that in comparison with things compounded it is almost nothing. . . . Throughout nature Swedenborg held that there was everywhere action and reaction, and absolute inertia nowhere; that the gross moved more slowly than the rare, but that the rare found a fulcrum for action in the gross; that the gross was moved by the action of the rare; and that without reaction there could be no action; for without a passive continent action would be dissipated like steam without a boiler, or the soul without a body. Every active or every force in its turn serves as a passive to a higher force; as for example, the boiler is passive to steam, steam to heat, heat to electricity, and electricity to some force more subtile still, and the highest finite force of all to the infinite."

There is in this metaphysics of the universe great intellectual force, consistency, and subtlety, and it sufficiently proves that Swedenborg could and did think. "From his cradle he was a *seeker*, 'which sect,' says Oliver Cromwell, 'is next best to that of a finder.'" Our author says, "My admiration of Swedenborg is wholly intellectual. He seems to me one of the finest specimens of the achromatic mind, working through perceptive faculties of singular size and clearness, that biography reveals. To use one of his own phrases, the very root of his being was a love of truth. Truth, for its own sake, he sought through all his years with a placid, deep-flowing, and irresistible persistency." "His intellectual powers were set in motion by the gentle fire of that love whose single joy is the knowledge of the truth." Here are two passages of estimate which we like:—

"In Swedenborg's works we do not find delicacy, but power; not finish, but size. We behold in him a Titan and no Apollo. All that he did was large, rough, and full of gaps. Not any of his doctrines are rounded into completeness, or fortified so as to answer or resist the aggression of ordinary questions. I do not say that many of his positions may not be held and defended, but, if they are, it must be with the aid of lines supplementary to his own. The fact is that the truths he saw he was unable to set forth in fair logical, as in fair rhetorical trim. He tumbled out his ideas instead of setting them out; or, more correctly, he tried to set them out, but with a success little greater than if he had tumbled them. Something of this disorder and incompleteness may be charged against his self-satisfaction and his solitary life. He was content to test his work by his own eye alone, and neither sought nor cared to have the verdict of others. . . . Although none of these writings may have any message or peculiar interest for us, yet whoever studies them in the series of their production, cannot

fail to observe a mind growing slowly and surely, and winning increase of strength and insight year by year, whilst working inwards from stones and iron, through flesh and blood to soul and spirit. I have heard them called with some pertinence Swedenborg's copy-books. . . . As such they evidence an industrious and valiant scholar who glorified himself in no achievement, but ever used the last won as a stepping-stone to something higher. No applause, no difficulty overcome, ever tempted him into the delusion that he had attained final excellence. He sought a settlement on the rock of Truth, and on nothing else could he long rest. Often, in sight of a mere fog island, he thought he discerned a place of rest, more than once he commenced to build on the sand, but he was ever first to discover his mistake, and arise and renew his quest for an everlasting foundation."

It is quite evident from these passages that Mr. White possesses a sound and independent judgment; that he has a proper conception of progress in character, and that he does not deal in stereotyped phraseology or criticism. He not only knows but shows that Swedenborg's "philosophy was in slow but constant transition;" and he makes it quite plain that he does not see all his thoughts as a divine tissue of unmistakable truth, or his moral teaching as a circle of immaculate purity. Indeed, there are some honest outbursts of indignation at certain of Swedenborg's tenets regarding allowable practices, which show such soundness of heart in the author as deserves high consideration, for it is really a matter of great difficulty to speak out the truth regarding the founder of any sect without deeply offending the prejudices of some.

One other extract from his analysis of Swedenborg's philosophy, this time his later and better one, we shall now make:—

"A man consists of two faculties—a will and an understanding, distinct from each other, yet so created as to form one mind. In the will and understanding are comprised the whole life of man; and as all things of creation are related to goodness and truth, so all things in man refer themselves to his will or to his understanding. His will is the habitation of the divine love, and his understanding, of the divine wisdom; his body is their passive instrument. The evil have properly no will or understanding. In them the will is closed to holy human loves, and is a mere organ of brutal lusts; and the understanding, void of spiritual truth, provides but science for the satisfaction of these lusts.

The note sounded in this, as the initial word of a moral philosophy, is elevated, and might be led out to good results. Several other portions containing corollaries from this we should have been glad to quote. We have long had a desire—sometime ago partially attempted—to bring out into effective philosophic distinctness the opinions of Swedenborg. To a great extent this book of Mr. White's accomplishes this, and if we pursue the matter farther, to this book we must be indebted for simplification, selection, and analysis of the most material elements in Swedenborg's world-life and mind-life.

The writer of this notice had occasion some twelve or fourteen years ago to test some speculations he had been making on the

Philosophy of Imagination, and he chose for this purpose the English "Ingenious dreamer," "John Bunyan," and his Swedish fellow "Emanuel Swedenborg." These investigations resulted in exciting a renewed interest in the lives of these men; and led him to regard Edmund Spenser, John Bunyan, and Emanuel Swedenborg as entitled to a place of no mean importance as philosophic thinkers. Such a book as Mr. White's is, would, at that time, have been as invaluable to us as Offor's "Bunyan," and G. L. Craik's "Spenser and his Poetry" were. And we can truly congratulate Mr. White on an achievement which reflects credit on his industry, talents, literary ability, and philosophical acumen, as well as supplies a distinct want in philosophic and theological literature. This book ought to be in the library of every Mechanics' Institute and Literary Society, and on the favourite shelves of thinkers. It does for Swedenborg what Spedding has been doing for Lord Bacon, at once asserts and reasserts his place in history. With the agreeable announcement that a second edition in one volume, thoroughly revised, has been called for by the public, and supplied by the author, at half the cost of the original work which we have been noticing, we recommend this book—to which we shall probably recur again—to all those who desire a work "wherein the history, the doctrines, and the other world experiences of the great Swede are concisely and faithfully recorded," and the origin and condition of the Swedenborgian sect are set forth—as worthy of purchase, perusal, and permanent possession.

Our Collegiate Course.

LITERATURE OF ENGLAND;

BIOGRAPHICAL, CHRONOLOGICAL, CRITICAL, ETC.

TABLE V.—HISTORIC WRITERS (1600—1700).

<i>Names and Dates.</i>	<i>Events and Works.</i>
1. SIR RICHARD BAKER, 1568—1644.	<div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; font-size: 3em; line-height: 1;">}</div> Born at Sissinghurst, Kent; received a liberal education at Oxford; and held several public offices of trust; was knighted by James I. in 1608, but lost his fortune, and was obliged to turn his attention to Letters. Most of his works were composed while he was a prisoner in the Fleet for debt. He wrote long meditations, prayers, and devotional books. His chief effort was long looked on as the best text-book on English history. It was a "Chronicle of the Kings of England, from the time of the Romans' Government unto the death of King James, 1641." It was continued by Milton's nephew, Edward Philips. A posthumous work, "Theatrum Redivivum," 1662, controverts Prynne's "Histrio-Mastix."

2. **ROBERT BRADY, M.D.**, } A native of Norfolk; entered Caius College,
1627—1700. } Cambridge, 1643; wrote an answer to Mr.
Petyt's work on "Parliaments," 1681; an
"Introduction to Old English History," 1681; Second Edition, 1684; a
"Complete History of England from the first entrance of the Romans to
the Death of King Richard II.," 1685, &c. Hume is stated to have relied
mainly on Brady for the facts and principles of his history.

3. **WM. BURTON**, } A native of Lindley, Leicestershire; the
1575—1681. } elder brother of Robert Burton (author of the
Anatomy of Melancholy); studied at Brasen-
nose College, Oxford, and the Inner Temple; author of a "Description
of Leicestershire, concerning matters of Antiquity, History, Armour, and
Genealogy," 1622; and a "Sketch of the Life of Leland," author of the
"Itinerary," prefixed to his "Collectanea." Nichols has superseded Bur-
ton's "History of Leicestershire."

4. **EDWARD HYDE**, } Born at Dinton, Wiltshire, 18th February;
Earl of Clarendon, } educated at Oxford; studied law under his
1608—1674. } uncle, Nicholas Hyde, Chief Justice of the
King's Bench. He was a member of the Long
Parliament, and spoke and voted for some time on the popular side, but
after the breaking out of the Civil War he went to the King's party. In
1642 was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, knighted, and made a
Privy Councillor. Went with Prince Charles (II.) to Jersey, and there
began his History of the Rebellion. In 1684 he went to Paris on a mission,
in 1649 to Spain, and in 1657, to the Hague, Charles II. appointed him
High Chancellor of England, in which office he was confirmed at the
Restoration, and was besides elected Chancellor of the University of Oxford.
He was successively created Baron Hyde, Viscount Cornbury, and Earl of
Clarendon. The Earl of Bristol accused him of high treason in the House
of Lords; this prosecution failed, but the ill-success of the war with Hol-
land, and the sale of Dunkirk, made him obnoxious, and he fell before a
court intrigue, and was deprived of his offices. He went to France, whence
he forwarded an apology to the Lords, which was ordered to be burned by
the common hangman. He died at Rouen, but was buried in Westmin-
ster Abbey. His daughter became the wife of James II., so that he was
the grandfather of Mary and Anne, Queens of Great Britain.

5. **SIR ROBERT BRUCE** } Born at Denton, Huntingdonshire; and
COTTON, } educated at Trinity College, Cambridge. He
1570—1631. } acquired a high reputation for learning and
integrity, and was trusted by the king and
many of the leading men of his time. He was knighted and created a
baronet by James I., but yet he joined the popular party in its claim for
the redress of grievances. Government procured, by some hidden means,
a copy of a treatise on politics, written by Sir Robert Dudley, in MS., from
his library, and this having been brought before the Privy Council, his
library was ordered to be seized, and himself to be imprisoned in the Tower.
Here his health failed, and he died at Westminster of a fever contracted
therein. "Life and Reign of Henry III., of England," 1627; "Comt
Gondemar's Translations." Many productions are issued in "Cottone
Posthuma."

6. **SIR WM. DUGDALE**, } A native of Shustock, near Coleshill, War-
1605—1685. } wick; studied at the Free School, Coventry;
Bought Blythe Hall in 1625, where he began

the "Antiquities of Warwickshire." Burton, the historian of Leicestershire, introduced him to Spelman, and he made known his ability to the Earl of Arundel, through whose influence he was made a member of the College of Herald. By Roger Dodsworth, a Yorkshire gentleman, he was incited to commence his "Monasticon Anglicanum." As pursuivant of arms, he attended the royal army, and in his capacity summoned the castles of Banbury and Warwick to surrender, at Oxford he was made Chester herald, 1644, passed as M.A., and kept a minute diary of occurrences. At the Restoration he was appointed Norroy, king-at-arms. He wrote on "The Embanking and Draining the Fens and Marshes of the Kingdom;" compiled "Origines Judiciales," and "The Baronage of England." In 1677 he was made garter, king-at-arms, and knighted. He died at his estate, Blythe Hall, and was buried in Shustock parochial church.

Epitome of Critical Opinions.

1. "I much admire the very character of your style, which seemeth to me to have not a little of the African idea of St. Austin's age; full of sweet raptures and of researching conceits; nothing borrowed, nothing vulgar, and yet all flowing from you (I know not how) with a certain equal facility."—*Sir Henry Wotton*. "Being reduced to method, and not according to time, purposely to please gentlemen and novices, many chief things to be observed therein, as name, time, &c., are egregiously false, and consequently breed a great deal of confusion in the peruser, especially if he be curious or critical."—*A. Wood*. "He wrote an 'Exposition on the Lord's Prayer,' which is co-rival with the best comments which professed divines have written on that subject."—*Fuller*. "Sir Richard Baker's Chronicle of the Kings of England was several times reprinted, and was a great favourite with our ancestors for two or three succeeding generations; but it has now lost all interest, except for a few passages relating to the author's time. . . . Sir Richard and his Chronicle are now popularly remembered principally as the trusted historical guides and authorities of Addison's incomparable 'Sir Roger de Coverley.'"—*G. L. Craik*.

2. "It is compiled so religiously upon the very text, letters, and syllable of the authorities, especially those upon record, that the work may justly pass for an antiquarian law-book."—*Lord Guilford*. "The well-disposed towards an acquisition of good old English history, will do well to secure a copy of it."—*Dibdin*.

3. "His natural genius leading him to the studies of heraldry, genealogies, and antiquities, he became excellent in those obscure and intricate matters; and, looking upon him as a gentleman, was accounted by all that knew him to be the best of his time for those studies, as may appear by his description of Leicestershire."—*A Wood*. "The reputation of Burton's book arises from its being written early, and preceded only by Lambarde's "Kent," 1576; Carew's "Cornwall," 1602; and Norden's "Survey;" and it is in comparison only of these, and not of Dugdale's more copious work, that we are to understand the praises so freely bestowed on it."—*Gough*.

4. "I cannot but let you know the incredible satisfaction I have taken in reading my late Lord Clarendon's "History of the Rebellion," so well and so unexpectedly well written; the preliminary so like that of the noble Polybius, leading us by the courts, avenues, and porches into the fabric; the style masculine, the characters so just, and tempered without the least impediment of passion or tincture of revenge, yet with such natural and

lively touches as show his lordship well knew not only the person's outsides but their very interiors."—*John Evelyn*. "Clarendon will always be esteemed an entertaining writer, even independent of our curiosity to know the facts which he relates. His style is prolix and redundant, and suffocates us by the length of its periods; but it discovers imagination and sentiment, and pleases us at the same time that we disapprove of it. . . . An air of probity and goodness runs through the whole work, as these qualities did really embellish the whole life of the author. . . . Clarendon was always a friend to the liberty and constitution of his country."—*Hume*. "He is excellent in everything that he has performed with care; his characters are beautifully delineated, his sentiments have often a noble gravity, which the length of his periods, far too great in itself, seems to befit; but in the general course of his narrative he is negligent of grammar and perspicuity, with little choice of words, and therefore sometimes idiomatic, without ease or elegance."—*Hallam*. "For an Englishman there is no single historical work with which it can be so necessary for him to be well and thoroughly acquainted as with Clarendon. I feel at this time perfectly assured that if that book had been put into my hands in youth, it would have preserved me from all the political errors which I have outgrown."—*Southey*. "No man wrote abler state papers. No man spoke with more weight and dignity in council and Parliament. No man was better acquainted with general maxims of statecraft. No man observed the varieties of character with a more discriminating eye. It must be added that he had a strong sense of moral and religious obligation, a sincere reverence for the laws of his country, and a conscientious regard for the honour and interest of the crown. But his temper was sour, arrogant, and impatient of opposition."—*T. B. Macaulay*.

5. "The name of Sir Robert Cotton must always be mentioned with honour; his memory cannot fail of exciting the warmest sentiments of gratitude, while the smallest regard for learning subsists among us."—*Dr. Samuel Johnson*. "Sir Robert Cotton (1570—1631) is celebrated as an industrious collector of records, charters, and writings of every kind relative to the ancient history of England. In the prosecution of his object he enjoyed unusual facilities, the recent suppression of monasteries having thrown many valuable books and written documents into private hands. "He was the author of various historical, political, and antiquarian works, which are now of little interest, except to men of kindred tastes."—*Chambers*.

6. "The clergyman, the lawyer, the antiquary, the historian, the architect, and topographer, as well as the possessor of real property, will find the "Monasticon Anglicanum," one of the most interesting and indispensable works that has ever issued from the press of this country."—*Dibdin*. "There are works which scrupulous accuracy, united with stubborn integrity, has elevated to the rank of legal evidences, such is Dugdale's 'Warwickshire.'"—*Dr. Whitaker*. "The 'Baronage of England' exhibits an extraordinary spirit of research, and a conscientious exactness that was seldom, if ever, satisfied with anything short of the evidence of his own eyes. As illustrating the history of the peerage families of England, this work is unrivalled; it is still the first authority on the subject—the textbook of genealogists."—*Bernard Burke*.

The Topic.

OUGHT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT TO PLEDGE THEIR VOTES?

AFFIRMATIVE.

ONE of the first things that a constituency looks to in a man who is asking for the votes of the electors, is whether his opinions be at all in conformity with those believed in by the majority of voters. If so, there is a chance—if he is an upright conscientious and intellectual man, capable of judging of the wants and wishes of the people—of reaching the honour of becoming their representative in the councils of the nation. If a man is not able to give a reason for the faith that is in him in regard to the great political questions upon which the happiness or misery of a nation depends, before those questions become the battle ground on which the two contending parties will use all their force of passion and eloquence, he is not fit to be trusted when those questions become the topic of the hour. Again, I think that a member of Parliament should, as far as it is practical, be a representative of the collective opinions of those he seeks to represent. When I say collective opinions, I mean those that refer to great national questions. For every voter takes an interest more or less in the affairs of state, and I believe it is the feeling that every voter feels who is possessed of a vote that causes him to vote for those who will best bring his own individual opinions to bear upon the legislation of the country.

I, therefore, think that it is necessary for the upholding of the state and for the good of the constituency that a member of Parliament should

pledge his votes on all great questions, such as those now before the country in regard to church, state, commerce, war, law, and finance.

D. W. R.

Intending candidates for Parliamentary honours should be thoroughly conversant with the principal measures before the country, and those likely to affect the interests in any way of the constituency which they wish to represent, in order to be able to explain to the electors the course they (the candidates) intend to pursue with regard to those measures. They do not go up to Parliament to represent a part of the community, and to vote according to the desire of that body. How then can this be done, unless the vote is pledged? I am, on the above grounds, of a decided opinion that members of Parliament should pledge their votes.—A. O. W.

They certainly ought on all points of vital importance. The members of the House of Commons are supposed to represent the opinions of the majority of the constituency by which they are returned to Parliament, and these electors have no guarantee that their opinions will be fairly represented unless such pledges are given. If a candidate comes before the electors and says such are my opinions on this subject and such my opinions on that, these opinions I am prepared to support in the House by my votes, and by a more active advocacy if necessary, then the electors are able to judge whether he is a fit and proper per-

son to represent them. A member of Parliament ought, upon the vital questions of the day, to be bound to represent the opinions of those by whose votes he is returned. We know that unpleasant differences might arise from this plan, when an M.P. might be convinced of the error of his opinions, and for that reason refuse to vote as he had pledged himself to do; but this would seldom occur, for it is well known that upon the more important affairs of the country which have been frequently discussed before the speeches made by M.P.'s, seldom convince opponents within the House. Of two evils choose the least; and we think it would be by far the least of these two evils to return to Parliament men pledged to vote in a certain way upon all the more prominent and vital questions of the day.—SAMUEL.

I CANNOT imagine any reason for returning members to Parliament unfettered as to their votes. What guarantee (bearing in mind "The Cave") have a constituency for the real Liberalism or Conservatism of a candidate, unless he promises to support or oppose important bills known as likely to be brought before Parliament? I would not, of course, in all cases, so fetter a member as to bind him down to details, which I think may generally be left to his good sense, unless his constituents are particularly desirous that certain details should be inserted in a bill he supports. I think members should be bound, as far as possible, to support bills favourable to the majority of their constituents; and I don't think it speaks much for the independence of a constituency to return an "unfettered" member. They ought to feel it an insult to be asked by a member to be allowed

to do as he likes when returned to St. Stephen's.—J. LLOYD EVANS.

NEGATIVE.

By no means. Those who return them should sufficiently confide in them to believe that they will support any beneficial measure. But "principle is superior to party" *ergo*, I think a request for M.P.'s to pledge themselves to support any leader is injudicious. Man is not immutable, and suppose a transition of political feeling takes place, where then is the pledge? Either conscience must be violated, or the promise nullified.

H. S. BRISTOL.

Who can so far foresee the political future, its parties, and its partizanship, to pledge himself with security that he will vote according to prearranged plans? Let us get honest sensible men and then trust them. Pledges are like promises, to pay which the dishonest are most ready to disburse and forget.

F. L. M.

Our firm conviction is, that if our representatives entered the House of Commons with the fixed determination to support every measure they thought would be for the good of the nation, we should have much better legislation than we have had of late. As it is, men pledge themselves to support a certain section, and for the sake of party, vote against their consciences, and convert the House into a mere battle field for one party trying to overcome the other.

Liberals and Conservatives alike are capable of introducing useful measures, and we should like to see party distinctions thrown aside, and a greater desire evinced to legislate for the public good.—F. T. G.

The Societies' Section.

TAKING SIDES.

ALL over the kingdom men are beginning to bethink themselves into which of the two great political camps they shall betake themselves for the autumn season. The moment, therefore, is one of extraordinary interest to persons who have been accustomed to study the growth of opinion in a society, and to seek the circumstances which determine the course of public sentiment in one direction rather than in another. There is now a wonderfully good opportunity of watching the conditions under which a decisive opinion about anything is formed in the minds of large bodies of men and women. We have really some of the advantages of the method of experiment, added to the advantages of the method of observation. The circumstances are infinitely varied for us and lie to our hand; we have only to observe for ourselves. The results ought to be full of instruction to those who have trained themselves to contemplate and classify the various movements of thought and sentiment which constitute the history of the development of the human intelligence. They will probably not reveal any new law, but they will at any rate help to confirm or to modify such generalizations as a man may have gathered from the facts of recorded history. At any rate, the least they can do will be to destroy the hold of some strange fallacies, which underlie assumptions that one may meet with largely in every-day practice.

There is an extremely general persuasion, for example, that everything goes by reason, demonstration,

proof, argument which appeals to the intellect, and which the intellect accepts and appreciates. Convince a man's understanding, and his conversion must be the inevitable consequence. Give him all the arguments for your own side, and all the arguments for the other; show him how indisputably the balance is in your favour, and he must yield to this inevitable logical pressure. If such a process be performed exhaustively and efficiently, with the force as of a geometric demonstration, the elector has no more choice about giving you his vote and interest than he has about believing that two and two make four. The simplicity of this conception of the method in which the changes essential to progress are made is extremely attractive. But, as a matter of fact, do men take this side rather than that because, after due and dispassionate examination, they are driven to conclude that the scale inclines on the one hand rather than on the other? "Reason," as Mlle. de Meulan said, "is for reasonable people." Philosophers insist on a preponderance of argument, established after large and complete comparison of both sides. Plain people are mostly content with a single argument, or perhaps, in the case of extraordinarily exacting intelligences a couple. Exceed two arguments in your demands, and you really rank among finished reasoners. Even the most sceptical sort of people take fully half of their least doubted beliefs on trust, of some sort or other. It is no wonder, therefore, that the "swinish multitude," as a

wise man in the last century got into trouble for calling the sovereign people, take most of their views on trust, and follow one course rather than another in political or social or religious questions, because some one else takes this course in whom they have been accustomed perhaps for wholly extraneous reasons to place entire confidence. But of those who aspire to the dignity of a reasoned conviction, who sincerely believe in argument and proof—if they only knew what argument and proof mean—who venture on occasion down into the thorny field of controversy, how many know all the arguments on their own side, as well as all those on the other, and how many only know a single consideration on their own side, and nothing else under the face of the wide heavens beyond that? It is almost confounding to reflect, first, that in politics there is scarcely ever a question which can be settled on a single issue, and secondly, that by the mass of people scarcely any question is ever settled on any other than a single issue. The complaint, with how little wisdom the world is governed is transformed into wonder that the governments of the world should, on the whole, be so decently endurable as they are. Men who can see round questions, with all their difficulties, their complexities, and their many-facedness, are overawed or horror-stricken at the rapidity and finality with which a man who knows none of these things will still rush to a positive opinion, and then hold it against all comers. Take, for example, any great transaction of recent times—the creation of the French Empire, the civil war in America, the Reform Act of last year. On each of these subjects there are a thousand relevant things to be said which a man ought to have weighed before he should undertake the authoritative enunciation

of his final estimate of what took place, and before, in the eye of a strictly logical and mentally methodical judge, he could have acquired a right to a decisive opinion at all worthy of the name. Yet we hear every day thoroughly confident judgments on the French Empire and the American Republic, and English democracy, from the lips or pens of men who never in all their lives saw more than one simple issue in any controversy that attracted their attention. It is essential to their peace of mind that they should form an instant and settled conclusion, never afterwards to be shaken or disturbed or doubted; they cannot bear the laborious suspense of judgment in which men of another sort hunt out right opinion, and without which right opinion is not wont to reveal itself.

We have already seen some of the indirect paths by which people suffer themselves to be drawn to espouse one set of opinions rather than some other set. They are content, for example, to believe a certain view to be right because somebody else whom they usually side with holds such a view; they suppose him or her to have gone through all needful processes of inquiry and examination, and accept the report as completely as if they had themselves gone through the evidence. The most perfectly trained, curious, and independent mind is obliged to do the same thing in many cases, perhaps in most, at one point or another. A more dangerously indirect principle of taking sides is to trust blindly to feeling, in matters that ought in fact and propriety to go by close reason. This, of course, is the arch enemy of truth and right. If pure reason ruled human affairs, the only thing to be done would be to prove the advantages of a line of conduct clearly, and its immediate acceptance

would instantly follow. We should all incontinently take the same side—the side of demonstration. But feeling twists, turns, and predisposes one in all manner of ways; and the seed of argument is not often cast into a virgin soil. Feeling traces out mental grooves for us, and if the reasonable proofs and considerations do not happen to run in them, then they are not allowed to reach us at all. This is the reason why most controversy is merely labour wasted. It is not that men are blockheads, that they do not know an argument when they see it, that they do not make it their fundamental canon to accept that view for which there is most, rationally, to be said. Bias accounts for all; it prevents them alike from seeing the gist of any one argument, and from summing up two sets of arguments and striking a balance. Such men insist on following their sentiment at all hazards, and in the consciousness that this sentiment glows inviolate within them, they find ample solace for what to other men would be the insufferable humiliation of knowing that their position is on rational grounds indefensible. Still, these

people who go by their sentiment and not by clear reason, if they are horribly tiresome when you want movement, are great helpers when you happen to want stability. They keep the world together, if they are the means of keeping many an abuse in it long after its time. And, after all, one tells the men of feeling on one's own side off against those in the enemy's camp, and thus in the long run the right side does win with its superiority of argument, though the ways in which that superiority is borne into the minds of men may be various and indirect enough. Even then there is a wondrous disparity between the supremacy which men concede to logic on their lips and the puny sway it exercises in their understandings. And if we may wish that there were more reality in its sovereignty, let us nevertheless echo George Eliot's wise exclamation, how many sins and cruelties bad logic has saved the world. It helps to keep many an obsolete abuse and injustice above ground, but reflect how many hideous and dreadful persecutions it has stayed.

THE JUBBULPORE DEBATING SOCIETY.

THERE is a rather odd Indian institution, the "Jubbulpore Literary and Debating Society," the members of which are natives. The subject for discussion at one of the recent weekly meetings of the society, was, it appears, "The Use and Abuse of Authority," and it was opened in an essay by one Baboo H. P. Banerjee. Baboo in the course of his essay, remarked that "it has generally been the habit of men of a low class, who, by competitive examinations have come to be at the head of a district in a foreign land, to treat their subjects with more or less contempt. These

gentlemen, so called, void of any high breeding and sensibility, have not the least idea of sympathising with the people with whom God has brought them in contact." This may be considered to refer to the English members of the Indian Civil Service. But Banerjee was quite tame in comparison with the chairman, Baboo K. C. Bose, who observed that "the greatest shortcoming—in fact, properly seen, it is a blunder of the English rule in India, is its failure to call out and employ native talent in the administration of the country. Under it, all roads to honourable career for

the aristocracy and gentry are virtually shut. Little crumbs of patronage are, indeed, now and then thrown to a few of the rising middle class, and the most is made of them. But the vast amount of talent which education is developing in the native mind finds no vent for its exercise, and generates discontent and murmurings to an alarming extent, which Asiatic passivity may hide for a time, but which will one day burst forth to the confusion of

all. If the English were wise, they would either put a stop to all education, or open up the administration of the country to the growing native talent, and thereby extinguish all discontent and murmurings."

Several circumstances make this little debate interesting, and not the least significant of them is that the natives of India have taken to airing their grievances in debating societies.

SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Was Richelieu or Danton the greatest statesman?

Does the political testament of Richelieu prove that he was a patriotic statesman?

Were the wars of the Fronde beneficial to France?

Was the revolution of Cromwell more or less glorious than that of William III?

Is the sovereignty of France or of England the first position in the civilized world?

Is the Pope of the Romish Church or the President of the United States the holder of the nobler rulership?

Is it beneficial that a monarch should reign and not govern?

Ought a land-tax or excise duties to be preferentially employed to raise national revenue?

Has the cost of the French Imperial dynasty exceeded the profit of its régime?

Is Tennyson superior to Wordsworth?

Ought the revenues of the church be secularized?

Is the Bible so inspired as to be infallible?

Do we owe the triumph of toleration more to philosophers and statesmen than to religionists?

Is the Code Napoleon fitted to be a model to European statesman?

Did the Church of Rome purchase existence at the price of independence and morality?

Would the success of Protestantism in France have been favourable to feudalism, or inimical to monarchy?

Ought France to be regarded as the centre of the European commonwealth of states?

Should the Irish Church Establishment be abolished, without regard to vested interests?

Is Roman Catholic Ireland able to be justly governed while an integral portion of the Protestant Empire of Great Britain?

Ought the land of Ireland to be compulsorily sold to the state?

Are all poor laws morally wrong [or bad in policy]?

Is numerical superior to local representation?

Is the word of God contained in the Bible, or is it co-extensive with it?

Have the Popes of Rome lived holier lives than the Archbishops of Canterbury for the last three centuries?

Should trades unions be held responsible for any outrages promoted or sustained by its office-bearers?

Ought trades unions to be compelled to get their rules sanctioned by Government?

Literary Notes.

THE Rev. A. B. Grosart, of Blackburn, has in preparation a Reprint of the whole works of Joshua Sylvester, translator of Du Bartas' "Divine Weeks and Months." Author of "Tobacco battered and the Pipes shattered," &c. Also an edition of "The Poems of Henry Vaughan, the Silurist (1614—1695)."

To the re-issue of Bishop Percy's "Reliques of Ancient Poetry," the Rev. J. Pickford has prefixed a *Memoir*; but upon this subject J. P. Collier promises to give some original particulars.

R. Morris will edit *Cursor Mundi*, for the Early English Text Society, for which he has just completed "*Old English Homilies*."

F. Hall, Esq., D.C.L., is issuing an edition of "The Works of Sir David Lindsay," of the Mount.

"An Amateur Author's Association" has been set up at Windsor, and is to take issue in a new magazine.

Jacob Van Launep, the Flemish poet, historian, philologist, &c., died 25th August.

Demosthenes' "*De Corona*" is a favourite for translation by lawyers; Lord Brougham produced one version, R. C. Kennedy another, and now Sir R. P. Collier, M.P., has issued a third.

Messrs. Sampson, Low, and Co. are about to issue a monthly series of "Cheap Editions of American Authors."

Shakspeare's Hamlet is a favourite in Germany, and is read in the schools. Dr. Jacob Hensgè has produced an edition with a commentary.

M. Thiers has in the press "A History of the Reformation."

William Carew Hazlitt is preparing a library edition of "The Popular Antiquities of Great Britain," by John Brand; but the work is to be "digested, corrected, and enlarged throughout" by the editor. The same learned gentleman has in the press "English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases."

W. S. Teuffel has issued, in German, a "History of Roman Literature."

M. Armand Prosper Faugère, editor of "The Thoughts, Fragments, and Letters of Blaise Pascal, 1644," has just issued a "Defence of Blaise Pascal, and connected therewith, of Newton, Galileo, and Montesquieu, against the fictitious documents presented by M. Charles to the Academy of Sciences." He affirms, and uses fac-similes to prove, that the Charles documents have been produced subsequently to 1644.

Interesting "Recollections of Oxford" are expected from George Valentine Cox, M.A., who has been schoolmaster of New College, esquire, bedell, and coroner in Oxford University.

J. Payne Collier has seen an edition, dated 1598, of "Hero and Leander," begun by Christopher Marlow, and finished by George Chapman.

Mr. Skeatt thinks that the MS. of Chaucer's "Astrolabe," in the Bodleian Library, Cambridge, contains autograph revisions by the author.

Dean Milman, poet, dramatist, historian, and preacher, died September 24th, aged 78.

The "Letters on Church and State, furnished by F. D. Maurice to the *Daily News*, are to be reissued in book form.

The Philosophy of Politics.

CITIZENSHIP—ITS LAWS AND LIMITS.

MEMBERSHIP in a State implies a participation in the advantages which the State can confer, concurrence in the objects aimed at by the State, and submission to all the legal requirements of the State, in regard to those who hold a share in the benefits for the accomplishing or securing of which the State exists. Citizenship is constitutional right—a fixed and determinate freedom exercised within certain recognised limits, and in concurrent observance of certain restraints. Citizenship is a condition of life only possible in a State, for only in or as a State can any number of men be regarded as those called together (*civi*) in one body, or as those assembled together (*coivi*) for a common purpose; and as in either of these ways forming a civic community (*civitas*) in which each requires to act as becomes a citizen (*civilis*). Those who are born (*nati*) together within some distinct and definite limits easily and readily form or can be brought to constitute a nation, and this nation, when formally settled and established, becomes a State, of which the several members are or ought to be citizens—persons citable to the conventions of the State, to the law-courts of the community, and to the defence and maintenance of the commonwealth; by such citation, as—being within the limits of law, necessity, or exigency—cannot be resisted without breach of duty, and treason to the civilization to which the State has attained, or at which it is, with the general consent of the citizens, aiming.

Citizenship is subjection, but it is subjection to Law—to civic determinations for social purposes, and implies the right of being cited to act as a sharer in political power, in the choice of councillors or administrators, or in the support and aidance of those who give council and hold administrative office. A citizen is a member of a community and a commonwealth, in regard to the management of which he is consulted either directly or indirectly, and for the performance of the duties incurred on account of the social polity he is liable either personally or pecuniarily. Citizenship, is therefore, subjection to laws, customs, financial schemes, public plans, and political purposes in the adoption, carrying out, or adaptation of which a citizen has a voice—effective in proportion to his interests and position, and protective of his interests and personality. That a citizen may be so in the true sense of the word, he ought to be

free to employ to the best of his own judgment all the powers which the Law cites him to exercise, and should be permitted to bring these powers as directly as possible to bear on the outworking of his own purposes. Of this exercise of his power he is called upon to make solemn registration by his *vote*, which is not merely his *voice*, but a mark of his devotion, of the essentially earnest, well-considered, duly-determined-upon course which he is desirous of seeing pursued in regard to civic matters.

Civil life imports that common purposes are to be pursued, for the common weal by the common will. The assent or consent of the constituents of a community is essential to the determination of a polity or general scheme of public action and obedience. In so far as the common good is preserved, it must be done at the common cost, and on a common understanding or mutually arranged plan. Each citizen commutes a portion of his individual rights for a share in the advantages of civilization, and as a member of a co-partnery has a claim to a voice in the management proportionate to his stake in the communal polity. So long as the State confers advantages at least equal in value to the sacrifices of individual freedom and personal purpose demanded of the citizen, submission is perhaps due, but so soon as the balance of disadvantage tilts over and shows that the cost of a civic condition outgoes the profit derivable from it, the question of submission or insubordination emerges and becomes an open one, on which the individuals may and probably must decide for themselves. Civicism is only preferable to Individualism on account of the advantages it confers, and man is only bound to sacrifice his personal and immediate welfare for the attainment of a civic and permanent benefit. The rights of individuality lapse and revert when the obligations of civicism are not fulfilled, or fail to effect their promised provisions.

In Aristotle's politics, a citizen is defined as one to whom the right belongs of being called to take part, personally or representatively, not only in the deliberative or legislative assemblies of the State, but also in the judicial proceedings of the civic community of which he forms a unit—a participant or sharer in the whole of the interests of the commonwealth in a less or greater degree. Whosoever formed part of the community without being a citizen, was a *subject*, for the Sovereign was only the Representative Force of the State embodied in one individual. To this Sovereign power, though every citizen is justly subject, yet of it he is at the same time a part—for through him and by him the laws are made which the Sovereign enforces, and hence he rules through the Sovereign. But the person without whose knowledge and consent, asked and gained in some orderly and proper way, laws could be made, and upon whom they could be enforced, was a subject without citizenship. Citizen and subject are not convertible terms—every citizen is a subject, but every subject is not a citizen, because from various causes he may either (1) never have attained to a place in the councils of the nation, or (2) may have forfeited it. To be a unit in a State

does not constitute citizenship ; but to be a legally effective unit in a State—as an initiator and administrator of its policy, purposes and plans—is to be a citizen.

The duty of the individual is to be all that his capacities, circumstances, opportunities, and position make it possible for him to become—to aim at and labour after the highest perfection of nature and condition within his reach—to aspire to rise to the supreme height of his life in all its possible outgoings and ongoings. The ultimate right of each individual is to be a self-hood developed into personal worthiness by self-control, self-culture, and self-conscious effort for the attainment of fixed ends and the fulfilment of predetermined purposes. This consciously directed growth and activity, this development of personal being, this sovereignty over self is Individualism. Its natural limit is that of personal capacity employed to its fullest in the perfection of the private character and nature of the agent, as an Individual—in the attainment of wholeness and wholesomeness of being. Individuality is conscious self-hood—is intentional identity of being, and aim, of reality and of purpose—is intelligent, responsible personal existence, willingly laboured for and accomplished by effort. Our personality is given to us at birth and in station, our Individuality is acquired by us by intent and action. It is the duty of duties that each man should become an individual—a fully developed personality, a conscious and intentional worker out of definite designs in harmony with his nature, condition, powers, and opportunities. Whosoever has failed in that, has failed in effecting life's supreme end in regard to himself, which is the true individualization of each human being.

But this individualization requires to be accomplished under conditions, and these conditions are perhaps peculiar to each. To work the primal germs of life and mind, which we are at birth, into a concrete and distinguishable whole, thoroughly differentiated from every other in the peculiar combinations of characteristics and acquisitions which make us noticeable, we make use of all that nature gives, civilization offers, and position confers. Within the limits of Nature's laws, and in accordance with them, we are compelled to contain ourselves in our efforts after personal development ; within the close environments of circumstances and opportunities, all our endeavours must be confined ; and in conformity with the civilization into which we are born, we are under the necessity of exerting our powers of will regarding the governing purpose of our personal development into a special selfhood. All men are, by the mere fact of existence, endowed with the same right, the right of individual development, and are charged with this same duty, the duty of perfecting, as far as possibilities allow, "the being that they are." This is the one equal right and duty to which all men are born, and this is the "liberty, equality, and fraternity" which is the birth-right of each human being—and thus—

"Each man's interest leads to all men's law."

The self-sovereignty of the citizen, the acquisition, culture, and exercise of self-hood is autonomic. But this autonomy, or right of being a law unto oneself, as it inheres in each, must be exercised by each in such a way that no avoidable infringement of the self-hood of others may be possible. As each has the self-same original right to be self-possessed and self-developed, any overt act of selfishness on the part of one must necessarily interfere with and effect the self-efficiency of another. Hence, that justice may be done to all, some limits must be imposed on each self, and by a mutual understanding this must be arranged and provided for. This mutual understanding takes the form of Law. It is the safeguard of civil life, and the guardian of Society at the same time that it is the shield of the personality of each, and the surrounding protection for each in his own select sphere of being and well-being. Law is, therefore, in its ultimate, so far as it is possible in any given state of society, the sum of the means thought to be best calculated to secure the safety of each and all by a mutual understanding of what is allowable and what must be avoided. It enweaves round the individual a safe area of autonomy, and it encircles social life with the precious freedom of an activity within fixed limits and known environments.

Law is the constraint of individual choice, for the general benefit of those who co-exist in civic life. But law does not restrain all human choice, or constrain all the outward acts of man. It only interferes with the active working out of such choices in man as, if allowed to have free course, would conflict with the choice and action of another, and by this collision of wishes and interests would tend to destroy the peace and harmony of the state of life called social, and so uncivilize civilization—as crime tends to do, and war does—in as far as it is the resolution of social life into the anti-social form in which each seeks the advantage he may most easily attain, whatever is the cost to others of that which he grasps and holds. Each man has an interest in each. Each is a composite element in an organic whole, and each must therefore so interact with others that all may go well. Hence law controls conduct, but cannot directly control character, and affects the outward life much more sternly than it can touch the inward nature of humanity. To be exposed to the unhindered and uncontrolled choice, desire, or caprice of another, is to be servile and without law; this servitude would always be the lot of the weaker; but as he who is the weaker is never really known till after trial, the disquiet of uncertainty would be ever felt, and life would be overweighted with care.

Legislation is disciplinary, intended to lead to the doing of what is thought to be right; and the observance of law is made obligatory by attaching to civic enactments punitive clauses to be enforced against those who fail to obey the registered will of the community. Coercion by penalties according to law is the means employed by the executive of the State to induce or compel the citizen to refrain from acting in opposition to the rights and interests of his fellows.

Citizenship is exercised under this legislative and judiciary restraint—a restraint, however, which reacts on the State by limiting its constraint of individual activity as well as limiting the freedom of the citizen. Law is therefore the protector of citizenship in its rights and claims, as well as the preventer or avenger of any attempted aggression, actual wrong, or projected violation of the duties and obligations incumbent on citizens. Law cannot reach motive, so as to control men; it can only act upon and prevent active manifestations of evil desires, overt transgressions. It cannot inculcate or enforce righteousness of thought or equity of motive; it can only repress undue neglectfulness in act, and enforce outward observance of formalities. Indirectly, by repressing evil, and by imposing restraints of acts of insubordination to morality, it may influence the mind in its emotional activities, but directly and of itself it is powerless for aught else than punitive discipline. The entire individuality of a man is the pledge which he gives to society that he will perform all legally determined duties, and abstain from the commission of any legally prohibited act, any overt motion or emotion, which will interfere with or injure any one or any number of his fellow citizens. All are pledged in the same manner, and give similar guarantees, and it is on this ground that society inflicts punishment in proportion to the offences committed against it, or against any of its members—for in a commonwealth an injury to one is a harm to all—by fine, or mulct in regard to property, by imprisonment or deprivation of personal liberty, by transportation or forcible expulsion for a time, or for life, from the commonwealth injured, by outlawry or *decitizenization*, by corporal suffering, from simple flogging to capital execution, for grievous offences; while for more venial transgressions of the civic pact it asserts its right to apply the ostracism of public opinion, and to deny the ordinary courtesies of social existence to those who show themselves to be heedless of the safeguards of civilization as laid down in the social customs, public etiquette, and civic legislation of the community. These penal inflictions on the individual constitute the external guarantees of civil life and social well-being.

But inasmuch as the individual pledges himself in his entirety as his security that he will fulfil the just requirements of the State, the State in its turn pledges its whole functions and possessions to the upholding of personal rights, and the promotion of individual happiness. It is the shield of rights and claims, of persons and property, of commerce and contracts. All its powers it promises and undertakes to employ in the prevention of social iniquities, in the arraignment of accused persons, and the punishment of convicted criminals, in the maintenance of the sovereignty of law, and in the perfecting of that organization of forces by which the choices, interests, right and claims of the citizen may be most effectively and perfectly carried out or secured. In so far as a State fails in circumscribing the overt acts of men within the decided and expressed wish of the citizens, as set forth in law publicly and pro-

perly determined on, it justifies conspiracy and insubordination, declares itself impotent, and ceases to have a fair claim to the fulfilment of civic duty and the financial support implied therein. This is the ground of asking that representation should be co-extensive with taxation, though the claim is equally strong that where life is pledged for the fulfilment of social duty, social representation should be extended as its safeguard.

Civilization is the result of the social co-operation of men, and the sum-total of human improvement attained by the combined intelligence and efforts of men endeavouring by united exertions to effect fixed purposes previously agreed on. Citizenship is therefore a condition of civilization. Citizenship is social aggregation, and implies duties to be done for the commonweal, and rights to be secured by the performance of these duties, and this, too, in a defined way by mutual recognition of the freedom of each, on the understanding that personal life shall be guaranteed as far as possible against injury, that family life shall be promoted and encouraged, that all the civic arrangements for the preservation and encouragement of these shall be for the common advantage of all, and that all that is sacrificed of private good shall be repaid by the enjoyment of peace and security made possible by the institution of means for the public good or general benefit of all. This established community of interests is civilization, and citizenship is partnership in civic life. Ever as public morality rises, and ethics becomes more thoroughly incorporated with society, civilization is enhanced, and the citizenship of the age requires a higher development and more extended scope. Personal liberty is perfected as social ethics attains to truthful development.

Civilization, as organized combination and co-operation, exists and professes to work for the preservation and improvement of the individual citizen, by the exercise of common counsels, and the exertion of common powers. John Stuart Mill, in his "Essay on Liberty," has laid down an inadequate law regarding the purpose and power of civilizing effort when he affirms "that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection—that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." This may be easily seen on reflecting that man neither becomes nor continues a member of society "to prevent harm to others," but to prevent harm to himself by lessening the likelihood of harm being done to him by others, and that the protection of self is the main use to which man applies existing laws and prevalent customs, so far as he actively and consciously employs them at all. It is for the amount of protection it affords to us, as well as to others, that we advocate and support law, and that we appeal to "the powers that be." Did self-protection not enter into the calculations of men, the wild savagery of individualism would be preferred by him to civicism.

On the belief, that that, which best prohibits and prevents the commission of injury by any on any, shall best tend to the protection of all, Civilization is founded, and hence it implies the self-protection of the individual as well as self-protection *from* the individual; the promotion, that is, of the individual welfare by the State, as well as the promotion of the welfare of the State by the individual. Citizenship is reciprocal respect of individualities on terms mutually agreed to, and, therefore, implies the best possible development of the individual as its prime aim. It is evident, therefore, that the very purpose of society is the best possible development of the individual; and that the only restrictions which society ought to put upon the development of any individuality, are those which shall at least tend to prevent it, in its development, from interfering to the detriment and deterioration of any other individuality. Citizenship involves co-accountability at least thus far: that no citizen shall so act in any overt manner, in any relation of life, as to affect intentionally the personal development of another injuriously; and the duty of the State, in this regard, is to see that the law legitimates the smallest possible amount of interference with individual life compatible with the maintenance, in full effectiveness, of the forms and advantages of civil existence.

At the very foundation of citizenship there lie the words, Duty and Right—two grand fundamental correlates, out of which law emerges. Law organizes duty and right into an engine of authority, at the same time that it compacts the interests of men into a trustworthy protection and defence against undue interference from fellow subjects on the one hand, and from authority on the other. Law is ethics embodied in enactment, and combined into a social force. Ethical imperatives appeal to the individual conscience, but legal imperatives exert their power upon the manifestations of life. They are the ethical imperatives of the civic commonweal consolidated into a code of duty, to which mutual obedience is demanded as the ground and condition of receiving the benefit and protection of civilization. Hence, neglect of duty is punished by withdrawal of right, and performance of duty is rewarded with civic protection and social respect or honour. Citizenship secures rights and enforces duties, and civilization consists in the equivalence of the value of the obligations incurred with the rights guaranteed—that state of citizenship being the noblest in which the fewest duties are imposed in return for the largest amount of guaranteed rights enjoyed, and the higher civilization yields the greater liberty.

The State is embodied order, and order implies obedience as the ground of permanence and the safeguard of progress. The citizen is the force-centre of effort, the source of progress, and the promoter of permanence and order through obedience. The State is impersonal; and though not an abstraction in reality, but a true and effective unity, it requires to be regarded by us as a vital congeries of constantly operating forces, of which the individual items are only constituents working out the will of the general

community without personal predilection, favour, or interest—instruments of a policy determined for them, and administrators of schemes propounded to them. The State is the whole body of the citizens, and the Government consists of those persons who have been selected to superintend and execute the behests of the State. The State gives the polity, the Government effects it by a determined policy—the polity is static, the policy is or may be variable; and hence the State endures though Governments change. The order of things does necessarily depend on the men who manage that order. But the progress of things expressly depends on those who possess originating functions, that is, on the citizens—the dynamic forces of the State, those who furnish its motive powers.

Order is not a good in itself. Order may be stagnation. It may maim and make halt the choicest powers of life, as was the case in the Middle Ages, and is the case in China and many parts of India. It is this sense of the impotency produced by the stereotyping of life, the fixing of its phases, and the moulding formalism of despotism that stirs the hate of the thoughtful and enthusiastic, and causes them to hold—

“It better men should perish one by one,
Than that earth should stand and gaze like Joshua's moon at Ajalon.”

This clogging standstill, and this mere maintenance of a fixed state, this resistance to the dynamic element in human nature, and this holding fast to the known and experienced excites the spirit of the enterprising, and utters itself in some such cry as—

Forward, forward let us range:
Let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of change!
Through the shadow of the globe we sweep into the younger day,
Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay!

But if order is not a good in itself neither is change. Alteration for mere alteration's sake is but a sorry mode of exercising the ingenuity of man or gratifying his constantly varying desires. We must recognize in change far higher functions than simple variousness; we must have change incorporated with progress, and we must content ourselves with order until the forthgoing energies of the soul of the age can show a purpose efficacious enough to move humanity from the mill-wheel rounds of custom, and the static forms of life and living into the forward-stretching pathways of progress, and into the dynamic exertions of improvement. It is by the union in the citizen of a due appreciation of the static or conservative force of order, and a proper degree of yielding to the operation of the dynamic principles of progress, that a commonwealth becomes glorious, and is indeed—

“A land of *settled* government,
A land of old and just renown,
Where Freedom *broadens slowly down*
From precedent to precedent.”

The acquired truths of natural and political science form the guarantees of moral order, and are the conservators of thrones and politics ; but the investigative faculties of man, and the researchful spirit of our race impel continually to strive after farther reaches of discovery, which, when attained, diffuse themselves among men, leaven social life, invigorates aspiration, excite the hope of man, and cause him to condemn the order of the past and aim at the development of the future.

Orderly progress, as an outgrowth of citizenship, is possible only when the citizen, having full opportunity of giving effect to his views and opinions concerning the right ordering of things, possesses also an ideal of a superior condition of social life than that which exists and is found in his own day and country ; is inspired with a belief in the possibility of attaining to that higher state of things, and animated by the hope of bringing it about, and is capable, either through sympathy or intelligence, of making choice of the best, readiest, and most appropriate means of accomplishing the transition from that which is to that which he desires should be. This implies, on the part of the citizen, intelligence, aspiration, and honesty of purpose—intelligence to perceive the defects of existing civilization, and to know the remedy likely to succeed as an improvement—aspiration such as to make him feel discontentment with things as they are, in so far as they seem to him to be capable of alteration for the better—and purpose, or the moral design of seeking, by such changes as appear to be safe and suitable, to promote the advancement of society and the progress of humanity. Hence the advantage in all social communities of free discussion, not only of things as they are, but of things as they might be, that the present conditions of life may be thoroughly understood, and the probable results of innovations may be as thoroughly as possible examined and tested by eager thought.

Progress is not inimical to order. Order is the critic of suggested progress, and progress is the critic of statutory order. Social life co-ordinates at once the static order of the past with the dynamic progress of the future in the transitions of the present, for the present always holds on and affiliates itself to the past, while it grasps forward to and impregnates the future. Love of the old and hopefulness of the new grow together into a complex love—the love of progress, and this becomes efficacious for human perfection. Hence it is that the far-seeing spirit is ever animated with hope of better things to come, and knows that—

“ Realms that wait in hoary State
Shall move to issues sweet and strange,
Love melts the iron rim of fate,
Around the weeping world of change.”

The good citizen sees and foresees—sees the benefits of long-matured order, foresees the advantages of well-considered pro-

gress ; labours with thorough dependence on the one, and labours with thorough independence for the other. Citizenship is dutifulness, and gives obedience to what is, and help to what is to be. Citizenship is rightfulness, and not only claims all that right makes his, but yields all that right imparts and secures to others. Citizenship is lawful liberty, is personal being developed to the utmost reach of faculty and opportunity in confraternity and brotherhood of feeling, sympathy and activity.

Our great constitutional historian, Henry Hallam, has very properly stated, that "Sceptres were committed, and governments were instituted for public protection and public happiness, not certainly for the benefit of rulers or for the security of particular dynasties." The people are not made to obey princes, or to submit to the mere behests of statesmen, but statesmen exist for behoof of the citizens, and princes are appointed to rule for the good of those committed to their care. The prince is the chief of the State, and the Ministry are his advisers and the people's servants. They hold their office on condition of causing, as far as in them lies, all the elements of civilization to work together for the general good of the citizenship over whom they are set, and to bring the greatest possible advantage to the State at the least possible expenditure of the comfort of the people, or the means by which the comfort of the people is affected. The growth, progress, development and enjoyment of personality is the highest and noblest good of humanity, and hence statecraft ought to reduce all active interference therewith to a minimum, and restrict every exercise of power as far as possible to the mere accomplishment of the aim of civilization—the augmentation of the happiness of man in security and community, the management of the changes in the conditions and arrangements of human life, so far as they are the result of effort and intelligence, so that they may on the whole tend to promote the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible numbers," and hence to make, or endeavour to make, all the necessary requirements of government permissive of, compatible with, or productive of a larger and larger amount of individual freedom and energy.

In the highest forms of citizenship there seem to us to be implied a need for a sense of civil security, that is, a fair chance of exemption from privation, pain, or constraint, of gaining or retaining tranquillity, ease, peace, and comfort, or those possessions, &c., by which human comfort is procured, promoted, or enhanced. This sense of security must cover the present and the future, and ought to be founded on and derived from the experience of the past. Memory, reflection, and foresight, ought all to be satisfied that a moral certainty of freedom from pain, danger, extraneous force, the ambitious or malicious intentions of others, has been provided for by the customs, laws, and government under which a man lives ; and that a trustworthy prospect exists, and may be expected to be enjoyed, of being treated, if not with

kindness and courtesy, at least with justice and rectitude, so much so as to be in no fear of personal injury, deception, oppression, or hurtful misrepresentation. He requires also to have some reason for believing that the subjection he yields, the tribute he pays, and the service he performs shall be all employed for the proper ends of the State, and not against himself and the civilization he desires to share.

The citizen requires liberty for self-development, for the exercise and enjoyment of his instincts, appetites, affections, faculties, powers, possessions—his passive and energetic nature, and all that belongs to them, in legitimate subordination to the enjoyment and exercise of a similar liberty in others. He has a just right to expect that no restraint or constraint may be put upon him or used towards him except such as is indispensable to his own well being, and the thorough and full development of the nature and self-hood of his fellow citizens. His acts must be such that he can feel that they are his own—the issues of his individual being, in conformity with the voluntary desires which are, in him, the springs of action. To ask more is to crave licence, to be content with less is, so far as it goes, to be willingly a slave, to be unduly subordinated in his personal being to requirements which hamper his full and perfect development and conscious self-hood.

That society may exist as a civic whole or a community, there must be a mutual understanding among its members of what is optional, permissible, and within the scope of individual duty, and what is imperative, legally required, and absolutely necessary to be done. Without this, social life is impossible, and civilization is only a splendid tyranny, a specious despotism, and a fatal sham.

Mutual aid, mutual reliance, associated effort, the right to trust in and reckon upon others are the great charms and blessings of civilization. These advantages, privileges, and benefits become possible only on condition that there is a mutual understanding concerning the reciprocations implied in civil life. No confidence, dependence, or co-operation could be effectively shown, felt, or acted upon, unless a mutuality of interests, rights, and duties were guaranteed by a common understanding. That supplies a centripetal force and gives cohesion to social life, that induces civility with trustworthiness, and imparts to society the structural cement which holds it together. This common understanding, whose effects so beneficially permeate civic communities, develops into, and manifests itself as Law—which thus becomes at once the safeguard of individuality and the prime structural support and stay of civilization—the protector alike of the social whole and the personal unit, because it is the embodied commands of Society, to which it is bound, as well as the interpreter of the obedience which is required of the individual in order that he may participate in the civilization of which it is both the outgrowth and bulwark. Law is a statement of all the enforceable

duties incumbent on all those who form part of the civil community among whom it is promulgated.

Civilization is carried on by the mutual or joint powers exercised through subordinate authorities, in such a way that while they all operate in their proper and normal form, each performs its obligations to the other, and exercises its rights with regard to each other, without encroaching upon each other, or usurping any of the rights, privileges, or possessions of others. On account of this necessity of working for common ends by different agencies, the State requires to make explicit declaration of its will in regard to the duties and obligations of citizens, and of the form, conditions, manner, time, and circumstance regarding their fulfilment; to make provision for the enforcement on the citizen of these duties and obligations, and to provide full opportunity for their due and specific performance. But the citizen, again, has claims upon the State for respect of his individuality, for the carrying out of all civic aims as desired and determined on, and for the holding of a just balance between man and man, class and class, interest and interest, &c. In order to secure this, Law is arranged for as the umpire and arbiter, in the ultimate, of the relative duties of each citizen with each, and of each with the State. The citizen may not only be cited to obedience and submission, but may also cite for fulfilment of contract and maintenance of right.

Out of a pure love of the right all law should emerge, and obedience should be rendered to it out of that same love of the right; but the love of the right is not in all cases and in all minds sufficiently powerful to induce true submission to its requirements, or the due observance of its decisions, and hence society sometimes requires to seek an obedience which is not prompted by a sense of right, but is stimulated by a sense of might. Society sometimes requires to enforce morality, and is not always able to accomplish that end through means directly appealing to the moral faculties or sentiments, and thus is under the necessity of introducing a lower measure of control over human desires and acts than a pure morality demands. This is what we mean by enforceable duties, that is, those duties to which, by the infliction of penalties, citizens can be impelled or compelled. Law can regulate overt acts, but cannot directly control or overrule emotions. It cannot compel to inward charity, though it may enforce outward benevolences—rates in aid of the poor. And in like manner it is unable to control, by its direct action, the workings of affections and emotions, reasonings, and the exertions of the will. It takes the citizen as bound to be submissive in heart, but it is only able to compel and enforce submission in overt act.

That the understanding come to in regard to law may be of such a sort as to meet the common sentiments of the members of a community, it must, as we have said, be mutual, be arrived at after the interchange of opinion the discussion of principles, the

consideration of plans, and the testing of the prevalency of ideas among those who are interested in the legislation of the commonwealth. In small communities this may be accomplished by the citation of each citizen according to a fixed form, and learning from them directly the mutual understanding to which they wish to give legal permanence and efficacy. In larger communities, where subdivision of the people has taken place, and where the population is vast, no such scheme of collecting the individual votes of the citizens is practicable, and hence some method of representing the general thought of the members of the community upon political matters requires to be adopted and employed. This again necessitates considerations, which we hope to epitomize and explain in a subsequent paper on "The Philosophy of Representation," but which we must, perforce, at present, suppose so to operate as to provide a permanent Committee of Public Safety, a suitable number of properly equipped agents, imperial, ministerial, administrative, consultative, judicial, executive, and protective, and a fair and moderate code of regulations for civic life. When the several imperatives to which the community in proper form has set the seal of its approval have been determined on, recorded, and made publicly known, they become the referable and enforceable rules of social existence, and the citizen is justified or condemned in proportion as he conforms to or disregards these decisions of the body corporate.

To this positive authority the citizen owes submission in so far as it holds its place as Civil Law, and claims only such service and obedience as leaves the individualism of the individual free scope for development, and infringes on, or asks the resignation of personal freedom in any matter only so far as is absolutely requisite to secure equal freedom of development to all the other members of the community—not as the conservators or distributors of equal personal possessions or privileges, but of equal rights and opportunities. This subjection does not detract from the right of the individual to agitate moral, social, and political questions, in such a way as to lead the community hereafter to bring its demands on the obedience and conformity of men into greater harmony with the best ethics, discoverable or revealed, to which the mind can attain, and may tend to inaugurate improvement, progress, and political reform.

The moral supremacy of the conscience is the only sure basis of individual happiness, and hence, if the general community command or demand submission to rules against which the conscience of the individual rebels, he is bound to employ all possible means open to him to secure permission to avoid conformity; but if the general decision of the social order be imperatively and irresistibly opposed to such a permission, the individual must submit to the doom of the citizens, and maintain the integrity of his own being though it cost the endurance of sufferings certainly morally unjust according to his light, when that is a light which has not

pierced the general gloom of the community. Though in the highest developments of social life true and genuine freedom of opinion and observance, when shown and known to be thoroughly conscientious, may be expected to have place among citizens, if they are not overtly used for the violent and undesired subversion of the Social State. As a general rule, therefore, the citizen may be regarded as bound to obedience to the law—and that all the more implicitly if provision is made, as there should be, for impartial debate, honest criticism, and conscientious agitation for change, improvement, and progress.

Obedience does not exhaust the duties of a citizen. Laws require to be administered, and purposes are in need of being carried out, and these demand from the citizens either personal service in their administration and effectuation, or the supply of the means by which those who labour and control may be rewarded for their intelligent supervision, or their effective accomplishment of what has been confided to them by and for behoof of the community. Service and tribute become the legitimate demands of the State for the promotion and carrying out of the purposes of the community as determined by the citizens either directly or through their representatives. No government can efficiently maintain its place among others, or honourably fulfil its duty to its constituents unless it can command, when required, the best services of the best men, as well as demand the supply of all needful requisites to enable it properly to execute the commissions entrusted to it. Citizens ought to hold themselves prepared for official positions if they are found best fitted for fulfilling the duties of them, unless higher calls from individual conscience interfere, and then they owe responsible considerations to society. In like manner, each citizen is in honour bound to pay justly, fairly, and willingly all such taxation as may be duly required for the efficient management of the national concerns.

It can scarcely be expected by anyone who knows how great is the dislike to pure speculation and theoretical philosophy which predominates in the English mind, and how averse we are in this country to act upon any truly logical method in legal, political, and social matters, that our theory of citizenship will harmonize with the practices prevalent in our own community. It is well known that, in our love for the practical, we have allowed such an agglomeration and accretion of makeshifts and expedients to accumulate, that law, politics, and civic customs form "a monstrous] chaos" of concreted institutions, of which no reasonable account can be given, and of which no philosophical explanation is possible. Civilization with us is not organically articulated, and logical, but experimentally devised and chronological, the result of what we call "the wisdom of our ancestors," but might more properly be regarded as "the progress and power of events." The set of artificial arrangements which we have woven together into a civilization, and call a constitution, has little consistency of

thought or plan in it, all its consistency is derived from its actuality. It cannot endure analysis or legitimate itself to the reason, because it is a complex of compromises between the readily applicable and the theoretically right. But it seems to be advisable in these days of reform to keep before our eyes the true conditions of order and progress, and to aim at the incorporation of these into all movements affecting civil life and human happiness. The more clearly we keep before us the nature, intent, and conditions of civilization, the more likely are we to conform our reforms to the truth of things and the nature of man.

We lay no claim to a practical acquaintance with politics, and we have no specific interest in the practical politics of the hour. We believe that honestly exercised opinion cannot but result in an approximation to the truth, and that all political action and agitation having truth as a main element in them must work advantageously for civilization. We simply profess here to consider the questions in politics which rise before us as philosophical ones, the investigation of which have an interest for thought independently of their ultimate practicability. At the same time, because we believe that the discovered truth of things must in the long run rule over and determine practical life, we have a hope that the cogitations of our speculative hours may aid in the furtherance of that good time coming when righteousness and equity shall prevail among individuals, classes, and communities; and when citizenship shall signify law-guarded independence.

Our theory of citizenship has special need of being pressed upon attention at the present time. As the masses become powerful, the individual is almost necessarily weakened; and persons are only effectively individual when they can impress the masses, and affect opinion. Life is no longer, as under savage ages, the struggle of one indomitable will against another's; it is the resistance and persistence of the individual against others in the combined force of opinion, or concurrence and companionship with them. Most men are contented "to be of opinion," though their duty and calling is to form, to have, and to exercise an opinion; for only so is life made truly effective. The proper duty of citizens is to go forth into life qualified and determined to seek truth ardently, vigorously, disinterestedly, and by free communion with the thoughts and doings of the great and glorious men of old—as well as with the impartial and honest thinkers of the present—to learn to weigh opinion, discern truth, and to be inspired with the modest courage, yet genuine daring of conscientious inquirers and actors; seeking to make others at once conscientious, free, and truthful, and endeavouring to induce all men to aspire after the noblest freedom of life—a life of obedience to honest and well-devised law—the result of due discussion and consideration by properly authorized representatives, and administered with fidelity, impartiality, and thoughtful adaptation—for that constitutes the citizenship of a free and civilized land.

Religion.

WOULD THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE IRISH CHURCH BE INJURIOUS OR BENEFICIAL TO PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY?

BENEFICIAL.—VI.

"E. B. O. R.," in the July number, says that "the union of Church and State may be a debateable question; indeed, it was debated in the very first volume of this serial, but it has really nothing to do with the question before us, which is not one of theory, but of practical effect."

This is a very curious statement, inasmuch as if there had not existed in England a Church in connection with the State, there is no ground for believing that there would have been an established Church in Ireland. I can quite understand that, as the "Church and State" question has been already argued in the pages of the *Controversialist*, it is unnecessary to go minutely into it in reference to the present subject; but to say that the establishment or disestablishment of the Irish Church "has really nothing to do" with Church and State is a mistake—the one hangs entirely upon the other.

The disestablishment of the Irish Church would, I think, not only be beneficial to Protestant Christianity, but one of the best things which could happen in a strictly religious point of view.

If we look at the title page of "The Book of Common Prayer," we find that "the *United Church of England and Ireland*" is mentioned; so that the established Church in Ireland is legally part and parcel of the Established Church in England. It has been said that popery would increase if the Protestant Church in Ireland were disendowed and disestablished; but surely those who hold this opinion must, of necessity, go farther, and add, that unless the State patronises and supports Protestantism in a pecuniary way it would soon die out, and, consequently, that it cannot be so closely connected with God as that He would put into the hearts of Protestants voluntarily to pay for the promotion of that which they consider to be the gospel truth.

"Establishment" means, in fact, pounds, shillings, and pence; and there is wealth enough in Ireland, as well as in England, to support, on the voluntary principle, every Church already erected, or hereafter to be erected, in either country. If Wesleyans, Inde-

pendents, and Baptists can support their several systems, it is, as it appears to me, an insult to churchmen to doubt, for one moment, that they are well able and, when the time comes, will be heartily ready to follow in the footsteps of these three great bodies.

I hold that "Protestant Christianity" in Ireland would have flourished to an immense degree beyond its present position, if the Protestant Church had *not* been established there; inasmuch as a church established by law necessarily loses its full power of free action, it is crippled in its movements. Certain "forms" of prayer *must* be used; certain "rites and ceremonies" *must* be followed; Acts of Parliament, articles, creeds, canons, and such like things, *must* be observed and obeyed; so that those who minister are tied and bound in many objectionable ways. When we consider, too, the great amount of liberality shown by those who do not belong to the Established Church in erecting and maintaining their several places of worship, I am almost inclined to wonder that there is any fear on the part of the laity about Protestant Christianity being injured if the Irish Church be disestablished.

I may be making a bold statement when I say that the real fear exists in the minds of the clergy, and that it arises chiefly on account of the downfall which would take place in their worldly positions. The clergy of an Established Church are, as such, of higher degree than the ministers of churches not established; an archbishop is called "his grace" because he is connected with a State Church; a bishop is called "his lordship" for the same reason, and so is an ordinary minister called a "clerk," all in a legal sense. These titles, of course, give them precedence over the "non-established ministers," and to do away with these things must naturally be annoying; still "Protestant Christianity" could not possibly be injured thereby.

"Christianity," if I understand that term rightly, means the gospel of Christ; and to say that men would not preach it, or cause it to be preached, however rich in this world's goods they may be, unless supported by the State, is to my mind one of the most unwarrantable statements which can possibly be made. In other words, unless Protestant Christianity be patronised and controlled by State rulers, consisting of "all sorts and conditions of men," of creeds and opinions exactly in opposition thereto, it cannot exist. This is the sum and substance of the whole argument on the "injurious" side of this debate.

Some persons, particularly the clergy, argue as if the movement made by that learned man, Mr. Gladstone, in reference to the Irish Church, proceeded through the agency of some "evil spirit," if not "Satan," in reality, who had got some controlling power over that great statesman; and inasmuch as such persons think that popery itself is "devil's" worship, it is also supposed that Mr. Gladstone is in league with the Church of Rome; so that there is a dreadful cry about "No popery," forgetting all the time that if Christianity means the gospel of Christ, it cannot be injured,

because whatever proceeds from God must of necessity be protected by Him.

I cannot find anything in the New Testament which leads me to believe, in the slightest degree, that any church whatever should be under State patronage and control, much less a church established, as in Ireland, in opposition to the wishes of the very large majority who disown its teaching, and despise and reject its whole system. If "Protestant Christianity" cannot be advocated, and carried out without the assistance of legal enactments, sure I am that Christ has not laid it down in the Scriptures that such assistance should be resorted to. If people will not believe in Him without calling in the aid of the law to try to make them, then it must follow that "Protestant Christianity" cannot be the Christ-like system its advocates claim it to be. Those who take the opposite side in this debate are bound, I submit, to be inconsistent in the advocacy of their principles. I cannot see how they can get over the difficulty, and shall therefore attentively watch their various reasonings.

"H. Scott," a writer on our own side, in the July number, rightly says that "England has again turned its attention to Ireland," and that "no true-hearted Protestant will leave the Church because it is freed from the patronage and control of the State; nay, rather will he feel himself bound to exert a greater power than ever for the maintenance and prosperity of that Church." And I will add to my colleague's remarks by saying that when the Irish Church—we will not now talk of the English Church, as that does not strictly belong to the present debate,—is disestablished, all the corruptions and wrongs as to the patronage of "livings," as they are called, and the "buying and selling" will come to an end. An established church, as such, and all the various inconsistencies belonging thereto, have proceeded from the acts of men, and do not form part of the pure gospel of Christ, and therefore must inevitably come to an end; and I firmly and conscientiously believe that Mr. Gladstone and his followers will, in the good time coming, accomplish the task they have taken in hand, notwithstanding the opposition and unfair and unchristian abuse they have been, and will be, subjected to.

The Irish Church question is an interesting debate, and I thank the conductors of this magazine for introducing it in their pages and permitting me to take part in the discussion.

Bristol.

R. D. ROBERT.

BENEFICIAL—VII.

DECIDEDLY beneficial.—To affirm the contrary is, I think, a gross libel upon Protestant Christianity, and betrays in him who makes it a lamentable want of faith in those glorious truths of Protestantism for which our forefathers suffered imprisonment and death, and in Him who is the head over all things to His church. Is the arm of the Lord shortened that He cannot save?

that earthly rulers must needs step in and interfere with His prerogative, and set up an organization of their own invention in preference to His divinely appointed one. Assuming that Protestantism is the truth, and Papacy error, truth being always found to be stronger than falsehood, and that as the stronger as a rule generally overcomes the weaker, supposing the circumstances of both to be equal, so Protestantism, or truth, fighting against Popery, or error, on equal ground, neither being helped, supported, or influenced in any way by the State, will as certainly as effect follows cause come off gloriously victorious, for if the Lord be on our side who can overcome us?

For God is above men, devils, and sin,
My Jesus's love the battle shall win,
On His mighty power I'll daily rely,
All evil before His presence shall fly.

As an advocate of free churches I am opposed on principle to all State church establishments. I believe that it is a violation of the spirit of true christianity for the State to interfere in any manner with the concerns of the Church of Christ. But I apprehend that the question before us is to be discussed apart from whether it is a right or good thing for a State to set up and endow one particular form or ecclesiastical system of religion in opposition to all others, and for such to be the national or State church. Many of those who now wish to see, and are striving for the severance of the episcopal church in Ireland from the State, maintain that those in England and Scotland should still remain as they are—the national churches.

It is admitted on nearly all hands, that the Roman Catholics in Ireland are at the present day more decidedly stauncher adherents of the papacy than any other people to be found on the face of the earth, and that this is the case in spite of Protestantism having been established in that country for the last two or three centuries. How is this? Surely there has been sufficient time for Ireland to have become at least as Protestant as England. We have heard of the triumphs of Protestant Christianity amongst the most savage, uncivilized heathens in the world, brought about in a quarter of the time. And what has brought about this result? Why, with the blessing of God, the labours of our devoted missionaries, sent out by our various missionary societies, were supported, not by the State, but by the voluntary system. God seems to delight to bless the free-will offerings of His people. "God loveth a cheerful giver." "Freely ye have received, freely give." Is not a solution of this question to be found in the fact that the Protestant religion has been thrust upon the Irish people, forced upon them whether they would have it or not? If I read my Bible correctly, I understand the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ to be one of love, persuasion, entreaty. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind, says the Apostle, not thou must

do this or the other, whether you conscientiously believe it right or not. "Come," says the Saviour, "unto me, all ye that are weary and heavy laden," &c. "Ho! every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters," &c. "Christ was lifted up on high that He might draw all men unto Him," not force them. But the Irish Church, as all State churches have done, and I think necessarily must do, more or less, has sought to promulgate its faith by force, coercion, the strong arm of the law, and we see with what unparalleled success. Physical force applied to man's will invariably succeeds in making him more inflexibly obstinate, and immovably determined in his own opinions and ways. It is like trying to bend iron with a steel hammer, or endeavouring to cut it through with a saw, but let the gentle flame of fire twirl noiselessly and quietly around it, and under its melting influence it will in a short time soften and bend as desired. So it is with the human heart, what force will not do love is able to accomplish. The bitter persecutions the Irish have suffered from English hands, in times past, on account of their religion, have made them naturally more averse than they otherwise would have been, not only to the teaching of the established church, but also of other Protestant denominations, and, humanly speaking, it can only be by lapse of time that this antipathy to the truth can be removed, even after the great stumbling block of the ascendancy of one religion over another shall be a thing of the past, and all jealousies, rivalry, superior social standing, &c., shall be swept away, and the way made clear for the union, in essentials at least, of all Protestant churches.

With the freedom of the Irish episcopal church from the shackles of the State we believe she will receive new life, fresh vigour. All her latent energies will be drawn forth by her necessities. She will soon realize the fact that if she is to exist she must exert herself, and put forth her own strength, relying, not on a State prop, but on Him who has promised to be with His church in all ages. As in individuals, the more self-reliant and independent they are, and the more they use and employ all their various gifts and faculties, the more they find they are enabled to do, and the more successfully. Dependence on others' help in most persons oftener produces more idleness and inertia than activity, and as the church is composed of individuals, what is true of the one may also be said to be true of the other. Where do we see the greatest amount of life and activity in the United Church of England and Ireland? Amongst the old State well endowed churches, or principally, if not entirely amongst the more modern ones, which have been built and are supported on the voluntary principle? I unhesitatingly answer in the latter. Coldness, lukewarmness, are with few exceptions the characteristics of those churches where the people are called upon to contribute next to nothing for the support of the Christian ministry and the spread of the Redeemer's kingdom in the world.

We have heard a good deal of the Established Church being the

great bulwark of Protestantism, but the doings in certain quarters of that Church of late years, does anything, I think, but justify this assertion. Would it not with more truth be said that she is the handmaid of Popery—the bridge which connects, and over which converts, or as we say, perverts, travel from the Protestant to the Romish faith—the portal through which many have, and and are still, we regret to say, passing through, either singly or in groups, from the ranks of Protestant Christianity, to that great antichristian apostasy of Rome. But of how few do you hear who go from amongst the ranks of Protestant nonconformists, and of those few, they are never known to go direct, but first pass through the Establishment, which appears so ably calculated to fit and prepare them for the superstitions of the Romish Church.

If the Irish Church is severed from the State, her advantages, we think, will be manifold. One of the greatest blessings, and the boast of Englishmen, liberty, will be hers, and with it, of course, power and control over herself, which she certainly does not now possess. She will be enabled to cut off those of her teachers who would assimilate her worship and doctrine to that abominable system which she professes to be the great bulwark against. She will then have the power to revise her book of common prayer, which so many eminent evangelicals desire, and purge from it everything contrary to the Word of God. The Canons and laws could be altered. The disgraceful system of buying and selling of livings could be removed, which would do away in a great measure with all those inducements for men to enter the ministry, who have no other recommendation than their being the younger sons of the aristocracy, and who are only too glad to join the Church for the sake of the emoluments or respectability of the profession, while they are as ignorant of the way of salvation as a new born babe, and so marvellously gifted with brains as to be unable to compose their own sermons. The Church would then, we believe, give forth no uncertain sounds, not half-Papacy half-Protestant, not that part only of the Bible is true and the other untrue, but that her trumpet sound would be clear and distinct, and that not a vestige of Popery would be found in her midst.

The closer a christian man adheres to the divine precepts in all things, so close does he approach the divine perfection, and the more he resembles his Maker, with the more complacency does God himself look down upon him, and that to bless him. So is it with the Church of Christ, the more she obeys, not some, but all the divine commands, imitates the patterns set before her in God's holy word, and implicitly trusts Him, rather than putting her faith in princes, and then, and not till then, can she expect to receive those favours and blessings which Christ has promised to every portion of His Church. When this is realized by the Episcopal Church in Ireland, we may, yea, we shall see her come forth in all her ancient pristine beauty, adorned as a bride prepared for her husband, to be a glory and blessing to poor benighted Ireland.

ZERO.

INJURIOUS—VI.

THOSE who are in favour of the disestablishment of the Irish Church make much use of the argument that its disestablishment is but an act of justice to the Irish people, and also, that placing it on a level with other denominations would go far towards suppressing that spirit of discontent which has been rife in Ireland for so lengthened a period.

On each of these points the blindness of the bulk of English Nonconformists is amazing. The Roman Catholics clamoured for emancipation, which, in 1829, was granted them, and when it was granted them they were as discontented as before, and have remained so to the present period. The Irish Church is not the greatest grievance of Ireland though it may be pretended that it is so. The Established Church of Ireland does not furnish such reason for the population of Ireland to be aggrieved as has been afforded by the English Church to the people of England, especially previous to the recent abolition of compulsory church rates. In Ireland there are neither church rates nor other payments, except tithes, for the support of the Established Church. All expenses of supporting the fabrics and worship are met by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, therefore the people of Ireland have had far less cause than the people of England to complain of an Established Church.

What, then, is the grievance of Ireland? What is it that the Catholic population of Ireland desire? Supremacy. Nothing short of this will satisfy them. And should the disestablishment of the Irish Church be granted, the discontent of Irish Papists will be as great as before. It is surprising that past experience has not taught the English people this. On this point we quote the words of an able living writer, who is personally acquainted with Ireland and her condition.

"This is the key to all the struggles and all the restless movements which have always characterized, and still characterize now, as much as ever the Romish Church. Look at Ireland—without exception the most thoroughly Romish, bigoted, priest-ridden country in Europe. What does Rome want there? Why can't she be quiet? Have not the Roman Catholics there well nigh everything that the Protestants have? Why, then, does she still go on as O'Connell bade her: 'Agitate, agitate, agitate?' Do you ask what she wants, and will go on agitating till she gets it? We will tell you in one word. Supremacy. She scorns toleration, or even to go halves. There was a time when she gladly accepted toleration from the hands of England, but as to equality and going halves, never dreamed of such a boon. But as to toleration now, she scorns the word as a badge of slavery; and that she should be treated only as an emancipated slave when she claims to be Queen—this does indeed rouse her ire. In Russia now, as once in England and Ireland, she gladly takes toleration when she can get nothing better. But give it she will not when she is in a condition to refuse it, as Spain can witness, where tolera-

tion is utterly disallowed, and none but Catholics can obtain even the rites of Christian burial. Power, then—absolute power, supreme dominion, unchecked authority is the grand object and ceaseless aim of the Romish system."

If these views be correct—as we believe they are—then the disestablishment of the Irish Church will not be beneficial to Protestant Christianity, neither will it allay the dissatisfaction of the Irish people.

The bulk of English Nonconformists view the disestablishment of the Irish Church principally as a political question, and greatly overlook the religious aspect of it. From before the passing of the Catholic Emancipation Act the greater part of English Nonconformists have dwelt on the injustice of not conceding to Roman Catholics privileges and liberties equal with those possessed by other religious denominations, apparently forgetting that the Church of Rome is a denomination different from all others, in the maintenance of certain tenets, as that—faith may be broken with heretics—a heretical sovereign may be lawfully deposed—heretical subjects may be justly punished for their heresy. The Church of Rome will not scruple to employ persecution for the punishment of whatever she views to be heresy, whenever she is possessed of the power so to do. The Church of Rome cannot, therefore, with justice to others, be dealt with as others, but must be kept with bit and bridle. To allow her liberty and power is to furnish her with the means of persecuting all who differ from her.

As proof that we are not now slandering the Church of Rome, we will adduce her own evidence, from one of her own periodicals—the *Rambler*, for September, 1855.

"You ask, if the Roman Catholics were lords in the land and you were in a minority, if not in numbers yet in power, what would he do to you? That, we say, would entirely depend upon circumstances. If it would benefit the cause of Catholicism he would tolerate you; if expedient, he would imprison you, banish you, fine you, possibly he might even hang you. But be assured of one thing, he would never tolerate you for the sake of the glorious principles of civil and religious liberty. Shall I hold out hopes to the Protestant that I will not meddle with his creed if he will not meddle with mine? Shall I lead him to think that religion is a matter for private opinion, and tempt him to forget that he has no more right to his religious views than he has to my purse, or my house, or my life-blood? No; Catholicism is the most intolerant of creeds. It is intolerance itself, for it is the truth itself."

In England a large and increasing number of the Episcopalian clergy are ritualists. We have reason to believe that the majority of the Irish Episcopalian clergy are not. We know it to be a fact that many of them are thoroughly anti-ritualistic. Placed in the midst of the adherents of Popery, they preach against it, and point out its enormous evils. Many of them we know to be self-denying and devoted, spending their private property for the benefit of

their Catholic parishioners, who in many instances place such confidence in them as to entrust them with the distribution of their savings in the way desired by them. We know that a Catholic has quite recently put into the hands of the Protestant clergyman more than £300 for distribution amongst his family. Other similar cases have come to our knowledge. These individuals dare not let their own priests know that they are possessed of money. Had they done so it must have been produced for the service of the Church, or, if refused, then the individuals so refusing it would be published at the altar. It is evident that in such cases as these the Irish Church is a barrier against Popery. In these cases the priests have withheld from them an influence which they otherwise would have, and money is kept from being applied to the maintenance and propagation of some of the most awful of delusions. The disestablishment of the Irish Church, by depriving the clergy of their status, would cause them to lose their present importance in the eyes of the people. And in many of the parishes of Ireland, composed almost entirely of Catholics, where would the means be found for the support of a Protestant church or chapel without an endowment? Parish after parish would be left without a Protestant teacher. The small flocks of Protestants in the country districts would in a short time be absorbed by the Papists. And can we avoid the belief that when there is no longer a Protestant pastor many of the people will forget Protestantism, and the children will be trained up in Popery? Thus Protestantism will speedily vanish from many districts, leaving the ground clear for the sway of the Romish priests.

We believe we have shown that the Established Church of Ireland has been, and still is, productive of a certain good. And in looking around us we perceive various institutions and customs to be in existence the introduction of which we should have opposed, yet we cannot now vote for their abolition, because we see them to be productive of certain benefits. If, without having any light from the experience of others to guide us, we were at this time settling a constitution for a country, we should probably oppose the existence of a standing army, as calculated to give the government the means of encroaching on the liberties of the people. But now the existence of such an army is a realized fact—having had an opportunity of observing the working of such an institution—having proved how it can be hedged round with restrictions so as to render it harmless to the nation's liberties, and how it can be made promotive of the nation's welfare, we would not lift our voice for its disbandment. Being a Nonconformist we would make opposition to the State commencing to endow any denomination, yet seeing, as we do, that the Established Church of Ireland is attended with certain good results, we would allow it to remain, on the principle that of two evils it is wise to choose the least. We fully endorse the sentiment expressed by Luther, in his letter to King Ferdinand, "In this world many

wrong acts will ever be done, which oftentimes, when done we must allow, to prevent greater wrong." And here we must admit in spite of our opposition on principle to Church Establishments, that such establishments have one very great advantage connected with them, and a freedom from one great evil. Who is so free as a beneficed clergyman? He is master of the situation. His income is safe, his glebe, house, garden, are his freehold. However displeasing to his hearers his preaching may be, on account of its truthfulness and faithfulness, none can call him to account, starve him out, or by the use of either crafty or forcible means vote him out, as has oftentimes been done amongst dissenters, when the minister has displeased a rich hearer, or a lordly deacon. How desirable a situation is that of a beneficed clergyman, for a faithful minister, in which none of his hearers, or all of them combined, have power to eject him from his position! We freely admit that this position of the ministers of an established church is a powerful argument in favour of church establishments. And it is an argument against the disestablishment of the Irish Church. Should all her faithful ministers continue after the disestablishment of their church to preach in Ireland, their disendowment would be a curtailment of their independence, and consequently an injury to Protestant Christianity.

Certain institutions and customs, the introduction of which we should have opposed, have become almost, if not quite, essential to the stability and well-being of a country. A certain weight has been placed upon them, they have been made to perform a certain duty, they have become the means of upholding some principle which we deem to be precious. Had they never been introduced their work would have been performed in some other way, but should they now be removed the place which they occupy could not easily be filled, and not at all without injury to that which it is of the first consequence should be upheld. We might oppose a house being built so as to have a beam in a certain position to support some of its parts, and advocate that those parts should be supported in some other way, but if we met with a house which is so built, we would not, because it has not been constructed in a way we should have approved of, remove the beam which bears so much of the weight of the building, and thus risk the downfall of the house.

These remarks apply to the Protestant Church in Ireland. Had we been determining what the State institutions of Ireland should be, we should not have advocated the setting up of a Church Establishment. But now it is set up, and we see it to be filling a certain place for good, we would not, because we are opposed to church establishments, remove it. We believe that the Irish Church cannot now be forcibly pulled from its place without letting down that which rests upon it, and that it is for the welfare of the nation that it should stand.

Popery is certain to be a gainer by the disestablishment of the

Irish Church. The fact that Roman Catholics are so desirous of such a consummation sufficiently shows that they view it as an event that would favour their own religion. As to their profession that they do not desire a State endowment for themselves, but simply to have all religious denominations on a level, these pretensions are not worthy of the slightest regard, as is shown by their own avowed principle that it is lawful to break faith with heretics. What reliance can be placed on the most solemn declarations from any individual who unblushingly avows such a sentiment? To labour for the disestablishment of the Irish Protestant Church under the cloak of a pretence that equality with others is all that is desired, and when that disestablishment is accomplished, turn it to her own ends, would be but an instance of the subtlety with which Rome has ever acted. We are only surprised that those who have seen so much of her craft are not better aware of what ends she has in view.

That Popery would gain by the disestablishment of the Irish Church is a belief we are confirmed in by Mr. Gladstone's reserve on the subject of what he would do with the revenues of that church should it be disendowed, also by his similar reservation of his intentions respecting Maynooth. If he has no sinister end in view, why this reserve? And is not the favour shown to his measure by Roman Catholics, a sign that they expect it to be promotive of their cause? Doubtless his own tendencies are towards Ritualism, and from such a quarter we do not expect a measure that makes against Popery.

Though opposed, then, to a state-endowed church, we believe the maintenance of that which now exists in Ireland to be a far smaller evil than the furtherance of Popery, with all its delusions, cruelties, and wickednesses, the power of which we believe will be furthered by the disestablishment of the Irish Church, and consequently Protestant Christianity *injured*. S. S.

INJURIOUS.—VII.

PROTESTANTISM is superior to political exigencies and religious freedom, is more valuable than freedom from Irish riots and Fenian rebellions—even if it could be proved that Fenianism and the tendency to rioting in Ireland really had any connection with the state of the Irish Episcopal Establishment; and, therefore, Protestants should hesitate before they overturn the so-called tyranny of the Episcopal Establishment in Ireland in favour of the Roman Catholic supremacy in one-third of Britain. Are Protestants willing to admit that the Royal supremacy—which is in our country the Sovereignty of the people—has perished, and that Papal supremacy has taken its place, has been seated on the abdicated throne. Justice to Ireland is surely not to be bought at the cost of injustice to the Protestantism of the British Empire; and the political fortunes of Britain are surely not to be imperilled for the sake of adding a new temporality to the Pope, who has failed in Italy, and has had

notice to quit Spain. Are we to stride back to the thirteenth century that we may fully satisfy the requirements of society in regard to freedom in the nineteenth century. Roman Catholic supremacy may—though that is most doubtful—get rid of Fenianism, but would the bane not be worse than the antidote?

The Irish Church has been misrepresented to be a badge of Saxon tyranny and enslavement. That church is no more a badge of that sort than the throne is, than the British parliament is, than the law of the land is, than the union of the realms. There is no enforcement on the Irish of belief in or even of attendance on the creed and services of the Irish Church. There are no revenues attached for the support of that form of worship to which any body, or set, or class can lay a claim to; the prescription of ages has given that right which law scarcely ever interferes with, though revolutions may. Nor would it be likely to restore the peace of Ireland to set on foot a scramble for the revenues of the Church in Ireland. The lands of Ireland have been purchased or inherited with this burden on them. If they have been purchased, then they have been bought so much cheaper on account of these burdens; if inherited, then they are inherited by that very law according to which the burden of the support of the church has been laid upon them; so that, in either way, no claim to the possession of these revenues can be made out by any proprietor. If any tenant is burdened with revenue payments, he gets his land at a lower rent in consideration of this burden, and he has therefore no claim. If neither of these parties has a claim, are we to use the church revenues as a sop to the landlord, or a bribe to the tenant to subdue Fenianism. If these parties are not to get the revenues, what difference will it make to them whether the church gets it, or any other scheme of imperial policy? Is there any imperial policy on which the church revenues can be employed on which all men are agreed? It is not education; for the united education of Ireland has been destroyed, as far as they had it in their power to do so, by the priesthood of Rome. It is not land reclamation; for that raises rents as well as succeeds in raising crops; and it would imply that land reclamation was of greater importance than soul reclamation. It is not tenant-right, for that cannot be settled by any expenditure of church revenues, unless Mr. Gladstone proposes to carry out Mr. Bright's plan of the compulsory sale of Irish estates, and uses the church revenues for the purchase-money. But it is doubted if this would be at all a successful scheme, while Irishmen remain improvident, and given to over-population. It has been denounced as a scheme likely to foster pauperism, overcrowding, and general debasement.

It seems to be clear then that Protestant Christianity would be injured by the abolition of the Irish Church in the first instance, by the weakening of that church in its legal status, in its income and in its power as a witness for the faith of the Reformation. Again, Protestant Christianity would be injured by the disestablishment and

disendowment of the Irish Church, by the necessity it would bring along with it of levelling down the other Protestant sects of Ireland, by the withdrawal of any grants given to them. Another injury done to Protestant Christianity would arise from the increased power the papal priesthood would have and acquire. But even more, Protestant Christianity would be injured by the struggle and scramble which would ensue as to who was to get hold of "the mammon of unrighteousness," which the Irish Church was compelled to relinquish; and by the terrible agitations which would arise concerning the appropriation or the misappropriation of these funds. Still further, Protestant Christianity would be injured by the example shown of the disregard felt for the prescription of ages, and the consecration of objects in connection with religious endowments of all kinds, and of church funds of every sort.

Besides, it ought to get some consideration whether the tithe ought not first to be confiscated, and an experiment be made with that before the church is touched; and this suggestion is all the more pertinent because the woes of Ireland have all along been far more agrarian than arian, or trinitarian or supralapsarian. The Established Church is generally supposed to get a tithe or tenth part of the produce of the land, in reality they do not get a fiftieth of it, and by far the larger proportion of that which is rightfully ecclesiastical has been taken possession of by the landlord, so that although seventy-five per cent. of church revenue has been allowed to lapse into the proprietors' hands, the tenant-right of Ireland has not been one whit improved. Well, this is a substantial refutation of the idea that great benefit would accrue to the population of Ireland, from the cession to the landlord of the remaining twenty-five per cent.

This is not a question of liberty of religious teaching as an act of mutual justice in religion, as it is sometimes represented to be. Rome does not tolerate opinion, will not be contented with equality, grasps at ascendancy. Nonconformity is Rome's abhorrence, and hence Nonconformists mistake the matter if they fancy that they are promoting religious equality by helping the Roman Catholic Priesthood to pull down the Irish Church. Rome will use them willingly enough as tools, but it will quite as willingly trample on all the rights of the soul now as in time's past—

"When Popes bear rule then heretics must burn."

By the discouragement of Protestantism and the encouragement of Popery, freedom of religious belief is not to be gained. The proscription of truth and the patronage of error—which concessions made to Popery are, cannot but injure Protestant Christianity; and alas! as of old—by the action of Nonconformists and the selfishness of England's clergy, the true faith is being most seriously injured in the house of its friends—and this, even this, is injurious, how injurious, who can tell, to Protestant Christianity.

M. D.

Literature.

ARE SENSATIONAL NOVELS SUPERIOR TO NOVELS WITH A PURPOSE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"It cannot be denied that a peculiar interest attaches just now to fiction, from the quantity of it produced, and from the influence which it exerts upon public opinion and feeling. The great mass of those who read at all begin by reading novels, essays, &c., and many people read little else all their lives."—JAMES HANNAY.

"The mass of mankind, in all ages, are more interested in the study of facts than of opinions; in listening to accounts of great and marvellous adventures, than to commentaries on the admiration of which they may be deserving."—COLONEL WILLIAM MURE, OF CALDWELL.

GOOD Archbishop Whately, his daughter tells us, loved fiction, fairy tales, and fairy-mythology, and "was always ready to answer the scruples of many excellent persons against fiction by observing that the imagination has been given to us by God, and that as He has seen fit to bestow it, it must assuredly be intended to be employed." This is a most judicious observation, and goes at once to the root of the question of the legitimacy of the perusal of novels. Fiction is not necessarily falsehood. Falsehood is the representation of that which is knowingly false as true, with intent to deceive, for the attainment of some end of our own. Fiction in its very name carries the fact that it is feigned, fashioned, formed, and worked up, and not actual, real, historic, or matter of fact. A novel is something new, and therefore, though told as an occurrence, bears in its name that it is not a narrative of what is old and historic, past and real. Inventiveness is put forward in the very name. Incident is the very groundwork and essence of fiction, and that incident is admittedly not presented but represented; and not represented as truth but as truth-like. Life has only a certain region of activity, and is closely encircled by law; but fiction can fancy any of these laws abrogated, and construct a narrative of events in which the possibilities of things are alone attended to within the limits of probability.

The plot is the main element in a novel; that is the first point inquired about regarding any new novel, and everything else sinks into insignificance before that—scenery, historic accuracy, conversational talent, wit, moral. The story is the great matter of interest. Well, the story is the sensational part. The incidents involved in and evolved by the plot; the interest excited by the development of events and character, the thrillingness of "the hairbreadth 'scapes" and strange occurrences constitute the most attractive

elements of the novel as a novel, and to the perfection of this all other considerations require to be held secondary. Novels ought not to be composed, as sermons too often are, by choosing a text, and then constructing a series of arguments to prove or enforce it. If any one pitches upon a particular moral as the foundation, groundwork, or result of his production, and then makes or finds a story to suit the inculcation of that moral, it is pretty plain that he is not very likely to give his whole mind pure and simple to the bringing out of a plot, but of a moral treatise or a sort of narrative tract; and that, in so far as this moral influences the course of the story, it must do it to the hurt and injury of the work as a novel—that is, an interesting narrative of complicated nature, in which, through various changes, a certain end is accomplished amid difficulties and sometimes disasters.

The very reason of a novel's being is that it is an imaginary narrative which excites interest in the incidents, persons, scenes, and plot. If a novelist comes to us saying, like the needy knife-grinder, "Story, God bless you, I have none to tell, sir," we look upon him as we would upon a soldier who never intends to fight, a wedded celibate, a tradeless merchant, or a freshwater sailor. He spins no yarn, and it is just a yarn that we want. No amount of garnishing with wit, poetry, descriptive prose, good moral teaching, &c. can compensate for want of an exciting plot, having that the reader can endure a great deal, and he soon gets practised in the art of skipping, which is the novel-reader's safeguard against novels with a purpose.

The word *sensational* applied to novels is somewhat of a slang term. It is a modern term recently introduced as a condensation of the old form of praise used to characterise a good novel, viz.—It is of such supreme interest as to enthrall the reader, and wherever it has been read it has created quite a sensation. Sensation, in this phrase, means a strong and vivid excitement of the faculties from the reality and power imparted to the story, being such as almost to make one feel that what is narrated to the intellect has been made perceptible to the senses. Thus, *sensational* really signifies realistic, having the power to impress the mind with a strong sense of possibility and probability.

"Romance has been elegantly defined as the offspring of fiction and love;" the novel may, in the same fashion, be defined as the daughter of character and event. The felicities of a fine imagination, accurate observations on human nature, enchanting elegancies of style, forcible representations of the passions, learned researches into the secret recesses of history, or ingenious pictures of manners and customs do neither singly nor combinedly constitute a novel, though any or all of them may have place in them. The one characteristic of a novel is plot; it is the prose epic of our day, and of all the qualities of the epic the fable is the first. "The romance is the older form of prose fiction, the novel the later one. The romance deals with the wonderful, the novel with common life. In our own times the novel has elbowed its elder brother almost

entirely out of the world. The great mass of our fictions are delineations of the state of life and society in which we ourselves exist, not borrowing the *forms* only of the contemporary world (as the old romances, by clothing their heroes in feudal garb also did), but confining themselves within the boundaries of its beliefs, ideas, and sympathies. But the novel in this shape is quite a modern production; not so ancient as our poetry or drama, and hardly more ancient than the beginning of last century." (James Hannay's "Course of English Literature," *Fiction*, p. 235).

Real life and manners; a plot, incidents, and characters copied or derived from the ordinary course of society mark out the novel from all other kinds of literature. Literature with a purpose naturally falls into sermons, treatises, disquisitions, dissertations, essays, tracts, &c., and only makes a hybrid sort of literature when it joins itself to the novel, and appears in disguise as such. It is very easy to decry sensational novels as the literature of crime, bigamy, adultery, and sin. This, however, is taking the extremes as the essence of the definition. No definition from extremes is possible; and therefore no argument could be held from such a point. It is true that in real life great crimes, forgeries, murders, adulteries, burglaries, the abduction of women, the change of children, &c. create a sensation; it is equally true that the chief interests in life are those which relate to the essentials of it—in what way a man progresses with his wooing, and woman with her winning of partners for life. For the same reason it is that—

"Most novels paint at full length people's wooings,
And only give a bust of marriages."

This only proves all the more that the sensational is that which interests, that it is not the purpose but the plot that sets young hearts a-bleeding, and detains old ones reading, and hence that sensational novels are superior to novels with a purpose.

The question under discussion is neither to be settled by a comparison of names, nor by a comparison of novels; neither by an enumeration of the writers who fill the one role as opposed to that of authors who fill the other, nor by a contrast of novel with novel in the respective schools. The true solution is to be found only by comparison of the class of novel with the definition of the novel. If we could once come to comprehend the original intent of the novel, we would have some means of determining the question in dispute; for that certainly is superior which comes nearer to the proper type of the thing under consideration.

It unfortunately happens that it is very difficult to get a proper definition of a novel. It is almost invariably taken for granted that it is far better understood than easy to describe, and hence it is that we have some difficulty in finding any standard of appeal. This increases the difficulty of conducting the discussion; for if we could lay down an authoritative definition as that of an impartial person, we could compare the several classes with the definition ac-

cepted and come to a decision without much delay, but we have as yet been unable to do this.

"Sensational" has been used by most of the writers on the opposite side of this question as synonymous with "Criminal." This is a fallacious use of the word. Indeed, all those catch phrases which condense ideas into epigrams are peculiarly liable to misapplication. The kind of novels I understand to be meant by the comprehensive and expressive term Sensational is that in which the interest arises from the intense realism of the plot and passion, and from the absence of any potent underlying purpose of a moral sort; such novels being written mainly for pastime, excitement, and entertainment, in consonance with the rules of art and not as ingenious sermons, schoolmasterly advisings, and disguised tracts. In this category are the novels of Sir Walter Scott and Fielding; Thackeray and Brontë; Braddon and Wilkie Collins, while Richardson and Edgeworth, Dickens and Gaskell, Miss Sewell and Nathaniel Hawthorne may stand as representatives of the purpose school. Lord Lytton cannot be quoted on either side. James, Lever, Croker, Lover, Eliot, and Wood may also be classed among sensationalists, while Hall, Craik, Oliphant, Disraeli, Hannay, and Martineau may be regarded as fair representatives of the writers of "novels with a purpose."

It is to be observed that this is not a question of the merits of Miss Braddon as compared with George Eliot, of Charles Dickens against Charles Reade, of Wilkie Collins versus Thackeray, and so on. It is a question of principle. We may have sensational novels written with a purpose, and we may have novels of purpose full of sensationalism; but what we want to get at is which class of novels, as a class, is more accordant with the aim of the branch of literature to which they belong than the other. We express our opinion unhesitatingly that sensationalism is indispensable to a novel, that it forms a *sine qua non*, that purpose is secondary, and plot primary, and therefore it is quite plain that sensational novels are superior to those with a purpose: That sometimes a sensation is sought to be created by illegitimate means, from an artistic and a moral point of view, it would be next to folly to deny; but we could point out equal faults committed in novels with a purpose, such as overlaying the incidents with colour which does not belong to them. Often, indeed, the most offensive of all novels are those which seek to excite a sensation in order that the purpose may seem more triumphantly established. While the truth is that the purpose of most events in life scarcely ever transpire—even with the advantage of "crown's quests" and open law courts.—B. D. M.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

It seems to me that the authors of the affirmative articles in the August number of the *Controversialist* have not drawn the proper line of demarcation. To place all novels of a didactic or preachment kind on one side, and all plot ones—terming them sensational, on

the other, appears wide of the mark. The subject of debate, it is true, is somewhat ambiguous; but still I think, if the line be rightly drawn, there will be no difficulty in obtaining a clear result. In order to accomplish this, in the first place, sharp and distinct definitions of the two classes of novels must be arrived at. This may be easily done, in my opinion, by simply arranging them, as they fulfil or do not fulfil certain conditions shortly to be explained, under two heads—good and bad. Under the former I should include all novels that produce tonic-like effects, by administering healthy excitement and recreation to the mind. Under the latter I should arrange all the creeping, sensational sort, during the reading of which one feels as if oppressed by the nightmare, together with those of a more or less pernicious kind, the aim of which is to excite our emotions, sympathies, and admiration on behalf of the vicious and criminal. Here, then, I would draw the line, and I think there cannot be any question regarding the side to which we ought to yield the palm.

C. H. S. states that every novel must have a purpose; and that purpose, he tells us, is only to cause pleasure and excitement by carrying one on from surprise to surprise. Surely this is a low estimate of what a novel should be! For instance, suppose an author composed a novel with the constant aim before him, not only of amusing his readers, but of benefiting them by means of exciting their sympathies in favour of all that is good, generous, noble, and true! Undoubtedly this would be a novel with a purpose, although there might not be anything whatever didactic about it, and though the said purpose might be so concealed that it could not be seen but only its influence felt. Of such a kind are the works of Dickens, Sir Walter Scott, and all the best writers of fiction. The reaction after perusing them is healthy. We feel as if we had been in good company, and therefore that we are better in every respect. As we are led on to perceive the triumphs of right over wrong, virtue over vice, and honesty over knavery and villany, our sympathies are widened and the better part of our nature is encouraged and refreshed, so that we feel more confidence in fighting the battles of life.

With regard to what are termed "preachment novels," it seems absurd to call them dishonest because they aim at instruction as well as amusement. They may form channels by which certain principles and truths may be more forcibly and pleasantly conveyed than by other means; as the very name and title of a treatise or sermon often repel the generality of readers. Besides, truths may be brought home to the minds of some people in this manner who could not be got at in any other way.

The sensational novel, as I have attempted to define it, is highly objectionable in every respect. Its sole aim is excitement—no matter by what means produced, if only this end can be obtained. From step to step through a maze of vice and crime the reader is led onwards; the agony is heaped up till the climax is attained in

some greater monstrosity than all the preceding ones. The stronger the excitement produced, the more powerful the writing is said to be! Powerful writing forsooth! If we analyze it we shall find how closely it resembles a sensational newspaper report of some horrible crime. The persons who are addicted to this kind of reading are something like opium eaters. Succeeding doses must be made stronger, the situations more startling, the monstrosities more horrible, or they fail to produce the desired effects.

The progress of this sensational writing is, in my opinion, greatly to be deplored. Confined at first to the lowest grade of fiction, like a young bird trying the power of its wings by making bolder and bolder flights, till at length the most daring is accomplished with impunity, it made tentative efforts upwards. Emboldened by success it soon made rapid headway; and the kind of literature that was found to be so successful in pandering to the morbid appetites of imperfectly educated servant girls and 'prentice boys, has been found equally successful when introduced to the higher ranks. Other "sensationalities" have at the same time been coming on to the foreground—performances on the high rope and the trapeze; sensational songs and plays; the "cancan;" Madlle. Finette; and, at length, introduced under the highest patronage, Madlle. Schneider. The fillip has been given to the ball down the incline, and who knows when or where it will stop?

It is said in extenuation of sensational novels that they are useful reading, inasmuch as they give faithful photographings of life, which is made up of lights and shadows. That life has its light and dark sides no one can deny; but how is it calculated to diminish the darkness, which should be the grand endeavour of every nation, by leading the fancy to delight in scenes of terror and deeds of violence, and by constantly bringing prominently in view, and investing them with a sort of halo of admiration, questionable heroes and heroines? Surely enough is recorded in the daily papers of the actuality of the said *dark* sides, without the necessity of resorting to the imagination!

If we take into consideration the prevalence of fiction at the present time, and how it finds a place in every household, for the sake of religion, morality, humanity, civilization, and all that is ennobling in manhood and womanhood, let it be of a wholesome, not of a sensational kind.

GRIMWOOD.



Politics.

WAS THE ABYSSINIAN WAR JUSTIFIABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"An Englishman may look with great satisfaction at the whole of the expedition to Abyssinia, in which there was such humane regard to the welfare of all concerned; such justice in dealing with a barbarous people, whilst the object was so pure, and accomplished by a man who seemed to be influenced by great principles. We, as Englishmen, may see him go from one position to another, mastering the difficulties of the way with great sagacity and diligence, climbing up those passes and those fastnesses, which are twice as elevated as our highest mountains, and at last climbing up to Magdala, and accomplishing the entire reduction of that nest of brigands."—*The Hon. and Rev. Baptist W. Noel, M.A.*

MAY we be allowed just gently to hint to the writers on this question that a little more instructiveness and interest would have been given to this debate, had we had a statement of facts on which to rest, and by which to test the arguments laid before us. I am not a little surprised that one or other of the Controversialists did not provide such a *vidimus* of the antecedents and the processes of the war as would have afforded a sufficient ground and supplied some ultimate reference for, or about, the arguments employed. This seems to me a great drawback to the just comprehension of the reasonings employed in this debate. It ought to have been remembered that the Abyssinian war was the culmination of nearly twenty years of history, and it might almost be said that it was only an offshoot of our doubtful Crimean war. That war which made such a noise was just going on when Theodore was contesting his right to the throne against all comers, and when Abyssinia was engaged in war with the Turks in Egypt, who taking advantage of the unsettled state of that country, had made inroads upon its territory and taken possession of a considerable portion of the lands which ought to have passed into the power of the Emperor Theodore, when he succeeded in defeating Ras-Ali, Dejug Oubié, and their generals.

The Emperor Theodore hearing of our procedure in the Crimea took up the idea that we were in favour of the Turks all through, and that we approved of all that they did. Acting on this foregone conclusion, and nursing the foolish fallacy of his own heated imagination, as if it had been the legitimate daughter of truth, he looked with an eye of "hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness" on British commerce and British progress and pursuits. His

jaundiced eye—jaundiced by the usurping traitor's self-reproachful consciousness of wrong—saw enmity in all that Britain undertook, and developed itself into a false idea that he was the special mark for British espionage and enmity. Having arrived at this conclusion on merely hypothetical surmises, he determined that he would take the first hand at active measures. Every reverse, every alight, every difficulty to which he was subjected, grew in his mind to be connected with British influence and antagonism. He banished the Catholic missionaries, and encouraged German Protestants because they proposed a plan by which he hoped so to improve the industries of his own country as to become independent of Britain; for they proposed to introduce handicraftsmen as their missionaries, and so to civilize and christianize step by step. He saw the advantage of this arrangement in the pursuance of his schemes, and he declared his readiness to accept as many artizan scripture-readers as they might send to him. So far, then, his interest and that of the missionaries coincided. Dr. Krapf and imperial craft were at one. He had, however, not an atom of love for the scheme, except as a counteraction to British influence. Our Mr. Plowden, who had been a Calcutta merchant, and his friend John Bell had established relations in the country, with which he thought it would be unwise to meddle, and he continued to them the outward privileges they had possessed under his predecessors. Garod, a rebel chief, killed Mr. Plowden, and Theodore to retaliate killed Garod. Garod's brother killed Bell, and then the king ordered an indiscriminate slaughter of the insurgents. Thus he fulfilled his duty, so far as he conceived international law demanded, and he would not accede to any claim on our part to punish criminals then in his territory. With the design of bringing affairs to a crisis, and to get at the central knot of the political complications in which he found himself involved, he wrote demanding British protection against the Egyptians who were advancing against his frontier at Tigré; at the same time that he was under the impression that France and Britain were secretly in league with his enemies. To this letter no answer was returned for several reasons—one doubtless being that we held no official diplomatic relations with Theodore, and that we had ordered our new consul, C. D. Cameron, to keep from interference in Abyssinian politics. The despatch containing this instruction was made known to Theodore, who instead of seeing in it a desire to abstain in any way from political affairs, thought it only a deceitful trick, and insisted on believing our Consul to be a spy on the sly in behalf of the Turks. He resolved to act on his suppositions theory; he made a sort of state prisoner of Consul Cameron, and afterwards committed a similar breach of right against the person of M. Lejean, the bearer of a letter from the French Emperor. Fancying himself "humbugged"—and believing, falsely, that the meshes of European policy were being thrown around him, to end at last in his being treated as a Rājā of India—that is, being deposed

from a real to a nominal authority, and made a sham king, he resolved on taking immediate steps to demonstrate his imperial power. He intercepted the letters of our Consul, beat Mr. Stern, the agent of the Society for the Promotion of Christianity, severely, and his servants, till they died; Mr. Stern and his fellow-missionaries, Mr. and Mrs. Rosenthal, were next cast into prison and tried for treason, being condemned to death. The Consul, under these circumstances of grave import, requested permission to leave, that he might bring the circumstances under the consideration of his government. On this he was imprisoned with the missionaries, and after awhile they were all removed to Magdala.

These things excited great distress among those who felt interested in the fate of those who went with their lives in their hands to preach the gospel, and they insisted on the exercise of the power of the Government for the protection of the lives, persons, and property of the missionaries in Abyssinia. On an envoy being sent to treat with him as a responsible government agent, Theodore, in self-willed tyranny, shut the ambassador of the British sovereign up in prison with those whose release he had been sent to negotiate. And as if to show his absolute independence as an imperial sovereign, Theodore, began to butcher and destroy with an indecent bloodthirstiness without a parallel in history, literally out-Heroding Herod. Intolerable as was his unjust treatment of our consul; unendurable as was his harshness, injustice, inhumanity, and rage, towards and against our missionaries, he could scarcely have been said to have filled up the measure of his iniquities till he had taken this insane idea of asserting his right to do what he liked without let or hindrance. Even then, however, the patience of our Government was not exhausted. They tried, through the Rev. Martin Flad, to gain access to the reason and conscience of the king; remonstrance, negotiation, and diplomacy were alike in vain, and war was unavoidable. Even then Government was merciful to him who knew no mercy, and offered him terms of grace,—namely, that within three months he should deliver up the captives. He took this as a declaration of war, prepared for contesting his supreme power in opposition to Britain, and foolhardily thrust upon us the need for chastising a monarch so insolently insensible to reason, inaccessible to humanity, and so unimpressible by common-sense considerations. His haughtiness and tyranny were sorely and soon punished. We need not exult over the wretched fate of this Napoleon-Nero of Abyssinia. He fell—fell by the coward's death—suicide. Here, even here, in the place and hour of victory, magnanimity and heroism, mercy and consideration tempered the justice which Britain saw it requisite to inflict, and the property, persons, privileges, and rights of the Abyssinians were thoroughly respected. The son of the vindictive and unscrupulous semi-barbaric sovereign has been taken under the charge of the Queen of England, and will feel the effects of that beneficence. Abyssinia has been relieved of an incubus to freedom and progress, and

a lesson has been read to the potentates of savage states, that the arm of British resource is long and active, and operates for the protection of the meanest subject of its wide-spread realm.

If ever there was a war worthy to be called a righteous one, surely that carried on in Abyssinia was one. It had no ambitious or offensive object to promote; it was stimulated by no base motive for intervention; it was undertaken with no other aim than the protection of human rights, the maintenance of the immunities of missionaries, and the security of subjects in whatsoever land they were; nay, there was an actual chivalry in it. It was a war in which English interests did not predominate. Nine out of the seventeen captives were German, two French, one Syrian, and only five were of British birth. It was a great moral demonstration of the determination of the civilized races to protect, defend, and avenge any of those who left their places in civilized life for the purpose of carrying into savage lands the blessings of the faith and the practice of civilized life; and it has been taken as a lesson home to the bosoms of the rudest savagery. We may well boast of the Abyssinian War as a war of Christian chivalry, having for its object the promotion of peace on earth and goodwill among men. Read thus, in the light of history, the Abyssinian War is found to be not only justifiable, but advisable; far more than advisable, a right, proper, earnest, Christian undertaking, calmly pursued and chivalrously accomplished.

G. S. P.

NEGATIVE.—III.

THE Abyssinian difficulty was one for the exercise of tact, discretion, and common sense, not for the use of fire, sword, and carriage. A little civility and a little money would have made the expedition unnecessary; and it is just to manage possible difficulties with judicious moderation, and little evil or expense, that statesmen are required. To bring the mere huffiness and self-importance of a savage monarch, touched, stimulated, and set up by a few pushing adventurers with a little authority, and a few not overwise or sensible missionaries, out of the unimportance of a squabble into the prominence of a war, was, to our thinking, an action suggestive of Dr. Walcott's lines upon the absurdity of him who

“ Casts of manure a waggon-load around
To raise a single daisy from the ground;
Uplifts the club of Hercules—for what?
To crush a butterfly, or brain a gnat!
Creates a whirlwind, from the earth to draw
A goose's feather, or exalt a straw;
Sets wheels on wheels in motion—what a clatter—
To force up one poor nipperkin of water;
Bids ocean labour with tremendous roar
To heave a cockle-shell upon the shore.”

Why, the very absurdity of contrast appears in putting opposite to

each other Victoria and Theodore, Britain and Abyssinia, "the ever victorious army" and the undisciplined hordes of a savage sovereign, the well-weaponed Briton and the almost gunless warriors of rude Abyssinia. To call the sending out of 15,000 British soldiers to meet the untrained, tactless mob of Theodore, a war, and to speak of this mere travestie of a contest as having "vindicated the honour of the crown" from the "insults" it had suffered from King Theodore, is surely a piece of the sublime audacity for which our Premier is not a little famous; and this lofty braggadocio is reported, on the same high and trustworthy authority, to have gained "the admiring respect of Europe."

Mr. Mansfield Parkyns, author of "Life in Abyssinia"—who ought to be a competent witness,—tells us the sort of enemy "our noble army" was sent out to meet on the equal terms of warlike contest. The soldiers of Abyssinia are, he says, "vain, and rather cowardly, very deceitful and treacherous, grasping and covetous, vicious, debauched, and thievish"—"for the most part collected from among the worst of the people." He further asserts of these same "worthy foemen" which our government selected,—“I would willingly stand their attack with two companies of rifles, or beat up their troops one after another with a battalion.” But we preferred to lick the half-naked nigger of a king with a noble British army, and at an expense of something more than six millions—it was *so* justifiable and praiseworthy!

Our contention, in brief, is that King Theodore, the *parvenu* Emperor of Abyssinia, was not an opponent worthy of Her most gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, "revered, beloved," who holds

"A nobler office upon earth
Than arms, or power, or brains, or birth
Could give the warrior kings of old."

That savage Abyssinian was not, as the phrase goes now, "a fit and proper" antagonist for civilized Great Britain to engage with; that it was quite a lowering of the dignity of our nation to elevate to the rank of foemen the few miserably accoutred and trained soldiers of the usurper of the Abyssinian purple—foemen of the legions whose names are written in glory on the pages of history as the conquerors of Napoleon I., and the heroes of the Crimea. We contend that it was not right to set our soldiery forth as on a level with the hordes of Abyssinian semi-slaves; and it is no slight evidence of the correctness of our opinions that oblivious silence has already closed over the glorious war in which we were engaged; statesmen, soldiers, newspaper-men, and even the rescued themselves, all agreeing to let forgetfulness of that war prey on the pages of modern history unmolestedly. We contend farther that it was a war of stupidity in its origin, and of far too costly a nature in its progress and end.

Is it not shameful that we should expend in battering poor savages a million of money per month, while we grudge to spend

upon the poor in our own streets and country places so much in a year? If the lives of the precious seventeen captives were worth so much, why do we leave so many to die in our streets of want and woe through our begrudgement of the means of life. Diplomacy, not force and common sense, not cannon balls, were wanted to get matters right with the Abyssinian sovereign. We were too haughty to use ordinary means while in our power, and when smarting under the idea that a breach of the etiquette of nations had been committed towards him, Theodore took reprisals; we could not condescend to explain or propitiate; but we could condescend to fight, and by this duel at war really glorified the savage sovereign, and made him a hero instead of a despot. The conditions of warfare were altogether unequal, and therefore the fact of war was disgraceful. We have made ourselves little else than the laughing-stock of Europe by our ridiculously low estimate of ourselves in undertaking the match, and our vain-glorious speechifications and title-givings on its conclusion. Of the Abyssinian contest, far more truly than of Blenheim, the satire is true—

“But 'twas a glorious victory.”

To prove that we were originally in the wrong, the following facts are more than enough:—

1st. We claimed jurisdiction over criminals in Abyssinia without giving reciprocal rights to Theodore.

2nd. We demanded that he should renounce all idea of reconquering any Abyssinian territory, of which the government of Egypt had taken possession, during the period when he was busy consolidating his power against insurgents and rivals.

3rd. We appointed Captain C. D. Cameron Consul in succession to Mr. Walter Plowden without consultation with the king; and sent him, without any explanation of our design, on a mission to Senaar, to examine into the cotton-growing capabilities of Abyssinia.

4th. An official letter, addressed by Theodore to the Government, was pushed into a pigeon hole in some “how-not-to-do-it circumlocution office,” in the Government departments of Great Britain, and was overlooked or forgotten, without apology.

5th. When Theodore's letter, after nearly two years' delay, was answered, the answer was foolishly entrusted to Mr. Rassam, whom Theodore looked on as a Turk and a spy, *i. e.*, an enemy.

6th. We did not conform to a well-known rule of Oriental politics by providing a return-present for the present of a king who proffers one as a sign of intended amity.

7th. Government did not show any real interest in Consul Cameron, or take any steps, until urged by a public demonstration, in favour of the missionaries who had been involved in the evil consequences resulting from the misunderstandings between our Foreign Office and the Negus of Abyssinia.

These were the material elements justifying the Emperor Theo-

dore's conduct in his own eyes towards the Consul, the missionaries, and all the Europeans within his dominions. Indeed, these were the things which crazed him. Had due and honest apology been, as was due, sent to King Theodore; had proper representation been made of the wishes and intents of the British Government; had reciprocating presents been forwarded by its envoys from our Government to the Negus; had offers of ransom even been made; the (so-called) war would have been unnecessary, and an infamous page in British history would have been left unwritten. It is true that we were the stronger, but it is no less true that we had every appearance of being the wrongers; and we have seen no justification of the crown officers—except the justification, such as it is, of the doings of the hero of Magdala, and the reports of the British Houses of Parliament—in which the morality of success seems to have been accepted as enough.

F. H. M.

CHARLOTTE BRONTE.—The world bends with infinite tenderness over the story of that woman, who had no beauty and no blessing, out on the Yorkshire moors. We pity her for the dismal scranny school of her childhood, where food for the outer and the inner life was alike hard, and crusty, and mouldy. We pity her for the lonely drudgery, so hapless and so hopeless, out in Brussels, as we see her set down to it, while her wings bleed, beating the bars of her cage, and the music sours within her—

“And the life still drags her downward
To its level, day by day;
What is fine within her growing,
Course to sympathetic clay.”

Our lips tremble as we see that striving after some touch of grace and beauty to deck the hard grey home, though it embody itself in no better thing than a bright little frock and a pair of tiny red shoes; yet, to see the poor blossom of grace and beauty shrivelling with fire, put there and held there by a father harder than the home. We watch her, a woman while yet a child—a woman because other little children still more helpless are motherless, and can find no other nature large enough to take them in, and understand and adopt them; a sister in all sweet, ingenuous, simple ways; a mother in all wise overbending care and love; and then, at last, a woman grown, walking over great stretches of wild country, that she might be alone with that other father and mother of us all, and gather strength and courage from the communion, to go back and bear her burden of a stern half-mad father, and a reckless lost brother, and a bare rugged life. Then we say, “Oh! why was not such a soul clothed in the beauty of June, and born in the vale of Tempe, in the golden days, the first-born and nursling of a queen?” But we say this no longer when the flower unfolds to the sun, when her books and her life, in all their variant strength and fulness, reveal the mystery of the homely, unfolding the rank, sharp contrasts of the garden plat, and the hot days and dark nights; for we see in the flower, brimming with refreshment and blessing to thousands, how, not to the beauty of the goddess, not to the flowery meadows and bosky dells of Arcadia, not to the first-born and nursling of a queen, could this power come but to such a soul, set in such a place, to battle through and gather all the influence of such a life.—“*Nature and Life*,” by Robert Collyer.

Toiling Upward.

THE LATE ROBERT STRATTON, B.A.

“Denn alle kraft dringt vorwärts in die Weite,
 Zu leben und zu wirken hier und dort :
 Dagegen engt und hemmt von jeder Seite
 Der Strom der welt und reißt uns mit sich fort.
 In diesem innern Sturm und äussern Streite
 Vernimmt der Mensch ein schwer verstanden Wort :
 Von der Gewalt, die alle Wesen bindet
 Befreit der Mensch sich, der sich überwindet.”—GÖTTE.

“For all power presses forward into the distance, to live and to work here and there; on the other hand, the stream of the world constrains and inhems and drags us along with it. In this inward storm and outward strife, man learns to comprehend a hard saying:—from the necessity which binds all being, that man frees himself, who overcomes himself.”

WE write but a humble name on our records to-day—a name, and to our readers hardly even that—little known, yet worthy, as we think, of a brief memorial and some thought. Sad issues are anything but infrequent in common life. “Labour and sorrow” are the ordinary human heritage, and the one duty of human life is to “apply our hearts unto wisdom.” This done, all that we can do is done. Ours it is [to] fulfil the proverb drawn from Corneille’s *Horace*, “Faites votre devoir et laissez faire aux Dieu”—Do your duty, and leave the issue to the Deity.

The best concerted schemes men lay for fame
 Die fast away;—*only themselves die faster!*

Yet, though death dwells in the infinite abysses of the unknown, so near to us that often only a film of the utmost gossamer fineness lies between us and doom, “Man is based on hope; he has properly no other possession but hope; this habitation of his is called the place of hope;” and therefore endeavour is his—and success is not. He of whom we now speak was one who strove to direct his energies aright, and to achieve that balance and harmony of faculties and feelings which make duty a delight. He aimed at becoming a positive being despite the creed of negation in which the world lives, and endeavoured to be an existence in the midst of circumstance. He chose to cultivate himself, in the belief that to make the best possible of himself was not only his own duty but

the surest way also of ultimately doing the best for himself; and he had heard the voice of the strong speaker of our time, saying, "Man, symbol of eternity imprisoned into time, it is not thy works, which are all mortal, infinitely little, and the greatest no better than the least, but only the Spirit thou workest in, that can have worth or continuance." He resolved to strive after worthiness of being—to knit thought, insight, and conduct into a threefold cord, having their ultimate unity and strength in truth, which is the essence of the life of lives. In lowly life he pursued high aims, and amidst the commonplaces of the earth he remembered the soul's eternal duties and destiny.

Robert Stratton, eldest son of Robert and Maria Stratton, was born in St. Pancras parish, London, 2nd August, 1840. His father was a shipwright, but shortly after the birth of his son Robert, he entered into partnership with his brother-in-law in working the saw-mills in Midford Place. Robert had somewhat more than attained his sixth year when his father died, leaving but little behind him of this world's wealth. In consequence of this, Robert, Alfred, and another boy, born seven weeks after the father's demise, were entirely dependent on the efforts of their mother, who, being a good milliner and dressmaker, struggled with praiseworthiness of effort to bring up the living legacies thus left to her care—not without success and honour.

Robert was a precocious boy, and had early shown great aptitude in the acquisition and use of the art of reading. His eagerness for learning attracted to him the interest of the Rev. Henry Hughes, master of the National Schools, All Saints, Gordon Square, London, where he was a successful pupil—of which fact the evidence exists in several prizes gained in successive years; and he had little more than completed his eleventh year when he obtained a prize of £5 for the best essay on the Exhibition of 1851, offered for competition to a selected number of boys—of which he was the youngest—by the Committee of Education. In his thirteenth year, on the suggestion of the Rev. H. Hughes, he was indentured as a pupil teacher in the school where he had been educated. Here he was not only able to earn a little for the help of the household, but was also enabled to pursue those studies to which his heart was given. His first year's examination was passed satisfactorily, but before the second came on he was prostrated by a severe attack of typhus fever. He lay in the hospital in a low condition; but ultimately the disease took a favourable turn, and he was admitted to the convalescent ward. Here he remembered that if his second examination was not passed he would both lose his grant from Government and be thrown back a year in his progress. With this idea powerful in his mind, he besought Dr. Jenner to permit him to leave the hospital for one day that he might undergo his examination. The doctor thought he was unable to manage any such task; but he persisted, and was at length allowed to make trial of himself. He went through the ordeal and succeeded, returning to the

hospital thereafter until he was far enough advanced towards recovery to be able to go home and get ready for harness again.

He had been but a short time at his resumed labour, when, by the unexpected demise of the Rev. Henry Hughes, in the prime of manhood, the interests of the school suffered, and in a short time, under the changed circumstances which ensued, the attendance fell so far below what it had been, that by the rules of the Committee of Education two of the pupil teachers required to be dismissed. Of those upon whom the change fell, Robert Stratton, as the most recently attached, was one. He was in a short time able to transfer his services, on the recommendation of the Inspector, to St. Mary's School, Islington, in which he completed his apprenticeship; and during this period he contributed to "The Pupil Teacher's Magazine"—a serial issued by G. J. Stevenson, Paternoster Row, the distinctive feature of which was its treatment of educational subjects in such a manner as to be professionally helpful to the class to whom it was addressed. To "The Boy's Own Magazine," published by S. O. Beeton, and edited by the late J. G. Edgar, we believe he also furnished short and able papers, which were valued by the editor, and interesting to the young readers of that miscellany.

On the completion of his apprenticeship, he obtained a scholarship, which enabled him to enter as a student at Highbury College, then under the principalship of the Rev. C. R. Alford, now bishop of Victoria, Hong-Kong. He was a member of the second class of the second division, and gained a second class certificate. The Rev. Principal at this moment seemed likely to bring all his efforts and endeavours to a sudden termination by refusing to recommend him to any scholastic position on account of his near-sightedness—one of the consequences of the typhus fever. In fact the Principal turned him off, saying, coldly, that "he did not know anything he was fit for." Robert Stratton, at this juncture, took the bold step of appealing to the Committee of Education against this blasting of all his prospects in a profession to devote himself to which he had been induced with their lordship's sanction. The case was remitted to the Principal, who thereupon provided his ex-student with a very high testimonial for intellectual ability, integrity, industry, and moral firmness. He was now anxious to be able to support himself, and aid the mother who had toiled so bravely on his behalf; and this the more so because his second brother was, by this time, doing something in his own behoof; and he did not relish the dependence in which he had hitherto, to a certain extent, lived, when his brother had become almost self-supporting.

Anxious to be employed, he advertised for a situation, and was offered an assistancy at Horrbridge, in Devon, which he gladly accepted. The school here did not fulfil the conditions of the Government in regard to school grants, and the Inspector refused to examine it; hence the value of R. Stratton's certificate was lost;

and the other emoluments were too low to enable him to remain till the school was rebuilt, according to the requirements of the committee. He was almost equally unfortunate in an engagement he made as assistant at the Christ Church Schools, Ashton-under-Lyne, where he only remained long enough to coach up some boys as pupil teachers, on whose passing the Inspector, he received notice to find another berth for himself. He secured an appointment in Newcastle-on-Tyne, where he was kindly used by the headmaster, whose help he highly valued. Shortly after he had been installed in his position in the metropolis of Northumberland, a vacancy occurred in the mastership of the boys' school in the Gateshead Union, and, with the approval of his master, as it offered some advantages, he became an applicant, and succeeded in gaining the position, which provided him with board, lodgings, &c., and £48 per annum. Here he remained for five years and a-half, bestowing great care on his charges, labouring with diligent assiduity to brighten to usefulness the intellects, and to train to honourable purpose the hearts of those poor children who demanded and won his sympathy and dutiful efforts. While diligently pushing on the children entrusted to him, and giving great satisfaction to his employers, he felt himself constrained to attempt to improve his own mind, and to have as an aim before him the acquisition of that knowledge which is power in all cases, and in many is also professional advancement. He began here a close and continuous series of studies, urged on thereto in great measure by the papers in advocacy and explanation of self-culture which he read with avidity in *The British Controversialist*. Here, too, he composed essays and tales for a small publication issued by Kent & Co., entitled *Companion for Youth*; and in competition for prizes offered by publications, of which we know nothing, called the *Weekly Budget*, and *The Key*, he gained several awards of money and of books. With these engagements, his personal studies, and his scholastic duties, he filled up his time for a while. But after serious reflection, he determined to devote his whole mind to definite and well-arranged studies, and sought advice from friends whom he trusted regarding his proposed course.

He was not contented with mere acquisition, he was anxious to possess guaranteed and proved ability, and hence, in successive years, he sat as a competitor for the certificates awarded by the Society of Arts for proficiency in several branches of knowledge. The branches in which he stood examination and passed were history, geography, grammar, English literature, logic, algebra, and geometry. These certificates were obtained at successive annual examinations between 1861-64. In January, 1864, he paid a hurried visit to the capital of Scotland, not only with the design of seeing that storied city, but to take his seat in the Rooms of the Protestant Alliance, in Edinburgh, as a candidate for the certificate of merit which that body proposed to give to those who could undergo a fair examination on that erudite posthumous work of

Dr. Isaac Barrow, "A Treatise on the Pope's Supremacy." To the study of this splendid work, weighty in authorities, and mighty in arguments, he had devoted much study; and he fully satisfied the examiners that he had become qualified for receiving the testimony to ability which they offered to successful competitors. He was greatly gratified at this success in logical Scotland, and was delighted at having had quoted to him, in a congratulatory letter, these lines of George Withers:—

"Give me that heart which, in itself, doth war
With many frailties (who like traitors are
In some besieged fort), and hath to do
With outward foes and inward terrors too;
Yet of himself and them a conquest makes,
And still proceeds in what he undertakes."

His success at these examinations stimulated him to determine upon becoming a matriculated student in the London University. This ambition was quickened within him by some interest taken in several of his papers in this serial by Professor Alexander Bain, and was intensified at an interview which, by the intervention of the writer, he obtained with the distinguished master in British Psychology, on one of his visits to the Literary and Philosophical Society of Newcastle-on-Tyne. In 1865 he passed his matriculation examination, and settled down in his own mind to pursue the course appointed for students who desire to become Bachelors of Arts. This made definite his desire to leave Gateshead, should an opportunity offer of fair employment in those higher branches of study upon which he had been for a long time privately, but persistently engaged.

The earliest acquaintance of the present writer with Robert Stratton commenced through the pages of this serial, in the establishment of "The Young Writer and Students' Assistant." As one of the students whose work was submitted for criticism, he made himself noticeable for thoughtful, steady improvement, and by his eager thirst for information. His earnestness led to a private correspondence being opened up, whereby special help was communicated in regard to peculiar studies in which he was engrossed. His aims in self culture being made known, books in Latin, Greek, and French were recommended to him, and such difficulties as arose in his progress were freely stated, and where possible, by his adviser, readily solved. At this period he studied hard and made much progress, and he felt the stirring within him of higher desires, a wish for a widened field. Through a little help, communicated by testimonials, introductory letters, &c., his aim was accomplished, and he had the gratification of being promoted to a mastership of a school in Lincoln, the city of the birth of George Boole, the eminent mathematizer of logic, and here, too, through the intervention of the writer, he made a few rare and valuable friends, among whom, as specially kind to him,

may be noticed Mr. Brooke, the early encourager and instructor of George Boole, a gentleman of varied talents, and of most engaging sympathies towards self educators.

At Northgate Academy, where he was second master, he continued his literary culture and efforts, in combination with heavy school duties, and the consequence was that his sight began to fail. He had, however, fixed his desires on gaining a B.A. degree, and he would not intermit his work till that were tried. Toiling on with this design before him he worked so hard as to injure his general health, and with exhausted body, excited mind, and failing sight, he sat down to the B.A. examination—and failed. He would not return to Lincoln as an unsuccessful aspirant. After some trouble he procured an appointment as second master in the grammar school of Bottesdale, in Suffolk, where he gained great favour with the boys, and became a trusted and valued colleague to the head master, J. Durrant, Esq. This gentleman, however, purchased the goodwill of the Hyde Road Commercial School, Manchester, and disposed of his interest in the boarders who had resided with him to his successor. Owing to the popularity of R. Stratton among the boys, the new master was anxious to retain his assistance, and this he promised to give for six months, Mr. Durrant having agreed to keep himself unfettered by any fixed engagement for that time, in order that, if he chose, Mr. Stratton might still be his helper and friend.

On full consideration of his circumstances, though highly comfortable at Bottesdale, he determined to proceed to Manchester at the expiry of the half-year, not only because he had formed a high opinion of Mr. Durrant, but because there appeared to him to be opportunities in Manchester which he could not hope for in the seclusion of a Suffolk grammar school. Mr. Durrant received his decision gladly, and welcomed him kindly to Hyde Road Commercial School, where he speedily made himself popular and useful, found himself happy, and perceived that much benefit would accrue to him from the openings for self-culture which the noble institutions of Cottonopolis presented. Shortly after his arrival in Manchester he connected himself with the evening classes conducted at Owens' College—studying Latin, Greek, logic, and political economy. The diligence, eagerness, and intelligence with which he pursued the tasks allotted to him are borne witness to by the certificates of merit which were awarded to him, which speak in terms of praise of his progress and labours. To do the daily work required of a master in a large public school, to contribute such papers as he did to this magazine, to perform the exercises, and to pursue the private studies required to keep pace with, and even to get somewhat ahead, of his Owens' College classes, imply a more than ordinary share, not only of effortful ambition and perseverance, but also of mental power and vigour of will. But this was not all; he was progressing at the same time with the readings and studies prescribed for intending candidates

for the Bachelorship of Arts in the London University, which, though much longed for and ardently laboured for, had not yet been attained.

The zeal with which he pressed forward in his course attracted the notice and won the goodwill of Principal Greenwood and Professor W. S. Jevons, both of whom added kindly encouragement to their class efforts. Stratton, in a letter to us, expresses himself enthusiastically grateful for the helpfulness they exerted in his favour, and speaks with much lovingness of his teachers. The chief honour which he attained, however, in his student career at Owens' College, was the gaining of the First Cobden Prize, of £10, for the best examination on the principles of political economy, including the composing of an essay, given out in the Examination Room, on some question relating to the applications of political economy to actual life. With his usual intense desire to have all his knowledge tested, Stratton "went in" for this examination, and, as we have intimated, came out first prizeman. We have seen the examination papers, which have been deservedly assigned a high place, and we have now lying before us the Essay which he wrote. The subject allotted for consideration was, "Does the tendency of Population to outstrip subsistence necessarily consign a large portion of the people to poverty?" and we find engrossed on the manuscript the following sentence by the examiner, Professor W. S. Jevons—"I agree with every word of this essay." This is, of course, high praise from the author of that treatise on "The Coal Supply," which affected the finances of Great Britain, gained the applause of J. S. Mill, and excited one of the keenest controversies of our day in "The British Association," "The Social Science Association," in the periodicals of the period, even in the House of Commons, and we have no doubt that R. Stratton enjoyed the curt but telling sentence much. He had the honour of receiving his prize from the hand of the Rev. F. D. Maurice, Professor of Causuistry and Moral Philosophy, and Principal of the Working Men's College, London—one of our modern "men of mark." The prize certificate he obtained ran textually as follows—"Owens' College, Manchester. Prize Certificate. Session 1867-8. It is hereby certified that the first Cobden prize, of £10, for diligent attendance on the Cobden Memorial Course of Political Economy, and the attainment of the first place in the examination was awarded to Mr. Robert Stratton." (Signed) J. G. Greenwood, Principal. W. S. Jevons, Professor. J. Holme Nicholson, Secy.

In July, 1868, he proceeded to London to sit as candidate, for the third time, for the degree of B.A. in the University of London; and the result is given in this quotation of a few of the words of a friend of his: "At the first examination (1866) he failed. He worked for another year, went up again (1867), and was again unsuccessful. Many would have been disheartened. He does not give up. He bestows on his cherished aim another twelve months' toil, and he is rewarded by gaining (1868) a first-class degree."

Did he hear a voice saying to him, in the words of Robert Herrick—

“On with thy work, tho’ thou beest hardly prest;
Labour is held up by the hope of rest”?

We know not; but we know that he gave his utmost endeavours to the duty of the time, and we know, too, that “rest” came unexpectedly soon.

This rest was much nearer than any one thought. He had returned to Manchester, having attained the fulfilment of a cherished ambition, had resumed his labours cheerfully, and had schemed out a good deal of work to be done during the oncoming winter—among other things a paper for this magazine, to take place in a projected series on “Modern Historians,” on H. T. Buckle, author of “The History of Civilization in England, Scotland, and Spain”; an essay on “Wynkyn de Worde,” the early Fleet Street printer; a memoir of “Heyne, the Classical Scholar,” as an instance of “Toiling Upward”—left in such a state of completeness as to be almost fitted for publication, and several contributions for the controversial department. Of these, and of the general progress of the magazine, he wrote enthusiastically and hopefully in a letter to the editor, whom he urged to visit him in Manchester to see how happy and comfortable he was; and yet, before that letter reached its destination, its writer, like Milton’s Lycidas, was—“dead, dead, ere his prime”; the “remorseless deep” had been “his watery bier.” Alas! “What hard mishap hath doomed this gentle swain?”

“Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise
(That last infirmity of noble mind)
To scorn delights and live laborious days;
But the fair guerdon, when we hope to find,
And think to burst out into sudden blaze,
Comes the blind fury, with the abhorred shears,
And slits the thin-spun life.”

With an old friend of his, John Smith, a fellow teacher, from Durham, who had visited him in Manchester, he agreed to take a holiday out, and for this purpose the two ran down to Liverpool together. When there they saw an excursion trip to Llandudno advertised, and this seemed to them a most promising way of spending the few hours of companionship allowed to them—between the Friday and the Monday. Accordingly, they determined to visit that delicious-aired Carnarvonshire watering-place, which is but about forty miles distant from Liverpool. There they would see the Great and Little Orme’s Head, and perhaps catch a glimpse of the peak of Snowdon or the ridges of Peanmanmawr, or at least place their feet

“On a rock whose haughty brow
Frowns o’er old Conway’s foaming flood.”

and cast their eyes over the heaving breast of the sea. Shortly after mid-day on Sabbath, 9th August, the two friends ascended the Great Orme's Head, and surveyed the far stretch of varied scenery which lay before them, enjoying its beauty and suggestiveness. By-and-by they proposed to descend the cliffs on the sea side of the pathway, to change their course, and to have a stroll on the beach. Down the steep beyond Dolfechan—unweeing of the dangers of the perilous way—they proceeded to steer their steps. They had reached that part of the hillside which is known as the Deer's Road (Hwylfa'r Carw), when Stratton, finding himself slipping, besought his friend not to come any farther. Mr. Smith halted, and asked, "Are you safe?" He heard a sudden exclamation of "Good Lord into—" and fearing the worst, clambered up hill, ran round to the horse-shoe point, and saw the hat of his friend floating out into the sea. A visitor saw the fatal fall from the townward side, and while Mr. Smith ran to the house of Mr. Hughes, at Dolfechan, to give the alarm, he ran to the town. A boat immediately put out, rounded the point, and came into the creek of the Deer's Resort (Gesel Cilfen Carw), and there the lifeless remains of Robert Stratton—his neck broken, his features mutilated, and his body bruised and cut—were found, about an hour after the accident. It was evident that he had lost his footing and been precipitated down the cliff into the cove, when there was about five feet of water in it, though when he was found he had been washed about by the eddy of the ebbing tide. An inquest was held on the body on Monday afternoon, at which a verdict of "Died by accidentally falling over the cliffs" was returned, and an order for burial was granted to his grief-stricken mother, to whom a telegram, followed by a letter, had imparted the sad tale of her bereavement of a son who had formed the hope, comfort, and dependence of her declining years—by a sudden and agonizing death.

On Tuesday, 11th August, his remains were consigned to their resting-place in the burial ground at St. Tudno's Church. Only a fortnight before, he had succeeded in gaining his B.A. degree, after a good struggle. Only one week had he survived the completion of his twenty-eighth year. "On the Sabbath he was born, and on the Sabbath he died." Lowly as his life had been, he had acted his part well in his circumstances, and he had been specially mindful of the home charities. In his Bible the following sentence stands written in red ink:—"Honour thy father with thy whole heart, and forget not the sorrows of thy mother; remembering that thou was begotten of them—and how canst thou recompense the things they have done for thee?" In this spirit, though his income was always small, he sedulously ministered to his mother's necessities, and for her benefit he had insured his life and made a small investment in the public funds. He was a kindly brother and a true friend, an attached member of the Church of England, and an earnest student of science and scripture. He was an able,

efficient, and conscientious, though humble, worker in a laborious profession, in which he was yearly taking an advancing step. He had endured hardness, and had persevered against and amid many difficulties. Though his life may have been common-place, yet is there a charm about its dutifulness and diligence, and there is a heart-striking grief at the suddenness of its transition from fulness of life to the distressful death which overtook him, that claims our regret for his early loss, and our sympathy for his bereaved mother and other relatives, who were justly delighting in his progress, and are now mournfully afflicted by his departure, the melancholy satisfaction will not be denied us, as one who has felt his hand-grasp in fellowship of effort and endeavour, as one who watched his course with friendly eye, and who had the delight of aiding somewhat in the development of his powers, and in the accomplishing of his aims and schemes, of noting our impressions of his character. As a scholar, he was laborious, plodding, and indefatigable, and the results were that he had acquired a large store of well-grounded lore; as a teacher, he was apt and interesting, kindly and thoroughgoing; as a thinker, he was versatile, lively, critical, and talented; as a writer, he was prolific and rapid, pointed and ready; and as a contributor to this serial, he was enthusiastic to do and quick to undertake, punctual to his engagements, and unsparing in his endeavours to add what he could to the efficiency of our pages; on the whole, he was a man of great promise, as well as of fair performance, and he impressed the writer with a high opinion of his abilities, his character, and his attainments; and a natural regret arises in the soul at the sudden extinction of a life so devoted to good purposes as his. He believed that—

“The soul of man
Createth its own destiny of power;
And as the trial is intenser here,
His Being hath a nobler strength in heaven.”

Hence he took all difficulties as incentives to endeavour, and looked upon all efforts as gains in reality, even though they did not, at the moment of expectancy, acquire the award of success. As one of his early friends has said, “I think a man is to be honoured who sets such an example of patient plodding and perseverance. Though shown, perhaps, in a very humble sphere, the principle is the same as when the higher prizes of life are aimed after. His motto through life appears to have been ‘upward’ and ‘onward,’ and that is the motto for every young man to make his own.” Of “toiling upward” his days were full, of the successes of life his share was scanty, but he bore a happy, contented, God-fearing heart in him; and he found in his experience the truth of a maxim read long ago in the pages of this serial, “Joy’s soul lies in the doing of one’s duty.”

“And trial ever consecrates the cup
Wherein we pour her sacrificial wine.”

Naught can touch him farther. Destiny, the doom-book of God, has accomplished his time life. "Frightful to all men is death, from of old named King of Terrors"—that "unknown of separation, foreignness, unconditioned possibility," and change to changelessness; but to the striving and the hopeful, who have felt and known that every new day is a birth-time of uncertainties, death comes less as a terror than an opportunity—more as a welcoming hand stretched out from the darkness than a sudden foeman dashing out from the gloom which surrounds life.

"'Tis long since death had the majority ;"

and we know full well that soon to the great majority of the foregone we must "pass over"—how soon, how suddenly, we know not, cannot even guess. Let it be ours to be found "toiling upward" in every sphere of effort—actual, intellectual, moral, spiritual,—and let us each hear the voice of the great poet-teacher of America, saying—

"So live, that when thy summons comes to join
The innumerable caravan that moves
To the pale realms of shade, where each shall take
His chamber in the silent halls of death ;
Thou go not, like the quarry-slave at night,
Scourged to his dungeon ; but, sustained and soothed
By an unfaltering trust, approach thy grave,
Like one who wraps the drapery of his couch
About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams."

S. N.

THE UNITY AND PROGRESS OF THE FINE ARTS IN GREECE.—Hesiod first preluded with a glorious drama, and gathering together some of the floating images of beauty, with which the minds of his compatriots were teeming, wove them into his early song. But it was Homer who first embodied the poetry of his race, in that immortal song which has been the glory of his nation, and the delight of all succeeding generations. It has been disputed whether such an individual as Homer ever lived, and whether this be true or not, the doubt, though scarcely tenable, in this instance shadows forth a truth of no small importance. The *Iliad* was not the creation of one, but of the Greek nation. Homer, however, first fixed in song those ideas which had long been struggling for utterance ; and embodying the traditions of the Greeks with their religion and poetry, built the superstructure on which the edifice of Grecian art was raised ; and whether this was afterwards moulded into the dramas of Sophocles, Pœschylus, or Euripides, or expressed in the lyrics of Pindar or Anacreon—whether it found tangible shape and form in the works of Phidias or Praxiteles, or was presented to the eye in the colours of Polygnotus or of Zenxis—all these were but different modes of the same feeling, the result of a sincere and enthusiastic adoration of what was great and beautiful in art.—*Westminster Review*.

The Reviewer.

The Spanish Gipsy. A Poem. By GEORGE ELIOT.

GEORGE ELIOT is a *pseudonym*. The authoress who has adopted it was remarkable among intellectual women before she assumed her masculine *nom de plume*. A translation of Dr. D. F. Strauss's "Leben Jesu," both accurate and perspicuous, is due to her careful, scholarly, and eloquent pen, and three volumes of better English composition could scarcely be pointed out than that which appears in this version from the German. At one time, we understand, she was co-editress of *The Westminster Review*, and wrote many articles of value on various subjects for its pages. She is not only thoroughly educated, but also widely informed. She is the daughter of a dissenting, if we mistake not, an Unitarian minister, who was settled at the time of her birth, 1820, it has been stated, at Belper, in Derbyshire. She had little more than completed her twenty-fifth year, when "The Life of Jesus critically examined" appeared, in 1846. In 1857, "Scenes of Clerical life" were published in *Blackwood*, and in 1858 "Adam Bede" excited attention, certainly not diminished in 1859, when "The Mill on the Floss" was issued. "Silas Marner, the weaver of Raveloe" and a re-issue of "Scenes of Clerical Life" mark 1861, then "Romola" ran through the pages of *Cornhill Magazine* to be republished in 1863, and "Felix Holt" gladdened the circulating libraries in 1866. Now, having attained reputation in theology, scholarship, social science, and fiction, she claims notice in a new and richer character as a poetess of the highest class—in a sort of combination of the drama and the epic, with a fine metaphysical undertone, which gives *set* to the whole.

The form of the poem is an innovation, while essentially dramatic: the scenery, reflections, and some portions of the narrative are given in verse, so that the descriptive portion acts somewhat like the Chorus of the old Greek drama, and furnishes the explanatory, reflective, and metaphysical portion of the author's aim. It is a drama of fate—metaphysical fate, and works the elements of a predetermined catastrophe into a most acutely-complicated web of incident, passion, thought, and evolution. The cross-play of circumstance and will, of weak human effort and the terrible irresistibilities of Destiny are brought before us with great ingenuity and force—though the force is that of Joanna Baillie rather than of Shakspeare. Indeed, we think that the metaphysics is the fault of the poem. It is not like the metaphysics of Shakspeare, implied though effective; it is consciously reproduced, and intentionally made prominent, and the life of this drama is rather reflex than direct. Often, in truth, there flash out from the page passages

of concentrated pith of mind—phrases of wondrous depth of import, and sentiments that startle with the lightning-like glare they throw into the mysteries of impassioned thought; felicitous subtleties of meaning and suggestion, potent interpretations of the shadowy consciousness in which emotion shows itself, and soul-touching instances of the analysis of human life-thought, than have ever probably been given off by any female intellect in any previous age; still the poem reads to us as if the plot had been formed to give opportunity for the metaphysics—that the incidental is altogether overpowered by the inevitable, and not that the metaphysics arise spontaneously out of the story of “Fate and Metaphysical Aid” the author projected.

The chief gist of this dramatico-epical novel may be given in a few words. Fedalma, the heroine, had been stolen from her kindred whilst young, and educated among the Spaniards under the care of Don Silva’s mother, and as a Christian, though a gipsy. At the opening of the story, Don Silva, the Spanish grandee, a noble of high descent, keeper of the frontiers of Spain against the Moors, notwithstanding her gipsy extraction (known to him, though not to her), contemplates making her his wife. Don Silva’s uncle, Father Isidora, prior of the Dominicans, is opposed to the union, and is eager, even at the risk of letting loose upon the lady the emissaries of the Inquisition, to break off the intended match. Don Silva determines on hurrying on the ceremony, and Fedalma yields consent to his importunity to become a duchess. The gipsy-chief, her father, Zarca, whose great ambition is to make his tribe a nation, having formed an alliance with El Zagel, the king of the Moors, has been captured by Don Silva’s soldiers, and been marched in chains into Bedmar. He recognizes, in Fedalma, his daughter, and having escaped, succeeds in getting an interview with her, in which he successfully appeals to her to relinquish the love of Don Silva, to return to her tribe and be their queen, and to lead her race to a new, prosperous, and peaceful life in Africa. Most reluctantly she lays aside her love for Silva, and her assured place as a Spanish duchess, at the call of what she thinks is higher duty, and goes with her father. Don Silva determines on yielding all to love; follows Fedalma, finds her, and learns that she retains her affection for him still. Zarca opposes his desire to take her even yet to wife, and Don Silva’s passion makes him heedless of all. He offers to become a gipsy, take the oath of the tribe, to live and fight with them, if he can but gain her. He is admitted to a noviciate which demands the relinquishment of place, rank, trust, honour, nobility, friendship, and faith, to be the companion of hated and fated wanderers. Meanwhile, Zarca has captured Bedmar; when Don Silva comes with the gipsies to his old stronghold, he finds followers and friends slain, and his uncle, Isidora, doomed to death by the hand of the executioner. Silva prays for his uncle’s life, and is repulsed; a sudden revulsion seizes upon his spirit, and in a frenzy of wrath he slays Fedalma’s father. Before

he dies, Zarca commands that Silva should be set free, and be allowed to go unharmed out of the fortress. The last scene of all of this eventful history shows us Fedalma and Don Silva at a parting interview. He is about to proceed to Rome, to crave the purification of his knightly sword by Papal absolution, and she is about to embark with her people for Africa, to realize her father's dream of the freedom, nationality, and greatness of the Zincoli.

We have not, in this ineffective outline, included the episodes, nor mentioned the subordinate characters, many of which deserved note, and are highly attractive. Here is one—

“Blasco is his name,
A prosperous silversmith from Aragon ;
In speech not silvery, rather tuned as notes
From a deep vessel made of plenteous iron,
Or some great bell of slow but certain swing,
That, if you only wait, will tell the hour
As well as flippant clocks that strike in haste
And set off chiming a superfluous tune.”

Juan, Fedalma's poetical lover, is another exquisite portrait, as he

“Walks up and down
And snuffs the orange-flowers, and shoots a pea
To hit a streak of light let through the awning ;
Has a queer face, eyes large as plums, a nose
Small, round, uneven, like a bit of wax
Melted and cooled by chance. Thin-fingered, little,
And, as a squirrel, noiseless, startling men
Only by quickness. In his speech and looks
A touch of graceful wildness, as of things
Not trained or tamed for uses of the world.
Most like the fauns that roamed in days of old
About the listening, whispering woods, and shared
The subtler sense of sylvan ears and eyes
Undulled by scheming thought, yet joined the rout
Of men and women on the festal days.
And played the syrinx, too, and knew love's pains,
Turning their anguish into melody.”

He is a good, shrewd fellow, of wondrous cleverness and worth, this Juan. Here is the comparison he makes between himself and the Don. It reads almost like a passage from Otway's highest muse:—

“Don Silva's love expects reward,
Kneels with a heaven to come ! but the poor poet
Worships without reward, nor hopes to find
A heaven save in his worship. He adores
The sweetest woman for her sweetness' sake,
Joys in the love that was not born for him,
Because 'tis lovingness, as beggars joy,
Warming their naked limbs on wayside walls,
To hear a tale of princes and their glory.

There's a poor poet (poor I mean in coin)
 Worships Fedalma with so true a love
 That if her silken robe were changed for rags,
 And she were driven out to stony wilds
 Barefoot, a scorned wanderer, he would kiss
 Her ragged garment's edge, and only ask
 For leave to be her slave. Digest that, friend."

In the first seven lines we have the scene pictured and Spain painted as glowingly as if Philips had laid on the colours :—

"'Tis the warm south, where Europe spreads her lands
 Like fretted leaflets, breathing on the deep :
 Broad-breasted Spain, leaning with equal love
 (A calm earth-goddess, crowned with corn and vines)
 On the Mid Sea that moans with memories,
 And on the untravelled Ocean, whose vast tides
 Pant dumbly passionate with dreams of youth."

After having had place marked, we have the time indicated as that in which, about the close of the fifteenth century, Spain was in the great agony of her contest with the Moors, and when :—

"The Moslem faith, now flickering like a torch
 In a night struggle on the shore of Spain
 Glares, a broad column of advancing flame,
 Along the Danube and the Illyrian shore
 Far into Italy."

The special scene of the piece lies around the "rich Bedmar" on the Castilian frontier, a town which had in that transition-time undergone many vicissitudes.

"'Twas Moorish long ago,
*But now the cross is sparkling on the Mosque,
 And bells make Catholic the trembling air.*"

Here Don Silva, a knight of the bluest Spanish blood, and of untarnished birth, is encamped with his forces, having in task the defence of the town against the Moors of Granada. The Don is

"A man of high-wrought strain, fastidious
 In his acceptance, dreading all delight
 That speedy dies and turns to carrion ;
*His senses much exacting, deep instilled
 With keen imagination's difficult needs.*"

But he is also a somewhat enigmatical character, being possessed of—

"A nature half transformed, with qualities
 That oft bewrayed each other, elements
 Not blent, but struggling, breeding strange effects,
 Passing the reckoning of his friends or foes.
 Haughty and generous. grave and passionate !
 With tidal moments of devoutest awe
 Sinking anon to farthest ebb of doubt ;

Deliberating ever, till the sting
 Of a recurrent ardour made him rush
 Right against reasons that himself had drilled
 And marshalled painfully. A spirit framed
 Too proudly special for obedience,
 Too subtly pondering for mastery."

In the first book the characters are brought together in a tavern court, and the relative explanations required for the comprehension of the story are given. The company adjourns to the Plaga Santiago, where feats of jugglery, dancing, &c., are going on. Here is the hour of sunset marked for us—

"And still the light is changing : high above
 Float soft pink clouds ; others with deeper flush,
 Stretch like flamingos bending toward the south,
 Comes a more solemn brilliance o'er the sky
 A meaning more intense upon the air—
 The inspiration of the dying day."

At the sound of Juan's lute, Fedalma, who had gone out with her nurse, seized with an irrepressible impulse—a gleam of the wild instincts of her race—rushes into the centre of the crowd, and scandalizes the proprieties by taking part in the dances of the public square ; and she,

"Feeling all life was music, and all eyes
 The warming quickening light that music makes,
 Moved as, in dance religious, Miriam,
 When on the Red Sea shore she raised her voice
 And led the chorus of her people's joy ;
 Or as the Trojan maids that reverend sang
 Watching the sorrow-crowned Hecuba :
 Moved in slow curves, voluminous, gradual,
 Feeling and action flowing into one,
 In Eden's natural, taintless marriage-bond ;
 Ardently modest, sensuously pure,
 With young delight that wonders at itself
 And throbs as innocent as opening flowers,
 Knowing not comment—soilless, beautiful.
 The spirit in her gravely glowing face
 With sweet community informs her limbs,
 Filling their fine gradation with the breath
 Of virgin majesty ; as full-vowelled words
 Are new impregnate with the master's thought.
 Even the chance-strayed delicate tendrils black,
 That backward 'scape from out her wreathing hair—
 Even the pliant folds that cling transverse
 When with obliquely soaring bend altern
 She seems a goddess quitting earth again—
 Gather expression—a soft undertone
 And resonance exquisite from the grand chord
 Of her harmoniously bodied soul.
 The exquisite hour, the ardour of the crowd,

The strains more plenteous, and the gathering might
 Of action passionate where no effort is,
 But self's poor gates open to rushing power,
 That blends the inward ebb and outward rush—
 All gathering influences culminate
 And urge Fedalma. Earth and heaven seem one,
 Life a glad trembling on the outer edge
 Of unknown rapture. Swifter now she moves,
 Filling the measure with a double beat
 And widening circle; now she seems to glow
 With more declared presence, glorified,
 Circling, she lightly bends and lifts on high
 The multitudinous-sounding tambourine,
 And makes it ring and boom, then lifts it higher,
 Stretching her left arm beauteous: now the crowd
 Exultant shouts, forgetting poverty
 In the rich moment of possessing her.

* * * *

But sudden, at one point, the exultant throng
 Is pushed and hustled, and then thrust apart:
 Something approaches—something cuts the ring
 Of jubilant idlers—startling as a streak
 From alien wounds, across the blooming flesh
 Of careless sporting childhood. 'Tis the band
 Of Gypsy prisoners. Soldiers lead the van
 And make sparse flanking guard, aloof surveyed
 By gallant Lopez, stringent in command.
 The Gypsies chained in couples, all save one,
 Walk in dark file, with grand bare legs and arms
 And savage melancholy in their eyes
 That star-like gleam from out black clouds of hair;
 Now they are full in sight, now stretch
 Right to the centre of the open space.
 Fedalma now, with gentle wheeling sweep
 Returning, like the loveliest of the Houris
 Strayed from her sisters, truant lingering,
 Faces again the centre, swings again
 The uplifted tambourine . . .

When lo! with sound
 Stupendous, throbbing, solemn as a voice
 Sent by the invisible choir of all the dead,
 Tolls the great passing bell that calls to prayer
 For souls departed: at the mighty beat
 It seems the light sinks awe-struck—'tis the note
 Of the sun's burial; speech and action pause;
 Religious silence and the holy sign
 Of everlasting memories (the sign
 Of death that turned to more diffusive life)
 Pass o'er the Praça. Little children gaze
 With lips apart, and feel the unknown god;
 And the most men and women pray. Not all.

The soldiers pray ; the Gypsies stand unmoved
 As pagan statues with proud level gaze.
 But he who wears a solitary chain
 Heading the file, has turned to face Fedalma.
 She, motionless, with arm uplifted, guards
 The tambourine aloft (lest, sudden-lowered,
 Its trivial jingle mar the duteous pause),
 Reveres the general prayer, but prays not, stands
 With level glance, meeting that Gipsy's eyes,
 That seem to her the sadness of the world
 Rebuking her, the great bell's hidden thought
 Now first unveiled—the sorrows unredeemed
 Of races outcast, scorned, and wandering."

Is not that intellectograph of the Lady Fedalma's mute pausation while the vesper bells strikes, "beautiful exceedingly?" Much as it may please us, however, and much as she gratified the crowd, she had affected the soul of Father Isidora painfully, and he impresses Don Silva with a sense of the indecorousness of the scene so much that he determines to rebuke her. Here is a specimen of this dramatic scene :—

DON SILVA.

Age, kindred, and your cowl,
 Give an ignoble license to your tongue.
 As for your threats, fulfil them at your peril.
 'Tis you, not I, will gibbet our great name,
 To rot in infamy. If I am strong
 In patience now, trust me, I can be strong
 Then in defiance.

PRIOR.

Miserable man !
 Your strength will turn to anguish, like the strength
 Of fallen angels. Can you change your blood ?
 You are a Christian, with the Christian awe
 In every vein. A Spanish noble, born
 To serve your people and your people's faith.
 Strong, are you ? Turn your back upon the Cross—
 Its shadow is before you. Leave your place :
 Quit the great ranks of knighthood : you will walk
 For ever with a tortured double self—
 A self that will be hungry while you feast,
 Will blush with shame while you are glorified,
 Will feel the ache and chill of desolation,
 Even in the very bosom of your love.
 Mate yourself with this woman, fit for what ?
 To make the sport of Moorish palaces,
 A lewd Herodias

DON SILVA.

Stop! no other man,
 Priest though he were, had had his throat left free
 For passage of those words. I would have clutched
 His serpent's neck, and flung him out to hell!
 A monk must needs defile the name of love:
 He knows it but as tempting devils paint it.
 You think to scare my love from its resolve
 With arbitrary consequences, strained
 By rancorous effort from the thinnest motives
 Of possibility?—cite hideous lists
 Of sins irrelevant, to frighten me
 With bugbears' names, as women fright a child?
 Poor pallid wisdom, taught by inference
 From blood-drained life, where phantom terrors rule,
 And all achievement is to leave undone!
 Paint the day dark, make sunshine cold to me,
 Abolish the earth's fairness, prove it all
 A fiction of my eyes—then, after that,
 Profane Fedalma.

PRIOR.

O there is no need:
 She has profaned herself. Go, raving man,
 And see her dancing now. Go, see your bride
 Flaunting her beauties grossly in the gaze
 Of vulgar idlers eking out the show
 Made in the Plaga by a mountebank.
 I hinder you no farther.

DON SILVA.

It is false!

PRIOR.

Go, prove it false, then.

Silva's love overcomes all, and its intensity is such as to drive him into the proposing of a private marriage early next morning. She is pacing her chamber in the hot passionateness of her nature, when a bird, shot through her window, falls dead at her feet. On a strip of linen under its wings are the words "Dear Child, Fedalma, be brave, give no alarm, your father comes," and almost immediately Zarca appears. His daughter feels the sense of kinship, and soon comes to feel at ease with her father, "as leopard is at ease with leopard," so that she consents to relinquish love for patriotic feeling. She feels a clinging to her womanhood and the proffered consummation of her life hopes, and she would fain accommodate duty and destiny to desire and devotion, but Zarca dashes all such half-hearted means of working out great purposes

at pressing times from her thoughts by forcefully describing them as—

“A woman’s dream, who thinks, by smiling well,
To ripen figs in frost.”

We quote the moment of self-sacrifice as an instance of the marvellous potency of words and thoughts George Eliot uses:—

ZARCA.

You who hold a curse
Or blessings in the hollow of your hand—
Say you will loose that hand from fellowship,
Let go the rescuing rope, hurl all the tribes—
Children, and countless beings yet to come—
Down from the upward path of light and joy;
Back to the dark and marshy wilderness,
Where life is nought but blind tenacity
Of that which is. Say you will curse your race?

FEDALMA (*rising and stretching out her arms in deprecation.*)

No, No—I will not say it—I will go!
Father, I choose! I will not take a heaven
Haunted by shrieks of far-off misery.
This deed and I have ripened with the hours:
It is a part of me—a wakened thought
That, rising like a giant, masters me,
And grows into a doom. O, mother life,
That seemed to nourish me so tenderly,
Even in the womb you vowed me to the fire,
Hung on my soul the burden of men’s hopes,
And pledged me to redeem!—I’ll pay the debt,
You gave me strength that I should pour it all
Into this anguish. I can never shrink
Back into bliss—my heart has grown too big
With things that might be. Father, I will go.
I will strip off these gems. Some happier bride
Shall wear them, since I should be dowered
With nought but curses—dowered with misery
Of men, of women, who have hearts to bleed
As mine is bleeding.

(*She sinks on a seat and begins to take off her jewels.*)

Now, good gems, we part.
Speak of me always tenderly to Silva.

(*She pauses, turning to ZARCA.*)

O father, will the women of our tribe
Suffer as I do, in the years to come,
When you have made them great in Africa?
Redeemed from ignorant ills only to feel
A conscious woe? Then, is it worth the pains?

Were it not better when we reach that shore
 To raise a funeral-pile and perish all?
 So closing up a myriad avenues
 To misery yet unwrought? My soul is faint—
 Will these sharp pangs buy any certain good?

ZARCA.

Nay, never falter; no great deed is done
 By falterers who ask for certainty.
 No good is certain but the steadfast mind,
 The undivided will to seek the good:
 'Tis that compels the elements, and wrings
 A human music from the indifferent air.
 The greatest gift a hero leaves his race
 Is to have been a hero. Say we fail!—
 We feed the high tradition of the world,
 And leave our spirit in Zincalo breasts.

FEDALMA (*unclasping her jewelled belt, and throwing it down.*)

Yes, I will say that we shall fail! I will not count
 On aught but being faithful. I will take
 This yearning self of mine and strangle it.
 I will not be half-hearted: never yet
 Fedalma did aught with a wavering soul.
 Die my young joy—die all my hungry hopes—
 The milk you cry for from the breast of life
 Is thick with curses. Oh, all fatness here
 Snatches its meat from leanness—feeds on graves.
 I will seek nothing but to shun base joy.
 The saints were cowards who stood by to see
 Christ crucified: they should have flung themselves
 Upon the Roman spears, and died in vain—
 That grandest death, to die in vain—for love
 Greater than sways the forces of the world!
 That death shall be my bridegroom. I will wed
 The curse of the Zincali. Father, come!

ZARCA.

No curse has fallen on us till we cease
 To help each other. You, if you are false
 To that first fellowship, lay on the curse,
 But write now to the Spaniard: briefly say
 That I, your father, came; that you obeyed
 The fate which made you a Zincala, as his fate
 Made him a Spanish duke and Christian knight.
 He must not think

FEDALMA.

Yes, I will write, but he—
 Oh, he would know it—he would never think

The chain that dragged me from him could be aught
But scorching iron entering in my soul.

(She writes.)

"Silva, sole love—he came—my father came,
I am the daughter of the Gypsy chief
Who means to be the Saviour of our tribe.
He calls on me to live for his great end.
To live!—nay, die for it. Fedalma dies
In leaving Silva: all that lives henceforth
Is the Zincala."

(She rises.)

Father, now I go
To wed my people's lot.

We cannot follow the course of the story farther. But here is a fine metaphysical passage which we cannot forbear to quote. It shows palpably the interweaving of thought in—

"Silva, inwardly debating, all his ear
Turned into audience of a two-fold mind:—
For even in tumult full-fraught Consciousness
Had plenteous being for a Self aloof
That gazed and listened like a soul in dreams
Weaving the wondrous tale it marvels at."

Our first quotation is descriptive of the state of his mind, and our second is expressive of the feelings of Silva when he had poised love and faith against each other, and determined to lose all for the former, and the nearer, and the more precious:—

"Now in his stead came loneliness and thought
Inexorable, fastening with firm chain
What is to what has been. Now awful night,
Ancestral mystery of mysteries, came down
Past all the generations of the stars,
And visited his soul with touch more close
Than when he kept that younger, briefer watch
Under the church's roof, beside his arms,
And won his knighthood.

"Well, this solitude,
This company with the enduring universe,
Whose mighty silence, carrying all the past,
Absorbs our history as with a breath,
Should give him more assurance, make him strong
In all contempt of that poor circumstance
Called human life—customs and bonds and laws
Wherewith men make a better or a worse,
Like children playing on a barren mound,
Feigning a thing to strive for or avoid.
Thus Silva urged, answering his many-voiced self,
Whose hungry needs, like petulant multitudes,
Lured from the home that nurtured them to strength,
Made loud insurgence. Thus he called on thought—
On dextrous thought, with its swift alchemy,

To change all forms, dissolve all prejudice,
 Of man's long heritage, and yield him up
 A crude fused world to fashion as he would.
 Thought played him double; seemed to wear the robe
 Of passion's prevalence: but served anon
 As tribune to the larger soul which brought
 Loud mingled cries from every human need
 That ages had instructed into life.
 He could not grasp night's black blank mystery,
 And wear it for a spiritual garb
 Creed proof: he shuddered at its passionless touch,
 On solitary souls the universe
 Looks down inhospitable; the human heart
 Finds nowhere shelter save in human kind.
 He yearned toward images that had breath in them,
 That sprang warm, palpitant with memories,
 From streets and altars, from ancestral houses,
 Banners and trophies, and the cherishing rays
 Of shame and honour in the eyes of men.

* * * *

"I never will repent!

If I have sinned, my sin was made for me
 By men's perverseness. There's no blameless life,
 Save for the passionless; no sanctities
 But have the self same roof and props with crime,
 Or have their roots close interlaced with vileness.
 If I had loved her less, been more a craven,
 I had kept my place, and had the easy praise
 Of a true Spanish noble. But I loved,
 And loving dared—not Death the warrior
 But infamy that binds and strips, and holds
 The brand and lash. I have dared all for her.
 She was my good—what other men call heaven,
 And for the sake of it bears penances:
 Nay, some of old were baited, tortured, flayed,
 To win their heaven. Heaven was their good;
 She mine. And I have braved for her all fires,
 Certain or threatened. For I go away
 Beyond the reach of expiation—far away
 From sacramental blessing. Does God bless
 An outlaw? Shut his absolution fast
 In human breath. Is there no God for me
 Save him whose cross I have forsaken? Well,
 I am for ever exiled, but with her!
 She is dragged out into the wilderness:
 I with my love will be her providence.
 I have a right to choose my good or ill—
 A right to damn myself: The ill is mine.
 I never will repent."

When the hour of revulsion comes, Don Silva is equally positive, wrong-headed, and strong-headed for the time being, and we quote

the passage in which the deed is done which separates, as by the blank blackness of death, Fedalma and Silva.

DON SILVA.

Zincalo, devil, blackest infidel.
 You cannot hate that man as you hate me!
 Finish your torture—take me—lift me up
 And let the crowd spit at me—every Moor
 Shoot reeds at me, and kill me with slow death
 Beneath the mid-day fervour of the sun—
 Or crucify me with a thieving hound—
 Slake your hate so, and I will thank it : spare me
 Only this man!

ZARCA.

Madman, I hate you not.
 But if I did, my hate were poorly served
 By my device, if I should strive to mix
 A bitterer misery for you than to taste
 With leisure of a soul in unharmed limbs
 The flavour of your folly. For my course,
 It has a goal, and takes no truant path
 Because of you. I am your chief; to me
 You are but a Zincalo in revolt.

DON SILVA.

No, I am no Zincalo! I disown
 The name I took in madness. Here I tear
 This badge away. I am a Catholic knight,
 A Spaniard who will die a Spaniard's death!
 [Hark! while he casts the badge upon the ground
 And tramples on it, Silva hears a shout :
 Was it a shout that threatened him? He looked
 From out the dizzying flames of his own rage
 In hope of adversaries—and he saw above
 The form of Father Isidor upswung
 Convulsed with martyr throes; and knew the shout
 The wonted exultation of the crowd
 When malefactors die—or saints or heroes.
 And now to him that white-frocked murdered form
 Which, hanging, judged him as its murderer,
 Turned to a symbol of his guilt, and stirred
 Tremors till then unwoke. With sudden snatch
 At something hidden in his breast, he strode
 Right upon Zarca: at the instant, down
 Fell the great Chief, and Silva, staggering back,
 Heard not the shriek of the Zincali, felt
 Not their fierce grasp—heard, felt but Zarca's words
 Which seemed his soul outleaping in a cry
 And urging men to run like rival waves
 Whose rivalry is but obedience.]

It was dark night
 Before the ships weighed anchor and gave sail ;
 Fresh night, emergent in her clearness, lit
 By the large crescent moon, with Hesperus,
 And those great stars that lead the eager host,
 Fedalma stood and watched the little bark
 Lying jet-black upon moon-whitened waves.
 Silva was standing too. He, too, divined
 A steadfast form, that held him with its thought,
 And eyes that sought him vanishing : he saw
 The waters widen slowly, till at last
 Straining he gazed, and knew not if he gazed
 On aught but blackness overhung by stars.

Then the end comes, with its drear, tragical loneliness of disparate existence, of the powerless submission due to fate, and of the dread dead endurancy of the hopeless future of a copeless destiny. Of the story the essence is summed up in Burns' brief epitome—

"Had we never loved so kindly,
 Had we never loved so blindly,
 Never met or never parted
 We had ne'er been broken-hearted."

No reader of this poem can fail to note the wealth of allusion to Biblical scenes, events, and lessons it contains ; nor can it escape their notice that, intimate as this acquaintance with Scripture seems, it is conjoined with no faith in its truth. It is used as mere rhetoric. This is condemned by rhetoric as false, for if the Bible is a doomed book it is wrong consciously to intersperse much matter derived from it into any book intended for vitality, and if a faith is not entertained in it by the writer it ceases to be used naturally, that is, poetically. Here is a passage from a speech by Zarca, which might have been written by Shelley when his "Queen Mab" days lasted, but it does not, as we think, beseem George Eliot to introduce by a side wind an attack on the faith of the people.

"Arabs are our friends,
 Grappling for life with Christians, who lay waste
 Granada's valleys, and with devilish hoofs
 Trample the young, green corn ; with devilish play
 Fell blossomed trees, and tear up well-pruned vines :
 Cruel as tigers to the vanquished brave,
 They wring out gold by oaths they mean to break :
 Take pay for pity and are pitiless ;
Then tinkle bells above the desolate earth,
And praise their monstrous gods, supposed to love
The flattery of liars."

This we say all the more readily, because it seems to us that she has attained to a near view of a higher truth than that of mere scepticism, in a passage somewhat, perhaps, inartistically introduced, as being anachronistic, into the mouth of the astrologer Sephardo, who says :—

“Two angels guide
 The path of Man ; both aged, and yet young,
 As angels are—ripening through endless years.
 On one he leans ;—some call her Memory,
 And some Tradition,—and her voice is sweet
 With deep mysterious accords:—the other,
 Floating above, holds down a lamp, which streams
 A light divine and searching on the earth,
 Compelling eyes and footsteps. Memory yields
 Yet clings with loving cheek, and shines anew
 Reflecting all the rays of bright lamp
 Our angel Reason holds. *We had not walked,
 But for Tradition ; we walk evermore,
 To higher paths, by brightening Reason's lamp.*”

Here we see the defect of the dramatic poem we have been considering, and of the metaphysics of the tragedy. It is a play of fate, not faith. It is as heathenic in this regard as is the Greek drama, and though it is placed in Christian times there is no adoption into the heart of the drama of true Christian influences. The characters are everywhere surrounded and inspired by the irresistible. The harsh, stern, hand of Inevitability holds the leading strings of each soul, and all the events that operate upon it. There is no evasion of the positive result. The elemental forces have decreed, and all will is powerless as a spider-thread to avert or change the catastrophe. We hope to hear better things of George Eliot yet than that the highest moral and intellectual lesson she has to give is that Fate not Faith now rules the world, that Circumstance governs Existence, and Sense outvalues Self. This is scarcely, perhaps, a fair conclusion for a critique on a poem, but we have an idea that the poem is in reality as much a metaphysical and moral as it is a poetical production, hence our divergence into this critique. It is a wonderful book, full of life, interest, thought, and beauty, and it cannot fail to heighten the fame of George Eliot.

THE poet must falsify history. He crowds, sometimes huddles, together in one brief event the events of years. He uses a “poetical licence.” All that he does well might be better done elsewhere ; and he is forced to do much that is wrong, false. Nothing but error can result from attempting to assimilate things essentially distinct. To poetize history or to historize poetry is like painting statues, it is mistaking the natural limits of art. You do not believe a statue to be flesh. Painting it only makes it hideous, and does not altar your conviction. So you do not believe a character in a poem to be a real man, giving him a well-known name and placing him in well-known circumstances does not shake your scepticism, though disturbing your historical impressions.—*George Henry Lewes.*

The Topic.

SHOULD NOBLEMEN POSSESS VOTES (OR EXERCISE INFLUENCE OVER VOTERS) FOR THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS?

AFFIRMATIVE.

THE interests of men in the State are various ; there is a *life* interest which every man possesses, a *property* interest which fewer can lay claim to, an interest of *class* again which all have, but, again, also an interest of *status* which few possess. In regard to life interest every man should have a vote, and for the protection of property above a certain sum (say a sum paying income-tax), he ought to have another vote. Of course a peer ought to use his life-vote as he please, and he would most probably give his property vote on the Conservative side. Hence, I affirm, noblemen ought to have votes for a member of the Lower House.

But, again, it is asked, ought noblemen to influence votes for members of the House of Commons? I say there is a just influence which wealth, education, status, and large power of acting on a community confers, and this a nobleman ought to exercise to the best of his judgment, in aid of the cause of truth, equity, independence, and progress. In the choice of a thorough gentleman, of a man of parts, of interest in national and local affairs, and in the encouraging of such men to come forward as candidates, there is a legitimate field of useful influence which a nobleman ought to exert.—
H. M. S.

I cannot see why not. The larger interest in the country a nobleman possesses the more requisite is it that he should look well to the class of men who offer themselves as representatives, and he ought to see, or endeavour to see, that they are men alive to the responsibilities they propose to take on themselves ; that they are men of thought, information, and principle, and that they are aware of the important issues in which their return may result. It is especially the place of the nobility to preserve the gentility, honour, and dignity of the Lower House by giving their interest and support to the old county families and the men of large enterprise and extensive conversance with political questions, in whose hands the management of national affairs may be safely placed. I think such influence as this, which naturally attaches to hereditary rank and the bearing of titles and estates, is just, beneficial, and necessary. Any enforcement of claim to control a voter in the suffrage he should give I would object to, but countenance example, taking a place on the hustings and using any general, as distinguished from oppressive, interest, I think, ought not to be begrudged to the good old nobility of England, the heirs of the men who have made our history what it is.—
W. P.

Our nobility are in a better posi-

tion than any other class for knowing the status, character, position, qualifications, private worth, and experience in the management of business, of any person offering himself for the highest civil dignity which a nation, by its votes, can bestow, the conferring on him of a place in the national councils as an adviser of the queen, a legislator for the people, an administrator of the imperial finances, and an arbiter in all the questions which can come before the most august assemblage of commoners in the world. I think that they can do the State some service by the influence they can exert in repressing the unruly aspirations of incompetent candidates, insisting on knowing the antecedents and real intentions of those who wish to be brought before a constituency, and offering some idea of the fitness of the intending candidate for the representation of the interests of the part of the country in which he resides, or in which he has large interests. Having found that a suitable person offers, he ought to employ the influence his position gives him to smooth the way to the aspirant, and by advice, friendly help, and courtesy, help an election. All this he can do efficiently and well if wisely and moderately, and this, I think, is perfectly legitimate.—YOUNG IDEA.

I do not see any good ground for objecting to a peer having a vote for an M.P. Being a nobleman ought rather to qualify than to disqualify a person for choosing the kind of men who ought to be called to the House of Commons; and I am quite unable to see how any law could hinder a peer from influencing the votes at an election. We might as well attempt to debar him from exerting the force of example on his neighbourhood. It is unavoidable, as man is constituted, that a peer's wish, if made known, will have an

effect, and that his example, if given, shall in many cases be followed. Grades of society are only really useful for the example, influence, and encouragement they exert or employ.—S. L.

NEGATIVE.

Our nobility have a very good share of the political power of this country already, in being members by right of birth, without any other recommendation at all, of one of the chambers of legislation. The House of Commons should be the House of *the* Commons, and not of a set of nominees, followers, dependents, hangers-on, and parasites of the lords of the land. I can see no nobility in threatened evictions, dismissal from service, or loss of trade, unless a vote is given as my lord desires, and this generally is the only sort of influence he does use at elections.—P. W.

Noblemen have an entire House of Parliament to themselves, and enjoy personal representation. They have the power therein to give individual votes. They are there equal each, so far as voting power is concerned, to entire constituencies who return only one member—so that the vote of one lord goes as far as say 150,000 of the inhabitants of Birmingham, Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, &c. This is voting power sufficient for any class and ought to content them so well that they should not voluntarily to interfere in any way—by voting themselves or influencing the votes of others—in the election of members for the Houses of Commons. Indeed, one of the most pressing requirements of our age—and one which will surely come as a large instalment of an anti-bribery bill—is that no peer having a seat in the Upper Chamber, or his heir-apparent shall, either directly or indirectly, interfere with, or meddle in

any way with the elections for the Commons House, or with the exercise of the franchise for elections into said House, on penalty of forfeiting, during the term of his natural life, the exercise of the power to vote in the Upper House. The age of privilege is dying, and the lordship of lords over the political conscience of the people must be brought to an end.—G. C. L.

Should noblemen possess votes (or exercise influence over votes) for members of the House of Commons is a question of great importance to the newly enfranchised, for it strikes at the fundamental principle of the new "Reform Bill," which is this, that the direct payment of the poor's rate, by the householder, gives him the power of voting on his own behalf.

I therefore think that any influence of a despotic character that may be brought to bear upon the electors, to compel them to vote against their own individual wishes and feelings, is a something that cannot be condemned too strongly.

One of the great crying evils of England in the past has been the fact of the country being governed by the chosen few, who have legislated for their own particular class instead of the great body of the people, as the opposition to the passing of the Reform Bill of '32, the repeal of the Corn Laws, and the abolishing of the Paper Duty, and other great measures will testify.

Now that the power of governing the country has been placed in the hands of the people, I think it is right that every voter should see that no part of the right which has

been withheld so long should be placed at the disposal of a select few.

Voting by proxy having been abolished in the House of Lords, I think it shows bad taste on the part of those who still possess the power, providing they are in a majority, of nullifying the decisions come to in the Commons to try and influence the votes of those who are under their control. For it shows bad taste on the part of those who possess great privileges (which are not always the most just) to try and aspire to what, in my humble opinion, is an unworthy position, namely, that of "grand elector" for a small constituency, and that is what is being done in some parts of England at the present time, for we find that is the position that has been taken up by one of the Ministers of the Crown, as the Woodstock election will prove.

When one reflects that the property which enables men to exercise an illicit influence was the gift of the nation, and that there are, in many instances, large pensions given in addition for services which they themselves have never rendered, the attempt to abuse the country's munificence to the destruction of its freedom of election, becomes a grave offence against decency as well as against morality.

On these grounds, I think that every voter ought to be allowed to vote according to his own desires, without the fear of some great avenging power hanging over him for not having obeyed the mandate of some peer of the realm.—D. W. R.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

786. Was not there a committee formed after the demise of W. J. Fox to issue an edition of his works "for the people," to supply a biography, and otherwise to perpetuate the memory of the Norwich factory boy?—LITCHFIELD.

787. Which is the best way to study Spenser's "Faery Queen"?—AVONIAN.

788. What is the nature of "The Purgatory of Suicides," by Thomas Cooper, the Chartist, whose decease was recently announced, and thereafter contradicted?—W. H. L.

789. Can you recommend any good cheap general atlas?—L. GROVER.

790. Who is Captain Curling, author of "The Forest Youth; or, Shakspeare as he lived: an Historical Tale?"—AVONIAN.

791. What is the worth of William Paley as a moralist and an economist? and what are the best editions of his works on these subjects?—ALFRED.

792. Can any reader give information concerning the works and life of Peter Bayne, who, I am told, is one of the finest of modern Christian philosophic thinkers?—GEO. D.

793. It is stated of some one that he edited his father's books, reported his proceedings, composed his memoirs, and carved his statue in marble: who was this person?—J. M.

794. Who said, while the American civil war was pending, "that neither peace, nor separation, nor mediation can be wrought out without slavery getting its death-blow"?—J. M.

795. "A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe" has

been published by an American, I am informed: who is he, and what is the nature of his work?—H. D. R.

796. Is it true that Sir Charles Lyell has, from being an antagonist, become an advocate of Darwin's theory of the origin of species?—RUSTICUS.

797. Have any books been published which use marginal references as a help to the complete understanding of the uses of words by eminent authors? as, for instance, is there any edition of Milton's poems in which references are given to the same words occurring in different places of the various works?—JOSEPH.

798. When are the examinations for the Civil Service of India held? who are eligible, and what are the preliminary conditions?—ADVENTURE.

799. What sort of a book is "Dod's Parliamentary Companion"?—ELECTOR.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

727. The *North American Review* was the subject of a query some time since in the columns of this Magazine. The answer given was acknowledgedly incomplete. Perhaps it may be as well, even though late, to make it somewhat more complete by the following additions, which I am now able to make. Appleton's "New American Cyclopædia," in speaking of the review literature of the United States, says,—“The ablest and most permanent publication of this sort has been the *North American Review*, which has been successively edited by Tudor, E. T. Channing, and R. H. Dana, Edward Everett, Sparks, A. H. Everett, Palfrey, Bowen, and Peabody; and

has constantly maintained a high character, both for style and critical ability." From 1854 to 1864 the superintendence of Dr. Peabody was given to it; but in July, 1864, the editorial chair received a double incumbency, for then the management was undertaken by James Russell Lowell, well known as a poet, and Charles Eliot Norton Law, we believe of the famous *Biblical Critic*. The characteristics of this review are independent criticism and well-considered opinions in politics and literature. Many of its articles have been reprinted in England, and even translated into foreign languages, and the writers of them are acknowledged as the men of the age.—R. M. A.

780. "The English Cyclopædia" is now completed in twenty-two volumes, and the issue of a supplementary volume in each of the departments—science and art, geography, history, biography, &c.—has been commenced in monthly parts. "The National Cyclopædia" is also completed in thirteen volumes, and Chambers's in ten.—R. M. A.

"The English Cyclopædia," which has been in course of re-issue for three years, is now completed in so far as the re-issue is concerned. It consists of *Geography*, four volumes, 42s.; *Natural History*, four volumes, 42s.; *Arts and Sciences*, eight volumes, 96s.; *Biography*, six volumes, 63s. There are, however, in course of issue, supplements intended to bring down the knowledge contained in the work to the state of the time of issue, which will make the whole very complete. It would be injudicious in me to say more than these facts amount to: for it has been announced that a competent writer is engaged in preparing an account of encyclopædias for this serial.—C. R. A.

781. Jean Diodati's "Annotations in Biblia" were issued in Geneva,

1607, and were translated from the original Latin into English in 1648. The author was born in Geneva in 1576, and he had made such progress in learning that Beza recommended him as professor of Hebrew in his native city when he was twenty-one; and he subsequently became professor of theology. In Italy he formed a friendship with Sarpi, and projected an agitation for the reform of the Papacy. He translated Sarpi's "History of the Council of Trent" into French. He was sent on a mission to the French churches and to Holland, where he attended the Synod of Dort, and aided in the drawing up of the Acts of that Assembly. He was a distinguished preacher, frank and outspoken, and entirely regardless of worldly considerations. He translated the Bible into Italian, and afterwards produced a French version. I do not know the book mentioned, but I should suppose, from the reputation of the man, that his "Annotations" would be of value, though perhaps now a little antiquated.—R. M. G.

782. The invention of this phrase is usually assigned to the Emperor Napoleon III., whose power of pithy and pretentious rhetoric is pretty generally conceded. Our own impression is that it is a Mazzinian phrase. We have heard Kossuth use something like it. And we recollect the phrase came into fashion about 1848, in which year a little book was issued by G. J. Holyoake, the well-known Secularist editor of the *Reasoner*, entitled "The Logic of Facts."—R. M. A.

795. John William Draper, M.D., LL.D., Professor of Chemistry and Physiology in the University of New York, author of "A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe," &c., is not an American. He was born near Liverpool, in England, in May, 1811. He was

educated at a Wesleyan Methodist school at Woodhouse Grove. His later studies were re-pursued in London, where he acquired a knowledge of chemistry under Dr. Edward Turner (1798—1839) in University College, then called the London University,—an eminent man, too early lost to science. In 1833 Draper joined some of his relations in emigrating to America. There he studied medicine at the University of Pennsylvania, where he took his degree of M.D. in 1837. Shortly thereafter he became professor of medicine in the college of Hampden Sidney in Virginia, and was promoted in 1839 to his present profession in New York, in the university of which he was chosen president of the medical faculty in 1851. Professor Draper owes his scientific reputation to his researches on light, especially the action of latent light. He is the author of many pamphlets, papers, &c., on physiology, physics, chemistry, medicine, &c., which have appeared in the scientific journals of the United States, of London, and of Edinburgh, several of which have been translated into German, French, and Italian. He has published many elementary scientific works, *e.g.*, "Text-book of Natural Philosophy;" "Elements of Chemistry;" "A Treatise on Mixed Mathematics." He has composed an able work on "The Chemistry of Plants," to which there is added an appendix containing observations on capillary attraction, the electrical and chemical action of light, &c.; but his greatest professional work is entitled "Human Physiology, statical and dynamical, or the conditions and course of the life of man," being the text of lectures delivered from his chair in New York. This book, which is illustrated with 300 engravings from photographs, is spoken of as the first of physio-

logical treatises. Of the work inquired after—"The History of the Intellectual Development of Europe," the following passage from *The North American Review* may convey a sufficient idea and characterization both of contents and of ability:—"It covers the entire history of European progress. The author's endeavour is to trace the action of primordial law in the general development of the race, and in the successive stages of growth and decline that have marked the collective life of portions of the race. The author is a rigid positivist in his method; but not after the school of Comte or of Buckle. Law is with him not automatic, but the outgoing of the will of the immutable Creator; and Christianity is not the growth of the human intellect, but the gift of God. In the light of Christian theism, sporadic and fortuitous events and changes are so only in appearance. The miscellaneous, confused aspect of human history is due solely to our lack of comprehensive theories. We have a Ptolemaic system of the spiritual universe, and thus must invent countless cycles and epicycles to bring what has been and is within the purview of our system. A true system of the spiritual, as of the material universe, must comprehend within its great circles all that man has been and thought, experienced and realized. That our author has drawn these circles with unerring hand is more than he would claim. To have made the attempt is of itself a great merit and a high achievement. His work must take its place as among the most truly original, profound, and instructive contributions of the age, in the department of speculative philosophy." Besides the works above-mentioned we ought to have named one in which he first advocated that

chemico-vital theory of which he has become the illustrator, viz., "The Forces which Produce Organization in Plants," published in 1844. It may help to shew that he is a man of wide attainments and sympathies if we note that in 1865 he issued "Thoughts on the Future Policy of America." He is a clear, able,

and popular lecturer, and has won the confidence of the public of the United States. His works have a few readers on this side of the Atlantic, and he is known among the advanced thinkers of the day as a man of decided originality and ability—quite worthy of an extended fame.—R. M. A.

The Societies' Section.

BELFAST YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION.

THE Winter Session of this society was inaugurated on September 3rd, by a social tea meeting in the Philharmonic Rooms, presided over by Robert Boag, Esq., T.C., one of the vice-presidents. There was a large attendance both of the general public and of the members and their fair friends. Tea having been served, &c.

Mr. Boag said—My Christian friends, I feel peculiar pleasure in taking the chair on this occasion, as I feel a deep and abiding interest in the prosperity of this association. In my youthful days there were no such opportunities open for young men to associate themselves together for intellectual, moral, and spiritual culture; and I may remind you that the first association of the kind was formed in London in the year 1814, and it arose in this way:—A young man engaged in an extensive warehouse, with the Spirit of Jesus in his heart, invited, to meet each week in his room, a number of his companions to engage in prayer. Others joined them, and they organized what is now so universally known as the London Young Men's Christian Association. Other large cities and towns throughout the

United Kingdom soon followed their example; and I well remember your own was instituted in 1850, embracing, as it still does, young men of all the evangelical denominations in town. In vain do I look around me this evening for some of those who first pioneered the way to the formation of this association. Some I know, after diligently and faithfully serving their Master here, have gone to their reward; others have gone abroad, carrying with them the spirit of this association, and have been the means of aiding and planting similar institutions in the land of their adoption; some are ministers of the gospel, and not a few have settled down around us, enterprising and successful merchants, while benevolent and devoted men; but all of them, I am free to say, carrying within them lively and happy recollections of their connection with this association. From 1850, similar associations spread over Europe and America, so that in 1855 it was deemed desirable to hold what was termed the world's convention of Young Men's Christian Associations. This meeting was held in Paris, and was attended by delegates from the

various societies, and a more general recognition of the brotherhood took place. It issued in the erection of a platform, upon which the Young Men's Christian Associations of the world have placed themselves, and upon which I hope they will ever continue to stand. This platform was made the subject of special and earnest prayer, and after a few changes it was finally adjusted thus—I quote from the original document,—“The Young Men's Christian Associations seek to unite those young men who, regarding Jesus Christ as their God and Saviour, according to the Holy Scriptures, desire to be His disciples in their doctrine and in their life, and to associate their efforts for the extension of His kingdom among young men.” Since 1855, conferences have been held every three years, at which delegates attend from the various societies. The last took place in Paris this very day twelve months ago, and about seventy delegates attended, representing England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Belgium, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, America; and the Belfast Young Men's Christian Association was respectably and ably represented in your delegates, Messrs. Crookshank and Anderson, who tell us it was the most interesting and successful that has taken place since the commencement of these societies. Reports were submitted of the various associations. The English set forth that there were 3,734 members in London alone, with 54 branch associations throughout England, numbering 4,044 members; making 7,778 in all. Holland reported there were 72 associations, with upwards of 3,000 members, 2,200 of whom were engaged in Sunday school work, and 1,000 labouring in other departments. In Belgium they have 11 associations, with 186 mem-

bers. In Germany there are 100 associations in the North, and 51 associations in the Eastern Province, with 2,681 members, and in the Western 139 associations, with about 6,000 members. The French Swiss reported that they had 57 associations and 600 members. In France there are 72 associations. Now who can tell the influence for good these numerous associations have had, and will have, over the whole earth? It may be they are the leaven which is to leaven the whole lump. It may be they are destined to diffuse gospel light and religious liberty throughout the world. Is there not much to encourage you? Yours is a noble work; persevere with all your might, and maintain your position among the associations of the world; strive to induce your companions and young men coming to town to reside to join your ranks; say to them, Come with us, and we will do you good, show you how to avoid the snares that beset your path in large communities like this, and we will lead you in wisdom's ways, which are pleasant, and her paths, which are peace. I was particularly struck in reading the sad and sickening details of that awful catastrophe which occurred the other day, by which a mysterious Providence instantaneously consumed a number of passengers on their way to Dublin, while others escaped unhurt, and were enabled to pursue their journey. With feelings of pain and pleasure I read that, after arriving at Holyhead, and going on board the steamer, those who escaped met, as it were with one accord, and united in offering up thanksgiving for their preservation to Him who ruleth, guardeth, and directeth all things, and who suffers not a sparrow to fall without His knowledge. Here you see, without distinction of sect or creed, were congregated

together peer and peasant, master and servant, rich and poor, old and young, kneeling at the throne of grace to one common Lord and Master. Such a scene reminds me of the meetings of this association. Why should not all who are one in Jesus meet occasionally here for mutual edification in unity and love, while they are looking forward and journeying to the same home above. I am afraid of trespassing too much on your time, but there is a matter or two I must still allude to. I understand your library is but small, and you wish to enlarge it, but have not the means. I am sure, were this known, there are numbers of respectable inhabitants in this town who have duplicate copies of works on Christian literature that they can easily part with, and whom we would ask to write on the fly-leaf their name with date, and present them to the Belfast Young Men's Christian Association, I have a few volumes myself, which I purpose to send in, and I will gladly take charge of any our friends outside may be disposed to give. Next I find your income has not met your expenditure, and that you are indebted to an indulgent and benevolent treasurer, Alderman Mullan. Now this ought not to be. You know the Christian rule, "Owe no man anything;" therefore I implore you to exert yourselves and see what you can do to wipe this

debt away, and, if you fail to raise the required sum, call upon the vice-presidents and others, who, I have no doubt, will generously and liberally aid in encouraging and supporting this noble society. I am delighted in seeing so many ladies present countenancing and encouraging you in this good work. I hope they will continue, and I trust they will not feel inclined to give their hand or their heart to any young man who is not a member of this or a similar association.

The annual report for 1867 having been read,

Mr. J. S. Clarke moved its adoption, referred to the encouraging position of the association, and advocated its claims to support.

Mr. Henry Bell seconded the motion, which was passed unanimously.

Mr. Joseph Gardiner addressed the meeting on "Our Work."

Mr. John Heron read the "Legend of Horatius" effectively, and was followed by

Mr. Samuel Murdoch, who ably recited Collins's "Ode to Eloquence."

James Haslett, Esq., T.C., having been called to the second chair, the thanks of the meeting were voted to Mr. Boag for his kindness in presiding on the occasion.

The musical part of the entertainment was ably conducted by Mr. W. Moss and an efficient choir.

THE REVISION OF OPINIONS.

Enthusiastic people of immature years are generally much puzzled to understand the slow rate at which the improvement of human society advances, and the difficulty with which regenerative ideas make their way even among those who would be most deeply benefited by their realisation. A long experience is needed before one sees that, alike

by their good points and their defects, men are shut up in grooves which, while they keep us in a certain path of order and steadfastness, have the drawback of making both change of direction and the access of notions from without matters of surpassing slowness and hazard. Obviously that society is most healthy and vigorous which numbers most

citizens in a position of influence and weight, whose attachment to a steadfast and continuous life makes them the foes of rash change, while it is not of that stupid kind which closes up all the avenues of the intelligence to new mental impression.

The people who are most honest in their anxiety to keep their opinions in good order in face of altering or newly discovered facts are invariably found to be also those by whom a well-based opinion is most tenaciously cherished. And this leads us to say that, except in a few marvellously disciplined minds, the quantity of opinion where revision is possible as a regular process is very limited compared with that where revision cannot be practised to any large or effective extent in one man's life.

The general rule which guides our allotment of praise and blame where revision of an opinion ends in its abandonment or radical transformation would seem to be that the surrender of a whole set of fundamental views is carrying revision a good deal too far, but that the surrender of a measure or specific bit of conduct enjoyed by them, and the adoption of a measure that is recommended by some opposing set of fundamental principles, constitute a process through which every honest man passes more than once or twice during his lifetime. That is to say, we praise a man when he tests a proposed measure or action, either in his own case or in the case of another person, not merely by its conformity to his general system of opinion, but by its amount of compliance with the conditions of that widest expediency which is always supreme over the claims of any one system. Wise men adhere to a scheme or co-ordinated body of opinion, because they think they perceive, after observing to the best

of their capacity, that it is on the whole more conducive than any other to those objects in whose attainment consists the wellbeing of society, according to their own conception of what social wellbeing means. At any rate, whether they are conscious of it or not, this is the true key to their allegiance to any given system. But all persons who have thought about such matters are agreed that no system is superior to its adversaries at every possible point. Nobody who knows what systems of opinion are can pretend that any one of them is universally on the highest practicable level; the only ground for adherence to it is that, a fair average being struck between our own and the rest, it occupies the highest level in a decisive majority of important conditions and circumstances. This being so, then in all grave and much-vexed questions, in which each of the two sides would agree that we are in the face of momentous issues, no man with anything like a proper anxiety that his opinions should be right will hesitate in setting to measure his existing view—whether he has come to it by inheritance or sheer accident, or along with some other opinions which he got in a parcel, and has not had leisure to overhaul in detail—by the supreme standard of general convenience in its best and highest sense. He may find on candid examination that here is a combination of circumstances for the solution of which in the most satisfactory manner possible his system offers less adequate suggestions than some other system for which in a general way he has no sympathy, but to which in the present case he is bound by all considerations of intellectual fair-dealing to award the palm.—*Saturday Review*.

SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Ought charity to be administered personally or by organized associations?

Ought the charities of Great Britain to be amalgamated?

Can the Church of England ever be the authoritative teacher of the nation at large?

Is "fixity of tenure" the remedy for Ireland's grievances?

Would the institution of a peasant proprietary benefit Ireland?

Has philosophy in general any relation to life?

Has the philosophy of Hobbes been properly understood?

Ought the payment of local taxes to form the ground of claim for the right to vote for a national representative?

Of three distinguished Quakers—Fox, Barclay, and Penn—which was the greatest?

Is worship without ecclesiasticism possible?

Is Government a complete science?

Has the possession of temporal power exercised a demoralizing influence on the Papacy?

Should university education be open to women?

Ought India and the Colonies to be represented in Parliament?

Should we institute a national colonization of the East?

Ought the national debt to be permanized or abolished [paid or repudiated]?

Can [and ought] land and capital [to] be democratized?

Should all forms of worship be equal before the law?

Should voting by proxy be abolished in the House of Lords [or extended to the members of the Commons]?

Ought there to be free trade in land?

Should the Commander-in-Chief of the army be also the Secretary of State for War?

Is confession consonant with Protestantism?

Is the course of history circular or linear?

Ought we to have female universities?

Is money capital?

Does the rate of interest depend on amount of money or average of profits?

Were the leaders of the commonwealth good statesmen?

Would a middle-class political ministry benefit this country?

Has John Bright or Benjamin Disraeli been the more efficient educator of the Tories?

Is the monk the highest style of man?

Is state intervention necessary for the promotion of physical science?

Can the High Church, Broad Church, and evangelical parties be reconciled and united?

Can the apostolic institution of Episcopacy be demonstrated?

Is the Bible the religion of Protestants?

Ought Cromwell to have a statue in Westminster Hall?

Ought public lectures to be subject to censorship?

Are the working classes irreligious?

Should spiritualism be investigated experimentally?

Ought vaccination to be compulsory?

Are priesthoods harmful or beneficial?

Is Britain losing its pre-eminence among manufacturing nations?

Is the Celtic inferior to the Anglo-Saxon race?

Is endowment or self-supporting freedom the right relation between the church of Christ and nations?

Ought religious endowments to be secularized?

Is the Opera absurd and contradictory in art?

Is music capable of being used dramatically?

Will the transit of power tend to evolution or to revolution?

Does parliamentary debate promote or retard beneficial legislation?

Is "office" a prize or a duty?

Are the Homeric poems historically credible?

Have there been mythopœic ages of history?

Is progress a normal fact of human society?

Was the massacre of St. Bartholomew the result of a plan or a panic?

Should churches be endowed as auxiliaries to the police [preservers of order, decorum, and peace]?

Ought constituencies to be de-localized?

Are the artizan classes a brotherhood?

Ought marriage to be indissoluble?

Is the revolution in Spain likely to be beneficial to Europe?

Have the Bourbons any claims on the gratitude of Europe?

Is "the gift of the golden rose" so awarded as to benefit the world?

Does the new Reform Act do credit to the wisdom [and patriotism] of our legislators?

Ought female emigration to be encouraged?

Ought the accounts of tallymen to be declared to be irrecoverable by legal process?

Is the nine hours' movement required?

Literary Notes.

MR. TIMMINS, the Midland Counties' Shaksperian, has in preparation a "Memoir of Baskerville, the Birmingham Printer."

M. B. Smedley has in the press a volume of poems.

A new edition of "Hearne's Diary" is announced.

Francis Bennoch, a city merchant, whose "Poems" have long been looked for by the literary world, is about to favour Letters with a "Memoir of Mary Russell Mitford."

A Biography of the late Rev. W. C. Burns has been undertaken by Dr. Islay Burns, Professor of Biblical Criticism in Glasgow.

Under the questionable title "Is there a God?" a series of *controversial papers*, written by Mr. Bradlaugh (Iconoclast) and Mr. Gillespie, author of an able book on "The Argument *à priori* for a

God," is to be published in one volume.

M. Paul Meyer has in the press "A Romance of Alexander"—an early French MS. text—with an account of his first visit to Oxford and its MSS.

Arthur Arnold, author of "From the Levant," has gained the Lloyd £25 prize, awarded by the Council of the Social Science Association for the best essay on "The most Feasible Plan for the Employment of Operatives and Workman in Casual Distress."

Count Walewski, playwright, essayist, journalist, pamphleteer, statesman, &c., died at Strasbourg, 27th September.

A new *University Gazette* is to be issued weekly at Cambridge as an organ of the higher culture.

We are to have shortly a new

"Life and Times of Daniel de Foe," with many new facts and hitherto uncollected pieces of his writings. Mr. Lee, the author, has been engaged many years on the researches of which this work will contain the results.

"A Life of St. Athanasius," primate of Egypt (296—373), whose creed has given rise to so much controversy, is in preparation by William Bright, author of a "History of the Church, from the Edict of Milan to the Council of Chalcedon."

Dr. D. Lorimer, historian of "The Protestant Church in France," &c., died 7th October.

Dr. William Bell, an eccentric Shaksperian, author of "Shakspeare's Puck and his Folk-lore," &c., died September 30th, in Germany.

Victor Hugo's "By Order of the King," a novel, is to be put into the printer's hands early in November, and to be issued in January, 1869. A poem, "The End of Satan," and a dramatic volume to be entitled, "The Theatre in Freedom," by the same author, are in progress.

Robert Buchanan has nearly ready "A Memoir of Audubon, the American Ornithologist (1780—1851), who continued the work of a Paisley poet—Alexander Wilson.

"Leaves from Prussian History," from the pen of Varnhagen Von Ense, are in the Leipsic press.

A translation of "The Odes and Epodes of Horace," by Lord Lytton, is to be issued from Blackwood's press, and the "Rightful Heir," of his old "Sea Captain," has been brought out by Mr. Murray.

"Ballads from MS.S.," chiefly of the time of Henry VIII., are to be edited by Mr. Furnival.

"Napoleon I. and Holland, 1806—1813," has been issued by Professor W. Jarissen, of Amsterdam.

Professor McCoeh publishes, as a farewell gift, "Philosophical Pa-

pers," prior to his departure for the Principalship of Princeton University, U.S.

Some curious and interesting "Memorabilia of the City of Glasgow" have been issued under the editorship of Mr. W. Watson, city chamberlain.

The *London Review* believes, that on an average there are half a dozen poets in each parish in Scotland.

A new volume of the "Poems" of the Coatbridge shoemaker's widow, old Janet Hamilton, has been largely subscribed for, and is nearly ready for issue.

An interesting literary discovery has been accidentally made in the Library at Frankfort. The fall of a shelf holding volumes containing the correspondence of Voltaire and Frederick the Great brought to light certain MS.S., yellow and dirty, which turned out to be a series of letters exchanged between Voltaire and Pyron. Their authenticity being duly certified, they were forwarded to the Royal Academy of Berlin.

A new issue of our "Old Dramatists," under the name of "The Mermaid Series," has been commenced.

At the Clarendon Press, Oxford, there has been produced an exact reprint of "The Holy Bible," of 1611.

F. W. Newman has in the press, "Miscellanies, chiefly Academical and Historical."

There is in preparation (by G. H. Lewes?) an edition of the "Ethics and Letters of Spinoza," with a Biography of the Philosopher and a Summary of his Doctrine.

Professor H. Morley has issued Part I. of "Tables of English Literature."

Of a uniform edition of the works of the late Dr. James Hamilton Vol. I. has been published. It is to be completed in six.

Partizanship,

AN OCCASIONAL ESSAY.

"An opinion, though ever so true and certain to one man, cannot be transfused into another as true and certain, by any other way but by opening his understanding, and assisting him so to order his conceptions that he may find the reasonableness of it within himself."—*William Wollaston*.

COLERIDGE, in his "Friend," adopted the plan of interposing, under the name of *Landing-places*, a few essays of lighter texture, but of an illustrative nature, between those serious and philosophical prelections of which that work principally consists. While recently reperusing that work—a singular compound of complex reasoning, poetic fancy, and prosaic disquisition—the idea occurred to us that it might not be amiss in us to employ the inter-space between the close of one year and the commencement of another as a Landing-place, and to interpose an Essay, if possible, of somewhat lighter cast than those which usually occupy this portion of *The British Controversialist*; or at least such as might break the continuity of strain upon the mind required in the perusal of the kind of papers most frequently here placed before our readers, while yet it might be of such a nature as at once to enforce and illustrate the accuracy of the opinions, advanced and kept prominent in all our endeavours, regarding the advantage to man of genuine freedom of thought.

It seemed to us, thus in search of something to write about, that the present time and the circumstances of the hour, imparted a natural interest to the consideration of the nature of Partizanship, its uses and abuses. It would appear that on this topic it might be judicious to form some matured opinion, and as we believe that the principles inculcated in these pages if properly thought out and applied, would, in a great measure, supply the basis of a proper comprehension of the rights and wrongs of party policy and spirit, we have determined on putting our belief to the test by attempting, in the sequel, to determine the true nature and exact office of Partizanship, in some of its most prominent and permanent manifestations in state, church, social life, literature and commerce, and to decide upon which of its forms and imperatives conduce to orderly progress, and which of them interfere with and impede the spread of wise thought and righteous action. Of course it is our chief aim to get at the root-principle of party action; the practical application of that principle to the regulation of the conduct of the reader in his own daily life and ordinary circumstances, we shall leave to be made by each in conformity with the impression made upon him,

concerning the soundness of our premises and the correctness of the deductions which we endeavour to draw from them.

There can be no doubt that practically the course of political and social advancement, of moral improvement and religious progress, is a pathway of perplexity. It is so crossed and intercrossed with subdividing and sectionizing lines; it is so interrupted by opposing forces, antagonist opinions, conflicting interests, diverse plans, associations and counter-associations, agitations and congresses, establishments and foundations, precedents and privileges, passions and plots, that caution and wariness of procedure are indeed requisite to get on in it all—especially to get on in it with straightforward forthrightness. It has many projected deviations, several incidences, and a few coincidences. To wind and warp through all the variations of project and opposition, and to gain impulsion and power, now from one and now from another of these, so as to ensure persistency and yet secure consistency, is a problem not easy of solution. Yet progress is the law of all vitality, and progress in harmony with order is truly constitutional progress—and that alone results in civilization. Were men all of one mind we could only look for stagnation or precipitation; because men are not thus cemented together into a total unity of thought, we have sects, parties, divisions, classes, schools, cliques—each with its own schemes, aims and claims, with its own policy and purpose, its own might and movement, its own force and influence—and civilization is the total result of the combined interaction of all these dynamic centres of mental power.

Party, in its original signification, conveys the idea of a portion of a great number separated from the original whole, and aggregated together into a new unity, yet not losing entirely its original character and place as a part of the typical integer. Participancy is not destroyed by, but is rather implied in, the existence of bodies of citizens in the relationship of parties. The idea is duplex; it involves the separation of an aggregate into parts, each holding a unity of its own, and yet not losing or giving up its share in the formation and composition of the totality of the citizenship. There is an ideal unity despite of this state of dispartition in which it may be said to exist, but it is of a whole made up of parts. We have state-parties and church-parties, parties in municipalities, and parties in public meetings;—but each of these has an implied unity of which the parties are only sub-constituents. The State is, as we may say, the unit of organization; and parties are the organized units within it, on the changes, movements, and effectiveness of which in their relative degrees, circumstances and positions, the living progress of the whole depends. Parties are co-operative agencies in themselves, and within the State, which is itself a large co-operative institution. The co-adjustment of parties influences the constitution, and the power of the State contains only the residue of the force of all its parties after the last activity and antagonistic effort of each party's special operations have been deducted.

"Union," according to the proverb, "is strength." Men acquire might and influence by the concentration of their personal powers and interests into the force of party. Conjoint effort is far more efficacious than disjoint exertion. Individuals are weak, parties are strong. The open hand, as Aristotle noted, gives only a smart slap, the closed fist gives a hard blow. Union, as well as time, works wonders. Association increases both the mass and the might of men, though at the same time it must be remembered that the accumulated force of aggregated society weakens individual power, and imparts a seeming littleness to what single persons can accomplish, or even dare. The might of social effort is immense, and especially the might of co-operative social effort. It makes a highway of "the dissociating ocean" by its ships, and joins province to province by its railways. It provides for the instruction of men by churches and newspapers, for their management by police and laws, for their welfare by manufactures and commerce, for their punishment as individuals by jails and penitentiaries, and as nations by warfare. It disciplines men into an army having common objects and similar aims, it encourages them by similar hopes and expectations, it sustains them by common sympathies, and urges them to labour in a common cause through community of interest. Union imparts consistency to opinion, and gives might to efforts, effectiveness to desire, and vigour to determination.

But union, however desirable, may lead to the massing of men in communities so vast as to be unwieldable and unmanageable; leadership in this case becomes impracticable and consentaneous, sympathy cannot be kept up. Schemes of universal dominion, plans of union, which propose to embrace vast masses of mankind, and to eliminate from the activities of our race the selfish emotions and the feelings which lead to partizanship are scarcely ever worthy of much more than a critical examination, and under that they too often prove themselves to be at variance with the most patent facts of human nature. We find that progress is only possible by conciliation of forces, and that a cessation of the dynamic powers, or any equilibrium of them, would bring us to a standstill wherein

"The individual withers and the world is more and more."

But life is constant change, and it abhors and resists stagnation; and no union which involves the continuance of man in the same condition is likely to commend itself to our race in our present state of being. The great organizations of natural and political life must have less organizations of thought and action, through whose antagonisms and concordances, by increment or decrement of strength, as the case may be, movement and progression are made possible. The attempt to subdue party produces inervation, as in China; chronic discontent, as in France; and usually results in revolution, as in Spain. The true policy of governments is to legalize the due operation of party as the organ, the guide and the exponent of public opinion.

Let us in the spirit of our semi-serious intention secure for ourselves and our readers a slight *divertissement* by an excursion into the fields of etymology, in regard to the name of the topic we have chosen to prelect upon, and on which we hope they have chosen to read somewhat. From the Hebrew *Paras*, to divide, or from the Greek *Peiro*, to bore, to make to pass through, and hence to divide, the Romans gained the noun *Pars*, a division, portion, or share, from which they formed their verb *Partiri*, to distribute or appoint a share, division or duty. From this verb, the Romansque languages of France and Spain took their *Partir*, to sever, sunder, or divide, and from the participle of their verb the French gain their noun *Partie* a portion, division, or party. This is the direct source of our term *Party*, employed, as a collective term, to denote a body or aggregate of individuals who pursue one aim and take one part in public affairs, and who co-operate for the accomplishment of the purpose which draws them apart from the general body of the community. A *Partizan* is one who adheres to, aids, abets, encourages, labours for and defends a party, one who takes a *part* in any cause and devotes himself to its success. Accidentally, however, we have a word of somewhat different derivation—Wachter says from *Barte*, an axe—which is the name of a kind of lance, a pike, a halbert, or a marshal's bâton, as we may learn from the Prince's address to the Montagues and Capulets concerning their quarrelsomeness in *Romeo and Juliet*, i. 1, when he says their enmity has

“Made Verona's ancient citizens
Cast by their grave beseeching ornaments,
To wield old partizans, in hands as old,
Cankered with peace, to part your cankered hate.”

The same term was by Synecdoche applied to the leader of a detached body of light troops, who made warfare by harassing the enemy and cutting off stragglers, by intercepting supplies, or by gaining intelligence of intended movements, and by using rapid but confusing strategies, instead of coming to direct fighting and an open encounter. The action of such a corps was denominated partizan warfare, and from the similarity of this style of conduct to that too frequently employed by the leaders of a party and their adherents, *partizanship* has come to signify not only interest in and adherence to a party, but also often signifies the use of tricks and strategies calculated to bring about the temporary success of a party. This is one of the words which, as Archbishop Trench remarks, “men have dragged downwards with themselves and made partakers more or less of their own fall. Having originally an honourable significance, they have yet, with the deterioration and degeneration of those who used them, deteriorated and degenerated too. What a multitude of words, originally harmless, have assumed a harmful as their secondary meaning; how many worthy have acquired an unworthy!” And is not Partizan-

ship one of those, and ought we not eagerly to search into its whole meaning, original and implied, that we may learn the truth regarding both the word and the idea it imports?

The heart of man rouses all its affections into warmth and eager activity, into energy and concentrated competency; the social affections and emotions are quickened and brightened, invigorated and intensified by community of feeling and interests, aims and plans. Simultaneity of action not only increases the power of men, but the enthusiasm of one excites that of another, till the spirit becomes animated by a concourse of emotions that often acquire an uncontrollable effectiveness over the passionate elements of human nature, and with a sort of irresistibility hurry man along to exertions he would never otherwise make, and to the commission of acts which in calmer moods and moments he would hesitate to believe himself capable of attempting. So stirring are the social affinities within us, and so heating are the frictions to which we are exposed in civic life, that we glow and gladden at difficulty, and greatness and grow in energy and executive power, in proportion as we are knit with others in sympathy, and are brought near to them by sameness of object and community of desire. "Matters," as John Locke says, "that are recommended to our thoughts by any of our passions, take possession of our minds with a kind of authority, and will not be kept out or dislodged; but as if the passion that rules were for the time the sheriff of the place and came with all the posse, the understanding is seized and taken with the object it introduces, as if it had a legal right to be alone considered there." This is the turning point of the beneficiality or injuriousness of the spirit of party. If it allies itself with those sympathies and interests which lead to the desire after the good and the true, energy and effectiveness come to it through these notions, and they conduce to earnestness and conviction, but if it associates itself with the antipathies and interests which incline to keep things as they are, and opposes the questioning or stirring of the determinations of the mind, the condition of the state or the prevalent opinion of the hour, then party spirit becomes inimical to peace and good order, to progress and enlightened reform. To give up our whole emotional nature to the success and predominance of any opinion is eminently unwise. Whether we are moved by affection for or dislike to an opinion, or the party by which that opinion is entertained or promoted, we act in opposition to the best interests of truth if we devote all our feeling and passion to its success, because anything that tends to close the eyes to, or withdraw the attention from, any part of the evidence on which correct conclusions depend, in the same, if not in an increased, proportion, tends to vitiate the conclusions drawn by the understanding, which only acts perfectly in the white radiancy of pure light, and does not see with accuracy in the coloured light which emotion and passion supply—as stained windows not only intercept the light, but cast shadows on cathedral floors.

In harmony with the intention of having this paper a little lighter than several which have of late gone before it, and have been somewhat thought-demanding, we propose to illustrate the different views which may be taken of the same, or nearly similar things, by men of differing parts, by contrastive selections provided to our hand readily in Professor H. Morley's recently issued volume of Extracts from "Cavalier and Puritan song," entitled "The King and the Commons," and having a patent or latent reference to "the great political and social battle lying at the heart of" the Carolan and Cromwellian age. By doing so we shall be sure that the quotations made "shall speak the mind of each great party to the struggle as expressed by its own best men, rather than as caricatured by the meaner sort of its opponents." But before proceeding to do this, we are desirous of quoting Professor Morley's explanation of the psychological secret of party spirit, as it bears a close relation to our subject. "Some men," he says, "are so constituted that they combat change, lest they lose what of truth and right the past has won; others seek change wherever they believe that they can take part in the conquests of the future. Minds equal in acuteness are employed continually upon an active test of the validity of every questionable plea. Truth only is strong enough to live through this incessant questioning, meanwhile the conflict calls forth all the manliness of man." *

We find, in looking over this handy collection of extracts, that Herrick asserts—

"That Prince who may do nothing but what's just,
Rules but by leave, and takes his crown on trust."

While Milton, quoting from Seneca, maintains that—

"There can be slain
No sacrifice to God more acceptable
Than an unjust and wicked king."

Milton, in a noble passage in "Paradise Regained" II., 468—472, boldly declares that—

"A crown,
Golden in show, is but a wreath of thorns,
Brings dangers, troubles, cares, and sleepless nights,
To him who wears the royal diadem,
When, on his shoulders, each man's burden lies;
For therein stands the office of a king,
His honour, virtue, merit, and chief praise,
That for the public all this weight he bears:
Yet he who reigns within himself and rules,
Passions, desires, and fears is more a king;
Which, every wise and virtuous man attains;

* "The King and the Commons," by Henry Morley. Introduction, p. vi.

And who attains not, ill aspires to rule
 Cities of men, or headstrong multitudes,
 Subject himself to anarchy within,
 Or lawless passions in him, which he serves."

How grandly reasonable is this conception of royalty, compared with that mere bedazzlement, by a title to which Herrick gives expression in these lines, so foolishly fulsome when applied to a Prince who possessed so little of the godlike in his life as Charles I.

"Give way, give way! now, now, my Charles shines here,
 A public light, in this immensive sphere;
 Some stars were fixed before, but these were dim
 Compared, in this my ample orb, to him.
 Draw in your feeble fires, while as that he
 Appears but in his meaner majesty;
 Where, if such glory flashes from his name,
 Which is his shade, who can abide his flame!
 Princes, and such like public lights as these,
 Must not be looked on but at distances;
 For if we gaze on the brave lamps too near,
 Our eyes they'll blind, or if not blind they'll blear."

Yet both Herrick and Milton were men who held their faith honestly, and found principles on which to rest their faith, and by which to direct their action. They differed in temperament no less than in sentiment, and there can be no doubt in men's minds now that the opinions each held was extreme in its way—that they were partizans, even when most honestly expressing, the one, the doctrine of the right divine of kings, and the other maintaining that the sovereign was the servant of the people. They could not look on the events of their time in the same light at all. Herrick, reflecting on the unsettlement of his age, exclaims,—

"Oh, times most bad,
 Without the scope
 Of Hope,
 Of better to be had!
 Where shall I go,
 Or whither run
 To shun
 This public overthrow?"

No places are
 This I am sure,
 Secure,
 In this our wasting war.
 Some storms we have passed,
 Yet we must all,
 Down fall,
 And perish at the last."

While Milton, evidently having in his mind's eye the era of the Civil War, takes this view of the event (*Samson Agoinster*, 1268—1276):—

“O how comely it is, and how reviving
To the spirits of just men long opprest,
When God into the hands of their deliverer
Puts invincible might,
To quell the mighty of the earth, the oppressor,
The brute and boisterous force of violent men,
Hardy and industrious, to support
Tyrannic power, but raging to pursue
The righteous, and all such as honour truth!”

It is quite evident from his “*Prosopopœia Britannica*,” that George Wither held a similar opinion to that of Milton on the accountability of kings to subjects, for in that poem he rightly though somewhat prosaically affirms that—

“A Realm that fears to call her Trustee to
Account for aught misdane, or left to do,
Is like those children who do fear the shows,
Which they themselves set up, to scare the crows;
And they, who think you have no rightful power
To curb his fury, who might you devour,
May think as well they should not put a clog,
Or hang a chain upon a shepherd's dog,
Although he daily bites and kills the sheep,
Which he was only bred and fed to keep.”

Wither appears to reflect, with equanimity at least, on the despite with which the people treated the idea that such divinity doth hedge a king, that sovereignty implies irresponsibility, but from the expressions used by John Cleaveland “*On the king's death*”—from which we quote a few stanzas, it would appear that he thought no possible justification could be found for lifting a hand against “the Lord's anointed.”

“Charles,—ah, forbear, forbear! lest mortals prize
His name too dearly, and idolatrize.
His name, our loss; Thrice cursed and forlorn
Be that black night which ushered in this morn.

Charles, our dread sovereign's, murdered at his gate!
Fell fiends! dire hydras of a stiff-necked state!
Strange body-politic! whose members spread,
And, monster-like, swell bigger than their head.

The blow struck Britain blind, each well-set limb
By dislocation was lopt off in him,
And though she yet lives, she lives but to condole
Three bleeding bodies left without a soul.

Religion puts on black, and loyalty
Blushes and mourns to see bright majesty

Butchered by such assassins; nay, both
 'Gainst God, 'gainst law, allegiance, and their oath
 Farewell, sad isle, farewell! Thy fatal glory
 Is summed, cast up, and cancelled in this story."

Milton, with his stern sense of purity of spirit, could affirm that—

"He that has light within his own clear breast,
 May sit i' the centre and enjoy bright day.
 But he that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts,
 Benighted walks under the mid-day sun,
 Himself is his own dungeon."—*Comus*, 381—6.

But cavalier Richard Lovelace finds no such power in self-control and conscious rectitude, and hence he sings this "Song of the Vintage":—

"Sing out pent souls, sing cheerfully
 Care shackles you in liberty;
 Mirth frees you in captivity.
 Would you double-fetters add?—
 Else why so sad?
 Besides your pinioned arms you'll find
 Grief, too, can manacle the mind.
 Live them prisoners, uncontrolled;
 Drink o' the strong, the rich, the old,
 Till wine, too, hath your wits in hold,
 Then if still your jollity
 And throats are free,—
 Triumph in your bonds and pains,
 And dance to the music of your chains."

This trust in wine, joy in its pleasures, and general tendency to go heartily into the worship of—

"Bacchus, that first pour out the purple grape,
 Crushed the sweet poison of misused wine,"

induced and encouraged Sir John Suckling to add to the zest of drinking by these verses:—

"Come let the State stay,
 And drink away,
 There is no business above it,
 It warms the cold brain,
 Makes us speak in high strain,
 He's a fool that does not approve it.
 The Macedon youth
 Left behind him this truth,
 That nothing is done with much thinking,
 He drank and he fought,
 Till he had what he sought,
 The world was his own—by good drinking."

The austere and abstemious Milton opposes to this illustration the following passages of "Samson Agonistes."

Chorus of Daintes.—"Desire of wine and all delicious drinks,
That many a famous warrior overturns,
Thou couldst repress; nor did the dancing ruby
Sparkling outpoured, the flavour or the smell,
Or taste that cheers the hearts of gods and men,
Allure thee from the cool crystalline stream."

* * * * *

Oh, madness to think use of strongest wines,
And strongest drinks, our chief support of health,
When God, with these forbidden, made choice to rear
His mighty champion, strong above compare,
Whose drink was only from the liquid brook."

Richard Brathwaite in his "Care's Cure," proposes to take all that happens with nonchalant ease, and affirms—

"Thus to love and thus to live,
Thus to take and thus to give;
Thus to laugh and thus to sing,
Thus to mount on pleasures wing;
Thus to sport and thus to speed,
Thus to nourish, flourish, feed;
Thus to spend and thus to spare,
Is to bid a fig for care."

But there is something more manly and more serious in the motto of George Wither—*Nec habeo, nec careo, nec curo*—"I neither have, nor want, nor care," and in his treatment of the cares of life.

"He that supplies my Want hath took my Care,
A rush I care not who condemneth me,
That sees not what my soul's intentions be;
I care not though to all men known it were,
Both whom I love or hate;—for none I fear.
I care for no more time than will amount
To do my work, and make up my account.
I care for no more money than will pay
The reckoning, and the charges of the day;
And if I need not now, I will not borrow,
For fear of wants that I may have to-morrow.
My mind's my kingdom, and I will permit
No other's will to have the rule of it."

But better even and nobler is the idea of Milton concerning the connection between life, duty, and joy.

"To measure life learn thou betimes, and know
Toward solid good what leads the nearest way;
For other things mild heaven a time ordains,
And disapproves that care—though wise in show—
That with superfluous burdens loads the day,
And, when God sends a cheerful hour, refrains."

All who have perused the History of the civil War, and who reread it in its literary aspect, under the guidance of Professor Morley, in "The King and the Commons," may not be prepared entirely to endorse Goldwin Smith's judgment:—"If a revolution ever was redeemed by its grandeur, it was the revolution which was opened by Pym, which was closed by Cromwell, of which Milton was the apostle and the poet. The material forces have been seen in action on a more imposing scale, the moral forces never," but they can scarcely hesitate to grant that "this war was on the whole carried on in a way of honour; and if not without personal animosity, at least without the savage cruelty which has marked the civil wars of some nations. It was waged like a war of principle, like the war of a self-controlled and manly race." If we see the influence of party in it, it is a thoroughly honest party spirit; for the sacrifices which were called for were those which nature holds dearest of all other interests, except that of having the witnessing of a good conscience toward God and toward man. Under the strong conviction of conscience, there were arrayed in our civil war "not only friend against friend, neighbour against neighbour, but father against son, son against father, brother against brother, women's hearts torn between the husband who fought on one side, and the father and brother who fought on the other; those who last Christmas met round the same board, before next Christmas to meet in battle." Such a contest shows at once the depth and the strength of principle, how it takes root downward, and bears fruit upward, and how men may be individually honest and sincere, while differing most widely upon some principle to which their life has become attached. But our allusion to this event, and our illustrations of difference of opinion, drawn from the writings of its chief poets, would want congruity with, and relevancy to, the subject of our contemplations, did we fail to point out that the want of freedom of debate, and of a machinery for the utilization of party action, lay at the root of the causes of civil war. Had it been possible in the policy of that day to adjust opinion by free discussion, and to give these opinions due weight by the varying success of parties, as their principles were found to be true and good, our civil war would have been a strife of tongues, and a conflict of arguments, good aims, and endeavours.

Pym maintains that "the best form of government is that which doth actuate and dispose every part and member of a State to the common good." It is a wise saying, and raises a great and grave question, namely, how may every part and member of a state be best actuated and disposed to the common good? Obviously, as we think, when the thoughts of men are free to investigate every suggestion and plan for improvement, to discuss its merits and demerits, to employ all just and proper means for furthering or opposing its adoption, and when it is known that the unforced arbitrement of conscience will be respected and given effect to, so long as no other better idea or method of conducting affairs has been proposed and

been generally adopted ; after having, like that which it is intended to supplant, been tried, tested, and made familiar to all by the exercise of free debate, and by the conflict of parties in public and in parliament. Free controversy is the great and genuine counter-revolutionist, or rather safeguard against revolution. Statesmanship is the science and art of promoting calm, steady, and continuous progress, and so of avoiding and rendering revolution impossible. It is incumbent, therefore, on the true statesman to provide for the full and thorough investigation by debate of every question connected with public policy, and so to arrange all the forms and proceedings of state business that party agitation may tend to aid and not to impede the cause and course of good government.

The best government to which a nation can at any time aspire is that which the noblest convictions of its most active and thoughtful parties can acquire acceptance for, and concentrate their effective forces to bring about. Laws are only willingly obeyed when there is a belief in their essential justice, and the honesty of their administration. The action of parties by procuring acceptability for newly proposed laws, and by watching their operation and application after they have been placed on the statute books, tends very much, not only to procure the passage of improved legislation, but also to secure the impartial administration of the laws in existence, in accordance with the spirit of the times. The watchfulness of parties has had this highly beneficial effect on public life among us, that public opinion has acquired the means and art of expressing itself peaceably. There is no adjournment of the power of the public will till plot, conspiracy, and the sword have found or formed an opening for its expression. A wise man can *foresee* many steps ; any one can *see* the next step in advance which legislation must take, for the action of party not only excites, intensifies, and concentrates public opinion, but it also reveals its course and its force. It is because parties present public opinion to the rulers in the full power of its aims and claims that our government is in the main a representative one. Parties are the lenses which concentrate public opinion on any subject to such a focus as brings it within the range of official vision.

England more than any other country dislikes pure political speculation, looks upon theorizing with distaste, and averts itself with repugnance from the proposal to resolve the problems of law and life by the inexorable results of methodical thought, and the determining ultimatum of logical sequence. It has no patience to search for principles if it can get hold of a rough and ready, averagely-working practice, and either set it or keep it going. The workableness of a suggestion is the first idea of English critical reflection ; hence it is the land of institutions, compromises, make-shifts, and expedients,—almost of anomalies. To have an end in view that is plain, unmistakeable, and, above all, attainable, is essential to the making of any impression on the English public ; hence thought must concentrate and organize its hosts, settle its

and object, enlist its adherents, issue its cry, unfurl its standard, become "a movement." Thus put into palpability, it attracts notice, excites attention, occasions talk, arouses sympathy here, and antagonism there. The favourers of it unite and agitate;—its opponents sneer first, condemn next, then feel the need of bracing up their energies to meet the new thought with such reasons as the old provides; thus discussion is evoked, active thought is elicited, force is brought face to face with force, a compromise is for the time effected, and the question is settled and shelved for awhile, only to be reopened in a new form and with new energy when thought has gained a fresh development, and stored up new forces for new efforts. Hence it is that British legislation is a series of compromises, rather than a codified sequence of carefully adjusted acts and requirements. Each party gathers up its observations on the past, and generalizes from these the nearest principle which can be applied to the experience of the present hour; and it seldom looks farther than such a mediate axiom as may form a basis for immediate action and practical effort. It is seldom that the ideas which form the moving forces of the councils of the nation are protoplasmic, formative, and seminal. They are in general distant derivatives from the primal roots of thought; roots which germinate chiefly in the fields of religious, moral, metaphysical, and social philosophy, and give off cuttings only, to practical politics and sociology. Philosophers pursue the analysis of the subjects of their contemplation into the far recesses and inner penetralia of thought, but practical politicians are content with accepting statements of breadth and simplicity, the ideas which are the results of methodical investigation, as their primordial principles. The philosopher's principles are found to be enthroned in the mind, bear sway over his thoughts, rule his acts, and give the grounds of political arguments, but the party politician accepts ideas stated in terms which embody and express, in terse and telling pithiness, opinions resulting from these ideas, and pre-supposing them to be granted.

Yet opinions very unlike in appearance, and, as they are applied, in reality, spring from the same principles. These secondary principles, or *media axiomata*, being reached by the leaders of a party, are pressed into the service of agitation, and are acted upon as if they were the truths which lie at the very root and in the very germ of things. The business of the philosophic thinker is to trace every element of causation as far back as possible, to ascertain the greatest extent to which it is applicable, and, if possible, to discover its ultimate source, or at least its most reliable proofs. It not unfrequently happens that sequences of causation which at first sight seem to be different, and to constitute a variety of species, are, when more closely examined, found to spring from the same source. But men in general have little disposition to inquire and to pry into any matter of thought farther than to find an intelligible and usable fixed point or statement of opinion, rising from which they may proceed at once to active practical exertions. Resting their

proposals for action on these secondary and derivative truths, the leaders of parties get the vantage ground of a comprehensible reason for their agitation, often a taking and pithy cry with which they may agitate the country, and upon the basis of which they can propose action. They rouse and stir the minds of the people to a perception of this truth and its consequences, and aggregate around themselves those who have similar aims and desires. Another section of thinkers may have reached down to a different secondary thought, and they on their part accept of and affirm this to be their first principle and basis of action, and they again aggregate and consociate a body who look with favour on their view of the matter. Each party, by exposition and illustration, endeavours to render clear and make familiar the absolute accuracy of the principle contended for by them, and by debate to prove its intrinsic claim to belief, as well as its extrinsic applicability to the purpose of the time. Each party widens the reach of agitation and increases the stir of thought, and hence the general public gains enlightenment in regard to the object, scope, and character of the movements in progress all around. Each party is so far helpful to each other that its existence quickens and intensifies the energies of the other, and both are in reality so far beneficial to the public that their activity prevents rash and hasty action on immature hypotheses, and secures the due and proper investigation of probable results and effects prior to attempts at realization; and even when allowed to realize its aim it is weighted with all the precautions which the opponents of the measure could suggest, when the inevitability of its adoption became evident. Our compromises are the results of the caution of parties, rather than of the precaution of thinkers.

In carrying great changes into effect, we must employ the instrumentalities and agencies which are attainable, and we must employ them, too, with all their defects and imperfections, their faults and failings. On this account it is that, if we form or join a party, we must resign some portion of our own individuality, and accept in some sort a secondary responsibility on account of others. Interests, friendships, cabals, intrigues, resentments, alliances, reconciliations, projects, bargainings, and even mistakes not our own, must find us prompt to engage in them and ready to defend. Corporate action must be united, and corporate responsibility must be accepted; and as the means, motives, and appliances of such activity must be level with the capacities, conditions, and moral sentiments of the mass, the highest and noblest aspirations of men are not attainable through party action. But this only makes it all the more desirable that the links of party ought not to be made too binding, nor its organization too pervading, lest, if they be so, the very agencies by which good has been accomplished may be employed to impede the attainment of other advantages. There is always a danger lest a successful party should proclaim a "finality," and shout out in the ears of men "thus far shalt thou go and no

farther." Though we cannot gain abstract perfection by party action, that is no reason why we should consent to relinquish the right of striving to make that attainable in the future which seems beyond reach now.

One of the gravest errors in regard to party committed in our country is that we crystallize our party traditions, and bind ourselves together by party connections, party leagues, party watchwords, and party names, and so endeavour to give permanency to that which is really impermanent. Thought is ever active, restlessly researchful, and hence the results of thought are continually changing, and public opinion is always in a state of transition. In our attempts to stereotype the transient, and to ice up the flowing river of thought we do ourselves grievous wrong, and introduce into political life much needless sorrow. A party, in the very nature of things, can never possess at any one time more than a part of the truth: to unite ourselves for ever to remain true and consistent to that party in its creeds, doctrines, associations and acts, is voluntarily to resign our right to reason upon public affairs as they arise, and so to destroy the very good which party life accomplishes, namely, the thorough sifting of opinion by earnest and serious discussion. It acts invidiously, too, in regard to the personality of party, by constituting party consistency into a virtue when it is in reality a vice, that is, when the times are ripe for new changes, and the traditions of parties hamper men of thought in their researches, in their expressions of opinion, and in the course of action they adopt upon new public questions and new views of national policy, by making personal fidelity to party more meritorious than honourable fidelity to truth, and consistency to the traditions of the past more praiseworthy than persistency in the pursuit of the truth fitted for the present time, or available for the requirements of the future. Intellectual and social forces are always at work, disintegrating parties, and causing, by action and reaction, a need for reorganization; and at certain epochs the lines which divide parties one from another do not coincide with the lines which separate political and social opinions and schemes. When this occurs there is a great temptation to "Give up to party what was meant for mankind," and to adhere to the personal connections it has brought around us, because of the consistency and force it possesses, though the tides of opinion are receding from its standpoint, and are gathering force elsewhere. Parties are unwilling to move forward and advance with the progress of opinion, the necessities of things, and the ceaseless change of sentiment and thought which the course of time occasions; still less are they magnanimous to forecast the anticipations which men may legitimately form. In the course of time the most admirably marshalled party becomes rather a centre of resistance than of assistance, and seeks to govern and control rather than to animate and guide the opinions of the nation. The thorough organization which gives it mastery at one period, by seeking to impart perma-

nency tends to arrogate predominancy, and thus it comes to pass that so many of the noblest minds and ablest thinkers are constrained to break with their party rather than forfeit their allegiance to truth and progress.

Then there arises the grievous accusation of apostacy, and suspicion clogs the path, while misrepresentation is active with the reputation of the man whose thorough conscientiousness of thought has brought him to overstep the lines of circumvallation within which the party had entrenched itself. "He who can take up a speculative question, and pursue it with the same zeal and unshaken constancy as he does his immediate interests or private animosities—he who is as faithful to his *principles* as he is to himself, is the true partizan." But they must be principles, and he must be prepared to follow them wheresoever they lead him, so that when one step is taken he may know that the next is not only inevitable but right. But he who, through vanity of consistency, or an over-refined regard to immediate appearances, through desire of keeping a foremost place among friends, or natural hesitancy to follow Truth wherever she leads, through fear of singularity or sense of obligation to patrons, restrains himself within the mere terms of a party's principle, when the soul of meaning has been eaten out of it by events and the progress of thought is a false partizan. He is a mask and not a reality. He values the empty husk of the past more than the new fresh growth in which another kernel is enclosed. These are the men who huckster and trim, who hold by "the old, old paths" when traffic has forsaken them and interest has fled from them. The crystallizations of party ought, like those of nature, to be soluble and reorganizable when occasion arises and change is desirable.

Sometimes a man adopts a party as a sort of "short hand compendious method of getting at a conclusion." It supplies him with "passion without proof, and action without thought" and fixes for him the right thing without the trouble of attending to "the formalities of reasoning or the dictates of common sense." It provides him with opinion ready made, concisely expressed, and portably arranged; it gives him the essence of all questions in a phrase, and acts as a guide-post for his feelings and sentiments, that they may take the most direct if not the most correct road to move in, and where to bring a vote to. But such allies are always unsafe ones for a party, they have neither opinions nor convictions, they have only inclinations, and these are liable to change and fluctuation. The man who forms an opinion must have thought, the man who accepts opinions must always be afraid to examine them lest they should turn out to be without good reasonable grounds. These, too, are the men who hold most tenaciously to the letter of the creed of a party; they have never estimated its contents, they have never considered its consequences, they stand in a "charmed circle" while they are enclosed thereby. They bring the indolence, the cowardice, the ignorance, the prejudice, and

the pride of men into a party, and they give to a party the help—if it can be so called—of intolerance, bigotry, and credulity—they give it mass, but do they not also impart to it weakness?

There are three great classes of errors into which partizanship betrays men:—(1) *Misstatements*, or actual and real errors, in representing the acts, opinions, writings, and sayings of opponents; a false presentation of the matter under consideration, or an explicit or implicit representation of facts or thoughts in a form more or less intentionally inexact or inaccurate, and having at the least a misleading connotation. Misstatements of reasonings are still more frequent than misrepresentations of incidents, or incorrect reports of opinions and sayings. These misstatements arise from the intervention of passion between the thing misstated, and the mind which has been employed in contemplating the thing; and from the difference in the point of view chosen for taking an impression of the thing into one's mind, or from a defect of intellectual sympathy on the part of those who originate the misstatement. But misstatements also arise from the inventive ingenuity of partizans, and misrepresentations are often made which are so palpably and knowingly false as to be with difficulty distinguished from unmitigated lies. These are extremes, of course, for it very seldom suits well, and it never answers long, to make violent distortions of truth, or to put before the mind of another an account so wide of the truth as to approach to caricature on the one hand, or falsehood on the other.

(2) *Understatements*, evasive constructions of the merits of opponents, or the misconduct or errors of friends. In undervaluing the good done by our antagonists, in depreciating their energy or earnestness, their honesty or their efficiency, in giving a low estimate of their services, or slurring over the part they took in working to beneficial ends the matters in which they concerned themselves, we are guilty of understatement and evasive speech. So thoroughly natural is this understatement to the human mind that it has actually become the office of art to give it perfection and point, and we employ parody to connect the ridiculous with our opponents' measures, irony to censure them, sarcasm to taunt them, mimicry to lower them in the eyes of others, and what the rhetoricians term *Aporia* that we may "hint a doubt and hesitate dislike" of their works or ways. Then, for the purpose of detracting from the measure of condemnation due to the party we favour, or rather let us say, of ourselves, there have been invented several forms of extenuative or excusatory speech. By *Litotes* we endeavour to express the faults to which we must plead guilty in terms excitative of as little blame and reprehension as we can, and by *Tapinosis* we boldly claim the right to gloze with phrases connotative of admiration and respect the very acts of whose turpitude we are sensible, whose baseness we cannot defend, and whose consistency with honour we are unable to maintain.

(3) *Overstatements* or exaggerations, either of the faults of our

opponents or of the deserts of our own party. Our admiration of our party—reinforced, to some extent, by our own egotism as a unit of it—causes us to look favourably upon the effect of every movement it makes, and induces us to ascribe every perceptible ripple on the surface of circumstance to the influence of the stir excited by the party whose tenets we expose. The importance of its aims and the potency of its effects impress us more the more closely we examine it, and our pride grows as, our interest increases. Our sympathies gain warmth, and our emotions, excited by the interest we feel, magnify the doings and the prospects, the aims and the influences, of the party to which we belong. On the other hand, our antipathies incline us to look only at the faults of the opposing party, and to note their failings. We see the evils they do through the microscopic observativeness of prejudice, and they appear to us mountainous in aggregate offensiveness. We pile up the most outrageous epithets and accusations against our opponents, and exhaust the language of *Auresis* in hyperbolical laudation of our own party, and in exaggerating the heinousness of that to which we are opposed. It is all the more important that we should point out this fact, because the passions of human nature are active and fierce in doing mischief, and only moderately lukewarm in doing good, on which account it is that we see the most violent animosities excited by the most trivial differences.

When the spirit of party has the effect of narrowing our views of policy and of truth; when it causes us to assign supreme importance to points of difference, and to look with jealous eyes and suspicious minds on those who differ from us, and so gives an inverted bias to the soul, it has begun to be hurtful, and requires considerate restraint. When the pledges it demands are not those of independence and sincerity of opinion, honesty of investigation and soundness of principle, but of adherence to leaders and blind obedience to their decisions, and of giving unqualified submission, if not approval, to all that they determine to be right, we may well doubt its genuine advantageousness; for it never can be truly advantageous to thinking men to resign their independence of mind, to forfeit their right to inquire into and understand the reasons for their actions, and the grounds of the movements in which they are asked to take effective parts; especially when party spirit inclines us to captious hostility, to carping jealousy, to arrogance of tone, and cunning in action; when it induces us to insincerity, or substitutes the irritation of personal feeling for the sorrow of heart which should move us when we think of what we suppose are the errors of others; when the shibboleths of party take the place of reasonings, and we find controversy exciting warmth of temper rather than acuteness of mind, we have good cause for suspecting that we have gone too far, and that party is gaining that love which ought to be sacred to truth.

Modern civilization was for a long period employed in the task of observing and preserving the balance of power among European

states, that is, in watching the progress of states, and using such means as were available to prevent any of them from acquiring such a preponderating influence as might enable it to threaten, impede, or endanger the independence of another. This was an external object, and engaged much of the attention of statesmen, until Napoleon began his ambitious attempt to resuscitate the Western empire, and to readjust the map of Europe: and the traditions of it survived till our own day, and formed a main element in the undertaking of the Crimean war. The prevalency of the doctrine of non-intervention has gradually been working a change in our foreign policy, and the diplomacy based on the idea of a balance of power is losing its hold. When the internal government of states became a subject demanding a statesman's best energies, an equally eager disposition entered into the minds of men to manage the balance of parties. It was felt that sovereign authority and central government were unstable in proportion as they were uncontrolled and unresisted, and that the best measures were passed when to the selfishness of one party there was opposed the selfishness of another, and when the enthusiasm for things as they are, had arrayed against it an enthusiasm for change in such a manner that the rashness of a desire for innovation was so tempered by conservative indifference to change, that a compromise between order and progress kept public affairs from sudden change, while it secured moderate improvement.

It is to be regretted that in this desire to bring about a balance of parties it was thought advisable to stereotype the personality of a party and to make adherence to a party not only a point of individual, but often even of hereditary duty. This traditional consistency of partisanship, inasmuch as it tended in the long run to induce men to prefer party consistency to principle, by transforming fidelity to party into a principle, has come of late to defeat the very purpose of party, namely, the thorough and persistent investigation of every opinion, *pro* and *con.*, by those who were interested in its proper settlement. It seems to us that the theory of the balance of party will become as effete as that of the balance of power, and that the balance of opinion by controversy is destined to take its place. Not that we can ever do without party as the organized form in which opinion expresses its force, but we believe that parties will become more mobile and less compactly coherent and individually stationary, and when adherence to truth, and the honest holding of individual opinion, will be respected indeed by men of all parties. Then men shall co-operate for whatever object seems to be desirable with all who hold the same aim, and, that aim being accomplished, will be free to form any new alliance which may seem to them to be thereafter advisable. Great is the might of party when based on sound principle; great are its uses in the common wealth as the exponent of the force of opinion; but opinion should be the formative *nexus* of party, and party ought not to be the inexorable umpire of human thought and action.

Religion.

CAN THE GOSPELS BE HARMONIZED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE enemies of Christianity have oftentimes sought to discredit the testimony of the Evangelists on account of the differences and difficulties which appear on comparing them.

Could the gospels be shown to be contradictory to each other, then, indeed, atheists, deists, and rationalists might triumph. But that the gospels can be evidenced to be harmonious with each other we firmly believe. To the task of showing this we now proceed.

First, we observe that many of the most important events recorded in the gospels, are related by each of the four Evangelists, the relations of these four individuals being consistent with each other. The departure of Jesus into Galilee after John's imprisonment is related by the writer of each gospel, as may be seen on reference to Matt. iv. 12, Mark i. 14, Luke iv. 14, and John iv. 1, 2, 3. The miraculous feeding of five thousand is likewise related by each evangelist, as a reference to Matt. xiv. 13—21, Mark vi. 30—44, Luke ix. 10—17, and John vi. 1—14 will show. The circumstance of Christ's public entry into Jerusalem is in like manner recorded by the four Evangelists, as may be seen by reference to Matt. xxi. 1—17, Mark xi. 1—11, Luke xix. 29—44, and John xii. 12—19. The pointing out of Judas to the disciples as the traitor is recorded by Matthew in chap. xxvi. 21—25, by Mark in chap. xiv. 18—21, by Luke in chap. xxii. 21—23, and by John in chap. xiii. 21—35. The prediction of Peter's fall Matthew relates in chap. xxvi. 31—35, Mark relates it in chap. xiv. 27—31, Luke in chap. xxii. 31—38, and John in chap. xiii. 36—38. The betrayal of Christ by Judas is described by Matthew in chap. xxvi. 47—56, by Mark in chap. xiv. 43—50, by Luke in chap. xxii. 47—53, and by John in chap. xviii. 2—12. Likewise Peter's denial of Christ is recorded in each of the same chapters. The delivering of Jesus to the Roman governor is asserted by Matthew in chap. xxvii. 1, 2, by Mark in chap. xv. 1, by Luke in chap. xxiii. 1, and by John in chap. xviii. 28—30. That the Jews demanded the release of Barabbas in preference to that of Jesus is related in each of the same chapters. The crucifixion of Christ is recorded by Matthew in chap. xxvii. 35, 38, by Mark in chap. xv. 24—28, by Luke in chap. xxiii. 33—38, and by

John in chap. xix. 18—24. The taking of the body of Jesus down from the cross and its burial are related in each of the same chapters. The visit of the women to the sepulchre on the first day of the week is related by Matthew in chap. xxviii. 1, by Mark in chap. xvi. 1—4, by Luke in chap. xxiv. 1—3, and by John in chap. xx. 1, 2.

The great agreement of these four writers in their relation of such important events as those on which we have adduced their combined and accordant testimony, is no slight evidence of the harmony of the gospels.

Secondly. Still more numerous are the instances of three of the Evangelists relating the same circumstances, their relations of events being harmonious, the one with the other. The ministry of John the Baptist is related by Matthew in chap. iii. 1—12, by Mark in chap. i. 1—8, and by Luke in chap. iii. 1—18. The baptism of Christ is described in each of the same chapters. Christ's temptation is likewise spoken of by Matthew in chap. iv. 1—11, by Mark in chap. i. 12, 13, and by Luke in chap. iv. 1—13. The healing of Peter's wife's mother, with many others at Capernaum is recorded by Matthew in chap. viii. 14—17, by Mark in chap. i. 29—34, and by Luke in chap. iv. 38—41. The healing of a leper Matthew relates in chap. viii. 2—4, Mark relates it in chap. i. 40—45, and Luke in chap. v. 12—16. The case of the healing of a paralytic is given us by Matthew in chap. ix. 2—8, by Mark in chap. ii. 1—12, and by Luke in chap. v. 17—26. The choice of the twelve apostles is given by Matthew in chap. x. 2—4, by Mark in chap. iii. 13—19, and by Luke in chap. vi. 12—16. The healing of a demoniac in Galilee, with the blasphemy of the Scribes and Pharisees thereat, is asserted by Matthew in chap. xii. 22—37, by Mark in chap. iii. 19—30, and by Luke in chap. xi. 14—23. The parable of the sower is related by Matthew in chap. xiii. 1—23, by Mark in chap. iv. 1—25, and by Luke in chap. viii. 4—18. Of the stilling of the tempest on the Sea of Galilee, Matthew gives us a relation in chap. viii. 18—27, Mark in chap. iv. 35—41, and Luke in chap. viii. 22—25. The circumstance of Jesus walking on the Sea of Galilee is recorded by Matthew in chap. xiv. 22—36, by Mark in chap. vi. 45—56, and by John in chap. vi. 15—21. Christ's transfiguration is stated by Matthew in chap. xvii. 1—13, by Mark in chap. ix. 2—13, and by Luke in chap. ix. 28—36. The case of the rich young man is recorded by Matthew in chap. xix. 16—30, by Mark in chap. x. 17—31, and by Luke in chap. xviii. 18—30. The preparation for the Passover is narrated by Matthew in chap. xxvi. 17—19, by Mark in chap. xiv. 12—16, and by Luke in chap. xxii. 7—13. A relation of the Passover itself is given in each of the same chapters, as also of the institution of the Lord's Supper. We believe that if a painstaking examination be given to the cumulative evidence which we have adduced, coupled with an impartial and thoughtful weighing of the purport of that evidence, the conviction will be necessitated—that the gospels can be harmonized.

Thirdly. None of those relations of events which are given by only one Evangelist present or imply any contradiction of the histories of any other of the Evangelists. They are simply a record of circumstances omitted from the other gospels, and can without difficulty be shown to be quite harmonious with them. Thus Luke's gospel commences with the occurrences of an earlier period than those related in the other gospels. Matthew chap. ii. and John chaps. ii., iii., iv., v., vii., viii., ix., x., xi., xiv., xv., xvi., xvii., with Luke chaps. xv., xvi., xvii., xviii., merely record occurrences which in the other gospels are not mentioned, but these chapters are not in any way irreconcilable with the narrations of any of the other Evangelists.

Fourthly. We purpose to show, that notwithstanding some verbal discrepancies which occur in the gospels, no one of them is really contradictory of any of the others. We purpose doing this by noticing some of these discrepancies, and showing that they do not overturn our affirmation that the gospels are harmonious with each other.

Both Matthew and Luke give the genealogy of Christ. Matthew states that Joseph was the son of Jacob, Luke that he was the son of Heli. Only one of the Evangelists can have given the lineage of Christ by generation. It is most probable that this is done in the genealogy of Matthew, as we know proceeds by natural descent till after the Jewish exile, and it continues the same mode of expression till Joseph, that mode of expression denoting a son by generation, which is not the case in the genealogy of Luke. Most probably Joseph's relation to Heli was by marriage with his daughter, so that Joseph was his *son-in-law*. In that case the genealogy in Luke is in fact that of Mary the mother of Jesus, thus showing that Christ was not only by law in the royal line of kings through his reputed father, but also in fact, by direct descent from his mother. According to Matthew, the centurion whose servant was sick came himself to Jesus; according to Luke he sent to him the elders of the Jews. This diversity of statement is easily accounted for. It is an old maxim that what one does by means of another he does himself. In a similar manner Christ is said to baptize, though it is immediately explained that Christ did not himself baptize but by his disciples (See John iv. 1, 2). Again, Pilate is said to have scourged Jesus, but it is not to be supposed that he did it with his own hands. Mark represents James and John coming to Jesus with a certain request, while Matthew represents their mother as presenting it, the fact doubtless being that the request was that of James and John presented through their mother.

Mark and Luke speak of but one demoniac Gadarene out of whom devils were cast, while Matthew speaks of two. But while Mark and Luke speak of only one demoniac, their language does not exclude another. The relation by Mark and Luke is comprised in that of Matthew. Matthew's account is not contradicted by

that of Mark and Luke. Doubtless something peculiar in the case of one of the Gadarenes made him more prominent, and led Mark and Luke to speak of him particularly. In his account of the healing of the blind near Jericho, Matthew speaks of two as being healed, while Mark and Luke speak of but one. This case is similar to that of the Gadarenes above referred to. Again, Matthew and Mark speak of this display of the power of Christ as having been made when he was departing from Jericho, while Luke's relation seems to describe it as being made on Christ's approach to the city. The words of Mark are, "they came to Jericho." This language may signify that Jesus remained some days in Jericho, and the miracle might be wrought, not when Christ was *finally* leaving Jericho, but when he was occasionally going out of, and returning to it.

When Christ was anointed with the precious ointment, the disciples are represented by Matthew as having indignation on account of it, while by John it is Judas who is represented as being displeased. Most likely he first and most strongly expressed displeasure at the circumstance, while others were led by his dissatisfaction, though not from the same feelings as himself, to express some discontent at the apparent waste.

By Luke and John, Christ is represented as foretelling the fall of Peter before the departure to the Mount of Olives, while by Matthew and Mark that prediction is represented as having been delivered on the way to the Mount. Most likely Christ dwelt on the subject twice, first before setting out and afterwards on the way. We feel assured that if other differences in the statements of the Evangelists be considered thoughtfully and without prejudice, it will be found that their relations are substantially the same, and that the gospels can be harmonized.

S. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE—III.

THE moral power and spiritual significance of the life and ministry of Christ have now so interpenetrated the civilization of Western Europe, and inwoven themselves with the actual condition of things, that Christianity is an institution more stable than thrones and dynasties. There can be no doubt that Christianity answered a felt want in human nature in its social relations as well as in the inner spirit of its revelations of the infinite and the eternal, and its appeal to the imaginative and the spiritual. But though the ideal of Jesus Christ by the moulding and pressure of the circumstances of the ages have taken a form and arrangement which, to our eyes, seems thorough and perfect, just as the creeds and the articles of churches have been fused and interlaced, so as to seem the complete teaching of scripture set in an essence, and put into its most potent logical shape; yet even as these creeds have been made the subject of investigation, and have led to the comparison of scripture with scrip-

ture, so now the life of Christ has itself become a topic for inquiry, and the spirit of research has gone back to the original sources to compare scripture with scripture, that it may be discerned whether the ground-plan of the biography of the great founder of Christianity supplies a picture so harmonized and adjusted as we have got it now. Strauss and Baur, Schleiermacher and Neander, Renan and Pressense, Young and Norton, Ellicott and Andrews, the Archbishop of York and the author of "Ecce Homo," have all, along with many others, entered into this field of critical investigation, and in so doing have given in their adhesion to the legitimateness of the inquiry, and the hope that there lies in it elements of interest alike for the student of truth, history, and theology. One of the Evangelical biographers, one, too, who confesses himself to be a compiler of a declaration of those things which are most surely believed among us, affirms that he does make this compilation that we "might know the certainty of those things." St. Luke thus writing seems to us to demand that his gospel should be taken as the standard of comparison, and that the other gospels should be used to see how far they afford corroboration of his statements, and, in short, *harmonize* with his vidiums of the life of Christ. This idea is still more strongly supported by the fact that St. Luke, more than any other evangelist, links his history of Christ with the contemporaneous political life and action of the time, and with the geographical condition of Syria in his age. He thus throws open upon his gospel the two eyes of history—Chronology and Geography, and shows his reliance upon the substantial truth of his statements by giving sides references, as it were, while he proceeds to the facts and circumstances which happened simultaneously or otherwise affected the revelations of the gospel. It is not a little strange that this position of St. Luke has not been recognized more fully, for thus a standard of comparison would have been gained.

Most harmonists take St. Matthew as their guide, and piece in the events recorded by the other evangelists as best suits their own views. Some—Luke indeed—accept the semi-platonic gospel of St. John as the basis of their ideal of Christ, and use the other gospels to give the force, vigour, and character of reality to that ideal. I think too little attention has been given to the fact that Christianity was to be a universal religion, was to progress over all the earth, and to permeate all minds. That on this account it must possess an adaptability to all minds, and hence that a highly realistic view of the life of the Lord was as necessary as a highly idealistic one, while there were other intermediate states of spirit to be provided for, to which the other gospels adapt themselves. I am inclined to think that the various necessities of men and the infinite purposes of God could not have been properly worked out had a single harmony of the gospels been possible; and therefore I see no force in the objection taken by "R. N." that there have been so many conflicting or disagreeing attempts at harmonizing the gospel. It is on this account that I give a modified negative to the

question proposed for debate, and affirm that "the gospels cannot be harmonized" in the same sense to each individual mind, and that though possessed of an essentially divine harmony they cannot be harmonized to minds like ours who only see one side, not all.

I base my opinion on this statement of the results of the investigations of Neander into the sources of the history of Christ:—

"The historical remains, as well as the nature of the case, show that the writing of the gospel history did not originate in any design to give a connected account of the life and public ministry of Christ as a whole, but rather grew out of a series of traditional accounts of separate scenes in his history. These accounts were partly transmitted by word of mouth, and partly laid down in written memoirs. The commission of the whole to writing naturally soon followed the spread of Christianity among the Greeks, a people much accustomed to writing. There can be no doubt that Paul makes use of written memoirs of the life of Christ. Our first three gospels resulted from the compilation of such separate materials as Luke himself states in his introduction. Matthew's gospel, in its present form, was not the production of the apostle whose name it bears, but was founded on an account written by him in the Hebrew language, chiefly (but not wholly) for the purpose of presenting the *discourses* of Christ in a collective form. John's gospel, which contains the only consecutive account of the *labours* of Christ arose in a very different way. It could have emanated from none other than that beloved disciple upon whose soul the image of the Saviour had left the deepest impress."

Now, my arguing runs thus, that variousness of design, of record, of points of exhibition, and of persons to be addressed, must make many portions of one and another of the gospels bring acts, ideas, and sufferings of Jesus into greater prominence in one than another; that traditions always tend to enlarge that which is felt to be of most importance, and to pass lightly over that which at the time seems to require little heed; that different sections of the church having different feelings regarding what was most interesting, would give greater effect to those portions of the life and teaching of Christ than others, and thus that, on all these grounds there would be an accumulation of difficulties in the way of the harmonizer.

I am also inclined to lay great stress on the infinite purposes of God in such a revelation of the life and work of Jesus. To present the life of Christ with all that variousness which would impart an interest to it for many minds would be one reason of this, while another would be that the life and character of Christ could not be apprehended in the same spirit by any two or more of those writers by whom the account was to be transmitted. I am inclined to say, therefore, that the four gospels cannot be minutely harmonized in event, circumstance, and doctrine, in the same sense to different minds.

W. H. S.

WOULD THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE IRISH CHURCH BE INJURIOUS OR BENEFICIAL TO PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY?

BENEFICIAL—REPLY.

"I hear many honourable gentlemen recommend to identify the principle of the English Church Establishment with that of the Irish Church Establishment. I am perfectly sure that by thus trying to identify them they drag down the one much more than they elevate the other. Not only are they not the same, but they are, in every point of view, totally different, both in spirit and principle. . . . There is but one case in all European experience in which the greater portion of the Church Temporalities has devolved—not to the Government—not to the majority of the people, but to the religion of a small and inconsiderable minority; that case is the Church of Ireland."—*George Grote, Historian of Greece, &c.*

"The grand and apparently insuperable difficulty with which it (the Protestant Establishment of Ireland—has had to contend is in effect this, that Christianity cannot be propagated through unchristian institutions, and that the State Church of a dominant minority is an institution which, being unjust, must be unchristian. . . . The hold of the Irish Establishment on the religious affections of the Irish people is a garrison of 20,000 men. At that price England purchases a source of just discontent and perpetual disaffection.—"*Irish History and Irish Character,*" by Mr. Goldwin Smith, formerly Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford.

THE *British Controversialist* has supplied a very good series of contributions on this question—especially on our side. "Georgius" has exhibited the moral argument for disestablishment with great ability, and proved the essential justice of the movement; "Samuel" has, with great patience and acuteness, entered the lists against E. B. O. R., and given the gentleman who hails from, as we assume from his signature, the second city in the empire devoted to the support of the church, the seat of the primacy of England, a most thorough defeat on every point of the argument raised; E. B. G. deals with the political economy of the question, and C. D., jun., takes up the religious view of the matter, arguing about state churches very conclusively. "R. D. Robjent" is pungent, and takes up a form of the argument of considerable originality; and "Zero" shows how grandly Voluntaryism can work against Popery—scorning the aids of State Establishment. These papers, on the whole, reflect credit on their writers, and on the earnest, religious zeal which affects men in connection with this question. In argument it cannot be doubted that it has been most conclusively proved that the disestablishment of the Irish Church would most undoubtedly be beneficial to Protestant Christianity as a matter of Christian brotherhood, moral fair play, and political amelioration.

The debate on which we have been engaged, however, since the question has been first mooted in these pages has been placed before

the nation for discussion under the highest sanctions. Parliament has been expressly dissolved that public opinion may declare its ripened conviction on the question of the Irish Church. The Constitutional party has taken into the field the cry, "Preserve the Irish Church," and they have besought and implored the aid of all the clergy to come "to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty;" and the great enchanter in whom that party places its confidence has issued a manifesto in which he predicts ruin and woe worse than are threatened in Daniel and Revelation combined if he be stricken from place, and the Irish Church is driven from among the institutions of the State. To this Mr. Gladstone has emitted a counter-blast, and the country has been called by her Majesty to decide on the question.

How has the country decided? Most unequivocally in the affirmative of the beneficiality of the disendowment and disestablishment of that church, which is a mockery of Christianity because enforced on men, and a tyranny because enforced on those who abjure its tenets.

Take as an example Scotland. At the moment I write the news has just reached London that a sevenfold victory has been as yet achieved in that land, the Conservatives elected being seven, and the Liberals forty-nine. Now this is a crucial verdict. Scotland is the stronghold of Protestant Christianity; it is said to be over-churched even to a fault. All its sects—at least, all its great ones—hold a similar faith, and one of the peculiarly Scotch beliefs is that the State should be Christian, and should overwatch, encourage, nourish, and cherish the Church. Scotland is notoriously inimical to Rome and Popery, and certainly would not raise her little finger to do anything that would advance the Papistical heresy, and yet it is her decided opinion, seven to one, that the abolition of the Irish Church as a State-endowed institution would be beneficial to Protestant Christianity, to the Church itself and to the State. This seems to me a most telling argument. In Ireland of course the question is complicated, and the reply is not pure and simple; in England, too, there are complications between Churchmen, who fear the downfall of their Church, and Nonconformists, who desire to beat down one in order that it may act more readily against another; but in Scotland the people favour establishments, and hate the Popery of Rome, yet they vote against the maintenance of this Irish Church. England, by the immense majority it has accorded to the Liberal party, has joined itself to those who oppose the Irish Church as an injury to Christianity, and we cannot forbear noticing that Canterbury, the city of England's greatest hierarch—the seat of the Primate of all England, and of course the place where, of all others, the supporters of the Church as an establishment ought to be strong, has given its verdict, not against establishments, but against the Irish Church as a State institution, by the election of two representatives, both pledged to support a measure for the disestablishing and disendowing of the Episcopal

Church in Ireland, from a sense of the policy and equity of such an abolition, and yet with the faith that the Church in Ireland will be more efficacious for good after this trial has been overpast than it is now. As it is, it is an antichristian eyesore or heart-sore to a jealous people; when it is free and honest in its rivalry with Rome it will gain to its heart the kindliness even of its foes.

The interest of the elections, and the suddenness with which I have been unexpectedly called upon to reply in this debate, have left me little leisure at the last moment to test elaborately the various arguments of the several opponents who have taken part in this debate. I admit that "Ebor" is strong on the inapplicability of the law of supply and demand to churches, but I shall briefly remind him that Christianity is a *missionary* religion, and holds in its heart a principle superior to that of political economy. L. H. E., in his fear of priests, forgets the power of the press. There is now a living public opinion with active organs everywhere, and before the press the priest must moderate his inclinations. C. S.'s pleading is highly honourable to his feelings, but he too forgets the missionary zeal of Christianity, and we cannot doubt that the most remote and retired parish in which true Protestants have a local habitation will find due provision made for their spiritual necessities,—as an example of how this would be done we may point to the highlands and islands of Scotland. G. D. debates the question from the political side, and does not attend to the state of the question, which is a religious, not a political one. It does not concern itself with the question he raises, Will it extinguish Fenianism? It regards the advancement or retardation of Protestant Christianity. But even on his own terms we would maintain that to do Christian justice would tend to pacify Ireland.

I adopt as my own the sentiments of a tract entitled, "A Protestant's Reasons for Disestablishing the Irish Church, which are:—

"(1) Because it is grossly unjust to establish a Protestant Episcopal Church in a country where there are but 700,000 Protestant Episcopalians, while there are 4,500,000 Roman Catholics;—and I do not wish by injustice to maintain Protestantism.

"(2) Because the attempt to force Protestantism on the Irish people by legislative enactments has strengthened their prejudice against the Protestant faith; has immensely increased the influence of the Roman Catholic priesthood, and has been a hindrance to the spread of scriptural truth.

"(3) Because, notwithstanding its wealth and its political privileges, the Protestant Establishment has so utterly failed to effect its professed object, that Ireland has become the most intensely Roman Catholic country in Europe.

"(4) Because the Episcopalians of Ireland, being the wealthiest part of the community, are as able to support their own Church as the Roman Catholics, who are the poorest, are to support theirs, and I believe they would be willing as well as able.

"(5) Because I believe that if the Irish Church were disestablished

its bishops and clergy would become more zealous, and its members continue to be good Churchmen and loyal subjects.

"(6) Because the continuance of the present state of things in Ireland is acknowledged to be impossible. Either all religious bodies must be endowed by the State, or none; and as religious equality *must* be conceded, I, as a Protestant, prefer the disestablishment of the Protestant Church to the setting up of a Roman Catholic establishment by the side of it.

"(7) Because the policy which it is proposed to adopt in Ireland has already been tried in America and in several of the British colonies, and neither Protestantism nor religion has suffered any injury.

"For these reasons, I, as a Protestant, as well as a well-wisher to Ireland, support the total and impartial disestablishment and disendowment of the Irish Church."

INJURIOUS—REPLY.

"Forced consecrations out of another man's estate, are no better than forced vows, hateful to God, who loveth a cheerful giver." JOHN MILTON, 1659.

THIS has been a most excellently sustained discussion. Month after month, as the several papers appeared, I have perused with interest the contributions which have been placed before the readers of this magazine, and I cannot but think that they are less tinctured with the ill-nature of bigotry, and more calmly rational than any set of papers equal in number which have appeared anywhere; while I do not think they have been at all defective in talent, research, and applicability to the question. H. Scott's paper is kindly and frank, and, no doubt sincere. He believes, along with Georgius, and Samuel, that the Irish Church itself would be the first to feel the salutary influence of the change proposed, namely, disestablishment. If the change is made, we cannot doubt but that, under divine grace, God's strength would be perfected amid the weakness of the church—for man's extremity is God's opportunity. But we are not permitted to do evil that good *may* come, not even that it *must* come; and hence we conclude, that to disestablish the church for our own ends, and from political expediency, because we believe that God will not withdraw his supporting favour from that Church, is to do wrong, and no act of wrongdoing *can* be beneficial to Protestant Christianity.

I feel myself bound, as an excuse for the devious pathways of debate I must pursue in replying to my opponents, to notice that few of them have kept anything like closely to the peculiar aspect of the debate placed before us. While I rejoice that so wide an interest has been taken in the consideration of the question, and that so many able papers have been produced on this topic, I regret that divergence from the true matter of discussion has been very

common. As I pointed out in my opening paper, we were, by the terms of the question, precluded from discussing the propriety or expediency of Church Establishments, which R. D. Robjont insists on debating. We were equally prohibited from making it a political question from the heading under which it appears. Neither were we at liberty to consider the expediency of disestablishment in regard to any Church, nor the prospective disadvantage any such parliamentary decision was likely to exert on the Established Churches of England or Scotland. We had to put in our view "Protestant Christianity" as opposed to the illegitimate electro-plated Christianity of the Romanist; and, knowing the contest which requires to be waged against the children of darkness by the children of light, to consider whether, in this contest, the disestablishment of the Irish Church would be beneficial. In other words, would a voluntary disarming, in the presence of our enemy, conduce to the success of that enemy, or the safety of the disarmer?

It is clear that, if I am to reply to my opponents, I, too, must be allowed somewhat to disregard the strict import of the question, and to diverge into side questions; for if I do not, the arguments left unanswered, and the points left untouched, would be credited as strongholds of the opposite side. The privilege which has been granted to what might be called *the-over-the-wayites* may, in part, be granted to me.

H. Scott truly says "no man knows what he is capable of doing till thrown entirely on his own resources;" but this would be small comfort to him or to me as against any legal spoliation to which we might be subjected. We might even get on better after the legally inflicted injury, but would it be beneficial to have legal injustice not only perpetrated in our case, but defended by our case? We fancy not.

Every one of our opponents—I don't quite like that strong word, and I suppose the editors won't quite like the substitute I have suggested above; but let that pass—every one of our opponents, has argued by analogies drawn from England. But Ireland is the land of anomalies. It is most productive; yet the population have too little to eat. It is devoutly religious, yet profoundly combative and unpeaceful. It is furiously national, and yet is quite under the power of a priesthood, enduring an alien alliance, and under foreign guidance.

The Romish priesthood do not give voluntarism the same fair field which the clergy of England allow it. They do not conscientiously grant toleration for any belief which is honestly held. They look upon persecution as meritorious; they look upon heretics to their creed as unworthy of either justice or mercy; and hence we cannot argue that they would permit the Irish Church as a voluntary institution to hold its place. Let H. Scott suppose himself to be one of twenty-five Protestants in a parish wholly given to Romanism otherwise, and that parish without a pastor except such

as twenty-five Irish peasants could provide, with no legal status, and no legal defence except that which might be got from a jury of his fellow parishoners, or their like, when the policeman happened to catch any of those who molested him and his fellow-worshippers; and does he believe that he would be likely to feel that he was placed in a situation which would be beneficial to his Protestant Christianity? We trow not. Well, many parishes would be so situated, and yet there could be no adequate protection secured against the priest and his party; and besides, what effect on morality would it have to leave the inhabitants of such parishes without means of baptism, marriage, or holy burial, unless by accepting the services of the priests?

It is asserted by Georgius that the Irish Church is "forced upon a people, nine-tenths of whom are averse to it, but yet are, to a certain extent, made to support it," p. 107. This sentence is a tissue of mistakes—1st, the Irish Church is not *forced* on the Irish people; all penal enactments are abolished (yet even these enactments were borrowed from the Romanists); and neither custom nor habit of persecution prevails among Protestants towards Roman Catholics—though the same affirmation cannot be made regarding the opposing sect; 2nd, the proportions of Romanists are not as 9 to 1 of Churchmen, but as $6\frac{1}{2}$ to 1; 3rd, the Catholic population are scarcely in any form whatever called on to support the Irish Church. The Ven. Archdeacon of Landisfarne, 6th May, 1868, says,—“The available income of the bishops and clergy of Ireland is about £400,000 a-year. This includes *all* receipts from tithe-rent charge and from glebe lands; and upwards of one-fourth of this income has been given to the Church by pious benefactors since the Reformation. Eight-ninths of this £400,000 a-year are paid by Churchmen, who earnestly deprecate any parliamentary interference, and the remaining one-ninth is paid by Roman Catholics of the present generation, because they either inherited or purchased their property with this known charge upon it.” The latter fact has been ably put and reasoned from by M. D. in his capital paper, of which see especially page 347, *ante*, when it is said,—“Is it not a hardship and an injustice that the Romanists of Ireland, who are the majority, should pay for the support of the Church of the minority, and that a Church of which they disapprove? The simple answer is that they do not contribute a penny to its support. Tithe in Ireland is of the nature of a reserved rent, charged upon the land, and all land has been [inherited] bought or rented subject to this charge. It belongs neither to the landlord nor to the tenant, but to the Church. It is like any charge of a family nature on a property. When the landlord buys, he does so subject to this charge, and, therefore, pays so much less for it. When the tenant takes land, he takes it subject to this charge, and, therefore, pays the less rent. If the rent-charge were to be removed to morrow, the very first effect in the market would be to raise the price of land [and so make it more difficult to introduce agrarian

reforms]. A large proportion, moreover, of the Church's income has accrued to it since the time of Queen Elizabeth. Five-sixths of all the glebe lands were granted in the reign of James I. Every glebe house, and almost every church, has been built since the Reformation. Large endowments and generous bequests have been made by private individuals since that period ; so that, in whatever aspect you regard them, the endowments of the Church are no injustice to the Romanists ; whereas the spoliation of them would be a gross injustice to the members of the Established Church."

Georgius says we all know that the Protestant State Church of Ireland was intended to convert the Roman Catholics, but that "it has failed to accomplish" that task. Is this quite so? In 1672 there were 300,000 Protestants in Ireland; now there are nearly a million and a-half. Churchmen were then to Roman Catholics relatively as one to eight; now the ratio is as one to six and a-half; and, besides, it must be remembered that prior to 1847-8 almost all the emigrants from Ireland were either Protestants or people who desired to forsake Romanism, but could only do it safely by leaving the land where they were under the immediate power of the priest. Independently of State aid, the Church has increased within the last century, her clergy from 800 to 2,172; her churches from 400 to 1,579; her glebe houses from 141 to 998; while the laity of the Irish Church during the last thirty years has contributed an average of £10,000 annually for church building purposes. Lord Chancellor Cairns says,—“The average income of each incumbent (in the Irish Church) is £280; the average number of members of the Church in town parishes is 1,590 souls, and in rural parishes 376. A country parish in Ireland averages 20 square miles. In England the average income of each incumbent is £285; the average population of a rural parish in England is 387 members of the church, and in Wales 248; and the average area of an English country parish is only 5 square miles.”* So that it does not appear that the Irish clergy have done less well than the English. But supposing that we could not appeal to these effective figures, is it not plain to Georgius, and any other thinking person, that if the Church of Ireland were really making no progress, and so worthy of having the finger of scorn pointed at it as effete and useless, that the Romanist clergy would not raise so mighty an outcry against it, that they would rather have it there as a palpable proof of the impossibility of Protestantism prevailing against their Church, the Church of St. Peter, though so supported and so allied to mighty and wealthy England. Rest assured that it is because the life of Christ is actively operative through the Irish Church,

* This statement of the case we adopt—as we do several other passages—from a very able, excellent, judicious, and temperate tract, entitled, “The Established Church in Ireland,” by W. Pakenham Walsh, M.A., Chaplain of Sandford, and late Donellan lecturer in the University of Dublin.

and by the ministrations of her clergy is being made practically felt, that the Romanist clergy are waging a war so hostile and antagonistic. "It has been gravely stated . . . that there are 199 parishes in Ireland in which there is not a single Protestant. This would be a startling anomaly if it were true. But what are the facts? There are in Ireland *civil* parishes constituted for *fiscal* purposes, and *ecclesiastical* parishes constituted for *spiritual* purposes. Three, four, or even more civil parishes may be included in one ecclesiastical parish; and it is possible that whilst no Protestants exist in one or more of the civil parishes there may be a goodly number in the others. The civil parishes number 2,428, but our ecclesiastical ones only 1,510; and there is only one of these latter in the whole of Ireland in which no church members are found, and that one is peculiarly circumstanced, having a church which is more conveniently situated than their own for some of the inhabitants of an adjoining parish, who are ministered to by a clergyman at the not very extravagant income of £191 10s. a-year." "We have, it is true," continues the author from whom we quote, "114 benefices in Ireland, in none of which the church population exceeds 25. But I have been surprised to find a list of 75 benefices in England, in none of which the whole population exceeds 39, and in which, allowing for the average of dissenters, the number of church people is the same as in ours. The net income of each of these 114 benefices is £164 6s. 10d. a-year, and it is worth considering whether these are not the very places where the little flock, scattered over a wide area, and surrounded by the members of a hostile and proselytizing church, requires the constant care of a resident pastor; and whether the income I have named is too much for one who is frequently the only person in the district to whom either Romanists or Protestants can look for assistance in their hour need." These quotations, I think, go completely to the root of R. D. Robjent's remarks on "pounds, shillings, and pence," and prove the accuracy of the remarks with which I opened the debate on the inapplicability of the commercial law of supply and demand to the Christian Church.

Samuel's able attack on our paper, which is very direct and forcible, now requires attention. He professes to prove that "the Irish Church is unjust in principle;" but we have shown, in our reply to Georgius, (1) that the poor Catholics do not pay for the Church, (2) that the Church is not forced on them, (3) that it is not administered as a Church possessing domination; and we now say that his argument that "we have been ruling Ireland with a rod of iron," is beside the question. The tripod on which he set his principle being deprived of its legs, cannot now stand.

Not only *justice* but *policy*, however, he maintains, demands disestablishment. He who is honest because it is the best policy is unjust; and again, the argument of Samuel evaporates. He brings a charge of Ritualism against the Irish Church as a ground for asserting that it is not a strong Protestant bulwark. But he

surely knows that the Irish Church is almost entirely free from Ritual nonsense, and that, in the presence of Rome, it knows that half-measures are of none effect ; hence his argument arises either in a misrepresentation or a misunderstanding. The history of Romanism is our proof that disestablishment of Protestantism is virtually the endowment of Papistical error ; and the history of the disendowment of any religion affords evidence of what we have said of the combined operation of fear and love of lucre in helping on change.

Samuel does not believe that disestablishment will be the abandonment of the principle of establishments. But we know that the enemies of establishments are those who most eagerly reiterate the Gladstonian cry—"Disestablish and disendow the Irish Church !" He does not think disestablishment would remove a rival from the Romish Church. Of course this is an acute evasion. When we said *remove*, we meant alter the relative position ; but he employs it to signify displace, and thus he gets a clever-looking argument by an *equivoque*. That is a dexterous turn which Samuel gives to his argument on our objection to the removal of burdens from the land which have been imposed upon. We say the burden is already laid on, that property has a right to bear it, and that to take the endowment from the Irish Church would be to give a bribe to the landlords, which, in the case of Catholics, would most probably be shared with the priests ; and thus the spoliation of the Church would injure Protestant Christianity. The cry of justice to Ireland is one which cannot be effectively maintained. Justice is mutually righteous ; it implies an equality of interest in doing what is right and concordant with conscientious feeling. But we have not to expect from Catholics this justice ; they do not acknowledge reciprocity in this duty. To keep faith with heretics is not in their creed. Romanism has not changed since the great Pym said, "The principles of popery are such as are incompatible with any other religion. Laws will not restrain them ; oaths will not. The Pope can dispense with both these ; and where there is occasion his command will move them, to the disturbance of the realm, against their own private disposition, yea, against their own reason and judgment, not only in spiritual matters, but in temporal. Henry III. and Henry IV. of France were no Protestants themselves, yet were murdered because they tolerated the Protestants."

It is not justice to give what we are not certain of getting an equivalent for. We have no guarantee for freedom of opinion and fair-play to Protestants from the Romanist clergy and their adherents. They ask, but they do not proffer. They cry justice to Ireland, but not justice *in* Ireland. Justice to themselves is one-sided ; they give no security that we shall get justice from them. Let us have all the fair-play given to, but not shown on our side. Till popery abandons her sacred right to act unjustly in the cause of God, as it avers, they cannot equitably claim equality. They must make themselves subject to the common laws of human

honesty before they have a claim to be heard and answered when they cry justice.

Samuel says it must have been a crime for the Protestants to seize upon Roman Catholic churches and their endowments; but Samuel must read his history better. What says history on the endowments of the Protestant Episcopalian Church in Ireland?

1. Christianity existed in Ireland before the days of St. Patrick.
2. The early Irish Church was substantially scriptural in its teaching, and wholly independent of Rome. (1) St. Patrick was ordained independent of the Pope, and his doctrines are anti-popish. (2) In A.D. 556, the bishops of Ireland *unanimously* condemned the Pope for his conduct in reference to the writings of Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas. (3) In A.D. 613, St. Columbanus, in a letter to Boniface IV., asserted the independence of the Irish Bishops, and maintained their right to rebuke the Bishop of Rome.
3. The Irish Church was brought under the yoke of Rome, by force and fraud, in the 12th century. (1) In A.D. 1074, the *first* Popish Bishop became resident in Ireland. (2) In A.D. 1084, the Pope of Rome (Gregory VII.) *first* claimed jurisdiction in Ireland. (3) In A.D. 1154, Pope Adrian IV. commissioned Henry II. to invade Ireland, and extend "the true faith to those ignorant and uncivilised tribes," on condition that the King was "willing to pay an annual tribute of one penny for every house there." (4) In A.D. 1172, the invasion was completed, and the compact between the Pope and the English King was ratified, by which Ireland was made a dependency of England, and the Irish Church the slave of Rome.
4. The Irish Church, in the 16th century, renounced the Romish errors that had been forced upon her in the 12th century, and returned to the doctrines of the Bible. (1) In A.D. 1534, *all* the nobles of Ireland renounced the supremacy of the Pope. (2) In A.D. 1560, all the Irish Prelates, with the exception of two, and the great body of the people, embraced the Reformed faith.
5. The Irish Church having returned to its old faith, the doctrines of the Bible, the Pope imported into Ireland a foreign hierarchy, and established there a new Church. (1) In A.D. 1568, Pope Pius V. excommunicated the English Sovereign, and commissioned the Irish nobles to rise in rebellion, with the view of stopping the Reformation, but in vain. (2) In A.D. 1570, the Pope sent foreign Jesuits into Ireland with the view of regaining his lost dominion. (3) In A.D. 1614, at the Synod of Drogheda, this foreign hierarchy was formally constituted, and thus the present Church of Rome in Ireland—an importation from abroad—came into existence at that date. From the above facts, we are entitled to infer the following as conclusions, viz. :—1. That the present Church of Ireland has existed from remote antiquity, and was the only Church in Ireland up till A.D. 1614. 2. That the present Roman Catholic Church in Ireland is a foreign importation, and came into existence there only in 1614. 3. That the foreign and alien Church is the Church of Rome. 4. That the present Roman Catholic Church in Ireland,

as it was created by the Pope *after* the Reformation, never owned, and never could by possibility own, any of the present property of the present Irish Church.

What are the results of yielding to the restless machinations of Jesuits, and trying to satisfy the papists by concessions? Have they been favourable to the progress of Protestant truth? Let all those who believe that the errors of Romanism are deadly and soul-destroying ponder over this one fact. In England and Scotland in 1829, when the Roman Catholic emancipation was granted, we had 447 priests—now we have 1,639; 449 chapels—now we have 1,283; then we had neither monastery nor convent—now we have 67 monasteries, and 227 convents. This is in Protestant England and ultra-Protestant Scotland, with all the might of two national Churches, and the united exertions of nearly a hundred sects of dissenters. With what grace, in the face of this fact, do we hear churchmen and dissenters alike crying out that the Irish Church has failed, as a missionary church, to outroot Papistry in Ireland! While in Ireland Romanism is decreasing, and in England it is increasing, might not the clergy of the Irish Church reply to those who bring this railing accusation against them, in the words of their common Lord and Saviour, “Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?”—but in the exercise of Christian charity, we shall not pursue the quotation farther.

Can any one doubt that it would be highly injurious to Protestant Christianity to see “a great nation, which has solemnly pledged itself to the maintenance of evangelical and Protestant truth, falsifying these pledges, voluntarily severing its connections with true religion, and perpetrating a great injustice to satisfy the godless expediency of the age?” Who can doubt that it would be injurious to Protestant Christianity “to withdraw from Ireland our national protest against the Church of Rome, and to hand over its population, so far as we are concerned, to the desolations of superstition? To disestablish the Irish Church what would it be but to give to the Church of Rome “the undisputed fulcrum of her canon law close to your own doors whereon to place the lever for your overthrow?” Can such a course be wise, or politic, or safe? If we “silence the only testimony that England has ever uttered in Ireland against the Popedom,” can we hope that Rome will repay our sacrifice of truth to expediency with anything but contempt—contempt not felt only, but shown in deeds of despite to our laws, and in acts abetting the treason of the foes of law? Can it be anything but most injurious to Protestant Christianity to see “a great nation renouncing its testimony for God; the little flocks of Protestantism in distant districts scattered, as sheep without a shepherd; the rising generation deprived of pastoral care, surrounded by influences hostile to their faith, and gradually absorbed into the mass of error and superstition around them; the Church of Rome crafty, unscrupulous, and intolerant, regaining in many places the ground

she had lost; insulting over the testimony she has silenced, and erecting ten thousand barriers against the re-entrances of that truth which English Protestants helped her to expel; and more than this—new vigour infused, and larger opportunity afforded for assailing the religious and civil liberties of the kingdom, and carrying out the designs of the Papacy throughout the whole empire?"

In conclusion, we beg to sum up the whole matter by quoting as a brief expression of the views given in this, and in our previous paper, the following reasons for not disestablishing the Irish Church:—"1. Because the Irish Church disseminates the Word of God; and how can we hope to give light and peace to Ireland by extinguishing the light of the Bible and putting down the gospel of peace? 2. Because the Irish Church is a national defence against Romanism, and removing that Church would promote popish ascendancy. 3. Because to appropriate the emoluments of the Irish Church for other than Irish Church purposes, would be spoliation, seeing that Church has an independent legal right to its property. 4. Because to apply any money taken from the Irish Church for education by popish teachers, or under the control of popish priests, would be robbing the cause of Christ to promote the cause of antichrist. 5. Because the disestablishment of the Irish Church will not satisfy the insatiable Romanists, and will tend to disaffect the loyal Protestants. 6. Because disestablishing the Irish Church, and transferring her emoluments to popish convents or popish schools, will leave many of her poor members without the means of grace. 7. By depriving the Protestant poor in Ireland of the means of grace, we are leaving them a prey to popery. 8. Because by disestablishing the Irish Church, we are renouncing God in the Government of Ireland, that we may please the papal hierarchy; and such national infidelity God will punish with national judgments.

E. B. O. R.

Literature.

ARE SENSATIONAL NOVELS SUPERIOR TO NOVELS WITH A PURPOSE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY

I RECOGNISE the ability with which PHILOMATHES opens the debate in which I stand opposed to him, and I confess that the moral earnestness of the late able and excellent R. S. has had no inconsiderable effect upon my mind. I shall not in this reply make any reference to the arguments of the latter name, but those of the former may require some effort on our part to meet and controvert.

PHILOMATHES has argued almost all through his interesting paper as if the question under debate had been "Are Sensational Novels superior [in moral effect and influence] to Novels with a Purpose?" and so misdirected the stream of thought from its very source. Of course the question signifies, "Are Sensational Novels (as novels) superior to those with a purpose," and the argument refers, then, not to the morality of the sensational novel, but to the effectiveness of it, and the ability that can be brought to bear on its production. We hold that what PHILOMATHES says Professor Bain calls plot-interest is the essence of the novel. If it were not so, there would be no meaning in the satire,—

"And novels—witness every month's review—
Come from the press, containing nothing new."

We cannot have a new morality. What we can have new are the succession of events, and the startling stir of plot and incident.

All great things are done with an unconsciousness of their greatness. A modest unconsciousness of merit distinguishes great men. Innumerable influences result from the events which men initiate which never entered into their deliberations. An overpowering spirit of energy spurs and inspirits them, and "they excell," as the saying is, "themselves." The actuality and embodiment of the future very seldom corresponds to the plan laid down in our minds for its progress. This is the reason why "truth is stranger than fiction;" and is it not also the reason why the nearer fiction comes to the actual truth of things the stranger it is? Curious coincidences of actuality and ideality seem to confirm this. The *denouement* of "Little Dorrit" was said by the critics to have been eked out by an incident in London life which had occurred during the course of the publication of that novel in serial issues; and yet Charles Dickens affirmed that the passage in which this accident occupies a place was not only thought out, but written out, nay, more, absolutely printed off before the event happened from which he was accused of having borrowed a *denouement* when his plot was *in extremis*. No novelist could have ventured to put the incidents of the wreck of "The London," or the Abergele accident into a novel, without running the risk of an accusation of overstepping the limits of *vraisemblance*, and dealing in sensationalism. This goes to prove that there is a sensationalism in nature of which we cannot see the purpose; and that though laws work in the very core of things and events, we cannot see and know these from the form and shape events take in our experience. We do not affirm that these laws are blindly effective because we cannot comprehend the immediate purpose of that which impresses our senses. To demand that we should see the living idea out of which the incidents and accidents of life issue, is to put forward a claim to too much. It is not granted to human knowledge to comprehend all, nor is it given to man to embrace the immeasurable whole of the

evolutions of experience. Hence it is always safest to keep within the possible, and we can know, describe, and narrate a succession of events without being able to trace their cause, or to eliminate from them the true lesson they are meant to teach. Besides, it ought never to be forgotten by the promoters of morality by novel writing that by leading up to a lesson through an invented story there is always a danger of the idea arising that the duty inculcated may be as much an invention as the incidents; while there is always the possibility of another form of story being written which would change the complexion of things, and throw doubt on the certainty of the lesson which had been inculcated through the previous story.

"R. D., Jun.," takes the same fallacious view of the question which we have pointed out as holding place in the paper of "Philomathes," namely, that this is a debate regarding *Morals* instead of one referring to *Literature*. He appears to be hardly quite sure that novels should be read at all, and, of course, if they ought not to be read, *a fortiori* they ought not to be written. If they are to be written or read at all, however, he is quite intent on their being written in the goody style—the pill, if taken, should be gilded or candied over, it ought not to be taken pure and simple. We, on the contrary, think, though this is going after him into the moral aspect of the matter, that the true and honest way is to be straight-forward and upright—if wrong, abstain; if right, go on. No shuffling should be used, as "F. W. J." eloquently enforces in the close of his article—an article which very pertinently opposes this notion of "R. D., Jun." Among the other uncertainties under which the mind of "R. D., Jun.," staggers, is that of the comparative sinlessness of drawing, painting, music, botany, mineralogy, amateur book-binding and novel reading! But he kindly grants that, though probably a sinful indulgence, as the mind craves it, it may be permitted to transgress—if, if "the novel is a good one," and "has a healthy tendency." How is this to be discovered if the novel is not read? If read, and found to be unhealthy, what soul-cleansing process does "R. D., Jun.," propose for the unfortunate wight who has acted as taster? Does "R. D., Jun.," believe that critics have no souls to be saved? If he does, why should he ask him to peruse all the sinful trash of which, according to his idea, novels consist, and so absorb so much guilt and danger that he may be warned against the pernicious, "the perilous stuff?" If he does not, why does he think that he can give an honest verdict on soul and conscience against a book which gratifies his profane and irredeemable spirit? More closely, how is the book to be known to have a healthy tendency till it is read; and if books are only to be bought, and perused after they have been found to be of healthy tendency, how are they to be discovered at all? Plainly "R. D., Jun.," expects some class of minds interposed between the novel writers and his own which shall be as impervious to the "evil communications" which "corrupt good manners" to be found, as he

thinks, in many novels, as the leaves of an evergreen are to Autumn rain. But we need not really attempt to controvert the paper which "R. D., Jun.," has contributed to this debate, for that is rather devoted to the question, Ought novels to be read by professing Christians? not to that which lies before us. His ideas of sensational novels appear to have been got through a reader, and are not at all up to the mark. He knows about "Dick Turpin" and "Jack Sheppard," but he has no acquaintance with "The Woman in White," "Charlotte's Inheritance," or "Anne Hereford."

We come next to "Grimwood," who has surely been reading some novel with a purpose—say that of advocating the abolition of capital punishment; and under the influence of the horror of the last scene of all, in some culprit's eventful history, has rushed into type and typology. The scaffolding of his argument is not very securely put up. His definition assumes the whole argument. Sensational novels are *bad*. Novels with a purpose are *good*. No *good* thing can be inferior to a *bad* one; and, therefore, by a short and easy process, we arrive at the plain conclusion that novels with a purpose are superior to sensational novels? But are sensational novels bad? and if they are bad, in what sense are they so? Has "Grimwood" proved that sensational novels are bad? No; he has assumed that; and, as his basement falls, all that he has built on it tumbles into *debris*. But, besides, his assumption, even if correct, would serve him no good turn in this debate, in which the question is a literary, not a moral one. That sensational novels are not *bad* in a literary sense is self-evident. A bad novel is an unenjoyable one; but unenjoyable novels can never attain an extensive and overmastering popularity. The very subject that we are discussing proves that sensational novels have attained a great popularity—that is, that, as works of art, they are not bad, and, therefore, are not amenable to the disparaging criticism which "Grimwood" has passed upon them.

We regret that in this debate the proper view of the question has not been taken, and that our opponents have treated the topic from the moral instead of the literary side. In our opening remarks we gave emphasis to this view, and, by definition and illustration, did our part to make the question clear. We have not really had any opposition in regard to the main elements of that paper. Though there has been this want of close, gripping contest, we cannot but rejoice that the debate has been brought before the readers of this magazine; for few can read the paper of "Philomathes" without gaining much good from his observations on novels and novel-reading, which, to our mind, are very fine. The paper written by our coadjutor, A. A. R., brings before us some excellent distinctions, and presents some views of interest, we should think, even to our opponents. B. D. M. has, with a good deal of liveliness, anatomized one or two fallacies, and has shown a wide acquaintance with the subject. I do not think it would be

possible to find in an equal space so much good matter on novels as is contained in the pages—about twenty—occupied with this subject; and I can cordially compliment not only my colleagues, but my antagonists on having made a very valuable addition to the discussion of a very important literary question; and I must confess I did not think so much that was good could have been said “on both sides.”

C. H. S.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

It has fallen to me to close this discussion. I do so with a feeling of grief, because since it was begun my right hand companion in this warfare of thought has been withdrawn from the company of searchers for truth, and has passed into the mighty multitude of those who know. Not certainly for him need we mourn when we reflect that his latest writings were words of holy confidence in God and the gospels, and (see page 282) of earnest exhortation to us whom he has left to look to the “Great Salvation;” and learn that his latest act was one of filial kindness and dutifulness—we mourn for the heavy loss which one so able and ready, so nimble of thought, and dexterous in argument makes in our small army of advocates for a liberal and elevated, a genuinely impartial and generally diffused spirit of consideration and debate. Who can read those warm and fresh, kindly and wise words in which the record of the brief, humble, but beautiful life of our dear brother in letters has been related by the sagacious and affectionate thinker to whom we have all so long looked up as our “guide, philosopher, and friend,” without regret that so much promise should have passed away, and such a life should have been blotted out so early and so saddeningly as well as suddenly? I could not; and I feel a heart’s thanks to be due to the writer of that appreciative paper concerning our fellow campaigner in the struggle for Truth.

With this word of appreciative recognition of R. S. we must turn to the labour which devolves on us, namely, to defend “novels with a purpose” against “sensational novels,” the plague of the literature of our age. R. S. made a very good point against the state of the question when he said every novel must have a purpose—what sort of a thing would a novel without a purpose be? But we have no intention of resting the solution of the question on points, while we believe that principles may be advanced which go to the very foundations on which the subject rests.

A novel is a work of art. Art is the conscious imitation or reproduction of experience. Experience is the true antitype and genuine source of art. Nature and life are the proper things to be reproduced in literature; and nature and life are full of purpose, are characterised by what Aristotle calls “the perfecting purpose” of being. It is because this is a fact that Schelling beautifully and truly says, “If we look upon things regarding not their essence, but merely their empty and derived form, they answer not to our souls. We must engraft on them our own

feelings and mind if we would they should respond to us." Purposeless incident, a mere sequence of stimulating narrative, a succession of events, cannot furnish an imitation of nature and life, in which all that is and acts manifests purpose.

C. H. S. admits what R. S. asserted, that "every novel has a purpose" and he very correctly, if not, indeed, naively, distinguishes between novels of purpose and sensational novels, by saying "this excites emotion, that endeavours to excite thought." What is this in its result but to admit the immense and real superiority of novels with a purpose? Are man's emotions nobler than his thoughts? If so, the exciter of a dog fight or a street riot is engaged in a nobler work than the lecturers in university chairs and the teachers of men throughout the land, because the former "excite emotion" as their main concern, while the latter "endeavour to excite thought" as their highest object. C. H. S. thinks singleness of purpose, not in the sense of straightforwardness of aim, but in the sense of having one object only before the mind, as a great recommendation of novels. We must think that the greater the number of purposes that can be kept prominently and effectively before the mind, the higher the effort is by which it is accomplished, and the nobler the result produced. It is because nature and life are infinite in their purposes, that they have an infinite interest, and we know, as a fact, that all the higher efforts of mind in art and literature effect many purposes and not single ones. The music of Mozart, the paintings of Raffaele, the dramas of Shakspeare, the sculptures of Flaxman, are all characterised by the manner in which they appeal to the many-sided sympathies of men, for their inclusion of many purposes in one, as the bud of the rose includes leaves, perfume, and nectar, as well as seed, perceptible beauty, intellectual suggestiveness, and poetic associations, as well as chemical decoctions and botanical instructions.

C. H. S. thinks "novels of purpose" restrict art; so they do, but this is the higher praise; for that is the mightiest art which, with the fewest elements in its grasp, can work out the most potent effects. As Schelling, whom we have quoted before, has said,— "The power of self-restriction is universally considered an excellence, as, indeed, one of the highest of excellences." Music and sculpture, for instance, work with only *sound* and *form* respectively, mathematics by mere *position*, yet how grand are the results which have been educed from these simple elements. Painting adds colour to form, and poetry adds words to music, and the drama combines sculpture, painting, poetry, architecture, and music in its imitations of nature and life, but the novel endeavours to represent the drama of existence in words alone; and this is its great praise that with elements so few it can work effects so great, and produce influences so wide-spread. This seems to prove the mistakenness of the views advanced by C. H. S. in objection to purpose in a novel restricting the art that can be shown in it. If it is true, as C. H. S. says, that "we are eager to know life" and hence "seek

sensational novels, not didactic ones," is it not because we seek sensational life, instead of being animated by a sense of the purpose of life?

A. A. R. affirms that "the novel with a purpose is dishonest," he might as justly say that a life with a purpose is dishonest, for that proposes the evolution of plot through the evolution of thought, and is the working out in action of designs entertained in thought.

Is it not a much more accurate assertion to say that sensational novels are dishonest, inasmuch as they exhibit life as a series of scenes without the connections of causation and purpose, and this gives false views of life and the issues of life? The same writer affirms that "the plot novel is honest," we, for our own part, cannot believe that a rapid narrative of stirring incidents in which murder, forgery, abduction, bigamy, assault, robbery, chicanery, &c., have a large share is an honest exhibition of human life, and we refuse to accept as an apology for the sensational novel a reference to our criminal annals and our police sheets. Indeed, were we to press any charge heavily against the sensation novel it would be that of undermining all faith in honesty, decorum, and principle, and of imparting all the interest of life to sensual pleasure and mere enjoyment.

F. W. J.'s paper might be called a tissue of irrelevancies. All his long quotations from W. G. Simms have, in fact, nothing to do with the discussion. He merely praises the novel, but does not prove that sensational novels are superior to those with a purpose. F. W. J. in one word overturns his whole—shall I say, argument? He affirms that a novel is an exercise of the *constructive* intellect. Now, construction without purpose is regarded as the height of folly, and that forms one horn of a dilemma; while the other is that construction for mere excitement's sake, and with no farther end—construction without regard to causation and purpose—is both foolish and false. On whichever of these F. W. J. chooses to impale himself, we, of course, do not know, but on either he will be unable to maintain that the sensational novel is the only true and consistent one. I do not see any consistency in F. W. J.'s averments that sensational novels are true and consistent, and that if sensational novels alone existed it is probable that the religiously inclined would not read them. From this, one would be inclined to think that F. W. J. thinks that religious people dislike the truth, and that in fact, the lovers of sensation are those alone who either have or can get at the truth. We can scarcely believe that he can mean so, and we shall not impute that to him, but we really cannot see that the honesty of a worthy pursuit should hinder the religious world from following it, and preferring what I would call an unholy hypocrisy. R. D. Junr.'s reply to this writer is exceedingly effective, and releases us from the necessity of exposing farther the weak points in F. W. J.'s paper. Grimwood gives a good criterion for testing the superiority of sensational novels over those with a purpose—what moral effect have they?—do they

strengthen the moral nature, revive the heart, purify the temple of the soul, make fitter for heroic fighting in the battle of life, encourage faith, truth, love, honesty and holiness?

The ingenuity of B. D. M. is much more remarkable than his ingenuousness. The sensational novel, he says, confesses itself false and invented, and so only asks to be read as a story. If this is so, then all the talk about its being a representation of life is nonsense and worse. But the novel with a purpose makes no pretension other than the sensational novel so far as regards its assertion of itself to be a work of fiction. It affirms itself to be so, and yet that it holds so closely to nature and life that the purposes and causes are seen to interknit and so to get woven together into event and plot. We cannot debate the topic easily with B. D. M., for he bases his argument on what we cannot believe—that the purpose of human life, and the relations of the motives to the actions of man are not able to be known. We think otherwise: we believe that the moral nature of man contains the very germs of his present state and future prospects, and that the relation of cause and effect is singularly close between the purposes of the spirit of man and the results that issue from his life. As novels are, or ought to be true and genuine reproductions and representations of nature and life, they must have a purpose in them, and ought not to be merely panoramas of incident “defying,” as R. S. said, “all laws of conceivable causation,” and hence we say as before, “we raise our voice in behalf of the novel with a purpose,” and maintain that it is far superior to any sensational novel.

PHILOMATHES.

Politics.

WAS THE ABYSSINIAN WAR JUSTIFIABLE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

“The present Government redeemed the honour of the country, freed its agents from captivity without the loss almost of a man, and enhanced the honour of the British arms, setting an example, at the same time, to other governments, of perfect disinterestedness and honour.”—*Blackwood's Magazine*, Nov. 1868, p. 628.

“The legacy of insult and difficulty which had been left us in Abyssinia could only be successfully encountered by a responsibility from which we did not shrink. The result of the expedition to that country vindicated the honour of the crown and the cause of humanity and justice, and it obtained for Her Majesty's forces the admiring respect of Europe.”—*Hon. B. Disraeli*.

“Our fellow-countrymen have been rescued from captivity in Abyssinia, and the power and disinterestedness of England have alike been shown in the brief and brilliant campaign which produced that result.”—*Lord John Manners*.

THE few papers which the above subject have elicited appear to

prove the general belief in our view. Where any national action is much disapproved, numbers of advocates to condemn such action are always in the arena, and lose no opportunity of publishing their views and sentiments.

Those who have, in the pages of the *Controversialist*, undertaken to condemn, seem to me to have signally failed. Each of the three, for instance, argue, *a posteriori*, that because the object was achieved so comparatively easy, and because the prisoners were not only rescued alive, but found not to have suffered much from brutal physical torture, that the foeman was not worthy of our steel, and that the sufferings of the captives had not reached that particular point where human aid ought to be extended to them. In reply to these, I say to the first, that the difficulties and dangers of the country, and the obstinacy and bravery of Theodore's troops were represented in terms strong enough to daunt any but a really noble heart, and to elevate the Negus to the position of a foeman capable of defying the strongest enemy; and to the second, that we waited not for the death of our consul and the missionaries, as rescue, not revenge, was the object sought. Even had these two charges any weight on the whole general argument, they would fail in this case, inasmuch as they were facts *discovered by the success* of the expedition *only*, and, therefore, not enter into the causes which led our Government to send forth the expedition. With R. F. G.'s doctrine of law I cannot hold, and his illustration is particularly wide of the mark. Müller, the German murderer, was not a government representative, and had committed what was a crime, not only according to our laws, but according to those of his own country. Again, certain exemptions from a country's customs are always extended to the representatives of foreign powers at all courts. Our ambassadors and consuls are not called upon to kiss the Pope's toe in Italy, to prostrate themselves and bury their faces in the dust before the Mogul and the Celestial Emperor, nor to eschew the reading of *Punch* in France and Prussia, while the American minister in England is allowed to appear before Her Majesty in a black instead of a white neckcloth, while natives and naturalised subjects, or even ordinary residents, have to pay obedience to these and similar foolish customs. The law of Abyssinia, which made it a capital offence to offend his Majesty, and left it entirely to his Majesty's fancy to say whether he was or was not offended, was a similar law offensive to common sense, and according to international custom in open abuse against the representative of a friendly power. Theodore, by not only accepting, but by asking for recognition as a sovereign, by the establishment of an embassy in his dominions, bound himself to an observance of this international, although unwritten, code of law.

The signature of the second article fully and pithily describes the article itself. M. T. in a mystified manner opens and concludes by referring to the perilous risks, hazards, and dangers of the campaign, while in the fourth paragraph, arguing from our success,

he says the expedition was a clear case of oppressive use of force against a weak enemy, whom we knew to be no match for us. He very curiously introduces a condemnation of England for refusing to fight Prussia, Austria and Russia for seeking to extend their possessions without encroaching on British soil or interfering with British rights into the argument, but fails to say why England should in those cases have interfered. The Alabama claims seem to me quite foreign to the subject, he speaks of, but for M. T.'s information I would just say, England refused to accede to America's extravagant demands, or to agree to arbitration or humiliating terms, and was prepared to accept the risks. Returning again to the subject proper I would advise M. T. and F. H. M. to read the opinions of French, Austrian, Italian, and American statesmen, and the press of those countries, to see whether England made itself a laughing-stock, or raised itself to a higher position in their respect by its Abyssinian action. He will find them in a collected form in *Public Opinion*, numbers for March and April. Had they read the newspapers at the time they would scarcely have made the assertions they did. F. H. M. is particularly eloquent about Theodore's weakness as a ruler, yet the organ from which he appears to draw inspiration on this point was the one which drew the darkest and most appalling pictures of the certain destruction of our army, before it returned after a short but brilliant campaign. In reply to M. T.'s expression of wonder that England should risk its prestige by an expedition so full of risk (!) I say that our prestige had been already attacked, and that the expedition was in defence of it, and therefore was not risking it. The sketch of the cause of the war which I gave at the beginning has been amplified by G. S. P.; while H. D., in a clear and logical manner, shows our justification from these several *a priori* facts, and the after results of the expedition. To have offered to ransom the prisoners would have been the most foolish step a great nation could descend to. It would have been an evidence of decay. The fall of the Grecian republic, the Roman empire, the Aztec and Inca's supremacy in America, and the decay of Venetia and Spanish power in Europe, were all heralded by the bribing of enemies, the purchasing of peace, and the ransoming of subjects; and long, we hope, will be the day ere England has to descend to so base a method of protecting her children. Besides, it was not money which Theodore wanted, but military aid, as the efforts made by our embassies to obtain a hearing showed. His first question was usually, would England assist him against Egypt, and on being told "no" he would hear no more. Diplomacy, I contend, was tried to the utmost, and sufficient apology was offered for an accidental oversight of his letter, notwithstanding the random statements of M. T. and F. H. M., that England neglected to send presents and letters, which the parliamentary debates and newspaper reports of various dates effectually dispose of. To contend that it was the messengers sent that displeased the Negus is

scarcely worthy of reply. The Government sent those who were supposed to be best acquainted with the customs of his court, and more likely to obtain a hearing, unaware that his Majesty would conceive an antipathy to the messenger on his arrival, or that he entertained one previously. After exhausting all legitimate and honourable arts of peace to obtain the release of those whose only offence was doing their duty to their Queen, their God, and their conscience, we were obliged to have recourse to war. We sought not revenge, but rescue, and nobly and heroically was the object achieved.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE public opinion of a country is not always on the right side. *Vox populi* is not always *Vox Dei*, though it is at all times possessed of incalculable potency. This power, public opinion—we contend against it—has a tendency to smother our arguments.

I may notice in commencing this reply, that our opponents seem to take for granted that the reason of the delay, after the misdeeds of Theodore, was, that he might have time to deliver the captives. If this were the case our opponents are wrong in asserting that a deliverance of the captives was not sufficient to relieve the shade which little Theodore had cast upon British honour, but that Theodore must be punished. If Theodore deserved punishment, righteously deserved punishment, at the hands of Britain, our Government acted unrighteously in trying to get the captives released without meting to Theodore just and condign punishment—which is absurd.

F. S. appears to make a pretty fair statement of facts, from which we may gather that the English Consul, and afterwards the special Envoy, acted in such a manner as to cause the Negus to confiscate their property. What this offensive act was we know not, and we must remember that what we do know is derived from the friends of those people who offended the Negus. We have yet to hear a full Abyssinian version of the affair. Is it not monstrous that England should cut up Theodore's little band without hearing Abyssinian versions of the matter? Without receiving any version save that of interested parties?

H. D. says, that those who risk themselves amongst strange and savage peoples must be protected by their Government. Not if they do so without the command of the Government, is our answer. But it may be said that Government risked these agents, that they went there involuntarily. I say that Government had no business to send them there, such a deed was a fault, and the fact that they fought to hide it makes it *two*: and, again, no British citizen can be involuntarily sent to Africa unless convicted. It was a mistake in the Consul to accept the post, and a mistake in the Government to create the Consulate. The war was caused by mistakes, was a mistake, and its results are now mistaken by a vain glorious nation.

H. D. says, that nothing but "a discharge of the wrath of nations"

could settle the Abyssinian difficulty. We say that the wrath never should have existed, it could not then be discharged.

G. S. P. proves, that sufficient preparations were not made to remove from the Negus the prejudice he would entertain against the allies of the Turks. Possibly Theodore might have heard of the insinuating way in which India was made a British possession. The Abyssinian war is not justifiable, as sufficient and adequate means were not taken to conciliate the Negus, to show him we were his friends, and that the military man sent there was not a spy. He also speaks of it under the name Christian chivalry. I protest against the misnomer; chivalry must be connected with odium by many an observer of history. The discharging of a nation's wrath is no more Christian than a war undertaken to popularize a Government, or test a Chassepot. War is a dire necessity which was once mischievously dressed in the garb of chivalry. Why does not G. S. P. state why the French and German prestige was injured because they did not fight Theodore, though nine out of seventeen captives were German, two French, and only five of British birth? F. S., quoting Rawlinson, said that "prestige is in politics what credit is in finance." It would be absurd for a banker to set upon and pummel a horde of mendicants who doubted the validity of his notes, and it was as absurd for England to brow-beat Theodore because he doubted her prestige. R. F. G.

The Essayist.

THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF TRIAL BY JURY.

It is peculiarly desirable to trace, if possible, the seed, bud, and progressive vegetation of a tree so beautiful and so venerable.—TURNER.

It is impossible to conceal the fact that there is in the public mind a growing contempt for the "twelve men in a box" about whom, according to popular belief, the material consideration for the prisoner is as to how they have breakfasted, and for the bar as to what time they dine. But whatever may be the estimate of trial by jury at the present day, it can never be forgotten that it has noble traditions; nor can its services in the past be lightly spoken of. To the "twelve good and true men" who from time to time have been empannelled to try causes affecting the liberty of the subject or the constitution, is due a fame as undying as the rights they have shielded. How often have their plain, honest "findings,"—putting aside law quibblings and intricate judge instructions, and based rather on a sturdy sense of justice, than the darkling beams of black letter law—averted appeals to sterner and mayhap bloody tribunals. However fledgling barristers may sneer

at jurymen as the dupes of *ad capandum* oratory, it will be a sad day in our history, and a sorry innovation on our "perfection of human reason" when in criminal and constitutional cases the decision of facts as well as of law is handed over to the legal acuteness of the bench. At times, when the noblest ornaments of our bench have bent to the touch of interest or the breath of royalty, the instincts of justice have remained true in the breasts of the "sturdy, honest, unlettered jurors, who derive no dignity but from the performance of their duties." True, not always when the most trusted strongholds of liberty have been beaten down, has this refuge escaped; and alas! at times, it, too, has been prostituted to the service of tyranny. Then, in the eloquent words of Hallam, "That primæval institution, those inquests of twelve true men, the unadulterated voice of the people, responsible alone to God and their conscience, which should have been heard in the sanctuaries of justice as fountains springing fresh from the lap of earth, have become, like waters constrained in their course by art, stagnant and impure." But how much oftener, in hours of peril, has it been true to its high responsibility; or straying for a time, has quick returned to its allegiance. To trace the history of this institution from its fountain in the distant past, broadening and deepening through the progress of the ages to its serene on-flow at the present, cannot be without instructive interest.

It is the peculiarity of many of the most valued of our institutions, and trial by jury amongst the number, that we cannot point to any particular time and place, and say with assurance this is its origin. We do not find them engrafted upon our constitution by any bold original legislative measure. We catch glimpses of them shadowed forth in customs and privileges, gradually becoming more distinct and stronger, and at length demanded as rights and confirmed by charter. Very often they are enveloped in a husk of superstition, which they retain when everything else of their original form has been lost or changed. The superstition of the jury is the number (twelve) composing it, such a favourite one with the Germanic tribes.

Great controversy has raged as to the origin of trial by jury; and our most reliable writers on early and mediæval legal history have contributed to the elucidation of the question, supporting their different views with great learning and ability. Some, like Blackstone, declare it to be of an origin so remote that it cannot be satisfactorily traced; some have traced it to the wisdom of Alfred; some again attribute it to Henry II., others ignore it until Magna Charta, whilst another class of writers give the honour of its birth to the 15th Century. Yet all are agreed as to data; they differ only as to deduction. A perusal of the writings on this question of Hallam, Turner, Palgrave, Spelman, Forsyth, Reeve, Creasy, Blackstone, Stephens, &c., show us how widely divergent, and yet all supportable with some show of argument, may be the views entertained on the point, and might well make us exceedingly

diffident to commit ourselves to a too assured opinion on the matter. But with all deference to this great array, we must say that after an earnest consideration of their views we can see no real and satisfactory halting place between Alfred and the Lancastrian dynasty. That is from the time when there were few of the elements of the modern jury except the number, and the unanimity of that number being decisive, to the period when it assumed, with few exceptions, all its present day features. Its various changes have glided so imperceptibly into each other, each in succession assuming the functions of its predecessor, that it seems an absurdly refined distinction to say that any of the intermediate stages was the true origin of trial by jury. It is as if when watching a diorama, where one view gradually fades and becomes indistinct, whilst another as gradually comes out, the two blending on the canvas, we should at any time while the two were blended claim for either a recognizable completeness. We had the picture that is fading, we shall have the one that is replacing it, but in between we have simply change. So we must be content to recognize trial by jury in its crudest form, or not until its development is complete.

Those who attribute trial by jury to Alfred's time find their proof in the following provision in an agreement between him and Guthrun, the leader of the Danes (about 880 A.D.):—"If a king's thane be accused of man-slaying, if he dare to clear himself, let him do so with twelve king's thanes. If any one accuse that man who is of less degree than a king's thane, let him clear himself with eleven of his equals and one king's thane." The proceeding here referred to is the compurgation familiar to students of Saxon history. A man charged with an offence had to clear himself by the oaths of twelve compurgators, he first taking oath that he was guiltless of the charge, and they swearing that his oath was to be relied upon. Failing to exculpate himself by this means, or if taken in the act, or openly guilty of perjury on a former occasion, or not being a freedman, a person had to clear himself by the ordeal.* The ordeal was of three kinds,—carrying the hot iron, taking a stone suspended by a string out of a pitcher of boiling water, or swallowing a bit of dry bread, with a prayer by the accused that it might choke him if he was guilty. The two former were proportioned to the enormity of the charge, or the previous character sustained by the person; and the iron which, if the charge was "simple," was a pound, might be increased, according to its enormity to three pounds; and the stone, usually at the depth of the hand, might be lowered to that of the elbow; indeed, as Spelman observes, their punishments and tests were meted with a mathematical exactness. The twelve compurgators were not enough if the accuser produced compurgators to outweigh

* For an account of the religious ceremonies observed at the ordeal, see Turner's "Hist. Aug. Sax.," vol. ii., p. 260, *et seq. ed.*, 1807.

them in legal value ; but the accused must bring others until he had the necessary preponderance. This sometimes drew together an immense assembly ; and Forsyth mentions the case of one Ulnothus, in which upwards of a thousand attended "*ut per juramentum illorum sibi vindicavit laudam terram.*" I have used the term "legal value," which, by way of explanation, necessitates a few words on the wergild (literally man-value or worth). This was the value (for under the Saxons literally every man had his price †), according to his rank and property, placed upon a man's life, and which in case of violent death, the one accused of causing it, and unable to clear himself, as before described, had to pay or suffer punishment. And this monetary value represented his status, and the value of his word in court. Thus a thane was valued at six times a ceorl, so that in getting the proper amount of exculpatory evidence, a man's wergild had to be borne in mind.

The Saxon juries (we use the term not controversially, but for narrative clearness) were then merely witnesses to the character of the accused. And such continued their functions for some time under the Normans. At this distance of time, the system of compurgation may seem peculiarly liable to abuse, very unlikely to promote justice, but rather to act as a premium on perjury. Still we must bear in mind the state of society on which it was based, and see the germinal idea of it. By the law of Frankpledge, men, formed into gilds, became responsible for the acts of their fellow gildsmen. Consequently the conduct and character of each would be under the strictest and most constant scrutiny ; and when the twelve compurgators took oath that their fellow gildsman was worthy of credence, they spoke from their own experience.

The Normans, children of the camp, naturally gave their warlike tone to the laws and legal customs of the land they conquered, and we find trial by compurgation, almost dying out under the Norman kings, and giving place to another mode of decision—trial by battle. With this, as not concerning our present enquiry, it is not our purpose to deal, further than to remark that its almost universal ascendancy has favoured, if not given rise to the supposition that trial *per pares* was the offspring of Henry the Second's time. But this was not the case. However great comparative disuse it may have fallen into under the Normans, compurgation was never really extinct.

As might have been anticipated, it did at length get very much abused ; and perjury became so rampant that towards the close of the Norman period, the juratores changed from being witnesses to the characters of the disputants to witnesses of the truth of their

† There is something exceedingly mercenary in the tariff by which, according to the laws of the Saxons, every bodily injury could be expiated in hard cash. Every part of the body had its value ; the loss of a man's beard (for variety was abroad even thus early) was estimated at twenty shillings, of a front tooth at six, of a broken leg at twelve, and of a broken rib at three shillings.

statements. Such they undoubtedly were when the "*assise of novel disseisin*" of Henry II. was passed, making them such by Statute. This enactment gave to the appellant in a suit regarding land the alternative of combat or of putting himself on the assise,—that is, to refer the case to four knights, chosen by the sheriff from the neighbourhood where the property was situate; and they, in turn, selected twelve more who were most cognizant of the facts. These were the recognitors of the Plantaganet period, so called because they decided from previous knowledge or recognition. They had to appear in court, and testify on oath the rights of the parties. If some of those summoned were not able to do so, they were dismissed, and their places supplied by others who were. If any swore falsely, they were imprisoned, deprived of their personal property, and made incapable of ever acting as recognitors again. At first they confined themselves to their personal knowledge alone; and in one notable instance the positive evidence of a solemnly executed deed was rejected, and the recognitors gave a verdict on their own belief of how the matter was. This was a most unjust proceeding, but nevertheless illustrates their functions. The testimony thus borne was their *vere dictum*. Originally confined to questions affecting land, the assise was under the name of '*jurata*,' extended to other matters.

Passing on we come to that celebrated safeguard of personal liberty—the 39th section of Magna Charta, commencing, *nulle liber homo*. But this can by no stretch of language be held to have originated trial by jury. On the contrary, it plainly purports to confirm to the people an existing institution, which, from plain inference, had been outraged by the unscrupulous monarch.

Thus far we have had the verdict of the assise founded on the personal knowledge of the recognitors. This was made as effective as possible by selecting all who were known to be able to give evidence,—witnesses to deeds, &c.; still this exclusiveness was a great defect, as, for instance, when an important witness was a woman or villein; and we suppose this defect would not be long in making itself felt. At any rate we find them gradually breaking through it, first admitting deeds, then permitting the oral testimony of those who had witnessed them, and still later receiving important parole evidence without the witnesses being sworn on the assise. An obscurely worded statute of Henry III. is supposed to have made the first provision for the admission of witnesses apart from the recognitors. The words of this statute are, however, so equivocal (a not unusual feature in old statutes) that we are by no means certain that such is their force. But there can be no doubt that it was accomplished in the time of Edward III., for in a report in one of the year books of this reign, we find that one of the parties challenged a witness, but his objection was overruled on the ground that the verdict could not be received from the witnesses, but from the jurors of assise. In the reign of Henry IV. we find the system advanced another step—viz., the necessity

of all evidence being produced in court. For a plaintiff having handed to one of the jurors a deed which he had not tendered in court on evidence, on its influencing the jury in giving a verdict for him, the court reproved the plaintiff, and refused to let him sign judgment. From this date the transitions from one stage to another are almost imperceptible. In the reign of Henry II. (according to the description of Fortescue in his "*De Landibus*," written about 1450), the jury had acquired nearly all the main features of its present day representative character, and we may consider it as then, at least, undisputably established.

Since that time its duties have been gradually made more intellectual and responsible. Its privileges have been increased, and its restraints lessened and removed. This is mainly owing to the sturdy independence and patriotic self-sacrifice of men who had perception enough to know, and courage to stand by their rights. The most important later issue raised between the bench and the jury-box was that in *Bushel's case* (familiar to students of constitutional history), where it was held that a jury are not punishable for their verdict, even though they 'find' against the evidence, or against the direction of the judge.

We shall not follow the progress of the institution as the enlightenment of successive periods added their contributions towards its perfection, but content ourselves with having traced it from its primæval form to its sure and firm establishment. Nor should we add to the value of our task by attempting any elaborate argument to decide a point over which so many abler men have hesitated—the exact period at which any of these various forms of 'twelve men' is to be called the "first traces of trial by jury." But we may be allowed, in taking a brief review, to say that to us it clearly seems a thing of progressive change—a tree on which successive periods have engrafted, but the roots of which are firmly planted in the times of the Saxons. First we have the custom of allowing a person to decide his dispute by getting the oaths of twelve others as to his reliability; then we have these juratores appointed by the court instead of by the person accused, and swearing to their personal knowledge of the disputed matters; then we have the admission of evidence by others than the juratores and both parties heard; and finally we have our modern jury. It was step by step—climbing up the ladder as light shone in upon them, and the demands of altered society required and pointed to an improved mode of obtaining justice. Two important features are common to each stage:—(1) with men (whether compurgators, recognitors, or jury-men), and not with the officers of the executive, rested the decision of the guilt or innocence, or the claims of the parties; and (2) their agreement on a verdict was necessary and conclusive. To us, we again repeat, there seems no halting place between Alfred and Henry III., and we confidently declare our own sympathy with the view that the jury system is the true lineal descendant of the Saxon compurgation.

NAM DRR.

RICHARD COBDEN.*

BY S. F. WILLIAMS.

EMERSON says that great men are of two classes—"those who stand for facts, and those who stand for thoughts. One class has the perception of Difference, and is conversant with facts and surfaces, cities and persons, and the bringing certain things to pass: the men of talent and action. Another class has the perception of Identity, and are men of faith and philosophy, men of genius." Richard Cobden was the noblest political representative of both classes this century has produced. His persevering and disinterested labours reared up into a reality a commercial policy the value of which is found in the fact that it is now almost universally adopted, and the result of which will hereafter be seen in the harmony of nations. He also preached a doctrine which is considered as visionary as a dream of genius—the doctrine of the identity of the interests of all nations—the doctrine of the union of communities into one great family whose object shall be, not to promote the welfare of one state at the expense of another, but to secure and further the common good of all, and thus bring about the reign of "peace on earth, and good-will towards men." Such was Mr. Cobden's object—to be attained by free intercourse between man and man. He enforces his creed with the inexorable logic of faith, with the wise counsels of a statesman, and the devotion of a philosopher. It is a noble creed—this brotherhood of nations. It is not the wild vision of an enthusiast to suppose that mankind may be ashamed by what the Arabs call "the war of trade." It is not the mere picture of a poet to imagine that rivalries may be broken up, and peoples of different race bound together in a grand whole. It is no chimera to believe that jealousy, selfishness, and hatred may be so terminated, and love enthroned in the hearts of men. It is no mere sentiment to think that nations may travel in beautiful aureoles, each in its orbit, without coming into collision with its neighbouring light; and that, as

Every star that shines to-night
Hangs trembling on an elder brother,

so the kingdom of the earth may, through inter-connection and inter-dependence by mutual commerce, form one vast and beneficent association. That is a sublime possibility. Cobden spent and sacrificed his life in the promotion of means for the realisation of this possibility; and his success was great. Great, indeed, were his achievements in an economical point of view—far greater is the fruit they will ultimately bear in the concord of states.

* For a *Résumé* of the events of the Life of Cobden, see *British Controversialist*, 1865. Vol. II. p. 375.

Thus was Cobden eminently a cosmopolitan man, a citizen of the world. He loved England much, but he loved humanity more. He had those universal sympathies, and did those universal services that the world owns him as its benefactor. Empires were the material on which he worked. The human race was his object, and not men divided into isolated kingdoms. He loved his country, but he saw that what made it great could also make other countries prosperous and great. So he made mankind his business. His large humanity destroyed those bits of geographical distances which separate nations, and which have often been the only preachers of war between neighbouring peoples. Englishman he was—a simple, unaffected, brave, true-hearted Briton. He was essentially a man, and therefore none of the tribes of men, be their few feet of earth here or there, could be omitted from his love. We claim him for our countryman, but the mention of his name takes us out of an island, and leads us to France, to Italy, to Spain, to Belgium, to Switzerland, and to Austria, which, we rejoice to say, has now gone the way of all despotisms—

“Unwept, unhonor'd, and unsung.”

He imported his principles far and wide into Europe. He was emphatically catholic in his aims, and in the extent of their accomplishment. He cultured nations in the policy of free-trade. He laid the foundation-stone of, and established, a school which has extended abroad, which is still enlarging its bounds, and which will continue to increase until the last vestige of the first remnant and rag of Protectionism shall be swept away. “Men,” say the Indian scriptures, “contemplate distinctions, because they are stupefied with ignorance.” Cobden, believing that physical distinctions are not necessary barriers to political unity, pushed them on one side, and showed how the concord of races may become a fact. He, in short, apprehended that the interests of all men everywhere are alike, that that which benefits England may be successfully applied, and be productive of the same rich harvest, in France or anywhere else. What a nobly broad view—this of the general well-being of mankind! What an exalted aspiration! What a loftily patriotic object! What a cosmopolitan principle—a principle before which national rivalries and national castes disappear, which recognises the relationships of all the millions that inhabit the earth, and which will bring them together in one glorious commonwealth!

Towards this result—so signal, so vast, so comprehensive—the consummation so devoutly to be wished—Cobden contributed more than any other man of his time; and, in fact, the object was one peculiarly his own, raised into prominence, raised into adoption in England, and into almost universal acceptance by his advocacy. There was a time when to counsel what is called “ignoble peace” was considered a sign of weakness, and condemned as unworthy of a great people; when to abstain from interfering in war, and

let everybody fight out their quarrels and settle their business themselves, was to show an indifferent, a callous, and a cowardly spirit. But now we hear a new doctrine. Now a new and nobler policy marks our relation to foreign countries—the policy of non-intervention in national disputes—the policy of neutrality with regard to physical force, and of the more effective weapon of moral support with regard to the justice or injustice of the cause in question in foreign wars. To Cobden we owe the recognition of this principle by English statesmen as the safest, wisest, and best course to pursue in international difficulties.

The first grand step Cobden made towards the association of nations was the destruction of the infamous and iniquitous English Corn Laws. That victory was the herald of the entire liberation of commerce; and Cobden knew that the liberation of commerce would be the opening up of a way for the triumph over national prejudices, for the commingling of races, for the fusing of the interests of various peoples, for the citizens of the globe to become familiar with each other, and thus for the establishment of the universal alliance, which was the noblest dream of Cobden's life, and which, with England and France for its promoters, is every day drawing nearer to accomplishment.

It is almost impossible at the present time to realise the fearful effects produced by the Corn Laws. They form a ghastly chapter in the domestic history of the country. A ghastly chapter; for it is a chapter wherein are recorded the weeping and wailing of men and women for the staff of life—of the slow death of children

“By bitter want blasted”—

of heart-wringing destitution of the body, and of unutterable destruction of soul in thousands of homes in the midst of a land of plenty. A chapter written by Famine with his gaunt hand; a dark picture sketched by the long fingers of hunger, and lighted up by the spectral glare of death; a picture of a whole people oppressed by the weight of toil and sorrow, walking in the dark shadow of their misery, engrossed with agony for bread, with their pallid faces shrivelled before their time—a people worn with the anguish of starvation, homeless, houseless, bitten through and through, skeletoned in body, and torn in mind by the gnawing monster, Want, whose teeth are sharper, and whose fangs are keener, deeper, and slower at their grim business than those of Death—a people mourning aloud for long years to God, “How long, O Lord, how long?” and for long years, out of their agony and despair, crying to wealth, to the aristocracy, to the ruling class, “Behold! I am sinking, bare of help: ye must help me! I am your brother, I am your sister, bone of your bone: God made us: ye must help me!” and receiving for answer again and again, through weary years of famishing and dying, “No! impossible! thou art no brother, no sister of ours!” Think of the tragedy carried on for half a generation, with millions of hunger-stricken

men on the stage, some of them stripped and naked and bare of all earthly comforts, some perishing from misery, and some maddened into the enactment of crimes by the despotism of the aristocracy. Think of years on years' accumulation of suffering. Think of thousands of ruined families being heaped up as ruined families, every day growing larger, growing ravenous, growing dehumanized, for nearly a quarter of a century, and no bread that they could buy, while the wealthy increased their gold, while the fields were rich with yellow harvest, while the lords and nobles, who built up their pomp and lived sumptuously every day on that which wrought the pauperism of the people, were reaping affluence out of the toils, and ease and luxury out of the sweat, of the poor who

“Died! while men hoarded
The free gifts of God:
They died! 'tis recorded,
In letters of blood;
Yet the corn on the hills
Waves its showery gold crown;
Still nature's lap fills
With the good heaven drops down.”

Yes, a vision, fearful as that of Coleridge, wherein the Ancient Mariner is described as being in this condition—

“Water, water everywhere,
And not a drop to drink,”

was more than realised when, though the fields were heavy with grain, and the garner of the rich were stored, vice and misery, as Carlyle says, “prowling and moaning like night birds, walked abroad, and wretchedness cowered into truckle-beds, or shivered hunger-stricken into its lair of straw;” when, though bread abounded, and there were cattle on a thousand hills, the people could obtain none,

“Because their food was dearer than their toil.”

And why was it so? It was because the aristocracy had got hold of this dangerous doctrine—a doctrine of tyrants—a doctrine full of inflammable material, and likely to lead, as it did lead, to an opposition of conflagration—the doctrine that the land is their exclusive property, that they are its gods, and therefore that they have the power to raise rents, and the might to sell when and at what price they list; “the right to all length and famine length—if they be pitiless, infernal gods! Celestial gods, I think, would stop short of the famine price; but no infernal nor any kind of god can be bidden stop!” And so they went on bolstering up the incomes of the richest class, enriching the exchequer of the landlords, and adding pain on pain to the labourer and the artisan. The work of selfishness proceeded but it did not prosper, for the

mass of Englishmen groaned in rage and destitution under the second curse—

“Deeper and deeper the tyrant’s lash flayeth;
Swifter and swifter fierce misery slayeth;
Tighter and tighter the grip of toil groweth;
Nearer and nearer the dark ruin floweth.”

This was the monopoly that Cobden set himself utterly to destroy. This was the evil Cobden consecrated his energies to extinguish. This was the despotism he hated with the strength of a patriot, and this the insufferable wretchedness that moved him to the sympathy of a man, and the monstrous bread-tax was doomed. Its condemnation had already been sounded in words that stung their hearers into life by a poet whose soul burned at the oppression of his kind—Ebenezer Elliott. From his smithy at Sheffield, he had beheld the unjust thing, and determined to put an end to it. He did battle against it unceasingly, blowing fierce blasts from his forge, sending down showers of fiery sarcasms, loud-toned anathemas, and inspiring battle cries. Rough, perhaps, and fierce were his words, red-hot with indignation and scorn, but the spirit was true and valiant; the hater of monopoly, the detester of selfishness, the intense, passionate lover of humanity. But it was reserved to Cobden to be the leading genius, the director and victor in the movement and the contest which Elliott began. The story of that bloodless war is a most interesting one.

The first blow that fell after the Sheffield hammer had ceased its sound for several years came from an arm equally as powerful, if not as swarthy, as that of Elliott—the arm of Richard Cobden, and it fell in the year 1838. Cobden was then thirty-four years old. He was born in June, 1804, at Dunford, near Midhurst, in Surrey, and his father was a small farmer. He started life as a warehouse-boy in London, then became a commercial traveller, and soon after set up for himself in the calico printing business, in Manchester. The keen and active politician could not long be hidden, and the very pursuits of his business led him to the study of those economic principles with which his commerce was associated. That, too, was a time of the intensest political excitement. The great reform struggle was fermenting the nation. Cobden could not pass through that without being impressed. He worked quietly on, however, and “wrought linked armour for his soul.” After a tour abroad in 1834, and in America in 1835, he addressed some letters to the public through the *Manchester Examiner*, on social, economic, and political topics. These attracted general attention; and afterwards great interest was excited by the publication of two incisively written pamphlets, *England, Ireland and America*, and *Russia*. About this time Cobden enrolled himself among the free-traders, and henceforth, inspired by him, controlled by him, and conducted at last to a great victory by him, the movement for the liberation of the kingdom from the suicidal policy of

the Government was carried on. Long and earnest was the contest. On the one side a people in despair, a trade all but paralysed, commerce on the verge of utter ruin, universal bankruptcy staring England in the face; on the other, a class of autocrats pillowing up the gigantic wrong by which these insolvencies were brought about. The spirit of revolution was abroad—the mad, incendiary spirit, full of the bitterest discontent, and using for its weapons pistols and pikes, brickbats, and conflagrations. Revolt was hatching its dark deeds, and rebellion sat brooding over its monstrous progeny. Efforts were made to avert the gathering storm. In 1836, an Anti-Corn Law Association was formed in London, but it did nothing from want of organization. The injustice went on generating its natural effects—mad passions, misery, ruin, wretchedness, “dark and baneful, like a Dantean hell.” The year 1837 was—crowned with goodness?—No! but with depression, distress, and rottenness of trade. England was crowded with what Carlyle calls “poor patients, all sick and sore from centre to surface—dingy, dumb millions, grimed with dust and sweat, with darkness, rage, and sorrow, struggling as they could to say ‘our lot is unfair, we cannot live under injustice, go ye and get us justice!’” Chartism—the name for discontent run into fiery wildness—broke out, and the Corn Laws kept all the air hot and glowing. In 1838, the Manchester Anti-Corn Law Association—the precursor of the famous League—was established, and the crusaders at once opened fire in lectures delivered by Mr. Paulton. Cobden was the life and soul of the association, which upon his resolution committed itself to agitate for the absolute repeal of the Corn Laws. Other associations sprung up, and the first great meeting was held in 1839, and having been adjourned to London, a monster petition, bearing 40,000 signatures, was got up. It was presented to the House of Commons by Mr. Villiers, who moved that the parties be heard at the bar of the House, and, of course, failed. The Alliance thereupon resolved itself into a League, of which Cobden was the general, and the campaign grew warmer, bolder, and more extended. Every kind of missile was thrown towards the enemy, who entrenched himself behind “privileges.” Pamphlets were circulated, full of the logic of facts, and of words that burned with the heat of passionate appeals. Lectures were delivered to popularize the doctrines. Tracts were scattered broadcast over the land. Banquets were held, from which speeches of eloquence and power went forth as not the least effective assaults on the blind, infatuated foe. At one of these Mr. Bright spoke, and Cobden at once enlisted him, girt with strong armour, into the service; and from that time they marched together in company. Prominent in the same cause, and some of them foremost in the thick of the conflict, were Charles Villiers, a tried and sincere man, but not very courageous; Milner Gibson, just then converted to Liberal opinions; Earl Grey, son of a noble sire; George Thompson, full of ardour and fiery courage, eloquent of speech; General

Perronet Thompson, who, having served his country as a soldier, came home to advocate free trade and reform with Jeremy Bentham and Sir John Bowring in the *Westminster Review*, in pamphlets, newspapers, and speeches; Sharman Crawford; Arthur Roebuck, then an extreme liberal, and then, as now, an erratically independent and eccentric critic; John Benjamin Smith; Archibald Prentice; the Earl of Carlisle; William Ewart; Leman Blanchard; Thomas Duncombe; Joseph Hume, the untiring advocate and the uncompromising toiler for reform in every department of the State; William Howitt, and a handful of other brave men who had courageously said to a stupendous wrong, Thou shalt die! Ladies joined the contest, true to the womanly nature which instinctively goes on the side of suffering. They organized tea parties, and helped on the noble cause with their beneficent influence. A deputation waited in 1840 on the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Trade, and as they detailed the distresses of the people, strong men wept. Convulsive sobs choked the utterance of Mr. Brooks; Mr. John Benjamin Smith was painfully overcome; and down the cheeks of the good Joseph Sturge, whose heart was like a child's in tenderness, tears rolled thick and fast, and in the whole deputation there was not an unweeping eye. Strange sight *that* in Downing Street, but useless and unheeded! The League dissociated itself from political parties, and at every election it put up, and mostly got returned, a League man, indifferent whether he were a Whig or Tory. And so the battle went on. Meeting upon meeting in swift succession. From platform, printing-office, banquet-rooms, hustings, and everywhere and anywhere whence the seige could be conducted, flew the destructive grape. Stormed at with shot and shell were the upholders of the iniquity. A conference of ministers of all denominations was held in Manchester to assist the cause. Cobden got into Parliament for Stockport in 1841, and with him other free-traders. As soon as he entered there he denounced the Bread Tax with unanswerable figures, and then the attacks were multiplied out of doors. Speech after speech, with a resistless pursuance of the same subject he made. Peel proposed a fluctuating duty in 1842, but the League held a session close to Palace Yard, and one day there was seen this sad and ominous picture, coloured with portentous signs, with a pale and haggard Prime Minister in the centre—Six hundred men shouting to Sir Robert, "Give us bread and labour!" In doors and out the agitation was continued, spreading itself to the agricultural districts, arousing the farmers, and showing what desolation the Corn Law wrought among them and their labourers. Landowners were won over, and the day of decisive victory—of the death of a monopoly—of the extermination of an injustice, was rapidly drawing nigh. The London theatres were hired, and on their broad boards there were, not "poor players strutting their fretful hours on the stage," but earnest men fighting this great war. Then, in 1845, came that magnificent spectacle, the colossal bazaar,

where the great idea of repeal was brought home to hundreds of thousands. At length in 1846, compelled by the necessity of a fiercer famine than ever from the bad harvest of 1845, Sir Robert Peel, amidst the gratitude of the nation, pronounced the doom of the Corn Laws. The last refuge of lies was abandoned. The right had triumphed. Justice, long delayed, had arrived at last. The system of protection received a blow which shattered it to its foundation. A new day dawned. A new era was inaugurated. For the people there was bread enough, and to spare, and as many as could did eat and were filled.

This achievement was pre-eminently Cobden's. It was he who marshalled the forces. It was he who planned and organized the seige. It was he who led the aggression. It was he who unweariedly conducted the charges against the direst and serried opposition of the Tories, the indifference of the middle classes, and the violent hostility of the Chartists. It was he who bore up firmly midst the snow and ice of disappointment. It was he who cheered the League in its moments of apprehension. It was he who inspired it with life and health at its apparently hopeless period. It was he who "baited not a jot of heart or hope, but still bore up and steered right onward." It was he who, undaunted by obloquy, unmoved by slander, uninfluenced by misrepresentation, undisturbed by the tumult of sneers and calumnies that raged around him, fearless of the force that beat tempestuously against him, carried on untorn the banner of justice and the flag of free-trade into the heart of the enemy's ranks, and then gave it waving over a defeated foe to one of his old antagonists to plant firmly on the summit of victory.

And how and in what may the victory be seen? It may be seen in almost every country abroad. The triumph was a universal one. Silently but powerfully, as the seed dropped in the earth, it went on working its way upward to issue above ground in a rich harvest. The example of England was the inspiration of France; and it fell to the lot of him who had done one splendid service at home—but the effect of which could not be confined to home—who had saved and regenerated his country, to develop his principles in foreign countries. The French Treaty was the natural result of the abolition of the corn laws. Though some years after that event, it is mentioned here because it was the amplification and unfolding of the same principle. The occasion of it was a speech delivered by Mr. Bright, in 1859, on the foolishness and injuriousness of prohibition tariffs. This speech was read by Michael Chevalier, who wrote to Cobden urging the adoption of the idea. It gained the warm approval of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Palmerston; and Cobden at once undertook the negotiation of the treaty, the main feature of which was the reduction of duties on the necessary commodities of life which the two countries exchanged. The proposals were bitterly assailed by the Protectionist party—the stupidest of all stupid parties. The animosity of the Tories was displayed as

much then as it had been fourteen years before ; but the fight, though hard, was not long. In a few months it was over ; and in almost the brief time of an accident a benefit was conferred on the whole world. The same fruits are growing up and ripening in Europe every year.

And to what end ? To the end that, as I said at the commencement and wish to illustrate in this paper, to the end that men, divided into states, may look upon and act towards each other as members of one family. Protection hindered this. It promoted jealousy and generated disputes. It was the parent of wars, for it kept up a separation, or rather a collision of interests. It fostered and fed upon the division of mankind into parts, each of which was resolved to further its own welfare and enrich itself at the expense of another. It fanned hostility, and encouraged disastrous competition. It kept nations apart from each other as foes. But the Commercial Treaty was an instrument for uprooting all that Protection involved, and Cobden employed it as such. He knew that it was something more than a gain of trade, and that its best value was not represented in increased commerce and in pounds, shillings, and pence, but in that which enlarged commerce brought with it—friendship. The removal of restrictions has a moral meaning, and results in a moral gain. “Free trade,” said the wisest and highest-minded of living statesmen, Mr. Gladstone—“free trade is not only a law of wealth and prosperity, but a law of friendship, a law of kindness among all nations.” Cobden knew this, and knew it deeply—that free commercial intercourse is the concord of heart and heart, and not merely of pocket and pocket. It is the web which binds together people and people. It tends to the agreement of interests, and the union of affection amongst the societies of the earth. It develops love as well as circulates money. It shows how mutually dependent we are that the productions of varied climates and soils have to be exchanged by their possessors ; and this fact is the link which joins state to state in a connection deeper and stronger than that of reciprocal traffic. Truly says Emerson, “every material thing has its celestial side ; has its translation into the spiritual and necessary sphere, where it plays a part as indestructible as any other. And to these ends all things continually ascend.” The celestial side and the end of commerce are of a moral kind. Its priceless benefit is not profitable traffic, but the interchange of sentiments through an utilitarian channel, leading to this sublime, and in no wise sentimental, result—the brotherhood of peoples. It was this view of commerce which was ever paramount in Cobden’s mind, and to which his work was ever devoted. It was this aim for which he fought the corn laws, and carried to completion the Anglo-French treaty. Far more deeply than most men did he perceive the bearing of trade on humanity. No statesman ever so thoroughly consecrated himself to the demonstration and realization of this truth. He pursued it with fervour and singleness of heart, and with success such as

falls to the lot and gladdens the heart of very few patriotic workers. Thus he placed the relation of England to France and to Europe upon a different and a surer footing. Hitherto we had cherished the unhappy notion that France was our "natural enemy." We had distrusted her; picked quarrels with her on every opportunity; kept up the wasteful and menacing institution of a standing army to frighten her from warlike intentions; threatened her with fearful destruction; concentrated all our military skill and valour to thwart her supposed purposes, and check her surmised designs. From the times of the Plantagenets to our own we have been falling out with and fighting the Gauls. Cobden changed that relation for a noble one, based upon mutual trust. He recreated the spirit of the two peoples; proved the harmony of their interests; wedded them in bonds which we hope will never be broken by the folly of politicians; and in ties which we trust will not only never be severed by the haughty nationalism of rulers, but which will every day grow more inseparably and indissolubly knitted together. In the year 1815, with 76,000 soldiers under him, Wellington, at a little village near Brussels, called Waterloo, conquered the modern Cæsar, and robbed France of its military glory; but he brought in the train of his conquest national boasting on the one hand, national jealousy, envy, and the passion revenge on the other. Forty-four years later Richard Cobden, with the moral support of a few statesmen at home, in a little room in Paris as the centre of his operations, achieved a conquest which was a death-blow to that boasting and that jealousy, which brought to an end the dangerous discord caused by that battle, healed the old wound, deep-seated though it was, and inspired the two nations, hitherto estranged as the consequence of war, with the determination to advance, and not to oppose, each other's interests. Which is the nobler sight in history? Those years of butchery and bayoneting with their fearful fruit, or those years of friendship with their rich and mellow golden fruit, sprung from seed cast by him, "the valiant man and free," who "with a larger heart and kindlier hand"

"Rang out some forms of party strife,
Rang in a nobler mode of life."

The same broad principle lay at the bottom of those other views of Cobden which are indicated by the terms, "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform." Cobden was emphatically a statesman of a few fixed ideas, all of which had their source in and contributed to this absorbing thing—internationalism. Let us see now how his views are governed by this principle.

After the abolition of the Corn Laws, Cobden laboured incessantly in the cause of "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform." He was opposed to war policies, to "bloated armaments," to the exclusion of the great body of the working classes from the privi-

leges of the constitution and the rights of citizenship. He believed that the settlement of international disputes should be made by arbitration; that the national expenditure should be reduced to an extent which would lessen our taxation by ten millions; and that the artizans should have a direct share in legislation, and their legitimate weight in the deliberations of the national assembly, on every possible opportunity he advocated these opinions. With reference to peace, he ridiculed the celebrated mania of a French invasion as a party cry. He worked with the Peace Society, and attended the well-known congresses at Paris, Frankfort, London, Manchester, and Edinburgh, at all of which he spoke. He was absent from one only—that at Brussels, to which he sent a letter. On all these occasions he urged his arbitration plan. On the breaking out of the Crimean War, the policy encouraging which he had opposed, Cobden ranged himself with Mr. Bright on the side of peace at the risk of losing his popularity, a thing which he lightly estimated. The country was undoubtedly with the Government; but Cobden did not hesitate to use all his force and eloquence in the House, in 1853 and 1854, against our interfering between Russia and the Turks. The country favoured what it was pleased to call a “plucky” policy; but Cobden pointed out the folly and the crime and the sin of such murderous pluckiness. All honour to his courage! and equal honour to Mr. Bright, who pursued the same manly and generous course in defiance of the sentiments of the times! Though they failed then, their efforts were not entirely in vain, for when peace came in 1856, the treaty contained a clause in favour of arbitration, which Lord Clarendon called “a happy innovation,” which Mr. Gladstone said was “a powerful engine on behalf of civilisation and humanity, because it asserted the supremacy of reason, of justice, and of religion;” and which even Lord Malmesbury termed “a security of the peace of Europe.” Cobden’s principles in this respect have had their influence, as seen in the attitude of England towards the Dano-German war. In the Chinese war of 1857, Mr. Cobden again condemned the conduct of the Government; and thus ever did he prove himself an opponent of war. Against it, in fact, against all armed intervention in foreign affairs, whether such interposition be based upon pique, upon a mistaken notion of honour, or upon the fancy that we are the protectors of nations, Mr. Cobden waged warfare. Hence his doctrine of arbitration, and his assaults on our army and navy expenditure. He also supported measures of parliamentary reform. He knew that the larger the interests represented in Parliament, in other words, the more real political liberty is extended, the greater the guarantees of peace, for exclusivism is always the parent of jealousy. He knew that the political association of nations is dependent upon the degree of political liberty possessed by them. Hence a monopoly of representation, in other words, the government for and by one section of the community to the exclusion of all other sections, found in him an

earnest antagonist. He supported Mr. Hume's motion, in 1848, for electoral reform, secret voting, and short parliaments; but wisely opposed the Chartist faction led by the insensate Feargus O'Connor. He declared himself favourable to the ballot, particularly in counties, where the "screw" has its greatest force. And he ranged himself on the side of all these movements because he was a patriot of the highest type, because he saw that the adoption of them would be stepping-stones to his cherished aim, because they would ultimately lead by slow degrees and more and more towards this summit of all time—the benefit of man universally. Commercial freedom, a congress of nations, and perfect political liberty—the three things with which Cobden's name is for ever identified—were with him the agencies and instruments of universal prosperity and universal happiness.

He died in the enjoyment of having brought into operation one of the means—commercial freedom. Instantly the world mourned its loss. In proof of his influence, in demonstration of the confidence he had obtained in Europe and over the globe, the warmest tribute to his memory, and the fullest recognition of his services were paid by France, Germany, Prussia, and America; by individuals such as Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Disraeli, and Bishop Wilberforce at home; and by Napoleon, Hippolyte Passy, Chevalier, Joseph Garnier, and others of like fame abroad. But his honour and glory are not in the memorial speeches of his survivors, but in his deeds; in the triumph of Free Trade; in his having taught to Europe and America the true principles of political economy; in the general acceptance of the doctrine of non-intervention; and still more in the highly exalted aims of modern governments; in removing international hatreds; in ennobling politics; in inculcating among kings and rulers and political societies the spirit of Christianity; in inspiring our political life with honesty and sincerity; in purifying and enlarging our ambition; and in strengthening, on a basis broad and sound as the truths of the Bible, the reign of Justice and Truth amongst men. The Bible? Yes, for that was always Cobden's guide. That was always his supreme counsellor. That ever fed his philanthropic spirit. He was modest, disinterested, simple, and kind of heart; single-minded; an intense lover of truth; indifferent to fame; untempted by rewards; unseduced by offers of distinctions and titles; incorruptibly faithful to his principles; and a high-souled moral teacher. More, and above all, he was a religious man, and all his works, truly says the Bishop of Oxford, were practical illustrations of Christianity. The Bible warmed and brightened into an intenser glow the love he brought to mend the world. It was that which inspired him to labour for the advent of the time when in society and in legislation the truth shall be recognised that "God hath made of one blood all nations of men." It was that which deepened within him the love of freedom, because he knew and felt that it is the great protector and guardian of the

liberties of men. It was the genius of that which awakened within him, and strengthened him for his great enterprise. It was the spirit of that which supported him on his errand of peace. It was the soul of that which quickened his pace in the march of liberty. He did not use it as some working men who spoke at the late conferences appeared to think it should be used—as an instrument for political purposes, for manhood suffrage, trades unions, and the enthronement of democracy; he elevated politics by infusing into them the spirit of the Bible. He did not bring the Bible down to the level of politics, but by his works and by his life he said—“Add to your politics this pure and divine element, and then the legislation of the country will be governed by that righteousness which exalteth a nation. Then freedom will be complete. Then will arise the dawn of universal good-will. Then the best blessings of the truest civil liberty will be enjoyed. Our divisions will be annihilated, hate will be quenched; the spirit of party will be destroyed, and Cobden’s object will be realized in the joining of all peoples and nations and tongues into one great brotherhood. “France,” said the illustrious Perrier—the celebrated French prime minister—when on his death bed, “France must have religion.” Yes, commerce will do something; benevolent institutions will do something; co-operation will do something; the extension of the suffrage and the education of the masses will do something; but the people must have religion if their civilization and reform are to be accounted worth anything. Therefore, we say, if their suffrages are to be wisely used—if they wish to exert a healthy influence on the senate—if they desire every department of society to be hallowed and ennobled—if, in a word, they want their liberties to be liberties, and to be so perpetually, they must not decry religion, but they must be quick to learn from the Bible in the way of well-doing to “be strong and of good courage, dread not nor be dismayed.” Then shall they and all their brethren be enlightened and happy, peaceful and free—then—but only then!

The Topic.

DOES J. S. MILL MERIT EQUAL CONSIDERATION AS A PHILOSOPHER AND A POLITICIAN?

AFFIRMATIVE.

JOHN S. MILL has set an example of honesty and uprightness as a politician, which ought to gain him the just consideration of every pure and upright mind.—M. A. N.

When I saw this subject announced I did not think it was possible for the revered philosopher

who stands first and foremost among economists and logicians, to have been made a martyr for principle’s sake. Had he been a time-server and a trimmer, had he been a dissembler and a man who would consent to play fast and loose, he might have been at the top of the poll for Westminster. But because he set principle and honest conviction

above all earthly considerations, he has been despised. This does not show his unfitness to be a politician, but the unfitness of the country for straightforward men. It is really lamentable to think that honesty should be regarded as a ground for opposing a notable thinker in his political career. The noble stand Mr. Mill has made for representative freedom and political honesty entitles him to even greater respect than his philosophical abilities.—JOHN W.

Every member of the House of Commons and every newspaper in Britain has been compelled to acknowledge the merit of J. S. Mill as a politician, as a gentleman who has absolutely elevated the tone of political life. He who does so is a benefactor to his country, far more by his life than he can be by his writings. Example is better than precept.—T. C.

NEGATIVE.

No. "'Tis true, 'tis pity; pity 'tis, 'tis true." Mr. Mill is too much of a theorist to make a good politician. Nothing that he has discussed has yet been of any practical importance—Female Suffrage, The Coal Question, Governor Eyre. These are not practical questions for the Government of to-day; yet J. S. Mill seems to think their discussion involves a nation's happiness. He wrote a pamphlet on Ireland, which turned out to be utterly useless as a practical scheme. The crowning folly of his career is his recommending candidates for Parliament. Were it not for the silliness of the action one might look upon it as a flagrant piece of impertinence; but J. S. Mill is simply an instance of the absurdity of sending men to Parliament de-

void of the practical character so necessary there. Surely it is time that the old delusion were exploded of imagining the sage of the study and the sage of the senate to be compatible.—S. W. YOUNG.

John Stuart Mill, though one of the noblest thinkers our country possesses, is yet unqualified for the rough work of a practical politician. He is too directly governed by thoughtfulness and too little touched by the sentiment of social life. He looks at things in the light of pure intellect, and not in the light of fitness for practical utility. He has verified the adage which affirms that one true pre-eminence only is attainable by an individual. He has the highest claims on regard as a philosopher in logic and in political economy, but he has not the pliability required in a legislator.—B. D.

Mr. Mill has allowed his impartiality in the championship of free opinion to carry him too far. He has not retained the reserve which a politician ought to have used. He patronized Bradlaugh to the dividing of the Liberal party at Northampton; he helped Odger in Chelsea, though that threatened to damage the cause of the progress of man; he endeavoured to press Mr. Chadwick upon a Scottish constituency, and to get them to ignore the past services of a Liberal member. He did this, it is granted, out of an excess of chivalrous generosity; but it had the effect of alienating from the party many who favoured Liberal and enlightened Reform. A politician must act otherwise. He must do the best that lies before him at the time, and must not insist on the absolutely best being done—or nothing or worse.—N. E. G.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

801. Who invented the word *folk-lore*? Querist.

802. Has the character of Hetty in "Adam Bede" any foundation in fact, or is it all imaginary?—B.A.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

778. I can add little to the solution of M. B.'s difficulty. Its conductor, R. N. Clarendon, was the author of a clear and elaborate view of the Finances of Ireland, published in 1791. It is probable that he was a private secretary in some department of the government, and that his Parliamentary Chronicle was got up in favour of the party which he served.—R. M. A.

783. I do not know any good reason for what appears to me to be the *guess* referred to. There were many persons of the name of Field in Stratford, as in everywhere else, in Shakspeare's day, and probably enough one of that name had gone to London, and become a printer. We think it highly probable that this Richard Field was connected with Nathaniel Field, who had been one of "The children of the chapel, was a member of Shakspeare's company, and coadjutor of Massinger in the production of "The Fatal Dowry," as well as the author independently of "A Woman's a Weathercock," "Amends for Ladies." If he came from Warwickshire that might ac-

count in part for Shakspeare's putting his printing in the way of the brother of a fellow-player as well as a fellow-townsmen. This, however, is heaping surmise on surmise. There is much "virtue in an if," but there is a good deal more in circumspection, and in writing upon Shakspeare, it ought to be a sacred duty to distinguish carefully fact from inference, inference from guess, and even guess from surmise. Suppositions ought never to be stated in the authoritative style of facts, and, of course, there ought neither to be forgeries nor fabrications on any topic.—S. N.

788. Having lately had the rare enjoyment of spending a week in the company of Thomas Cooper, the Chartist, I can not only testify to the falsity of all reports which have been in circulation respecting his death, but also to the continued vigour of his physical and intellectual powers. Until I had the pleasure of hastily perusing the author's own sole remaining copy, I had not been able to meet with the "Purgatory of Suicides." It is out of print and impressions have become very scarce. Should any reader possess a copy which he is willing to part with, or know of any person who may have one, I shall be greatly obliged by the information being sent to me through the editor. It has been frequently stated that the work is being withdrawn from circulation by its

author, in consequence of his change of views respecting Christianity. This is most positively not the case. The work is not anti-christian—it is not in any sense theological or polemical—though it contains occasional indications of scepticism or unbelief. Even these, however, are subdued by a hearty recognition of the transcendent moral glory of Jesus Christ. The plan of the work may be briefly outlined thus:—A partial autobiographical introduction shows us the writer in Stafford gaol (where, in a damp, unhealthy cell, the poem, a Hebrew grammar, and other works were composed) and forcibly recounts the cause for which he suffered his imprisonment. A dream leads him into purgatory, whose halls and inhabitants are described with an almost Miltonic force and grandeur. A special portion of this region is appropriated to suicide kings, law-givers, and philosophers. These hold high and often passionate and characteristic converse upon the great themes of government and man's welfare. The poem is of course intensely democratic, and the final ending of its movement is in the triumph of universal liberty and the arrival of the happy time when, through the realization of the principles of freedom, peace and goodwill reign for ever. The author's life is one of the noblest specimens of "toiling upwards" which the world has ever seen, or the human race ever presented for our admiration, imitation, and encouragement; nor have the deprivations and sufferings through which his early progress was achieved, damped in the least the ardour of his spirit, or the intense earnestness of his zeal for knowledge and for truth. Though he has now travelled far towards old age, on recounting to me some of the experiences of his youth, he could only use the words,—“I would go through all again rather

than live without knowledge.”—W.

791. William Paley, D.D., I take to be a sound moralist, a good philosopher, and one who has done his share towards defending the Christian faith. In his work on Moral and Political Philosophy, there are many things from which I am compelled to dissent. Although any who have read his wonderful work must say he holds very liberal views for a sub-dean and rector, His “Evidences of the Christian Religion” will last for many years, they are read in most of our colleges, and if Alfred has not yet read them; I would recommend him to do so. His works, the best edition, 1819, are in 5 Vols.: 1. Moral Philosophy; 2. Natural Philosophy; 3. Sermons; 4. Evidences of the Christian Religion; 5. A work on some of the Epistles. The five large 8vo. volumes can be had in London for less than 15s., old calf.—A. S.

797. I am not aware of any work except the Bible, published with marginal references, but “Joseph” may procure a concordance to Milton and Shakspeare, which is no doubt what he wants. J. H. Friswell is the author of the first, and the publishers, Low, Son, and Co., London; Mrs. Cowden Clarke is the authoress of the second, and Longmans (I think) the publishers—S. W. YOUNG.

798. “Adventure” may obtain information as to the Indian Civil Service, by applying to the Secretary, India Board, Westminster. The necessary testimonials are a certificate, proving the age of the candidate, which must be above eighteen, and under twenty-three. Another from a medical man, testifying that he has no disease or constitutional affection that would unfit him for the service. Another from the head of the school or college where last he received his education,

testifying to his being of good moral character. In the *British Controversialist*, vol. I., new series, Telemaque gives a very full account of the subjects for examination, &c., to which we refer "Adventure." "The Guide to the Civil Service Examination," published by Cassell, Petter, and Galpin, price 1s., might also be of use to him.—**ARIEL.**

801. Wm. J. Thoma, the editor

of "Notes and Queries," first employed it in the *Athenæum*.

802. I am not well acquainted with "Newgate Calendar" literature, but I remember, when taking a tour through George Eliot's "England," hearing Anne Featherstonhaugh named as the original of *Hetty*. Who Anne is or was, deponent knoweth not.—**S. N.**

The Societies' Section.

AN incident at Cork is worthy of record. There exists in that city a "Catholic University Literary, Historical, and Æsthetical Society," with members exclusively Roman Catholics who meet under ecclesiastical superintendence. The subject last advertised for discussion was "That the character of William the Third is worthy of admiration." Two gentlemen were to take the affirmative, two others the negative side. It may be that the parts of all the actors were prepared; but that the character of William should be debated at all in a "Catholic" assembly in Ireland is a fact for congratulation.—*Athenæum*.

GLASGOW:—*Bridgeton Working Men's Club*.—The first of a series of lectures was delivered in this Institution, recently, by the Rev. Alex. Wallace, D.D., of East Campbell Street U.P. Church, (Author of "The Bible and the People," &c.). Mr. Dun, president of the club, in the chair.

The lecturer's subject was "Our Native Wood Notes Wild." At first glance, the subject would suggest thoughts of our feathered

songsters, and he would give scope to this sentiment, believing, as he did, in the language of birds as well as of flowers; but the matter on which he wished more particularly to enlarge was the poetry of Scotland. No nation in the world had produced such an array of great poets as old Scotland, *e.g.*, the names of Dunbar, King James, Drummond, Sir David Lindsay, Burns, Ramsay, Tannahill, Wilson, Gray, Alex. Smith, Robert Buchanan, Wingate, Macdonald, and a host of others—all of whom had contributed to the melody of our native land their "Wood notes wild." But the lecturer would confine himself for this evening to the living poetess of Scotland, old Janet Hamilton,—a short, graphic sketch of whose life, and an account of the many difficulties and trials she had to overcome, the invention of her own system of writing, so that she might be able to pen the burning thoughts of her mind, the vast extent of her reading and powers of memory, all forming qualifications rarely to be met with in one of her sphere of life—the lecturer gave. In conclusion, he read with much feeling a few of her productions.

In accordance with the expressed desire of the rev. lecturer, upwards of forty subscribers were entered with the directors for the volume of old Janet Hamilton's works, now on the eve of publication.

Birmingham Central Literary Association.—The Twelfth Annual Report of the Birmingham Central Literary Association has reached us, and from its interesting and satisfactory nature we are induced to present a very large portion of it to our readers, who should note its temperance of tone and hopefulness of spirit.

"In reviewing our position it must not be forgotten that there are considerable difficulties in the way of conducting any Society such as ours with success. Indeed it may be said that some of these difficulties increase with each succeeding year of the Association's existence. Thus the prevailing custom of residence in distant suburbs renders it an irksome task for very many to attend evening meetings in the centre of a large town. Again, it is obvious that during an existence of eleven years, those stock subjects which in turn do duty in all similar societies, have gradually been exhausted. It becomes, therefore, no easy matter to hit upon a list of subjects, each of which will ensure a numerous attendance. It will be seen that a large proportion of the subjects selected come under the head political. Our excuse for this, if excuse be needed, is that these are the most generally interesting; nor need we seek far to find the explanation of this fact, seeing that political questions must inevitably be those by which the public mind is most deeply stirred, and about which information is most widely diffused. Still your Committee would regret to find that class of

subjects disappear from our minutes, which require for their debate greater literary knowledge and research than the perusal of a newspaper supplies, and which, when chosen, often afford great intellectual enjoyment to small, but select meetings.

"Inclusive of the annual ones, twelve meetings in all have been held. At these, nine subjects have been debated; and in two instances the discussion has been adjourned to a second evening. The average attendance of members has been rather over twenty-four, being about the same as that of last Session.

"The subjects debated have been as follows:—

"Politics.—1. That a due regard for the honour and prestige of England justifies the Government in the preparations made for the relief of the Abyssinian prisoners. Affirmed. 2. That the conduct of Lord Derby's Government in reference to the question of Reform, was unworthy of a great party, and a grave departure from a proper standard of political principle and morality. Negatived. 3. That 'Liberals' are justified in supporting Mr. S. S. Lloyd as third Member of Parliament for Birmingham. Negatived. 4. That women who bear their fair share of direct taxation should not be excluded from the franchise. Affirmed. 5. That Lord Cairns' Amendment, with regard to three-cornered constituencies, will prove beneficial. Negatived. 6. That a fair distribution of the revenues of the Irish Church among the various religious bodies, would be preferable to their complete secularization. Negatived.

"Religion.—1. That the suggestions made at the Wolverhampton Church Congress as to the 'best means for bringing Nonconformists into the Church of England,' if

adopted, are not likely to effect their object. Affirmed. 2. That the use of M.S. sermons is on the whole advantageous. Negatived. 3. That the modern institutions called bazaars are unworthy means of raising money for religious objects. Affirmed.

"Two only of the above debates were held in public, but these were eminently successful. At each the attendance was very large and the speaking good, and your Committee think that here at least they have ground for unalloyed congratulation.

"Nineteen new members have been added to our ranks since the last annual meeting, and in the same period six resignations have been received. The number of the former is decidedly above the average; and, better still, some of them have given proof of their appreciation of the objects of the Association by a constant attendance at the meetings, and by taking part in the proceedings. Indeed, it is one of the most favourable features of the Session that several excellent maiden speeches have been delivered. These have indicated promise of very effective membership, an anticipation which your Committee earnestly hope will be amply fulfilled in the future.

"In addition to the ordinary meetings of the Association, the admirable precedent of former Sessions, of holding a *Conversazione*, was this year followed with marked success. In the number of members and friends who attended, and in all other elements of enjoyment, this gathering compares favourably with all preceding ones, while in a pecuniary respect it occupies a unique position, the Treasurer being able to hand over a respectable balance to the general fund.

"Your Committee feel it to be

superfluous to enlarge upon the advantages of societies such as our own. What, and how great, these advantages, intellectual and social, are, have often been pointed out in these reports, and are abundantly testified by the unflagging interest still taken in the concerns of the Association by some of its oldest members. Indeed, it may be added that most of those who are ever seen at our meetings are frequent attendants. Still your Committee cannot abstain from giving expression to the oft-repeated regret, that the advantages of the Association are confined within such a comparatively small area. They have again to deplore that so much machinery is employed with so little apparent use—that out of the total number of members the average attendance remains so small. Unfortunately past experience convinces them that whatever the attractions offered, it would be chimerical to expect a larger proportion of the present list members to take an active part in our real work. They are of opinion that if the advantages of the Association are to be more widely spread it must be by means of a fresh accession of working members. It has already been hinted that something in this way has been done during the past year, and there is little doubt that still more may be accomplished in the same direction. We have, however, no cause for despondency. While we maintain our position we have reasonable ground for encouragement. A profound living thinker has said 'we ought not to forget that there is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs towards the worse, consisting of all the follies, all the vices, all the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses of mankind, which is only controlled, and kept from sweeping all

before it, by the exertions which some persons constantly, and others by fits, put forth in the direction of good and worthy objects. It gives a very insufficient idea of the importance of the strivings which take place to improve and elevate human nature and life, to suppose that their chief value consists in the amount of actual improvement realized by their means, and that the consequence of the cessation would merely be that we should remain as we are. A very small diminution of those exertions would not only put a stop to improvement, but would turn the general tendency of things towards deterioration, which once begun, would proceed with increasing rapidity, and become more and more difficult to check, until it reached a state often seen in history, and in which many large portions of mankind even now grovel, when hardly anything short of superhuman power seems sufficient to turn the tide, and give a fresh commencement to the upward movement.'

"Although the Session commenced with a nominal balance in the hands of the Treasurer, the Association was then in debt for expenses previously incurred, to the amount of £15 19s. 6d., while at the present date the whole of the liabilities of the Association are discharged. Your Committee, therefore have the pleasure to present one of the most satisfactory financial statements on record.

At the Annual Meeting held on September 25th, the following Gentlemen were elected to fill the various offices of the Association during the ensuing Session:—President, Mr. T. Griffiths; Vice-President, Mr. M. Maher; Treasurer, Mr. T. Hadley; Auditor, Mr. H. Hallam; Hon. Secretary, Mr. J. E. Hartley; Committee, Mr. C. Lean, Mr. H. S. Pearson,

Mr. F. Schnadhorst, Mr. T. H. Smith, Mr. G. Zair, on application to whom information may be had in regard to membership, &c.

"The first Debate of the Session was held on the Subject—'That any attempt to exclude Religious Instruction from a National System of Education should be met with the most strenuous opposition.' The affirmative was supported by Mr. J. Long, and the Negative was undertaken by Mr. C. Lean."

SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Were the Religious Wars of France productive of good results?

Ought the House of Bourbon or of Austria to have been successful in France (1598—1661)?

Would Morality vanish were Christianity overpowered by its foes?

Are Facts alone divine?

Are the Fine more moral than the useful arts?

Are there historical, moral, and scientific contradictions in the Bible?

Have all the great charters of human freedom been gained by the shedding of blood?

Are charitable institutions really societies for the promotion, diffusion, and organization of pauperism?

Are Realism and Transcendentalism reconcilable?

Is the idea of a superintending Providence rendered probable or improbable by the history of man?

Can high education counteract the eagerness of the senses?

Is Rationalism consistent with Worshipfulness?

Has the character and influence of Theodore Parker been intellectually, morally, and religiously beneficial?

Was Lord Bute a national benefactor?

Literary Notes.

A translation of Renan's "Vie de Jesus" is appearing as a feuilleton in a Spanish newspaper called the *Discussion*.

Philip Harwood, formerly a minister of the Unitarian body, is reported to be the new editor of the *Saturday Review*.

It is reported that a daily newspaper, *The Echo*, advocating positivism, is to be established in London.

An association for the collection and publication of documents illustrative of Scottish history has been established under the name of "The Grampian Club."

The "Select Writings," political, scientific, topographical, and miscellaneous of the late Charles MacLaren, editor of the *Scotsman*, are to be issued in two vols.

Dr. John Brown has in the press "Spare Hours."

The schoolmasters of Scotland are collecting materials for a "History of the Burgh and Parochial Schools" of that country.

W. W. Story, author of "Roba di Roma," &c., has in the press a volume of Poetical Sketches of Italy.

Of one of the rare old Blackwoodists or Ebonyites, Charles K. Sharpe, we are to have specimens under the headings of Etchings, Prose, and Poetry.

A work on Religion, Philosophy, History, Arts, and Sciences, is promised from the pen of M. Thiers.

Edward Edwards, author of "The Life of Raleigh," &c., is engaged on a "Treatise on Free Town Libraries; their formation, working results," &c.

Carlyle's "Frederick" is being added to the uniform series of that author's works.

Lives of "Columbus" and "Pizarro" are promised by Arthur Helpa.

Ralph Thomas is preparing a bibliograph on James Galt, the novelist.

J. G. Nichols is editing, for the Camden Society, the "Life of Lady Anne Halket," from autobiographic sources.

"Chaucer's England," by Matthew Browne, will carry back the history of literary life somewhat farther than we had it before. "Shakspeare's England" has been written on, Masson will shortly, it is to be hoped, give us the completion of what may be called "Milton's England." We want "Dryden's England." Mr. Carruther's biography of the author of the "Dunciad," supplies tolerably well "Pope's England." "Gray's England," "Wordsworth's England," and "Tennyson's England" are yet to be written. "The Scotland of Hume, Burns, and Scott" might find some expositor. What saith John Hill Burton, Robert Carruthers, or Robert Chambers to this field of effort.

J. A. Langford proposes, in a third volume, to bring up to the present time "The Story of Birmingham Life;" to "a Century" of which he has already given two excellent volumes.

J. T. Wooler, author of "Orange Blossoms," and about fifty other dramatic pieces, died 28th September.

Thomas Carlyle is reported to have found a new object for his hero worship and his authorship, in George III., of whom he is said to be writing a memoir.

"Lancashire; its Puritanism and Nonconformity," by the Rev. Dr. Halley, is nearly ready.

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